The Burhān by Mohammed Hijab

A range of arguments for God’s existence that can and have been expressed in the realm of Philosophy of Religion have their roots in some of the medieval renditions covered in the previous chapters. Such arguments have made their way into the domain of popular debates, discussions, and articles. The importance of having the strongest possible theistic argument(s) cannot be overstated, as weak or overcomplicated arguments have less potency in any such conversations. In this chapter, I will present my arguments for God’s existence, which find much of their inspiration from the Burhān argument. The arguments will aim to be both basic and effective in demonstrating the existence of a necessary existence. I will present five overall proofs, and then make two separate cosmological arguments in this context, with one from dependence and the other from causation. As for the ontological argument, I will present three possible formulations of it: the first will exclusively refer to dependence, the second to modal terms of contingency and necessity, while the third will argue from causation. To establish the will of the necessary being, I will use the argument of particularisation mentioned before. Finally, I will present a fine-tuning argument inspired by the Burhān. I will also offer three arguments for the oneness of the necessary existence to establish theistic monotheism. All these arguments should be understood in conjunction with each other to appreciate the veracity of the case being made. I will present the arguments formally. However they will be written in an accessible way intended for use by religious spokespeople to lay audiences. Following Ibn Taymiyyah’s distinction that prevents conflations between ‘parts’ and ‘attributes’, the word ‘piece’ will be used to mean something that ‘can be removed, added, broken off, torn off or cut off from something’.87 Furthermore, I distinguish between the terms ‘causality’ and ‘dependence,’ as an object can be caused by something but not be dependent on it to exist (i.e. a child in relation to his parents). However, the latter term entails that an object relies upon something for its continued existence.

Part I:

Proposition: There cannot be a world with only dependent thing(s) without reference to an independent thing, as dependent thing(s) cannot continue existing on their own. Existence is only explicable with reference to an independent existence, as impossible existences do not exist by logical necessity. Furthermore, dependent existences cannot self-generate or self-maintain.

Part II:

1. Everything made up of pieces is dependent.

2. The universe is made up of pieces.

3. Therefore, the universe is dependent.

Put in another way:

1. Everything made up of pieces is dependent.

2. An infinite multiverse is made up of pieces.

3. Therefore, an infinite multiverse is dependent. Expressed ontologically, the argument runs as follows:

Part I:

1. Any set with more than one member is dependent on its members.

2. An infinite set is a set with more than one member.

3. Therefore, an infinite set is dependent on its members.

The mathematical element of this argument helps safeguard the cosmological argument from the fallacy of composition, which states that what is true for the part must also be true of the whole. This is because it shows that the mereological distinctions of part/whole and dependence can be reasoned on a priori grounds, as well as cosmological ones. Having explained the distinction between a cause and dependency, at this point one may ask what is the distinction between dependence and independence on the one hand, and contingency and necessity on the other? Simply put, necessary things do not have to be independent. This is especially clear in the case of ‘scientific necessities’. For example, consider the statement, ‘Human beings cannot sprint 100 meters in one second.’ This type of necessity does not need to be true in all possible worlds, universes, or conceptions, although it is true in our own. Interestingly, a miracle could be defined as something that breaks scientific necessities, but not logical ones. Notwithstanding, the case for a differentiation in ‘independence’ and ‘necessity’ is made easier with so-called ‘scientific necessities’ – but what of logical ones? The argument being expressed here is that the category of necessary facts (like 2 + 2 = 4) presupposes existence. This is because the most foundational thing conceivable is that ‘there is no doubt that there is existence’. The category of existence is more basic than the category of facts; facts need to exist, but existence does not rely on anything. Thus, this may be said in the following manner:

Proof 2.

