Hujja ta Farko ta Hankali akan Wanzuwar Allah: Hujjar Halitta
The First Rational Indicator For The Existence Of Allah: Argument From Creation
Wannan hujja tana da sunaye da dama a fagen addini gabaɗaya, musamman a fagen Musulunci. Duk suna dogara ne ga babban ra'ayi cewa duk abin da ya fara wanzuwa bayan ya kasance babu, dole ne yana da dalilin da ya fifita wanzuwarsa a kan rashin wanzuwarsa. Haka kuma sun ƙunshi ra'ayin cewa duk abin da yake mai yiwuwa, tabbas yana dogara ne ga dalili marar dogara wanda ya halicce shi.122 Wannan dalili shi ne Allah . Wasu daga cikin sunayen wannan hujja sune: hujjar halitta, hujjar ƙirƙira, hujjar mai motsi na farko, hujjar kalam, sanadin duniya baki ɗaya, hujjar sanadin farko, hujjar sanadi, hujjar duniya, hujjar cosmological, da sauran su.
This argument has multiple names in the religious space generally, and in the Islamic domain in particular. They all revolve around the central idea that whatever comes into existence after having been non-existent must have a cause that preferred its existence over its non-existence. They also comprise of the idea that whatever is possible is most definitely contingent on a non-contingent cause that created it.122 That cause is Allah . Some of the names for this argument are: the argument from creation, the argument from invention, the prime mover argument, the kalam argument, universal causation, the argument from first cause, the causal argument, the argument from the universe, the cosmological argument, and others.
Duk wanda ya yi tunani a kan wannan hujja zai ga cewa ita ce mafi sauƙi daga cikin dukkan alamomin da ke nuna Allah. Wannan ya bayyana dalilin da ya sa wannan hujja ta yadu a cikin dukkan wayewa, al'adu, da al'ummomi. Abin da ke motsa ta shi ne tambaya ta dabi'a da ke neman sanadin abubuwan da ake gani da ke faruwa a lokaci. Ko da yake yanayinta da sunayenta sun bambanta, tushenta yana cikin ka'idoji guda biyu masu matuƙar bayyana:
One who ponders over this proof will find it to be the simplest of all the indicators that are suggestive of Allah . This explains why this argument is widespread across all civilisations, cultures, and nations. The motivation behind it is an instinctive question seeking the cause of observable and perceived temporal events. Though its scenarios and names are varied, its basis lies in two extremely clear propositions:
• Mataki na farko: Abubuwan da ke faruwa cikin lokaci suna wanzuwa. Abin da ke faruwa cikin lokaci shi ne wanda rashin wanzuwarsa ya riga shi, ko kuma duk abin da yake da farko.
• First proposition: Temporal events exist. A temporal event is that which was preceded by its non-existence, or anything that has a beginning.
• Shawara ta biyu: Abubuwan da ke faruwa a cikin lokaci suna nuni zuwa ga kasancewar wani dalili.
• Second proposition: Temporal events point to the existence of a cause.
• Kammalawa: Abubuwan da suka faru a lokaci a cikin halitta dole ne su kasance da sanadi, wanda shi ne Allah.
• Conclusion: Temporal events in existence must have a cause, which is Allah .
