The Divine Reality by By Hamza Andreas Tzortzis

Imagine you are a taxi-driver and one day you receive a call to pick up two passengers from the train-station. You are quite close so you arrive before the scheduled time. The passengers’ train arrives and after a few moments they get into your car. You exchange greetings and then you ask them where they want to go. They request that you take them to their office, which is about 9 miles away. You start the car and begin to drive. After some time, you drop them off at their office. Now rewind the story. Imagine that just after the passengers get into your car, you put on a blindfold. In this scenario, would you be able to drive your passengers to their destination? The answer is obvious. You could never drive them to their destination because you are blind; you cannot see because of the blindfold. However, what if you insisted that you could drive your vehicle with your blindfold on? Wouldn’t your passengers describe you as irrational, if not insane? The taxi-driver who can see represents Islamic theism, and the taxi-driver who has a blindfold on represents atheism.

Introducing the argument.

Before I explain why the taxi-drivers in this story are analogies of atheism and Islamic theism, let me provide you with some essential background information. Both Muslims and atheists assume that they have the ability to reason. This means that we are able to form mental or rational insights. We “see” our way to a conclusion in our minds. Our minds take premises or statements and “drive” them to a mental destination; in other words, a logical conclusion. This is a key feature of a rational mind. So why is atheism like a taxi-driver with a blindfold on? Most forms of atheism imply philosophical naturalism, which demands that reason (and everything else) must only be explained via blind, non-rational physical processes. However, just as you cannot drive passengers to their office with a blindfold on, physical processes that are blind can never “drive” any premises in our minds to a mental destination. In other words, they cannot create and recognise the logical relations between the premises of an argument. Therefore, atheism is in effect equivalent to rejecting reason itself, because it invalidates its own assumption. Our ability to reason simply does not fit within the naturalistic worldview, because rationality cannot come from blind, non-rational physical processes. To maintain that it can is the same as believing that something can come from nothing. From this perspective, atheism is irrational. Atheism invalidates the thing that it claims to use to deny God: reason. So why is Islamic theism like a taxi-driver who can see? Our ability to form mental insights fits within Islamic theism because this ability makes sense (i.e. is explained adequately), as it was given to us by the Creator Who is All-Seeing, The-Knowing and The-Wise. A thing cannot give rise to something if it does not contain it, or if it does not have the ability (or the potential) to give rise to it. In other words, rationality can only come from rationality. This is why our ability to form mental insights can come from the Creator. The argument in this chapter asserts that our ability to reason is assumed by both atheists and theists. This assumption, however, fits nicely within Islamic theism and does not fit or make sense under atheism. Therefore, it would only be rational to accept Islamic theism over atheism. This chapter will examine these assertions in detail. However, before I elaborate, the dialogue below is a summary of what will be discussed in this chapter:

Atheist: “There is no evidence for the existence of God. Belief in God is irrational.”.

Muslim: “That’s an interesting assertion. Before we continue, can I ask you, do you believe that you have rational faculties? In other words, do you believe you can reason?”.

Atheist: “Obviously. Any rational person would deny God. There’s simply no evidence.”.

Muslim: “Okay, great. So can I ask, how do you explain your rational faculties under atheism?”.

Atheist: “What do you mean?”. Muslim: “Well, do you believe all phenomena can be explained via physical stuff? And do you believe that there is no supernatural?” Atheist: “Sure.”.

Muslim: “Physical stuff is just blind and non-rational. So how can rationality come from non-rationality? How can anything arise from something that does not contain it or have the potential to give rise to it? How can we form rational insights based on blind physical processes? In this light, how can you explain your ability to reason?”. Atheist: “Well, we have a brain that has evolved.”. Muslim: “Okay, and according to atheism an evolved brain is based on physical stuff too, no?”.

Atheist: “Yes, but our brains have evolved to be rational, because the more you know about the world the more likely you are to survive.”.

Muslim: “That’s not true; holding non-rational beliefs about the world can lead to survival too.”.

Atheist: “So what? We both assume reason to be true, so it’s not an issue.”.

Muslim: “Well, for me it isn’t. But under atheism your ability to reason does not make sense. Atheism has invalidated the very assumption that it claims to use to deny God. So it is absurd to be an atheist since atheism nullifies reason itself.”. Atheist: “No, you have to prove God to me first.”.

