The Islamic Personality by Sheikh Taqīuddīn An-Nabahānī

Al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar, with this name, that is, by connecting two words together for one meaning, has a specific referent; that is, al-qadā’ linked to al-qadar, by making them two concomitant matters whereby one is not separable from the other, and they have a meaning that is exclusive to them. It is not correct to include in it other than this meaning which has not been used by the Sahabah or the Tabi’een. By studying the shar’i and linguistic texts and studying the sayings of the Sahabah, Tabi’een and those who came after them from the Ulama’, it is apparent that the terms al qadā’ wa‘l-qadar together, have not been used with a specific technical [istilāhī] meaning by any of the Sahabah or Tabi’een, nor have they come together with a specific technical meaning in the Qur’ān or the Hadīth; though they have come together in their linguistic meaning in what al Bazzār reported from the hadīth of Jabir with a hasan chain on the authority of the Prophet (PBUH) that he said:

Therefore this terminological meaning which alludes to this name is not found except from the Mutakallimūn, after the first century had passed and after the translation of the Greek philosophy. It did not exist in the time of the Sahabah nor was there any dispute or discussion of those two terms as one name for a specific technical meaning. Throughout the era of the Sahabah the Muslims did not know of ‘al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar’ though the word qadā’ had come on its own and the word qadar had come on its own in the ahadīth just as the two had come together in the aforementioned hadīth of Jabir, but in all of these cases they had come in the linguistic meaning. They have not come in the technical meaning. The word qadā’ has come in the hadīth of al-qunut. Al-Hasan said, the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) taught me words I say in the qunut of the witr, then he mentioned the du’a of qunut, of which is,

Its meaning is, protect me from the evil of what you have judged, for you judge what you wish and no one judges over you. The word qadar has come in the hadīth of Jibrīl in some of its narrations: He  said,

And in his  saying

The meaning of the word qadar in these two ahadīth is the Determination [taqdīr] and Knowledge of Allah , that is, that you should believe that the things have been written by Allah  in the Lawh al-Mahfūdh and He  knows of them before they come into existence, whether they be good or bad; and say Allah  has written this in the Lawh al-Mahfūdh and he  knew it before it came into being and he  did what he wished. The word al-qadā’ in the meaning which it came in this hadīth or anywhere else it came was not disputed by the Muslims; they did not have discussions with regards to its wording or its import.

As for the word qadar in the meaning mentioned in those two ahadīth, the Muslims, before the presence of Greek philosophy, did not disagree about it or have discussions with regards to its wording or import. But after the presence of the Greek philosophy amongst the Muslims, a group from Kufa arose and said: there is no qadar, that is, there is no one who (pre)determines and everything occurs without any previous determination; they were called the Qadariyyah and they are the ones who deny the qadar and say that Allah  created the fundamentals of things and then left them, so He  does not have knowledge of their particulars [juz'iyāt]. This is contrary to what has come in the clear text of the Qur’ān which states that Allah  is the Creator of all things, small or big, fundamental or branchial, and that He  determined everything before its existence, that is, He  wrote it in the Lawh al-Mahfūdh, that is, He  knew it before it came to be. He  said:

And

However, this disagreement and discussion is only with respect to the ‘qadar of Allah’ in terms of His  Knowledge. So the Qadariyyah claimed that Allah  knows the fundamentals of things but not their partial aspects, whilst Islam states that Allah  knows the fundamentals of things as well as their partial aspects. Thus, the discussion with respect to the qadar of Allah , that is, His Knowledge, is about the subject of Allah's Knowledge. It is a subject different to that of al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar. It is a different discussion, separate from the discussion of al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar. Its reality that took place is the same, that is, it is a different subject to that of al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar.

Thus, it is plainly apparent that the words al-qadā’ and al-qadar have each come on their own with each having a specific meaning. They do not have any relation with the study of al-qadā’ wa‘l qadar. In other words, the word al-qadā’ in all its linguistic and shar’i meanings that have come from the Legislator, and the word al-qadar in all its linguistic and shar’i meanings that have come from the Legislator, have no relation to any of these terms, whether mentioned alone or together, in the discussion of al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar. They are confined with regards to their meaning, to that what they come with from the linguistic and shar'i meanings.

