The Islamic Personality by Sheikh Taqīuddīn An-Nabahānī

The Sharī’ah evidence is a proof that the hukm it denotes is a hukm shar’i. Therefore, the consideration of a hukm as a Sharī’ah rule depends on the consideration of its evidence. Consequently, the discussion about the judgement of an evidence is the basis in considering the Sharī’ah rules. When there is a suitable evidence for an incident to prove that its hukm is such and such, then this hukm is considered a Sharī’ah rule for that incident based on the consideration of its evidence. However, if there are two appropriate evidences for an incident; one indicates a certain hukm, a prohibition (hurma) for example and the other indicates a different hukm such as permissibility (ibaha). Then we must outweigh (tarjeeh) one of the evidences over the other until it becomes possible to adopt a hukm on the premise that its evidence is stronger than the other. Therefore, one must know the angles of outweighing (tarjeeh) the appropriate evidences that are used as proof so as to facilitate adopting the strongest evidence by outweighing it over other evidences. The evidence for the obligation of outweighing and acting upon the strongest evidence, that is, the strongest evidence, is the ijma’ of the Sahabah (May Allah be pleased with them for that). So, they (the Sahabah) outweighed the report of ‘A'isha  with regards to the touching of the two circumcised parts. Her statement:

They outweighed her saying over the report of Abu Sa’id al-Khudri who said that the Prophet PBUH said:

This is because the wives of the Prophet PBUH were more versed about these matters than the men. The Sahabah also outweighed the report of one of his PBUH wives who narrated that he used to wake up in the morning in a state of janaba (major ritual impurity) against what Abu Hurairah  reported from al-Fadl ibn ‘Abbas that the Prophet PBUH said:

In a similar way ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib found the report of Abu Bakr stronger, thus he did not put him to oath as he did with others. In a similar way abu Bakr found the report of al-Mughira about the inheritance of the grandmother stronger due to what was narrated in addition to it by Muhammad ibn Maslama. Also, ‘Umar found the report of Abu Musa al-Ash’ari about the isti’zan (seeking permission) stronger after it has been corroborated by Abu Sa’id al-Khudri’s narration. The Sahabah did not outweigh opinions and analogies except after studying the texts up to the point that it was not possible to go (in study) any further. Whoever scrutinises their situation and observes the facts of their Ijtihādat will come to know without any doubt whatsoever that they used to oblige the use of a preponderant evidence as opposed to a weaker one from two speculative (zanni) evidences. This is also indicated by the Prophet’s  acceptance of Mu’az, when he sent him to Yemen as a judge, on the order of evidences and the precedence of one evidence over the other.

However, when two evidences conflict it will not be correct to resort to the outweighing of one evidence over the other except in the event when it not possible to use both of them together. If it is possible to act upon both of them that is better, since it is better to act upon both evidences than to disregard one of them altogether because an evidence in principle is to act upon and not to disregard. Furthermore, it is not correct to act upon both evidences through excuses and pretexts but according to the indication of the text. An example of using two conflicting evidences is the saying of the Prophet :

And his saying :