Muslim: “That’s a cop-out, because your use of the word ‘proof’.

assumes your ability to reason. However, you are not justified in making such an assumption because rationality is nullified under atheism. Rationality cannot come from non-rationality. From this perspective, atheism is irrational. However, rationality can come from rationality. This is why Islamic theism explains best why we can use our reason, as it came from the Creator Who is All-Seeing, The-Knowing and The-Wise.”.

What is reason?.

In the context of this argument, reason refers to the fact that we have rational faculties. We can acquire truth, we desire to discover, and we can infer, induce and deduce. A significant aspect of our rational faculties is the ability to come to a logically valid conclusion. When we reason logically, our conclusions will be based on our rational insight that is occurring in our minds; we see that the conclusion follows. Technically speaking, the conclusions we make are based on the logical relations between the premises of a logical argument. We see that the conclusion follows based on these relations. This “seeing” cannot be explained physically. Nothing in physical world can explain why and how these premises are connected to the conclusion. In summary, when we reason logically we have a mental insight that the conclusion follows logically; it is logically connected to its previous premises. Deductive arguments are a good example to explain our rational insights. Deductive arguments are where the premises guarantee the truth of the conclusion. A deductive argument is valid if its conclusion follows necessarily from its premises. It is sound if it is valid and its premises are true or rationally acceptable. Consider the following deductive argument: 1. All bachelors are unmarried men. 2. John is a bachelor.

3. Therefore, John is an unmarried man.

We know that (3) necessarily follows from (1) and (2) based on our insight. Nothing in the physical world can prove why (3) is connected to the previous premises; in other words, why it logically follows. The conclusion doesn’t only necessarily follow by virtue of the meaning of the words in the premises65; it does so due to the relations occurring between them.

66 The connection between the conclusion and the logical relations between the premises cannot be observed and explained physically. From this perspective, reason clearly has a transcendent dimension. To drive this point home, consider the following deductive argument:

1. John has observed 5 modifus.

2. The 5 modifus John has observed are yellow.

3. Therefore, some modifus at least must be yellow.

This is a valid argument; the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. John has observed 5 yellow modifus, so it necessarily follows that at least some modifus must be yellow. Given premises (1) and (2), (3) must follow. However, why do we agree that the conclusion (3) necessarily follows from these premises? Why do we believe in the logical validity of the conclusion, although we have no idea what a modifu is? (By the way, I have made the word up). It is because the logical flow of the argument occurs in our minds regardless of the meaning of the premises and any personal inferences we might ever have formed from our own experiences. There is a connection between the relations of the premises and the conclusion. We have achieved an insight into conclusion (3) without any external, material and semantic data. We have achieved an insight into something that is not based on our experience (we do not know what a modifu is). In actual fact, if the word “yellow” was replaced with “zellow” (another made-up word), the conclusion would still necessarily follow; some modifus (at least 5) must be zellow. Not only have our minds come to a conclusion that is not based on any external evidence; our minds have also established relations between the premises. These relations cannot be explained using physical or empirical evidence. Our minds have directed and driven our insight (in other words, established these logical relations) to conclude that (3) must follow from (1) and (2). Our minds have taken premises (1) and (2) and driven or directed our insight to conclude (3).

However, being driven or directed to a mental destination or endpoint is not a characteristic of a physical process. Physical processes are blind, random and have no intentional force directing them anywhere.

This means that we cannot use physical processes to account for our ability to achieve an insight into a conclusion. Reason: an assumption of science The human mind has a distinctive quality; we can distinguish between right and wrong, truth and falsehood, beauty and vileness. This clearly separates us from animals. Our mental abilities have enabled us to progress and advance. In fact, we must trust our rational faculties before we can even begin to conduct science. One of science’s key assumptions is that our minds have the ability to reason. Without such an assumption, we could never use words such as evidence, fact, truth and proof. The human practice of science rests on the assumption that we can reason. This means that the existence of reason cannot be fully accounted for by any type of scientific explanation. For example, when a scientist attempts to address a testable hypothesis or an answerable question, there is an assumption that the results can be rationalised. Scientists also accept that they have the ability to assess the logical validity of a scientific explanation. This obviously assumes that the scientist can use her reason before she performs any science. This does not mean that science cannot provide any partial explanation at all for our ability to reason. However, it is unable to justify reason from a foundational point of view. Attempting to demonstrate how reason emerged via some physical process does nothing to explain its transcendent dimension. This includes the ability to come to a logically valid conclusion that is determined by an insight in one’s mind. This is why relying solely on a scientific explanation is inadequate: it fails to account for the fact that we see the conclusion in our minds. We have the ability to make a logical conclusion based on the relations between premises. We can also do this without the key words in the premises being based on anything we can understand or verify empirically. Science can only deal with what can be observed in some way; logical relations between premises cannot be observed. Since science requires reason in order to begin to explain reason, to argue that it can somehow justify our ability to reason would be tantamount to arguing in a circle. Science is a useful tool to help us understand the world, but it has many limitations (see Chapter 12). At this point one might argue that assumptions do not need to be explained or accounted for, because some assumptions (or first principles) are taken to be true without evidence. This is a valid point.

