Hujjar fiṭrah ga Allah ba ta takaita ga abin da ke cikin rai kawai, wanda ke bukatar mutum ya tabbatar da cewa akwai Mahalicci. A maimakon haka, yana yiwuwa fiṭrah ta bayyana wannan muhimmin gaskiya ta hanyoyi da dama kuma a matakai daban-daban.

The argument from fiṭrah for Allah  is not limited to the element that exists in the soul, which requires a person to affirm that there is a Creator. Rather, it is possible that the fiṭrah reveals this substantial fact in a number of ways and at various levels.

Daga cikin al'amuran da mutum zai iya fahimta ta atomatik akwai wasu gaskiyoyi na halitta da na hankali, waɗanda ake kira ilimin fahimta ta asali ko gaskiyoyin da ba sa buƙatar tabbaci. Waɗannan ana sanin su ta asali a zuciya, kuma rai yana samun su ba tare da bincike ko tunani ba. Wannan ya bambanta da irin ilimin da ake kira ilimin ka'ida, wanda ba a samunsa sai ta hanyar bincike da tunani.

Of the issues a person can automatically grasp are certain natural and rational facts, referred to as intuitive knowledge or self-evident truths. These are innately known and are acquired by the soul without any analysis or reasoning. This is in contrast to the type of knowledge that is known as theoretical knowledge, which can be acquired only via analysis and reasoning.

Farkon bambancin da ke tsakanin su ya kamata ya bayyana sosai; a zahiri, ya kamata ya zama abu mai bayyana kansa, ta yadda kowane mutum zai gane shi nan take, sabanin ilimin ka'ida wanda ke iya fuskantar shakka da suka. Irin wadannan suka ana iya kore su ta hanyar nazari da hujja. Ilimin hankali (intuitive) a dabi'arsa ba ya dogara da hujja; maimakon haka, shi kansa ilimin hankali ake amfani da shi a matsayin shaida. Ilimin ka'ida kuwa ana mayar da shi zuwa ga ilimin hankali domin tabbatar da shi. Yana bayyana haka, Ibn Ḥazm ya ce, ‘Duk abin da za a iya samu nan take ta hanyar hankali ko gabobin jiki ba ya bukatar hujja kwata-kwata. Maimakon haka, irin wadannan al'amura ne kowa ya kamata ya yi amfani da su a matsayin hujja da kuma karyata, bayan haka ne za a iya ɗaukar tunanin ka'idarsa a matsayin daidai ko kuskure.’42

The difference between the two should be clear; in fact, it should be self evident such that every person must instantly recognise it, as opposed to theoretical knowledge that can be prone to doubt and objection. Such objections may be repelled through analysis and reasoning. It is in the nature of intuitive knowledge that it is not dependent on proof; rather, intuitive knowledge itself is used as evidence. Theoretical knowledge is referred back to intuitive knowledge for verification. Explaining this, Ibn Ḥazm says, ‘Whatever that can be acquired immediately through logic or the senses is not in need of evidence at all. Rather, it is these types of facts that everyone ought to use as evidence and refutation, after which his theoretical reasoning can be deemed to be correct or incorrect.’42

Muʿallimī ya ce, "Dangane da ilimin da ke zuwa ta hanyar fitar da hankali da kuma bayyananniyar masaniya, masana ilimin hankali sun amince cewa shi ne kuɗin ilimin hankali. Amma samun ilimi ta hanyar nazari da bincike ba zai yiwu ba sai idan ya dogara ga na farko, kuma an danganta shi da shi."43 Yin tunani ba zai iya aiki ba sai da kasancewar ilimin fahimta na zahiri. Idan babu shi, za a sami zagayen hujja da ci gaba mara iyaka, wanda hakan zai rusa dukkan tsarin tunani. Yana bayani kan wannan, Ibn Taymiyya ya ce, "Ilimin da ake samu ta hanyar nazarin hujja dole ne ya koma ga ƙudurori na fahimta. Duk wani ilimi da ba na fahimta ba dole ne ya koma ga ilimin fahimta. Idan ƙudurori na ka'ida ana tabbatar da su koyaushe ta hanyar makamantansu, to za a samu zagayen hujja ko ci gaba mara iyaka na dalili. Ta hanyar larura da yarjejeniyar masana ilimin hankali, dukkansu ba daidai ba ne ta fuskoki da dama.

Muʿallimī said, ‘As for instinctive and self-evident information, the logicians agree that it is the currency of logic. On the other hand, deriving information from analytical knowledge can only be aspired when it is based on, and attributed to, the former.’43 Reasoning cannot work without the existence of intuitive information. Without it, circular reasoning and infinite regress would come as a result, causing the collapse of the entire system of reasoning. Explaining this, Ibn Taymiyyah said, ‘Knowledge that is acquired by analysing proof must refer back to intuitive propositions. Any piece of knowledge that is not intuitive must refer back to intuitive knowledge. If theoretical propositions are constantly proven by their like, circular reasoning or infinite regress of causality would ensue. By necessity and the agreement of logicians, both are improper from a number of angles.

Ma'arifar ka'ida da aka samu ta hanyar ilimi na zahiri ita ce wadda ake samu daga sanannun maganganu waɗanda ba sa buƙatar bincike. Da a ce waɗannan maganganu ma na ka'ida ne, da sun zama masu dogara ga wasu maganganun, wanda hakan zai kai ga rashin ƙarshen maganganun ka'ida a cikin mutum. Mutum mai farawa ne – ya samu bayan ya kasance ba ya nan. Ilimin da ke cikin zuciyarsa ma mai farawa ne. Idan ilimin da ke cikin zuciyarsa ba a samunsa ba tare da wani ilimi kafin shi ba, to hakan zai nuna cewa zuciyarsa ba ta da wani ilimi tun farko. Saboda haka, wajibi ne a sami wasu bayanai na kai tsaye, sanannu da kansu, waɗanda Allah ya sanya a cikin zuciyar mutum. Manufar kowace hujja ita ce komawa zuwa irin wannan bayani na kai tsaye. Haka kuma, bayanai na kai tsaye wani lokaci kan fuskanci shakku da raɗe-raɗi, kamar shakkun masu ruɗar magana waɗanda ke kushe bayanai na zahiri da na kai tsaye. Misali, akwai shakkun da Rāzī ya jefa a farkon littafinsa al-Muḥaṣṣal, wanda mun tattauna a wani wuri.

Acquired theoretical knowledge is that which is gained from known propositions that do not require analysis. Had those propositions been theoretical as well, they would have in turn been contingent on other propositions, leading to an infinity of theoretical propositions inside man. Man is temporal – he came into existence after having been non-existent. The knowledge in his heart is temporal. If the knowledge in his heart was not acquired without knowledge prior to it, it would mean that his heart would be without knowledge right from the start. Therefore, it is necessary that there are basic self-evident pieces of information that Allah places within a person’s heart. The aim of any proof is to refer back to this type of self-evident information. Furthermore, self-evident information is sometimes subject to doubts and whispers, like the doubts of sophists who cast aspersions on tangible and self-evident information. These include, for example, the doubts cast by Rāzī in the beginning of his al Muḥaṣṣal, which we have discussed elsewhere:

Shubuhat da ke cutar da wannan ilimi ba za a iya korar su da hujja ba. Wannan saboda manufar hujja ita ce ta koma ga wannan ilimin na fitina (wato na asali da fitar da kai). Saboda haka, idan shakka ta shiga, hanyar bincike da nazari tana rufewa. Shi ya sa ba a yin muhawara da wadanda suke musanta ilimin da ake gani da kuma wanda dabi'a ke tabbatarwa. A zahiri, idan irin wannan mutum yana taurin kai, a hukunta shi har sai ya amince da gaskiya. Idan ya yi kuskure saboda lalacewar hankalinsa ko tunaninsa, ko kuma ba ya iya fahimtar wannan ilimi, ko kuma saboda wani dalili daban, a yi masa magani domin ya samu abubuwan da ake bukata don samun ilimi, kuma ya iya kawar da abubuwan da ke toshe shi. Idan har yanzu bai iya fahimta ba saboda lalacewar dabi'arsa, a yi masa magani da magungunan da suke magance hakan, ko da addu'a, ruqyah, kulawa ta musamman, da sauransu. In ba haka ba, a bar shi.44

Doubts that are injurious to that information cannot be repelled with proof. This is because the aim of proof is that it refers back to that intuitive information. Therefore, when doubt creeps in, the path to analysis and research is closed off. This is why those who deny tangible and instinctive information are not to be debated. In fact, if such a person is being obstinate, he should be disciplined until he admits the truth. If he is mistaken due to corruption afflicting his senses or his mind, is simply unable to understand that information, or for any other reason, he should be treated so that he can gain the prerequisites of acquiring knowledge and be able to dispel those things that block it. If he is still unable to comprehend because of corruption in his temperament, he should be treated with medicament that deals with this, or with supplication, ruqyah, special attention, etc. Otherwise, he should be left alone.44

Duk wani yunƙuri na tabbatar da sahihancin gaskiyar da ba ta bukatar hujja (self-evident truths) ta hanyar hankali yana da matuƙar wahala. A gaskiya, yana iya zama ba zai yiwu ba, kuma yana iya sa mutum ya fara shakkar su, don haka ya fada cikin wani nau'i na yaudara ta hankali (sophism). Ko ta yaya dai, irin wannan hanya za ta zama kamar azabtar da rai ba tare da wata riba ba. Yana bayani kan haka, Ibn Taymiyyah ya bayar da misali mai kyau don nuna yanayin wannan matsala:

Any attempt to demonstrate the veracity of self-evident truths through reasoning is very hard. In fact, it can be impossible and may lead a person to doubt them, thus falling into one of the many types of sophism. In any case, such a process would be tantamount to torturing the soul without any benefit whatsoever. Expounding on this, Ibn Taymiyyah offered a fine example to demonstrate the nature of this problem:

Idan aka yi ƙoƙarin fahimtar abubuwan da ake fahimta ta hanyar ilhami ta hanyoyin da ba na ilhami ba, mutum zai yi ta azabtar da ransa a banza. Wannan kamar mutumin da aka umurce shi da ya raba wani adadin kuɗi daidai gwargwado tsakanin mutane da dama, aikin da ya kamata ya yi ba tare da wahala ba. Wani zai ce masa, “Dakata, ba za ka iya raba shi ba sai ka san ma'anar rabo, kuma sai ka bambance tsakanin rabo da ninkawa. Rabo shi ne akasin ninkawa. Ana yin ninkawa ta hanyar haɗa raka'o'in lamba ɗaya da raka'o'in wata lamba, yayin da ake samun rabo ta hanyar raba raka'o'in lamba ɗaya da raka'o'in wata lamba. Shi ya sa idan aka ninka sakamakon rabo da mai rabawa, sakamakon zai zama wanda za a raba, kuma idan aka raba lambar da ta fito daga ninkawa da ɗaya daga cikin lambobin biyu da aka ninka, sakamakon zai zama ɗayan lambar…” “Abin da na faɗa game da ma'anar ninkawa ba shi da inganci, domin yana shafar ninkar lamba gabaki ɗaya, ba lambobin juzu'i ba. Ma'anar da ta haɗa komai ita ce: Ninkawa shi ne jimillar da dangantakarta da ɗaya daga cikin lambobin da aka ninka ta yi daidai da dangantakar lamba ɗaya da ɗayan lambar…” “Ninka rabin da kwata yana ba da kashi ɗaya bisa takwas. Dangantakar kashi ɗaya bisa takwas da kwata daidai take da dangantakar rabi da lamba ɗaya.” Duk da cewa waɗannan maganganu duka gaskiya ne, a bayyane yake cewa mutumin da yake da kuɗi kuma yake son raba su daidai tsakanin mutane da dama, zai shiga wahala a banza idan ya tilasta wa kansa fahimtar duk waɗannan kafin ya raba kuɗin. Watakila ma ba zai fahimci waɗannan abubuwa ba, kuma zai ga suna da wahala.45