The ayāt which have come in demonstrating the Knowledge of Allah  are the ones that indicate the all-encompassing nature of Allah's  Knowledge with regards to all things, thus His  saying:

And His  saying,

And His  saying,

And His  saying,

These verses were revealed to the Messenger (PBUH) and they were memorised and understood by the Sahabah, it did not occur to them to discuss al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar. Furthermore, the wording, understanding and indication of these verses states that they are a clarification about the Knowledge of Allah  and have no relation to the study of al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar. Similarly the ayah,

It has nothing to do with the discussion of al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar because it is a refutation of the kuffār who differentiated between bad and good. Thus, they made bad to come from the Messenger  and good from Allah . So Allah  refuted them by declaring that everything is from Allah . The discussion is not about the good that a human being does and the evil that he pursues; rather the discussion is about fighting and death. The ayah itself and that what precedes it clarifies this:

So the subject is what befalls them and not what they are doing. Thus it has nothing to do with the study of al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar.

Therefore, all that has been mentioned above has nothing to do with the study of al-qadā’ wa‘l qadar; they do not come under its meaning and have no relation whatsoever with what has been mentioned above. Rather, al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar as a meaning has come from Greek philosophy which was transmitted by the Mu'tazilah who gave an opinion with regards to it. Ahl al-Sunnah and the Jabriyyah refuted them and Ahl al-Sunnah (also) made a refutation of the Jabriyyah. The discussion was confined to the same meaning and preceded upon the same premise. Thus the issue is a meaning/sense that came from Greek philosophy and it came to the fore in the debate which used to take place between the Muslims and the kuffar who used to be armed with the Greek philosophy. It is a meaning which has a relevance to the ‘aqīdah (creed), thus what is desired is to give Islam's opinion regarding this meaning. The Mu'tazilah gave an opinion and the Jabriyyah refuted them and gave another opinion. Ahl al-Sunnah refuted all of them and gave an opinion, and said about it that it is a third opinion which has come out from the two opinions and they described it as ‘the pure milk, sweet to drink, that comes out from between excrement and blood’.

Therefore, the subject of discussion, which came from the Greek philosophy, became known, and since it is related to the ‘aqīdah (creed), the Muslim must be clear as to what his belief is regarding this subject. The Muslims did actually state their opinion and three schools of thought arose. Thus it is not allowed to refer the issue of al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar to what has come of the meaning of al-qadā’ or al-qadar, linguistically and in the Sharī’ah, nor is it allowed to imagine or conceive for al-qadā’ or ‘al-qadar any meaning from mere supposition, conception or imagination, and to say, for example, that al-qadā’ is the universal judgement on only the universals and al qadar is the universal judgement on the partial aspects and its details, or to say that al-qadar is the eternal plan for things and al-qadā’ is the execution and creation according to that predetermination and plan. Indeed, this is not allowed because this is mere imagination, assumption and a failed attempt of applying certain linguistic and shar’i expressions because they do not apply to it, they rather indicate general meanings; . It would then be an arbitrary action to restrict the two words to these specific meanings without evidence.

Similarly, it is not allowed to claim al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar is a secret from amongst the secrets of Allah  and that we have been forbidden to discuss it, because there is no shar’i text to say that it is one of the secrets of Allah , not to mention the fact that the subject matter is sensorially perceivable, for which an opinion must be given, so how can it be said that it cannot to be studied?! In addition to the fact that it is a rational inquiry and a subject which relates to matters that are studied by the intellect as a reality that is sensorially-perceivable; and since it relates to the imān in Allah . Thus, al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar, in the meaning placed as the subject matter and which became part of the ‘aqīdah (creed) must be studied.

The question of al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar, or in other words, the issue of al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar, is the actions of the servants and the attributes of things. This is because the issue mentioned is the actions of the servant and what arises from these actions, that is, the attributes brought about by the servant in things: are they the creation of Allah  ? Is He  the one who has created them and brought them into being? Or is it the servant? Is the servant the one who created them and brought them into being? The Mu'tazilah, all of them, said that the servant is the one who creates his own actions: he is the one who creates the action and brings it into being. They differed about the attributes. Some of them said that the servant is the one who creates all of the attributes that are caused by man and he is the one who brings them into existence. Others differentiated between the attributes. Some of these made them as being created in things by the servant and brought into existence by him and part of them made them as being created in things by Allah  and brought into existence by Him. As for the Jabriyyah, they said that Allah  creates all the actions of man as well as all the attributes caused by man in things. He is the one who brings them into existence; the servant has nothing to do with the creation and formation of the action or in causing the attribute in the thing. Ahl us-Sunnah said that the actions of the servant and the attributes caused in things by the servant are created by Allah . But they said that Allah  creates them while the servant performs the action and the servant causes the attribute. So Allah  creates them when the servant has the ability and will and not by his own  ability and will.