However, there is a difference between valid and invalid assumptions. For an assumption to be valid it must make sense to the sphere of knowledge, concept or theory that it supports. However, if an assumption that aims to support a worldview cannot fit within that worldview, then the assumption cannot be presumed. For example, science rests on the notion that there is “consistency in the causes that operate the natural world”67

. If scientists were to always conclude that physical causes are inconsistent, then that assumption would need to be dismissed or changed. If philosophical naturalism (and even science) maintains that reason can be explained via random, non-rational physical processes, then how can an atheist—who adopts naturalism—account for such an assumption when it clearly cannot fit within the perspective of naturalism? Naturalism actually denies reason, because rationality cannot come from non-rational physical processes. Mental insights cannot come from blind physical processes. Therefore, atheists must change their worldview or dismiss the idea that we are rational.

Under atheism we cannot justify our rational faculties.

Most atheists are philosophical naturalists; naturalism asserts that there is no supernatural, and that physical processes can explain all phenomena. According to naturalism, if we probe the most basic levels of reality, we see that everything is the result of blind, random, non-rational physical processes; subatomic particles, atoms and molecules are whizzing around without any direction, guidance or intended outcome. Physical stuff has no purpose; nothing is intentionally driving these physical processes. If this is the case, though, how can we claim our minds have the ability to achieve mental insights? How can we claim the ability to reach a conclusion? A key part of being able to reason is to have rational insights, to see in one’s mind that something logically follows from something else based on the logical relations between premises. This is where naturalism fails, as it asserts that all phenomena are based on random, non-rational physical processes.

The ability to take premises and “drive” them towards a mental destination is invalidated if one postulates that the ability comes from blind, non-rational physical processes. A thing cannot give rise to something if it does not contain it, or if it does not have the ability (or the potential) to give rise to it. For example, I cannot give you $500 if I do not have the money, and I cannot raise the amount if I am jobless with bad credit (this principle will be used throughout this book).

Likewise, if physical processes do not contain rationality, then how do they give rise to it? Physical processes by definition do not contain rationality, and they do not have “insight”. They cannot see the conclusion that follows from an argument. Physical processes are not purposefully or intentionally driven or directed. Therefore, to even suggest that rationality can come from non-rational physical processes, is exactly the same as believing that something can come from nothing. Consider the following example. Similar to the story at the beginning of this chapter, imagine there are two bus-drivers. The first has good eyesight and is an experienced driver. The second bus-driver is blind and inexperienced. The first driver starts his journey and picks up two people called “Premise 1” and “Premise 2”. Their final destination is “Conclusion”. He sees the destination on his map and as the journey is coming to an end he clearly observes the final stop. The second driver is escorted to his bus at the bus station. Waiting on the bus are “Premise 1” and “Premise 2”. Their destination is the same as in the first scenario. The driver manages to start the bus. However, do you think he will reach the destination? Just like the taxi-driver with the blindfold, he will never reach the final destination. Physical processes suffer the same problem. They are blind. They cannot explain reason because a feature of rationality is the ability to derive insight or reach a conclusion, and one cannot obtain insight from something that is blind. To assert such a thing is the equivalent of saying something can arise from nothing. From this perspective, atheism—because of its naturalistic perspective—is not only irrational, but an adversary of reason. It invalidates the thing that is required to make any claim about God:

reason itself. Since rationality cannot come from non-rationality, it follows that naturalism cannot explain our ability to reason. Despite this argument, there are a few possible objections. These will be discussed at the end of this chapter. However, one key objection argues that computer programmes have the ability to reason deductively: computer programmes are made up of physical stuff; therefore, physical processes can explain rationality. This contention will be addressed in detail at the end of this chapter. However, the main point is that computer programmes do not have “insights”; in particular, they do not have meaningful insights. Human rationality involves the ability to establish meaningful conclusions. The very fact that we can question the implications or the meaning of a conclusion (even if we do not know its meaning, as in the case of the modifus above) indicates that human rationality involves meaningful insights. Computer programmes do not have these meaningful insights. In actual fact, a computer system is based on syntactical rules (the manipulation of symbols), not on semantics (meaning). This will be explained further later.

Can Darwinian evolution justify our rational faculties?.

According to naturalists our minds have evolved to be rational. Naturalists argue that it was advantageous for our ancestors to have known the truth about their environments. Having an ability to distinguish between truth and falsehood was necessary for their survival. Despite the fact that naturalism invalidates the assumption that we have the ability to reason, Darwinian evolution seems a plausible explanation on the surface. However, when we scratch a little deeper we run into a myriad of problems. Even Charles Darwin himself had his doubts about this matter. He understood that our ability to acquire truth could not be accounted for if it had only evolved from lower life-forms. He wrote in a letter in 1881: “But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would anyone trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?”68 Now let’s see whether naturalistic evolution can provide a lifejacket with which to rescue human rationality. When we use the term naturalistic evolution, we are referring to the idea that the evolutionary process is free from Divine intervention; according to this idea, our minds evolved to be rational because our ability to reason and attain true beliefs is necessary for survival. There are several problems with this claim. Firstly, our ability to distinguish between truth and falsehood is not a requirement for survival. Secondly, achieving mental insights is also not a requirement for our continual existence. Evolution is about the ability to survive, not about the ability to make logically valid conclusions. Finally, our ability and desire to discover—a necessary feature of a rational mind—is often detrimental to our survival. One of the key features of our rational minds is their ability to attain truth and discard what is false. We also have mental insights, and the ability to see a conclusion based on previous premises. These are the very processes we use when we engage in science. Now the question to ask is: Can naturalistic evolution account for these abilities? The answer is no. All we need to do in order to disprove this idea is show that false beliefs can lead to survival. In that case, there is no need for the evolutionary process to result in rational faculties. So can false beliefs result in survival? It does not take long to work out that countless false beliefs do. An individual who believes that all insects with red markings on their bodies are poisonous will avoid all insects with red markings and survive. However, this belief is false, as many insects with red on their bodies are harmless, the common ladybird being the most obvious example. Someone else might avoid all fungi because he or she believes they are poisonous, and by doing so survive. However, we know that some fungi, like button mushrooms, are completely healthy and nutritious to eat. Professor of Philosophy Anthony O’Hear provides a similar example to show that evolution can produce false, rather than true beliefs, thereby showing that non-rational beliefs can lead to survival: “A bird may avoid caterpillars with certain types of colouring because they are poisonous; but it will also avoid non-poisonous caterpillars with similar colours, and may be credited with a false belief about the poisonousness of the harmless caterpillar. Of course, the survival chances of the bird are increased by its avoidance of the caterpillar type which includes both noxious and harmless caterpillars. Having a false belief, then, about a particular caterpillar will be a by-product of a survival-producing disposition. Given that the harmless caterpillars have evolved through mimicry of the poisonous ones, we have here an evolutionary explanation of falsehood, reinforcing the general point that there is no direct way of moving from evolutionary workings to truth.”69