When instinctively comprehended matters are reasoned through non instinctive means, one will be tormenting the soul in vain. This is similar to a man who is told to divide a certain sum of money into equal portions among a number of individuals – a task that should be performed without difficulty. Someone may say to him, “Wait, you cannot divide it without knowing the definition of division and without drawing a distinction between division and multiplication. Division is the opposite of multiplication. The latter is carried out by compounding the units of one number by the units of the other, whereas the former is achieved by dividing the units of one number by the units of the other. This is why when the quotient is multiplied by the divisor, the result is the dividend, and when the number resulting from multiplication is divided by one of the two numbers multiplied, the result is the other number… “What I have said about the definition of multiplication is not valid because it applies to the multiplication of integers, not fractional numbers. An all-inclusive definition would be: Multiplication is the sum total whose relation to one of the numbers multiplied is the same as the relation of figure one to the other number… “The multiplication of one-half by one quarter results in one-eighth. The relation of one-eighth to one quarter is the same as the relation of one-half to the figure one.” Although these are all valid statements, it is clear that the person who has money and wishes to distribute it equally among a number of individuals would agonise in vain if he were to force himself to understand all this before he divided the money. He may not even understand these matters and may find them problematic.’45

Yana bayyana abin da tsarin tunani don gaskiyar da ta bayyana da kanta zai iya kaiwa, ya kara da cewa: ‘Yawancin bayanai suna da wajibi kuma na dabi'a ne. Idan mutum ya so ya tilasta wa kansa ba da hujja a kan hakan, zai yi masa wahala. Zai jefa kansa cikin shakka, ko dai saboda hakan zai kai ga dogayen maganganu, ko kuma saboda suna da wuyar warwarewa, ko kuma saboda duka biyun.46

Explaining what the process of reasoning for self-evident truth can lead to, he adds: ‘A lot of information is necessary and instinctive. If a person wants to force himself to offer reasoning for that, it would be difficult for him. He would land himself into doubt, whether because it would lead to lengthy propositions, because they are difficult to unlock, or both.46

Idan akwai wani lokaci da ya zama wajibi a yi wa abubuwan da suke bayyane a kan kansu bayani ta hanyar hujja, to wannan a zahiri yana nuna cewa abubuwan an halicce su a cikin zuciya kuma suna cikin dabi'a, ba don a tabbatar da cewa gaskiya ne ba. Akwai bambanci tsakanin bayyana yanayin wani abu da kuma yunkurin bayar da shaida game da gaskiyarsa. Na farko yana kama da tunatarwa ga wanda ya manta ko ya yi sakaci. Shi ya sa, idan ana magana kan hujjojin da ke tabbatar da wanzuwar Allah ﷻ, Ibn Taimiyya ya ce: "Don haka idan ya ga alamomin da ke tabbatar da wanzuwarsa, za su zama abin farkawa daga wannan yanayi, kamar yadda Shi ya ce: 'Lalle ne, idan Shaidan ya yi kwarin gwiwa ga masu tsoron Allah, sai su tuna, sai su fara gani a sarari.'" Haka kuma zai zama tunatarwa ga tuna Allah lokacin da mantuwa da sakaci suka rinjaye mutum. Saboda haka, yana zama abin farkawa domin kawar da jahilci da mutum zai iya fuskanta, da kuma tunatarwa domin cire sakaci. Duk da haka, sanin wanzuwar Allah a asali yana cikin rai ta dabi'a ba tare da wata hanya ta waje ba.48

If there is ever a case that self-evident facts need to be reasoned, then that would actually be to demonstrate that they are indeed innate and instinctive, not to prove they are correct. There is a difference between revealing the nature of something and the attempt to offer evidence for its veracity – the former is akin to reminding the heedless and forgetful. This is why when discussing the evidence that proves the existence of Allah , Ibn Taymiyyah said, So when he sees the signs that necessitate His existence, they would be an eye-opener from that spectrum, just as He  said, “Indeed, when Satan whispers to those mindful of Allah, they remember their Lord then they start to see things clearly.”47 It would also be a reminder to remember Allah when forgetfulness and heedlessness overcome. Therefore, it is an eye-opener to dispel the ignorance one may experience, and a reminder to remove one’s heedlessness. This is despite the fact that the core recognition of Allah’s existence is instinctively found in the soul without any external means whatsoever.48

Wannan ya kawo tambayoyi guda biyu masu muhimmanci.

This brings about two valid questions:

A ina rayuwar ruhi ta samu ilimin fitri?

1. Where did the soul gain intuitive knowledge?.

2. Daga ina ilimin hankali (intuitive knowledge) yake samun cikakkiyar mahangar gama-gari da ta tabbata?

2. From where does intuitive knowledge acquire its universal and absolute objectivity?.

Daga abin da ya gabata, an bayyana a fili cewa ilimin fahimta (intuitive) yana nan a cikin zuciya tun asali. Ba a samunsa ta hanyar karatu ko koyo ba, kuma ba bayani ne da ake karɓa daga wata hanya ta waje ba. Saboda haka, yana da ma'ana a tambayi: Me ko wane ne ya sanya waɗannan ra'ayoyin na halitta a cikin zuciya? Amsar da ta dace ita ce Allah. Domin kaucewa wannan tambaya, maganganun masu musun Allah sun yi ƙoƙarin sa shakku kan yanayin ilimin nan na halitta, suna cewa irin wannan sani yana samuwa ne daga ilimin da hankula ke karɓa ta hanyar tsarin ƙididdiga na tattara misalai (istiqrā’). Suna gabatar da misali: Idan mutum ya ƙara tuffa ɗaya a wata tuffa, za a samu tuffa biyu; idan ya ƙara lemu ɗaya a wani lemu, za a samu lemu biyu. Wannan ƙa'ida ce ta duniya: 1+1=2. Sun ƙara da cewa ƙa'idar dalili da sakamako (causality) tana samuwa ne daga tsarin dalili da sakamako da mutum yake gani ta hankulansa. A takaice, suna da'awar cewa wannan ilimi yana samuwa ne daga gogewa, ba don akwai wani ilimi na asali a wannan fanni da ya riga hankula ba. Wannan hanyar tunani, wato fassara ilimin hankali ta hanyar mayar da shi ga ilimin hankula, da watsi da duk wata baiwa ta asali, tana haifar da matsaloli da dama a fannin fahimta. Tana buɗe kofa ga shakkar gaskiyar waɗannan ra'ayoyi, waɗanda a zahiri gaskiya ce ta asali kuma mai maimaituwa. Hanyar "gwadawa da gwaji" wadda ta shafi kowane gogewar ɗan Adam ba ta yiwuwa a cika ta gaba ɗaya. Saboda haka, yana yiwuwa mutum ya ci gaba da kasancewa cikin shakku game da wannan ƙa'idar duniya, domin tana iya karyewa a wani wuri a waje da iyakataccen gwajinsa. Misali, ba zai sani ba cewa akwai wani al'amari a wani wuri a cikin duniya da ya faru ba tare da wani dalili na waje ya haifar da shi ba.

From the previous discussion, it was made clear that intuitive information is already present in the heart. It is not acquired through the process of education. It is not information accessed from any external source. Therefore, it is perfectly natural to ask the following question: What or who placed these instinctive ideas in the heart? The logical answer is Allah. In order to sidestep this question, atheist discourse has strived to cast doubt on the instinctive nature of this cognition, claiming that such information is borne out of the education received by the senses via the process of induction (istiqrā’). They propose the following: If a man adds an apple to another, it would be two apples; if he adds an orange to another, it would be two oranges. This is a universal rule: 1+1=2. They add that the rule of causality is borne out of the cause-effect process that man perceives through his senses. In a nutshell, they claim that this knowledge is borne out of this experience, not because of any instinctive knowledge in this regard that precludes the senses. This philosophical outlook – interpreting rational information by referring them back to sensory knowledge and disregarding any innate predisposition – leads to a number of cognitive problems. It opens up the door of doubting the instinctive and recurring truths that these concepts actually are. The ‘try-and-test’ method that covers every human experience is impossible to achieve. Therefore, it is possible that a man can still have doubts about this universal law, as it might be broken somewhere outside of his limited ‘try-and-test’ experiment. For example, he would not know that there is an event, somewhere in the universe, that came to pass without any external cause triggering it.

Wannan matsala ta sa wasu masu ra'ayin rashin addini suka gabatar da wani ra'ayi wanda ke amincewa da yadda wadannan ka'idoji na hankali ke maimaituwa a aikace a duniya, ba tare da neman bayyana su daga mahangar falsafa ko ta ka'ida ba. Wadannan masana falsafa suna amincewa da wata yarjejeniyar amfani ta musaya a duniya: mutum yana gudanar da rayuwarsa ta yau da kullum yana mai imani cewa wadannan gaskiyoyi ne na haihuwa kuma a bayyane suke, alhali a zahiri, halinsu na kasancewa a bayyane, na haihuwa, da na dabi'a ba abu ne da za a iya tabbatarwa ko gabatar da hujja a kansa ba. Matsalar ta kara tsanani idan wasu masu ra'ayin rashin addini suka dauki tsarin shakka game da ka'idoji bayyanannu kuma masu wajibi: cewa babu ilimin ka'ida da za a iya samu daga gare su, kuma bai kamata a karbe su a matsayin gaskiyar da ke bayyana kanta ba.

This problem led some atheists to propose a view that acknowledges the universal recurrence of these rational concepts in practice, without attempting to explain them from a philosophical or theoretical viewpoint. These philosophers acknowledge a pragmatic quid pro quo arrangement in the universe: Man engages with his daily life believing these are innate and self-evident truths, while in reality, their self-evidentiary, innate, and instinctive nature is something that cannot be demonstrated or reasoned with proof. The problem is compounded when some atheists actually adopt a sceptical approach to self-evident and necessary concepts: that there cannot be any theoretical knowledge that could be gained from them, nor should they be accepted as self-evident facts.

