Anthony Wallace anasema:

Anthony Wallace says:

Imani katika nguvu za kiroho imepangwa kutoweka duniani kote, kutokana na kuongezeka kwa upevu na kuenea kwa maarifa ya kisayansi (Wallace, 1966, p.264-5).

Belief in supernatural powers is doomed to die out, all over the world, as a result of the increasing adequacy and diffusion of scientific knowledge (Wallace, 1966, p.264-5).

Je, maendeleo ya maarifa ya kisayansi yanawaondoa watu kutoka kwenye mambo ya kiroho (ya kimiujiza)?

But are developments of scientific knowledge driving people away from the supernatural?

Majaribio mengi yamefanywa ili kuelewa mwelekeo wa kutokuwa na dini unaoshuhudiwa katika nchi za Magharibi. Uchambuzi wa kina wa sababu za kijamii za jambo hili uko nje ya upeo wa makala hii. Swali kuu linalochunguzwa ni kiwango ambacho hoja za kisayansi za Wanaatheisti Wapya zimeathiri mwelekeo huu, huku jaribio la kwanza la kijamii la kuchunguza kutokuwa na imani nchini Uingereza likifanywa na Susan Budd katika kitabu chake Varieties of Unbelief (1977). Budd alitumia makala za kumbukumbu (obituaries) kutoka mashirika ya kidunia na ya kimaadili 200

Numerous attempts were undertaken to understand the irreligious trajectory witnessed in the West. An exhaustive explication of sociological reasons for this are beyond this paper’s scope. The main question under investigation is the extent to which New Atheist scientific argumentation has impacted this trend with one of the first sociological attempts to investigate irreligiosity in England conducted by Susan Budd and described in Varieties of Unbelief (1977). Budd used obituaries from secular and ethical organisations of 200

wasifu kati ya 1850 na 1960 (Sheard, 2014, uk. 1) zinazotambua sababu tatu za kutoamini, ikiwa ni pamoja na 'kusoma Biblia na kazi za kawaida za kiakili, kutokuamini na chuki dhidi ya viongozi wa dini, na ukosoaji wa imani ya kutokufa' (Budd, 1977, uk. 106). Sayansi na nadharia ya Darwin hazipo kabisa hapa. Vipindi kati ya 1958 na 1974 huenda vilikuwa vya kushangaza zaidi katika mabadiliko ya idadi ya watu kuelekea kutokuwa na dini katika ulimwengu wa Magharibi.

biographies between 1850-1960 (Sheard, 2014, p.1) identifying three causes for unbelief, including ‘reading the Bible and rationalist classics, a distrust and resentment towards clergy members and a criticism of belief in immortality’ (Budd, 1977, p.106). Science and Darwinism are conspicuously absent here. The periods between 1958-1974 were perhaps most dramatic in demographic movement towards irreligiosity in the Western world.

Kuhusu muktadha wa Uingereza, Hugh McLeod anataja ubinafsi (individualism), ujamaa (socialism), usayansi (scientism), ufeministi, ukosoaji wa dini, "mapinduzi ya kingono" (sexual revolution) na ustawi wa baada ya vita kuwa sababu zinazoelekeza watu kwenye kutokuwa na dini (McLeod, 2005, uk. 206). Malezi ya kifamilia yasiyo ya kidini yalionyeshwa na McLeod (na wanasosholojia wengi wanaosoma kipindi hiki) kuwa sababu kuu ya kutokuwa na dini utu uzima (McLeod, 2005, uk. 228). Umuhimu wa kipindi hiki katika kubadilika kuelekea kutokuwa na dini unaelezwa kwa msisitizo mkubwa na Callum Brown:

Elaborating on the British context Hugh McLeod mentions individualism, socialism, scientism, feminism, religious criticism, the ‘sexual revolution’ and post-war affluence as reasons for an irreligious direction (McLeod, 2005, p.206). An irreligious family socialisation was indicated by McLeod (and most sociologists studying this period) as a primary reason for irreligiosity in adulthood (McLeod, 2005, p.228). The criticality of this period in altering to irreligiosity is toughly stated by Callum Brown:

Ilichukua karne kadhaa (katika kipindi ambacho wanahistoria walikuwa wakikiita Enzi za Giza) kuigeuza Uingereza kuwa Ukristo, lakini imechukua chini ya miaka arobaini kwa nchi hiyo kuuacha (Brown, 2009, p.1).