Part I:

1. Existence is presupposed in everything that is real.

2. Necessary facts are real.

3. Therefore, necessary facts presuppose existence.

Part II:

1. If necessary facts presuppose existence, they depend on it. 2. Necessary facts presuppose existence.

3. Therefore, necessary facts depend on existence.

When I use the term ‘independent’, I mean self-sufficient. That is to say that which is independent does not need anything outside of it to explain or cause it. Nor does it have to depend on anything for its existence. As we have previously shown, not all necessary things are independent, as they rely on presupposed states of affairs in order to exist. Consequently, independence is more specific than necessity. Something which is independent must be necessary, but not all necessary things are independent. If this is true, then the argument of dependence above should bring about a critical reflection which concludes with an independent entity. This is because all things in the world have pieces, and all ontological composites depend on their members. To explain anything, we therefore need an independent entity upon which all other things depend, while it itself depends on nothing. This independent being will be necessary by definition, as anything ‘independent’ is necessary. If this is true, then it cannot be conceived of in any other way. If something cannot be conceived of in any other way, it must be so in all times and places, or independent of time and place. In both events it will be eternal. Eternality is thus not conceived as a ‘positive quality’ insomuch as it describes a lack of beginning or end. This shifts the burden of proof onto the interlocutor. They must either prove that eternality should be conceived in the ways I have described, or that it is possible for something immaterially necessary to possess the quality of beginning. Making the argument using modal terms, I state:

1. Anything that can be conceivably rearranged abstractly is contingent.

2. The universe can be conceivably rearranged abstractly.

3. Therefore, the universe is contingent.

This can be expressed in another way:

1. Anything that can be conceivably rearranged abstractly is contingent.

2. An infinite multiverse can be conceivably rearranged abstractly.

3. Therefore, an infinite multiverse is contingent. It is important to note here that I am not referencing causal contingency at this point. The argument can be made in the following mathematical or ontological way: 1. Any set that can be conceivably rearranged is contingent. 2. An infinite set can be conceivably rearranged.

3. Therefore, an infinite set is contingent. Put simply, a set may have three members: A, B, and C. Such a set may be expressed as A, B, and C; B, C, and A; C, A, and B, and so on. This is the same set with a different arrangement. There is nothing necessary about this set being expressed as A, B, and C, as there is nothing which prevents one from changing the set by adding D or removing C. Thus, the set A, B, and C can be conceivably rearranged. The reason for mentioning ‘abstractly’ in this context is to circumvent the deterministic objection that all things are necessary because of an uninterrupted line of causal events. Ironically, some atheists may deny or doubt causality when confronted with the cosmological argument, yet they affirm it when making a case for determinism. Indeed, it is important in the field to look out for the interlocutor’s metaphysical inconsistencies. Thus, the determinist may only make a claim for necessity as it relates to a specific object’s connection with a God, an uninterrupted causal chain, or another similar substitute. Connected to this argument is the argument of particularisation, which establishes a will for the necessary existence. It runs as follows:

1. Anything that could be conceived of otherwise in abstraction was arranged by something else.

2. The universe could be conceived of otherwise in abstraction.

3. Therefore, the universe was arranged by something else.

Put in another way:

1. Anything that could be conceived otherwise in abstraction was arranged by something else.

2. An infinite multiverse could be conceived otherwise in abstraction.

3. Therefore, an infinite multiverse was arranged by something else.

Following Proof 1 mentioned above, the ‘something else’ responsible for arranging the contingent thing must ultimately terminate in an independent/necessary ‘something else’. The fact that an independent/necessary existence is capable of doing this would suggest the capacity to make choices. To arrange the universe/multiverse in one way rather than another indicates a choice; it chose that it should be one way rather than another. A question may be asked: is not the choice making capacity or ‘will’ of the independent existence itself something which can be conceived otherwise in abstraction? If so, would not the same problem with a universe or the multiverse be applicable to the independent existence? The fact that the independent existence is necessary means that all ways of describing the independent existence will also be necessary. That is to say that any attribute of the necessary existence, including ‘will’, is necessary. Therefore, if we establish that everything about the necessary existence is necessary, we also establish that nothing about the necessary existence is or can be contingent. To bolster this opinion, one can make use of a variation of the fine-tuning argument, using necessity and contingency as a starting point.