Masanin falsafa Lawrence Krauss ya bayyana sau da yawa cewa tunanin ɗan adam na zamani ne, kuma ya samu ci gaba bisa ka'idar Darwin domin ya iya mu'amala lafiya da hatsarorin savannah; sai dai waɗannan tunani ba lallai ba ne su iya fahimtar yanayin wannan duniya ko gaskiyar wanzuwa. Saboda haka, in ji shi, wajibi ne a fahimci duniya ta hanyar kanta – ta hanyar lura da gwaji (empiricism), ba tare da dogara ga abin da ake kira ka'idojin hankali ba, balle a ɗauke su a matsayin alƙalan gaskiya. Gaskiya, in ji shi, ita ce kawai abin da za mu iya samu ta hanyar lura da hankula bisa tsarin kimiyya, komai ban mamaki ko sabanin ra'ayi da zai iya kasancewa ga zukatanmu na dabi'a. Krauss ya faɗi haka a littafinsa A Universe from Nothing: Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing, wanda ya ginu a kan ra'ayin cewa ko da yake duniya ta fito daga babu komai, tana iya halittar kanta daga kanta bisa dokokin kimiyyar lissafi. Wannan iƙirari, tare da cikakkun bayanan da ya ƙunsa, yana da matsala ƙwarai, domin yana kai ga matsaloli da dama na tunani waɗanda suke da haɗari ƙwarai. Wasu daga cikin wannan rikicin tunani sun bayyana a muhawarar da Krauss ya yi da Hamza Tzortzis, mai taken Islam or Atheism: Which Makes More Sense? A cikin wannan muhawara, an fallasa matsayin Krauss mai karo da kansa da rudani, inda aka nuna cewa ya kasa gina wata matsaya ta tunani mai ƙarfi. Matsalolinsa suna farawa ne da cewa yana watsi da ainihin ra'ayoyin hankali. Watsi da su yana kai ga barin amincewa ba kawai ga kayan lura ba, har ma da rashin amincewa da kanta hanyar kimiyya. Hanyar kimiyya ita ce kawai hanyar samun ilimi, a cewar ra'ayin kimiyyanci mai tsanani (extreme scientism). Amma hanyar kimiyya tana dogara ne da zato waɗanda ba za a iya tabbatar da shaidarsu ta hanyar kimiyyar kanta ba; in ba haka ba, za ta kai ga zagaye-zagaye (circularity). Matsayin cewa ilimi zai iya dogara ne kawai akan bayanan halitta da na kimiyya, matsayi ne mai karo da kansa wanda ba za a iya ɗaukarsa a matsayin karɓabbe ta fuskar hankali ba. Amma me za mu yi idan wannan irin suka aka miƙa ta ga waɗanda suke musun ginshiƙan hankali na asali, alhali kuma – kamar yadda kake gani – suka ɗin ta dogara ne a kansu? Ta yaya zai zama mai gamsarwa ga waɗanda ba sa ganin wata matsala wajen karɓar cewa duniya ta halicci kanta? Idan suna shirye su karɓi irin wannan 27

The famous atheist Lawrence Krauss has stated on multiple occasions that the human mind is primitive and evolving – in Darwinist terms – to safely interact with the dangers in the savannah; however, they are minds that are not necessarily able to understand the nature of this universe or existential reality. Therefore, he claims, it is necessary that the world is understood through the world itself – via observation and empiricism, without relying on anything known as rational concepts, let alone referring to them as arbiters of truth. Truth, he claims, is only that which we can access via observation and the senses according to the scientific method, no matter how strange it may appear – or contradictory even – to our instinctive minds. Krauss mentioned this in his book A Universe from Nothing: Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing, which is based on the idea that even though the universe came from nothing, it can create itself from itself as per the laws of physics. This assertion with the detail it entails is extremely problematic, as it leads to multiple cognitive problems that are extremely dangerous. Some of this cognitive disorder became apparent in Krauss’s debate with Hamza Tzortzis, Islam or Atheism: Which Makes More Sense? In this debate, the self-conflicting and confused position of Krauss was exposed, as it was revealed that he was unable to construct any sound cognitive viewpoint. Its problems begin in that it discards basic rational concepts. Discarding them leads to the abandonment of not only trust in the tools of observation, but also a loss of trust in the scientific method itself. The scientific method is the sole path to knowledge, as per the view purported by extreme scientism. The scientific method is based on assertions whose evidence cannot be demonstrated through the scientific method itself; otherwise, it will lead to circularity. The position that knowledge can only be based on natural and scientific information is a self-contradictory one that cannot be deemed rationally acceptable. However, what are we to do if this type of objection is directed at those who deny basic rational concepts, when – as you can see – the objection is based on them? How can it be convincing to those who do not see any problem in accepting that the universe created itself? If they are willing to accept this type of 27

Ra'ayi, to me, abin da ke hana su da'awar cewa "hanyar kimiyya daidai ce saboda... hanyar kimiyya kanta" shi ne cewa wannan zai zama zagayawa cikin hujja, kuma irin wannan tunani yana kaiwa ga sofisanci. Hakika, wasu masu musun Allah sun fada cikin irin wannan tunanin.

view, then what is stopping them from claiming that ‘the scientific method is correct because of…the scientific method’? There is little doubt that the proposal of such a conceptualisation leads to sophistry. Indeed, some atheists have fallen victim to this type of mentality.

A wani lokaci, na shiga tattaunawa da wasu matasa waɗanda akidar rashin imani ta shafa. Tattaunawar ta kai mu ga muhawarar salon Yammacin duniya a kan wannan maudu'i, don haka na ga ya zama wajibi a mayar da tattaunawar zuwa wani matsayi na bai ɗaya. Na fara magana a kan hanyoyin samun ilimi na ɗan Adam. Na ce, a takaice, waɗannan hanyoyi guda uku ne:

On one occasion, I was in a discussion with some youth who were afflicted by atheist ideas. The discussion led us to Western-style polemics on the subject, so I saw that it was necessary for the discussion to be brought back to a common ground. I started to speak on the human sources of information. I said that, broadly speaking, these sources are three:

1. Gabobin jiki biyar.

1. The senses.

Dabarar Ma'ana (Logic)

2. Logic.

3. Bayanan da aka watsa

3. Transmitted information.

Imagine how surprised I was when I learned that, according to them, the source of acquiring knowledge is only sensory, not rational matters (whether theoretical or innate)! I wanted to be certain that this problem really existed in their way of thinking. I asked them a number of questions to determine their convictions on the subject, and why they would propose such a fundamental principle. What I said was the following: 'One basic rational concept is that "part < whole". Imagine we have an orange in front of us and we split it into quarters. Would that one quarter be smaller than, equal to, or larger than the whole orange?' I was shocked when they replied: 'We cannot know until we see this orange and cut it ourselves.' I told them, 'At home, I have a book titled Majmūʿ Fatāwā Ibn Taymiyyah in 37 volumes. Is the first volume smaller than, equal to, or larger than the whole collection?' They said, 'We would not know until we visited you at your home and saw it.' There was a coffee pot in front of us. I said to one of them, 'Lift the pot up.' When he raised it, I said, 'Will you be able to raise the coffee cup, which is lighter, based on your knowledge that you can lift something heavier?' He reached out to the cup, and I said to him, 'I do not want you to experiment.' He said, 'I would not know the answer until I experiment.' I finished my line of questioning by asking one of them, 'Do you exist or not?' He said, 'I exist.' I said, 'Is it possible that science in the future will be able to prove that you are in fact non-existent?' He said, 'It is possible.' The discussion ended there.

Imagine how surprised I was when I learned that the source of gaining information according to them was sensory only, not rational issues (whether theoretical or instinctive)! I wanted to be certain that this problem actually existed in their mindset. I asked them a number of questions to ascertain their convictions on the topic, and why they would propose such a key principle. What I said was the following: ‘One basic rational concept is that “part < whole”. Imagine we have an orange in front of us and we split it into quarters. Would that one quarter be smaller than, equal to, or larger than the whole orange?’ I was shocked when they replied: ‘We cannot know until we see this orange and cut it ourselves.’ I told them, ‘At home, I have a book titled as Majmūʿ Fatāwā Ibn Taymiyyah in 37 volumes. Is the first volume smaller than, equal to, or larger than the whole collection?’ They said, ‘We would not know until we visited you at your home and saw it.’ There was a coffee pot in front of us. I said to one of them, ‘Lift the pot up.’ When he raised it, I said, ‘Will you be able to raise the coffee cup – which is lighter – based on your knowledge that you can lift something heavier?’ He reached out to the cup – I said to him, ‘I do not want you to experiment.’ He said, ‘I would not know the answer until I experiment.’ I finished my line of questioning by asking one of them, ‘Do you exist or not?’ He said, ‘I exist.’ I said, ‘Is it possible that science in the future will be able to prove that you are in fact non-existent?’ He said, ‘It is possible.’ The discussion ended at this.

Mu dai, akwai wasu daga cikinsu da ba su yarda da yadda abokan aikinsu ke musun asalin ra'ayoyin hankali ba, suna ganin cewa irin wannan tunani da tushe zai kawo ƙarshen muhawara. Sai dai abokansa sun ƙi wannan ra'ayi. Gaskiya ne cewa wasu daga cikin shawarwarinsu ba lallai ne sun samo asali daga taurin kai ko girman kai ba. A maimakon haka, sun dogara ne da bayanai, wasu daga cikinsu sun koma ga ƙa'idar cewa ilimi ba za a iya kafa shi ta hanyar ilhami ba sai ta hanyar gabobin jiki. Haka kuma, suna dogara ga ikirari na kimiyya – musamman a fannin ilimin kimiyyar ƙwayoyin zarra (quantum physics) – wanda ya ruɗe su har suka gaskata cewa babu hanyar haɗa ikirari na hankali da na kimiyya.

To be fair, there were some among them who did not agree with their fellows’ denial of basic rational concepts, and were of the view that this type of theorising and foundational basis would end the discussion. However, his friends were opposed to this. The truth is that some of their proposals did not necessarily arise from obstinacy or haughtiness. Rather, they based this on data, some of which goes back to the rule that knowledge cannot be instinctively established without the intermediary of the senses. They also rely on scientific assertions – especially in the field of quantum physics – that duped them into believing that there is no way to marry rational and scientific assertions.

Duk wanda ya karanta ilimin kimiyyar zarra (quantum physics) zai san yadda yake da ruɗani, da kuma yadda yake da wahala ga zuciyar ɗan adam ya kewaya bangarorinsa da yawa. John Wheeler ya ce, ‘Idan ba ka rikice gaba ɗaya da injiniyar zarra (quantum mechanics) ba, to ba ka fahimce ta ba.’49 Roger Penrose ya ce, ‘Injiniyar zarra (quantum mechanics) ba ta da wata ma'ana ko kaɗan.’50 Richard Feynman ya ce, ‘Ina ganin zan iya cewa cikin aminci cewa babu wanda ya fahimci injiniyar zarra (quantum mechanics).’51

Whoever has read quantum physics will know how ambiguous it is, and how complex it is for a human mind to navigate its many aspects. John Wheeler said, ‘If you are not completely confused by quantum mechanics, you do not understand it.’49 Roger Penrose said, ‘Quantum mechanics makes absolutely no sense.’50 Richard Feynman said, ‘I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics.’51

Ba na tsammanin ya dace mutum ya yi watsi da ilimin da ya bayyana kansa da ƙimarsa ta zahiri saboda ilimin halitta kawai ba. Abin da ya wajaba shi ne a sanya ilimin halitta ya kasance ƙarƙashin ilimin da ya bayyana kansa; duk abin da yake daga cikin na farko yana da ruɗani ko kuma yana sabawa na ƙarshen, a yar da shi. Dole ne mu yi imani cewa mun jahilci hakikanin abubuwa; idan wannan jahilci ya ƙare, to tabbas abin da ake gani da taɓawa zai dace da abin da hankali ya tabbatar. Idan ba a bi wannan hanya ba, za mu zama ba tare da wani ilimi ba, ko na taɓawa ko na hankali. Don haka an riga an tabbatar sarai cewa akwai wata matsala ta gaske da ke fuskantar yawancin masu musun Allah, cewa akwai wani ɗan rashin iya tare da hakan a wajensu wajen sasanta waɗannan abubuwa biyu, wanda hakan ke kai su ga kammalawa masu haɗari ƙwarai.

I believe that it is not proper for a person to discard self-evident knowledge and their objective value just for natural knowledge. What is incumbent is to have natural knowledge governed by self-evident knowledge – whatever from the former is ambiguous or contradicts the latter should be cast aside. We must believe that we are ignorant of reality; if that ignorance is dispelled, then most certainly the sensory and tangible would be in alignment with the rational. Without this approach, we will be left without any knowledge, whether tangible or rational. It has thus been conclusively proven that there is a real problem facing many atheists, and that there is a degree of inability on their part to reconcile the two, leading to extremely dangerous conclusions.

