The Incoherence Of Atheism by Abdullāh ibn Ṣāliḥ al-ʿUjayrī

The argument from fiṭrah for Allah  is not limited to the element that exists in the soul, which requires a person to affirm that there is a Creator. Rather, it is possible that the fiṭrah reveals this substantial fact in a number of ways and at various levels.

Of the issues a person can automatically grasp are certain natural and rational facts, referred to as intuitive knowledge or self-evident truths. These are innately known and are acquired by the soul without any analysis or reasoning. This is in contrast to the type of knowledge that is known as theoretical knowledge, which can be acquired only via analysis and reasoning.

The difference between the two should be clear; in fact, it should be self evident such that every person must instantly recognise it, as opposed to theoretical knowledge that can be prone to doubt and objection. Such objections may be repelled through analysis and reasoning. It is in the nature of intuitive knowledge that it is not dependent on proof; rather, intuitive knowledge itself is used as evidence. Theoretical knowledge is referred back to intuitive knowledge for verification. Explaining this, Ibn Ḥazm says, ‘Whatever that can be acquired immediately through logic or the senses is not in need of evidence at all. Rather, it is these types of facts that everyone ought to use as evidence and refutation, after which his theoretical reasoning can be deemed to be correct or incorrect.’42

Muʿallimī said, ‘As for instinctive and self-evident information, the logicians agree that it is the currency of logic. On the other hand, deriving information from analytical knowledge can only be aspired when it is based on, and attributed to, the former.’43 Reasoning cannot work without the existence of intuitive information. Without it, circular reasoning and infinite regress would come as a result, causing the collapse of the entire system of reasoning. Explaining this, Ibn Taymiyyah said, ‘Knowledge that is acquired by analysing proof must refer back to intuitive propositions. Any piece of knowledge that is not intuitive must refer back to intuitive knowledge. If theoretical propositions are constantly proven by their like, circular reasoning or infinite regress of causality would ensue. By necessity and the agreement of logicians, both are improper from a number of angles.

Acquired theoretical knowledge is that which is gained from known propositions that do not require analysis. Had those propositions been theoretical as well, they would have in turn been contingent on other propositions, leading to an infinity of theoretical propositions inside man. Man is temporal – he came into existence after having been non-existent. The knowledge in his heart is temporal. If the knowledge in his heart was not acquired without knowledge prior to it, it would mean that his heart would be without knowledge right from the start. Therefore, it is necessary that there are basic self-evident pieces of information that Allah places within a person’s heart. The aim of any proof is to refer back to this type of self-evident information. Furthermore, self-evident information is sometimes subject to doubts and whispers, like the doubts of sophists who cast aspersions on tangible and self-evident information. These include, for example, the doubts cast by Rāzī in the beginning of his al Muḥaṣṣal, which we have discussed elsewhere:

Doubts that are injurious to that information cannot be repelled with proof. This is because the aim of proof is that it refers back to that intuitive information. Therefore, when doubt creeps in, the path to analysis and research is closed off. This is why those who deny tangible and instinctive information are not to be debated. In fact, if such a person is being obstinate, he should be disciplined until he admits the truth. If he is mistaken due to corruption afflicting his senses or his mind, is simply unable to understand that information, or for any other reason, he should be treated so that he can gain the prerequisites of acquiring knowledge and be able to dispel those things that block it. If he is still unable to comprehend because of corruption in his temperament, he should be treated with medicament that deals with this, or with supplication, ruqyah, special attention, etc. Otherwise, he should be left alone.44

Any attempt to demonstrate the veracity of self-evident truths through reasoning is very hard. In fact, it can be impossible and may lead a person to doubt them, thus falling into one of the many types of sophism. In any case, such a process would be tantamount to torturing the soul without any benefit whatsoever. Expounding on this, Ibn Taymiyyah offered a fine example to demonstrate the nature of this problem:

When instinctively comprehended matters are reasoned through non instinctive means, one will be tormenting the soul in vain. This is similar to a man who is told to divide a certain sum of money into equal portions among a number of individuals – a task that should be performed without difficulty. Someone may say to him, “Wait, you cannot divide it without knowing the definition of division and without drawing a distinction between division and multiplication. Division is the opposite of multiplication. The latter is carried out by compounding the units of one number by the units of the other, whereas the former is achieved by dividing the units of one number by the units of the other. This is why when the quotient is multiplied by the divisor, the result is the dividend, and when the number resulting from multiplication is divided by one of the two numbers multiplied, the result is the other number… “What I have said about the definition of multiplication is not valid because it applies to the multiplication of integers, not fractional numbers. An all-inclusive definition would be: Multiplication is the sum total whose relation to one of the numbers multiplied is the same as the relation of figure one to the other number… “The multiplication of one-half by one quarter results in one-eighth. The relation of one-eighth to one quarter is the same as the relation of one-half to the figure one.” Although these are all valid statements, it is clear that the person who has money and wishes to distribute it equally among a number of individuals would agonise in vain if he were to force himself to understand all this before he divided the money. He may not even understand these matters and may find them problematic.’45

Explaining what the process of reasoning for self-evident truth can lead to, he adds: ‘A lot of information is necessary and instinctive. If a person wants to force himself to offer reasoning for that, it would be difficult for him. He would land himself into doubt, whether because it would lead to lengthy propositions, because they are difficult to unlock, or both.46

If there is ever a case that self-evident facts need to be reasoned, then that would actually be to demonstrate that they are indeed innate and instinctive, not to prove they are correct. There is a difference between revealing the nature of something and the attempt to offer evidence for its veracity – the former is akin to reminding the heedless and forgetful. This is why when discussing the evidence that proves the existence of Allah , Ibn Taymiyyah said, So when he sees the signs that necessitate His existence, they would be an eye-opener from that spectrum, just as He  said, “Indeed, when Satan whispers to those mindful of Allah, they remember their Lord then they start to see things clearly.”47 It would also be a reminder to remember Allah when forgetfulness and heedlessness overcome. Therefore, it is an eye-opener to dispel the ignorance one may experience, and a reminder to remove one’s heedlessness. This is despite the fact that the core recognition of Allah’s existence is instinctively found in the soul without any external means whatsoever.48

This brings about two valid questions:

1. Where did the soul gain intuitive knowledge?.

2. From where does intuitive knowledge acquire its universal and absolute objectivity?.

From the previous discussion, it was made clear that intuitive information is already present in the heart. It is not acquired through the process of education. It is not information accessed from any external source. Therefore, it is perfectly natural to ask the following question: What or who placed these instinctive ideas in the heart? The logical answer is Allah. In order to sidestep this question, atheist discourse has strived to cast doubt on the instinctive nature of this cognition, claiming that such information is borne out of the education received by the senses via the process of induction (istiqrā’). They propose the following: If a man adds an apple to another, it would be two apples; if he adds an orange to another, it would be two oranges. This is a universal rule: 1+1=2. They add that the rule of causality is borne out of the cause-effect process that man perceives through his senses. In a nutshell, they claim that this knowledge is borne out of this experience, not because of any instinctive knowledge in this regard that precludes the senses. This philosophical outlook – interpreting rational information by referring them back to sensory knowledge and disregarding any innate predisposition – leads to a number of cognitive problems. It opens up the door of doubting the instinctive and recurring truths that these concepts actually are. The ‘try-and-test’ method that covers every human experience is impossible to achieve. Therefore, it is possible that a man can still have doubts about this universal law, as it might be broken somewhere outside of his limited ‘try-and-test’ experiment. For example, he would not know that there is an event, somewhere in the universe, that came to pass without any external cause triggering it.

This problem led some atheists to propose a view that acknowledges the universal recurrence of these rational concepts in practice, without attempting to explain them from a philosophical or theoretical viewpoint. These philosophers acknowledge a pragmatic quid pro quo arrangement in the universe: Man engages with his daily life believing these are innate and self-evident truths, while in reality, their self-evidentiary, innate, and instinctive nature is something that cannot be demonstrated or reasoned with proof. The problem is compounded when some atheists actually adopt a sceptical approach to self-evident and necessary concepts: that there cannot be any theoretical knowledge that could be gained from them, nor should they be accepted as self-evident facts.

