Tasawwur za Wanaatheisti Wapya kuhusu Darwinism ni kwamba ni njia ya kukaribia kabisa kuthibitisha kutokuwepo kwa Mungu. Kwa mfano, Richard Dawkins anaeleza hoja kuu dhidi ya ‘nadharia ya Mungu’ katika kitabu chake kwa kuifupisha katika pointi sita. Anahitimisha kwa kusema kwamba ikiwa hoja hiyo itakubaliwa, ‘dhana ya kiimani ya dini – dhana ya Mungu – haiwezi kusimama, na Mungu karibu hakika hayupo’ (Dawkins, 2006, uk. 156). Kwanza kabisa, anadai kwamba ‘mojawapo ya changamoto kubwa zaidi kwa akili ya binadamu, kwa karne nyingi, imekuwa kueleza jinsi mwonekano changamano na usio na uwezekano wa muundo (design) unavyotokea,’ na kwamba ‘mwelekeo wa asili ni kuhusisha mwonekano wa muundo na muundo halisi wenyewe.’ Akifafanua zaidi pointi zake za tatu na nne, Dawkins anaendelea, ‘mwelekeo huo ni wa uongo, kwa sababu dhana ya mbunifu mara moja inaibua swali la nani alimbuni mbunifu.’ Katika hatua hii Dawkins anaandika:

New Atheists view Darwinism as a means to almost disprove the existence of God. For instance, Richard Dawkins details the central argument against the ‘God thesis’ in his book by summarising it into six points. He concludes by stating that if the argument is accepted ‘the factual premise of religion – the God hypothesis – is untenable. God almost certainly does not exist’ (Dawkins, 2006, p.156). Firstly, he claims that ‘one of the greatest challenges to the human intellect, over the centuries, has been to explain how the complex, improbable appearance of design arises’ and that ‘the natural temptation is to attribute the appearance of design to actual design itself.’ Elaborating further on his third and fourth points, Dawkins continues, ‘the temptation is a false one, because the designer hypothesis immediately raises the question of who designed the designer’. At this point Dawkins writes:

Darwin na wafuasi wake wameonyesha jinsi viumbe hai, pamoja na kutokuwezekana kwao kitakwimu kwa kiwango cha kushangaza na mwonekano wao wa kubuniwa, vilivyobadilika polepole na hatua kwa hatua kutoka mwanzo rahisi. Sasa tunaweza kusema kwa uhakika kwamba udanganyifu wa ubunifu katika viumbe hai ni udanganyifu tu (Dawkins, 2006, uk. 157-8).

Darwin and his successors have shown how living creatures, with their spectacular statistical improbability and appearance of design, have evolved by slow, gradual degrees from simple beginnings. We can now safely say that the illusion of design in living creatures is just that – an illusion (Dawkins, 2006, p.157-8).

Kwa Dawkins, Darwin "alifanya iwezekane kuwa mtu asiyeamini Mungu aliyeridhika kiakili" (Dawkins, 1986, uk. 2). Dawkins anakubali kwamba ulimwengu wa fizikia haujazaa nadharia inayolingana na nadharia ya mageuzi ya Darwin, lakini anaamini kwamba ni jukumu la wanafizikia kutafuta nadharia sawa za kosmolojia. Kwa madhumuni hayo, Dawkins anasema:

For Dawkins, Darwin ‘made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist’ (Dawkins, 1986, p.2). Dawkins admits that the world of physics has not resulted in an equivalent theory of Darwinian evolution, but believes it to be the responsibility of physicists to find such equivalent cosmological theories. To this end Dawkins states:

Na ingawa Udarwini huenda usihusiane moja kwa moja na ulimwengu usio hai – kwa mfano elimu ya ulimwengu (cosmology) – bado huongeza ufahamu wetu katika maeneo yaliyo nje ya eneo lake la awali la biolojia (Dawkins, 2006, uk. 113).

And although Darwinism may not be directly relevant to the inanimate world – cosmology for example – it raises our consciousness in areas outside its original territory of biology (Dawkins, 2006, p.113).