This is the issue - the issue of al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar – and this is a summary of the opinions that have been opined about it. Anyone who scrutinises these views must know the basis on which the discussion has been built such that the discussion is on a common basis. Thus the outcome will be as required by the basis of the discussion and it will not be an incorrect one. The basis of the discussion in al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar is not the action of the servant in terms of whether he created the action or Allah  created it, nor is it the will of Allah  in that His  will is conditional on the action of the servant so it must exist with this will, nor is it the Knowledge of Allah  in terms of Him  knowing that the servant will do such and such an action or that His  Knowledge encompasses the servant, or that this action of the servant is written in the Lawh al-Mahfūdh so he must act according to what has been written. Indeed, the basis of the discussion is definitely none of these things, because they have no relation to the subject from the perspective of reward and punishment; they are related to the question from the perspective of formation from nothing, the connection of the will to all possibilities, the all-encompassing Knowledge of all things and the Lawh al-Mahfūdh. This is quite different from the subject of the reward and punishment for an action.The topic of discussion on whose basis the question of al-qadā’ wa‘l qadar is built is the issue of reward and punishment for an action, that is, is man obliged to perform an action, good or evil, or does he have a choice? And, does man have the choice to perform an action, or does he have no choice? The person who scrutinises the actions of the servants sees that man lives within two spheres: one which he dominates, the sphere that is present within the region of his conduct, and within which his actions happen absolutely by his choice; the other (sphere) dominates him; he exists within its domain, and the actions that occur within it, whether they originate from him or fall upon him, occur without his choice.

Thus, the actions that fall within the sphere that dominates man, man has no choice in them or in their existence; they are of two types: a type which is a requirement of the laws of the universe, and a type not necessitated by the universal laws, even though all the things (that occur) may not emanate from these laws. As for the actions necessitated by the laws of the universe, man submits to them totally; he acts according to them as a matter of compulsion, because he moves with the Universe and Life, which are subjected to a specific regulation, which does not change. Subsequently, man's actions in this sphere occur without his will, he is forced in these actions and has no choice. He came to this life without his will and he will leave it without his will; he cannot fly merely by the use of his own body, nor can he walk in his natural form on water, nor choose for himself the colour of his eyes, the shape of his head or the size of his body. Indeed, it was Allah  who created all of this without any influence or relation from the created man, because Allah  created the laws of the Universe, made them regulate the universe and made the universe act according to them without having the ability to change. As for the second type, they are actions which happen beyond man's control, which he cannot avoid and which are not related to the laws of the universe; they are the actions which occur either unintentionally through him or upon him and which he cannot avoid, such as if someone falls on a person and thus kills him, or if someone shoots at a bird and unintentionally hits a person and kills him, or if a car, train or plane should crash, without any possibility to avoid the incidents, and as a result the passengers die. All these examples are actions which occurred from a man or upon him - though they are bound by the laws of the universe - they happened without his will and outside his ability to control them, and they are within the sphere that dominates man. All the actions which occur within the sphere that dominates man are termed qadā, because Allah  alone has decreed them, and has not given the servant the freedom of will in such actions; he has no choice with regards to them. Therefore man is not reckoned on these actions, whether, with respect to man, there is benefit or harm in them or like or dislike, that is, regardless of whether they are, according to man, good or bad; Allah  alone knows the good and bad in these actions, because man has no influence on them; he does not know them or how they are brought into existence, and he is absolutely unable to avoid and bring them about. Therefore there is no reward or punishment for them. Thus this is qadā’, and it is therefore said that the action happened by qadā’. It is upon man to have imān in this qadā’ and that this qadā’ is from Allah , the Glorified and Exalted.