The famous atheist Lawrence Krauss has stated on multiple occasions that the human mind is primitive and evolving – in Darwinist terms – to safely interact with the dangers in the savannah; however, they are minds that are not necessarily able to understand the nature of this universe or existential reality. Therefore, he claims, it is necessary that the world is understood through the world itself – via observation and empiricism, without relying on anything known as rational concepts, let alone referring to them as arbiters of truth. Truth, he claims, is only that which we can access via observation and the senses according to the scientific method, no matter how strange it may appear – or contradictory even – to our instinctive minds. Krauss mentioned this in his book A Universe from Nothing: Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing, which is based on the idea that even though the universe came from nothing, it can create itself from itself as per the laws of physics. This assertion with the detail it entails is extremely problematic, as it leads to multiple cognitive problems that are extremely dangerous. Some of this cognitive disorder became apparent in Krauss’s debate with Hamza Tzortzis, Islam or Atheism: Which Makes More Sense? In this debate, the self-conflicting and confused position of Krauss was exposed, as it was revealed that he was unable to construct any sound cognitive viewpoint. Its problems begin in that it discards basic rational concepts. Discarding them leads to the abandonment of not only trust in the tools of observation, but also a loss of trust in the scientific method itself. The scientific method is the sole path to knowledge, as per the view purported by extreme scientism. The scientific method is based on assertions whose evidence cannot be demonstrated through the scientific method itself; otherwise, it will lead to circularity. The position that knowledge can only be based on natural and scientific information is a self-contradictory one that cannot be deemed rationally acceptable. However, what are we to do if this type of objection is directed at those who deny basic rational concepts, when – as you can see – the objection is based on them? How can it be convincing to those who do not see any problem in accepting that the universe created itself? If they are willing to accept this type of 27

view, then what is stopping them from claiming that ‘the scientific method is correct because of…the scientific method’? There is little doubt that the proposal of such a conceptualisation leads to sophistry. Indeed, some atheists have fallen victim to this type of mentality.

On one occasion, I was in a discussion with some youth who were afflicted by atheist ideas. The discussion led us to Western-style polemics on the subject, so I saw that it was necessary for the discussion to be brought back to a common ground. I started to speak on the human sources of information. I said that, broadly speaking, these sources are three:

1. The senses.

2. Logic.

3. Transmitted information.

Imagine how surprised I was when I learned that the source of gaining information according to them was sensory only, not rational issues (whether theoretical or instinctive)! I wanted to be certain that this problem actually existed in their mindset. I asked them a number of questions to ascertain their convictions on the topic, and why they would propose such a key principle. What I said was the following: ‘One basic rational concept is that “part < whole”. Imagine we have an orange in front of us and we split it into quarters. Would that one quarter be smaller than, equal to, or larger than the whole orange?’ I was shocked when they replied: ‘We cannot know until we see this orange and cut it ourselves.’ I told them, ‘At home, I have a book titled as Majmūʿ Fatāwā Ibn Taymiyyah in 37 volumes. Is the first volume smaller than, equal to, or larger than the whole collection?’ They said, ‘We would not know until we visited you at your home and saw it.’ There was a coffee pot in front of us. I said to one of them, ‘Lift the pot up.’ When he raised it, I said, ‘Will you be able to raise the coffee cup – which is lighter – based on your knowledge that you can lift something heavier?’ He reached out to the cup – I said to him, ‘I do not want you to experiment.’ He said, ‘I would not know the answer until I experiment.’ I finished my line of questioning by asking one of them, ‘Do you exist or not?’ He said, ‘I exist.’ I said, ‘Is it possible that science in the future will be able to prove that you are in fact non-existent?’ He said, ‘It is possible.’ The discussion ended at this.

To be fair, there were some among them who did not agree with their fellows’ denial of basic rational concepts, and were of the view that this type of theorising and foundational basis would end the discussion. However, his friends were opposed to this. The truth is that some of their proposals did not necessarily arise from obstinacy or haughtiness. Rather, they based this on data, some of which goes back to the rule that knowledge cannot be instinctively established without the intermediary of the senses. They also rely on scientific assertions – especially in the field of quantum physics – that duped them into believing that there is no way to marry rational and scientific assertions.

Whoever has read quantum physics will know how ambiguous it is, and how complex it is for a human mind to navigate its many aspects. John Wheeler said, ‘If you are not completely confused by quantum mechanics, you do not understand it.’49 Roger Penrose said, ‘Quantum mechanics makes absolutely no sense.’50 Richard Feynman said, ‘I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics.’51

I believe that it is not proper for a person to discard self-evident knowledge and their objective value just for natural knowledge. What is incumbent is to have natural knowledge governed by self-evident knowledge – whatever from the former is ambiguous or contradicts the latter should be cast aside. We must believe that we are ignorant of reality; if that ignorance is dispelled, then most certainly the sensory and tangible would be in alignment with the rational. Without this approach, we will be left without any knowledge, whether tangible or rational. It has thus been conclusively proven that there is a real problem facing many atheists, and that there is a degree of inability on their part to reconcile the two, leading to extremely dangerous conclusions.

In his book The Grand Design, which was co-authored with Leonard Mlodinow, Stephen Hawking said, ‘Indeed, like many notions in today’s science, it appears to violate common sense. But common sense is based upon everyday experience, not upon the universe as it is revealed through the marvels of technologies, such as those that allow us to gaze deep into the atom or back to the early universe.’52 The problem with this passage is the ambiguity surrounding the idea of ‘common sense’. Does it mean that basic rational concepts are to be denied, or does it simply mean nomological impossibilities?

A person might mistakenly assume that something nomologically impossible is also rationally impossible, only to later find out that it is not rationally impossible. However, there is a package of basic instinctive concepts that appear to be higher than the very existence of man. Such instinctive information is not gained by mere human experience. This is why it is an error to deny logical impossibilities, which in reality are those scenarios that lead to a contradiction, such as a squared circle, a moving motionless body, something that is neither in existence nor in non-existence, etc. These sorts of images are not from the family of nomological impossibilities – such that our understanding of nomological impossibilities goes back solely to our human experience. Rather, these are logical impossibilities that cannot ever be envisaged in the external world at all.

The problem with Hawking’s passage is further clarified with what he mentions in the same book: ‘Quantum physics might seem to undermine the idea that nature is governed by laws, but that is not the case.’53 If this appears to be the case, then why is it not like that then in actual truth? The reason for that is what appears to be contradictory would be referred back to other concepts and assertions, so that the problem of contradiction is solved. One of these concepts are the instinctive rational concepts.

The truth is that quantum physics, with all its scientific and rational implications, is an important field of study. It requires the convergence of many specialists to clarify the reality of assertions made in physics in order to offer answers to concepts brought up by those assertions.

The problem faced by atheists vis-à-vis basic rational principles goes back, for the large part, to their materialistic and Darwinist outlook on our existence. If we could negotiate the deadlock caused by the notion that matter is able to produce logic, and that Darwinist evolution is able to create this product, then one question that Darwinism poses vis-à-vis our rational capabilities is this: Did nature evolve and develop minds for us that are able to reach objective realities, or did it evolve and develop them for us to live and survive, regardless of the possibilities in revealing the actual true nature of things? Is it possible that our minds tell us something and make it out as if it is necessary for us so that we can live and survive, even though this might just be a fantasy?

This is one of the deep problems with Darwinism. It leads to wide problems in general atheist discourse across a number of issues, such as the innateness of faith in God, the desire for religion, the sense of morality, the tendency of free will, etc. This is because all of these are explained through the Darwinist lens, that is based on either a) the advantages of living for living beings or b) the causes of their existence if those advantages are not primarily intended or are considered inconsequential, but are rather just a by-product of the natural selection process for life and the survival of humankind. Logic is not the first to think this. Nature – as per the Darwinist view – evolved our minds so we can survive. As for the fact that these minds are able to learn about reality, then that is a by-product if it exists; otherwise, it is quite possible to assume that our minds have duped us, simply so that we may survive. This deep problem was something acknowledged by Darwin himself. He expressed his confusion on the issue, saying, ‘But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy.’54 The 53 The Grand Design, p. 93.

54 Darwin Correspondence Project, Letter to William Graham, 3 July 1881, https://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/DCP-LETT-13230.xml 30

rejection and downplaying of these rational and necessary truths – whether they are those truths that are sometimes incredibly self-evident, or those undeniable truths that are somewhat reserved by nature – has created a severe pushback against philosophy and rational theory, whether that is governed by the religious mindset or not.

