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For the majority of people who believe that God is the Creator of the universe and remains a willful agent in the world, God’s ability to perform miracles—or to enable others to perform them—is easy to accept. After all, if God created the laws of nature, it logically follows that He is not bound by the system He designed but can also bring about occurrences outside of that system. Miracles are only problematic for atheists (who believe in no God) and deists (who posit a non-intervening God), both of whom may find it refreshing to familiarize themselves with the case for Allah’s existence in the Qur’an and Sunnah.348
While belief in miracles was standard in Christian societies, the transition to modernity signaled a shift toward a more skeptical stance. The mechanical naturalists of Enlightenment thought painted a “disenchanted” view of nature as a closed system, describing natural laws as disconnected from God.349
Ultimately, they had a profound aversion to any suggestion of miraculous intervention. The notion of miracles was commonly rejected because they were “unscientific.” Perhaps the most notable vanguards of this view were the Dutch rationalist Baruch Spinoza (d. 1677) and the Scottish empiricist David Hume (d. 1776). Both used various arguments to reject the possibility of miracles, all of which suffer from either factual errors, logical inconsistency, or irrelevance to the miracles of the Prophet Muhammad .صلى الله عليه وسلم In his Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza argued that belief in miracles was but a remnant of the naive premodern mind, its inability to interpret natural phenomena, and not the intended meaning behind passages in the Torah. His contempt for miracles is expected, as the idea of “supernatural intervention” was perceived to be at odds with the philosophical outlook of rationalism that dominated his era and soon produced the European Enlightenment. However, Spinoza’s unbridled zeal to disprove the very possibility of miracles is contrary to his usual astuteness. For instance, he attempts to explain away every explicit biblical account of miracles as not actually miraculous. He even claimed that every supposed miracle can be seen as a misunderstood natural phenomenon.
While ignorance and superstition have certainly driven some people to prematurely classify some events as miracles, what scientific evidence suggests that staffs can be transformed into snakes, people blind from birth can have their sight restored, or that the moon can be split and restored? According to Spinoza, since our knowledge of nature is incomplete, there is no way to assert that a particular event is miraculous since it may have a yet-undiscovered natural explanation. Spinoza presumed that inexplicable occurrences should simply require us to rewrite our understanding of the laws of nature. However, modern philosophy of science considers Spinoza’s argument fallacious; the fundamental laws of nature are not rewritten when miracles occur. A bird being miraculously resurrected from a disassembled carcass350 does not require us to revise our knowledge of the natural decay of corpses.
Aside from this epistemological objection to miracles, another objection Spinoza raised was quasi-theological cum ontological:
“If anyone asserted that God acts in contravention to the laws of nature, he, ipso facto, would be compelled to assert that God acted against His own nature.”351 But this argument is entirely contingent upon accepting Spinoza’s impoverished conception of God. Spinoza considered God as nothing other than nature itself (a view that limits the Divine so severely that many are convinced that Spinoza’s beliefs are essentially no different from atheism). On such a view, certainly it would seem absurd for nature to contradict itself. But when God is the Supreme Master of all in existence, who says “Be” and something comes into existence, then there is no rational objection to God intervening in His creation and delimiting the scope of some of the natural laws that He has ordained.
It is interesting that Spinoza also asserted that if miracles were true, they would imply that God created a flawed world that He had to keep repairing. Not only does this contradict his view that miracles should make us revise our understanding of natural laws, but it also constitutes a strawman argument whereby a position no one actually holds is refuted. Believers do not claim that the purpose of miracles is to fix a flawed world.
Rather, they believe that the One who created this world and the laws that govern it can also suspend them.
The weakness of Spinoza’s critique was evident. It was only after Hume published his Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding that debates surrounding the logical and scientific possibility of miracles intensified. Not only were Hume’s arguments more refined, but prevailing paradigms of the Enlightenment era such as skepticism and naturalism were conducive to a wider embrace of his views. Hume alleged that we are forced by continuous evidence of nature’s uniformity to dismiss even the strongest testimony of any momentary supernatural event, since it would, by definition, violate the proven laws of nature.
He further justified this by the lack of historical evidence for any one miracle, and by the multitude of the faithful who claim them in support of their conflicting doctrines. How Islam’s unique mechanism of knowledge transmission satisfies the criterion of historical evidence will be discussed shortly, but the fact that different religions offer different accounts does not justify dismissing them all. Doing so would render the very study of history useless, since sifting through conflicting reports and weighing them against one another is every historian’s methodology. Even Hume himself followed this protocol when he considered nature’s ongoing testimony stronger than individual accounts of miracles. As for Hume’s argument for the superiority of empirical science over historical testimony, this stems from his philosophical framework which was effectively that of an agnostic or atheist. Theists, on the other hand, perceive miracles as identical to natural phenomena, in that both originate with God. Just as the universe began by the command of God, and its laws run as ordered by God, miracles can sometimes occur in it by the will of God. The reality of miracles is ultimately an extension of the divine reality; just as God evidenced His existence and magnificence through the brilliant laws of nature, He evidenced His omnipotence and the integrity of His messengers through occasionally breaching these same laws in mind-boggling ways. Finally, the “laws of nature” are a mere description of the world as we experience it, not a necessary prescription for how it must function. Miracles can, therefore, simply be exceptions to the predominant natural order, contrary to it but not contradictory. That would deliver us from Hume’s presumption of irreconcilability and shift our investigation from the logical possibility to the historical documentation of miracles.352
348 See: Justin Parrott, “The Case for Allah’s Existence in the Qur’an and Sunnah,” Yaqeen Institute for Islamic Research, February 27th, 2017.
349 Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, Islam and Secularism (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 1978), 18.
350 The Qur’an 2:260, Saheeh International Translation.
351 Baruch Spinoza, A Theological Political Treatise (Dover Philosophical Classics:
2004), chapter VI, 83.
352 I must acknowledge the valuable contributions of Dr. Nazir Khan, the Director of Research Strategy at Yaqeen Institute, to this subsection.
Reference: The Final Prophet - Mohammad Elshinawy
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