Ibn Rushd (Averroes) al-Ḥafīd, jikan Ibn Rushd, ya ce a cikin littafin al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij al-Adillah (Bayyana Hanyoyin Hujjoji) yana bayyana tushen wannan hujja: Amma hujjar daga ƙirƙira, tana ƙunshe da wanzuwar dabbobi, da tsirrai, da sammai. Wannan hanya tana dogara ne a kan ƙa'idodi guda biyu waɗanda suke tabbata a cikin dabi'un halittar kowane mutum. Ƙa'ida ta farko ita ce cewa waɗannan abubuwan da suke wanzuwa an ƙirƙire su. Wannan abu ne da ake sani da kai daga dabbobi da tsirrai, kamar yadda Ya ce: "…waɗancan gumaka da kuke kira baicin Allah ba za su iya halittar ko ƙudaje ɗaya ba, koda sun taru gaba ɗaya domin hakan." Muna ganin jikunan da ba su da rai waɗanda ake halitta rai a cikinsu. Tabbas mun sani cewa akwai wani mahalicci da yake halitta su kuma yake ba su rai a nan, wanda shi ne Allah. Dangane da sammai, mun sani daga motsinsu marar karkata cewa an umarce su da kula da abin da yake a duniya, kuma an hore su domin amfaninmu. Abin da aka hore dole ne an ƙirƙire shi kuma an umarce shi daga wani. Ƙa'ida ta biyu kuwa ita ce, kowane abu da aka ƙirƙira yana da mai ƙirƙirawa. Saboda haka, za a iya fitar da hukuncin daidai daga waɗannan ginshiƙai guda biyu cewa wani abu da yake wanzuwa yana da mai aikatawa wanda ya samar da shi.126
Explaining the foundation of this argument in al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij al-Adillah (Revealing the Methodologies of the Arguments), Ibn Rushd (Averroes) the grandson123 said, As for the argument from invention, it captures the existence of fauna, flora, and the heavens. This method is based on two principles that are firmly present in the innate predispositions of all people. The first is that these existing entities are invented. This is something automatically known from fauna and flora, as He said, “…those idols you invoke besides Allah can never create so much as a fly, even if they all were to come together for that.”124 We see inanimate bodies in which life is created. We definitely know that there is an entity that creates and favours them with life here, which is Allah . As for the heavens, we know from their unfaltering movements that they have been commanded to look after what is here in the world, and that they have been subjugated for our benefit. Something that is subjugated is, by necessity, invented and commanded by something else. As for the second principle, it is that every invented thing has an inventor. Therefore, one can correctly deduce from these two propositions that something in existence125 has a doer that originated it.126
Za a iya lura da abin da Ibn Rushd ya lura da shi. Ya bambanta tsakanin yadda dabbobi da tsirrai ke nuna cewa an halicce su (wato suna da farko), da yadda sammai ke nuna hakan. Ga na farko, ya ɗauke shi a matsayin abu bayyananne da kansa; ga na biyu kuwa, ya ɗauki alamar yadda aka hore su a matsayin alamar cewa an halicce su. Bisa wannan, za mu iya cewa alamomin abubuwan da suke da farko ga Allah suna da matakai biyu. Wannan ya dogara ne da yadda abubuwan da suke da farko suke kusa ko nesa da abin da hankula da lura za su iya kama, da kuma yiwuwar cewa idan suka bayyana, hankula za su iya gani su kuma fahimce su.
We can note the observation that Ibn Rushd makes. He differentiated between how fauna and flora are indicative of origination, vesus how heavens are indicative of the same. For the former, he considered it self-evident; for the latter he considered the sign of their subjugation as the sign for their origination. Based on this, we can say the indicators of temporal events for Allah are of two levels. This is based on how close or remote temporal events are from being capturable by the senses and observation, and the potential of them being observable and perceptible to the senses when emerging:
Fitowar lokaci ta halittun da ake iya gani daya bayan daya.
• The temporal emergence of individually observable creations.
• Fitowar duniya cikin lokaci (jinsin al'amuran lokaci).
• The temporal emergence of the world (the genus of temporal events).
Lokacin da muka yi tunani a kan yanayin yadda wahayi ya magance wannan hujja, sai mu lura cewa matakin farko shi ne ya fi bayyana. Wannan saboda ana iya fahimtarsa da hankula, kuma hakan ita ce hanya mafi sauri ta cimma manufa, ba tare da buƙatar dogayen gabatarwa ba, ko doguwar muhawara ta falsafa, ko tabbatar da wani abu da ba ya nan ko ba a iya gani ba. Yana bayyana hanyar Alƙur'ani a nan, kuma yana nuna cewa abubuwan da ake gani na zamani ba sa buƙatar hujja don tabbatar da zamaninsu, sai Ibn Taymiyyah ya ce: "Hanyar da aka ambata a cikin Alƙur'ani ita ce ta yin hujja da zamanin mutum da sauran halittu – wanda aka sani zamaninsu ta hanyar gani da makamantan hakan – don tabbatar da kasancewar Mahalicci. Ana iya yin hujja da Mai ƙirƙira ta hanyar ƙirƙirar mutum. Ƙirƙirar mutum ba ta buƙatar a yi hujjarta ta hanyar haɗa shi da canji, ko zamani, ko kuma wajabcin cewa abubuwan zamani suna da ƙarshe."
