The Islamic Personality by Sheikh Taqīuddīn An-Nabahānī

The Muslims believed in Islam with an imān that was free of doubt. Their belief was so strong that it did not result in any questions that would indicate skepticism. Nor did they discuss the ayāt of the Qur’ān except in a manner that would enable them to comprehend the reality of the thought therein. They did not inquire into the suppositions that might be drawn from it nor the logical conclusions that may be deduced from it. They went to the world, carrying this Islamic Da’wah to all the people, fighting in its path, opening the cities, and the nations embraced what they carried.

The whole of the first century Hijri elapsed with the current of the Islamic Da’wah overwhelming everything that stood in its way; the Islamic thoughts were being given to the people as they had been received by the Muslims: with a brilliant understanding, a definitive faith and a surprisingly splendid awareness. Yet, the carrying of the Da’wah in the opened (conquered) lands led to an intellectual collision with the people of other religions who had not yet embraced Islam as well as (some of) those who had entered its domain. This intellectual collision was strenuous. The people of other religions were acquainted with some philosophical thoughts and had certain viewpoints which they got from their religions and so they used to stir skepticism and debate with the Muslims over creedal points [aqa’id], because the basis of the Da’wah is built upon the ‘aqīdah and the thoughts associated with it. So the Muslims sincerely wished well for (the success)

of the Islamic Daw’ah and argued with them in order to counter them. This led many of them to learn some philosophical thoughts in order to use these as a weapon against their adversaries. Moreover apart from their sincerity in carrying the Da’wah and the refutal of their adversaries’ arguments, this learning (of the philosophies) was jusitified to them and they were motivated towards it due to two factors:

Firstly: the Noble Qur’ān, besides its call for tauhīd (monotheism) and prophethood, tackled the more prominent sects and religions which were widespread at the time of the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم; it countered them and refuted their advocacies. It dealt with shirk, in all its forms, and refuted it. There were amongst the mushrikīn those who deified the planets and took them as associates to Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ; the Qur’ān refuted their belief. Some of them advocated the worship of idols and made them into partners of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ; it refuted this adovation. Some of them denied prophethood altogether; the Qur’ān refuted their belief; some of them denied the prophethood of Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم and it refuted this belief. Some of them denied the ressurection and the accounting on that day; the Qur’ān refuted their belief. Some of them deified Isa عليه السلام, or made him into the son of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ; the Qur’ān refuted this belief; and the Qur’ān did not suffice with this: it ordered the Messenger صلى الله عليه وسلم to engage in debate with them:

Further, the life of the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم had been a life of intellectual struggle with all of the kuffār, the mushrikīn and the People of the Book. Many incidents were reported about him in Makkah and Madinah in which he discussed with the kuffār and debated with them as individuals, groups, and delegations. This intellectual struggle which is prominent in the ayāt of the Qur’ān and in the ahādith of the Messenger صلى الله عليه وسلم and in his conduct was read and heard by the Muslims; it was thus only natural for them to discuss with the people of other religions and to engage with them in an intellectual struggle and to debate with them. The ahkām of their religion call for such discussion; the nature of the Islamic Call - its clash with kufr - will not progress without the occurrence of such struggle, discussion and argumentation, between it and kufr. As for that what makes this struggle adopt an intellectual character, the Qur’ān itself calls for the use of the intellect, and it cites intellectual proof and sensory evidence. The call to its ‘aqīdah is based exclusively on the mind, not on textual evidence. Thus it was inevitable for the debate and the struggle to take an intellectual character and to be marked by the same.

Secondly: Certain philosophical and theologial issues had leaked to the Muslims from the Nestorian Christians and their like, and the logic of Aristotle was known amongst the Muslims; some had become familiar with certain books of philosophy. Many books were translated from Greek into Syriac and then into Arabic; later, translation was made from Greek (directly) into Arabic. This supported the presence of philosophical thoughts. Some other religions, specifically Judiasm and Christianity, had resorted to Greek philosophy as a weapon and brought it into the (Muslim) lands. All of this generated philosophical thoughts, pushing the Muslims to study them.

Thus these two factors, the rules and thoughts of Islam concerning argumentation and the presence of philosophical thoughts, were the factors which pushed the Muslims to shift to intellectual discussions and philosophical thoughts, learning them and using them as material in their discussions and debates, and they justified this. Yet all of this was not a comprehensive philosophical study but merely a study of (some) philosophical thoughts to refute the Christians and Jews, because it would not have been possible for the Muslims to rebut except after they had familiarised themselves with the arguments of the Greek philosophers, especially those related to logic and theology. Because of this they were urged to study the foreign sects and their arguments and proofs. Thus the Muslim lands became a ground where all opinions and all religions were presented and debated. Undoubtedly, debate provokes pondering and thinking and gives rise to multiple issues that provoke contemplation and lead each group to adopt what it deems most correct. This debate and thinking was extremely instrumental in the emergence of people who took a new path/methodology in inquiry, argumentation and discussion. The philosophical thoughts which they had learnt influenced them greatly, in their method of proving and in some of their thoughts. As a result the science of ‘Ilm al-Kalām [Islamic Scholasticism] developed, becoming a specialised branch of knowledge, and there emerged in the Islamic Lands amongst the Muslims the group of Mutakallimīn [Scholastics].

Since these Mutakallimīn were essentially defending Islam, explaining it rules and, and elucidating the thoughts of the Qur’ān, they were mostly influenced by the Qur’ān, and the basis on which they built their discussion was the Qur’ān. Yet, since they had learnt philosophy in order to defend the Qur’ān and used it as a weapon against their adversaries, they evolved a particular methodology of inquiry, verification and evidencing; an approach which was different to the methodology of the Qur’ān, the Hadīth and the Sahābah رَضِيَ اللهُ عَنْهُ, and also different to the methodology of the Greek philosophers in their inquiry, verification and evidencing.