A cikin littafinsa mai suna The Grand Design, wanda ya rubuta tare da Leonard Mlodinow, Stephen Hawking ya ce: ‘Hakika, kamar yadda yawancin ra’ayoyin kimiyyar yau suke, sai ya bayyana kamar yana saba wa hankali na yau da kullum. Amma hankali na yau da kullum yana dogara ne da abubuwan da muke fuskanta kullum, ba a kan duniya kamar yadda ake bayyana ta ta hanyar al’ajabin fasahohi, irin waɗanda ke ba mu damar duba zurfin zarra ko komawa zuwa farkon duniya.’52 Matsalar da ke cikin wannan magana ita ce rashin bayyana ma’anar ‘hankali na yau da kullum’. Shin yana nufin an ƙi ainihin ra’ayoyin hankali ne, ko kuwa yana nufin kawai abubuwan da ba za su yiwu ba bisa dokokin yanayi (nomological impossibilities)?

In his book The Grand Design, which was co-authored with Leonard Mlodinow, Stephen Hawking said, ‘Indeed, like many notions in today’s science, it appears to violate common sense. But common sense is based upon everyday experience, not upon the universe as it is revealed through the marvels of technologies, such as those that allow us to gaze deep into the atom or back to the early universe.’52 The problem with this passage is the ambiguity surrounding the idea of ‘common sense’. Does it mean that basic rational concepts are to be denied, or does it simply mean nomological impossibilities?

Mutumin zai iya zaton cewa wani abu da ba zai yiwu ba bisa dokokin halitta (nomological) shi ma ba zai yiwu ba a hankali, sannan daga baya ya gano cewa ba haka yake ba a hankali. Duk da haka, akwai wata jumla ta ra'ayoyi na asali da ke bayyana a matsayin mafi girma fiye da wanzuwar mutum kanta. Irin wannan sani na asali ba a samunsa ta kawai gogewar ɗan adam. Saboda haka kuskure ne a musanta abubuwan da ba za su yiwu ba a ma'anar hankali (logical), wato yanayin da ke kai ga sabani, kamar murabba'in da'ira, jikin da ke tafiya amma ba ya motsi, ko wani abu da ba ya wanzuwa kuma ba ya rashin wanzuwa, da sauransu. Irin waɗannan hotuna ba su cikin rukunin abubuwan da ba za su yiwu ba bisa dokokin halitta, don haka fahimtarmu game da abubuwan da ba za su yiwu ba bisa dokokin halitta ba ta komawa ga gogewarmu ta ɗan adam kawai. Maimakon haka, waɗannan abubuwa ne da ba za a iya tunanin su a duniyar waje ba kwata-kwata.

A person might mistakenly assume that something nomologically impossible is also rationally impossible, only to later find out that it is not rationally impossible. However, there is a package of basic instinctive concepts that appear to be higher than the very existence of man. Such instinctive information is not gained by mere human experience. This is why it is an error to deny logical impossibilities, which in reality are those scenarios that lead to a contradiction, such as a squared circle, a moving motionless body, something that is neither in existence nor in non-existence, etc. These sorts of images are not from the family of nomological impossibilities – such that our understanding of nomological impossibilities goes back solely to our human experience. Rather, these are logical impossibilities that cannot ever be envisaged in the external world at all.

Matsalar da ke cikin ɓangaren Hawking an ƙara bayyana ta da abin da ya ambata a cikin littafin guda: ‘Ilimin kimiyyar ƙwayoyin zarra (quantum physics) na iya zama kamar yana raunana ra'ayin cewa halitta tana tafiya ne bisa dokoki, amma lamarin ba haka yake ba.’53 Idan wannan ya zama kamar haka, to me ya sa ba haka yake ba a gaskiyar lamari? Dalilin hakan shi ne abin da ya bayyana kamar sabani za a mayar da shi ga wasu ra'ayoyi da tabbatarwa, ta yadda matsalar sabani za ta warware. Ɗaya daga cikin waɗannan ra'ayoyi shi ne ra'ayoyin hankali na asali.

The problem with Hawking’s passage is further clarified with what he mentions in the same book: ‘Quantum physics might seem to undermine the idea that nature is governed by laws, but that is not the case.’53 If this appears to be the case, then why is it not like that then in actual truth? The reason for that is what appears to be contradictory would be referred back to other concepts and assertions, so that the problem of contradiction is solved. One of these concepts are the instinctive rational concepts.

Gaskiya ita ce cewa ilimin kimiyyar ƙwayoyin zarra (quantum physics), tare da dukkan tasirinsa na kimiyya da na hankali, fanni ne mai muhimmanci na nazari. Yana bukatar haɗuwar ƙwararru da yawa domin a bayyana gaskiyar iƙirarin da ake yi a fannin kimiyyar physics, don a samar da amsoshi ga ra'ayoyin da waɗannan iƙirari suka tayar.

The truth is that quantum physics, with all its scientific and rational implications, is an important field of study. It requires the convergence of many specialists to clarify the reality of assertions made in physics in order to offer answers to concepts brought up by those assertions.

Matsalar da masu kafirci ke fuskanta game da ka'idojin hankali na asali ta samo asali, a mafi yawan ta, daga kallon wanzuwarmu da suke yi na abin duniya da kuma na Darwin. Idan za a iya warware tsaiko da ake samu sakamakon ra'ayin cewa abin duniya yana iya samar da hankali, kuma cewa juyin halittar Darwin yana iya kawo wannan samfurin, to tambaya guda da Darwinism ke gabatarwa game da iyawar hankalinmu ita ce: Shin dabi'a ta samar da hankula a gare mu, wadanda za su iya kaiwa ga hakikanin abubuwa, ko kuwa ta samar da su domin mu rayu mu tsira, ba tare da la'akari da yiwuwar bayyana ainihin yanayin abubuwa ba? Shin zai yiwu hankalinmu ya gaya mana wani abu kuma ya sa mu dauka cewa wajibi ne a gare mu domin mu rayu mu tsira, alhali kuwa hakan na iya zama kawai mafarki?

The problem faced by atheists vis-à-vis basic rational principles goes back, for the large part, to their materialistic and Darwinist outlook on our existence. If we could negotiate the deadlock caused by the notion that matter is able to produce logic, and that Darwinist evolution is able to create this product, then one question that Darwinism poses vis-à-vis our rational capabilities is this: Did nature evolve and develop minds for us that are able to reach objective realities, or did it evolve and develop them for us to live and survive, regardless of the possibilities in revealing the actual true nature of things? Is it possible that our minds tell us something and make it out as if it is necessary for us so that we can live and survive, even though this might just be a fantasy?

Wannan yana ɗaya daga cikin manyan matsaloli na Darwinism. Yana kai ga manyan matsaloli a cikin tattaunawar atheist gabaɗaya kan batutuwa da dama, kamar asalin imani ga Allah, sha'awar addini, jin ɗabi'a, da kuma yanayin son zaɓi (free will), da sauransu. Wannan saboda dukkan waɗannan ana bayyana su ta hanyar ra'ayin Darwin, wanda ya dogara ko dai a kan a) fa'idodin rayuwa ga halittu masu rai, ko b) dalilan wanzuwarsu idan waɗannan fa'idodin ba su ne babban manufa ba, ko ana ɗaukar su marasa muhimmanci, amma kawai abin da ya biyo baya ne na tsarin zaɓin halitta (natural selection) don rayuwa da tsira da ɗan Adam. Ba Logic ne farkon wanda ya yi tunanin haka ba. Yanayi – bisa ga ra'ayin Darwinism – ya ƙirƙiri hankalinmu domin mu tsira. Game da cewa waɗannan hankula suna iya koyon gaskiyar zahiri, to wannan abin da ya biyo baya ne idan yana wanzuwa; in ba haka ba, za a iya ɗauka cewa hankalinmu ya yaudare mu, kawai domin mu tsira. Wannan babbar matsala ce da Darwin kansa ya gane. Ya bayyana rikicewarsa game da batun, yana cewa: 'Amma tare da ni koyaushe wannan shakka mai ban tsoro takan taso ko imanin tunanin mutum, wanda aka samo daga tunanin dabbobi marasa hankali, yana da wata daraja ko kuma abin dogaro ne kwata-kwata.' 54 The Grand Design, p. 93.

This is one of the deep problems with Darwinism. It leads to wide problems in general atheist discourse across a number of issues, such as the innateness of faith in God, the desire for religion, the sense of morality, the tendency of free will, etc. This is because all of these are explained through the Darwinist lens, that is based on either a) the advantages of living for living beings or b) the causes of their existence if those advantages are not primarily intended or are considered inconsequential, but are rather just a by-product of the natural selection process for life and the survival of humankind. Logic is not the first to think this. Nature – as per the Darwinist view – evolved our minds so we can survive. As for the fact that these minds are able to learn about reality, then that is a by-product if it exists; otherwise, it is quite possible to assume that our minds have duped us, simply so that we may survive. This deep problem was something acknowledged by Darwin himself. He expressed his confusion on the issue, saying, ‘But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy.’54 The 53 The Grand Design, p. 93.

54 Darwin Correspondence Project, Letter to William Graham, 3 July 1881, https://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/DCP-LETT-13230.xml 30

54 Darwin Correspondence Project, Letter to William Graham, 3 July 1881, https://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/DCP-LETT-13230.xml 30

Ƙin yarda da raina waɗannan gaskiyar da suka wajaba kuma na hankali – ko waɗancan gaskiyar da ke bayyana sosai a wasu lokuta, ko waɗancan gaskiyar da ba za a iya musantawa ba amma kuma sukan ɓoye ta yanayinsu – ya haifar da mummunar adawa da falsafa da ka'idar hankali, ko da kuwa an gudanar da ita bisa tsarin tunanin addini ko a'a.

rejection and downplaying of these rational and necessary truths – whether they are those truths that are sometimes incredibly self-evident, or those undeniable truths that are somewhat reserved by nature – has created a severe pushback against philosophy and rational theory, whether that is governed by the religious mindset or not.

Shi ya sa mutane da dama, a yanayi daban-daban, suka bayyana cewa falsafa ta mutu kuma ba ta da wata amfani. Wata shahararriyar magana ita ce ta Hawking a farkon littafinsa The Great Design: ‘A al'adance waɗannan tambayoyi ne na falsafa, amma falsafa ta mutu. Falsafa ba ta ci gaba da ci gaban kimiyya na zamani ba, musamman a fannin physics. Masana kimiyya ne suka zama masu ɗaukar fitilar gano abubuwa a neman ilimi.’55 PZ Myers ya ce, ‘Yawancin falsafa na iya lalata ka.’56 Krauss kuma ya ce, Falsafa fage ce da, abin takaici, take tuna mani da wannan tsohuwar barkwancin Woody Allen, "waɗanda ba sa iya aiki, suna koyarwa, waɗanda ba sa iya koyarwa, suna koyar da motsa jiki." Kuma mafi munin ɓangaren falsafa shi ne falsafar kimiyya; masu karanta ayyukan masana falsafar kimiyya, kamar yadda na sani, wasu masana falsafar kimiyya ne kawai. Ba shi da wani tasiri a kan physics ko kaɗan, kuma ina shakkar cewa sauran masana falsafa suna karanta shi saboda yana da matuƙar fasaha. Don haka yana da wahala a fahimci abin da ke tabbatar da shi. Don haka zan ce wannan rikici yana faruwa ne saboda mutanen da ke cikin falsafa suna jin barazana, kuma suna da cikakken hakkin jin barazanar, domin kimiyya tana ci gaba amma falsafa ba ta yi.57

This is why many people, in various contexts, have declared that philosophy is dead and offers no benefit. One famous quotation is by Hawking in the beginning of The Great Design: ‘Traditionally these are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics. Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge.’55 PZ Myers said, ‘A lot of philosophy can destroy you.’56 Krauss said, Philosophy is a field that, unfortunately, reminds me of that old Woody Allen joke, “those that can’t do, teach, and those that can’t teach, teach gym.” And the worst part of philosophy is the philosophy of science; the only people, as far as I can tell, that read work by philosophers of science are other philosophers of science. It has no impact on physics what so ever, and I doubt that other philosophers read it because it’s fairly technical. And so it’s really hard to understand what justifies it. And so I’d say that this tension occurs because people in philosophy feel threatened, and they have every right to feel threatened, because science progresses and philosophy doesn’t.57

Wannan kin yarda da matsayin hankali, tare da zato-zato na ilhami da na ka'ida da take yi, idan aka hada shi da abubuwan da ke biye da shi, to yana kai ga sophistry (karkatar da hujja), kamar yadda aka bayyana a baya. A cikin inuwarsa mai duhu, duk wata damar samun ilimi da fahimta za ta rushe. Ba shakka, zai hallaka ka'idar da ilimin kimiyyar halitta da na gwaji ke tsaye a kanta.