As for the actions that occur in the sphere that man dominates, it is the sphere in which he proceeds with choice according to the system he chooses, whether it is the Sharī’ah of Allah  or any other. This sphere is the one in which actions carried out by man or involving him occur by his will. Thus he walks, eats, drinks and travels anytime he likes; likewise he refrains from doing any of these things whenever he likes; he also burns with fire and cuts with a knife when he chooses, and he satisfies his instincts of procreation, ownership and hunger as he likes. All this he performs or abstains from, by his choice. Therefore, man is accountable on actions which occur within this sphere. Thus, he is rewarded for the action deserving reward and is punished for the action deserving punishment. These actions have nothing to do with qadā’ nor does it have anything to do with them because man is the one who undertook them with his own will and choice. Therefore, actions of choice do not come under al-qadā’.

As for al-qadar, it relates to the actions, whether they occur in the sphere which man dominates or in the sphere which dominates him, which occur from or on things through the matter of the universe, man and life, and cause an effect, that is, something results from the action; so this mechanism that man causes in things in terms of attributes, is it created by man or by Allah  just as He  has created the things themself. The one who scrutinises this issue will find that these matters which are caused in things are from the attributes of the things, not from the action of man, as evidenced by the fact that man is not able to form them (i.e these effects) except in the things which possess the (relevant) attribute amongst its attributes. As for the things which do not have the (relevant) attribute amongst their attributes, man is not able to cause in them what he wants. Therefore these matters are not from the actions of man but from the attributes of the things.

Thus, Allah  has created the things and set [qaddara] in them attributes in a manner that nothing else is possible to come from them except what He has set in them, such as setting in the date pit (the attribute) of growing date palm from it and not apple, and such the human sperm to result in humans not any other animal. Allah  has created specific attributes in things, for example, He created in fire the attribute of burning, in wood the attribute of catching fire, and in the knife the attribute of cutting. He  made the attributes an essential and perpetual part of the objects in accordance with the Laws of the Universe. When it appears that the attributes are no longer present, it means Allah  has stripped them off, and such an event would be unusual; it only happens to the prophets as a miracle for them. Likewise, in the manner that Allah  created attributes for the objects, He  created in man instincts and organic needs and, as He  created attributes in objects, He  created in the instincts and organic needs specific attributes. Hence, in the procreational instinct Allah  created the sexual inclination, and in the organic needs He  created the attribute of hunger. He made these attributes adhere to them according to the laws of the universe. The particular attributes that Allah the Exlated has created in objects, instincts and organic needs are called al-qadar, because Allah  alone created the things, instincts and organic needs and determined in them their attributes. Thus when the sexual desire occurs in man, when he sees upon opening his eyes and when the stone goes up when thrown upwards and down when thrown downward, all of this is not by man’s action, rather it is by the action of Allah ; meaning that it is from the nature of the things to be so, that is, Allah  created them and created particular attributes in them, thus they (the attributes) are from Allah  and are not from man; man has nothing to do with them, nor can he effect them in any way. This is al-qadar, and it is thus said that al-qadar in the subject of al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar is the attributes of the things which man causes in them. It is upon man to have imān in that the one who determined the attributes in these things is Allah .

Hence al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar are the actions which occur in the sphere that dominates man, irrespective of whether they are a requirement of the Laws of the Universe or not, or if they emanate from him or fall upon him, and the attributes which results in the objects. The meaning of imān in al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar, both the good and the bad thereof being from Allah , is (having) imān in that the actions which occur from him or upon him against his will, and he has no power to drive them away, and the attributes which man causes in the object are from Allah  and are not from the servant, nor does he have anything to do with them. Thus the actions with regards to which man has a choice are excluded from the subject of al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar, because these actions occur from man or upon him by his choice, and because when Allah  created man and created the attributes in the objects and in the instincts and the organic needs, and created in man the distinguishing intellect, He  gave him the choice to carry out the action, or abstain from it, and He  did not oblige him to do or not do it. Nor did He  make in the attributes of things, or in the instincts and organic needs anything that obliges man to do or not to do the action. Therefore man has the choice to carry out the action or abstain from it by way of the distinguishing mind that Allah  bestowed him with, and He  made the (sound) intellect the criteria of the accountabilty. Therefore He  set for man reward for doing good, because his mind chose to carry out the orders of Allah  and abstain from his  prohibitions, and He  also set for him punishment for doing bad, because his mind chose to disobey the the orders of Allah  and commit what He  had prohibited. So his accounting on such actions is true and just, because man has the choice to carry out the actions and is not compelled to do so; and al qadā’ wa‘l-qadar has nothing to do with this matter, it is a question of the man himself doing his action by choice. Therefore man is accountable for what he earns,