As for their divergence from the methodology of the Qur’ān, then the Qur’ān’s approach bases its call on an instinctive [fitrī] basis; it is based on this instinct [fitrah] and it addresses the people in a manner consistent with this fitrah. At the same time the Qur’ān is based on the intellectual basis; it is based on the mind and addresses the intellect; Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ says,

And

And

And

And

And

Thus the approach of the Qur’ān with regards to Allah’s capability, knowledge, and will tread on the basis of the fitrah and the intellect. This approach is consistent with the fitrah and it generates a feeling within every human being to listen and respond to it; even an atheist comprehends it and succumbs to it. It is an approach that suits every human being, with no distinction between the elite and the commoner or between the educated and the uneducated.

Moreover, the mutashabih ayāt wherein is ambiguity and in which there is lack of clarity for the reader, have come in the general form, without detail; they have come in the form of a general description of things or a reporting of realities wherein a lack of inquiry, thoroughness and substantiation is apparent. So the reader does not reject them nor does he truly comprehend the realities denoted by them beyond the denotations of the words therein. Therefore, the natural stance with regards to them is one of acceptance as is the case towards the depiction of any reality and the verification of any fact, without seeking effective causes or substantiation. Thus, certain ayāt depict one facet of the actions of man and in so doing indicate compulsion; other ayāt depict other facets and in so doing indicate free choice. Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ says,

And

On the other hand, He الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ also says,

Other ayāt establish for Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ a face and a hand and speak of Him as the Light of the Heavens and the Earth and state that He الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is in the Heavens:

Other ayāt establish his uniqueness:

Thus certain ayāt came in the Qur’ān which are seemingly contradictory. The Qur’ān called such ayāt mutashabihāt (polysemous). Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ says,

When these ayāt were revealed, the Messenger صلى الله عليه وسلم conveyed them to the people and the Muslims memorised them by rote, they did not generate any discussion or debate. They did not see in these ayāt any contradictions that required reconcilation. They understood every ayah with reference to the aspect it came to describe or verify. Thus the ayāt were harmonious in reality and in their selves. They believed in them, trusted them and understood them in a general manner, and they sufficed themselves with this understanding; they regarded them as a description of reality or a reporting of facts. Many amogst the wise did not like the discussion concerning the details of the mutashabihāt or the debate thereof. They thought that such discussion was of no benefit to Islam. The general understanding, to the extent one understands, would render the discussion of the details and elaborations unnecessary. Thus the Muslims comprehended the approach of the Qur’ān and received its ayāt upon this approach throughout the era of the Messenger صلى الله عليه وسلم and so did those who came after them until the entire first century Hijri had elapsed.

As for their difference from the methodology of the philosophers, the philosophers depended solely on syllogisms; they evolved syllogisms in a logical form from a minor and major premise and a conclusion. They used terminology and jargon such as ‘essence’ and ‘accident’ and the like; they initiated intellectual problems which they built on the basis of logic, not on the basis of sense-perception or the reality.

The methodology of inquiry adopted by the Mutakallimīn diverges from this. They believed in Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ, in His Messenger صلى الله عليه وسلم and in all that his Messenger صلى الله عليه وسلم came with; what they intended was to prove these beliefs through logical reasoning. They then intitiated inquiry into the recency of the world and to establish proof for the recency of things. They began to expand upon this, and thus new issues opened up before them; they pursued the discussion of these and their offshoots to their logical ends. So, they did not discuss the ayāt in order to understand them as was the approach of those who came before them and as is the purpose of the Qur’ān, but they believed in those ayāt and then began to cite evidence for what they themselves understood from them. This is one of aspect from the aspects of the inquiry. As for the other aspect, it is with regards the ayāt mutashabihāt. The Mutakallimīn were not content to have imān in these ayāt in their generalised sense without detail. They collected the ayāt which were apparently contradicting and after having pursued them, such as those related to compulsion and free choice and those which might indicate the incarnation of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ, They focused their minds on them and were as presumptuous as none else. Their thinking led them to an opinion on every issue. Once they had reached to their opinion, they addressed the ayāt which apparently seemed to contradict their view and interpreted them away. Such interpretation of meaning [ta’wīl] to match their opinion was the primary characteristic of the Mutakallimīn. Thus if their inquiry led them to the conclusion that Allah is too sublime to be characterised with location and direction, they twisted His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ establishing Himself الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ on the Throne [al-istiwā alā‘l-‘arsh]. If their discussion led them to the conclusion that the negation of the attribute of direction with regards to Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ entails that the eyes of people would be incapable of seeing Him الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ, they twisted the interpretation of the reports related to the sighting of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ by the people. Thus, interpreting the meaning to suit their opinion was a characteristic from amongst the characteristics of the Mutakallimīn and their major distinction from the previous generations [salaf].

This methodology of giving the intellect the freedom to inquire into every thing, the comprehensible and the incomprehensible, the natural and the supernatural, the sensorially perceviable and the sensorially imperceviable, inevitably makes the intellect the basis of (judging) the Qur’ān, not the other way round. Thus it was natural for this approach of interpretation to emerge, and it was natural that they would take any direction they chose on the basis that, in their view, the intellect opted for it. This necessitated major discrepancies amongst them. Thus if the reasoning of one group led them to advocate free choice and to interpret away compulsion, the reasoning of others may well lead them to affirm compulsion and to interpret away the ayāt of free choice; it might lead others still to concile both opinions into a new opinion. All of the Mutakallimīn were prominently characterised with two things: first, the dependence on logic and syllogization in their proofs, not on the sensorially accessible, and second, dependence on interpreting away the ayāt that contradicted the conclusions they had reached.