The Distinguished Jurists Primer by Ibn Rushd

This category comprises two things: the identification of the obligations and the conditions, and the person for whom it is obligatory and when.

There is no dispute about its obligation, because of the words of the Exalted, “And pilgrimage to the House is a duty unto Allah for mankind, for him who can find a way thither”.236 The conditions of the obligation are of two kinds: conditions of validity and the conditions of obligation. There is no dispute among the jurists that the conditions of validity include (professing the faith of) Islam, as pilgrimage by a person who is not a Muslim is not valid. They disagreed about its validity when performed by a minor (sabt). Malik and al-ShafiT maintained that it is permissible (and valid), while Abu HanTfa prohibited it.

The reason for the disagreement stems from the conflict of a tradition with the principles. Those who permitted it acted on the basis of the well known tradition of Ibn <Abbas, which is recorded by al-Bukhan and Muslim, and it contains the words, “A woman raised a young boy toward the Prophet (God’s peace and blessings be upon him) and said, ‘Is there hajj for him, O Messenger of Allah?’ He said, ‘Yes, and there is reward for you’”. Those who disallowed this relied on the principle that worship is not valid if performed by one lacking discretion.

Malik’s disciples also differed about the validity of its performance on behalf of an infant. There is no dispute about the validity of its performance by one whose performance of prayer is valid, which corresponds to what the Prophet (God’s peace and blessings be upon him) said, “From seven to ten”.

The conditions of obligation include being a Muslim, in accordance with the opinion that the disbelievers are addressed by the laws of Islam.237 There is no dispute about the stipulation of ability (both physical and financial) for this, because of the words of the Exalted, “For him who can find a way thither”.238 Though there is a disagreement over the details of this (ability) it is generally considered to be of two kinds: direct and by delegation. In direct ability there is no disagreement among the jurists that its conditions are bodily ability, financial ability, and security. They disagreed about the details of bodily and financial ability. Al-Shafi T, Abu Hamfa, and Ahmad, and this was c the view of Ibn Abbas c and ^mar ibn al-Khattab, held that the conditions for these are food provisions and the availability of transportation. Malik said that for the person who is able to walk the availability of a riding animal (a means of transportation) is not a condition of obligation and pilgrimage is obligatory for him. Likewise, surplus is not a condition for ability, in his view, if the person is able to earn a living on the way even if he has to beg.

The reason for this disagreement arises from the conflict between the tradition (which is) laid down for the elaboration of ability and the general implication of its words. This is so as a tradition from the Prophet (God’s peace and blessings be upon him) is laid down that “he was asked, ‘What is the ability (to perform the pilgrimage)?’ He said, ‘Food provisions and a riding animal’”. Abu HanTfa and al-ShaficT interpreted this to apply to everybody, while Malik interpreted it to apply to a person who was not able to walk and also did not have the strength to eke out a living on the way. Al-Shafi<T formed this opinion as it is his method that if an unelaborated text occurs in the Qurian and then a sunna is laid as an elaboration of this unelaborated word it is not possible to avert the elaboration.

With respect to its obligation through ability by delegation, Malik and Abu Hanifa maintain that delegation is not binding, even when that ability is there, if the inability for direct performance exists. Al-ShafiT maintains that it is binding, thus, for a person who possesses sufficient wealth with which someone other than he can perform the pilgrimage, if he himself cannot perform it physically, then that person must perform it on his behalf. But if someone is found who can perform it on his behalf with his own wealth and physical ability, like a brother or next of kin, his liability is dropped. This is an issue that they termed ma^dub (incapacitated person), who is a person who cannot be seated on the riding animal. In his view, if a person dies without performing the pilgrimage, it is binding upon his heirs to set something from his estate with which some person can perform the pilgrimage on his behalf.

The reason for disagreement over this arises from the conflict of analogy with a tradition. Analogy dictates that acts of worship cannot be performed by one person on behalf of another by delegation, thus, no one prays on behalf of another nor does one pay zakat in another’s place. The tradition opposing this is the well-known tradition of Ibn ‘Abbas recorded by the two shaykhs (al- BukharT and Muslim), and it reads “that a woman from Khath^m said to the Messenger of Allah (God’s peace and blessings be upon him), CO Messenger of Allah, hajj is an obligation prescribed for His servants, but I find my father an old man who cannot sit firmly on a riding animal. Should I then perform the hajj for him?’ He said, ‘Yes’”. This was the case of a living person. In the case of a dead person there is a tradition that was recorded by al-BukharT, which is also from Ibn ‘Abbas, who said, “A woman from Juhayna came up to the Prophet (God’s peace and blessings be upon him) and said, ‘O Messenger of Allah, my mother made a vow to perform hajj. but she died, so should I perform it on her behalf?’ He said, ‘Perform the pilgrimage for her. Do you think that if she had a debt would you not pay it off? The debt of Allah has a prior claim for satisfaction’”. There is no dispute among the Muslim jurists that it is voluntary when performed for another, the disagreement is about its performance as an obligation.