1. The universe is fine-tuned for life by necessity or contingency.

2. If it is fine-tuned by necessity, then a necessary existence must account for the necessary fact of fine tuning.

3. If it is fine-tuned by contingency, then a necessary existence must account for any series of contingencies.

4. The universe is fine-tuned for life.

5. Therefore, the universe is fine-tuned for life by a necessary existence.

Premise 3 mentioned above links to the initial postulation, which states that there cannot exist only dependent existences as ‘dependent thing(s) cannot continue existing on their own. Existence is only explicable with reference to an independent existence, as impossible existences do not exist by logical necessity and dependent existences cannot self-generate and or self-maintain’. Since contingency – like dependence – is something which is susceptible to generation, destruction, and could be arranged otherwise, the same thing can be said about an infinite series of ‘dependent things’ can likewise be said of an infinite series of contingent things. Notice the lack of mention of the terms ‘chance’ or ‘randomness’, which are usually employed in such arguments. These terms are themselves in need of justification by the atheist interlocutor, since they must prove that such a thing as ‘chance’ or ‘randomness’ exists, and that it is not merely an expression of one’s ignorance of the mechanics of the universe or any other aspect of existence. Determinist atheists cannot in fact believe in ‘chance’ or ‘randomness,’ as concepts like these imply volatility and unpredictability – both of which are impossible in the deterministic worldview. Likewise, many compatibilist atheists would also agree with determinists on the predictable nature of the world.

The biggest weakness of fine-tuning arguments is the proponents use of scientific data (e.g. of the constants) to make their case. To circumvent this objection, one may reference regularity, stability, and uniformity of nature (which are presuppositions of scientific work) as better starting points than the fine-tuning of constants. On this point, John Haldane states: Stability, regularity, and intelligibility in world and mind are underlying assumptions of even the most limited claims of scientific realism. But suppose we ask what reason we have for making these assumptions. The general answer cannot be that they are conclusions of scientific enquiry, since they are part of what makes it possible.88.

That water would boil at 100 degrees today, yesterday, and tomorrow is an assumption of scientists when measuring the temperature of water. It is not due to repeated investigation of water temperature for every day and in every environment. If it were even possible that water could boil 100 degrees today, -100 tomorrow, and 1,000 the next day, scientific research would be fruitless. This, of course, also applies to quantum mechanics, which additionally requires axioms and assumptions to work. That the universe is complicated (consisting of many pieces), stable, and mechanistic is evidence that the necessary existence (which preponderated it) has knowledge. Having said this, an argument for uniformity could be stated in the following way:

Part I.

1. The fact of the universe being uniform, regular, and stable must be either contingent or necessary.

2. If it is necessary, then a necessary existence must account for it.

3. If it is contingent, a necessary existence must also account for it.

4. The universe is uniform, regular, and stable.

5. Therefore, a necessary existence accounts for it.

Part II.

Assuming that uniformity, stability, and regularity are necessary facts of the universe, one may argue reductio by stating:

1. A contingent existence cannot sufficiently account for the necessary fact of the regularity, stability, and uniformity of the universe.

2. The universe is a contingent existence.

3. Therefore, the universe cannot sufficiently account for the necessary fact of the regularity, stability, and uniformity of the universe.

The arguments one may employ do not need to have the inception of the world (or universe) as one of their premises. This is not because an eternal universe cannot be successfully refuted, but only to undermine the argument of the interlocutor. The argument may run as follows:

1. Anything made up of pieces is caused.

2. The universe is made up of pieces.

3. Therefore, the universe is caused.

Or, put in another way:

1. Anything made up of pieces is caused.

2. An infinite multiverse is made up of pieces.

3. Therefore, an infinite multiverse is caused.

With these five proofs, one should be able to competently make a case against atheism. In addition, it should be outlined on the field that atheism has no explanatory scope to answer the most fundamental questions, let alone explain ‘all that exists’. Atheism itself lacks any explanatory or refutational scope. After proving that a necessary existence exists, it is befitting for those intending to establish the validity of monotheistic theism to offer three additional arguments for the oneness of such a necessary existence. These arguments take their inspiration from the Burhān and Dalīl al Tamanuʿ, including viewpoints presented by Muslim thinkers like al-Ghazālī in his book Al-Iqtiṣād fi al ʿItiqād.