It took several centuries (in what historians used to call the Dark Ages) to convert Britain to Christianity, but it has taken less than forty years for the country to forsake it (Brown, 2009, p.1).

Kwa kuchunguza wanafunzi 836 katika muktadha wa Kanada, Bruce Hunsberger anatambua ujamaa wa msingi nyumbani kuwa jambo lenye umuhimu mkubwa zaidi katika kutokuwa na dini (Hunsberger, 1984, uk. 1).

Analysing 836 students in a Canadian context, Bruce Hunsberger identifies primary socialisation in the home as the most salient factor for irreligiosity (Hunsberger, 1984, p.1).

Akiangalia kipindi cha mwaka 1987 hadi 2012 kwa mtazamo wa Kimarekani, na kwa kutumia Utafiti wa Kijamii wa Jumla (General Social Survey) wa Davis na Smith (1992) kama msingi wa matokeo yao, Michael Hout na Claude Fischer wanaunganisha ongezeko la mgawanyiko wa kisiasa na sababu muhimu ya kutokuwa na dini, wakisema:

Surveying the time period from 1987-2012 from an American context and using the General Social Survey (Davis and Smith, 1992) to inform their results, Michael Hout and Claude Fischer link increased political polarisation as a salient reason for irreligiosity, stating:

Wanasiasa wa itikadi huria walikuwa wameongezeka kwa kiasi kikubwa katika kutoonyesha upendeleo wowote wa kidini, wastani wao walikuwa wameongezeka kidogo katika kufanya hivyo, na wanasiasa wa itikadi ya kihafidhina (Hout na Fischer, 2014, uk. 438).

Political liberals became substantially more likely to express no religious preference, moderates became somewhat more likely to do so, and political conservatives (Hout and Fischer, 2014, p.438).

Hout na Fischer wanatoa kutajwa maalum kwa "uhuru wa kujitawala" (autonomy), wakidai kwamba:

Hout and Fischer make special mention of ‘autonomy’ claiming:

Asili ya karatasi hii, tunadai mabadiliko ya thamani kuelekea uhuru zaidi na mbali na mamlaka ya jadi. Katika kuunda dhana yetu, tumetegemea utafiti wa saikolojia ya kijamii wa miaka ya 1950 ambao ulibaini kuibuka kwa mwelekeo chanya kuelekea kufikiri kwa kujitegemea, ambao tunauita "uhuru." Ushahidi mwingi umekusanywa kwa kuwauliza washiriki wa tafiti kupanga mambo ambayo inaweza kuwa muhimu kwa mtoto kujifunza, ikiwa ni pamoja na "kufikiri kwa nafsi yake" na "kutii" miongoni mwa sifa nyingine zinazoweza kuhitajika (Hout and Fischer, 2014, p.433).

Original to this paper, we invoke a value shift toward greater autonomy and away from traditional authority. In formulating our hypothesis we have drawn on social psychological research in the 1950s that identified the emergence of a positive bias in favor of thinking for oneself we refer to as “autonomy.” Most evidence has been compiled by asking survey respondents to rank things it might be important for a child to learn, including “to think for him or herself” and “to obey” among other potentially desirable qualities (Hout and Fischer, 2014, p.433).

Zaidi ya hayo, akitumia Utafiti wa Kijamii wa Jumla (General Social Survey) (Davis na Smith, 1992) katika muktadha wa Marekani, Stephen Merino anahitimisha:

Furthermore, using the General Social Survey (Davis and Smith, 1992) in an American context, Stephen Merino concludes:

Kundi za hivi karibuni za watu waliokulia bila dini ni huria zaidi – asilimia , ikilinganishwa na takriban asilimia 20 wanaojitambulisha kuwa wahafidhina. Vilevile, kundi za hivi karibuni za watu waliokulia bila dini zina uwezekano mkubwa zaidi wa kuonyesha kutokuwa na imani na makanisa na mashirika ya kidini (Merino, 2012, uk. 10).

The most recent cohorts raised with no religion are even more liberal – percent, compared with roughly 20 percent who self-identify as conservative. Likewise, more recent cohorts raised with no religion are much more likely to express a lack of confidence in churches and religious organizations (Merino, 2012, p.10).

