Anthony Wallace ya ce:

Anthony Wallace says:

Imani da ikon allahntaka zai mutu a ko'ina cikin duniya, saboda karuwar isasshen ilimin kimiyya da yaduwarsa (Wallace, 1966, shafi 264-5).

Belief in supernatural powers is doomed to die out, all over the world, as a result of the increasing adequacy and diffusion of scientific knowledge (Wallace, 1966, p.264-5).

Shin ci gaban ilimin kimiyya yana kawar da mutane daga abubuwan ghaibu?

But are developments of scientific knowledge driving people away from the supernatural?

Akwai ƙoƙari da yawa da aka yi don fahimtar yanayin rashin addini da aka gani a Yamma. Bayanin dukkan dalilan zamantakewa game da wannan ba ya cikin iyakar wannan takarda. Babbar tambayar da ake bincika ita ce har zuwa wane mataki hujjojin kimiyya na sabbin masu kin addini (New Atheist) suka yi tasiri kan wannan yanayi, tare da ɗaya daga cikin farkon ƙoƙarin nazarin zamantakewa kan rashin addini a Ingila wanda Susan Budd ta gudanar kuma ta bayyana a cikin Varieties of Unbelief (1977). Budd ta yi amfani da labaran mutuwa (obituaries) daga ƙungiyoyin boko da na ɗabi'a guda 200

Numerous attempts were undertaken to understand the irreligious trajectory witnessed in the West. An exhaustive explication of sociological reasons for this are beyond this paper’s scope. The main question under investigation is the extent to which New Atheist scientific argumentation has impacted this trend with one of the first sociological attempts to investigate irreligiosity in England conducted by Susan Budd and described in Varieties of Unbelief (1977). Budd used obituaries from secular and ethical organisations of 200

Tarihin rayuwa tsakanin shekarar 1850 zuwa 1960 (Sheard, 2014, shafi na 1) ya gano dalilai uku na rashin imani, ciki har da "karanta Littafi Mai Tsarki da manyan littattafan masu ra'ayin hankali, rashin amincewa da kiyayya ga malaman addini, da sukar imani da rayuwa madawwamiya" (Budd, 1977, shafi na 106). Kimiyya da ka'idar Darwin ba su bayyana a nan ba. Shekarun tsakanin 1958 zuwa 1974 su ne watakila mafi tsanani wajen sauyin al'umma zuwa rashin addini a duniyar Yamma.

biographies between 1850-1960 (Sheard, 2014, p.1) identifying three causes for unbelief, including ‘reading the Bible and rationalist classics, a distrust and resentment towards clergy members and a criticism of belief in immortality’ (Budd, 1977, p.106). Science and Darwinism are conspicuously absent here. The periods between 1958-1974 were perhaps most dramatic in demographic movement towards irreligiosity in the Western world.

Don a ƙarin bayani kan yanayin Birtaniya, Hugh McLeod ya ambaci akidar mutum-mutumi (individualism), gurguzanci (socialism), kimiyyanci (scientism), 'yancin mata (feminism), sukar addini, 'juyin juya halin jima'i' ('sexual revolution') da wadatar bayan yaƙi (post-war affluence) a matsayin dalilan karkata zuwa rashin addini (McLeod, 2005, p.206). McLeod (da kuma yawancin masana ilimin zamantakewa da suka yi nazarin wannan zamani) ya nuna cewa tarbiyyar iyali marar addini ita ce babban dalilin rashin addini a lokacin girma (McLeod, 2005, p.228). Callum Brown ya bayyana muhimmancin wannan zamani wajen canzawa zuwa rashin addini da tsananin magana:

Elaborating on the British context Hugh McLeod mentions individualism, socialism, scientism, feminism, religious criticism, the ‘sexual revolution’ and post-war affluence as reasons for an irreligious direction (McLeod, 2005, p.206). An irreligious family socialisation was indicated by McLeod (and most sociologists studying this period) as a primary reason for irreligiosity in adulthood (McLeod, 2005, p.228). The criticality of this period in altering to irreligiosity is toughly stated by Callum Brown:

Ya ɗauki ƙarnuka da yawa (a abin da masana tarihi ke kira da Zamanin Duhu) kafin a mayar da Biritaniya ga addinin Kiristanci, amma ya ɗauki ƙasa da shekara arba'in kafin ƙasar ta watsar da shi (Brown, 2009, p.1).

It took several centuries (in what historians used to call the Dark Ages) to convert Britain to Christianity, but it has taken less than forty years for the country to forsake it (Brown, 2009, p.1).

