安东尼·华莱士说:

Anthony Wallace says:

随着科学知识日益充分且日益普及，人们对超自然力量的信仰注定会在世界各地逐渐消亡（Wallace，1966，第264–265页）。

Belief in supernatural powers is doomed to die out, all over the world, as a result of the increasing adequacy and diffusion of scientific knowledge (Wallace, 1966, p.264-5).

但科学知识的发展是否正在促使人们远离超自然的信仰？

But are developments of scientific knowledge driving people away from the supernatural?

尝试理解西方所见证的非宗教化走向，此前已有大量努力。对于其中的社会学原因作出详尽阐释，超出了本文的范围。本文所要考察的主要问题是：新无神论的科学论证在多大程度上影响了这一趋势。最早对英格兰非信仰现象进行社会学研究的尝试之一，是苏珊·巴德（Susan Budd）开展的研究，其成果见于《不信的多样性》（Varieties of Unbelief，1977）。巴德使用了来自世俗组织和伦理组织的200份讣告作为研究材料。

Numerous attempts were undertaken to understand the irreligious trajectory witnessed in the West. An exhaustive explication of sociological reasons for this are beyond this paper’s scope. The main question under investigation is the extent to which New Atheist scientific argumentation has impacted this trend with one of the first sociological attempts to investigate irreligiosity in England conducted by Susan Budd and described in Varieties of Unbelief (1977). Budd used obituaries from secular and ethical organisations of 200

在1850年至1960年间的传记中（Sheard, 2014, p.1），作者指出了三种导致不信的原因，包括“阅读《圣经》和理性主义经典、对神职人员的不信任与怨恨，以及对灵魂不朽信仰的批判”（Budd, 1977, p.106）。科学与达尔文主义在这里明显缺席。1958年至1974年间，西方世界人口向非宗教化的转变或许最为剧烈。

biographies between 1850-1960 (Sheard, 2014, p.1) identifying three causes for unbelief, including ‘reading the Bible and rationalist classics, a distrust and resentment towards clergy members and a criticism of belief in immortality’ (Budd, 1977, p.106). Science and Darwinism are conspicuously absent here. The periods between 1958-1974 were perhaps most dramatic in demographic movement towards irreligiosity in the Western world.

在英国的背景下进一步阐述，休·麦克劳德（Hugh McLeod）提到，个人主义、社会主义、科学主义、女权主义、宗教批判、“性革命”以及战后的富裕，都是导致人们走向非宗教方向的原因（McLeod, 2005, p.206）。麦克劳德（以及研究这一时期的大多数社会学家）指出，家庭中的非宗教社会化是成年后非宗教倾向的一个主要原因（McLeod, 2005, p.228）。卡勒姆·布朗（Callum Brown）则十分严厉地指出了这一时期在转向非宗教方面的关键性：

Elaborating on the British context Hugh McLeod mentions individualism, socialism, scientism, feminism, religious criticism, the ‘sexual revolution’ and post-war affluence as reasons for an irreligious direction (McLeod, 2005, p.206). An irreligious family socialisation was indicated by McLeod (and most sociologists studying this period) as a primary reason for irreligiosity in adulthood (McLeod, 2005, p.228). The criticality of this period in altering to irreligiosity is toughly stated by Callum Brown:

在欧洲历史学家所称的“黑暗时代”，英国花了数个世纪才皈依基督教，而该国抛弃基督教却只用了不到四十年（Brown, 2009, p.1）。

It took several centuries (in what historians used to call the Dark Ages) to convert Britain to Christianity, but it has taken less than forty years for the country to forsake it (Brown, 2009, p.1).

根据布鲁斯·亨斯伯格（Bruce Hunsberger）在加拿大背景下对836名学生进行的分析，他指出，家庭中的初级社会化是导致不信教最显著的因素（Hunsberger, 1984, p.1）。

Analysing 836 students in a Canadian context, Bruce Hunsberger identifies primary socialisation in the home as the most salient factor for irreligiosity (Hunsberger, 1984, p.1).

在美国语境下考察1987至2012年这一时期，并借助综合社会调查（Davis and Smith, 1992）的数据，迈克尔·霍特（Michael Hout）与克劳德·费舍尔（Claude Fischer）指出，政治两极化加剧是导致宗教信仰淡薄的一个突出原因，并写道：

Surveying the time period from 1987-2012 from an American context and using the General Social Survey (Davis and Smith, 1992) to inform their results, Michael Hout and Claude Fischer link increased political polarisation as a salient reason for irreligiosity, stating:

政治自由派明显更有可能表示没有宗教信仰倾向，温和派也略微更有可能如此，而政治保守派则（Hout and Fischer, 2014, p.438）。

Political liberals became substantially more likely to express no religious preference, moderates became somewhat more likely to do so, and political conservatives (Hout and Fischer, 2014, p.438).

Hout 和 Fischer 特别提到了"自主性"，并声称：

Hout and Fischer make special mention of ‘autonomy’ claiming:

Original to this paper, we invoke a value shift toward greater autonomy and away from traditional authority. In formulating our hypothesis we have drawn on social psychological research in the 1950s that identified the emergence of a positive bias in favor of thinking for oneself we refer to as "autonomy." Most evidence has been compiled by asking survey respondents to rank things it might be important for a child to learn, including "to think for him or herself" and "to obey" among other potentially desirable qualities (Hout and Fischer, 2014, p.433).