When we contemplate the nature of how revelation dealt with this argument, we notice that the first level is more present. This is because it is perceptible by the senses, which is the quickest way to acquiring the aim without the need for lengthy propositions, expansive philosophical argumentation, or proving something that is not present or observable. Explaining the Qur’anic method here, and highlighting that observable temporal events are not in need for evidence to demonstrate their temporality, Ibn Taymiyyah states, ‘The method mentioned in the Qur’an is by reasoning for the temporality of man and other beings – whose temporality is known by observation and similar means – in order to demonstrate the existence of the Creator . The Originator can be argued for by the origination of man. Man’s origination does not need to be reasoned by associating him with change, temporality, or the necessity of temporal events being terminal.
Bambancin da ke tsakanin tunani ta hanyar sanin cewa wani abu yana da farko (na kasancewar sa bayan rashinsa) da tunani don tabbatar da farkon sa yana da bayyananne. Abin da ke cikin Alkur'ani shi ne na farko, ba na biyu ba. Allah {Shin an halicce su ne ba tare da komai ba, ko su ne masu halittar kansu?}127 Saboda haka, kasancewar dabbobi, tsirrai, karafa, ruwan sama, gizagizai da makamantansu sun fara kasancewa bayan rashinsu, ana sanin hakan ta hanyar larura; ana ganinsa ne a zahiri, don haka ba ya bukatar hujja. Abin da ba a iya sanin sa kai tsaye ta hanyar hankula ba ne kawai ake koya ta hanyar hujja. Farkon kasancewar wadannan halittu ilimi ne na dabi'a wanda ba ya bukatar shaida. Ana sanin sa ta hanyar hankula ko ta dabi'a, ko dai ta hanyar sanarwa da ke iya ba da ilimin dabi'a, ko ta wasu hanyoyin ilimin larura. Fitowar mutum daga ruwan maniyyi kamar fitowar 'ya'yan itatuwa daga bishiyoyi da tsirrai daga kasa ne, da sauransu. Ana sanin ta hanyar hankula cewa wannan 'ya'yan itacen ya fito, ya zama mai kasancewa bayan rashinsa; haka ma mutum da sauran halittu. Allah {Shin mutane ba sa tunawa cewa mun halicce su tun a baya, alhali ba su kasance komai ba?}128, kuma Yana cewa {Mala'ika ya amsa: "Haka zai kasance! Ubangijinka ya ce: Yana da sauki a gare Ni, kamar yadda na halicce ka tun a baya, alhali ba ka kasance komai ba!"}129130
The difference between reasoning through his temporality and reasoning for his temporality is evident. What is in the Qur’an is the first, not the second. Allah says, “Or were they created by nothing, or are they their own creators?”127 Consequently, the mere temporal emergence of fauna, flora, metals, rain, clouds, and similar is known by necessity; it is in fact witnessed and does not need proof. Only that which is not necessarily known through the senses is to be learned via proof. The temporality of these beings is instinctive knowledge that does not require evidence. It is known either sensorily or instinctively, whether by way of being informed that can offer instinctive knowledge, or by other ways of necessary knowledge. The emergence of man from seminal fluid is like the emergence of fruits from trees and flora from the Earth, etc. It is sensorily known that this same fruit is emergent, coming into existence after having not occurred; the same applies to man and others. Allah states, “Do such people not remember that We created them before, when they were nothing?”128, and He says, “An angel replied, ‘So will it be! Your Lord says, “It is easy for Me, just as I created you before, when you were nothing!”129’130