In this topic, they disagreed about the person who performs hajj for someone else, who may be living or dead, as to whether it is a condition for him that he should have performed hajj himself. Some of the jurists held that this is not a condition, but if he has performed the obligation for himself that would be better. This was Malik’s opinion for the person who performed hajj on behalf of a dead person, for in his view hajj for a person who is living is not valid. The other jurists held that it is a condition that he should have performed the obligation for himself. This was the opinion of al-Shafi‘T and others besides him, and if a person, who had not performed hajj for himself, did perform hajj for another it would be converted to a personal performance. The reliance of these jurists is upon the tradition of Ibn ‘Abbas “that the Prophet (God’s peace and blessings be upon him) heard a manJ pronouncing the talbiya on behalf of someone called Shubrama. He said, ‘And who is this Shubrama?’ The man replied that he was his brother or (he said) his close relative. He said, ‘Have you performed hajj for yourself?’ The man said, ‘No’. He said, ‘Perform hajj for yourself first and then for Shubrama’”. The first group of jurists objected to this tradition as it was narrated as mawquf up to Ibn cAbbas (i.e. the isnad (chain) did not contain1 the name of the Companion’s disciple).

They also differed, in this topic, about a person who offers himself for a wage to perform hajj on behalf of someone else. Malik and <al-Shafic7 disapproved of this, but said that if it happens it is permissible. Abu HanTfa did not permit it. He relied on the argument that the purpose was to seek nearness to Allah and wages are not allowed for that. The argument of the first group was the consensus about the permissibility of earning wages for writing the mushaf and for the construction of mosques, which are also one way of seeking nearness to Allah. Hiring during hajj, in Malik’s view, is of two kinds. The first is what his disciples called the balagh, whereby a person offers his services for a wage that would be enough to provide the (required) provision and a riding animal. If that wage falls short of the balagh he is to be paid what would be enough, and if an excess is left over he is to return it. The second is the customary hiring whereby something falling short is to be made up by him and if there is an excess it belongs to him. The majority maintain that hajj is not binding upon a slave until he is manumitted, but some of the Zahirites make it obligatory for him.

This is all about the person on whom this worship is obligatory and about the person whose performance is valid.

With respect to the time when it becomes obligatory, they disagreed whether the,command necessitates immediate or delayed compliance?239 Both opinions are attributed to Malik and his disciples. The apparent opinion of the later jurists of his school is that it is delayed, butrhis disciples from Baghdad said that it is immediate. Reports from Abu HanTfa and his disciples differ, but their preferred opinion is that it is immediate. Al-ShaficT said that it is spread out over a period of time. The reliance of those who say that it spreads over a span of time (is not immediate) is that hajj became obligatory years before the Prophet (God’s peace and blessings be upon him) performed the hajj. If it required immediate compliance the Prophet (God’s peace and blessings be upon him) would not have delayed the performance of his hajj. If he had done so because of an excuse he would have explained it. The argument of the other group is that if it is specific to a particular time, the principle would be to attribute sin to the person who relinquishes it till the time passes, the basis (for the analogy) being the time of prayer. The distinction between this and the command for prayer, in the view of the second group, is that its obligation is not renewed from moment to moment and in prayer it is renewed every moment. On the whole, those who held the initial time of obligation in hajj, as applicable to an individual who has the ability (for performance), to be similar to the initial time of prayer said that compliance is delayed, while those who held it to be similar to the last time of prayer said that compliance is immediate. The reason for holding it to be similar to the last portion of the time of prayer is that it is terminated with the advent of the time in which his act is not valid, just as the time of prayer is terminated with the advent of time in which the worshipper is not considered to be offering his prayer as W#. These jurists also argue on the basis of the risk that becomes associated with the postponement to another year because of the greater possibility of death occuring during a longer period. They maintain that this is different from the case of delay in prayer from its first time to its last, as the likelihood of the person’s death within that short time is far less than it is within a year. Perhaps they may add that delaying prayer within its fixed period does not separate the worshipper from the chance to perform the prayer as 'add*, but delay in this case of hajj leads to the expiry of its period and the start of a much longer period in which the performance of this worship is not valid. This is not similar to the case of the unqualified command, because in the unqualified command, in the view of those who maintain that it implies liberty of delayed compliance, a delay in performance does not lead to the advent of a time in which the required worship is not valid, as it does in the case of hajj when it is time for it and the subject postpones it to the future. The disagreement, then, on this issue does not belong, as has been assumed, to the category of their dispute whether an unqualified command necessitates immediate or delayed compliance.

