This argument has multiple names in the religious space generally, and in the Islamic domain in particular. They all revolve around the central idea that whatever comes into existence after having been non-existent must have a cause that preferred its existence over its non-existence. They also comprise of the idea that whatever is possible is most definitely contingent on a non-contingent cause that created it.122 That cause is Allah . Some of the names for this argument are: the argument from creation, the argument from invention, the prime mover argument, the kalam argument, universal causation, the argument from first cause, the causal argument, the argument from the universe, the cosmological argument, and others.

One who ponders over this proof will find it to be the simplest of all the indicators that are suggestive of Allah . This explains why this argument is widespread across all civilisations, cultures, and nations. The motivation behind it is an instinctive question seeking the cause of observable and perceived temporal events. Though its scenarios and names are varied, its basis lies in two extremely clear propositions:

• First proposition: Temporal events exist. A temporal event is that which was preceded by its non-existence, or anything that has a beginning.

• Second proposition: Temporal events point to the existence of a cause.

• Conclusion: Temporal events in existence must have a cause, which is Allah .

Explaining the foundation of this argument in al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij al-Adillah (Revealing the Methodologies of the Arguments), Ibn Rushd (Averroes) the grandson123 said, As for the argument from invention, it captures the existence of fauna, flora, and the heavens. This method is based on two principles that are firmly present in the innate predispositions of all people. The first is that these existing entities are invented. This is something automatically known from fauna and flora, as He  said, “…those idols you invoke besides Allah can never create so much as a fly, even if they all were to come together for that.”124 We see inanimate bodies in which life is created. We definitely know that there is an entity that creates and favours them with life here, which is Allah . As for the heavens, we know from their unfaltering movements that they have been commanded to look after what is here in the world, and that they have been subjugated for our benefit. Something that is subjugated is, by necessity, invented and commanded by something else. As for the second principle, it is that every invented thing has an inventor. Therefore, one can correctly deduce from these two propositions that something in existence125 has a doer that originated it.126

We can note the observation that Ibn Rushd makes. He differentiated between how fauna and flora are indicative of origination, vesus how heavens are indicative of the same. For the former, he considered it self-evident; for the latter he considered the sign of their subjugation as the sign for their origination. Based on this, we can say the indicators of temporal events for Allah  are of two levels. This is based on how close or remote temporal events are from being capturable by the senses and observation, and the potential of them being observable and perceptible to the senses when emerging:

• The temporal emergence of individually observable creations.

• The temporal emergence of the world (the genus of temporal events).

When we contemplate the nature of how revelation dealt with this argument, we notice that the first level is more present. This is because it is perceptible by the senses, which is the quickest way to acquiring the aim without the need for lengthy propositions, expansive philosophical argumentation, or proving something that is not present or observable. Explaining the Qur’anic method here, and highlighting that observable temporal events are not in need for evidence to demonstrate their temporality, Ibn Taymiyyah states, ‘The method mentioned in the Qur’an is by reasoning for the temporality of man and other beings – whose temporality is known by observation and similar means – in order to demonstrate the existence of the Creator . The Originator can be argued for by the origination of man. Man’s origination does not need to be reasoned by associating him with change, temporality, or the necessity of temporal events being terminal.

The difference between reasoning through his temporality and reasoning for his temporality is evident. What is in the Qur’an is the first, not the second. Allah  says, “Or were they created by nothing, or are they their own creators?”127 Consequently, the mere temporal emergence of fauna, flora, metals, rain, clouds, and similar is known by necessity; it is in fact witnessed and does not need proof. Only that which is not necessarily known through the senses is to be learned via proof. The temporality of these beings is instinctive knowledge that does not require evidence. It is known either sensorily or instinctively, whether by way of being informed that can offer instinctive knowledge, or by other ways of necessary knowledge. The emergence of man from seminal fluid is like the emergence of fruits from trees and flora from the Earth, etc. It is sensorily known that this same fruit is emergent, coming into existence after having not occurred; the same applies to man and others. Allah  states, “Do such people not remember that We created them before, when they were nothing?”128, and He  says, “An angel replied, ‘So will it be! Your Lord says, “It is easy for Me, just as I created you before, when you were nothing!”129’130

One subtle point that Ibn Taymiyyah alluded to is the state of familiarity or the lack thereof vis-à-vis observing a particular event, and the impact this state has on a person becoming heedless of the indicators that are easily accessible to him. Ibn Taymiyyah  says, ‘This is why the fiṭrah of the creation is wired so that whenever they see a newly emerging event – such as thunder, lightning, and earthquakes – they remember and glorify Allah. This is because they know that this recurrence did not recur by itself, but rather there was an Originator who caused it to originate. Though they know the same is applicable to all other newly emerging events, the events they are used to are already familiarised to them, as opposed to the rarely recurring ones. Otherwise, those who mostly remember and glorify Allah when newly emerging events that are rare appear would have already seen those oft-recurring signs of Allah that are far greater than the rare event. Had Allah done nothing other than create man, that alone would be the greatest of signs. Everyone knows that man was not created by himself, his parents, or anyone else from humankind. Everyone knows that he must have had an originator. Everyone knows he must have had a Creator that created him, and that He is present, alive, omniscient, omnipotent, all-hearing, and all seeing. One who creates other living things is worthier of being alive; one who grants other things knowledge is worthier of knowledge; one who makes other things powerful is worthier of power. It is also known that the masterful design therein denotes the knowledge of the Doer, and that the special design denotes the will of the Doer. The process of origination per se could not have occurred without the originator’s power. A person’s knowledge of his own specific, personal, and individual self would offer him the knowledge of these godly meanings and other things, as Allah  states, “…as there are within yourselves. Can you not see?”131’132

It should be noted that most Qur’anic passages that reveal the temporal nature of events were brought to demonstrate a wider point, not to merely prove the existence of the Creator, like the two verses Ibn Taymiyyah concluded his previous statement with. The context in these verses show that they were revealed to offer reasoning for the perfect power of Allah , and that He is able to bring about the Resurrection. In other words, one who created things out of nothing is a fortiori able to refashion them. This amount, as mentioned before, implicitly yet self-evidently suggests that the Omnipotent exists, and that His existence is suggested by the mere emergence of the creation out of nothing. The most famous verse that carries this rational argument is Allah’s statement: ‘Or were they created by nothing, or are they their own creators?’133

For the issue we are dealing with here, this awe-inspiring verse is the most enduring proof in the Qur’an. The verse starts off by setting out the great theological reality by focusing the discussion to what are the possibilities, after which it proceeds to demonstrate why all the options are impossible save for the only true option: Man has a Creator Who created him. The verse poses a question to rational people: ‘Were they brought into existence without anyone causing it? Or did they bring themselves into existence? It is neither, for it is Allah Who created them and gave them life, having previously been nothing worth mentioning.’134