The fact that false beliefs can lead to survival raises another difficult question for naturalism: Why should we trust our minds? Since there is no necessary link between truth and survival—and that false beliefs can also lead to survival—then how can we trust our rational faculties if they could have been based on an evolutionary process driven by false beliefs? Our desire to discover also poses a problem for evolution. There is no need for evolution to result in abilities that allow us to understand the laws of physics or engage in mathematics. It just does not make sense that we should end up with minds that have the ability to understand the universe. Cockroaches and beetles survive extremely well, and have done so for millions of years, yet we do not see them sitting over coffee discussing the existential and logical implications of atheism (or anything else). Think about this for a moment: Imagine a rocket containing 500,000 kilogrammes of fuel, about to be blasted into space at 17,500 miles per hour. What drives an astronaut to board this shuttle, unknowing of whether or not he will return or even reach space? Is this desire to explore and discover conducive to his survival? What drives a climber to ascend Mount Everest, enduring cold and harsh conditions, not knowing if he will reach the summit? Isn’t he designed to put his survival first? What drives a monk to isolate himself, remain celibate and devote himself to discovering inner peace? Does not this go completely against survival and reproduction? Indeed, the desire to discover is powerful in humans and in many cases overrides our desire to survive. We see many cases of people cutting themselves off from the very things that are conducive to their survival, and in doing so achieve true happiness and peace. So, how can we explain our desire to discover, resulting in activities that are detrimental to survival? The answer is we cannot. These desires do not make sense if one adopts naturalistic evolution. In conclusion, our higher levels of rationality and desire to learn often lead us to spend time in ‘superfluous’ activities which do not aid survival and reproduction, such as art, spirituality, philosophy or designing novel contraceptive techniques. Natural selection should have eliminated all of these, because such behaviours have no adaptive benefits. Because the Darwinian evolutionary mechanism explains only “survival and reproduction”, it cannot account for our ability to reason, or for its most conspicuous characteristic: the desire to discover. It should be clear from these two problems that the Darwinian theory of evolution, which is geared towards survival, not truth, is an inadequate explanation of our ability to reason and desire to discover. Academics have recognised these problems and have made some startling remarks. Biologist John Gray states: “If the human mind has evolved in obedience to the imperatives of survival, what reason is there for thinking that it can acquire knowledge of reality, when all that is required in order to reproduce the species is that its errors and illusions are not fatal? A purely naturalistic philosophy cannot account for the knowledge that we believe we possess.”70 DNA discoverer Francis Crick said, “Our highly developed brains, after all, were not evolved under the pressure of discovering scientific truths, but only to enable us to be clever enough to survive and leave descendants.”71 Cognitive scientist Steven Pinker wrote, “Our brains were shaped for fitness, not for truth. Sometimes the truth is adaptive, but sometimes it is not.”72 Although Sam Harris, outspoken atheist and neuroscientist, believes that science will eventually give us answers, he admits that “…our logical, mathematical, and physical intuitions have not been designed by natural selection to track the Truth.”73 In summary, when atheists claim to have used their rational faculties to prove that God does not exist, it is a form of intellectual hypocrisy. To account for the fact that they have a rational mind, they have to deny atheism or deny reason itself. The intellectual irony is that their ability to reason is best explained by the existence of God. A Note on Evolutionary Reliabilism Many naturalists admit that there is no necessary link between survival and truth. They maintain that it is highly likely that there were biological conditions and pressures that gave rise to reliable cognitive faculties that produce true beliefs. These faculties must have been conducive to biological fitness and were subsequently preferred by natural selection. The view that Darwinian evolution can explain our truth-reliable cognitive faculties is referred to as evolutionary reliabilism. In order for evolutionary reliabilism to be justified the probability of natural selection favouring truth-reliable cognitive faculties must be greater than the probability of favouring unreliable cognitive faculties that produce false beliefs. The main premise for this argument is that truth-reliable cognitive faculties were more fitness enhancing (conducive to our survival and reproduction) than unreliable cognitive faculties that produced false beliefs. However, based on our discussion so far, this premise is undermined. There are additional reasons why this premise is unwarranted; some of these are discussed below.

Unreliable cognitive faculties that produced false beliefs could have led to our survival and reproduction. We could have held cautious belief-forming processes that were false, yet fitness enhancing. The academic James Sage argues:

“For example, an organism may hide because it believes falsely that a predator is nearby. Evolutionarily, it pays to have cautious belief-forming processes that “over detect” dangerous predators, especially when false beliefs carry little cost.”74

Truth-reliable cognitive faculties could have not been favoured by natural selection as they came as a high cost. James Sage maintains that truth-reliable cognitive faculties “come at a high price”75. The biological cost of these faculties involves the following:

“(i) the brain requires oxygen, calories, and cooling, (ii) calculating detailed inferences (even with minimal data) requires considerable time and concentration, (iii) accessing information from past experience requires extensive storage capacity and retrieval pathways, (iv) identifying relevant information requires multi-level sorting subroutines, (v) ranking desires and goals requires extensive deliberation and reflection, and (vi) utilizing “detectors” (and other perceptual inputs) requires precision and acuity. Each of these factors carries a significant biological cost.”76

Since truth-reliable cognitive faculties put a strain on key biological resources that are essential for survival, natural selection could have favoured fitness enhancing unreliable cognitive faculties that produced false beliefs which were less taxing.