This is why many people, in various contexts, have declared that philosophy is dead and offers no benefit. One famous quotation is by Hawking in the beginning of The Great Design: ‘Traditionally these are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics. Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge.’55 PZ Myers said, ‘A lot of philosophy can destroy you.’56 Krauss said, Philosophy is a field that, unfortunately, reminds me of that old Woody Allen joke, “those that can’t do, teach, and those that can’t teach, teach gym.” And the worst part of philosophy is the philosophy of science; the only people, as far as I can tell, that read work by philosophers of science are other philosophers of science. It has no impact on physics what so ever, and I doubt that other philosophers read it because it’s fairly technical. And so it’s really hard to understand what justifies it. And so I’d say that this tension occurs because people in philosophy feel threatened, and they have every right to feel threatened, because science progresses and philosophy doesn’t.57

This denial of the space for rationality, along with its instinctive and theoretical assertions, when taken with its implications, leads to sophistry, as has been explained before. In its dark shadow, any possibility to access cognition and knowledge would fall apart. Naturally, it would destroy the rule upon which the natural and empirical sciences are founded.

It is strange that even though they magnify and exaggerate the importance of empirical science, they unknowingly operate from a set of preconceived notions that cannot be proven by empirical science. An example of this is the initial starting point that the universe has a reality that is separate from our perception, that it can be studied, that it is subjected to a particular set of laws, and that these laws are fixed. So, whatever is considered to be from the natural laws today will become an accepted reality tomorrow. Operating from a preconceived framework is neither strange nor hard to envisage. What is more amusing is that they cannot divorce themselves from instinctive rational truths, even though they claim to deny them. Merely exercising the process of evidence-based reasoning speaks to the fact that they accept the concept of causality, and that there is a link between evidence and that which it points to, because evidence really is a cause of knowing that which the evidence points towards.

In an interesting discussion between Frank Turek and an atheist (Michael) found in one of Turek’s lectures at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the atheist explicitly doubted the existence of instinctive rational concepts:

Michael: I would argue that the laws of logic really don’t exist then.

Frank: So you’re saying that they do really exist.

Michael: No.

Frank: Yes, you’re saying they do.

Michael: How am I saying they do?.

Frank: Because you’re using the law of non-contradiction right now to say that I’m wrong.

The law of non-contradiction – which says that opposite ideas cannot both be true at the same time and in the same sense – is one of the fundamental laws of logic. Despite using that law and others, Michael continued to assert that the laws of logic don’t really exist. It sounded like he was saying that the laws of logic are just a human convention; that we human beings simply invent these laws in our minds but they don’t really exist outside of our minds. Several atheists have held this position, including Dr. Stein. When I asked Michael if that was his position, he said “Yes.” So I then asked him, “Before there were any humans on the Earth, was the statement, ‘There are no human beings on the Earth’, true?” Following a long pause, Michael gave a meandering response. After some prompting, he reluctantly admitted that the statement “likely” would be true (yet he continued to cling to the idea that the laws of logic were mere human conventions). Well, of course the statement would be true. And since there were no human minds to conceptualize it, the laws of logic cannot be a mere human convention. In addition, there are several other reasons to believe that the laws of logic are not human conventions that they exist independently of human minds.58

This discussion reveals the atheistic dilemma in determining the nature of innate concepts in and of themselves. So are they objective and absolute, or are they relative based on a person’s senses? In light of previous statements, many atheists state it is not necessary to follow these instinctive concepts. In fact, they explicitly mention they are opposed to them because of ideas from natural science related to quantum physics and other fields. They set out that reality might be, or indeed is, in conflict with innate and instinctive knowledge. The implications of this sort of assertion – that basic rational concepts are merely a result of the workings of our minds, with no external objective truth associated with them – are numerous and dangerous. Having human interaction to bring about conviction is at its essence an attempt to bring about conviction to every person on the basis of a common cognitive playing field. The rule upon which this cognition is built must be natural and universal, not relative to x person. With this rule, it is possible to bridge the cognitive identity between the two sides to bring about conviction. Without this, each person would remain confined to their own cognitive realm, unable to fruitfully interact with the next person, as those meanings that transcend both of them – by which they would have been able to forge interaction with a degree of commonality – would be absent.

Had those instinctive concepts been merely the construct of the human mind, every human idea would also be the construct of our minds, leading knowledge to become relative again. In that case, we would lose both the power and the confidence of ever possibly gaining conviction in virtually anything. This would be a catastrophic problem. Without necessary truths upon which theoretical knowledge can be built, there would be no pathway to offer a coherent philosophical outlook through which the process of evidence-based reasoning or employing proofs would be feasible. The consequences of such an outlook are that one would end up adopting a sophist approach that discards trust in all human knowledge. Such an assertion is the exact environment in which that false claim can gain credence. It asserts that all knowledge is relative, that there is no pathway to gain definitive and conclusive cognitive information, and that nobody possesses objective reality. Such an assertion is self-contradictory, for it assumes that it should be the arbiter unto itself, which exposes its falsehood and error. Disregarding the instinctive rational concepts and their objective nature is in reality to disregard a) every engagement of the human mind, b) the possibility of human interaction, c) the ability to convince one another, and d) the natural empirical sciences. All of these concepts can only survive with the rule that acknowledges instinctive concepts and affirms their higher value that transcends human existence. The truth is that these types of assertions are a natural overflow from adopting the atheist viewpoint. Without affirming a Maker for this universe – a Maker that would be described with absolute perfection – the possibility of affirming absolute truths would not be possible. And if we are unable to affirm absolute truths, there is no chance for proving the existence of absolute and instinctive knowledge, as it is in the nature of instinctive knowledge to be absolute and agnostic of time, place, environment, and persons. Such knowledge is indeed above and beyond the existence of humans. The law of non-contradiction is both necessary and universally true, whether man exists or not. The principle of causality was an absolute truth before man ever came into existence. The same applies to the notion that ‘part < whole’, etc. There is no pathway to affirm these absolutes without affirming an absolute existence, which is Allah .

A person in denial of his own existence is unable to prove the existence of any absolute truth. Even though he offers a compromise by claiming ‘relative absolutism’ in some aspects of knowledge and science, this conclusion is totally false, as it does not possess the rule upon which cognition can be based in the first place. However, in reality, it is a conclusion that is largely in line with atheist conceptualisations, through which it is impossible to philosophically set out any rational and instinctive knowledge. This is because the cognitive structure for these types of assertions and the demonstration of them through proof is not possible without having faith in the existence of Allah. Based on this, we can understand the deep and poignant statement of the scholars: ‘Knowing Allah is fundamental to knowing anything.’ I used to ponder quite a bit over this expression in my pursuit of understanding the reality, dimensions, and wealth of meaning behind the outlook expressed in this statement, and the connection between knowing Allah  and all other knowledge. After grasping these facts, it became apparent to me that the point here is this: All this knowledge is actually a branch of knowing Allah . Whosoever does not comprehend His existence is unable to philosophically or rationally establish any coherent cognitive theory that explains to us why this knowledge exists and how it can be acquired. In this regard, Ibn Taymiyyah said, Knowing Him (Allah) is the highest of all knowledge. It is the goal, the end, the culmination, and the root of all knowledge, even though knowledge of other than Him might come first, or might be a precursor to, knowing Him. Knowing Him – in addition to being loftier, more wholesome, and more beneficial – is a necessary need. A servant cannot achieve righteousness without Him. There is no felicity without Him. He is the root to the realisation of all knowledge that – through Him – deserves to be labelled as such.’59

His student Ibn al-Qayyim  said, Ponder over the whole world, in all its parts across its higher and lower dominions. You will find it to be a testament to the Maker, the Creator, and the King. Denying its Maker and rejecting Him in the minds and the innate predispositions is tantamount to denial and rejection of knowledge itself. There is no difference between the two. According to pure, enlightened, and lofty minds and the sound fiṭrah, the indication of the Creator to the creation, the Doer to the action, and the Designer to the fashioned is more obvious than the opposite view. Those with knowledge and foresight use Allah as evidence for His actions and design, whereas common people use His design and actions to point to Him. No doubt, both are correct methods and each is true. The Qur’an comprises of both. As for the evidence from design, it is plentiful. As for the evidence from the Maker, that has a case in point as well. It is what the Messengers pointed to when they told their nations, “Is there any doubt about Allah…?”60, i.e., should we doubt in Allah until evidence for His existence is presented? Which evidence is more proper and apparent than this itself? How can something that is more obscure be used in evidence to prove something that is more obvious? Then the Messengers alerted people to the evidence by adding: “…the Originator of the heavens and the Earth?”61 I heard Shaykh al-Islām Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyyah  say, “How can you demand proof for something that in itself is proof for everything?” He also used to say the following couplet as an example: “Nothing can be deemed to be correct in the minds when day requires evidence.” It is known that the existence of the Lord  is more apparent to the minds and the fiṭrah than the existence of day. Whosoever cannot see this in his mind and fiṭrah should view them with suspicion.62