Kwa hiyo, kulingana na Dawkins, ni Darwin peke yake ndiye anayewawezesha wanaoamini kutokuwepo kwa Mungu kutoa hoja madhubuti dhidi ya hoja ya ubunifu (argument from design) – ambayo kwa Dawkins ni "kwa kifupi, hoja inayopendwa zaidi na waumbaji" (Dawkins, 2006, p.113). Dawkins anaona kutajwa kwa Mungu kuwa jambo lisilo la lazima, kwa kuwa "Mungu hangelazimika kufanya chochote kabisa" ili viumbe hai viwe vile walivyo (Dawkins, 2006, p.118). Kwa hiyo, hoja ya kwanza ya Waatheisti Wapya ni kwamba Darwin kwa ufanisi anakanusha ushahidi wenye nguvu zaidi wa mbunifu kupitia mageuzi.

Therefore, according to Dawkins, it is Darwin and Darwin alone who allows atheists to articulate a cogent case against the argument from design – which is to Dawkins ‘in a nutshell the creationists’ favourite argument’ (Dawkins, 2006, p.113). Dawkins considers reference to God as superfluous as ‘God wouldn’t have to do anything at all’ for living beings to be the way they are (Dawkins, 2006, p.118). Hence, the first argument of the New Atheists is that Darwin effectively disproves the strongest evidence for a designer through evolution.

Hoja za Dawkins zimepingwa sana kwa misingi ya kifalsafa. Mijadala mingi ya hadharani imemjibu Dawkins kwa namna hii. Kwa mfano, John Lennox amepinga hoja kwamba mageuzi ya Darwin hayaendani na dhana ya Mungu kwa kusema kwamba 'Dawkins anafanya kosa la kategoria, anachanganya mchakato na wakala' (Fixed Point Foundation, 2017, 00:30:55). Akitambua mapungufu yake ya kifalsafa, Dawkins mwenyewe anakiri kwamba 'yeye si mwanafalsafa na hilo litaonekana wazi' (The Archbishop of Canterbury, 2012, 00:35:52). Hata hivyo, hitimisho la Dawkins linashirikiwa na baadhi ya wanafalsafa wenzake ambao wanamwona Dawkins kuwa 'mwenzangu na mshirika katika sababu hii' (Grayling, 2014).

Dawkins’s arguments have been heavily refuted on philosophical grounds. Many such refutations have been made to Dawkins in public debates. For example, John Lennox has refuted the point that Darwinian evolution is incompatible with the God thesis by stating that ‘Dawkins is making a category mistake, he is confusing mechanism with agency’ (Fixed Point Foundation, 2017, 00:30:55). Aware of his own philosophical limitations, Dawkins admits that he is ‘not a philosopher and that will be obvious’ (The Archbishop of Canterbury, 2012, 00:35:52). Nevertheless, Dawkins’s conclusions are shared by some of his philosopher associates who consider Dawkins ‘a colleague and fellow in the cause’ (Grayling, 2014).

A.C. Grayling, ambaye tuliona akijihusisha na wanafalsafa wengine wa 'Atheism Mpya', anatoa hoja zinazofanana na zile za Dawkins dhidi ya 'nadharia ya Mungu', akisema, 'zaidi ya hayo, dhana ya usanifu ina mashaka kwa sababu inadai kutoa maelezo kwa kutegemea kitu chenyewe kisichoelezeka' (Grayling, 2013, uk. 77). Kama Dawkins, Grayling hatumii muda mwingi kujadili hoja za kawaida za kifalsafa za kitheist; yaani kutaja 'sababu isiyosababishwa' kama jambo linalohitajika ili kuvunja mfululizo usio na mwisho wa sababu, badala yake, anachagua kutumia nadharia ya Darwin kama hoja ya kuangamiza dhidi ya nadharia ya Mungu. Ingawa Grayling anakubaliana na madai mengi ya Dawkins, hoja yake inatofautiana kidogo. Katika kutaja usahihi wa thamani za kimsingi za ulimwengu, Dawkins anakataa wazo la Mbunifu kuwa njia ya busara, akisema, 'ni lazima awe na ugumu wa kutosha kufanya hivyo' (The Archbishop of Canterbury, 2012, 01:45:30).