Like with many philosophical topics there are arguments for and against evolutionary reliabilism. For an in-depth discussion on the why evolutionary reliabilism does not adequately explain our truth-reliable cognitive faculties, with responses to popular and academic objections, please read my essay Can evolution adequately explain our truth-reliable cognitive faculties?78

Islamic theism: the best explanation.

I could not give you a loaf of bread if I did not have one in the first place or if I did not have the ability to obtain or make one. This is based on the following rational principle: A thing cannot give rise to something else if it does not contain it, or if it does not have the ability to give rise to it. For instance, non-rational forces cannot give rise to rationality, as they do not contain it in the first place. Physical processes are non-rational because they do not have any “insight”. They cannot see a conclusion following from previous premises. God makes sense of the fact that we have rational minds, because rationality can come from the Creator Who is All-Seeing, The-Knowing and The-Wise. If in the beginning of the universe there had been only non-rational, blind, random, physical matter and processes, then no matter how they were arranged they could not give rise to rationality. However, if in the beginning there was a creator with the names and attributes mentioned above, it follows that the universe can contain conscious beings with the ability to reason. From this perspective, atheists actually need God to account for their rational faculties. Therefore, the existence of a Creator Who is All-Seeing, The-Knowing and The-Wise is the best explanation for a universe with conscious organisms that have the ability to reason. Islamic theism provides a beautiful and simple answer to the main questions raised in this chapter. God created us and gave us rational minds with a desire to discover, in order to aid us in fulfilling our purpose. One way God does this is by directing us towards His creation, wherein lie His signs (i.e. clues, hints, indications). By pondering and reflecting over these signs, we can appreciate His majesty and creative power, for which appreciation and acknowledgement then naturally lead us to worship Him (see Chapter 15). God via His knowledge, power and will created the universe and our minds, hence explaining our ability to reason and discover the interconnecting principles of the cosmos. This brings to mind a beautiful verse of the Qur’an: God says, “We will show them Our signs in the horizons and within their own selves until it becomes clear to them that it is the truth. But is it not sufficient concerning your Lord that He is over all things a Witness?”79. God continuously encourages us to ponder, to use our minds: “Then do they not reflect upon the Qur’an, or are there locks upon [their] hearts?”80. “So will you not reason?”81. These verses signify that we have the ability to reason and ponder on the natural world to attain truth. God also says in the Qur’an: “Indeed, in the creation of the heavens and the Earth and in the alternation of the night and the day are signs for the people of understanding.”82

From this, we can draw a comprehensive conclusion. God gave us rational minds and the desire to discover, so that we can use our rational faculties to understand the universe in all its beauty, which in turn leads us to worship the One Who created it (see Chapter 15). God placed within us the very tools required for us to engage in disciplines such as science, yet the irony is that when some of us find this God-given gift, they use it to challenge God Himself (see Chapter 12). There are some key objections to this argument that are addressed below.

God of the gaps.

The “god of the gaps” objection asserts that a gap in scientific knowledge about a particular phenomenon should not give rise to belief in God’s existence, or reference to Divine activity, because science will eventually progress far enough to provide an explanation. This objection cannot be applied to the argument presented in this chapter because it does not address a gap within scientific knowledge; it addresses the foundations of science. The ability to reason is required before any science can take place. To argue that science will eventually explain its own assumptions is tantamount to arguing in a circle. This discussion is beyond the realm of science, as we are discussing the foundational assumptions of science itself. Hence the “god of the gaps” objection is in this case misplaced.

This is a presuppositional argument.

Presuppositionalism is a form of argument that asserts that we cannot account for reason without the Christian worldview. The assertion maintains that you cannot use reason if it is unaccounted for. However, the atheist can—and rightly does—throw the argument back at the Christian. The atheist can ask why the Christian believes he has accounted for his ability to reason. If the Christian replies that the Christian worldview accounts for his ability to reason, then the atheist is within his right to ask how, and the argument can go around in circles. The argument in this chapter is not a presuppositional one. It accepts the assumption that we have the ability to reason, and it does not argue that before you use your reason you need to account for your ability to reason. The argument answers the question: Given that we accept the fact that we can reason, what worldview best explains our ability to do so? It argues that the best way to explain our ability to reason is by God’s existence, and that naturalism—and by extension, atheism—invalidates the assumption that we have the ability to reason. Therefore, atheism must be rejected. Rationality can arise out of complexity.