Suffice it to say that it is Allah  Who is the First Teacher. He is the one Who bestowed His favour upon His creation in the form of education – whether without an intermediary, such as people’s innate and instinctive predispositions, Him giving the potential and the tools to allow them to analyse and reason, or via His Prophets and Messengers. He  said, ‘Read, O Prophet, in the Name of your Lord Who created.’63 Thus, the Islamic conceptualisation of cognition declares that the manifestations of all knowledge originate from Allah , and that there is no way – whether rationally or philosophically – to establish a coherent theory of knowledge without affirming this fact. So, the existence of this instinctive knowledge points to His existence , as they are intuitively felt. If the opposing side accepts their existence as objective truths, they would be compelled to affirm the existence of Allah, as these truths cannot possibly be established without Him. However, if the opposing side denies it, the price of such a denial would be very high, as it would categorically shut off the door to any knowledge acquisition; in fact, it would be worse than that, on par with sophism. Consider the following example – a discussion between Nick Pollard and Richard Dawkins:

Pollard: ‘Susan Blackmore said recently in The Skeptic: “I think the idea we exist is an illusion...The idea that there is a self in there that decides things, acts and is responsible...is a whopping great illusion. The self we construct is just an illusion because actually there’s only brains and chemicals and this ‘self’ doesn’t exist – it never did and there’s nobody to die.” Would you agree with that kind of reductionist explanation of who your wife is, who you are?’.

Dawkins: ‘Yes. I mean, Susan is sticking her neck out for one particular view of what a self is, and it’s one that I am inclined to think is probably right; but I don’t think we are yet in a position to substantiate that. What makes it seem plausible to me is various things. One is that brains have come into the world by a gradual process of evolution and we have a continuum from ourselves through all the other animals to animals that have very simple brains, to animals that have no brains at all, to plants. Certainly, the prediction that we don’t survive death seems to me to be overwhelmingly probable. That would be a good operational test – not that we can actually test it, but in principle: if a self is something other than brain stuff, then it should survive when the brain rots – and I’d place a very heavy bet (which I realize I could never actually win) that when my brain rots myself will not in any sense exist.’.

Pollard: ‘Do you believe that the idea that I exist is an illusion?’.

Dawkins: ‘Well, I’m certainly happy that we are a product of brains and that when our brains die, we disappear. To call us an illusion is possibly a good way to express it. But I wouldn’t wish to commit myself to saying that our sense of self is an illusion. It depends what you mean. I certainly feel that there’s a me.’64.

So Dawkins was quite prepared to accept that the conscience of an individual per se, his sense of personal identity that distinguishes him from others, and his understanding of the ‘me’ concept are all merely illusions. Though Dawkins attempted to come across as diplomatic to downplay the problematic nature of his answer to the reader, his words are sufficient in clearly conveying the type of ideas he espouses. Indeed, Dawkins attempted to portray himself as a rational person during the last moments of this discussion. However, in reality, he tried to sidestep the topic and did not offer anything that would contradict the assertion he made. Merely sensing the concept of ‘me’ and being conscious of it was not the topic of discussion at all, for that is an obvious matter that every person finds and believes for themselves. The posed question actually was the following: Is there anything that explains this tendency? In other words: Is there anything that is real and in existence, which can be correctly classed as ‘me’, that explains how we feel about our existence? Or is the concept of ‘self’, ‘me’, or ‘distinct personal identity’ merely an illusion without any external reality?

From the fiṭrah-driven elements that man finds in himself is the deeply entrenched moral instinct. With this, one can grasp not only what are good and bad morals, but one also instinctively feels that these moral values are objective by nature. Being objective is what gives these morals their true value and removes relativity from them. These are objective realities that transcend not only human existence, but all material existence. Whether man and the universe exist or not, these moral values retain their objectivity.

Comprehension is twofold: the ability to distinguish good from evil, and the ability to comprehend the objectivity found in the values of good and evil. This duet of comprehension can be deployed in this subject, in which we are attempting to demonstrate the existence of innate predispositions in our own selves that point to the existence of God. This is because this moral inclination cannot be explained without affirming the existence of the Divine. Just as the rational concepts require that we ask the question ‘Who placed them in the soul?’, then likewise the moral inclination requires us to ask: ‘Who placed it there?’ There is another question that is deeper: What explains this instinctive feeling in ourselves that justice is an objective value that makes it universally good, as opposed to injustice, which we necessarily consider to be an objectively evil trait? Consequently, is it possible to offer a philosophically coherent moral outlook in light of the view that does not acknowledge the existence of God? In other words, is it possible that there is any objective good without the existence of God? Put in another way: Is it possible that a person can be good and righteous without the existence of God?

Many atheists jump the gun here, believing that most atheists are morally upright, or that they carry what can only be described as morally good actions in their daily lives. They therefore conclude that it is possible to be good without having any faith in God. However, the question was not whether it is possible to be good without faith in God. What the question is actually demanding is whether it is possible to be good without the existence of God. In other words, can objective moral values exist without the existence of God? If not, then the question of whether we are good or bad becomes irrelevant, as those values would not exist to begin with. This issue reveals one of the deep problems of atheist ideology. It is a problem that goes deeper than merely the difference between good and bad values, or the difference between the means by which good values can be discerned from bad ones. In fact, it is a problem that extends to the question of whether universal moral values that transcend human existence exist, e.g., whether honesty and justice are universally good values, regardless of whether man exists or not, or whether injustice and transgression are universally evil values and not relative to a particular society or era.

The theistic viewpoint adopts this position, and it can argue for its case from a philosophical lens thanks to its faith in the Perfect Lord. This is in addition to the existence of the human fiṭrah that instinctively encourages man to discern between these values. It allows man to grasp that justice is good and injustice is evil – without education or philosophical analysis. It allows him to feel that these values are above and beyond his own existence, and that they are not merely a bunch of titles that man ascribes to a group of actions without any core value being associated with them. The essence of the discussion on morality is a metaphysical one that goes beyond the material realm. Attempting to offer a philosophical viewpoint for the moral dimension from the prison of the material viewpoint is not only difficult, but impossible. Faith in the existence of a God associated with absolute perfection allows a believer to digest the existence of values that are beyond his own existence, as well as universally recognised traits of perfection, those traits of faults that are opposites to perfection, and a universal standard of ethics by which all actions are judged. Without this faith, this standard would cease to exist and the moral standard for judgement would become relative – they would be as many as the number of people and societies out there.

Since an atheist believes that the existence of the universe and man is just a coincidence – or as per the expression of Stephen Hawking: ‘The human race is just a chemical scum on a moderate-sized planet’65 – then what is the scientific or rational justification to believe in the existence of these universal moral values? In light of atheism, does man’s conscience have actual value that paints morality with any level of objectivity? How is it possible to explain the innate tendency within people that these values are above and beyond their existence, allowing them to instinctively know what is good and what is evil? Historical atheist discourse recognised this problem. In the attempt to find a solution, it led to ideas such as nihilism, absurdism, and anarchism. They understood the problem and its implications, so they took them to their rational conclusion, ending up with these deviant philosophies of theirs, while fully cognisant of their implications in light of their materialistic and atheistic outlook on existence.

The problem nowadays is that atheists present themselves as humanists. They express a fair degree of moral hardiness in their discourses regarding what they believe to be right and wrong. However, they fail to clarify the rule upon which this moral hardiness rests. When they do attempt to clarify, they either fall into the problem of a utilitarian and pragmatic justification of morality, in which morality loses its value altogether; or they fall into relativism, in which morality loses its universality. This causes the moral hardiness they portray, and the zeal with which they claim moral values, to lose its justification. An assessment of their method in critiquing the practices they personally are not inclined to view positively would reveal this. It would also highlight the contradiction between the atheist outlook on the universe and moral practice. To clarify, say we have four people. Two are theists who believe in God, the Final Abode (Afterlife), that man will be held to account for his actions, and that he will be recompensed with reward for good acts and with punishment for evil acts. The other two are atheists who do not believe in any recompense in the Afterlife; in fact, they do not believe in the Afterlife at all, nor the existence of God for that matter. One from each pairing adheres to good morals; the other two do not, but rather possess and perpetrate evil practices. We here pose the question: Which of these four is more aligned with his existential outlook on the universe? The answer is obvious: The moral conduct of the pious theist is more attuned to his existential outlook on the universe, which actually believes in the existence of universal morality. The conduct of the immoral theist is not attuned to his religious outlook. As for the atheist whose moral conduct appears to be good, it is not attuned in reality to his nihilistic outlook on the universe, as moral values therein would not be universal. Dr. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Masīrī has an interesting observation to this scenario, revealing some of our innermost thoughts on the topic. He says, ‘Humanist philosophy in the West, with its emphasis on universal moral values that transcend man’s natural and materialistic state, is an expression of the hidden god and the materialist’s unconscious search for holiness. These types of values…do not have any material foundation.’66

I have personally witnessed a number of the youth affected by atheist doubts who argue about the existence of God. I asked them, ‘In light of your denial of God’s existence, how can you rationally or philosophically explain why you are morally responsible, as I think you are? In fact, how do you explain the existence of transcendent and universal moral values at all, in light of your denial?’ What would surprise me every time is how the other side was unable to comprehend the quagmire they were in, and how they erroneously believed – having denied the existence of God – that their denial was the end of their journey on this issue. They could not understand how their denial is actually just the beginning of a series of denials, in which they would be forced to deny a number of universal truths, such as the instinctive rational concepts, universal morality, the innate sense of purpose and free will, and man’s value in and of himself, among other issues.