Detailing this argument, Ibn al-Qayyim says, Contemplate the phrasal repetition of the creation term, and the restriction that comprises of establishing evidence in the simplest and most eloquent manner. Allah  is essentially saying, “How could have these creations – having not been in existence – been created without a Creator? This would be considered impossible by anyone with understanding and rationality, that there can be something made without a maker, or something created without a creator.” If a person passes by a wasteland without any building, then he passed by it again and saw solid buildings and castles, he would have no doubt that these had a maker. Then Allah said, “Or were they created by nothing, or are they their own creators?”135 This, likewise, shows that it is impossible that a servant invents and creates himself. How can someone be able to create himself out of non-existence? He cannot even increase his own life, not even by an hour, even though he has all the facilities of life. He cannot even extend his finger, fingernail, or even one strand of his hair. Given that both options are false, the only option that remains is that they have a Creator Who created them, and a Fashioner Who fashioned them. He is the True Divine Who is worthy of their worship and thanks. How can they thank a god other than Him when He is the one and only being that created them? If it is said, “What is the place of Allah’s statement ‘Or did they create the heavens and the Earth? In fact, they have no firm belief in Allah’136 in this evidence?”, it would be said in response: “The best place. Through the first couple of segments, He explained that they have a Creator and Fashioner, and that they are created. With the third segment, He explained that they are unable to create, having been created themselves and brought into existence. They did not create themselves. They did not create the heavens or the Earth. It was the One, the Omnipotent, the One described as ‘There is neither any god nor lord besides Him’ Who created them. He created the heavens and the Earth. By creating the upper and lower dominions and everything therein, He alone is the one Who created both residence and resident.”’137

Jubayr ibn Muṭʿim  has a beautiful narration revealing the greatness of this Qur’anic verse. He said, ‘I heard the Prophet  read al-Ṭūrin the Maghrib prayer. When he reached this verse: “Or were they created by nothing, or are they their own creators?”138, my heart almost flew out.’139 The one contemplating the method of the Prophets in debating those who denied the lordship of Allah  and claimed it for themselves will note that the Prophets instructed them with this rational method to argue for the lordship of Allah , and subsequently His worthiness to be worshipped alone.

The most infamous person who denied the lordship of Allah  was Pharaoh. He said, ‘I am your lord, the most high!’140 As thus, part of the discussion Mūsā had with him was to use the effects of the power of Allah  as an evidence against him. Allah  says, ‘Pharaoh asked, “And what is ‘the Lord of all worlds’?”’141

Mūsā  offered a variety of answers and proofs. He reminded Pharaoh of the innate instinct, that Allah is far more recognisable than the need for some definition. He explained that all of Allah’s creation is existentially dependent on Him – all the heavens, the Earth, and everything in between is in need of Allah  for creation, sustenance, and assistance. His statement ‘Lord of the east and west’142 is additional information and emphasis that all events are dependent on Him, . Everything above and beneath you, everything in the east and the west, and everything in between that is in front of you and behind you is dependent on Him .

Ibn Taymiyyah analysed the debate between Mūsā and Pharaoh:

Pharaoh shrouded his denial and rejection in the form of a rhetorical question. He was not asking about the attributes of a Lord he had already acknowledged, as he was in denial of Him and rejected Him. This is why towards the end of the discussion, he said, “If you take any other god besides me, I will certainly have you imprisoned.”143

He also said, “…although I am sure he (Mūsā) is a liar.”144 His question was actually to convey his denial and rejection. He was basically saying, “The world does not have a lord who sent you. Who is this?” – as a point of denial. Mūsā explained that He is known to both him and those who were present in court, and that His signs were apparent, clear, and undeniable. He stated that they were denying with their tongues what they instinctively knew to be true. As related in another place in the Qur’an, Mūsā said to Pharaoh, “You know well that none has sent these signs down except the Lord of the heavens and the Earth as insights.”145 Allah  said, “And, although their hearts were convinced the signs were true, they still denied them wrongfully and arrogantly. See then what was the end of the corruptors!”146 Pharaoh did not say “Who (Arabic = man) is the Lord of the Worlds?”, as man is a question about a specific being. It is used in questions in which an exact and specific entity is being questioned, with its generic identity already known. It is like when a conduit is asked when he comes from someone, “Who (man) sent you?” ‘As for mā, that would be used in a question for description. Pharaoh was saying, “What is this? And what is this that you have called ‘Lord of the Worlds’?” He said this out of denial and rejection of Him. When he asked this in a dismissive fashion, Mūsā answered that He is far more recognisable than to ever be denied, and that He is far more obvious than to be ever doubted. He said, “He is the Lord of the heavens and the Earth and everything in between, if only you had sure faith.”147 He did not say, “…if only you had sure faith in such and such” – he kept it open ended. In essence, if you had certainty for anything, the first on the list of certainties should be conviction in this Lord – just as when the Messengers said to their people, “Is there any doubt about Allah?”148 If you say, “We have no certainty in anything. In fact, all knowledge has been seized from us”, then this is a general claim to sophism. Its claimant is obviously lying, as knowledge is part and parcel of every human. Every rational human must have some knowledge. This is why it has been stated in the definition of rationality that it is the instinctive knowledge, which no rational person is free of. So when Pharaoh said, “Your messenger, who has been sent to you, must be insane”149, it was a lie on the Messenger. They had left their praiseworthy traditions, and thus they ascribed the Messengers to insanity. They also showcased a denial or doubting in the Creator. This was the state of their common people and their religion. This was a good religion in their eyes, and the god they obeyed was Pharaoh: “Your messenger, who has been sent to you, must be insane.”150 So Mūsā explained to him that he is the one who has been left bereft of beneficial logic, and he is worthier of this ascription. He said, “He is the Lord of the east and west, and everything in between, if only you had any sense.”151 Logic requires instinctive and certain knowledge, the greatest of which in the fiṭrah is acknowledging the Creator. He then went on to explain that affirming Him is a logical implication. However, beneficial knowledge is praiseworthy when a person endowed with it acts upon it. If he does not act upon it, it would be said that he is bereft of logic. It would also be said that the one who does not follow what he is seemingly certain of actually does not possess certainty. Certainty can also mean knowledge that is settled in the heart; it can also mean acting upon this knowledge. Therefore, the term believer (one who is certain) would only be said for those in whose hearts both knowledge and action have settled. The people of Pharaoh did not follow when they knew. They therefore possessed neither logic nor certainty. The statement of Mūsā denotes both points: If you have certainty, you will know Him, and if you have logic, you will know Him. If you claim that you have no certainty or logic, then likewise your people. This therefore would be an acknowledgement on your part that your humanity has been taken away from you. Whoever is like this is unfit to claim divinity. Even though this is false on your part, you still believe Him. It is as Allah  said, “And, although their hearts were convinced the signs were true, they still denied them wrongfully and arrogantly.”152 You have logic by which you can recognise Him. However, your predilections prevent you from following what logic dictates. You want to boast in the land and be corrupt. Therefore, from this angle, you have no logic.’153