This denial of the space for rationality, along with its instinctive and theoretical assertions, when taken with its implications, leads to sophistry, as has been explained before. In its dark shadow, any possibility to access cognition and knowledge would fall apart. Naturally, it would destroy the rule upon which the natural and empirical sciences are founded.

Abin mamaki ne cewa duk da cewa suna girmama tare da wuce gona da iri wajen muhimmancin kimiyyar gwaji (empirical science), suna aiki ba tare da sani ba bisa wasu tunani da ra'ayoyi da aka riga aka yi tunaninsu, waɗanda kimiyyar gwaji ba za ta iya tabbatar da su ba. Misali na wannan shi ne farkon tunani cewa duniya tana da gaskiyar da ta bambanta da fahimtarmu, cewa za a iya nazarinta, cewa tana bin wani tsari na dokoki, kuma waɗannan dokoki ba sa canzawa. Don haka, duk abin da ake ɗauka a yau a matsayin dokar halitta, gobe zai zama gaskiyar da aka karɓa. Aiki bisa tsarin tunani da aka riga aka yi ba abu ne mai ban mamaki ko mai wahalar tunani ba. Abin da ya fi ban dariya shi ne cewa ba za su iya raba kansu da gaskiyar hankali ta dabi'a ba, duk da cewa suna da'awar ƙin su. Kawai yin tunani bisa hujja yana nuna cewa suna karɓar ra'ayin dangantakar sanadi (causality), da kuma cewa akwai alaƙa tsakanin hujja da abin da ta nuna, domin hujja ita ce ainihin sanadin sanin abin da take nunawa.

It is strange that even though they magnify and exaggerate the importance of empirical science, they unknowingly operate from a set of preconceived notions that cannot be proven by empirical science. An example of this is the initial starting point that the universe has a reality that is separate from our perception, that it can be studied, that it is subjected to a particular set of laws, and that these laws are fixed. So, whatever is considered to be from the natural laws today will become an accepted reality tomorrow. Operating from a preconceived framework is neither strange nor hard to envisage. What is more amusing is that they cannot divorce themselves from instinctive rational truths, even though they claim to deny them. Merely exercising the process of evidence-based reasoning speaks to the fact that they accept the concept of causality, and that there is a link between evidence and that which it points to, because evidence really is a cause of knowing that which the evidence points towards.

Wani tattaunawa mai ban sha'awa tsakanin Frank Turek da wani mai kafirci mai suna Michael, wanda aka samu a cikin wani laccar Turek a Jami'ar Wisconsin-Madison, mai kafircin ya bayyana shakkunsa a fili game da kasancewar ra'ayoyin hankali na asali (na dabi'a).

In an interesting discussion between Frank Turek and an atheist (Michael) found in one of Turek’s lectures at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the atheist explicitly doubted the existence of instinctive rational concepts:

Michael: Ina so in ce dokokin hankali ba su wanzuwa ba kenan.

Michael: I would argue that the laws of logic really don’t exist then.

Frank: Don't so kake cewa da gaske suna wanzuwa.

Frank: So you’re saying that they do really exist.

Michael: A'a.

Michael: No.

Frank: Eh, kana cewa suna yi.

Frank: Yes, you’re saying they do.

Michael: Yaya zan ce suna yi?

Michael: How am I saying they do?.

Frank: Domin kana amfani da dokar rashin karo da juna (law of non-contradiction) a yanzu haka don ka ce ni ba daidai nake ba.

Frank: Because you’re using the law of non-contradiction right now to say that I’m wrong.

Dokar rashin karo da juna – wacce ta ce ra'ayoyi biyu masu sabanin juna ba za su iya zama gaskiya a lokaci guda kuma a ma'ana guda ba – na ɗaya daga cikin ginshiƙan ilimin ma'ana. Duk da yin amfani da wannan doka da wasu, Michael ya ci gaba da iƙirarin cewa dokokin ma'ana ba su wanzuwa da gaske. Ya yi kama da yana cewa dokokin ma'ana kawai yarjejeniya ce ta ɗan adam; cewa mutane kawai suna ƙirƙirar waɗannan dokoki a zukatansu, amma ba sa wanzuwa a zahiri a wajen zukatansu. Masu kafirta da yawa sun riƙe wannan matsayi, ciki har da Dr. Stein. Sa'ad da na tambayi Michael ko wannan ita ce matsayinsa, ya ce "Eh." Sai na tambaye shi, "Kafin a sami wani ɗan adam a Duniya, shin jumlar, 'Babu mutane a Duniya', gaskiya ce?" Bayan dogon shiru, Michael ya ba da amsa mai karkacewa. Bayan an matsa masa, ya amince da rashin son rai cewa jumlar "wataƙila" za ta zama gaskiya (duk da haka ya ci gaba da riƙe ra'ayin cewa dokokin ma'ana yarjejeniyar ɗan adam ce kawai). To, tabbas jumlar za ta zama gaskiya. Kuma tunda babu zukatan ɗan adam da za su tsara ta a hankali, dokokin ma'ana ba za su iya zama yarjejeniyar ɗan adam kawai ba. Bugu da ƙari, akwai wasu dalilai da yawa da ke nuna cewa dokokin ma'ana ba yarjejeniyar ɗan adam ba ne, cewa suna wanzuwa ba tare da dogaro da zukatan ɗan adam ba.58

The law of non-contradiction – which says that opposite ideas cannot both be true at the same time and in the same sense – is one of the fundamental laws of logic. Despite using that law and others, Michael continued to assert that the laws of logic don’t really exist. It sounded like he was saying that the laws of logic are just a human convention; that we human beings simply invent these laws in our minds but they don’t really exist outside of our minds. Several atheists have held this position, including Dr. Stein. When I asked Michael if that was his position, he said “Yes.” So I then asked him, “Before there were any humans on the Earth, was the statement, ‘There are no human beings on the Earth’, true?” Following a long pause, Michael gave a meandering response. After some prompting, he reluctantly admitted that the statement “likely” would be true (yet he continued to cling to the idea that the laws of logic were mere human conventions). Well, of course the statement would be true. And since there were no human minds to conceptualize it, the laws of logic cannot be a mere human convention. In addition, there are several other reasons to believe that the laws of logic are not human conventions that they exist independently of human minds.58

Wannan tattaunawa tana nuna matsalar masu kafirci wajen tantance yanayin ra'ayoyin da aka haife su da su a cikin kansu. Shin suna da manufa kuma cikakku ne, ko kuwa suna da alaƙa ne da hankulan mutum? Dangane da abubuwan da aka faɗa a baya, masu kafirci da yawa sun ce ba wajibi ba ne a bi waɗannan ra'ayoyin na dabi'a. Ma'ana, sun bayyana a fili cewa suna adawa da su saboda ra'ayoyin kimiyyar halitta da suka shafi ilimin kimiyyar ƙwayoyin zarra (quantum physics) da sauran fannoni. Suna gabatar da cewa gaskiyar zahiri na iya kasancewa, ko kuma haƙiƙa take, a sabani da ilimin da aka haife shi da shi da kuma na dabi'a. Irin wannan iƙirari yana da sakamako da dama kuma yana da haɗari: cewa ainihin ƙa'idodin hankali na asali kawai sakamakon aikin tunanin mu ne, ba tare da wata gaskiya ta waje mai manufa da ke da alaƙa da su ba. Hulɗar ɗan Adam wajen samar da gamsuwa a asalinta yunƙuri ne na kawo gamsuwa ga kowane mutum bisa tushen fagen tunani guda ɗaya. Ƙa'idar da wannan tunani ya dogara a kanta dole ne ta kasance ta dabi'a kuma ta duniya baki ɗaya, ba ta dangantaka da wani mutum ba. Tare da wannan ƙa'ida ne za a iya haɗa daidaiton tunanin ɓangarorin biyu don samar da gamsuwa. Idan babu ita, kowane mutum zai kasance a kulle a cikin duniyar tunaninsa, ba zai iya yin mu'amala mai amfani da wani ba, domin ma'anonin da suka wuce su duka – waɗanda ta hanyarsu za su iya kulla mu'amala da wani matakin kamanceceniya – ba za su kasance ba.

This discussion reveals the atheistic dilemma in determining the nature of innate concepts in and of themselves. So are they objective and absolute, or are they relative based on a person’s senses? In light of previous statements, many atheists state it is not necessary to follow these instinctive concepts. In fact, they explicitly mention they are opposed to them because of ideas from natural science related to quantum physics and other fields. They set out that reality might be, or indeed is, in conflict with innate and instinctive knowledge. The implications of this sort of assertion – that basic rational concepts are merely a result of the workings of our minds, with no external objective truth associated with them – are numerous and dangerous. Having human interaction to bring about conviction is at its essence an attempt to bring about conviction to every person on the basis of a common cognitive playing field. The rule upon which this cognition is built must be natural and universal, not relative to x person. With this rule, it is possible to bridge the cognitive identity between the two sides to bring about conviction. Without this, each person would remain confined to their own cognitive realm, unable to fruitfully interact with the next person, as those meanings that transcend both of them – by which they would have been able to forge interaction with a degree of commonality – would be absent.

Idan waɗancan ra'ayoyi na fitila da ke cikin fahimta ba komai ba ne face tsarin tunanin ɗan adam, to kowace ra'ayi ta ɗan adam ma za ta zama tsarin tunaninmu, har ilimi ya koma dangantaka kuma. A wannan hali, za mu rasa ikon da kwarin gwiwar cewa za mu iya samun tabbaci a kusan kowane abu. Wannan zai zama babbar matsala. Ba tare da gaskiyoyin dole waɗanda ilimin ka'idoji zai dogara a kansu ba, ba za a sami hanya da za ta bayar da falsafa mai daidaito ba, wadda ta hanyarta hujja bisa shaida ko amfani da dalilai za su yiwu. Sakamakon irin wannan ra'ayi shi ne mutum zai karkata zuwa ga hanyar masu yaudara wadda ke watsi da amincewa da duk ilimin ɗan adam. Irin wannan iƙirari ne yanayin da ƙarya za ta iya samun karɓuwa. Yana cewa duk ilimi dangantaka ne, cewa babu hanyar samun bayanai tabbatattu da kammalallu, kuma babu wanda ya mallaki gaskiya ta zahiri. Irin wannan iƙirari yana sabawa kansa, domin yana ɗauka cewa ya kamata ya zama alƙali a kan kansa, wanda hakan ke fallasa ƙaryarsa da kuskurensa. Watsi da fahimtar hankali na fitila da yanayinsu na zahiri shi ne, a gaskiya, watsi da: (a) kowane aikin hankalin ɗan adam, (b) yiwuwar hulɗar ɗan adam, (c) ikon shawo kan juna, da (d) ilimin kimiyyar halitta na gwaji. Dukkan waɗannan abubuwa za su iya ci gaba da wanzuwa ne kawai da ƙa'idar da ta yarda da fahimtar fitila kuma ta tabbatar da girmanta wanda ya wuce wanzuwar ɗan adam. Gaskiya ita ce irin waɗannan iƙirari suna fitowa ta halitta ne daga karɓar ra'ayin masu musun Allah. Ba tare da tabbatar da Mahalicci ga wannan duniya ba – Mahalicci da za a bayyana shi da cikakkiyar kamala – ba zai yiwu a tabbatar da gaskiya cikakka ba. Idan kuma ba za mu iya tabbatar da gaskiyar da ba ta canzawa ba, to babu damar tabbatar da wanzuwar ilimi mai cikakken tabbaci kuma na dabi'a, domin a dabi'ar ilimin dabi'a yana da cikakken tabbaci, ba ya dogara da lokaci, wuri, muhalli ko mutane. Irin wannan ilimi yana sama da wanzuwar mutane. Dokar rashin karo-karo (law of non-contradiction) tana da wajibi kuma gaskiya ce ta duniya baki ɗaya, ko mutum ya wanzu ko bai wanzu ba. Ƙa'idar dalili (principle of causality) gaskiya ce mara canzawa tun kafin mutum ya samu. Haka ma batun cewa 'sashe < jimla', da sauransu. Babu wata hanya ta tabbatar da waɗannan gaskiyoyi marasa canzawa sai an tabbatar da wanzuwa mara canzawa, wanda shi ne Allah.