This type of problem explains why atheists tend to run away from discussing the question of morality’s ontology, namely the philosophical question in relation to the very existence of moral values. We note that they attempt to change the question to one of epistemology: a question regarding how we can identify moral values. It is a strange tactic on their part, which I have unfortunately found them perpetrating in every debate that has touched upon the question of morality. For example, see the debate between William Lane Craig and Christopher Hitchens, the one between Frank Turek and Christopher Hitchens, the three-part debate between William Lane Craig and Lawrence Krauss, the debate between Trent Horn and Dan Barker, as well as many others to discover how they run away from the question. The sole exception to this, which I have come across, was David Silverman’s debate with Frank Turek. Silverman clearly said that any morality that is presumed to be natural, objective, or universal does not exist – all values that a person has are relative. When confronted with the implications of his view – like, among many examples, torturing children or cannibalising them is not universally wrong, but only relative to the person who believes it is wrong – all he could say was: ‘Yes, this is not an easy question.’ We should understand that when we discuss moral philosophy, there are two important levels to the discussion:

1. Does universal morality exist or not?.

2. How can we know about those moral values – if they indeed exist?.

As the New Atheists can sense the problem arising from the first question in light of their atheist conceptualisation, you will see them repeatedly sidestep the question and spend all their efforts answering the second: ‘How can we know good morals from bad ones? Is there a way to know about them outside the religious framework or not? Can the natural sciences help us solve this problem?’ Yet the first question would remain unanswered. It represents a real problem for atheist philosophy. In his famous novel The Brothers Karamazov, Fyodor Dostoevsky writes that the prisoner Mitya said, ‘But what will become of men then? Without God and immortal life? All things are lawful then, they can do what they like?’67 In the same story, after a few pages, Mitya says, It’s God that’s worrying me. That’s the only thing that’s worrying me. What if He doesn’t exist? What if Rakitin’s right – that it’s an idea made up by men? Then, if He doesn’t exist, man is the chief of the Earth, of the universe. Magnificent! Only how is he going to be good without God? That’s the question. I always come back to that. For whom is man going to love then? To whom will he be thankful? To whom will he sing the hymn? Rakitin laughs. Rakitin says that one can love humanity without God. Well, only a snivelling idiot can maintain that. I can’t understand it. Life’s easy for Rakitin. “You'd better think about the extension of civic rights, or even of keeping down the price of meat. You will show your love for humanity more simply and directly by that, than by philosophy.” I answered him, “Well, but you, without a God, are more likely to raise the price of meat, if it suits you, and make a rouble on every kopeck.” He lost his temper. But after all, what is goodness? Answer me that, Alexey. Goodness is one thing with me and another with a Chinaman, so it’s a relative thing. Or isn’t it? Is it not relative? A treacherous question! You won’t laugh if I tell you it’s kept me awake two nights. I only wonder now how people can live and think nothing about it.68

A number of atheists have written to deal with this dangerous problem. However, they all sidestep the core of the issue, which reveals an utter incapacity on their part to answer this deep question. For example, look at Sam Harris’s attempt to answer the question in his book The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values, in which he offered a perspective that can be summarised as follows: Morality raises the welfare of man. As science is able to tell us what can achieve welfare, it is therefore able to delineate good moral values from evil ones.

I am not going to tackle the issue of whether this tool is correct or not. A long debate can be held over to what extent science is effective in uncovering moral values, or whether science even has a position in this space at all. The fact is that all what Sam Harris did here was to construct a philosophical viewpoint for scientific abstracts, not that those abstracts engage with the question of morality in and of itself. Harris assumed a viewpoint on morality that is based on what advances the welfare of man as the essence and standard of the moral process. He did not offer any evidence – scientific or empirical – for why he chose this standard. The reason is obvious: Natural science per se cannot tell us whether this standard is correct or not. Although science can, to an extent, tell us what can contribute to the welfare of man, the assertion that ‘contributing to the welfare of man is morally good’ is not a scientific one, nor a scientifically demonstrable one. We shall discuss the unsuitability of the natural sciences as a moral standard when we come to examining detailed examples. It is indeed a very limited tool in its ability to assist us in the topic. However, I want to highlight the impartiality of this book by answering the ontological question of morality.

There are works that attempt to answer the question, such as Michael Shermer’s The Science of Good and Evil, Robert Hinde’s Why is Good Good?, Robert Buckman’s Can We Be Good Without God?, and Marc Hauser’s Moral Minds. All these works adopt a Darwinist outlook to explain morality. Though they do not explicitly state it, they are on the verge of claiming that there is nothing called universal morality. And this is how their view should be, as the implication of the Darwinist approach in dealing with this question is that morality does not have any real universal existence; rather, it is like man, with the capacity to evolve and regress as per the trajectory of the universe. Man’s moral conscience, they claim, is just an accident and does not possess any real objective value. For example, when a cat eats a mouse, it has not perpetrated any moral wrongdoing. This is how all human actions should be viewed in the Darwinist conceptualisation. In a social context, a person’s criminal actions should not be considered immoral from an objective reading.

We can now see a noteworthy anomaly in atheist ideology. The most famous tools for the dissemination of atheism (such as the question of evil and divine justice, or denigrating faith based on evils perpetrated by its adherents) appear to be meaningless tools in a backdrop where God is considered to be non-existent. This is because good and evil have no presence except in light of God’s existence. In reality, an atheist is unable to establish the foundation to deny the existence of God unless he acknowledges Him. This is a deep anomaly; in fact, it is a painful contradiction for them. When we then come to look at the issue of setting the standards by which morality can be discerned from immoral values, and how the tools to identify both can be delineated, we find that there is a great deal of contention among atheists. Whereas Harris attempts to make science the source of knowing morality, Dawkins states, ‘Science has no methods for deciding what is ethical. That is a matter for individuals and for society.’69 In fact, Dawkins takes it a step further: ‘Not all absolutism is derived from religion. Nevertheless, it is pretty hard to defend absolutist morals on grounds other than religious ones.’70

Let us stay with Dawkins for a moment. Unlike other pioneers of New Atheism, he has the temerity to express the problems faced by atheism in this regard. In one of his discussions, he acknowledges the difficulties on the issue: ‘What’s to prevent us from saying Hitler wasn’t right? I mean, that is a genuinely difficult question.’71 In another discussion, he says, ‘I couldn't, ultimately, argue intellectually against somebody who did something I found obnoxious. I think I could finally only say, “Well, in this society you can’t get away with it” and call the police. I realize this is very weak, and I’ve said I don't feel equipped to produce moral arguments in the way I feel equipped to produce arguments of a cosmological and biological kind. But I still think it’s a separate issue from beliefs in cosmic truths.’72 In fact, in another discussion, he went even further. When asked, ‘Ultimately, your belief that rape is wrong is as arbitrary as the fact that we've evolved five fingers rather than six’, his reply was: ‘You could say that, yeah.’73

He clarifies this further in another discussion: ‘Well, one way to understand it is that, by accident, we have evolved a brain which is powerful enough to be able to look into the future and evaluate distant consequences. So, I can see that to spend my whole life satisfying selfish whims might make me less happy in the long run than if I spend it doing something else like helping other people. If you catch me giving money to Oxfam74 and you say, “Why are you doing that?” and I can’t answer you, it doesn't seem to me that I have in any way betrayed my belief in a godless cosmos. If you challenged me with a fossil rabbit which radioactive dating proved was 2000 million years old, that would really be worrying. That would, at a stroke, disprove evolution. Challenging me with being able to explain why I give money to charity, that doesn’t bother me very much.’75 After all, Dawkins is the one who made the famous statement: ‘The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference.’76