There was a confrontation between Ibrāhīm  and Namrūd (Nimrod) similar to that of Mūsā  and Pharaoh. Allah  says, ‘Are you O Prophet not aware of the one who argued with Abraham about his Lord because Allah had granted him kingship? Remember when Abraham said, “My Lord is the One Who has power to give life and cause death.” He argued, “I too have the power to give life and cause death.” Abraham challenged him, “Allah causes the Sun to rise from the east. So make it rise from the west.” And so the disbeliever was dumbstruck. And Allah does not guide the wrongdoing people.’154 Explaining the segments of this debate and the state of Namrūd, Ibn Kathīr  said, That is because he denied that there is a god other than him, like Pharaoh said to his people, “O chiefs! I know of no other god for you but myself.”155 It was only his arrogance and prolonged rule that led him to his tyranny, gross disbelief, and severe obstinance. This is why Allah said, “…because Allah had granted him kingship?”156 It is like he demanded evidence from Ibrāhīm for the existence of the Lord he was calling to. Ibrāhīm said, “My Lord is the One Who has power to give life and cause death.”157 By this he meant: “The evidence for His existence is the appearance of these observable things after they were previously in non-existence, and their non existence after they had been in existence. This is automatically proof for the existence of the Doer and the Chooser, as they would not have occurred by themselves. Therefore, it is necessary for there to be an entity who brought them into existence. That would be the Lord to Whose worship that I call, for He is alone and without partner.” At that moment, the interlocutor – Namrūd – said, “I too have the power to give life and cause death.”158 Qatādah, Muhammad ibn Isḥāq, Suddī, and others said, “Look – I now have two people brought to me. They are on death row. I hereby order that one is killed and the other pardoned. This is the meaning of giving life and death.” It appears – and Allah knows best – that this is not what Namrūd meant, as this is not a direct answer to Ibrāhīm, nor is it related to his question, as it does not preclude the existence of a Maker. Rather, what he meant was to proclaim this station for himself out of stubbornness and arrogance. He pretended that by doing this, he was the one who issued life and death. Pharaoh followed him on this: “O chiefs! I know of no other god for you but myself.”159 This is why when he claimed this puffery, Ibrāhīm told him, “Allah causes the Sun to rise from the east. So make it rise from the west.”160 By this he meant: “If you are claiming that you give life and death, then the One Who does this is the One Who enforces His will in existence by creating His chosen entities, and by subjugating the planets and their movements. This Sun appears every day from the east – if you are a god who gives life and death as you claim, then bring it from the west.” When he knew he was unable and could not offer a response, he realised that he could no longer boast in this situation, and was left dumbstruck. Allah  said, “And Allah does not guide the wrongdoing people.”161 This means He does not inspire them to any evidence or proof. Rather, their evidence is futile in the eyes of their Lord. Upon them is wrath, and they will suffer a severe punishment. Revelation according to this meaning is far better than what most logicians mention, namely that Ibrāhīm’s switch from the first issue to the second was a switch from one evidence to another that was more clear-cut. Some logicians refer to this switch with an unsavoury expression. However, it is not like they have stated. Rather, the first issue is like the proposition to the second and highlights the falsehood of what Namrūd claimed in both the first and second issues. And to Allah belongs all praise and thanks.162

• First proposition: Temporal events exist.

• Second proposition: Every temporal event has someone who caused it.

• Conclusion: Allah  is the cause of temporal events.

Evidence for these two propositions, and how they lead to the aforementioned conclusion, is required.

The proof of this proposition is the senses and observation, which is what Ghazālī, Ibn Rushd, Ibn Taymiyyah, and others pointed out in relation to perceptible temporal events. On the temporality of the universe (and everything within it), both its existence and non-existence can be envisaged, and thus its existence is not considered necessary – it is only contingent. Contingent entities are most certainly temporal, as they require the existence of a non-contingent being for them to come into existence. The temporality of the universe will be discussed in more detail in the next section, by the permission of Allah.

The senses are cognitive transmitters, not cognitive arbiters. A man’s recognition of the emerging things he witnesses and senses around him is necessary. Ibn Taymiyyah  said, The method of bringing evidence by using that whose temporality is observable is in the Qur’an, and the ancient scholars and Imams have agreed to it, though in conjunction with instinct and the senses. With this, there is no need to offer evidence for the temporality of specific Doubting the temporality of those things whose emergence can be observed leads to sophism, which shuts down the possibility of any knowledge. It results in the equalisation of a sane person and a madman.

The proof for this is rational instinctiveness, as represented in the principle of causality. It is a self-evident and instinctive issue whose opposite scenario cannot be envisaged: It is not possible to imagine the existence of a temporal matter without knowing there was a cause that brought about its emergence. Ibn Taymiyyah said, ‘Knowing that an originated entity must have an originator is innate and instinctive knowledge.’164 Therefore, this is an issue that does not require a process of evidence-based reasoning. Rather, it would be accepted as fact, for it is basic knowledge, upon which theoretical knowledge is based. Rational necessities are to be used as evidence for other things. They are not there to be proven. They acquire their decisiveness from their innateness. Without affirming their instinctiveness, the basis of knowledge would become an infinite series, causing the collapse of the possibility of gaining any knowledge. Therefore, there must be some basic facts – or cognitive concepts – upon which the process of evidence-based reasoning is founded. One of these instinctive cognitive concepts is the principle of causality.

It is interesting that the process of evidence-based reasoning requires that rational necessity is acknowledged. The connection between evidence and what it points to is governed by this rule, for evidence is the cause of gaining knowledge about what it points to. The opponent’s mere attempt to disprove the principle of causality is a tacit acknowledgement on his part in favour of it. On the deep influence of this principle on the make-up of human rationality, Ibn Taymiyyah said, It is known by fiṭrah – upon which Allah predisposed his slaves with clear logic – that an emerging event does not occur without something originating it, and that the emergence of a temporal event without an originator can be automatically ruled out as false. This is entrenched in all children of Adam, even small children. If a child were struck and said, “Who hit me?”, and he was told, “Nobody”, his mind would not accept that the strike occurred without someone perpetrating it. This is why if someone posited that writing, construction, implantation, or similar can occur without someone doing these, rational people would consider him to be either a madman or a sophist, just like someone who denied self-evidence and instinctive knowledge.’165

For further emphasis and clarity on this instinctive knowledge, it can be said that, prior to existence, anything that is now existent was: a) impossible, b) possible, or c) necessary. The first option is unviable as it would have never come into existence in the first place. The third option is also unviable as it would never have been non-existent. Therefore, the only credible option left is that it is possible – that it can accept both existence and non-existence. And because it left nothingness to come into existence, there must be an entity exercising preponderance in favour of its existence over its non-existence, without which it would have remained in the realm of nothingness. The entity exercising preponderance in favour of its existence is also known as the cause or reason for its existence. Based on this, we say that there is nothing that comes into existence without a cause that preferred its existence over its non-existence. It is impossible that this cause is non-existent, as nothingness does not exist as an entity. It cannot be envisaged that nothingness caused it to be – anything that does not possess something cannot offer that same thing to something else. Likewise, it would be impossible for something to be its own cause. If something was non-existent, it cannot be a cause for something else to come into existence, let alone itself. If we assumed that something chose itself to be in existence, that would be evidence for it being a necessary entity, whose nothingness would be impossible. It is a contradiction and a self-evident impossibility that something that is possible is also necessary. It only remains to say that the cause of an entity’s emergence is something in existence that is external to that. That is the point.