They disagreed, within the topic, whether it is a condition for the obligation of hajj on a woman that she must have a husband or a dhu mahram (a relative of the prohibited degree for marriage) who is willing to accompany her on the journey for hajj. Malik and al-Shaf?T said that this is one alternative condition for the obligation. The other alternative is for a woman to go for hajj with a trustworthy female companion. Abu HanTfa, Ahmad, and a group of jurists said that the availability of a willing husband or a mahram is a condition for the obligation.

The reason for the disagreement arises from the conflict of the command for hajj and of taking up travel for it with the proscription about a woman’s travelling alone without her husband or a mahram. This is so as it is established from the Prophet (God’s peace and blessings be upon him) through Abu Sa Td al-Khudri, Abu Hurayra, Ibn <Abbas, and TJmar, that he said € “It is not permitted for a woman, who believes in Allah and the Last Day to travel without a dhu mahram”. Those who gave predominance to the generality of the command of hajj said that she may travel for hajj even when she is not accompanied by a dhu mahram (but with a trustworthy group of women). Those who restricted the general implication with this tradition, or held that it is an elaboration of “ability”, said that she is not to travel for hajjy unless she is accompanied by a dhu mahram.

We have now spoken about this rite, which is called hajj,, regarding the basis due to which it becomes obligatory, and for who and when. In this section there remains the discussion of the rite known as 'umra. A group of jurists said that it is obligatory. This was the opinion of al-ShaficT, Ahmad, Abu Thawr, Abu °Ubayd, al-Thawri, al-Awza T, and c it was the opinion of Ibn c Abbas and Ibn TJmar from among the Companions, and also of a group of the Tabi un. Malik and a group of jurists c said that it is a sunna. Abu HanTfa said that it is voluntary, which was also the opinion of Abu Thawr240 and Dawud. Those who maintained that it is obligatory argued on the basis of the words of the Exalted, “Perform the pilgrimage and the himra for Allah,”241

and also on the basis of the reported traditions. One of these is the report from Ibn TJmar from his father, who said, “A Bedouin, who had a fair countenance and was wearing white clothes came up to the Messenger of Allah (God’s peace and blessings be upon him) and said, ‘What is Islam, O Messenger of Allah?’ He replied, ‘That you testify that there is no god but Allah, that Muhammad is His messenger, and you establish prayer, pay the zakat, fast the month of Ramadan, perform the pilgrimage and the ^umra, and wash yourself free of impurities’”. cAbd al-Razzaq has mentioned that “Ma'mar informed us on the authority of Qatada, who used to relate that when the verse ‘And pilgrimage to the House is a duty unto Allah for mankind, for him who can find a way thither’,242 was revealed the Messenger of Allah (God’s peace and blessings be upon him) said, ‘The two, the hajj and the htmra, anyone who performs them has fulfilled the obligation’”. It is related from Zayd ibn Thabit from the Prophet (God’s peace and blessings be upon him) that he said, “The hajj and the ^umra are two obligations, and there is no harm for you with whichever you commence”. It is related from Ibn cAbbas that himra is obligatory, and some have attribute this statement through an isnad to the Prophet (God’s peace and blessings be upon him).

The argument of the other group of jurists, who hold that it is not obligatory, is based on authentic and well-known traditions that have been laid down about the number of the obligations in Islam and that do not mention the <-umra, An example is the tradition of Ibn TJmar, “Islam is structured upon five things”, in which he mentioned the pilgrimage alone. There is also the tradition of the one asking what Islam is, and in some of its versions are the words, “that you perform the pilgrimage to the House”. Perhaps, these jurists also said that a command implying completion (as it appeared in the Quranic verse 2 : 196 quoted above) does not give rise to an obligation, as it means that once an obligation or a sunna act is started, it should be completed and not cut off. The jurists who maintained that it is a sunna, also argued on the basis of traditions. These include the tradition of al-Hajjaj ibn cArta from Muhammad ibn al-Munkadir from Jabir ibn <Abd Allah, who said, “A man asked the Prophet (God’s peace and blessings be upon him) about the <umra, whether it was obligatory? He replied, ‘No, but if you perform the <umra it is better for you’ ”. Abu TJmar ibn Abd al-Barr c said that this is not persuasive insofar as he was the sole narrator.

Perhaps, those who maintained that it was voluntary argued on the basis of what is related from Abu Salih al-HanafT, who said, “The Messenger of Allah (God’s peace and blessings be upon him) said, '‘Hajj is obligatory and <umra is voluntary’”. This, however, is a munqatf tradition.

The reason for the disagreement stems thus from the conflict of traditions on the subject, and the vacillation of the command requiring completion between whether or not if gives rise to an obligation.