Emergent materialists argue that a system of complex physical processes, undergoing complex interactions, can give rise to properties or phenomena that do not exist in the individual components that comprise the system. The emergent materialist will cite the history of science: when something was deemed ‘mysterious’, it was later demystified when the underlying complex processes were understood. Therefore, the emergent materialist responds to the argument from reason, by postulating that our ability to reason—more specifically, the ability to achieve an insight into a conclusion—is based on complex processes in the brain. Once these processes are understood, our ability to reason will have been explained. A common example that emergent materialists cite is water, H20. Water is made up of hydrogen and oxygen, which are gases, yet when combined chemically they form the life-sustaining liquid. Water has properties that hydrogen and oxygen do not. Examples like these provide the emergent materialist with the confidence to argue that a property can arise from a system of complex processes, even though it is not present in the components of that system. Nevertheless, this example is misplaced because the argument articulated in this chapter is not a case of a physical thing bringing into existence another physical thing (like gases hydrogen and oxygen giving rise to water’s physical properties). On the contrary, what requires explaining is a nonphysical property (having a mental insight into a conclusion) arising from physical ones (blind physical processes). If the complex processes that underpin brain-activity were understood, and all of their causal interactions were mapped out, how would that explain our ability to reason? It would still not answer the question: How can we acquire truth using our ability to form insights with minds allegedly based on prior blind, random physical processes? To simply refer to complexity does not explain anything, and it is tantamount to saying, “it just happens”. It seems to me that emergent materialism is a weak attempt to fill the gap created by a naturalistic worldview (Chapter 7 explains how emergent materialism cannot explain subjective conscious experiences). Another problem with the H20 example is that rational insights— based on relations between premises—seem to be very different to physical processes, in this case neural activity. The H20 example assumes that rational insights and physical processes are the same. Professor Raymond Tallis argues that “both shiny water and H20 molecules need to be revealed as one or the other. They correspond to two different modes of observation… The two aspects of water are two appearances, two modes of experiencing it, and this hardly applies to neural activity as electrochemical activity and as experience.”83

The wider implication of adopting emergent materialism is that we allow theories that cannot explain the physical relations or processes of a system. If one argues that complexity can explain new properties—without explaining how they emerge—then why should we expect a theory to explain anything? Merely waiting for our scientific understanding to improve is not an argument. This is equivalent to explaining to a trainee builder that you can build a house by having many bricks. This is not true; other things are also required to build a house, such as cement, a design, bricklayers, plumbers, electricians, tools, etc. In conclusion, emergent materialism is not a coherent theory; it is an incoherent attempt to fill the gap left by naturalism.

Computers are rational; therefore, physical processes can explain rationality.

A common objection to the argument that rationality cannot arise from physical processes is the alleged ability of computer programmes to engage in deductive reasoning. A key feature of rationality is that, in a valid deductive argument, the conclusion necessarily follows. Since computer programmes are based on physical processes and exhibit a key feature of rationality, physical processes can account for our ability to reason, the argument goes. This is another misplaced contention. As highlighted in this chapter, human reasoning is based on having mental insights based on the logical relations between premises. Computer programmes cannot “see” anything. Humans not only have insights; our insights are also meaningful. We have the ability to understand and question the meaning of the conclusions we come to. Computer programmes are not characterised as having meaningful insights. Computer programmes are based on syntactical rules (the manipulation of symbols), not semantics (meaning). To understand the difference between semantics and syntax, consider the following sentences:

• I love my family.

• αγαπώ την οικογένειά μου.

• আমি আিার পমরবারকে ভালবামি.