This proof is known as the argument from temporality, the kalam argument, the argument from the universe, or the cosmological argument. The propositions and conclusion of this proof are similar to those of the first level that we just dealt with:

• First proposition: Anything with a beginning must have a cause.

• Second proposition: The universe has a beginning.

• Conclusion: Therefore, the universe must have a cause.

The cause that preferred its existence over its non-existence is Allah .

In actuality, this method of reasoning is not new in the philosophy or kalam space. In fact, it is the most famous entry point of kalam into the issue of the existence of Allah . This is why even some of those who have used this reasoning within the contemporary Western arena – such as the famous Christian debater William Lane Craig – have called it the ‘kalam cosmological argument’; he also has a book with the same name. In the beginning of this book, he makes the following important acknowledgement: ‘Probably no chapter in the history of the cosmological argument is as significant – or as universally ignored – as that of the Arabic theologians and philosophers. Although we find in them the origin and development of two of the most important versions of the cosmological argument, namely the argument from temporal regress and the argument from contingency, the contribution of these Islamic thinkers is virtually ignored in western anthologies and books on the subject.’168

What must be considered when discussing this class of indication – which is the argument from the creation to prove the Creator – is that it is in reality affirming the temporality of a specific creation, or a number of creations, with tools of reasoning that lead to the same conclusion offered by eyewitness observation. This is because the religious conceptualisation in general – and the Islamic one in particular – believes in the existence of other worlds beyond the specific world which we call our universe. Ibn Taymiyyah’s famous polemic with the philosophers and the kalam scholars on the issue of the temporality versus the pre-eternality of the world, and his position on infinite regress of events and the pre-eternality of their genus, complicates the question. In his view, there is no beginning or end to creation as a whole, though every individual created being would have a beginning. Therefore, in light of this viewpoint that Ibn Taymiyyah reasoned, there is not much benefit to be had in attempting to prove there was a beginning to creation as a whole, since this view claims there was no beginning. So long as Allah  is ascribed with complete power and will, and that He created whenever He likes, then every specific creation a mind can envisage to have a beginning can possibly have been preceded with another, precisely for the reason that Allah’s power and will are perfect. When a person judges that the chain must be broken, that there must be a first creation, and that it is impossible for it to be preceded by another creation, the problem of impossibility being ascribed to the Lord  would come into play, and the impossibility of the deed would be applicable to Allah . This is something He can never be described with, as He is pre-eternally and forever into the future described with creation, power, and will. The fact is this issue confuses the mind and is consigned to the deep end of philosophical debate. This is obviously not the place for that discussion. I only wanted to point this out so we can situate this class of argument in its rightful place. It would therefore not be suitable to promote it with zeal. One should only engage with this argument to the extent of its beneficial impact: that it brings about a quick acknowledgement from all sides that the universe we are in is temporal, that anything in the purview of our senses is temporal, and that anything in this universe that is absent from us is also temporal. The acknowledgement of most atheists today on the temporality of the universe, and that everything therein is temporal, is one that was typically not found in pre-modern atheism. It was only until recently that they used to believe the universe is pre-eternal; in fact, they had this down as an accepted fact, and stated that the burden of proof for its temporality was on those who claim it is temporal. Bertrand Russell, the famous British mathematician and philosopher, claimed that ‘the universe is just there, and that is all’ – it required no explanation according to him; it was pre-eternal without anything that caused it to begin.169

During the early stages of the history of cosmology, there was an agreement of sorts on two fundamental notions related to the nature of the universe:

1. The universe is homogeneous with the same characteristics – it is the same across all its constituent parts.

2. The universe is in a fixed and constant pattern.

When Einstein came and introduced relativity, these two assumptions appeared to contradict the first iteration of the law of relativity that he theorised. To deal with this problem, he proposed a constant coefficient he called the cosmological constant in order to counterbalance the effect of gravity. That way, there would be balance in the new theory of the universe that he had proposed, which was that the universe is static. This was the generally accepted view on the universe in most scientific circles back then: The universe was characterised as being static and constant.

Thereafter, the Belgian Catholic priest and physicist Georges Lemaître and the Russian scientist Alexander Friedmann came onto the scene. They offered a new theory for the universe: The universe is expanding, and it began from an extremely dense and compact state. Key support for the expansionist theory of the universe came from Edwin Hubble. In 1929, he made an important discovery: The galaxies around us are moving farther out from us with a speed that corresponds to the distance between them and us; their speed increases as the distance widens. Expansionism was detected through the light spectrum of those galaxies – they appear to be reddish, which suggests that they are moving farther away, as opposed to when something is moving closer, in which case it appears to the observer to have a blue haze. In 1946, George Gamow theorised that, alongside the expansion of the universe and the falling of temperature, photons successfully detached from matter. This was represented in the form of a light ray that Gamow assumed existed, and that it continued to beam across the universe. This was accidentally discovered by Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson. This phenomenon was later named as cosmic microwave background radiation, representing one of the strongest proofs for the Big Bang theory. This radiation uncovered the existence of abnormally high levels of temperature in between the galaxies, and that space does not have a temperature of absolute zero. Rather, space temperature sits at around 3 Kelvin – this radiation is the heat remnant of the Big Bang. As a result of this discovery, the two researchers won the Nobel Peace Prize in Physics in 1978. This point marked a shift in the science community: Rejection of the Big Bang turned to general acceptance. It is interesting to note that this discovery on their part was an accident. They said, ‘Either we’ve seen the birth of the universe, or (as one astrophysical folk tale would have it) we’ve seen a pile of 81

pigeons!’173 In summary, this theory states that the universe that we are in started from a single, hot, and infinitely dense mass of matter. It then started to expand for around 13.8 billion years. This expansion was not because of galaxies in the universe moving apart from one another like some might initially understand; rather, what is expanding is space itself, in which these celestial bodies live.