Had those instinctive concepts been merely the construct of the human mind, every human idea would also be the construct of our minds, leading knowledge to become relative again. In that case, we would lose both the power and the confidence of ever possibly gaining conviction in virtually anything. This would be a catastrophic problem. Without necessary truths upon which theoretical knowledge can be built, there would be no pathway to offer a coherent philosophical outlook through which the process of evidence-based reasoning or employing proofs would be feasible. The consequences of such an outlook are that one would end up adopting a sophist approach that discards trust in all human knowledge. Such an assertion is the exact environment in which that false claim can gain credence. It asserts that all knowledge is relative, that there is no pathway to gain definitive and conclusive cognitive information, and that nobody possesses objective reality. Such an assertion is self-contradictory, for it assumes that it should be the arbiter unto itself, which exposes its falsehood and error. Disregarding the instinctive rational concepts and their objective nature is in reality to disregard a) every engagement of the human mind, b) the possibility of human interaction, c) the ability to convince one another, and d) the natural empirical sciences. All of these concepts can only survive with the rule that acknowledges instinctive concepts and affirms their higher value that transcends human existence. The truth is that these types of assertions are a natural overflow from adopting the atheist viewpoint. Without affirming a Maker for this universe – a Maker that would be described with absolute perfection – the possibility of affirming absolute truths would not be possible. And if we are unable to affirm absolute truths, there is no chance for proving the existence of absolute and instinctive knowledge, as it is in the nature of instinctive knowledge to be absolute and agnostic of time, place, environment, and persons. Such knowledge is indeed above and beyond the existence of humans. The law of non-contradiction is both necessary and universally true, whether man exists or not. The principle of causality was an absolute truth before man ever came into existence. The same applies to the notion that ‘part < whole’, etc. There is no pathway to affirm these absolutes without affirming an absolute existence, which is Allah .

Mutumin da ya musanta wanzuwarsa ba zai iya tabbatar da wanzuwar wata gaskiya cikakkiya ba. Ko da yake yana bayar da sulhu ta hanyar da'awar "cikakken alaƙa" (relative absolutism) a wasu fannoni na ilimi da kimiyya, wannan matsaya ba daidai ba ce gaba ɗaya, domin ba ta da ƙa'idar da ilimi zai iya dogara a kanta tun farko. Duk da haka, a zahiri, wannan matsaya tana daidaita da tunanin masu musun Allah, wanda ta hanyarsa ba zai yiwu a gabatar da wani ilimi mai ma'ana da na dabi'a ta fuskar falsafa ba. Wannan saboda tsarin tunani na irin waɗannan maganganu, da kuma tabbatar da su ta hanyar hujja, ba zai yiwu ba sai da imani da wanzuwar Allah. Bisa wannan, za mu fahimci zurfi da tasirin maganar malamai: "Sanin Allah shi ne tushen sanin kowane abu." Na dade ina tunani sosai a kan wannan magana a cikin neman fahimtar gaskiya, girma, da arzikin ma'ana da ke cikin wannan hangen nesa, da alaƙar sanin Allah da duk sauran ilimi. Bayan fahimtar waɗannan abubuwa, ya bayyana a gare ni cewa abin da ake nufi shi ne: duk wannan ilimi a zahiri reshe ne na sanin Allah. Duk wanda bai fahimci wanzuwarsa ba, ba zai iya kafa wata ka'idar tunani mai daidaito ta falsafa ko ta hankali da za ta bayyana mana dalilin wanzuwar wannan ilimi da yadda za a iya samun sa ba. Dangane da haka, Ibn Taimiyya ya ce: "Sanin Shi (Allah) shi ne mafi daraja a cikin dukkan ilimi. Shi ne manufa, ƙarshe, kammalawa, da tushen dukkan ilimi, ko da yake ilimin wani abu banda Shi na iya zuwa farko, ko kuma ya zama mataki zuwa sanin Shi. Sanin Shi – baya ga kasancewarsa mafi ɗaukaka, mafi tsarki, kuma mafi amfani – wata larura ce. Bawa ba zai samu adalci ba sai da Shi. Babu rabauta sai da Shi. Shi ne tushen tabbatar da dukkan ilimin da – ta wurinsa – ya cancanci a kira shi haka."59

A person in denial of his own existence is unable to prove the existence of any absolute truth. Even though he offers a compromise by claiming ‘relative absolutism’ in some aspects of knowledge and science, this conclusion is totally false, as it does not possess the rule upon which cognition can be based in the first place. However, in reality, it is a conclusion that is largely in line with atheist conceptualisations, through which it is impossible to philosophically set out any rational and instinctive knowledge. This is because the cognitive structure for these types of assertions and the demonstration of them through proof is not possible without having faith in the existence of Allah. Based on this, we can understand the deep and poignant statement of the scholars: ‘Knowing Allah is fundamental to knowing anything.’ I used to ponder quite a bit over this expression in my pursuit of understanding the reality, dimensions, and wealth of meaning behind the outlook expressed in this statement, and the connection between knowing Allah  and all other knowledge. After grasping these facts, it became apparent to me that the point here is this: All this knowledge is actually a branch of knowing Allah . Whosoever does not comprehend His existence is unable to philosophically or rationally establish any coherent cognitive theory that explains to us why this knowledge exists and how it can be acquired. In this regard, Ibn Taymiyyah said, Knowing Him (Allah) is the highest of all knowledge. It is the goal, the end, the culmination, and the root of all knowledge, even though knowledge of other than Him might come first, or might be a precursor to, knowing Him. Knowing Him – in addition to being loftier, more wholesome, and more beneficial – is a necessary need. A servant cannot achieve righteousness without Him. There is no felicity without Him. He is the root to the realisation of all knowledge that – through Him – deserves to be labelled as such.’59

Shehinsa Ibn al-Qayyim ya ce, Ka yi tunani a kan duniya gaba ɗaya, a dukkan sassanta, a cikin mulkinta na sama da na ƙasa. Za ka same ta a matsayin shaida ga Mahalicci, Mai halitta, kuma Sarki. Musun Mahaliccinta da ƙin Shi a cikin hankula da dabi'un halitta daidai yake da musun ilimi da ƙin sa. Babu bambanci tsakanin su biyun. A cewar hankula tsarkaka, masu haske da daraja, da kuma fiɗrah mai ƙoshin lafiya, nuni na Mahalicci ga halitta, na Mai aikatawa ga aiki, da na Mai tsarawa ga abin da aka siffanta, ya fi bayyana fiye da akasin wannan ra'ayi. Masu ilimi da hangen nesa suna amfani da Allah a matsayin hujja ga ayyukansa da tsarinsa, yayin da talakawa kuwa suke amfani da tsarinsa da ayyukansa don nuna Shi. Babu shakka, dukkan hanyoyin biyu daidai ne kuma kowacce gaskiya ce. Alƙur'ani ya ƙunshi duka biyun. Hujjar daga tsari kuwa tana da yawa. Hujjar daga Mahalicci kuma tana da misali a kanta. Ita ce abin da Manzanni suka nuna lokacin da suka ce wa al'ummarsu, "Shin akwai shakka game da Allah…?"60, watau, shin ya kamata mu yi shakka game da Allah sai an gabatar da hujja a kan kasancewarsa? Wace hujja ce ta fi dacewa da bayyana fiye da wannan kanta? Ta yaya abin da ya fi ɓoye zai zama hujja ga tabbatar da abin da ya fi bayyana? Sannan Manzanni suka faɗakar da mutane ga hujjar ta hanyar ƙara da cewa: "…Mai ƙirƙirar sammai da ƙasa?"61 Na ji Shaikhul-Islām Taqiyyuddīn Ibn Taimiyya yana cewa, "Ta yaya za ka nemi hujja ga abin da shi kansa hujja ne ga kowane abu?" Yana kuma yin amfani da wannan waƙa a matsayin misali: "Babu abin da za a ɗauka daidai a cikin hankula idan rana ta buƙaci hujja." An sani cewa kasancewar Ubangiji ta fi bayyana ga hankula da fiɗrah fiye da kasancewar rana. Duk wanda ba ya ganin haka a cikin hankalinsa da fiɗrah-nsa, to ya kamata ya yi masa kallon shakka.62

His student Ibn al-Qayyim  said, Ponder over the whole world, in all its parts across its higher and lower dominions. You will find it to be a testament to the Maker, the Creator, and the King. Denying its Maker and rejecting Him in the minds and the innate predispositions is tantamount to denial and rejection of knowledge itself. There is no difference between the two. According to pure, enlightened, and lofty minds and the sound fiṭrah, the indication of the Creator to the creation, the Doer to the action, and the Designer to the fashioned is more obvious than the opposite view. Those with knowledge and foresight use Allah as evidence for His actions and design, whereas common people use His design and actions to point to Him. No doubt, both are correct methods and each is true. The Qur’an comprises of both. As for the evidence from design, it is plentiful. As for the evidence from the Maker, that has a case in point as well. It is what the Messengers pointed to when they told their nations, “Is there any doubt about Allah…?”60, i.e., should we doubt in Allah until evidence for His existence is presented? Which evidence is more proper and apparent than this itself? How can something that is more obscure be used in evidence to prove something that is more obvious? Then the Messengers alerted people to the evidence by adding: “…the Originator of the heavens and the Earth?”61 I heard Shaykh al-Islām Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyyah  say, “How can you demand proof for something that in itself is proof for everything?” He also used to say the following couplet as an example: “Nothing can be deemed to be correct in the minds when day requires evidence.” It is known that the existence of the Lord  is more apparent to the minds and the fiṭrah than the existence of day. Whosoever cannot see this in his mind and fiṭrah should view them with suspicion.62

Ya isa a faɗi cewa Allah ne Malami na farko. Shi ne Wanda ya yi wa halittunsa falalar ilimi, ko dai ba tare da wani mai shiga tsakani ba, kamar yanayin fitar da mutane da ɗabi'unsu na asali, da kuma ba su ƙarfin da kayan aikin da za su iya nazari da tunani, ko kuma ta hannun Annabawansa da Manzanninsa. Ya ce: "Ka karanta, ya Annabi, da sunan Ubangijinka Wanda ya halitta."63 Don haka, falsafar Musulunci game da fahimta ta bayyana cewa bayyanar dukkan ilimi tana samuwa ne daga Allah, kuma babu wata hanya – ta hankali ko ta falsafa – da za a kafa ka'idar ilimi mai daidaito ba tare da tabbatar da wannan gaskiyar ba. Saboda haka, kasancewar wannan ilimin na dabi'a yana nuna wanzuwarSa, kamar yadda ake jin su ta hanyar ilhami. Idan ɓangaren da ke adawa ya yarda da wanzuwarsu a matsayin gaskiyar haƙiƙa, za a tilasta masa ya tabbatar da kasancewar Allah, domin waɗannan gaskiyoyi ba za su yiwu a kafa su ba tare da Shi ba. To amma idan ɓangaren adawa ya musanta hakan, farashin wannan musantawar zai yi tsada sosai, domin zai rufe ƙofar samun kowane ilimi gaba ɗaya; ma dai, zai fi haka muni, kuma zai kasance daidai da sofisanci. Ka yi la'akari da wannan misali – muhawara tsakanin Nick Pollard da Richard Dawkins:

Suffice it to say that it is Allah  Who is the First Teacher. He is the one Who bestowed His favour upon His creation in the form of education – whether without an intermediary, such as people’s innate and instinctive predispositions, Him giving the potential and the tools to allow them to analyse and reason, or via His Prophets and Messengers. He  said, ‘Read, O Prophet, in the Name of your Lord Who created.’63 Thus, the Islamic conceptualisation of cognition declares that the manifestations of all knowledge originate from Allah , and that there is no way – whether rationally or philosophically – to establish a coherent theory of knowledge without affirming this fact. So, the existence of this instinctive knowledge points to His existence , as they are intuitively felt. If the opposing side accepts their existence as objective truths, they would be compelled to affirm the existence of Allah, as these truths cannot possibly be established without Him. However, if the opposing side denies it, the price of such a denial would be very high, as it would categorically shut off the door to any knowledge acquisition; in fact, it would be worse than that, on par with sophism. Consider the following example – a discussion between Nick Pollard and Richard Dawkins:

Pollard: 'Susan Blackmore ta ce kwanan nan a cikin mujallar The Skeptic: "Ina ganin ra'ayin cewa muna wanzuwa ruɗu ne... Ra'ayin cewa akwai wani kai a ciki wanda ke yanke shawara, yana aiki kuma yana da alhakin... babban ruɗu ne. Kan da muke ginawa ruɗu ne kawai, domin a zahiri akwai kwakwalwa da sinadarai kawai, kuma wannan 'kai' bai wanzu ba - bai taɓa wanzuwa ba, kuma babu wanda zai mutu." Shin za ka yarda da irin wannan bayanin na rage komai zuwa sinadarai game da wacce matarka take, da kuma kai wanene?'

Pollard: ‘Susan Blackmore said recently in The Skeptic: “I think the idea we exist is an illusion...The idea that there is a self in there that decides things, acts and is responsible...is a whopping great illusion. The self we construct is just an illusion because actually there’s only brains and chemicals and this ‘self’ doesn’t exist – it never did and there’s nobody to die.” Would you agree with that kind of reductionist explanation of who your wife is, who you are?’.

Dawkins: 'Na'am. Ina nufin, Susan tana fitar da wuyanta don wani takamaiman ra'ayi game da menene kai, kuma ra'ayi ne da nake da ra'ayin cewa watakila daidai ne; amma ban yi imani mun riga mun kai matsayin tabbatar da hakan ba. Abin da ke sa mini ya zama mai yiwuwa abubuwa ne daban-daban. Daya shi ne cewa kwakwalwa ta zo duniya ta hanyar sannu-sannu na juyin halitta, kuma muna da jerin ci gaba daga kanmu ta cikin dukkan sauran dabbobi zuwa dabbobi masu kwakwalwa mai sauki, zuwa dabbobi da ba su da kwakwalwa kwata-kwata, har zuwa tsirrai. Tabbas, hasashen cewa ba mu rayuwa bayan mutuwa yana da alama a gare ni mai yiwuwa sosai. Wannan zai zama kyakkyawan gwajin aiki - ba cewa za mu iya gwada shi a zahiri ba, amma a ka'ida: idan kai wani abu ne banda abu na kwakwalwa, to ya kamata ya tsira lokacin da kwakwalwa ta ruɓe - kuma zan sanya babban caca (wanda na fahimci cewa ba zan taba cin nasara ba) cewa idan kwakwalwata ta ruɓe, ni kaina ba zan wanzu ta kowace ma'ana ba.'

Dawkins: ‘Yes. I mean, Susan is sticking her neck out for one particular view of what a self is, and it’s one that I am inclined to think is probably right; but I don’t think we are yet in a position to substantiate that. What makes it seem plausible to me is various things. One is that brains have come into the world by a gradual process of evolution and we have a continuum from ourselves through all the other animals to animals that have very simple brains, to animals that have no brains at all, to plants. Certainly, the prediction that we don’t survive death seems to me to be overwhelmingly probable. That would be a good operational test – not that we can actually test it, but in principle: if a self is something other than brain stuff, then it should survive when the brain rots – and I’d place a very heavy bet (which I realize I could never actually win) that when my brain rots myself will not in any sense exist.’.

Pollard: "Shin kana ganin cewa ra'ayin cewa ni ina wanzuwa ruɗu ne?"

Pollard: ‘Do you believe that the idea that I exist is an illusion?’.

Dawkins: 'To gaskiya, na yi farin ciki da cewa mu kayan kwakwalwa ne, kuma idan kwakwalwarmu ta mutu, muna bace. Kiran mu da zato na iya zama hanya mai kyau ta bayyana hakan. Amma ba zan so in tabbatar da cewa jin kai namu zato ne ba. Ya dogara da abin da kake nufi. Ni dai na ji cewa akwai "ni".'64.

Dawkins: ‘Well, I’m certainly happy that we are a product of brains and that when our brains die, we disappear. To call us an illusion is possibly a good way to express it. But I wouldn’t wish to commit myself to saying that our sense of self is an illusion. It depends what you mean. I certainly feel that there’s a me.’64.

Dawkins était bien disposé à admettre que la conscience de l'individu en tant que telle, son sentiment d'identité personnelle qui le distingue des autres, et sa compréhension du concept de « moi » ne sont que des illusions. Bien que Dawkins ait tenté de paraître diplomate pour atténuer le caractère problématique de sa réponse au lecteur, ses propos suffisent à montrer clairement le type d'idées qu'il défend. En effet, Dawkins a cherché à se présenter comme un homme rationnel durant les derniers instants de cette discussion. En réalité, pourtant, il a tenté d'éluder le sujet et n'a rien offert qui puisse contredire l'affirmation qu'il avait faite. Le simple fait de percevoir le concept de « moi » et d'en avoir conscience n'était nullement le sujet de la discussion, car c'est une évidence que chaque personne constate et croit pour elle-même. La question posée était en réalité la suivante : existe-t-il quelque chose qui explique cette tendance ? Autrement dit : existe-t-il une réalité, une existence qui puisse correctement être qualifiée de « moi » et qui explique la manière dont nous ressentons notre existence ? Ou bien le concept de « soi », de « moi » ou d'« identité personnelle distincte » n'est-il qu'une illusion sans aucune réalité extérieure ?

So Dawkins was quite prepared to accept that the conscience of an individual per se, his sense of personal identity that distinguishes him from others, and his understanding of the ‘me’ concept are all merely illusions. Though Dawkins attempted to come across as diplomatic to downplay the problematic nature of his answer to the reader, his words are sufficient in clearly conveying the type of ideas he espouses. Indeed, Dawkins attempted to portray himself as a rational person during the last moments of this discussion. However, in reality, he tried to sidestep the topic and did not offer anything that would contradict the assertion he made. Merely sensing the concept of ‘me’ and being conscious of it was not the topic of discussion at all, for that is an obvious matter that every person finds and believes for themselves. The posed question actually was the following: Is there anything that explains this tendency? In other words: Is there anything that is real and in existence, which can be correctly classed as ‘me’, that explains how we feel about our existence? Or is the concept of ‘self’, ‘me’, or ‘distinct personal identity’ merely an illusion without any external reality?

Daga cikin abubuwan da fiṭrah ta sanya a cikin mutum akwai ɗabi'ar kyawawan halaye da ke tattare da shi sosai. Ta wannan ɗabi'a, mutum yana iya fahimtar ba kawai waɗanne halaye ne nagari da waɗanne ne marasa kyau ba, har ma yana jin a zuciyarsa cewa waɗannan ƙimomin ɗabi'a abubuwa ne na zahiri (objective) a yanayinsu. Kasancewarsu abubuwa na zahiri ne ke ba su gaskiyar darajarsu, tare da cire musu sauyi da dangantaka da ra'ayi. Waɗannan hakikanin abubuwa ne da suke fi ƙarfin ba kawai wanzuwar ɗan adam ba, har ma da duk wanzuwar abin duniya. Ko mutum da duniya suna wanzuwa ko ba sa wanzuwa, waɗannan ƙimomin ɗabi'a suna riƙe da zahirinsu.

From the fiṭrah-driven elements that man finds in himself is the deeply entrenched moral instinct. With this, one can grasp not only what are good and bad morals, but one also instinctively feels that these moral values are objective by nature. Being objective is what gives these morals their true value and removes relativity from them. These are objective realities that transcend not only human existence, but all material existence. Whether man and the universe exist or not, these moral values retain their objectivity.

Fahimta tana da bangare biyu: ikon bambance nagarta da mugunta, da ikon fahimtar abin da ba ya canzawa (na zahiri) da ke cikin ma'anonin nagarta da mugunta. Wannan haɗin fahimta biyu za a iya amfani da shi a cikin wannan maudu'i, wanda a cikinsa muke ƙoƙarin nuna cewa akwai dabi'u na asali a cikin kanmu da ke nuni zuwa ga kasancewar Allah. Wannan saboda wannan ɗabi'ar ta ɗabi'a ba za a iya bayyana ta ba tare da tabbatar da kasancewar Mai Girma (Allah). Kamar yadda ra'ayoyin hankali ke buƙatar mu tambayi: 'Wa ya sanya su a cikin rai?', haka nan ɗabi'ar ɗabi'a ke buƙatar mu tambayi: 'Wa ya sanya ta a can?' Akwai wata tambaya mai zurfi: Menene ke bayyana wannan jin ɗabi'a a cikinmu, cewa adalci ƙima ce ta zahiri wadda ke sa ta zama nagarta a duniya baki ɗaya, sabanin zalunci, wanda muke ɗauka a zahiri a matsayin halin mugunta? Saboda haka, shin yana yiwuwa a gabatar da tsarin ɗabi'a mai daidaito a hankali bisa ra'ayin da ba ya amincewa da kasancewar Allah? A wasu kalmomi: shin yana yiwuwa a samu wata nagarta ta zahiri ba tare da kasancewar Allah ba? Ko a ce ta wata hanya: Shin yana yiwuwa mutum ya zama nagari kuma mai adalci ba tare da kasancewar Allah ba?

Comprehension is twofold: the ability to distinguish good from evil, and the ability to comprehend the objectivity found in the values of good and evil. This duet of comprehension can be deployed in this subject, in which we are attempting to demonstrate the existence of innate predispositions in our own selves that point to the existence of God. This is because this moral inclination cannot be explained without affirming the existence of the Divine. Just as the rational concepts require that we ask the question ‘Who placed them in the soul?’, then likewise the moral inclination requires us to ask: ‘Who placed it there?’ There is another question that is deeper: What explains this instinctive feeling in ourselves that justice is an objective value that makes it universally good, as opposed to injustice, which we necessarily consider to be an objectively evil trait? Consequently, is it possible to offer a philosophically coherent moral outlook in light of the view that does not acknowledge the existence of God? In other words, is it possible that there is any objective good without the existence of God? Put in another way: Is it possible that a person can be good and righteous without the existence of God?

