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The Scientific Deception Of The New Atheists by Mohammad Hijab

Why Has The West Become Increasingly Irreligious?

Anthony Wallace says:

Belief in supernatural powers is doomed to die out, all over the world, as a result of the increasing adequacy and diffusion of scientific knowledge (Wallace, 1966, p.264-5).

But are developments of scientific knowledge driving people away from the supernatural?

Numerous attempts were undertaken to understand the irreligious trajectory witnessed in the West. An exhaustive explication of sociological reasons for this are beyond this paper’s scope. The main question under investigation is the extent to which New Atheist scientific argumentation has impacted this trend with one of the first sociological attempts to investigate irreligiosity in England conducted by Susan Budd and described in Varieties of Unbelief (1977). Budd used obituaries from secular and ethical organisations of 200

biographies between 1850-1960 (Sheard, 2014, p.1) identifying three causes for unbelief, including ‘reading the Bible and rationalist classics, a distrust and resentment towards clergy members and a criticism of belief in immortality’ (Budd, 1977, p.106). Science and Darwinism are conspicuously absent here. The periods between 1958-1974 were perhaps most dramatic in demographic movement towards irreligiosity in the Western world.

Elaborating on the British context Hugh McLeod mentions individualism, socialism, scientism, feminism, religious criticism, the ‘sexual revolution’ and post-war affluence as reasons for an irreligious direction (McLeod, 2005, p.206). An irreligious family socialisation was indicated by McLeod (and most sociologists studying this period) as a primary reason for irreligiosity in adulthood (McLeod, 2005, p.228). The criticality of this period in altering to irreligiosity is toughly stated by Callum Brown:

It took several centuries (in what historians used to call the Dark Ages) to convert Britain to Christianity, but it has taken less than forty years for the country to forsake it (Brown, 2009, p.1).

Analysing 836 students in a Canadian context, Bruce Hunsberger identifies primary socialisation in the home as the most salient factor for irreligiosity (Hunsberger, 1984, p.1).

Surveying the time period from 1987-2012 from an American context and using the General Social Survey (Davis and Smith, 1992) to inform their results, Michael Hout and Claude Fischer link increased political polarisation as a salient reason for irreligiosity, stating:

Political liberals became substantially more likely to express no religious preference, moderates became somewhat more likely to do so, and political conservatives (Hout and Fischer, 2014, p.438).

Hout and Fischer make special mention of ‘autonomy’ claiming:

Original to this paper, we invoke a value shift toward greater autonomy and away from traditional authority. In formulating our hypothesis we have drawn on social psychological research in the 1950s that identified the emergence of a positive bias in favor of thinking for oneself we refer to as “autonomy.” Most evidence has been compiled by asking survey respondents to rank things it might be important for a child to learn, including “to think for him or herself” and “to obey” among other potentially desirable qualities (Hout and Fischer, 2014, p.433).

Furthermore, using the General Social Survey (Davis and Smith, 1992) in an American context, Stephen Merino concludes:

The most recent cohorts raised with no religion are even more liberal – percent, compared with roughly 20 percent who self-identify as conservative. Likewise, more recent cohorts raised with no religion are much more likely to express a lack of confidence in churches and religious organizations (Merino, 2012, p.10).

In a British context, Linda Woodhead cites ‘individual freedom’ and ‘liberal democracy’ as a ‘salient factor’ (Woodhead and Catto, 2012, p.253), stating:

My argument is thus that growing pluralisation and liberalisation in Britain have, since the 1970s, been met by opposite tendencies in religion, and that it is this clash which helps to explain the increasingly rapid rise of ‘no religion’. It’s not that religion or spirituality per se have become objectionable to ‘modern man’, as some older secularisation theorists and ‘enlightenment atheists’ liked to think, but that the particular kinds of religion on offer in late modern Britain have not offered the social, spiritual and moral goods which younger people affirm and desire (Woodhead and Catto, 2012, p.258).

Woodhead effectively refutes theories of secularisation, stating:

The patchy global distribution of ‘no religion’ undermines simplistic accounts of secularisation that imagined all countries propelled to the same secular destination point by the irresistible forces of modernisation (Woodhead, 2012, p.254).

Woodhead’s appreciation of census data limitations (collected each decade in England) is useful as it accounts for data skewing due to its collection by heads of households (Woodhead, 2012, p.246). Woodhead mitigates these issues by creating survey questions which scale the extent of a participant’s atheism (Woodhead, 2012, p.49-50), concluding that ‘only 13 percent of ‘nones’ are strongly secular—amounting to under 5 per cent of the population’ (Woodhead, 2012, p.250) and that ‘the growth of ‘no religion’ cannot be conflated with the growth of the secularism championed by the ‘New Atheists’ (Woodhead, 2012, p.250). Fahmi (2018) supports these findings reporting that approximately 90% of Americans believe in a ‘higher power’ despite 26% claiming to have no religion (Pew Research, 2019). Accordingly, only a minority of religious ‘nones’ are ‘confidently’ atheistic.

This data is noteworthy as it effectively suggests that the number of ‘confident atheists’ in Britain (5%) is similar to the number of Muslims.

Reference: The Scientific Deception Of The New Atheists - Mohammad Hijab

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