In the mid-90s, scientists attempted to uncover a rule that explains all irreversible processes in the universe. As a result of those efforts, the second law of thermodynamics was discovered. The first step to realising this was to note that heat always transfers from a more heated body to a less heated one, and heat keeps on transferring until all connected bodies reach thermal equilibrium. The fact of the matter is that the thermal transfer is just one example of many, which can be described as the equilibrium concept or the balance of nature. The same can be seen vis-à-vis the spread of gases to achieve equilibrium, electricity, and other cases as well. Had these phenomena not occurred in nature, life would have been impossible. By this phenomenon, the air – for example – does not separate out so that oxygen gathers only on one side of the room and nitrogen on the other side. One significant development in the shaping of this law is its connection with the concept of entropy. It is a technical term used to denote the amount of chaos. Anytime there is an increase in the scale of disorder within a system, the sum of the entropies rises therein; likewise, when there is a disorder scale decrease, the sum of the entropies decreases. This is why the law of thermodynamics has within it a provision that states that systems are inclined to switch from low entropy to higher entropy. In other words, they switch from order to disorder. What concerns us here is the connection of this law to the universe. The universe is a closed system. This is why the second law of thermodynamics is applicable to it. As a closed system, the universe strives to achieve equilibrium in multiple fields. Heat spreads until it reaches equilibrium, and likewise the same occurs in the distribution of energy, entropy, and others as well.

As such, had the universe been pre-eternal, it would have already reached equilibrium, as it would have had an infinite amount of time to have reached this state. And had it reached this state, heat would have been equally distributed across all bodies inside the universe, the systems as we see them today would not have existed, disorder would have been equal across all its corners, the fountain of energy would have been depleted, and all movement would have stopped. In fact, every natural and chemical process would have stopped. Yet, the state of the universe is the exact opposite. The universe still has a system to it. It has not yet reached the stage of heat death. In light of what has preceded, the universe reveals to us an important fact: It is not pre-eternal, but rather has a fixed age when we look back into its history, and it had a start to it.

Based on these two propositions, we can say there is an external cause for the universe that is above its matter and beyond its nature. This external cause brought the world out into existence. That cause is Allah  Himself.

One who denies the existence of Allah  would not accept the instinctive indication of this argument, and would instead cast a set of doubts on it. These doubts either go back to the argument’s first proposition, second proposition, or conclusion. Here, I shall mention the most important doubts and objections that have been listed.

The main way of casting doubt to this proposition is through the claim that something can come into existence without any cause, and that it is possible for a contingent entity to be chosen for existence – versus non-existence – without a chooser. Based on this, it is possible that the universe just came into existence without cause; therefore, it is not in need for a cause that preferred it to exist. As thus, this claim would make the need for an independent creator irrelevant. The most famous sceptic argument strives to negate man’s instinctive element. That instinct denotes the principle of causality. It has been previously highlighted that this principle is an instinctive and self-evident rational concept that does not require external veracity. The most famous sceptic of this principle is the English philosopher David Hume. He is a pioneer of the empiricist school, that declares that only the senses can be the source for human knowledge. He states.

To be fully acquainted, therefore, with the idea of power or necessary connexion, let us examine its impression; and in order to find the impression with greater certainty, let us search for it in all the sources, from which it may possibly be derived. When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects: consequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, anything which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion.176

He also said, The generality of mankind never find any difficulty in accounting for the more common and familiar operations of nature – such as the descent of heavy bodies, the growth of plants, the generation of animals, or the nourishment of bodies by food: but suppose that, in all these cases, they perceive the very force or energy of the cause, by which it is connected with its effect, and is for ever infallible in its operation. They acquire, by long habit, such a turn of mind, that, upon the appearance of the cause, they immediately expect with assurance its usual attendant, and hardly conceive it possible that any other event could result from it.’177

Hume constructed a philosophical argument that highlights his vision on the principle of causality and the nature of the relationship between cause and effect. He wrote this in his book A Treatise of Human Nature. The summary of his scepticism thesis is as follows:

We find that all distinct ideas are mutually separate. This includes the notions of cause and effect. They are both different concepts, and therefore separate. This is why it is easy for us to envisage in our minds an effect without envisaging its cause. Therefore, it is possible that we think of something coming into existence without simultaneously thinking of its cause, because the distinction between cause and effect is possible in our thoughts and minds. Given that this is the case, it should also be possible that there is no link between cause and effect in the real world, as there is no inherent impossibility or contradiction that prevents this. Therefore, possibility dictates that effect can exist without cause, and thus the claim that every effect must have a cause collapses, and the principle of causation become unacceptable.178

The most significant objection here is the attempt to offer alternative viewpoints that would replace the traditional theory of the Big Bang. The objection firstly entails – and maintains – the notion that the universe is pre-eternal, like the static model, or that it assigns an evolutionary angle to the Big Bang in the sense that it was the beginning relative to our universe, but not the absolute beginning. It would appear that the attempt to propose such alternative theories is ideologically driven by the rejection of the theoretical implications of the Big Bang. We have one physicist express deep resentment of this theory, as if it were a religiously driven conspiracy. He said, ‘The underlying motive is, of course, to bring in God as creator. It seems like the opportunity Christian theology has been waiting for ever since science began to depose religion from the minds of rational men in the seventeenth century.’184 The idea of the Big Bang made Einstein initially uncomfortable, as its implication was that the universe – as we see it today – has a beginning. He said, ‘This circumstance (i.e., of an expanding universe) irritates me.’ Robert Jastrow notes: Einstein never liked the idea of a big bang because it suggested a beginning and a creation, and a creation suggested a Creator.’ He quoted Eddington by saying, ‘As a scientist I simply do not believe that the present order of things started off with a bang.’ Jastrow adds: ‘Oh yes, the metaphor there was that we know now that the universe had a beginning, and that all things that exist in this universe – life, planets, stars – can be traced back to that beginning, and it’s a curiously theological result to come out of science. The image that I had in my mind as I wrote about this was a group of scientists and astronomers who are climbing up a range of mountain peaks and they come to the highest peak and the very top, and there they meet a band of theologians who have been sitting for centuries waiting for them.185

The irony here is that it was the famous astronomer, Fred Hoyle, who coined the term ‘Big Bang’ for this theory, which he mockingly said in one of his discussions on the BBC. As a result, the theory became known by this term.

What is interesting is that in 1993, the Sky & Telescope magazine had a competition for a more suitable name for the Big Bang. Readers from 41 countries poured in with their suggestions, reaching a total of 13,099 recommendations, including ‘Matter Morphosis’, ‘The Bottom Turtle’, ‘Super Seed’, ‘Hubble Bubble’, ‘Bertha D. Universe’, ‘Doink’, ‘Let There Be Stuff’, and ‘Hey Looky There at That!’ The judges were Carl Sagan, Hugh Downs, and Timothy Ferris. In the end, the winner was announced to be – surprise surprise – Fred Hoyle! It seems that the name he mockingly assigned was the most appropriate.