Wani ma'ana mai laushi da Ibn Taymiyyah ya yi nuni da shi shi ne yanayin saba ko rashin saba da wani abin da ake gani, da tasirin wannan yanayi ga mutum wajen zama mai gafala game da alamomin da ke samun sauƙi a gare shi. Ibn Taymiyyah ya ce: "Saboda haka ne fiṭrar halitta take a tsara ta ta yadda duk sa'ad da suka ga wani sabon abu mai tasowa – kamar tsawa, walƙiya, da girgizar ƙasa – sai su tuna su kuma tsarkake Allah. Wannan kuwa saboda sun san cewa wannan abin da ya sake faruwa bai sake faruwa da kansa ba, a'a, akwai Mai ƙirƙirarsa wanda ya sa ya samu. Ko da yake sun san haka ya shafi duk sauran sabbin abubuwa masu tasowa, abubuwan da suka saba da su sun zama sanannu a gare su, sabanin waɗanda ba sa faruwa sau da yawa. In ba haka ba, waɗanda galibi suke tunawa da tsarkake Allah idan sabbin abubuwa marasa yawan faruwa suka bayyana, da sun riga sun ga waɗannan alamomin Allah masu yawan faruwa waɗanda suka fi girma sosai fiye da abu mai wuya. Da Allah bai yi wani abu ba sai halittar mutum, to da wannan kaɗai zai zama alama mafi girma. Kowa ya sani cewa mutum bai halitta kansa ba, ba iyayensa ba, ko wani daga cikin ɗan Adam. Kowa ya sani cewa dole ne yana da mai ƙirƙirarsa. Kowa ya sani dole ne yana da Mahalicci da ya halicce shi, kuma cewa Shi yana nan, mai rai, mai sani, mai iko, mai ji, mai gani. Wanda ya halicci sauran halittu masu rai ya fi cancantar rayuwa; wanda ya ba wasu abubuwa sani ya fi cancantar sani; wanda ya sa wasu abubuwa su yi ƙarfi ya fi cancantar iko. Haka nan ana sani cewa tsari mai kyau da ke cikinsa yana nuna sanin Mai aikatawa, kuma tsari na musamman yana nuna nufin Mai aikatawa. Tsarin samar da abu da kansa ba zai iya faruwa ba sai da ikon Mai ƙirƙirar. Sanin mutum game da kansa, na musamman, na kansa da na ɗaiɗaikunsa, zai ba shi sanin waɗannan ma'anoni na ubangiji da sauran abubuwa, kamar yadda Allah ya ce: "…kamar yadda suke cikin kanku. Shin ba ku gani ba?"131"132
One subtle point that Ibn Taymiyyah alluded to is the state of familiarity or the lack thereof vis-à-vis observing a particular event, and the impact this state has on a person becoming heedless of the indicators that are easily accessible to him. Ibn Taymiyyah says, ‘This is why the fiṭrah of the creation is wired so that whenever they see a newly emerging event – such as thunder, lightning, and earthquakes – they remember and glorify Allah. This is because they know that this recurrence did not recur by itself, but rather there was an Originator who caused it to originate. Though they know the same is applicable to all other newly emerging events, the events they are used to are already familiarised to them, as opposed to the rarely recurring ones. Otherwise, those who mostly remember and glorify Allah when newly emerging events that are rare appear would have already seen those oft-recurring signs of Allah that are far greater than the rare event. Had Allah done nothing other than create man, that alone would be the greatest of signs. Everyone knows that man was not created by himself, his parents, or anyone else from humankind. Everyone knows that he must have had an originator. Everyone knows he must have had a Creator that created him, and that He is present, alive, omniscient, omnipotent, all-hearing, and all seeing. One who creates other living things is worthier of being alive; one who grants other things knowledge is worthier of knowledge; one who makes other things powerful is worthier of power. It is also known that the masterful design therein denotes the knowledge of the Doer, and that the special design denotes the will of the Doer. The process of origination per se could not have occurred without the originator’s power. A person’s knowledge of his own specific, personal, and individual self would offer him the knowledge of these godly meanings and other things, as Allah states, “…as there are within yourselves. Can you not see?”131’132