Lokacin da na fara shiga duniyar karatu, ɗaya daga cikin littattafan farko da na karanta shi ne na Shawkiy Abu Khalil mai suna Gharīzah am Taqdīr Ilāhī? (Gharīzah ko Ƙaddarar Allah?). Wannan littafi yana kawo kyawawan al'amura daga duniyar dabbobi, inda dabbobi ke aikata wasu ayyuka cikin ilhami, waɗanda suke cikin muradin rayuwarsu, ba tare da an koya musu ba, an horar da su ko an rene su domin hakan ba.

When I embarked the world of reading, one of the first books I read was by Shawkiy Abu Khalil titled Gharīzah am Taqdīr Ilāhī? (Instinct or Divine Decree?). This book adopts wonderful scenes from the animal world, in which animals instinctively carry out specific actions that are in their survival interests, without ever being educated, trained, or brought up to do so.

Wa wanene ya shiryar da ɗan jariri ya riƙe nonon mahaifiyarsa? Wa ya dasa ilhamar uwaye a zuciyar uwa, har ta riƙa kula da 'ya'yanta? Wa ya koyar da tsuntsaye yin ƙaura tsakanin wurare na musamman? Wa ya sanya ilhamar rayuwa a cikin dukkan halittu masu rai? Wa ya buga soyayyar kyau a cikin rai? Dukkan waɗannan abubuwa, kamar abubuwan da suka riga su waɗanda ke cikin mutane da halittu masu rai ta asali, suna tayar da tambaya: Ta yaya waɗannan ilhamomi suka samu? Wa ya halicce su a cikin rai? Ku tambayi masu ƙaryata Allah game da su. Zai yi ta magana game da ka'idar Darwin da yadda waɗannan ilhamomi suka kasance wani ɓangare na tsarin juyin halitta domin rayuwar halittu. Duk da haka, tambayar ta kasance: Daga ina waɗannan ilhamomi suka fito tun farko? A wata ma'ana, bisa ga juyin halitta na Darwin, ta yaya wannan ilhama ta samu, wadda a wani lokaci a cikin juyin halitta ba ta wanzu ba, sai kuma ta bayyana kwatsam ta kafu sosai a cikin rayukan halittu? Yaushe ainihin waɗannan ilhamomi suka fara bayyana? Ta yaya suka samu siffa? Kuma ta yaya ake gadon su daga tsara zuwa tsara? Masu ƙaryata Allah ba su da amsa ga waɗannan tambayoyi. Abin da kawai suke da shi shi ne ko dai su nuna mamakinsu gaba ɗaya, ko su mayar da wannan muhawara zuwa ga kwayar halitta mai son kai wadda ke tura halitta mai rai ta tsira a kowane hali. Mu kawai za mu iya rawa a kan waƙarsa, kamar yadda Richard Dawkins ya shahara da faɗa. Ku yi tunani a kan ilhamar uwa. Ka faɗa mini – ka taɓa ganin wani abu mai tsarki fiye da wannan? Na rantse da Allah, babu wani abu a duniya kamar zuciyar uwa – alamar soyayya ta gaskiya da tausayi cikakke. Ina roƙon ku da sunan Allah ku tuna labarun uwaye tare da 'ya'yansu – abubuwan al'ajabi marasa iyaka waɗanda kalmomi ba sa iya bayyanawa. Yayin da nake rubuta waɗannan kalmomi, labarai da dama suna zuwa min a rai.

Who guided a child to take the breast of its mother? Who planted the instinct of motherhood in a mother’s heart, so that she looks after her children? Who taught birds to migrate between specific places? Who instilled the survival instinct in all living things? Who imprinted the love of beauty in the soul? All these phenomena, like their predecessors that are innately found in living humans and creatures, beg the question: How did these instincts come about? Who created them in the soul? Ask the atheist about them. He will go on about Darwinism and how these instincts were part and parcel of the evolution process for the purpose of survival of living creatures. However, the question remains: Where did these instincts come from in the first place? In other words, in light of Darwinist evolution, how did this instinct come about, which at a point of time during evolution did not exist, only to appear all of a sudden in such a deeply embedded manner within creature’s souls? When exactly did these instincts first appear? How did they form? And how are they generationally passed down? Atheists have no answer to these questions. The only thing they have is either to express their utter confoundment or to bring this discussion back to the selfish gene85 that pushes a living being to survive at any cost. We can only dance to its tune, which is how Richard Dawkins famously puts it. Ponder over a mother’s instinct. Pray tell me – have you seen anything purer than that? I swear by Allah, there is nothing in existence like a mother’s heart – a symbol of true love and perfect compassion. I ask you by Allah to remind yourself of the stories of mothers with their children – they are endless wonders that words are unable to describe. As I write these words, I am confronted by dozens of stories:

Wani tunani na halitta da ke cikin mutum shi ne ma'anar manufa mai zurfi a cikin zuciyarsa, ko kuma sha'awar manufa (teleological tendency). Wannan ji ne ke sa shi tambayar manyan tambayoyi: "Ni wane ne? Daga ina na fito? Me ya sa nake nan? Ina zan ƙare?" Waɗannan tambayoyi masu zurfi su ne ke banbance mutane da dabbobi. Idan dabbobi suna motsawa ne bisa ilhami ta farko, to abin da ke motsa mutum shi ne tunanin halitta da ke cikinsa na neman manufar wanzuwarsa da rayuwarsa. Saboda haka ne sunayen da suka fi gaskiya su ne Ḥārith (manomi mai huɗa) da Hammām (ma'aikaci mai himma), kamar yadda Annabi ﷺ ya bayyana, domin suna ƙunshe da manyan halaye guda biyu na mutum waɗanda ke wakiltar sha'awarsa ta burin abu da neman sa. Waɗannan halaye guda biyu ba za su yiwu ba sai da kasancewar wani abu da za a iya so da nema. Burin ƙarshe da za a iya nema shi ne Allah (SWT).

Another innate tendency present in man is his deep emotional sense of purpose, or teleological tendency. It is this feeling that makes him ask the big questions: ‘Who am I? Where did I come from? Why am I here? Where will I end up?’ These deep questions are what distinguish humans from animals. If animals desire to move on their primal instincts, what moves man is his innate tendency to seek out the purpose of his existence and life. This is why the truest of names are Ḥārith (ploughman) and Hammām (energetic worker), as stated by the Prophet 95, as they comprise of two central features of man that represent his desire to wish and to seek. These two traits are not possible without the existence of something that can be wished and sought after. The ultimate aim that can be sought is Allah .

Yadda Ibn Taymiyyah ya ce: ‘Rai ba zai iya zama babu ji da buƙata ba. A gaskiya, irin wannan babu ba zai yiwu ba a cikin rai. Ji da buƙata na cikin hakikanin rai. Ba za a iya tunanin rai ba tare da ji da sha’awa ba. Ba daidai ba ne a ce rai na iya zama babu Mahalicci – babu ji game da wanzuwarSa ko rashinSa, ko ƙaunarSa ko rashin ƙaunarSa. Ba daidai ba ne a ce amincewa da Shi da ƙaunarSa ba wani sashe ne wajibi na wanzuwar rai ba, koda kuwa babu wata adawa. A’a, wannan ƙarya ce, domin rai yana ɗauke da abin da yake so a matsayin wani sashe wajibi na fiɗrarsa. Saboda rai koyaushe yana buƙata a matsayin aiki wajibi na mahallinsa, ba za a iya tunanin cewa ran mutum zai taɓa zama babu sha’awar wani abu ba. ‘Shi ya sa Annabi ﷺ ya ce, “Mafi gaskiyar sunaye su ne Ḥārith da Hammām.” Rai dai halitta ce mai rai – kowace halitta mai rai tana motsi da ra’ayinta. Saboda haka, rai dole ne yana da motsin da yake so da kansa. Don haka, kowane “abin da yake so” dole ne yana da abin da yake sha’awa. Abin da ake so ko dai don kansa ne kai tsaye, ko kuwa a matsayin hanya zuwa wani abu; abin da ake so a matsayin hanya zuwa wani abu dole ne ya kai ga sha’awa ta farko. Saboda haka, ba zai yiwu duk sha’awoyin mutum su zama hanya zuwa wani abu ba, domin hakan zai kai ga kuskuren jerin dalilan ƙarshe marasa iyaka, wanda ba zai yiwu ba, kamar jerin dalilan aiki marasa iyaka – ko ma fiye da haka. Tun da mutum dole ne yana da abin da yake so, a ƙarshe Allah ne zuciyarsa ke marmarin. Saboda haka, kowane bawa dole ne yana da abin bautawa. Ta haka ne aka sani cewa bawa an halicce shi da yanayin son ubangijinsa.’96

Wata siffa ta ɗan adam ita ce, yana jin a cikin kansa, ta yanayin halitta, bambanci tsakanin zaɓin da yake yi da waɗancan ayyuka da ke fitowa daga gare shi ba tare da nufinsa ba. Idan mutum ya ɗaga gilashin ruwa zuwa bakinsa, ko ya ɗauki jakarsa, ko ya shiga motarsa, yana iya jin a zuciyarsa cewa waɗannan abubuwa ne da ya zaɓa, bambanci da bugun zuciyarsa, da gudanar jini a jijiyoyinsa, da sanyin da jikinsa ke ji. Mutum na iya dakatar da numfashinsa na ɗan lokaci da zaɓinsa, amma ba zai iya ci gaba da yin hakan ba, domin martanin jiki wanda ba shi da iko a kansa yana tilasta shi ya yi numfashi. Wannan ɗabi'a ta haihuwa – cewa mutane suna da 'yancin zaɓi, wanda za su iya jin sa ta yanayin halitta – tana buƙatar bayani. Haƙiƙa, kasancewar wannan ɗabi'a tana buƙatar bayani.

A feature of humans is that they instinctively feel within themselves the differentiation between man’s choices and those acts that emanate involuntarily from him. When a person raises a glass of water to his mouth, picks up his bag, or gets in his car, he can instinctively differentiate between those and his heart pulsing, the blood running in his veins, and the cold shivers his body feels. A person can stop breathing for a while by choice, but he is unable to continue to do so, as the involuntary bodily reaction requires him to breath. This innate tendency – that people have free will, which they can instinctively feel – requires an explanation. In fact, the existence of this tendency requires an explanation.

Ga alama cewa ƙin yarda da wanzuwar Allah (atheism), saboda ra'ayinsa na abin duniya game da wanzuwa, ba zai iya bayar da bayani mai gamsarwa game da al'amarin 'yancin zaɓi (free will) ba. Idan ayyukanmu na son rai kawai sakamakon hulɗar sinadarai na jiki (biochemical) da bugun wutar lantarki a cikin tsarin jijiyoyi da tsokoki na jiki ne, kuma duk wannan ana sarrafa shi ne da dokoki tabbatattu, to ta yaya zai yiwu a sami wani 'yancin zaɓi? Wannan ya sa masu ƙin Allah da yawa suka karɓi falsafar tsattsauran ra'ayin ƙaddara (extreme determinism). A cikin wannan tunanin, 'yancin zaɓi wani ruɗi ne, kuma mutum an tsara shi ne don ya aikata abin da yake aikatawa, duk da cewa yana iya tunanin cewa yana da 'yancin zaɓi. A cikin adabin Larabci na gargajiya, wani mai ra'ayin ƙaddara ya bayyana wannan da cewa: "Mutum an tsara shi da siffar wanda yake da 'yancin zaɓi."

It would seem that atheism, in light of its materialistic outlook on existence, is unable to offer a plausible explanation for the phenomenon of free will. If our voluntary actions are merely and exclusively the result of biochemical interactions and electric pulses in the body’s neuromuscular system, and that is all governed by fixed laws, how is it possible for there to be any free will? This has led many atheists to adopt an extreme determinist philosophy. In this conceptualisation, free will is an illusion and man is actually programmed to do what he does, even though he might think he has free will. In classical Arabic literature, one determinist expressed this as ‘Man is programmed with an image of one with free will’.