A.C. Grayling, who we observed associating himself with other ‘New Atheists’, makes similar arguments against ‘the God thesis’ to Dawkins’s, claiming, ‘moreover the design hypothesis is implausible because it purports to offer an explanation by invoking something itself unexplained’ (Grayling, 2013, p.77). Similar to Dawkins, Grayling spends little time engaging with the stock philosophical theistic contentions; namely reference to an ‘uncaused cause’ as being necessary to break the infinite regress, rather, he opts to invoke Darwinism as a fatal argument against the God thesis. Though Grayling is in agreement with much of Dawkins’s claims, his argument differs slightly. In referencing the fine tuning of the universal constants Dawkins rejects the idea of a designer as a reasonable recourse stating ‘he’s got to be at least complicated enough to do that’ (The Archbishop of Canterbury, 2012, 01:45:30).

Profesa Anthony Kenny, aliyeongoza mdahalo kati ya Dawkins na aliyekuwa Askofu Mkuu Rowan Williams, alimchunguza Dawkins kwa kutofautisha kati ya utata wa muundo na utata wa kazi. Kenny alitoa mfano wa kulinganisha wembe wa umeme na wembe wa kunyoa wa kukunjwa, akisema kwamba "wembe wa kukunjwa una muundo rahisi zaidi lakini una uwezo tata zaidi kuliko wembe wa umeme," ambapo Dawkins alijibu, "Sielewi kabisa unachosema," huku hadhira ya Chuo Kikuu cha Oxford ikicheka kwa nyuma (The Archbishop of Canterbury, 2012, 01:56:40). Kwa kuwa kurasa mbili zimetolewa kwa hoja ya usanifu na kurasa tano kwa njia tano za Thomas Aquinas, ni salama kuhitimisha kwamba mchango wa kifalsafa wa Dawkins katika taaluma ya kitaaluma kuhusu hoja za kawaida umekuwa karibu hauna maana. Hata hivyo, hoja za Dawkins zimepingwa kiasi cha kufikia kejeli na udhalilishaji wa kibinafsi (ad hominem). Ili kusisitiza hoja hii, Alister McGrath anaandika kwamba Dawkins anapofikia:

Professor Anthony Kenny, who chaired the debate with Dawkins and the ex-Archbishop Rowan Williams, probed Dawkins by differentiating between complexity of structure and complexity of function. Kenny presented the example comparing an electric razor with a cut throat razor and stating that ‘the cut throat razor is more simple in design but has more complex powers than the electric razor’ to which Dawkins replied, ‘I really don’t see what you are saying’ as the Oxford university audience laughed in the background (The Archbishop of Canterbury, 2012, 01:56:40). Having dedicated two pages to the design argument and five to Thomas Aquinas’ five ways, it is safe to conclude that Dawkins’s philosophical contribution to academia regarding classic arguments has been virtually non-existent. Nevertheless, Dawkins’s arguments are contested to a point of ad hominem ridicule and degradation. To emphasise this point, Alister McGrath writes that when Dawkins comes to:

anapoingia kwenye suala lolote linalohusu Mungu, anaonekana kuingia katika ulimwengu mwingine. Ni ulimwengu wa kundi la mdahalo la wanafunzi wa shule, unaotegemea kauli za moto na za shauku kupita kiasi, zilizokolezwa na urahisishaji wa kushangaza, pamoja na upotoshaji wa mara kwa mara (McGrath, 2007, p.9).

deal with anything to do with God he seems to enter a different world, it is a world of a schoolboy debating society, relying on rather heated, enthusiastic overstatements, spiced up with some striking oversimplifications and more than occasional misrepresentation (McGrath, 2007, p.9).