Dangane da nazarin ɗalibai 836 a yanayin ƙasar Kanada, Bruce Hunsberger ya gano cewa koyon zamantakewa na farko a cikin gida shi ne abu mafi muhimmanci wajen haifar da rashin addini (Hunsberger, 1984, p.1).

Analysing 836 students in a Canadian context, Bruce Hunsberger identifies primary socialisation in the home as the most salient factor for irreligiosity (Hunsberger, 1984, p.1).

Ta hanyar duba lokacin daga 1987 zuwa 2012 daga mahangar Amurka, kuma suna amfani da Babban Binciken Zamantakewa (General Social Survey) na Davis da Smith (1992) don tabbatar da sakamakonsu, Michael Hout da Claude Fischer sun danganta karuwar rarrabuwar kan siyasa da wani babban dalili na rashin addini, inda suka ce:

Surveying the time period from 1987-2012 from an American context and using the General Social Survey (Davis and Smith, 1992) to inform their results, Michael Hout and Claude Fischer link increased political polarisation as a salient reason for irreligiosity, stating:

Masu sassaucin ra'ayin siyasa sun ƙara yiwuwar bayyana cewa ba su da wani addini da suke fifitawa sosai, masu matsakaicin ra'ayi sun ɗan ƙara yiwuwar hakan, sannan masu ra'ayin siyasa masu ra'ayin riƙau (Hout and Fischer, 2014, p.438).

Political liberals became substantially more likely to express no religious preference, moderates became somewhat more likely to do so, and political conservatives (Hout and Fischer, 2014, p.438).

Hout da Fischer sun yi musamman ambaton ‘’yancin kai’’ (autonomy), inda suka ce:

Hout and Fischer make special mention of ‘autonomy’ claiming:

Asal ga wannan takarda, muna gabatar da wani sauyin dabi'u zuwa ga karin 'yancin kai da nesa da ikon gargajiya. Wajen gina zatonmu, mun dogara ga bincike na ilimin halayyar zamantakewa na shekarun 1950, wanda ya gano bullar son zuciya mai kyau ga tunani da kai, wanda muke kira "'yancin kai" (autonomy). Yawancin shaidu an tattara su ne ta hanyar tambayar masu amsa binciken su yi wa abubuwan da zai iya zama muhimmi yara su koya matsayi, ciki har da "tunani da kansa" da "biyayya" tare da sauran halaye masu kyau da ake so (Hout and Fischer, 2014, p.433).

Original to this paper, we invoke a value shift toward greater autonomy and away from traditional authority. In formulating our hypothesis we have drawn on social psychological research in the 1950s that identified the emergence of a positive bias in favor of thinking for oneself we refer to as “autonomy.” Most evidence has been compiled by asking survey respondents to rank things it might be important for a child to learn, including “to think for him or herself” and “to obey” among other potentially desirable qualities (Hout and Fischer, 2014, p.433).

Haka kuma, ta amfani da Babban Binciken Zamantakewa (Davis da Smith, 1992) a yanayin Amurka, Stephen Merino ya kammala da cewa:

Furthermore, using the General Social Survey (Davis and Smith, 1992) in an American context, Stephen Merino concludes:

Ƙungiyoyin da aka fi kwanan nan waɗanda aka tashi ba tare da addini ba sun fi zama masu sassaucin ra'ayi – kaso, idan aka kwatanta da kusan kashi 20 cikin ɗari waɗanda ke bayyana kansu a matsayin masu ra'ayin mazan jiya. Haka kuma, ƙungiyoyin da suka fi kwanan nan waɗanda aka tashi ba tare da addini ba sun fi nuna rashin amincewa da coci-coci da ƙungiyoyin addini (Merino, 2012, p.10).

The most recent cohorts raised with no religion are even more liberal – percent, compared with roughly 20 percent who self-identify as conservative. Likewise, more recent cohorts raised with no religion are much more likely to express a lack of confidence in churches and religious organizations (Merino, 2012, p.10).