The point here is that Hoyle was extremely critical of this theory. He considered it to be pseudoscience. Alongside Thomas Gold and Hermann Bondi, Hoyle proposed an alternative theory that admitted to the mutual distancing of the galaxies, but without ever acknowledging that the universe had an absolute beginning. His theory is called the steady state theory. He remained true to his position since he proposed it in 1948 right until his death in 2001. The Nobel laureate and physicist Steven Weinberg remarked on this theory by saying, ‘The steady state theory is philosophically the most attractive theory because it least resembles the account given in Genesis.’186

The oscillating universe model is based on the idea that the universe expands for a period, then collapses and contracts, and then expands again. The process repeats itself, resembling a ‘crunch and bounce’. This view states that the universe at its core is pre-eternal without any definitive beginning, but it is in a constant state of volatility of expansion and contraction. This model has a number of problems. In addition, it carries the pervading yet unsubstantiated mentality of the pre-eternality of the universe. One can detect this in what John Gribbin said:

The biggest problem with the Big Bang theory of the origin of the Universe is philosophical – perhaps even theological – what was there before the bang? This problem alone was sufficient to give a great initial impetus to the Steady State theory; but with that theory now sadly in conflict with the observations, the best way round this initial difficulty is provided by a model in which the universe expands from a singularity, collapses back again, and repeats the cycle indefinitely.190

One objection to the oscillating universe theory is that the notion of contraction is an area of great debate in the scientific community. Alan Guth and Marc Sher wrote a scientific paper titled ‘The Impossibility of a Bouncing Universe’, in which they mentioned that even if it is assumed that the universes contracts, it would be unable to repeat another bang.

Many cosmologists believe that the universe will continue to expand indefinitely and that the universe’s mass is not sufficient to cause a ‘Big Crunch’, as it requires a gravitational force that is capable of countering the force of expansion. Scientists estimated that the universe’s expansion was slowing down as a result of gravity, but it turned out – thanks to two teams of scientists who went on to win the Nobel Prize – that it is in fact completely the opposite: The universe is expanding at an ever-increasing rate of speed as a result of a centrifugal force – known as dark matter – that is greater than gravity. It has a power that is the opposite to gravity and pushes the universe to expand further and further out. This centrifugal power represents the cosmological constant, the extremely precise value which left scientists stunned. The value is so fine balanced that even the change of a fraction of 10120 would be cataclysmic for the universe. Had it been even a fraction more, the universe would expand quicker so to not allow stars and galaxies to form; were it a fraction less, the universe would have rapidly collapsed on itself, soon after the Big Bang.

This poses a profound question: What exactly determined this constant of physics in this extremely precise and finely balanced manner, so that the universe and life could form? We shall discuss this in the section on the second rational indicator, Allah willing. The point here is that this centrifugal force, which many astrophysicists and cosmologists have detected, alludes to the fact that the universe will continue to expand indefinitely. For example, the atheist physicist Victor Stenger said, ‘Now, it should be noted that most cosmologists currently do not expect that the big crunch will happen. The best guess based on current observation and theory is that the universe is open; that is, it will expand forever.’191

This model is an evolved version of the Big Bang theory. It affirms that our universe has an origin, but it adds that this does not mean that this is the absolute beginning of all matter and energy. This view states that matter and energy are pre-eternal. To clarify, this theory proposes that the constituent parts of the universe expand and contract at varying rates. It is possible to treat these parts as various universes, or the multiverse. Though it could be the case that our universe has an origin point, this does not mean that all universes are like this. Scientists have noted that this theory has also been beset by a number of problems. This is why the cosmologist Andrei Linde attempted to solve the problem facing this model by offering a refined version of it, called new inflation. However, he himself noted that there are faults in this, which led him to propose his most famous model called chaotic inflation. In brief, it proposes that there is a ‘mother universe’ from which many new universes are spawned, and from them other universes are born – like bubbles. This process would continue forever. This theory suggests that though the new universes have a beginning, the principal universe does not. Speaking on the overall pre-eternality of the universe, he said, ‘The most difficult aspect of this problem is not the existence of the singularity itself, but the question of what was before the singularity…This problem lies somewhere at the boundary between physics and metaphysics.’194 Because of this problem, and because of the lack of impetus to affirm anything beyond the realm of physics, Linde assumed a model that negated a beginning and end for time. Just as the principal universe is pre-eternal, he argued that new universes would endlessly continue to be made. As thus, he could escape the notion of singularity and the a priori questions that come with it. In other words, he evaded searching for a cause for the emergence of the universe by making it (somewhat) pre-eternal. When we analyse this model – and all previous models – we can see that none of them are based on science. They are at best assumptions. In fact, they are just hypotheses that are designed to avoid the problem of an absolute beginning for the universe. This is why many physicists believe it is impossible to demonstrate – let alone test – the validity of these theories through evidence.

In 1994, Arvind Borde and Alexander Vilenkin published a paper. It stated that all models of future inflation could only work from a point of initial singularity, and that there must be a beginning for the universe. This paper was further developed and its conclusions were published in partnership with Alan Guth in 2001. It was further incremented and republished in 2003. The title of the paper is ‘Inflationary spacetimes are not past-complete’.195 Through calculations, this short four-page paper clarifies that in any expanding universe, the relative velocity of things increases every time we retreat into the past; however, this velocity cannot continue infinitely because, as per modern physics, nothing can travel faster than the speed of light (299,792 km per second approximately). Therefore, there must be a boundary at which this relativistic velocity stops, and it is this that corresponds to the beginning of the universe. Vilenkin re-emphasised the conclusion of this study in a 2012 conference held at Cambridge to celebrate Stephen Hawking’s 70th birthday.196 As stated before, Vilenkin is the one who famously said, ‘Did the universe have a beginning? At this point, it seems that the answer to this question is probably yes.’197 In fact, in his book Many Worlds in One, he writes, ‘It is said that an argument is what convinces reasonable men and a proof is what it takes to convince even an unreasonable man. With the proof now in place, cosmologists can no longer hide behind the possibility of a past-eternal universe. There is no escape: they have to face the problem of a cosmic beginning.’198

The background to this objection is this: Even if it is assumed that there is a cause behind the emergence of the world, how is Allah then automatically assumed to be that cause? This is one of the most famous objections of atheists. What is strange is that when Richard Dawkins discussed the argument from temporality for the existence of God in his infamous book The God Delusion, he offered only this objection:

Even if we allow the dubious luxury of arbitrarily conjuring up a terminator to an infinite regress and giving it a name, simply because we need one, there is absolutely no reason to endow that terminator with any of the properties normally ascribed to God: omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, creativity of design, to say nothing of such human attributes as listening to prayers, forgiving sins and reading innermost thoughts.199

Then he focuses on the attributes of Allah , and how it is possible for these to be His attributes. Upon further analysis, this strategy on his part – and by atheists in general – is a strategic evasion of the point under discussion, landing it onto a completely separate issue. Whoever uses this in evidence would be doing so to prove the existence of the non-contingent being, not its attributes. Jumping from the central point of the argument to an issue not tackled by its proponents reflects either a lack of impartiality or wanton ignorance of the rules of debate and philosophical discussion. Consider the following:

• One of the most significant areas of difference between atheism and theism is the belief of atheists in matter, and that there is no cause behind matter. The theist argument implies that there is a super-material cause that allowed the world to come into existence. This is part of the evidence – it is a brick within the construct of the rational indicator for Allah’s existence , namely that Allah  is different from His entire creation and the nature of the universe.