Katika muktadha wa Uingereza, Linda Woodhead anataja 'uhuru wa mtu binafsi' na 'demokrasia ya kiliberali' kama 'kipengele muhimu' (Woodhead and Catto, 2012, p.253), akisema:

In a British context, Linda Woodhead cites ‘individual freedom’ and ‘liberal democracy’ as a ‘salient factor’ (Woodhead and Catto, 2012, p.253), stating:

Hoja yangu basi ni kwamba kuongezeka kwa utofauti wa makundi ya watu na kuongezeka kwa uhuru wa kijamii nchini Uingereza, tangu miaka ya 1970, kumekabiliwa na mwelekeo tofauti kabisa katika dini, na ni mgongano huu unaosaidia kueleza kwa nini idadi ya watu wasio na dini inaongezeka kwa kasi zaidi. Si kwamba dini au hali ya kiroho zenyewe zimekuwa jambo lisilokubalika kwa 'mwanadamu wa kisasa', kama baadhi ya wananadharia wa zamani wa usekularisheni na 'wasioamini Mungu wa Mwangaza' walivyopenda kudhani, bali aina mahususi za dini zinazotolewa katika Uingereza ya kisasa ya marehemu hazijatoa manufaa ya kijamii, kiroho na kimaadili ambayo vijana wanayathibitisha na kuyatamani (Woodhead and Catto, 2012, p.258).

My argument is thus that growing pluralisation and liberalisation in Britain have, since the 1970s, been met by opposite tendencies in religion, and that it is this clash which helps to explain the increasingly rapid rise of ‘no religion’. It’s not that religion or spirituality per se have become objectionable to ‘modern man’, as some older secularisation theorists and ‘enlightenment atheists’ liked to think, but that the particular kinds of religion on offer in late modern Britain have not offered the social, spiritual and moral goods which younger people affirm and desire (Woodhead and Catto, 2012, p.258).

Woodhead anatoa hoja madhubuti dhidi ya nadharia za usekulari, akisema:

Woodhead effectively refutes theories of secularisation, stating:

Usambazaji usio sawa wa "kutokuwa na dini" duniani unadhoofisha simulizi rahisi za usekularishaji ambazo ziliwazia nchi zote zikisukumwa kufikia kituo kile kile cha kisekula na nguvu zisizozuilika za usasa (Woodhead, 2012, uk. 254).

The patchy global distribution of ‘no religion’ undermines simplistic accounts of secularisation that imagined all countries propelled to the same secular destination point by the irresistible forces of modernisation (Woodhead, 2012, p.254).

Appreciation of the limitations of census data (collected each decade in England) by Woodhead is useful, as it takes into account the skewing of data caused by its collection from heads of households (Woodhead, 2012, p.246). Woodhead addresses these issues by creating survey questions that measure the extent of a participant's atheism (Woodhead, 2012, p.49-50), concluding that "only 13 percent of 'nones' are strongly secular—amounting to under 5 per cent of the population" (Woodhead, 2012, p.250) and that "the growth of 'no religion' cannot be conflated with the growth of the secularism championed by the 'New Atheists'" (Woodhead, 2012, p.250). Fahmi (2018) supports these findings, reporting that approximately 90% of Americans believe in a "higher power" despite 26% claiming to have no religion (Pew Research, 2019). Accordingly, only a minority of religious "nones" are "confidently" atheistic.

Woodhead’s appreciation of census data limitations (collected each decade in England) is useful as it accounts for data skewing due to its collection by heads of households (Woodhead, 2012, p.246). Woodhead mitigates these issues by creating survey questions which scale the extent of a participant’s atheism (Woodhead, 2012, p.49-50), concluding that ‘only 13 percent of ‘nones’ are strongly secular—amounting to under 5 per cent of the population’ (Woodhead, 2012, p.250) and that ‘the growth of ‘no religion’ cannot be conflated with the growth of the secularism championed by the ‘New Atheists’ (Woodhead, 2012, p.250). Fahmi (2018) supports these findings reporting that approximately 90% of Americans believe in a ‘higher power’ despite 26% claiming to have no religion (Pew Research, 2019). Accordingly, only a minority of religious ‘nones’ are ‘confidently’ atheistic.

Data hii ni ya kuzingatiwa kwa sababu inaonyesha kwamba idadi ya "wasioamini Mungu wenye kujiamini" nchini Uingereza (5%) ni sawa na idadi ya Waislamu.

This data is noteworthy as it effectively suggests that the number of ‘confident atheists’ in Britain (5%) is similar to the number of Muslims.