1. If a necessary existence is an existence that cannot be any other way, there cannot be more than one.

2. A necessary existence cannot be any other way.

3. Therefore, there cannot be more than one necessary existence.

If there was anything to demarcate ‘necessary existence 1’ from ‘necessary existence 2,’ that property of demarcation would disqualify ‘necessary existence 2’ from being necessary, by definition. This is because it would be conceived that ‘necessary existence 2’ could be ‘another way’ and therefore ‘necessary existence 2’ would not be necessary at all in this case. Instead, it would be considered contingent. For instance, if one supposes God 1 is necessary in all aspects and God 2 is different from God 1, that which differentiates God 2 from God 1 will indicate contingency in at least one of the ‘Gods’, or even both. If power is a necessary attribute of God 1 – and God 1 is necessarily powerful – but ‘God 2’ does not exhibit power by necessity, then this means that God 2 does not meet the criterion of necessity required to be the ‘necessary existence’.

Part I.

1. If the necessary existence is responsible for all other things in existence, then the necessary existence has capacity over all things in existence.

2. The necessary existence is responsible for all other things in existence.

3. Therefore, the necessary existence has capacity over all things in existence.

Part II.

1. If the necessary existence has ultimate capacity over all things in existence, nothing other than the necessary existence is over all things capable.

2. The necessary existence has capacity over all things in existence.

3. Therefore, the necessary existence is over all things capable.

1. For nature to be stable, uniform, and regular, there must only be one external agent arranging the world.

2. Nature is stable, uniform, and regular.

3. Therefore, there must be only one external agent arranging the world It could be argued that a collection of ‘minds’ cooperated together to allow nature to be stable, uniform and regular. However, if the one who is all capable is responsible for the existence of such minds, then they will also be responsible for whatever such minds produce.

The collection of proofs and arguments I have provided above establishes the necessity, choice making capability, ultimate capacity, independence, and oneness of the necessary existence. As initially stated, a necessary existence must exist to account for the continued existence of the world. Furthermore, a necessary existence must exist to account for any existence whatsoever, as ‘dependent existences’ could neither generate nor maintain themselves. To make these arguments effective in pastoral and apologetic settings, one should start by asking fundamental thought-provoking questions, such as, ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ This question – despite its simplicity – is profound enough to engender deep thoughts and strike existential chords within the recipient, drawing the interlocutor towards theism in a manner more valuable than argumentation. In terms of analogies and metaphors, Joshua Rasmussen (who authored a book specifically for lay audiences) gives the example of a stack of bricks on the ground, in which the stack of bricks represents dependent things, and the floor represents the independent entity.89 One may also use the example of the sea floor and the sea, and how one assumes the dependence of the water’s settlement without visualising the sea floor. This brings to mind just how clear the case for independence is. To young people (who may be familiar with their smartphones), one may give the example of the mobile phone depending on charge, with the charge depending on some sort of power plant. Without any exception, this process terminates with a self-sufficient independent entity. Likewise, when referencing causation, one can argue that anything which is composed of pieces is causally contingent. I am made up of my body parts, a fact which indicates that I was pieced together by something external to me. The universe is made up of many pieces, which denotes that something external to it pieced it together as well. Imagery is important in these arguments if they are to be effective before laypeople, as is questioning and placing the burden of proof on the atheist interlocutor. Worthwhile questions in this regard include: Can existence be explained by non-existence? What is nonexistence, and is it even conceivable without reference to existence? Is zero ever intelligible without reference to natural and negative numbers? Can there be a state of affairs where only dependent things depend upon dependent things ad infinitum? How do you justify such a state of affairs cosmologically or on a priori grounds? Questions like these are important to show power of the theistic position, as well as the utterly impotent nature of the opposing view.

Much of the New Atheist polemic against religion depends on notions which imply that religion is ‘outdated’. Both Richard and Betty seem affected by this kind of discourse. The simple fact that educated scientists and other kinds of intellectuals choose to be atheists can be influential in keeping someone from positively engaging with theism. Richard and Betty are both fascinated with Bertrand Russell for example. They may even quote him directly when making a case against theism. On strictly logical terms, this is obviously inconsequential and an ‘appeal to authority’. Both Richard and Betty are clever enough to know that. Psychologically, as shown in multiple studies (most notably Milgram’s Shock Experiment), one cannot be sure that Richard and Betty are not immune influenced by the intellectual status of some atheists like Russell. It may be a simple, yet powerful, point of reminder therefore to simply outline the sheer number of intellectual contributors who not only were theists, but argued for theism throughout the years.