Hoja kama hizi zinahusiana na sayansi-tu ya wazi ya Dawkins, na kutojali kwake (au kukosa kwake ufahamu)

Such generalisations relate to Dawkins’s overt scientism, his disregard (or lack of awareness)

ya masuala ya kifalsafa na kitheolojia (theolojia ikiwa ni somo ambalo Dawkins haonekani kuamini kuwa ni "somo lolote kabisa" (Dawkins, 2006, uk. 57). Profesa Michael Ruse, ambaye mwenyewe ni mtu asiyeamini kuwepo kwa Mungu, anakwenda mbali zaidi ya hapo akisema:

of philosophical and theological issues (theology being a subject that Dawkins does not appear to believe is ‘a subject at all’ (Dawkins, 2006, p.57). Professor Michael Ruse, an atheist himself, goes further than this stating:

Nilichoandika kwamba The God Delusion ilinifanya nione aibu kuwa mtu asiyeamini Mungu, na nilimaanisha hivyo. Nikijaribu kuelewa jinsi Mungu angeweza kutohitaji sababu yoyote, Wakristo wanadai kwamba Mungu yupo kwa lazima. Nimejitahidi kuelewa maana ya hilo.

I have written that The God Delusion made me ashamed to be an atheist and I meant it. Trying to understand how God could need no cause, Christians claim that God exists necessarily. I have taken the effort to try to understand what that means.

Dawkins na wenzake hawajui madai kama hayo, na wanawadharau kabisa wale hata wanaojaribu kuyaelewa, achilia mbali kuyaamini. Hivyo, kama mwanafunzi wa mwaka wa kwanza wa chuo kikuu, yeye anaweza kwa furaha kuzunguka akiuliza kwa sauti kubwa, "Nini kilimsababisha Mungu?" kana kwamba amegundua jambo kubwa la kifalsafa (Askofu Mkuu wa Canterbury, 2009).

Dawkins and company are ignorant of such claims and positively contemptuous of those who even try to understand them, let alone believe them. Thus, like a first-year undergraduate, he can happily go around asking loudly, "What caused God?" as though he had made some momentous philosophical discovery (The Archbishop of Canterbury, 2009).

Dennett, kama Dawkins, anaidharau na kukwepa uchambuzi kamili wa kupinga hoja za kawaida za sababu ya kwanza, akisema:

Dennett, much like Dawkins, ridicules and evades a full explication/refutation of the classical first cause arguments claiming:

Baadhi ya watu wangependelea zaidi msururu usiokoma wa mafumbo, inaonekana, lakini katika zama hizi gharama yake ni kubwa mno: ni lazima ujidanganye mwenyewe (Dennett, 1995, p.26).

Some people would much prefer the infinite regress of mysteries, apparently, but in this day and age the cost is prohibitive: you have to get yourself deceived (Dennett, 1995, p.26).

Labda jambo lililokosolewa zaidi kuhusu mbinu ya New Atheism ni mwenendo wake wa kuhama kutoka sayansi asilia kwenda falsafa ya kidini. Kuhusu hili, McGrath anasema:

Perhaps the most critiqued aspect of the New Atheist approach is its progression from the natural sciences to religious philosophy. In this regard, McGrath states:

Tatizo halisi kwangu ni jinsi Dawkins anavyopiga hatua kutoka nadharia ya mageuzi ya Darwin hadi kwenye msimamo wa kutokuamini Mungu wenye kujiamini, ambao yeye anauhubiri kwa bidii ya kimasihi na uhakika usiopingika (McGrath, 2006, p.10).

The real issue for me is how Dawkins proceeds from a Darwinian theory of evolution to a confident atheistic world-view which he preaches with messianic zeal and unassailable certainty (McGrath, 2006, p.10).