• The argument proves a number of issues related to the nature of this cause, which makes it a suitable argument to prove the existence of Allah, as well as some of His attributes. If the universe came into existence after nothingness, its cause must be a creator through whom this universe was created. He must be pre-eternal, as the series of causes must stop at him so that a series of infinite causality does not arise. That is to say that he must not be an effect of another cause, as the universe needs a cause that is atemporal. Furthermore, the emergence of the universe has unique features to it, which makes it an entity that emerged from will; this points to an actor who carried out this deed through his own volition. This doer acting with his own volition must be alive, as there is a difference between a live actor and a dead actor. It also suggests great power, through which this event took place; without power, no such deed could have occurred. Thus, the act of the universe’s creation suggests in itself some of the perfect attributes of Allah .

• The point of this argument is not to prove the existence of Allah with all His perfect attributes. Rather, it is sufficient to prove the least amount that is required, which is that there is a Doer who acts with power and choice. This is the point of contention with atheists. Otherwise, beyond these basic attributes, proving other attributes of the Creator  can be achieved through other forms of rational evidence, such as the argument from providence, the teleological argument, or scriptural evidence, like Allah  informing His servants of the attributes He has. It is therefore an error to dupe the recipient of this information that the point of this argument was to prove both the existence of Allah  and all His perfect attributes, in which case objections may arise such as ‘But it does not prove xyz attributes’, for that would be totally off-topic and was never the point of the argument to begin with.

This is a well-known objection. Atheists say, ‘The theists’ answer to the question “What is the cause for the emergence of the world?” with Allah is ignorance of causality. It is as if theists are filling in the gaps of their ignorance with such an answer. Theists emphasise this ignorant stance of theirs by appealing to ignorance, and thus use as evidence the opponent’s inability to dismantle it – nothing more. They fail to offer any proof for the evidentiary veracity of their statement.’ This rhetoric is another error on the part of atheists. Our affirmation of the existence of the Creator is not based on our inability to explain the ultimate cause of the universe, nor is it merely a blind leap of faith in which we shoved in the concept of God to solve a problem for which we have no answer. Rather, our belief is a result of a set of rational and instinctive propositions that offers this conclusion. Our belief of Allah being the cause for the existence of the universe is based on knowledge, not ignorance. As proven earlier, the universe is temporal. It is therefore either temporal with a cause behind it, or without a cause; the latter is impossible as temporal entities must have a cause. A cause would be either the temporal entity itself or something different; the former is impossible as it would have been non-existent before emergence – something that does not possess existence for itself cannot confer existence onto something else. Therefore, as it emerged from a separate cause, that cause must in itself be temporal or atemporal; if the former, this series must end at an atemporal cause, as infinite causality is impossible. Therefore, it becomes clear that our position is not merely the desire to fill in the gap left by ignorance, but is rather a considered and rational answer that relies on self-evident propositions.

The atheists’ protracted leveraging of this objection is a reaction to old-age human haste in explaining many of the natural phenomena through direct divine intervention. These explanations did not realise that almost all of Allah’s actions in His creation are through a set of laws and rules governing the system of the universe, as predetermined by Allah Himself. Atheists unjustly generalise this errant judgement across all reasoning processes used by believers of Allah . That Allah acts in His universe and is the existence of causes is not strange to Islamic discourse; in fact, it is a point that is explicitly mentioned in the Qur’an through the mention of many causes within natural phenomena. Ibn al-Qayyim  said, ‘Were we to list the total number of places from the Qur’an and the prophetic tradition that affirm causes, they would surpass 10,000 places without exaggeration.’200

I conclude this with some important words by Richard Swinburne in his book Is There a God?, where he critiqued this objection: ‘Note that I am not postulating a “God of the gaps”, a god merely to explain the things which science has not yet explained. I am postulating a God to explain what science explains; I do not deny that science explains, but I postulate God to explain why science explains. The very success of science in showing us how deeply orderly the natural world is provides strong grounds for believing that there is an even deeper cause of that order.’201

This objection is actually a combination of a gross restriction of the definition of science on the one hand, and an exaggeration of it on the other. Atheists draw their existential philosophy from a purely material view: They have faith in only what the empirical sciences dictate, and they accept only natural material explanations for phenomena. As thus, there is no room for any supernatural or metaphysical explanation. Check what the atheist Scott Todd said – he stated in clear terms what this outlook meant: ‘Even if all the data point to an intelligent designer, such a hypothesis is excluded from science because it is not naturalistic.’202

The Darwinist and atheist Richard Lewontin said, Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common sense is the key to an understanding of the real struggle between science and the supernatural. We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfil many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door.203

This exaggerated view of the capabilities of the empirical natural sciences, which is clearly partial to a narrow view of materialism, has a name coined for it in scientific and philosophical circles: scientism. It is a portmanteau of ‘science’ and the suffix ‘-ism’. It represents the ideology of the exaggerated view of the empirical sciences, restricting knowledge only to them. The roots of this ideology are actually ancient. The direction of this philosophy was steered by Auguste Comte, who formulated positivist philosophy, which spawned multiple schools of philosophy. Exaggeration on materialism only got worse as time went by. It is not a concealed fact that part of the justification of this exaggeration goes back to huge scientific and technological achievements driven by the scientific method. It was a turning point for humankind at all levels, in ways that could not have been imagined. However, the problem with this was how it looked down on other modes of the acquisition of knowledge, and how it attempted to confine knowledge acquisition to its own method, details, complexities, and distinctive ways. It is a methodological problem that leads to mass scientific problems, which are clear for all to see. The accuracy of empiricism, upon which scientism is based, is known to work either through its own method or an external method. If our understanding of the accuracy of empiricism is based on empiricism itself, that would be false, as it would become a circular argument; it would also be a self contradiction as it is improper to suggest that a claim is evidence unto itself. However, if empiricism as a method is verified by an external source, our objective would have been achieved: An external source of knowledge acquisition other than empiricism was used to verify empiricism. The fact is that every knowledge field has its own tools and cognitive sources; therefore, the attempt to force empiricism onto every field of knowledge, and to believe that it alone is suitable to answer everything, would become a methodological and cognitive problem, which would in turn lead to multiple scientific problems. The science and knowledge fields in themselves reveal these sorts of problems. History, for example, has its own sources; similarly mathematics; likewise all other subjects. The idea that the empirical scientific method alone is the tool to acquire knowledge contradicts the multiplicity of sources that are part and parcel across all subjects. In the debate between William Lane Craig and the atheist Peter Atkins, the deep-rooted confusion of atheists was exposed, as it was demonstrated to be incapable of using science to explain everything, which is exactly what Atkins was proposing during the debate.