So the Messenger  praised the one who gave witness before he was called to give testimony, and he  criticised the one who gave witness before he was called to give testimony. Thus, the Prophet’s  praise of the one who gave witness before he was asked to give it indicates that it has been ordered by the Legislator. And the Prophet’s  criticism of the one who gave witness before he was asked to give testimony indicates that it has been prohibited by the Legislator. This is a contradiction between the two evidences, and their reconciliation is: that giving testimony regarding a right of Allah , the Sharī’ah has ordered to provide it without being requested to do so. And giving testimony regarding a right of the servant, the Sharī’ah has forbade that the witness testifies before he is asked to do so. It is absolutely essential that one attempts to act upon both the evidences. If it is not possible to practise them both together and they contradict despite being equal in strength and generality, then it must be looked into. If the later evidence is known then it abrogates the earlier one whether both evidences were definite (qat’i) or speculative (zanni), whether from the Quran or Sunnah. Both evidences cannot be from the Quran and Sunnah at the same time because the Sunnah does not abrogate the Quran, even if it is mutawatir (recurrent report). As for when the later evidence is unknown; then both of them must be speculative (zanni) because definite evidences (qat’i) do not contradict each other. If they are speculative (zanni), then they should be outweighed and the stronger evidence is used. The strength of the evidence means its strength in terms of the order of the evidences and in terms of the level of considering the deduction in each type of the speculative evidences. As for the order of the evidences; the Quran is stronger than the Sunnah even if the Sunnah is mutawatir (recurrent). The mutawatir (recurrent) Sunnah is stronger than the ijma’ (consensus) and the ijma’ which has been transmitted recurrently is stronger than the isolated hadīth (khabar al-ahad). The isolated hadīth (khabar al-ahad) is stronger than the qiyas (analogy) if its ‘illah was taken by way of indication (dalāla), deduction or analogy. As for when its ‘illah is taken explicitly, it is treated as the text which has indicated the ‘illah explicitly, and it takes its rule in terms of the strength of the evidence. If the text was Qur’ānic then its hukm is that of the Qur’ān, and if it was the Sunnah then its hukm is that of the Sunnah. If it is indicated by the ijma’ then the rule of the ijma’ is taken. In terms of considering the deduction in each type of the speculative evidences, the speculative evidences are of two types; the first is the Sunnah and the second is the analogy (qiyas). Each one has specific considerations in the outweighing of evidences. i.e, based on the strength of the evidence. As for the Sunnah, the strength of the evidence with respect to it means its strength in terms of the chain (sanad) of transmission, its strength in terms of the text, and its strength in terms of the meaning. As for the strength of the Sunnah evidence in terms of the chain (sanad) it will be based on the following issues:

First: pertaining to the transmitter (rawi). The transmitter who was in direct contact is preferred to the transmitter who was not in direct contact because the former is more aware of what he narrates. It is like the narration of Abu Rafi’ that

It is preferred to the narration of Ibn ‘Abbas that

This is because Abu Rafi’ was the mediator between them and he was the representative of the Messenger of Allah  in her marriage to him. And the hadīth is outweighed according to the legal comprehension of the transmitter. The report of a transmitter who is a faqih (jurist) is preferable over the report of a transmitter who is not a faqih (jurist). The hadīth which has been transmitted by a rawi through memorisation is preferred to the hadīth which has been transmitted by a rawi through the medium of written materials, So when one of the two transmitters relies on his memorisation of the hadīth and the other relies on written materials, the one who has committed it to memory is more preferable because he is more free from suspicion. The hadīth narrated by a well known transmitter is preferred to the hadīth narrated by a lesser known transmitter.

Second: Pertaining to the same report. The recurrent hadīth (khabar mutawatir) is preferred to the isolated hadīth (khabar al-ahad). The report which has a complete chain (musnad) is preferred to a mursal report because we know the transmitter of the musnad and we do not know the transmitter of the mursal.

Third: Pertaining to the time of transmission. The transmitter who narrated the hadīth in his maturity is preferred to the hadīth which has been narrated by a transmitter at the time of his childhood that is, when he was a child.

Fourth: Pertaining to the manner of transmission. The report on which there is agreement over its continuous link (raf’ihi) to the Prophet  is preferred to the report about which there is disagreement over its continuous link to the Prophet . The report which cites the actual words of the Messenger  is better than the report which has been transmitted by meaning.

Fifth: Pertaining to the time in which the hadīth was mentioned. The hadīth which has been transmitted generally without a date is preferred to a hadīth which is dated as early, because the general hadīth is more similar to the later hadīth. The report which is mentioned in the last days of the Prophet  is preferred. So the report mentioned during the illness when he  died is preferred to the general report.