John Gray anaona udanganyifu wa wanaoitwa "New Atheists" katika kutumia sayansi kujaribu kukanusha "dhana ya Mungu" kuwa:

John Gray considers the New Atheist manipulation of science in attempting to disprove the ‘God hypothesis’ as:

Mjadala wa kale wa enzi ya Kivictoria kati ya sayansi na dini unarudiwa tena kwa kuchosha. Lakini wazo kwamba dini ni mkusanyiko wa nadharia zilizokwisha kukataliwa lenyewe ni nadharia iliyokwisha kukataliwa - mabaki ya falsafa ya karne ya kumi na tisa iitwayo positivism (Gray, 2018, p.9).

A tedious re-run of a Victorian squabble between science and religion. But the idea that religion consists of a bunch of discredited theories is itself a discredited theory - a relic of the nineteenth-century philosophy positivism (Gray, 2018, p.9).

Gray alibainisha mfanano kati ya mawazo haya na yale ya Auguste Comte katika Catchechisme Positiviste (1852) (Gray, 2018, uk. 10). Hata hivyo, New Atheism inavuka dhana za kiumbo (positivist) kwamba mazungumzo yasiyo na maana au ya kimetafizikia hayana thamani, kwani inalenga kukanusha dini kwa kutumia sayansi. Mbinu kama hii imekosolewa kwa kuwa haitofautishi kwa makini kati ya naturalism ya kimetafizikia (metaphysical naturalism) na naturalism ya kimbinu (methodological naturalism), kama alivyobainisha Massimo Pigliucci anayeandika:

Gray identified similarities between these ideas and those of Auguste Comte in Catchechisme Positiviste (1852) (Gray, 2018, p.10). However, New Atheism transcends positivist assumptions of meaningless or metaphysical discourse as it aims to disprove religion using science. Such an approach has been criticised as it lacks careful distinction between metaphysical and methodological naturalism as noted by Massimo Pigliucci who writes:

Jambo muhimu hapa ni kwamba mwanasayansi kimsingi kwa ufafanuzi ni mtu wa naturalism ya kimbinu; hata hivyo, hana ahadi yoyote maalum (isipokuwa maoni yake mwenyewe ya kimetafizikia) kwa naturalism ya kifalsafa. Kwa maneno mengine, sayansi si lazima ihusishe kutokuamini kuwepo kwa Mungu (atheism), ambalo ndilo hofu ya wafuasi wa msimamo mkali (fundamentalists) (Pigliucci, 2006, p.2).

The crucial point here is that a scientist is, essentially by definition, a methodological naturalist; however, she does not have any specific commitment (aside from her own metaphysical views) to philosophical naturalism. In other words, science does not necessarily entail atheism, which is the fundamentalist's fear (Pigliucci, 2006, p.2).

Pigliucci anaendeleza hoja hii kwa kuongeza:

Pigliucci furthers this by adding:

Kuna, kwa hiyo, sababu nzuri kwa nini wanasayansi wengi wenyewe ni wa dini, na ni kosa (kwa upande wa mahusiano ya umma na kwa mtazamo wa kifalsafa)

There is, therefore, a good reason why many scientists are themselves religious , and it is a mistake (both in terms of public relations and from a philosophical standpoint)

kuwasilisha mtazamo wa kisayansi kana kwamba kwa lazima unaongoza kwenye kutokuamini kuwepo kwa Mungu. Sayansi haiwezi kumudu, wala haihitaji, mapambano ya moja kwa moja dhidi ya dini (Pigliucci, 2006, p.2).

to present the scientific worldview as if it necessarily leads to atheism. Science can neither afford, nor does it need, a head-on confrontation with religion (Pigliucci, 2006, p.2).

Elliott Sober anakubaliana na Pigliucci akisema:

Elliott Sober echoes Pigliucci stating:

Kwa baadhi ya watu, nadharia ya Newton na nadharia ya Darwin zinaashiria kwamba hakuna Mungu. Hata hivyo, hivi ndivyo nadharia hizi zisemavyo; ni tafsiri ya kifalsafa inayohitaji dhana za ziada (Sober, 2009, p.376).

For some people, Newtonian theory and Darwinian theory suggest that there is no God. However, this is not what these theories say; it is a philosophical interpretation that requires additional premises (Sober, 2009, p.376).