This idea has spread across atheist circles recently. It has become a key objection to the argument from creation and invention. This objection claims the universe to be self-sufficient and not dependent on a founder, or that it has the power to make itself, or that it is possible it emerged from nothing. This notion was proposed by Bertrand Russell in his book Why I Am Not a Christian, and is covered extensively in The Grand Design, co-authored by the famous theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow. It is the same claim made by the famous atheist Lawrence Krauss in his book A Universe From Nothing, in which he claims that the universe – in light of modern physics – can emerge from nothing without the need for an external entity that would explain this emergence; rather, the emergence of the universe is from nothing. In the beginning of The Grand Design, there is a discussion on the type of questions that the book seeks to offer an answer to, and the source of information that feeds into these answers:

We each exist for but a short period of time, and in that time explore but a small part of the whole universe. But humans are a curious species. We wonder, we seek answers. Living in this vast world that is by turns kind and cruel, and gazing at the immense heavens above, people have always asked a multitude of questions: How can we understand the world in which we find ourselves? How does the universe behave? What is the nature of reality? Where did all this come from? Did the universe need a creator? Most of us do not spend most of our time worrying about these questions, but almost all of us worry about them some of the time. Traditionally these are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics. Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge. The purpose of this book is to give the answers that are suggested by recent discoveries and theoretical advances. They lead us to a new picture of the universe and our place in it that is very different from the traditional one, and different even from the picture we might have painted just a decade or two ago.209

These answers are laden with materialist and atheist mentality, and at the same time are divorced from rational facts. The book claims that ‘because there is a law like gravity, the universe can and will create itself from nothing...’210 The problems in this passage come to light at the most cursory of investigations. Gravity is describing the natural phenomenon that is present across the universe, which could not have existed before the universe existed; how could it therefore be the cause for the universe coming into existence? (The mathematician John Lennox has a treatise, God and Stephen Hawking, in which he challenged the views of Hawking. This small work exposes the scientific and philosophical holes in The Grand Design and refutes many of its claims).

As for Lawrence Krauss, he attempted in his book A Universe from Nothing: Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing to convince readers that modern physics underlines that the universe could have emerged from nothing. The philosopher and physicist David Albert wrote a highly critical review on it in the New York Times, ‘On the Origin of Everything’.211 The Darwinist and atheist Jerry Coyne agreed with much of his critique, acknowledging that Krauss’s book was weak and that he was surprised by the commendations it received, especially the one by Dawkins towards the end of the book.212 It is interesting to note that Krauss did not directly respond to Albert’s review, though he did call him a ‘moronic philosopher’213, even though Albert – like Krauss himself – has a doctorate in theoretical physics. The instinct of the mind governs that every temporal event has a cause, and that it is impossible for something to happen without a cause, or that it is the cause unto its own emergence. This is precisely what Allah  alludes to in the Qur’an: ‘Or were they created by nothing, or are they their own creators?’214

This is one of the most famous atheist objections against believers. It is a key rational doubt against theism in atheist discourse. Upon contemplation, it is just sparring rhetoric – nothing more. Their entire belief system rests upon the notion that Allah did not create the world. Therefore, their objection ‘So who created Allah?’ would be typical of believers’ experiences. In most contexts, these are simply tools for unfruitful quarrel and objection.

When studying the many atheist personalities that have gone by, we can easily uncover how many had this objection, and how this question took control and pressurised many minds. It is one of the most important doubts that introduced the inclination to atheism in many people. John Stuart Mill, Bertrand Russell, David Hume, and Stephen Hawking have all stated that this question represents a problem in theism, which ultimately led them to adopt, or become convinced by, atheism. It is noted that this is also the central question in the book The God Delusion. In almost every instance, this question is heavily present in, and at the forefront of, New Atheism discourse, which one can detect by studying its writings, articles, debates, and other materials. The problems brought about by this question can be dispelled by the following points:

1. This is obviously not a new question. In fact, it is quite a natural question for people to think about. It is ultimately one of satan’s evil suggestions, and is founded on a hugely erroreous proposition. 2. This question is based on an error perpetrated by atheist discourse. It is a gross misunderstanding of the precise nature of the rational evidence for faith offered by theists. The question carries the following conceptualisation of the argument from creation and invention to support the existence of Allah :

• Everything in existence must have a cause.

• The universe exists, and therefore it must have a cause.

• The cause for its existence is Allah.

The inevitable question after this is: ‘Allah exists, but who made Him?’ The reason why this question is faulty is that the argument from creation and invention, as presented in this manner, is different to the precise nature of the argument in its proper image, as offered by those who want to demonstrate the existence of Allah . We did not claim that everything in existence has a cause. Rather, our claim is that everything which is temporal must have a cause. As for any particular existing entity, its existence a) can be non-contingent and necessary, such that minds can only envisage it to exist, and by its very nature, it is not dependent on any cause that gave rise to it; b) is contingent and therefore merely possible, with its existence dependent on a self-subsisting necessary entity; or c) is impossible, such that the mind cannot envisage its existence.

3. This question is pointless. When a person says, ‘Who then created Allah?’, the question would be inherent of self contradiction, rendering the question meaningless. If the question has no meaning, then obviously there would be no case to answer it. Imagine if, in response to this question, an answer is offered that is aligned with what theists believe in, such as: ‘Nobody created Him because He is uncreated.’ Imagine if then someone objects to this answer by saying, ‘We did not ask whether He is created or not. Rather, what we are asking about is who created Him.’ The fact is that Allah  is not a temporal being to begin with, thus rendering this question inapplicable to Him. He  is the First – there is nothing before Him . Questions like this are more like impossible questions that the other side cannot offer a valid answer to, not because they are unable to answer, but because the question itself is faulty. If a man asked you about the length of the fourth side in a triangle, it would be impossible to answer, because triangles only have three sides to them. If you are told, ‘A male gave birth to a girl – what is her name?’, the question itself would be faulty as it carries a false premise that renders it incapable of receiving an answer, because males cannot give birth. Therefore, the reality of the ‘Who then created Allah?’ question is essentially ‘Who created the one who has no creator?’, or ‘What is the cause for that which is without cause?’, or ‘What preceded the thing that has nothing before it?’ All these questions cannot be answered, as they carry a faulty premise, rendering them unqualified to be answered. Inherent to accepting a question as admissible and searching for an answer to it is to grant the questioner that his question is not self-contradictory. Given that the question has been demonstrated to be faulty and self-contradictory, then to treat such a question as admissible would be tantamount to abdicating the law of non-contradiction. Such an abdication is invalid and impossible, given that the law of non-contradiction is an instinctive rational concept that exposes the faulty premise of the question.