The Islamic Personality by Sheikh Taqīuddīn An-Nabahānī

The meaning of the word “canons” in the Arabic language is fundamentals (usul) with the singular being “canon” (qanun). It is a foreign word which has been arabicised. The canon in the foreigner’s terminology means the command published by the ruler so that the people follow it. The canon is also known as “the collection of rules which the ruler compels people to follow in their relationships.” The canon is essentially of two categories. Firstly, the rules which organise the relationships from their basis are of two types. The first is the basic canon which is the constitution, the second is the rest of the canons which are not (part of) the constitution. As for the second category of canons, they are the ones which organise secondary actions which do not have a rule specific to them but whose basis has a general rule. Or it organises the means i.e. the styles by which the basic actions, which have a general rule but whose branch has no specific rule for it, are performed. Or it organises the tools. They are termed as administrative canons or administrative systems or something similar. Since the speech of the Legislator actions came related to the actions of the slaves and obliging the restriction of oneself to them, therefore their organization comes from Allah (swt). The Islamic Shari’ah came related to all actions of the people and all their relationships, whether their relationship with Allah or their relationship with themselves or their relationship with others. Therefore there is no place in Islam for people to legislate canons to organise the systems as they are restricted by the Shari’ah. Allah (swt) said:

And:

And:

Muslim narrated from Aisha that the Messenger of Allah (saw) said:

Allah (swt) is the One who legislates laws for the people, not the ruler, and He compels them and the ruler to follow them in their relationships, to restrict themselves by them and to prevent them from following (any) other (rules). Therefore there is no place for the human being to lay down rules to organise people’s relationships, nor any place for the ruler to compel people or give them an option to follow principles and rules laid done by human beings organising their relationships. However the Shari’ah rules, which is the speech of the Legislator related to the actions of the slaves, came in the Qur’an and the Sunnah and there is much with them that carries (potentially) different meanings according to the Arabic language and the Shar’a. So it is natural and inevitable that people differ in understanding them, and that this difference in understanding leads to the limit of separation and differences in the intended meaning(s). Therefore it is inevitable to have separated and different understandings so that due to this, there can be separated and differing opinions in one rule. When the Messenger (saw) said in the battle of the Allies:

Some people understood that he meant hurrying and they prayed Asr along the way, while (other) people understood he meant the meaning of the sentence (literally) so they did not pray Asr and delayed it until they reached Banu Quraydha where they then prayed it. When (the matter) reached the Messenger (saw), he consented to the two groups each (according to) their understanding. When the Messenger (saw) said:

People understood that he meant no correct (saheeh) prayer so they said that reciting the Fatiha is a pillar of the prayer such that the prayer of the one who does not recite it is invalidated. Whereas other people understood that he meant the complete prayer so they said that reciting the Fatiha is not a pillar of the prayer; rather, reciting the Qur’an is the pillar such that if one doesn’t recite the Fatiha but recites any ayah of the Qur’an then his prayer is correct. Similarly, they differed over his (saw) statement:

A group understood that if the Muslim killed a disbeliever, he is not killed for it (in retaliation)

but is punished, for example, by imprisonment since the Messenger’s (saw) statement

Is explicit in not killing him. Others understood that he distinguished between the belligerent disbeliever (kaffir harbi) and the pledged disbeliever (kaffir dhimmi) so the Muslim is killed for the covenanted disbeliever if he kills, and likewise the disbeliever under treaty (kaffir mu’ahid) and the protected disbeliever (kaffir must’aman) since the Messenger’s (saw) statement in the same hadith indicated this in his saying:

Its meaning is that a Muslim is not killed for a disbeliever, nor is the covenanted person killed for a disbeliever. Since the covenanted person is a disbeliever, it necessitates that the word disbeliever means belligerent i.e. the covenanted disbeliever is not killed for a belligerent disbeliever. So the hadith’s meaning is that the Muslim is not killed for a belligerent disbeliever, nor is a covenanted person killed for a belligerent disbeliever; its understanding is that the Muslim is killed for a non-belligerent disbeliever and the covenanted person is killed for a non belligerent disbeliever. The covenanted person is a disbeliever and his being like the Muslim who is not killed for a disbeliever indicated that the meaning of the word “disbeliever” in the hadith is the belligerent disbeliever not the dhimmi. This is strengthened by what is narrated that there was a Muslim brought to the Messenger of Allah (saw) who had killed a Jew so he killed him. With this variation in understanding, there is variation in the rule. The same applies to many ayat and ahadith. The difference of opinions in one rule makes it inevitable upon the Muslim to adopt one opinion among them as they are all Shari’ah rules and the rule of Allah in respect of one person cannot be more than one. Therefore it is inevitable to specify one rule among them to adopt, thus the Muslim’s adoption of the Shari’ah rules is essential and there is absolutely no escape from this in any way when one performs the action. The mere obligation of acting upon one rule whether it is obligatory or recommended or prohibited or disliked or allowed obliges the adoption of a specific rule. Therefore it is obligatory upon each Muslim to adopt whether he is a mujtahid or a follower (muqallid), Khalifah or not. When he adopts a specific rule, this Shari’ah rule becomes the rule of Allah upon him and it becomes obligatory upon him to act according to it alone, teach it to people and call to Islam based upon it. This is because the meaning of the Muslim’s adoption of the rule is to act according to it, teaching it to others and calling to it when he calls to the rules and thoughts of Islam. When the Muslim adopts a specific rule this rule becomes in itself the rule of Allah upon him, and it is not allowed for him to leave it except in three (cases): Firstly, if the weakness of the evidence becomes clear to him and there appears stronger evidence than its evidence which is attributed to him that the rule of Allah is that indicated by the stronger evidence. In this case, it is obliged upon him to leave what he adopted and to adopt the new opinion since it has become the rule of Allah upon him. Secondly: If he begins to think that the new opinion was adopted by one more knowledgeable than him in deduction and more precise in deduction or has more comprehensive knowledge about the Shar’a. In this case, it is allowed for him to leave what he adopted and adopt something else due to what is proved about the famous Sahabah who left their opinions and adopted the opinion of others. Abu Bakr (ra) adopted Ali’s (ra) opinion and left his opinion, and Umar (ra) adopted Ali’s (ra) opinion and left his own. Thirdly: If the intention is to unify the Muslims’ standpoint upon one opinion. In this case, it is allowed for the Muslim to leave the opinion he adopted and adopt the opinion which he wishes to unify the Muslims’ standpoint due to what was proved about Uthman who accepted to take the pledge from the people upon the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger and the opinion(s) of the two Sheikhs after him, Abu Bakr and Umar. The Sahabah consented to him doing what he did which is leaving what he adopted and adopting what Abu Bakr (ra) and Umar (ra) had adopted. In these situations, the Muslim leaves what he adopted and adopt something else; apart from these (situations), he is not allowed to leave it in any way since the Shari’ah addressed each individual and it is upon each Muslim to adopt what he reached via ijtihad or following (taqleed). Once he adopted, he is obliged upon what he adopted save the situations excluded by the Shari’ah evidence.

This is in relation to each individual organising his relationships with himself. As for taking care of the affairs of the Ummah by the Khalifah, his undertaking the ruler’s responsibilities and establishing the rules of Allah upon the people, there is no doubt that he must adopt specific rules to direct the people’s affairs according to them. He must also adopt specific rules in what is general for all Muslims in all affairs in the affairs of ruling and authority like zakat, land tax (kharaj), foreign relationships and all that relate to the unity of the State and rule. Adoption in these situations by the Khalifah is obligatory not optional, because it is an obligatory matter in relation to the actions he undertakes in his capacity as a Muslim obliged to direct all his actions according to a specific rule which is the rule of Allah upon him. There is no difference in this between personal matters and public matters. In relation to the affairs of rule and authority, they are within the basic actions in taking care of the affairs which are obliged for him to direct according to one specific rule. As for what relates to the unity of the State, it must be directed according to one specific rule since the unity of the State is obligatory and each action leading to it is obligatory. Therefore adopting one rule for all that relates to it is obligatory, not optional. As for anything beyond that, it is allowed for the Khalifah to adopt specific rules to compel the people to act upon, and it is allowed for him not to adopt. He will act in this matter according to what he sees as more beneficial for the good of Muslims, strengthening the spread of Islam, teaching of its rules and more suitable for the justice of the rule and strength of the authority. Abu Bakr (ra) did adopt Shari’ah rules which he obliged upon the people, and Umar (ra), Uthman (ra) and Ali (ra) adopted rules after him which they obliged people to act upon. The Sahabah were silent about this throughout their time, and none of them was heard about rejecting the adoption of rules, obliging them upon the people and not acting upon rules they had adopted; even though it is from what is rejected since it is obliging people to leave the rules they adopt which are rules of Allah (swt) upon them. Thus, it is an Ijma’a of the Sahabah that the Khalifah can adopt specific rules and oblige people to act upon them. Therefore if the Khalifah adopts specific rules, whether they were within what he is obliged to adopt or in what he is allowed to adopt, it is obligatory upon every Muslim among his citizens to act according to this rule and leave acting upon the rule he had previously adopted. This is because what the Khalifah adopted became the rule of Allah upon him in respect of action. It is not permitted for him to act in contradiction to it; rather it is obligatory for him to act according to it alone even if it were contrary to what he thought and even if it were weak evidence in his view. This is due to what the Ijma’a of the Sahabah concluded that the Imam can adopt specific rules; commanded acting upon them and it is obliged for the Muslims to obey him even if it differed from their ijtihad. The famous Shari’ah principles about this are:

And

And

I.e. between him and the people is the obedience to the State, and between him and Allah (swt) is that what the Imam adopts becomes the rule of Allah upon him in respect of action. However, the obedience of the people to the Imam’s command, the obligation upon them to act according to what he adopted in the rules, and not acting upon their opinions and what they adopted is not considered an adoption of what the Imam adopted. It is rather obedience to his (the Khalifah’s) command and executing what he adopted in terms of action not the adoption of what he adopted. Therefore it is permitted for any Muslim to teach what he adopted of the rules and to call to them when he invites to Islam even if they differed from the Imam’s adoption. This is because the Ijma’a of the Sahabah is upon the obligation to act according to the Khalifah’s adoption not teaching or invitation (da’wah); it is specific to action. Thus we find that whereas Abu Bakr (ra) would divide wealth between Muslims equally without looking into who embraced Islam early or not, Umar (ra) had a different opinion which is (considering) a man and his precedence (in embracing) Islam and another man and his lateness. He debated Abu Bakr (ra) in this, but he obeyed what Abu Bakr (ra) adopted and remained adopting his opinion. When he was appointed Khalifah, he invalidated acting upon Abu Bakr’s (ra) opinion and acted upon his opinion. Therefore there is a distinction between the Muslim adopting the opinion and his obedience to what the Khalifah adopted. Obedience to the Khalifah’s adoption obliges acting upon it only and not calling towards it or teaching it. As for adopting the opinion, it is (for) teaching it, calling to it and acting upon it. Therefore it is allowed for there to exist political groups i.e. parties which adopt opinions different from those adopted by the Khalifah, but they are all like the rest of the Muslims, obliged in respect of action to act according to what the Khalifah adopted and nothing else.

However, when the Khalifah adopts Shari’ah rules he chooses a specific rule in its capacity as a Shari’ah rule deduced by Shari’ah ijtihad. He does not legislate from his own self; verily Allah (swt) is the only Legislator. Thus he is restricted within the Shar’a and the Shari’ah rules since the condition of his pledge (bay’ah) is to act upon the Book and the Sunnah. And since he, in his capacity as a Muslim even if he is a Khalifah is restricted by the commands and prohibitions of Allah (swt), is obliged to stop within the limits of the Shari’ah rules and is not permitted to transgress them in any way whatsoever. It is not permitted for him to come with a rule, even if a single one, from other than the Islamic Shar’a. The Messenger’s (saw) statement is clear:

Therefore it is not permitted for the Imam to make the allowed (halal) forbidden (haram) or make the forbidden allowed, nor to abolish a rule or prevent acting upon a rule since this is haram for the Khalifah as it is haram for every Muslim. Nor should one say that the benefit of the Muslims requires forbidding such and such since Allah has specified the Muslims’ benefit by specific rules; if the Khalifah comes and views the benefit in other than these (rules), then he would have abrogated them which is never permitted. Thus one cannot say that taking care of the Muslims’ affairs has allowed him to direct them according to his ijtihad because Allah has allowed him to take care of the Muslims’ affairs by the Book and Sunnah i.e. the Shari’ah rules and allowed him to (perform) ijtihad within their limits. He does ijtihad in the secondary actions which have no explicit text but whose origins (usul) came with an explicit text which is general; he does ijtihad to choose what he sees as more suitable and beneficial. As for what came with the rule of Allah (swt) upon it, there is no place for the Khalifah’s ijtihad in this affair; rather he is obliged to execute the Shari’ah rules as they are without any substitution or change. Yes, he can view an action as allowed but it leads to a haram which the Shar’a forbade such as viewing that the exchange of a specific book would inevitably lead to corruption of the people in their deen or would inevitably lead to spreading debauchery among the people so he prevents it. He can see an action as allowed but it would inevitably lead to a harm which the Shar’a came obliging its removal such as seeing that placing goods before the stores would prevent people passing by the road in the road or annoy by passers so in this case he prevents the allowed and punish whoever does it. However this is not forbidding the halal but rather executing a Shari’ah rule he deduced from the shari’ah principle:

And the principle

Or someone else deduced it and he (the Khalifah) adopted and executed it. In this case it is obliged upon him to do this as it is a Shari’ah rule which is obligatory to be executed. So he would have prevented haram and not what is allowed. Similarly, if there is a matter or a rule which can potentially be performed via numerous secondary actions for whose origin came general evidence, then in this case all the actions through which it is possible to perform the rule or matter are of the permissible actions. This is like the Khalifah reaching the knowledge of the people’s opinion, or their opinion concerning who should represent them in the Majlis Ash-Shura which is similar to what is known as the electoral canon. All these secondary actions are from the permissible actions, so it is permitted for the Khalifah to command with one of them in exception among the others, wherein obeying him is obligatory. In this case he would not have obliged a permissible action or prevented another permissible action, but would have adopted a rule and adopted a means by which to execute a rule. At this point, obeying him is obliged in the rule he adopted and the action leading to it since it follows the rule and the follower takes the rule of the followed. Similar to this are all the organizational and administrative canons as they are compelling a permissible action as it is compelling what follows a rule adopted by the Khalifah and compelling it requires leaving anything other than it i.e. preventing it. It is just like adopting rules and it does not come from the Shari’ah rules. He would not have obliged a permissible action or prohibited another permissible action, but rather he did of what the Shari’ah allowed him in adopting rules and what would lead to performing them. In these three situations: Preventing what leads to haram, or (preventing) what leads to harm, or compelling specific styles among many, the Khalifah has not left the Shari’ah rules or his competency from adoption and there is an evidence for each one of them. There is nothing here to legitimise and permit the Khalifah to change any Shari’ah rule under the pretext of benefit; rather he must completely restrict (himself) to all the Shari’ah rules in everything.

As for what is said that the Messenger (saw) did forbid permissible matters and prevented them in taking care of the Muslims’ affairs, there is no proof in it for the Imam to do this in taking care of the Muslims’ affairs. This is because the Messenger (saw) is a legislator on behalf of Allah (swt) so if he forbade an allowed (thing) or allowed a forbidden rule then he has verily abrogated it. Abrogation is specific to the Qur’an and Sunnah i.e. by the Qur’an and Hadith, not for anyone other than the Messenger (saw). As for his preventing specific allowed things, this is either because they would lead to harm which Allah had forbidden or to a haram forbidden by Allah. This is legislation for us, and does not relate to taking care of the affairs, so it is not taken as evidence to give the Imam the competency to change the rules under the pretext of taking care of the affairs of the people. Whoever reviews some of the Messenger’s (saw) actions; this would become manifestly clear for example:

1. It was narrated that in the battle of Tabuk when the Messenger (saw) passed by Al-Hijf, he encamped there and people sought to drink from its well. When they rested, the Messenger of Allah (saw) said:

It appears from this example that the Messenger (saw) prohibited the use of an allowed thing so he forbade an allowed thing, whereas the reality of the incident is not like this. Rather, its reality is that the Messenger prohibited a specific thing of the allowed things not an allowed rule or an allowed thing. This specific thing would inevitably lead to a harm for which a text came forbidding its occurrence. The Messenger (saw) knew that drinking water from this well would result in a definite harm such that what the Messenger (saw) did was not forbidding an allowed action but rather forbidding what would lead to a harm forbidden by Shar’a which is harm befalling the army. Similarly his prohibition of anyone going out alone except that he have a companion is the prohibition of a specific action of the allowed matters, a specific action which would definitely lead to a harm that is forbidden by the Shar’a. The evidence for this is that those people whom the Messenger (saw) commanded did what they were commanded except two men from Banu Sa’ida. One went out to relieve himself and the other went out searching for his camel. As for the one who went out to relieve himself he collapsed in his place and the one who went to find his camel, the wind carried him and cast him on the two mountains of Tayyi. When the Messenger of Allah (saw) was informed about this he said:

Then the Messenger of Allah made du’a for the one who had collapsed and and he was cured; as for the one who fell between the two Mountains of Tayyi, he was later brought back to the prophet (saw) in Madinah by the people of Tayyi. Another evidence for this is that when the Messenger of Allah (saw) passed by Al-Hijr, he covered his face with his cloth and spurred his camel and said:

Here we must note the distinction between forbidding a specific action of the allowed actions or forbidding a specific thing of the allowed things, and forbidding an allowed action or forbidding an allowed thing. Forbidding an allowed thing is where the action has been allowed by the Shar’a, then the ruler comes and forbids it on the pretext that there is a harm existing in it; such as importing goods from outside has been allowed by Shar’a but the ruler views that allowing importing causes harm to (internal) factories and forbids it. This is forbidding an allowed action which is never allowed for the ruler since the Shar’a knew, when it allowed it, that it would be beneficial or harmful and gave it the rule of permissibility. Forbidding it is not allowed as this would be abrogating the Shar’a rule which is void in all circumstances. As for forbidding a specific thing among the allowed things, this is when it occurs to him that one of the allowed matters would lead to a harm which the Shar’a came to forbid so the ruler considers it correct to forbid this matter to lift the harm. For instance, the ruler considers that importing sugar leads to closing and the bankruptcy of sugar factories within the country making it dependent upon the kuffar in importing sugar. At this point, it is allowed for the ruler to prevent importation of sugar to prevent the harm to the whole Ummah which is her dependency upon the kuffar for one of its necessities and it's the lack of sufficiency. In this case, it is allowed to prevent this allowed matter and it is not forbidding an allowed thing; rather, the allowed thing i.e. importing remains allowed. It is rather the forbidding of an allowed matter which is importing sugar. This is like the Messenger (saw) forbidding the drinking of water from a specific well in which he knew there was harm. His forbidding did not forbid an allowed matter i.e. he did not forbid water, but rather he forbade a specific matter of the allowed matter which is drinking from this well. Accordingly, forbidding a specific thing of the allowed actions is permitted whereas forbidding an allowed thing is never permitted.

2. It is narrated that when the Messenger (saw) was returning from Tabuk, he prevented those who reached water before him from drinking from it until he reached. A group of hypocrites preceded (the others) and drank from it. When the Messenger (saw) came and found that those who preceded had drank from it such that he did not find any water, he cursed those who preceded and drank from it. This is also preventing a specific thing from the allowed things, as this leads to a harm which is preferring a group with the water exclusively over the rest of the army despite the dire need for it in the desert. Accordingly, this is not forbidding an allowed thing under the pretext of taking care of the affairs.

3. Muslim narrated via Amru bin Ash-Shareed from his father who said: In the delegation from Thaqif there was a man suffering from leprosy so the Prophet (saw) sent to him:

And he (saw) prevented him from mixing with the people. This is not forbidding the allowed, rather it is forbidding an action which would lead to harm. Due to this, it has come in another hadith narrated by Ahmad via Tareeq bin Hurayra:

In this way it becomes clear to the one following what is used as evidence in this matter from the Messenger’s (saw) hadith that there is no forbidding of an allowed (matter) in them. Rather it is forbidding a specific thing of the allowed thing, and this specific thing leads to a harm which the Shar’a came forbidding it. Therefore this is legislation and evidence that the Imam can prevent specific things from the allowed things, and specific actions of the allowed actions, this is if it leads to harm which the Shar’a came to prevent. As for what is narrated about the Sahabah regarding (certain) incidents, it is clear to anyone who follows them that they are forbidding an allowed (action) which leads to haram or leads to a harm which the Shar’a came to prevent, and some of them are compelling an allowed (mubah) action (in order) to perform a Shari’ah rule or a matter the Shar’a commanded some and prevented others such as the adoption in styles. This is allowed for the Imam, for eg; the compilation of the registers (diwan) by Umar (ra), and obliging one mushaf and burning all (other) mushafs by Uthman. Of this type is Umar (ra) obliging the Sahabah to stop (discussing the) hadith when this preoccupied them from the Qur’an, and his preventing the prominent Sahabah from leaving Madinah to the conquered lands so that the people are not enchanted by them and they are not enchanted by the world. Similar to this is what the governors, rulers and Khulafaa did in compelling those who knead dough to placing their turbans on their forehead so that their sweat does not fall in his dough, and to place a piece of cloth upon their nose so that nothing from it falls into the dough and shave their armpits so that nothing from it falls into the dough, and other similar things which came in the Fiqh books. All of them fall within the shari’ah principle

And the shari’ah principle

There is nothing here which indicates that it is allowed for the Khalifah to forbid a mubah or allow a haram under the pretext of taking care of the affairs. Therefore the canons according to the foreign understanding i.e. that they are the ruler’s commands in an unrestricted (manner) are not obligatory to be obeyed as long as the Khalifah’s command is not in adopting a Shari’ah rule and obliging this rule. The canons are what the Khalifah adopted from the Shari’ah rules. However, the Khalifah may command what he considered of the principles to perform the Shari’ah rules or the actions or matters requested by the Shar’a such as the administrative canons or systems. This is considered adoption of styles which follows the adopted rules and these canons are obligatory to be obeyed as the Khalifah adopted them and because they are within the statement of the Glorified:

Since the obedience came in general covering everything the Shar’a did not come to prevent.