In this chapter, I will critically examine some of the pre-existing literature available on the contingency argument made ‘ontologically’ in the field of Philosophy of Religion. I will assess whether it is fit for use in apologetic, polemic, and pastoral purposes. In addition, I will further evaluate some articulations of the cosmological argument and their relevance to the Burhān, which can itself be presented as a cosmological argument. Looking through certain arguments, I will critically assess which of the arguments is most easily stated and timeless, while also having the most explanatory scope and being least susceptible to refutation. These four conditions are of vital importance to the arguments, especially in regard to their use in pastoral and apologetic settings.

In the subsequent chapter, I will present my own rendition of these arguments, while using the Burhān as my guide. Although some of the arguments mentioned in this chapter can still be effective in such settings, I intend to demonstrate how the vulnerabilities of these arguments make the Burhān a better choice considering the conditions mentioned above.

Cosmological arguments – most notably the Kalām argument presented by William Lane Craig – have been at the centre of much of the contemporary discourse around the validity of theism. As discussed in the previous chapter, Craig reiterates al Ghazālī’s argument that ‘whatever begins to exist has a cause; the universe began to exist, and therefore the universe has a cause’.65 The fact that the argument has generated much controversy – both within academia and public debate circles – indicates both its popularity and effectiveness. In order for the second premise of the argument to be sustained, Craig has made a series of arguments defending causality, which includes a static theory of time, the impossibility of an actual infinite, as well as posited arguments against quantum notions of a ‘loosened’ (or non-existent) causality.66 For example, in his book Time and Eternity, Craig makes the following argument relating to the special theory of relativity: 1. Either the Einsteinian relativity interpretation or the Minkowskian space-time interpretation of STR is correct. 2. If the Minkowskian space-time interpretation of STR is correct, then 3. a static theory of time is correct and the Einsteinian relativity interpretation of STR is not correct. 4. Therefore, a static theory of time is correct.67

Employing these kinds of arguments may be an unnecessary encumbrance for advocates of theism. This is because the argument depends on disproving actual infinities in the real world in order to prove the universe has a beginning. To accomplish this, Craig has to argue against a legitimate mathematical interpretation of infinite sets (namely Cantorian interpretations) or alternatively show how they are not applicable in the real world.68 If one is making the argument and is not well-acquainted with mathematics or the philosophy underpinning mathematics, the atheist interlocutor (who may be more educated on these subjects) may cite opposing interpretations and ultimately derail his opponent’s argument. The same thing may be said of relying on scientific proofs in order to prove the second premise of the Kalām argument, or the general idea that the universe has a beginning. For example, in New Proofs for the Existence of God, Robert J. Spitzer dedicates a considerable portion of his book to proving the occurrence of the Big Bang, the second law of thermodynamics, ‘why a bouncing universe cannot have been bouncing forever’, and similar topics.69 The corrigible nature of science and volatile changes that occur in our understanding of physics not only require apologists to have a strong grasp of these fields, but may even lead to the understanding that the evidence presented today will be contradicted by future discoveries. In this way, such arguments do not fulfil the timeless criterion which is necessary for the continued relevance of theistic arguments. As we will see in our section in which the argument is presented, it may be unnecessary to engage with the interlocutor on the point of infinity. The same can be said for the case of the Kalām argument if one simply makes an argument from composition, a matter which has already been discussed.

Many of the issues that one may have with the Kalām cosmological argument are overcome with Leibniz’s contingency argument, an argument that can be made both cosmologically and ontologically. Leibniz’s argument is not only consistent with the Burhān but contributes to it by introducing a general ‘explanatory principle’ referred to as the principle of sufficient reason, abbreviated as PSR.70 Pruss summarises the argument in the following steps: ‘(1) Every contingent fact has an explanation. (2) There is a contingent fact that includes all other facts. (3) Therefore, there is an explanation of this fact’.71 Pruss goes on to argue that the PSR is ‘self-evident’,72

comparing it to the law of the excluded middle in axiomatic logic. As with the Burhān, the argument terminates with something that explains everything else in existence without requiring an explanation itself. The simplicity of this argument makes it fit for use in apologetic and pastoral settings. However, the term ‘explanation’ may seem inappropriate, especially in cosmological examples. Moreover, the use of the term ‘possible worlds’ (as given in the system of S5 Modal logic) confers vulnerability upon the argument, as it opens the doors to ‘modal nihilism,’ the like of which was famously elaborated upon by W. V. Quine in his work The Web of Belief. Modal nihilism (and other such forms of modal scepticisms) can and have been refuted with considerable ease. A rejection of the modal categories (or indeed logic, mathematics, or any a priori truth) disarms Quine of the ability to use such tools in order to repudiate them.73 Nevertheless, in order to sidestep this objection, I intend to produce at least one version of the argument without making reference to either causality or modality.

Ontological arguments for the existence of God could be said to have had a relatively less impact on public discourse. Alvin Plantinga, who himself employs a ‘victorious’ modal ontological argument, states:

Our verdict on these reformulated versions of St. Anselm’s argument must be as follows. They cannot, perhaps, be said to prove or establish their conclusion. But since it is rational to accept their central premise, they do show that it is rational to accept that conclusion.74

Using modal logic, Plantinga attempts to reformulate the ontological argument of a ‘maximally perfect being’, which was first famously elaborated by Anselm of Canterbury. Anselm’s argument runs as follows:

(1) God exists in the realm of understanding but not in reality.

(2) Existence in reality is greater than existence in the mind alone.

(3) God’s existence in reality is conceivable.