These statements expose the fragility of his position on morality, and the lack of any principles upon which the existence of these values can be based. Dawkins’s problem is that he is ever ready to accuse others of moral deviance, just as he is prepared to describe actions he does not like as immoral. In fact, he says religion is evil and that Islam is the greatest evil in the world today. Yet it would seem from his statements that the universe does not have any inherent evil or good in it at all. This is a brief summary of the theoretical problems associated with moral philosophy in atheism. When we explore the detailed application of morality in atheist thought, other problems will appear. In a debate between Hamza Tzortzis and Lawrence Krauss held in Britain titled Islam or Atheism: Which Makes More Sense?, Tzortzis asked Krauss why incest is wrong. The audience gasped when he said, ‘It’s not clear to me that it’s wrong.’ He went on to clarify that this act has a societal and empirical taboo, as incest leads to genetic defects in children, which is why we have (as he says) developed to dislike it. As for the deed itself, he said that it was hard for him to find a moral justification to prevent it. For this reason, he said he did not see a problem for a brother and a sister to commit incest, so long as it is a one off and contraception is used as a precautionary measure. On this, Richard Dawkins tweeted, ‘“Why is incest wrong?” Islamist asked. http://bit.ly/16vpiJG @LKrauss1 tried to use REASON in his answer. Reason? Pearls before swine.’ Peter Singer went a step further, stating he saw no issue in bestiality so long as the rights of the animal are not violated. He made these comments in an open social discussion. Obviously, his remarks attracted huge criticism.77 Related to this is the debate between William Lane Craig and Christopher Hitchens titled Does God Exist? When Hitchens was asked about this, he did not give a clear-cut answer like he typically used to do. He offered an off-topic remark and attempted to evade the question twice.78 On the online Eltwhed forum, there is a thread by Muhammad al-Bāḥith titled ‘Scandalous atheist positions and criminal Darwinist morality (updated)’. In this, the thread author mentions a number of immoral assertions and deviant practices considered to be acceptable by some atheists.79

As mentioned before, what magnifies the problematic nature of all these theories is their overzealousness in expressing their vision on morality, and critiquing opposing viewpoints to the extent that the uninitiated listener would start to think that the atheists have a universal moral system that everybody should adhere to. However, these atheists are completely unable to offer any rational or scientific justification for the existence of any absolute moral values.

I conclude this point with an example that highlights the overzealousness with which atheists approach this topic. According to Richard Dawkins, the religious upbringing of children is a form of abuse and conflicts with their human rights. The mere utterance to them that ‘God created the world’ is taking advantage of their innocence. One of his ten pieces of advice in his book The God Delusion states that children should not be taught anything religious.80 He says elsewhere, ‘It’s one thing to say people should be free to believe whatever they like, but should they be free to impose their beliefs on their children? Is there something to be said for society stepping in? What about bringing up children to believe manifest falsehoods?’81

This issue took up a large part of his book. In fact, he dedicated an entire section to it. In it, he says, ‘Once, in the question time after a lecture in Dublin, I was asked what I thought about the widely publicized cases of sexual abuse by Catholic priests in Ireland. I replied that, horrible as sexual abuse no doubt was, the damage was arguably less than the long-term psychological damage inflicted by bringing the child up Catholic in the first place. It was an off-the-cuff remark made in the heat of the moment, and I was surprised that it earned a round of enthusiastic applause from that Irish audience...

But I was reminded of the incident later when I received a letter from an American woman in her forties who had been brought up Roman Catholic. At the age of seven, she told me, two unpleasant things had happened to her. She was sexually abused by her parish priest in his car. And, around the same time, a little school friend of hers, who had tragically died, went to hell because she was a Protestant. Or so my correspondent had been led to believe by the then official doctrine of her parents’ church. Her view as a mature adult was that, of these two examples of Roman Catholic child abuse, the one physical and the other mental, the second was by far the worst.82

This is also the view of the other New Atheists: Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens, Daniel Dennett, Lawrence Krauss, and others. What is really surprising is why Dawkins would remain silent over what civil society and the state should do to address this ‘problem’ of indoctrinating children, as he puts it. Why does he not explicitly call for decisive measures against this, such as imprisonment, fines, or intrusive supervision of parents who raise their children on religion? Considering that he believes that this act is abusing children’s rights, and that the harm caused by this is far more than even sexual abuse meted out to them, he should be open about what should be done. The overzealous manner in which these ideas are being disseminated explains – to me at least – the type of action taken by fascist atheist regimes who had political power and were able to combat the ‘evils of religion’. This petrifies me, as these sorts of ideas can be imported by groups that do not suffice with just loud voices, but in fact believe there is a need to make moves to finish off religious movements. This can be in the form of armed militia roaming the land to remove all traces of ‘evil religion’ by force. And according to them, the most evil manifestation of religion is Islam.83

The summary that I wish to underscore is that the innate moral inclination and instinctive feeling that morality is natural, objective, and transcendent beyond the existence of man, is one of the proofs for Allah’s existence . Without Him, there would be no point to this type of moral inclination. In fact, there would be no meaning to morality at all, as its objective transcendent value would have been negated. Just as we comprehend through our senses the necessity of the external world’s existence, we also feel the necessity of the existence of these absolute moral values. When we call out an oppressor by stating that his deed is oppression and immoral, we are expressing our deep belief that oppression is immoral. This belief transcends our personal feelings. It reveals our deep conscience in that there are values that are above and beyond our own selves. We can instinctively feel that harming children and perpetrating injustice and oppression are absolutely immoral. It is not a tendency that came as a result of mere personal upbringing or societal conditioning. Rather, these types of practices are described as being absolute and constant by the instinctive rational concepts. The atheist philosopher, Michael Ruse, said it well: ‘The man who says that it is morally acceptable to rape little children, is just as mistaken as the man who says that 2 + 2 = 5.’84 Obviously, the problem lies in how morality is viewed in light of atheism. It is like a child dragging a cat from its tail. Its mother tells them not to do this. The child asks, ‘Why?’ She answers: ‘Because it hurts the cat.’ The child asks, ‘What is the problem in hurting it?’ She says, ‘Because it is wrong to hurt any animal without cause or advantage gained.’ The child keeps going on: ‘Why is it wrong to hurt an animal without cause?’ The mother ends up frustrated and proclaims: ‘It is wrong. End of.’ Indeed – it is wrong, end of. However, where did this mistake of dragging a cat from its tail acquire its objective value of being wrong that is independent of us? This is the question that atheist movements are unable to offer an answer.

It is possible to fashion this point into an argument for the existence of God. So, if God did not exist, then objective moral values would not exist. However, objective moral values do exist by necessity – therefore, God exists.

When I embarked the world of reading, one of the first books I read was by Shawkiy Abu Khalil titled Gharīzah am Taqdīr Ilāhī? (Instinct or Divine Decree?). This book adopts wonderful scenes from the animal world, in which animals instinctively carry out specific actions that are in their survival interests, without ever being educated, trained, or brought up to do so.

Who guided a child to take the breast of its mother? Who planted the instinct of motherhood in a mother’s heart, so that she looks after her children? Who taught birds to migrate between specific places? Who instilled the survival instinct in all living things? Who imprinted the love of beauty in the soul? All these phenomena, like their predecessors that are innately found in living humans and creatures, beg the question: How did these instincts come about? Who created them in the soul? Ask the atheist about them. He will go on about Darwinism and how these instincts were part and parcel of the evolution process for the purpose of survival of living creatures. However, the question remains: Where did these instincts come from in the first place? In other words, in light of Darwinist evolution, how did this instinct come about, which at a point of time during evolution did not exist, only to appear all of a sudden in such a deeply embedded manner within creature’s souls? When exactly did these instincts first appear? How did they form? And how are they generationally passed down? Atheists have no answer to these questions. The only thing they have is either to express their utter confoundment or to bring this discussion back to the selfish gene85 that pushes a living being to survive at any cost. We can only dance to its tune, which is how Richard Dawkins famously puts it. Ponder over a mother’s instinct. Pray tell me – have you seen anything purer than that? I swear by Allah, there is nothing in existence like a mother’s heart – a symbol of true love and perfect compassion. I ask you by Allah to remind yourself of the stories of mothers with their children – they are endless wonders that words are unable to describe. As I write these words, I am confronted by dozens of stories:

• A son stabs his mother, but she intercedes on his behalf so that no harm comes his way.

• Another abandons ever visiting his mother – she has no hope left in life other than to drag herself to him in order to see him.

• A paraplegic son has an elderly mother who looks after him in spite of her age.

• A mother’s daughter died. Her heart was transplanted into another woman. Imagine you were there to see the tears rolling down her face as she heard the heartbeat of her daughter’s heart inside another person through a stethoscope.