As for the strength of the evidence in terms of the matn (text) they are from the following issues:

First: If one of the reports is in the form of a command and the other is in the form of a prohibition. The prohibition is preferred to the command.

Second: If the one of the reports commands a thing and the other permits a thing. The hadīth which permits is preferred to the one that commands. Because acting upon the hadīth of permission necessitates the interpretation of the command by diverting it from the command to act to a permitted action, which is one of its established meanings. Acting upon the command necessitates the suspension of the entire hadīth of permission. Acting upon both evidences is better than suspending one of them.

Third: When one of them is a command and the other is a report (khabar). So the report (khabar) is preferred to the order, because the report (khabar) is stronger in meaning than the command. Therefore, abrogation of the (khabar) is avoided as opposed to the command which can be abrogated.

Fourth: When one of them is a prohibition and the other is a report (khabar). The report (khabar) is preferred to the prohibition for the same reason the report (khabar) is preferred to the order.

Fifth: That which is related to the words of the report. The report (khabr) whose words indicate reality (haqiqa) is preferred to the one whose words indicate a metaphor (majaz). The report which contains (includes) the divine reality (haqiqa shari’a) is preferred to the one which includes the linguistic reality (haqiqa lughawiya) or the traditional reality (haqiqa urfiya) because the Prophet  was sent to explain the divine (facts). The report which includes a reason (‘illah) for the hukm, whether it was explicit, indicative or deduced is preferred to the one which does not point to a reason (‘illah) for the hukm, this is because the reasoned hukm is stronger from the legislative point of view.

As for the strength of the report in terms of the meaning they are in the following issues:

First: If one of the reports conveys ease (takhfif) and the other conveys harshness (taghleez). Then the report which includes ease is preferred to the report which includes harshness due to His  saying,

and His  saying,

And due to his  saying:

“And his  saying:

Second: If one of the reports conveys a prohibition and the other conveys a permission. The report which indicates a prohibition is preferred to the report which indicates a permission due to his  saying:

Third: If one of the reports conveys a prohibition and the other conveys an obligation. If an indication (qarina) for outweighing does not exist then the report which indicates a prohibition is preferred to the report which indicates an obligation.

Fourth: If one of the reports conveys an obligation and the other conveys permissibility, then the report which indicates an obligation is preferred to the report which indicates a permissibility. Because leaving an obligation entails a sin and leaving a permissibility does not entail anything. So, being further from the sin is more proper than being further from a thing that does not entail anything. Because, the report which indicates an obligation has a decisive request and the report which indicates a permissibility is either a request giving choice or it is itself a choice. The decisive request is preferred to other requests.

This is with respect to the considerations of tarjeeh in the Sunnah. As for the considerations of tarjeeh in analogy (qiyas), they are according to the evidence of the reason (‘illah). So the analogy (qiyas) whose reasoning of its description (‘illayat wasfihi) is proved by the definite text is preferred to the one whose reasoning of its description is established by non definite text. Because the definite text is inconceivable to indicate other than reasoning (‘illah), while the indefinite text is not. The analogy whose ‘illah is proved explicitly is preferred to the one whose ‘illah is established through induction, deduction or analogy. That whose ‘illah is established by deduction is preferred to that whose ‘illah is established by analogy. Thus the outweighing (tarjeeh) of analogy is according to the ‘illah and its evidence.

These, briefly, are the preponderant qualifications. Through them the stronger evidence is known and taken so that the Sharī’ah rule is outweighed. This is possible in two cases: firstly, in the case of the muttabi’ (follower) in his judgement of two evidences without possessing the ability to deduce (istinbat) due to the absence of exerting the effort seeking the preponderant opinion. Secondly, in the case of the mujtahid when he is confronted with two evidences. In both cases, when there are two evidences then one must be outweighed over the other. When an evidence is outweighed he is obliged to adopt the hukm whose evidence is stronger and act upon it, and leave the hukm whose evidence is proven to be weak.