The Islamic Personality by Sheikh Taqīuddīn An-Nabahānī

The personality in every human being consists of his ‘aqliyya (mentality) and nafsiyya (disposition). His outward appearance, body, dress or any thing apart from these has no bearing on his personality, these are only superficial. It would be pointless for anyone to think that such aspects have any relevance or bearing upon the makeup of the human personality. This is because man is distinguished (from other creatures) by his ‘aql (intellect), and it is his sulūk (conduct) that indicates his elevation or decline. This is because man’s sulūk (conduct) in this life is only in accordance with the concepts he holds, his sulūk (conduct) is thus necessarily intertwined with his concepts, beyond separation.

The sulūk (conduct) relates to those actions performed by man to satisfy his instincts and organic needs He therefore acts in accordance with the muyūl (inclinations) that he holds towards satisfaction of these instincts. Thus, his mafahīm (concepts) and muyūl (inclinations) are the backbone of his personality. As for what are these concepts and what do they constitute and what are are their results? And what are these muyūl (inclinations) and what causes their formation and what are their affects? This needs an explanation. Concepts are the meanings of thoughts and not the meanings of statements. A statement or expression denotes a meaning that may or may not exist in reality. Thus, when the poet says:

These meanings exist in reality and are comprehensible through sense-perception, though comprehending them may require deep and enlightened thought. However, when the poet says

This connotation is absolutely non-existent. The man praised did not pierce two horsemen with a single strike of his spear, nor did anyone ask this question, nor is it possible for him to pierce a mile of horsemen, these meanings illustrate and explain the words. As for the meaning of fikr (thought), if the meaning indicated by the words exists in reality and is sensorially perceivable or conceivable by the mind as something that is sensed and thus believed in, this meaning is a concept for the person who senses it, or conceives and believes in it. It is not a concept for anyone who does not sense it or conceive it although he may understand the meanings of the sentence said to him or read by him. Hence it is imperative for one to receive or approach speech, whether he reads or hears it, in an intellectual manner. That is, he must understand the meanings of sentences as they indicate and not as the writer or speaker, or even he himself wants them to be. At the same time, he must comprehend the reality of these meanings in his mind in a manner that he can identify them such that these meanings become concepts. Therefore, concepts are the comprehensible meanings whose reality is comprehended by the mind, whether it is a perceivable reality existing outside the mind or one that is accepted on the basis of perceivable reality as existing outside it. Anything apart from these meanings of words and sentences is not termed as a ‘concept’, it is mere information.

Concepts are formed by the rabt (association) of the reality with information or the association of information with the reality and by the crystallisation of this formation (of concepts) in accordance with the basis or the bases upon which the information and reality are considered when their association takes place i.e, in accordance with one’s understanding and comprehension of the reality and the information when he associates them. Thus, a person acquires an ‘aqliyya (mentality) by which he understands words and sentences and comprehends meanings and their identified reality and gives judgement upon it (i.e the reality). Therefore, the ‘aqliyya (mentality) is the mode of comprehending or understanding things. In other words, it is the way how a reality is associated with the information or information is associated with the reality, by considering it upon one basis or specified bases. From here stems the divergence in mentalities such as the Islamic mentality, the Communist mentality, the Capitalist mentality, the Anarchist mentality and the Monotonous mentality. Thus it can be said that these mafahīm (concepts) determine the conduct of man towards the comprehended reality and his inclination towards it, its acceptance or rejection and they build in him a particular inclination and a specific taste.

As for the mayl (Pl: muyul) (inclinations), they are the desires that motivate man towards satisfaction in association with the mafahīm (concepts) he holds about the objects he believes that will provide satisfaction of his desires. These inclinations are the outcome of the vital energy that pushes man to satisfy his instincts and organic needs and the association between this energy and the mafahīm (concepts) (he carries). These inclinations alone form the nafsiyya (disposition) of man i.e. man’s nafsiyya (disposition) is formed by his instinctual drives associated with the mafahīm (concepts) he holds about life. The nafsiyya (disposition) then is the mode which determines the satisfaction of instincts and organic needs. In other words, it is the mode whereby the drives toward satisfaction are linked with the mafahīm (concepts) one carries. It is a combination of the relationship (inside each human being) between his desires and his mafahīm (concepts) about life, and the mafahīm (concepts) he holds about those material objects that will satisfy his instincts and organic needs.

It is this (above described) ‘aqliyya (mentality) and nafsiyya (disposition) that the Shakhsiyyah (personality) constitutes. Although ‘aql (intellect) or comprehension is innate in man and is definitely existent in every human but the formation of the ‘aqliyya (mentality) is by the action of man. Similarly, although inclinations (muyul) are innate in man and are definitely existent in every man, the formation of nafsiyya (disposition) is performed by man. Since the presence of a basis or bases upon which information and the reality is considered on association which crystallises the meaning so that it becomes a concept and since the combination that occurs between the drives and the mafahīm (concepts) is what crystallises the drive so that it becomes an inclination, the basis or bases upon which man considers information and the reality upon which their association occurs has the most important influence in the formation of the ‘aqliyya (mentality)

and nafsiyya (disposition). If the basis or bases upon which his ‘aqliyya (mentality) is formed is other than the basis or bases upon which his nafsiyya (disposition) is formed, his ‘aqliyya (mentality) will be different from his nafsiyya (disposition) because he would then be measuring his inclinations upon a basis or bases that are deep rooted in him and would be associating his drives with concepts other than those which formed his mentality. He forms a personality that lacks distinctiveness, a personality with variance and discrepancy, one whose thoughts are different from his inclinations, because he understands words and sentences and comprehends the reality in a mode different to his inclinations.

Consequently, the proper treatment of personality and its formation can only be achieved through the establishment of a single basis for both man’s ‘aqliyya (mentality) and nafsiyya (disposition). The standard against which man measures information and the reality when he links them together should be the same standard basis according to which his drives and concepts are associated. The result of this is the formation of a unique and distinctive shakhsiyya (personality).