(4) If God did exist in reality, then he would be greater than he is in (1) and (2).

(5) It is conceivable that there be a being greater than God is in (3) and (4).

(6) It is conceivable that there is a being greater than the being about which nothing greater can be conceived (5), by the definition of ‘God’. (7) It is false that it is conceivable that there is a being greater than the being about which nothing greater can be conceived.

Since (6) and (7) contradict each other, we may conclude that (8) It is false that God exists in the understanding but not in reality.

So, if God exists in the understanding, he also exists in reality; but clearly enough he does exist in the understanding, as even the fool will testify; therefore, he exists in reality as well.75

Plantinga’s main contention with this argument centres around the second premise. Regarding this point, he states that ‘it is fair to say that it is step (2) – the assertion that existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone – that is the troublemaker here’.76 But is the idea of ‘greatness’ open to analysis? Leibniz thought not, arguing that it is ‘impossible to demonstrate that perfections are incompatible – and he concluded from this that all perfections can co-exist together in a single entity’.77 Plantinga, however, attempts to restate the argument, and does so in the following way:

(9) God does not exist in the actual world.

(10) For any worlds W and W’ and object x, if x exists in W and x does not exist in W’, then the greatness of x in W exceeds the greatness of x in W’.

(11) It is possible that God exists.

(12) So, there is a possible world W such that God exists in W according to (11).

Having said this, Kurt Gödel’s ontological proof resolves many of the issues here. Gödel’s argument depends on two axioms: the first, stipulating that if a property is positive, then not a (∼ A) is not positive. The second is that if A is positive, and A entails B, then B is positive.83 What Godel means by ‘positive’ has been a subject of scholarly contention, with some84 preferring to critique the argument by interpreting positivity in the ‘moral/aesthetic’ sense, despite admitting that it may simply mean ‘attribution’. Such an interpretation leads Gustafsson (who references the two axioms stated above in S5) to state that ‘being God-like seems positive and being Devil-like seems negative’.85 But if one assumes – as Rasmussen and Pruss contend – that ‘existing necessarily’ is positive and possibly causing something is possible, then the ontological argument is certainly sustainable. Rasmussen and Pruss make the argument in a reductio format in the following way:

To see this, for a reductio suppose A & B is impossible. Then nothing can have both A and B, and so necessarily anything that has A lacks B. Thus, A entails ∼ B. Hence ∼ B is positive by (2) since A is positive. By (1), B cannot be positive – and we have a contradiction. It follows from (3), (4), and (5) that N & C is possibly instantiated.86.

(2) referred to above is effectively the assumption of modus ponens; (1) is Gödel’s assumption that if A is positive, then not A is not positive. (3) is the assumption that existing necessarily is positive, and (4) assumes that possibly causing something is positive. Though Gödel’s argument is definitely valid in modal logic, assumptions such as the ones articulated by Pruss and Rasmussen are almost certainly susceptible to attack. Furthermore, the argument is virtually inaccessible to lay audiences when delivered in this way. That Kurt Gödel even attempted such an argument – and succeeded in securing its validity – is alone worthy of mention, as it dispels common New Atheistic notions of irrational or unprovable faith. Using such a long-winded argument that requires foreknowledge of modal logic, however, is not practical in pastoral or mainstream apologetic settings.

In this chapter we have been able to gauge the advantages and disadvantages of some ontological and cosmological arguments found in the Philosophy of Religion. We have issued comments on their practical utility from an apologetic perspective. With this in mind, the following conclusions can be made with reference to the Kalām cosmological argument, the main strength of using an argument like this is the brevity of its initial premises. The argument has generated much controversy and has been at the centre of the debates regarding God’s existence. Having said this, the limitations of the argument relate to substantiating the second premise, especially when physics based reasoning is referred to. Such reasoning has been highly volatile in the last century, and subsequently is less likely to meet the timeless criterion mentioned before. Arguing for a finite universe with a beginning is another contentious issue, as the argument demands that an actual infinity in the real world cannot exist. It is my estimation that the Burhān and Tarkīb arguments could be said to be more timeless and undercutting than the Kalām cosmological argument, as both the scientific reasoning needed for premise 2 of the latter and arguing against actual infinity are not requirements in order for the reasoning to be functional. This is especially relevant when considering infinite multiverse atheistic responses. Relating to the ontological argument, the type of argument made by Plantinga can be said to be ineffectual in fulfilling the object of proving God’s existence. As we have already seen, Plantinga actually admits this himself. The main disadvantage of this type of argument is the susceptibility of the formulations, which can ultimately lead to parody arguments that are just as valid and prove exactly the opposite of what is attempted. The way this issue is rectified is by proving a ‘positive element’ over a ‘negative one’, which requires an argument in and of itself. In my estimation, this is best done by Gödel. Having said this, the argument (while effective) is virtually inaccessible to lay audiences since it is written in S5 modal logic. Leibniz’s argument (from a principle of sufficient reason) does not have the same type of limitations and may be used in its place instead. The Burhān argument works quite similarly to Leibniz’s. But as we have seen, it has other features like the Tarkīb (composition) argument which strengthen the case for the contingency of the universe or multiverses.

Knowing Richard, he may reject the idea that the universe requires any sort of explanation at all. He may suggest that asking ‘what is the explanation for the universe?’ is an unnecessary question. We know however, that Richard doesn’t apply this kind of logic to anything else in existence. If anything happens to Richard in his life which impacts it, he will demand some kind of an explanation. It is important to outline this to Richard, as Richard has one set of criteria in day-to-day living, but another set when dealing with the ultimate questions of life.