These three sentences mean the same thing: I love my family. This refers to semantics, the meaning of the sentences. But the syntax is different. In other words, the symbols used are unalike. The first sentence is using English ‘symbols’, the second Greek, and the last Bangla. From this, the following argument can be developed:

1. Computer programmes are syntactical (based on syntax).

2. Minds have semantics.

3. Syntax by itself is neither sufficient for, nor constitutive for semantics.

4. Therefore, computer programmes by themselves are not minds.84.

Imagine that an avalanche somehow arranges mountain rocks into the words I love my family. It would be absurd to say that the mountain knows what the arrangement of rocks (symbols) means. This indicates that the mere manipulation of symbols (syntax) does not give rise to meaning (semantics).85

Computer programmes are based on the manipulation of symbols, not meanings. Likewise, I cannot know the meaning of the sentence in Bangla just by manipulating the letters (symbols). No matter how many times I manipulate the Bangla letters, I will not be able to understand the meaning of the words. This is why for semantics, we need more than the correct syntax. Computer programmes work on syntax and not on semantics. Computers do not know the meaning of anything. Professor John Searle’s Chinese Room thought-experiment is a powerful way of showing that the mere manipulation of symbols does not lead to an understanding of what they mean:

“Imagine that you are locked in a room, and in this room are several baskets full of Chinese symbols. Imagine that you (like me) do not understand a word of Chinese, but that you are given a rule book in English for manipulating the Chinese symbols. The rules specify the manipulation of symbols purely formally, in terms of their syntax, not their semantics. So the rule might say: ‘Take a squiggle-squiggle out of basket number one and put it next to a squiggle-squiggle sign from basket number two.’ Now suppose that some other Chinese symbols are passed into the room, and that you are given further rules for passing back Chinese symbols out of the room. Suppose that unknown to you the symbols passed into the room are called ‘questions’ by the people outside the room, and the symbols you pass back out of the room are called ‘answers to questions.’ Suppose furthermore, that the programmers are so good at designing the programs and that you are so good at manipulating the symbols, that very soon your answers are indistinguishable from those of a native Chinese speaker. There you are locked in your room shuffling your Chinese symbols and passing out Chinese symbols in response to incoming Chinese symbols… Now the point of the story is simply this: by virtue of implementing a formal computer program from the point of view of an outside observer, you behave exactly as if you understood Chinese, but all the same you do not understand a word of Chinese.”86

In the Chinese Room thought-experiment, the person inside the room is simulating a computer. Another person manages the symbols in a way that makes the person inside the room seem to understand Chinese. However, the person inside the room does not understand the language; they merely imitate that state. Professor Searle concludes:

“Having the symbols by themselves—just having the syntax— is not sufficient for having the semantics. Merely manipulating symbols is not enough to guarantee knowledge of what they mean.”87

The objector might respond to this by arguing that although the computer programme does not know the meaning, the whole system does. Professor Searle has called this objection “the systems reply”88. However, why is it that the programme does not know the meaning? The answer is simple: it has no way of assigning meaning to the symbols. Since a computer programme cannot assign meaning to symbols, how can a computer system—which relies on the programme—understand the meaning? You cannot produce understanding just by having the right programme. Searle presents an extended version of the Chinese Room thought-experiment to show that the system, as a whole does not understand the meaning: “Imagine that I memorize the contents of the baskets and the rule book, and I do all the calculations in my head. You can even imagine that I work out in the open. There is nothing in the ‘system’ that is not in me, and since I don’t understand Chinese, neither does the system.”89

A simple response to this objection also includes the fact that computers are not independent systems with the ability to engage in deductive reasoning. They were designed, developed and made by human beings that are conscious and rational. Therefore, computers are just a protraction of our ability to perform rational insights. William Hasker explains:

“Computers function as they do because they have been endowed with rational insight. A computer, in other words, is merely an extension of the rationality of its designers and users; it is no more an independent source of rational insight than a television set is an independent source of news entertainment.”90.

Atheism does not—and cannot—have a monopoly on reason. It is a shame that there is a growing perception that atheists are rational, and that atheism is based on reason. Nothing could be further from the truth. Blind, random physical processes cannot account for our ability to reason. This is why atheism invalidates the very thing it claims to use to reject the Divine. However, according to Islamic theism, we live in a rational universe created by the All-Seeing, The-Wise and The-Knowing Creator, who gave us the ability to reason. This is coherent and accounts fully for our rational faculties; nothing else will (indeed, nothing else can). Maintaining that blind, random physical processes can make sense of our ability to see, think and learn is irrational. Those who persist in this thinking are in fact adversaries of reason. They are no different from a taxi-driver putting on a blindfold and insisting that he can drive his passengers to their destination.