Original to this paper, we invoke a value shift toward greater autonomy and away from traditional authority. In formulating our hypothesis we have drawn on social psychological research in the 1950s that identified the emergence of a positive bias in favor of thinking for oneself we refer to as “autonomy.” Most evidence has been compiled by asking survey respondents to rank things it might be important for a child to learn, including “to think for him or herself” and “to obey” among other potentially desirable qualities (Hout and Fischer, 2014, p.433).

此外,斯蒂芬·梅里诺(Stephen Merino)利用美国语境下的综合社会调查(General Social Survey,Davis和Smith,1992)得出结论:

Furthermore, using the General Social Survey (Davis and Smith, 1992) in an American context, Stephen Merino concludes:

最近一批在没有宗教信仰的环境中长大的人群，其自由主义倾向更为明显——百分之，而自认为保守派的人约为百分之二十。同样，较新的、在无宗教环境中长大的人群，也更有可能表示对教会和宗教组织缺乏信任（Merino, 2012, p.10）。

The most recent cohorts raised with no religion are even more liberal – percent, compared with roughly 20 percent who self-identify as conservative. Likewise, more recent cohorts raised with no religion are much more likely to express a lack of confidence in churches and religious organizations (Merino, 2012, p.10).

在英国的语境中,琳达·伍德黑德(Linda Woodhead)将“个人自由”和“自由民主”视为一个“显著因素”(Woodhead and Catto, 2012, p.253),并指出:

In a British context, Linda Woodhead cites ‘individual freedom’ and ‘liberal democracy’ as a ‘salient factor’ (Woodhead and Catto, 2012, p.253), stating:

我的论点是：自20世纪70年代以来，英国日益增长的多元化与自由化，在宗教领域遭遇了相反的趋势，而正是这种冲突有助于解释“无宗教信仰”人数为何迅速攀升。并非宗教或灵性本身令“现代人”生厌，正如一些较早的世俗化理论家和“启蒙无神论者”所设想的那样；而是晚期现代英国所提供的特定宗教形态，未能给予年轻人所认同并渴望的社会、灵性与道德价值（Woodhead and Catto, 2012, p.258）。

My argument is thus that growing pluralisation and liberalisation in Britain have, since the 1970s, been met by opposite tendencies in religion, and that it is this clash which helps to explain the increasingly rapid rise of ‘no religion’. It’s not that religion or spirituality per se have become objectionable to ‘modern man’, as some older secularisation theorists and ‘enlightenment atheists’ liked to think, but that the particular kinds of religion on offer in late modern Britain have not offered the social, spiritual and moral goods which younger people affirm and desire (Woodhead and Catto, 2012, p.258).

伍德黑德有效地反驳了世俗化理论，他指出：

Woodhead effectively refutes theories of secularisation, stating:

“无宗教”在全球分布上的参差不齐，削弱了那些简单化的世俗化理论——这些理论设想，所有国家都会在现代化不可抗拒的力量推动下，走向同一个世俗化的终点（Woodhead, 2012, p.254）。

The patchy global distribution of ‘no religion’ undermines simplistic accounts of secularisation that imagined all countries propelled to the same secular destination point by the irresistible forces of modernisation (Woodhead, 2012, p.254).

伍德黑德对英格兰人口普查数据局限性的认识（每十年收集一次）是有用的，因为这种数据会因由户主填报而产生偏差（Woodhead, 2012, p.246）。伍德黑德通过设计调查问题来衡量参与者无神论的程度，从而缓解这些问题（Woodhead, 2012, p.49-50）。他得出结论认为，“‘无宗教者’中只有13%是强烈的世俗主义者——仅占总人口的5%以下”（Woodhead, 2012, p.250），并且“‘无宗教’的增长不能与‘新无神论者’所倡导的世俗主义的增长混为一谈”（Woodhead, 2012, p.250）。Fahmi（2018）支持这些发现，他报告称，尽管有26%的美国人声称没有宗教信仰，但约90%的美国人相信存在某种“更高的力量”（Pew Research, 2019）。因此，只有少数宗教上的“无宗教者”是“坚定”的无神论者。

Woodhead’s appreciation of census data limitations (collected each decade in England) is useful as it accounts for data skewing due to its collection by heads of households (Woodhead, 2012, p.246). Woodhead mitigates these issues by creating survey questions which scale the extent of a participant’s atheism (Woodhead, 2012, p.49-50), concluding that ‘only 13 percent of ‘nones’ are strongly secular—amounting to under 5 per cent of the population’ (Woodhead, 2012, p.250) and that ‘the growth of ‘no religion’ cannot be conflated with the growth of the secularism championed by the ‘New Atheists’ (Woodhead, 2012, p.250). Fahmi (2018) supports these findings reporting that approximately 90% of Americans believe in a ‘higher power’ despite 26% claiming to have no religion (Pew Research, 2019). Accordingly, only a minority of religious ‘nones’ are ‘confidently’ atheistic.

这一数据值得注意，因为它实际上表明，英国“自信的无神论者”（5%）的人数与穆斯林的人数相近。

This data is noteworthy as it effectively suggests that the number of ‘confident atheists’ in Britain (5%) is similar to the number of Muslims.