These stories and others are in the millions. Every mother has her own story with her child. Every story has a case of love that deserves telling. Conversely, the callousness of Darwinism would like to render all of this into mere utilitarian mechanical movements, subject to the whims of the selfish gene. In other words, there is no real love that preoccupies a mother’s heart, but rather it is selfishness that engulfs her genes as she is engulfed by her selfish desire to survive through that child. It is a bleak and meaningless picture. It robs people of everything that is of meaning to them, and of anything that is precious to them. Man can rise above his personal inclinations and his desire to survive. He is able to escape the fierce grip of Darwinism. He can use his inclination to boot evolution out of contention. He can make a sacrifice for someone else, even if it means sacrificing his own self. Yet, a Darwinist86 would come to tell us that he is personally ready to lay down his life for two brothers or eight cousins. You may ask: Why these specific numbers? And how can one explain the point of sacrifice in Darwin’s theory? It is quite simple: The selfish gene will be able to maintain his identity through these two brothers; it will need a larger pool of cousins to guarantee the survival of his genes and identity through them. This is how a supposedly enlightened human – enlightened only by the dark theory of the Darwinist selfish gene theory – explains what sacrifice means in Darwinist theory. An acceptable explanation for these instincts can only be attained when we believe in the existence of Allah . Allah  is the One Who gifted them. A mother’s mercy, for example, is but a very tiny part of Allah’s mercy, which He placed within His creatures, by which the entirety of His creation shows mercy among themselves.

During his discussion with Pharaoh, Mūsā  alluded to the instinctive element in all of creation – and the one who placed those in them. Allah says, ‘Pharaoh asked, “Who then is the Lord of you two, O Moses?”’87 ‘He replied that it was their Lord Who created all of creation, gave every creation an image suitable for it – large, medium, or small – all of which points to His great work of art, as well as the rest of His attributes. Mūsā  then said, “…then He guided”88

every creation to that which He created it for. This general guidance is observable in all creations. You can see every creation striving for benefit and warding off harm from itself. It is not just humans who do this, for Allah  even placed a degree of intellect in animals, whereby they can be seen doing this, as per the statement of Allah : “Who has perfected everything He created.”89

Consequently, the One Who created all of creation, balanced them all so beautifully that minds cannot envisage anything more beautifully calibrated, and guided them to what is in their interests is the real Lord. Denying Him would be denying the greatest of all existence. It would be extreme arrogance, obstinance, and a false proclamation. Even if we were to assume a person denied all known things in front of us, his denial of the Lord of the Worlds would be even worse than that. This is why when Pharaoh could not counter this conclusive evidence, he resorted to whataboutery and evaded the subject: “Pharaoh asked, ‘And what about previous peoples?’”90, i.e., what is their state? What is their news? Is there any update on them? They too denied God, disbelieved, oppressed, were stubborn – are we simply just not following them?91

In his book on exegesis, Ibn al-Jawzī said, ‘On Allah’s statement “…then He guided”92 are three views: 1) He guided how a male approaches a female; 2) He guided to marriage, food, and shelter; and 3) He guided everything to its sustenance. Mujāhid said this. If one raises the objection of how this demonstrates a proof against Pharaoh, the answer is that creation and guidance are known to exist, so there must be a Creator and Guide.’93 One example that Allah  related in the Holy Qur’an in this regard is: ‘And your Lord inspired the bees: “Make your homes in the mountains, the trees, and in what people construct.”’94

Another innate tendency present in man is his deep emotional sense of purpose, or teleological tendency. It is this feeling that makes him ask the big questions: ‘Who am I? Where did I come from? Why am I here? Where will I end up?’ These deep questions are what distinguish humans from animals. If animals desire to move on their primal instincts, what moves man is his innate tendency to seek out the purpose of his existence and life. This is why the truest of names are Ḥārith (ploughman) and Hammām (energetic worker), as stated by the Prophet 95, as they comprise of two central features of man that represent his desire to wish and to seek. These two traits are not possible without the existence of something that can be wished and sought after. The ultimate aim that can be sought is Allah .

It is as Ibn Taymiyyah  said: ‘The soul cannot be vacant of feeling and want. In fact, such vacantness is impossible in the soul. Feeling and want are part and parcel of its reality. A soul cannot be envisaged without feeling and wanting. It is not correct to say that the soul can be vacant of the Creator  – vacant of feeling either His existence or non-existence, or of His love or lack thereof. It is not correct to say that acknowledging Him and His love is not a necessary part of the soul’s existence, even if unopposed. Rather, this is false, because the soul carries what it desires as a necessary part of its fiṭrah. Because the soul always wants as a necessary function of its essence, it cannot be envisaged that a person’s soul can ever be vacant of wanting something. ‘This is why the Prophet  said, “The truest of names are Ḥārith and Hammām.” The soul after all is a living creature – every living creature moves of its own volition. Therefore, the soul must have movement that it wills for itself. Thus, every “wishing entity” must have something it wishes for. Whatever is wished is either for itself per se, or it is as a means to something else; something wished as a means to something else must inevitably lead to the primary wish. Therefore, it is impossible that all of a person’s wishes are a means to something else, as that would lead to the fallacy of serial infinity of final causes, which is impossible, just like – or even more so than – the serial infinity of efficient causes. Given that man must have something he wants, it is ultimately Allah that his heart yearns for. Therefore, every servant must have a god. It is thus learned that the servant is predispositioned to love his god.96

This state of man, and those questions to which he is predispositioned to explore, would be absolutely pointless in light of atheism. If man is the result of an accident and the random coincidence of matter and time, such questions would be without value; in fact, they would be utterly meaningless. This is explicitly mentioned by Richard Dawkins and other atheists who ridicule these great questions. And yes, these questions would indeed be ridiculous from an atheist viewpoint.

Their state is very close to the early polytheists, as Allah says, ‘And they argue, “There is nothing beyond our worldly life. We die; others are born. And nothing destroys us but the passage of time.”’97 So if our final destination is death and nothing else, and if there is no god after that, life would really be meaningless. This inclination in our souls – to search for the ultimate purpose of life – is merely an absurd inclination. Otherwise, in light of atheism, what is the real difference between whether I, humankind, or the universe exist or not? Is there any explanation for this innate tendency? The Mahjari poet Elia Abu Madi (Īliyā Abū Māḍī) has a great piece of poetry, in which he depicted this confusion. His lengthy ode, Qaṣīdah al-Ṭalāsim, evokes pain and confusion. He starts it off with this:

I have come. I don’t know where from. But I have come.

I saw a path in front of me, so I walked.

I shall continue to walk, whether I like it or not.

How did I come? How did I see my path?.

I don’t know.

Am I new or ancient in this existence?.

Am I free or a prisoner in shackles?.

Am I leading my own life or am I being led?.

I wish I knew, but….

I don’t.

And my path. What is my path? Is it long or short?.

Am I ascending, or am I falling into it and drowning?.

Am I traversing down the path, or is it the path that is traversing?.

Or is it that we are both still and it is time that is moving?.

I do not know.

I wonder if I am a trustworthy keeper of secrets.

Do you think I knew I was buried in it?.

And that I would emerge and come into existence?.

Or do you think I understood nothing?.

I do not know.

What do you say about the time before I became an upright human?.

Do you think I was nothing, or do you think I was something?.

Is there a solution to this balderdash, or will it remain forever?.

I do not know. I do not know why.

I do not know.98.

In atheism, life would almost be like the play Waiting for Godot, written by Samuel Beckett. It comprises of a two-way inconsequential discussion between two actors, who are waiting for a third man who never arrives. This is almost exactly how our lives would be – killing time without aim or purpose. This was acknowledged by the most ardent of pioneers of the anarchic, nihilistic, and absurdist schools of atheism.

However, atheists today want to leapfrog this problem with an overly simplified solution. They claim that although man came about as a result of coincidence and random movement of matter, he can still set his personal goals. What they want to tell us is this: ‘Yes, on a theoretical level, we believe that there is no aim, goal, or point to life. However, we do not carry this theoretical view into practice, as life as such would not have been possible. Rather, what we strive to do is to forge some purpose in life. In other words, we dupe ourselves into believing that there is some goal for us to live.’

A feature of humans is that they instinctively feel within themselves the differentiation between man’s choices and those acts that emanate involuntarily from him. When a person raises a glass of water to his mouth, picks up his bag, or gets in his car, he can instinctively differentiate between those and his heart pulsing, the blood running in his veins, and the cold shivers his body feels. A person can stop breathing for a while by choice, but he is unable to continue to do so, as the involuntary bodily reaction requires him to breath. This innate tendency – that people have free will, which they can instinctively feel – requires an explanation. In fact, the existence of this tendency requires an explanation.