A cikin mahallin Birtaniya, Linda Woodhead ta ambaci ‘’yancin mutum’’ da ‘’dimokuradiyyar sassaucin ra’ayi’’ a matsayin wani ‘’muhimmin abu mai tasiri’’ (Woodhead and Catto, 2012, p.253), inda ta ce:

In a British context, Linda Woodhead cites ‘individual freedom’ and ‘liberal democracy’ as a ‘salient factor’ (Woodhead and Catto, 2012, p.253), stating:

Hujjata ta a nan ita ce cewa karuwar yawan al'adu da sassaucin ra'ayi a Birtaniya tun shekarun 1970 sun samu martani daga akasin hakan a fannin addini, kuma wannan karo-karon ne ke taimakawa wajen bayyana saurin karuwar masu cewa 'babu addini'. Ba wai addini ko ruhaniyya da kansu sun zama abin ƙi ga 'mutumin zamani' ba, kamar yadda wasu tsoffin masana ra'ayin boyewar addini (secularisation) da 'masu kafirci na Haskakawa' ke tunani, a'a, nau'o'in addinin da ake bayarwa a Birtaniya ta zamani ta ƙarshe ba su ba da alherin zamantakewa, na ruhi da na ɗabi'a da matasa ke tabbatarwa da kuma marmari ba (Woodhead and Catto, 2012, p.258).

My argument is thus that growing pluralisation and liberalisation in Britain have, since the 1970s, been met by opposite tendencies in religion, and that it is this clash which helps to explain the increasingly rapid rise of ‘no religion’. It’s not that religion or spirituality per se have become objectionable to ‘modern man’, as some older secularisation theorists and ‘enlightenment atheists’ liked to think, but that the particular kinds of religion on offer in late modern Britain have not offered the social, spiritual and moral goods which younger people affirm and desire (Woodhead and Catto, 2012, p.258).

Woodhead yana karyata ra'ayoyin sakularisanci yadda ya kamata, inda ya ce:

Woodhead effectively refutes theories of secularisation, stating:

Rarraba "babu addini" a duniya baki ɗaya, wadda ba ta daidaita ba, tana raunana bayanan sauƙi game da sakularisation waɗanda suka yi tunanin cewa dukkan ƙasashe ana tura su zuwa wuri guda na sakularist saboda ƙarfin da ba a iya tsayayya da shi na zamantakewa (Woodhead, 2012, p.254).

The patchy global distribution of ‘no religion’ undermines simplistic accounts of secularisation that imagined all countries propelled to the same secular destination point by the irresistible forces of modernisation (Woodhead, 2012, p.254).

Woodhead ta nuna fahimta game da iyakokin bayanan ƙidayar jama'a (wanda ake tattarawa kowace shekara goma a Ingila), wanda yake da amfani domin yana lissafin karkatar bayanai saboda shugabannin gidaje ne suke tattara su (Woodhead, 2012, p.246). Woodhead yana magance waɗannan matsaloli ta hanyar ƙirƙirar tambayoyin bincike waɗanda ke auna girman rashin imanin mahalarci (Woodhead, 2012, p.49-50), kuma ya kammala da cewa 'kashi 13 cikin ɗari kawai na 'marasa addini' ne masu tsananin ra'ayin boko—wanda bai kai kashi 5 cikin ɗari na yawan jama'a ba' (Woodhead, 2012, p.250), da kuma cewa 'karuwar 'babu addini' ba za a iya haɗa ta da karuwar ra'ayin boko da 'Sabbin Masu Musun Allah' suke yaɗawa ba' (Woodhead, 2012, p.250). Fahmi (2018) yana goyon bayan waɗannan sakamako, yana bayar da rahoton cewa kusan kashi 90 cikin ɗari na Amurkawa sun yi imani da 'ikon sama', duk da cewa kashi 26 cikin ɗari suna iƙirarin ba su da addini (Pew Research, 2019). Saboda haka, mafi ƙarancin marasa addini ne ke da tabbataccen ra'ayin rashin imani.

Woodhead’s appreciation of census data limitations (collected each decade in England) is useful as it accounts for data skewing due to its collection by heads of households (Woodhead, 2012, p.246). Woodhead mitigates these issues by creating survey questions which scale the extent of a participant’s atheism (Woodhead, 2012, p.49-50), concluding that ‘only 13 percent of ‘nones’ are strongly secular—amounting to under 5 per cent of the population’ (Woodhead, 2012, p.250) and that ‘the growth of ‘no religion’ cannot be conflated with the growth of the secularism championed by the ‘New Atheists’ (Woodhead, 2012, p.250). Fahmi (2018) supports these findings reporting that approximately 90% of Americans believe in a ‘higher power’ despite 26% claiming to have no religion (Pew Research, 2019). Accordingly, only a minority of religious ‘nones’ are ‘confidently’ atheistic.

Wannan bayanai yana da muhimmanci domin yana nuna cewa adadin "masu kafirci masu ƙarfin gwiwa" a Biritaniya (5%) yana kusan daidai da adadin Musulmi.

This data is noteworthy as it effectively suggests that the number of ‘confident atheists’ in Britain (5%) is similar to the number of Muslims.