It would seem that atheism, in light of its materialistic outlook on existence, is unable to offer a plausible explanation for the phenomenon of free will. If our voluntary actions are merely and exclusively the result of biochemical interactions and electric pulses in the body’s neuromuscular system, and that is all governed by fixed laws, how is it possible for there to be any free will? This has led many atheists to adopt an extreme determinist philosophy. In this conceptualisation, free will is an illusion and man is actually programmed to do what he does, even though he might think he has free will. In classical Arabic literature, one determinist expressed this as ‘Man is programmed with an image of one with free will’.

In his book Free Will, Sam Harris says, ‘My choices matter – and there are paths towards making wiser ones – but I cannot choose what I choose. And if it ever appears that I do – for instance, after going back between two options – I do not choose to choose what I choose. There is a regress here that always ends in darkness.’99 This position was well received by the atheist rank and file, and even by those with a materialistic outlook on the world who have reservations on atheism. What Harris said in the beginning of the book suffices in learning about his position: ‘Free will is an illusion.’100 He goes on to say, ‘Free will is actually more than an illusion (or less)101, in that it cannot be made conceptually coherent.’102

In his book The Science of Good and Evil, Michael Shermer tackled the issue of free will in a dedicated section. Having discussed the complexity of influences and factors that contribute to a person making a specific choice, he said, ‘The number of causes and the complexity of their interactions make the predetermination of human action pragmatically impossible. We can even put a figure on the causal net of the universe to see just how absurd it is to think we can get our minds fully around it. Tulane University theoretical physicist Frank Tipler has calculated that in order for a computer in the far future of the universe to resurrect in a virtual reality every person who ever lived or could have lived, with all causal interactions between themselves and their environment, it would need 10 to the power of 10 to the power of 123 bits (a 1 followed by 10123 zeros) of memory. An entity capable of this would be, for all intents and purposes, omniscient and omnipotent, and this is what Tipler calls the Omega Point, or God. Suffice it to say that no computer within the conceivable future will achieve this level of power; likewise no human brain even comes close. Thus, as far as we are concerned, the causal net will always be full of holes. Therefore, in the language of this model: human freedom is action taken with an ignorance of causes within a conjuncture of events that compels and is compelled to a certain course of action by constraining prior conditions. To that extent we may act as if we are free.’103 This is clear in its implication that free will is a mere illusion, and that when our deeds appear, it might seem that we are free in what we do, although in reality, we are not.

In the final part of the trilogy of debates between Lawrence Krauss and William Lane Craig, the question of free will came up. Krauss evaded the topic and did not offer a clear answer. However, he did – after some pressure – allude to ideas similar to those championed by Shermer in the previous citation, revealing that he is in total agreement with hard determinism, even though he was embarrassed to say it explicitly. As for Christopher Hitchens, he has an interesting answer to the question. When asked, ‘Do you have free will?’, his reply was: ‘Yes I have free will – I have no choice but to have it.’ In his debate with the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, Richard Dawkins was hesitant on the topic of free will, though he was bolder than Krauss. He stated that his materialistic outlook on the world led him to incline to the view that there is no such thing as free will, though he stressed that he had not given the issue much thought. Nevertheless, in his River Out of Eden, Dawkins has a famous passage that is indicative of his position: ‘DNA neither knows nor cares. DNA just is. And we dance to its music.’104 In other words, what motivates man is the selfish survivalist gene, and we can only dance to its rhythm and tune. Daniel Dennett has a book called Freedom Evolves, in which he offered his perspective. His view is opposed to Harris’s extreme view in negating free will altogether. In philosophical circles, Dennett’s view is known as compatibilism – a hybrid of absolute free will and hard determinism. It argues that it is possible to marry the two without falling into self-conflict. In my estimation, this view is one that is more of soft determinism than it is about believing in true free will. Coincidentally, Harris severely critiqued compatibilism in his book Free Will. There is no doubt that the purely materialistic view on existence and life can throw up such ludicrous concepts on human free will. In this view, the whole universe is governed by strict, unchangeable laws. Man – with all his feelings, emotions, and his very being – cannot escape its grip; rather, his choices and wishes are but biochemical reactions administered by the brain. Even if he thinks he has choice, that choice has already been programmed into him. The implications of determinism are both numerous and dangerous. It raises problems on morality and questions on individual responsibility. So, if criminals are programmed to do what they do, what is then the moral justification to punish them? If good people are programmed to be good, what is the moral justification to recompense them, thank them, and praise them? What is the moral justification to resent evil perpetrated by humans? In atheism, all of these would be programmed routines that bring about predetermined actions, from which man cannot separate himself. In fact, how would an atheist justify – in light of determinism – proselytising for atheism? A believer would have already been programmed to believe, and likewise an atheist to disbelieve. So why then this zealotry when inviting people to atheism, when in reality there is no true freedom for man to choose? What is the moral justification to acquire knowledge and science when a person cannot discern between right and wrong, given that he has no free will? A person would simply be moved and pushed to a particular set of results, regardless of the nature of those results and whether they can be described as right or wrong. In the beginning of his book The Astonishing Hypothesis, Francis Crick said, ‘The Astonishing Hypothesis is that “You”, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules. As Lewis Carroll’s Alice might have phrased it: “You’re nothing but a pack of neurons.” This hypothesis is so alien to the ideas of most people alive today that it can truly be called astonishing.’105

Imagine if Crick instead wrote this in the beginning of his book: ‘The Astonishing Hypothesis is that every scientific conclusion in this book that I have derived was not the result of true free will. In fact, it is no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.’ Would such conclusions have any scientific or cognitive value to them?

Is it not intriguing that Sam Harris is prepared to write an entire book on free will to convince us that it does not exist, and that man is subject to hard determinism? Why would there be any value to those letters and words then when he constructed them without his own free will? Based on this theory, he did not construct anything rational; rather, they are just a bunch of letters that were cobbled together as a result of biochemical processes whose agenda is not to seek out the truth, let alone to arrive at it. After all of this, it is the irony of ironies that atheists label themselves ‘free thinkers’ as an expression of their ideological identity, when it is their atheist view that is unable to offer any scientific rule upon which it is possible to build any intellectual activity, never mind their clear denial of human free will, without which there would not be objective value to any intellectual activity. In light of their view, man is neither a thinker nor free. Is it also not strange that atheists are overly zealous to stamp the illusion of God out of existence and replace it with atheist ideas, yet at the same time, they are not so keen to disabuse people from the illusion of free will? All of this reveals the danger of the view of atheists vis-à-vis existence. It is a view laden with chasms and holes. The source of this is atheism’s denial of God. It is a type of pure nihilism that dominates the scene when the Lord is taken out of the equation of existence. It is therefore incorrect to confine the debate of this phenomenon to the limits of questions on the Creator. Rather, there should be a detailed study into the implications and impact of denying God’s existence on cognitive structures, one’s outlook on the universe, one’s position on the questions of purpose, values, morality, as well as other issues.

Allah is not the only illusion according to atheism. Morality is an illusion; human free will is an illusion; self-conscience is an illusion; the meaning and purpose of existence is an illusion; the basic rational concepts are an illusion; man’s spiritual existence is an illusion; and the question of the reality of humanity is an illusion. It is as the atheist Will Provine, former Professor of Life Sciences at Cornell University, stated: ‘No Gods, no life after death, no ultimate foundation for ethics, no ultimate meaning in life, and no human free will are all deeply connected to an evolutionary perspective. You’re here today and then gone tomorrow, and that's all there is to it.’ He adds: ‘And I immediately began to doubt the existence of the deity. But it starts by giving up an active deity. Then he gives up the hope that there’s any life after death. When you give those two up, the rest of it follows fairly easily. You give up the hope that there’s an eminent morality. And finally, there’s no human free will. If you believe in evolution, you can’t hope for there being any free will. There’s no hope whatsoever of there being any deep meaning in human life. We live, we die, and we’re gone. We’re absolutely gone when we die.’106

We close this section on this final point. In summary, the soul bears an imprint that requires man to recognise his Lord , acknowledge His perfection, and appreciate that he is in need of Him. Allah  placed imprints on the soul that point to Him. If a man does not hold onto what the fiṭrah points to, he will inevitably fall into the sea of confusion and bewilderment. The fiṭrah can be tainted by doubts and objections, in which case rational evidence is needed to help man rediscover his innate predisposition. We shall discuss this latter point in more detail in the coming sections.