Yana da kyau a lura cewa yawancin ayoyin Alkur'ani da ke bayyana cewa abubuwa suna da farko da ƙarshe ba an kawo su ne kawai don tabbatar da wanzuwar Mahalicci ba, kamar ayoyi biyu da Ibn Taymiyyah ya kammala maganarsa ta baya da su. Mahallin waɗannan ayoyi ya nuna cewa an saukar da su ne domin bayar da hujja akan cikakkiyar ikon Allah, da kuma cewa Yana iya kawo Tashin Kiyama. Wato, wanda ya halicci abubuwa daga babu, to lalle ya fi iya sake maida su. Wannan ma'ana, kamar yadda aka ambata a baya, tana nuna a fakaice amma a bayyane cewa Mai iko duka yana wanzuwa, kuma wanzuwarSa tana samuwa ne kawai daga bayyanar halitta daga babu. Ayar da ta fi shahara wadda ke ɗauke da wannan hujja ta hankali ita ce maganar Allah: "Shin an halicce su ne ba daga komai ba, ko su ne masu halittar kansu?"133
It should be noted that most Qur’anic passages that reveal the temporal nature of events were brought to demonstrate a wider point, not to merely prove the existence of the Creator, like the two verses Ibn Taymiyyah concluded his previous statement with. The context in these verses show that they were revealed to offer reasoning for the perfect power of Allah , and that He is able to bring about the Resurrection. In other words, one who created things out of nothing is a fortiori able to refashion them. This amount, as mentioned before, implicitly yet self-evidently suggests that the Omnipotent exists, and that His existence is suggested by the mere emergence of the creation out of nothing. The most famous verse that carries this rational argument is Allah’s statement: ‘Or were they created by nothing, or are they their own creators?’133
Don wannan ayar mai ban mamaki ita ce hujja mafi dorewa a cikin Alkur'ani game da wannan batu. Ayar ta fara ne da kafa babbar gaskiyar akida ta hanyar mayar da hankalin tattaunawar kan abubuwan da za su yiwu, sannan ta ci gaba da nuna dalilin da ya sa dukkan zaɓukan ba za su yiwu ba sai dai zaɓi ɗaya tilo na gaskiya: cewa mutum yana da Mahaliccin da ya halicce shi. Ayar ta yi tambaya ga mutane masu hankali: "Shin an halicce su ne ba tare da wani ya haddasa halittarsu ba? Ko kuwa su ne suka halicci kansu?" Ba ɗaya daga cikin waɗannan ba ne, domin Allah ne ya halicce su, ya ba su rai, bayan da a baya ba su zama komai da za a ambata ba.134
For the issue we are dealing with here, this awe-inspiring verse is the most enduring proof in the Qur’an. The verse starts off by setting out the great theological reality by focusing the discussion to what are the possibilities, after which it proceeds to demonstrate why all the options are impossible save for the only true option: Man has a Creator Who created him. The verse poses a question to rational people: ‘Were they brought into existence without anyone causing it? Or did they bring themselves into existence? It is neither, for it is Allah Who created them and gave them life, having previously been nothing worth mentioning.’134
Ibn al-Qayyim, yana bayani kan wannan hujja, ya ce: Ka yi tunani a kan maimaita kalmar halitta, da kuma takaitaccen bayanin da ke ƙunshe da kafa hujja cikin sauƙi da fasaha. Allah yana cewa, "Ta yaya waɗannan halittu – waɗanda ba su wanzu ba – za a halicce su ba tare da Mahalicci ba? Wannan zai zama abin da ba zai yiwu ba ga duk wanda yake da fahimta da hankali, cewa akwai abin da aka yi ba tare da mai yinsa ba, ko abin da aka halitta ba tare da mahalicci ba." Idan mutum ya wuce wani fili marar gini, sannan ya sake wucewa ya ga gine-gine masu ƙarfi da katanga, babu shakka zai yi imani cewa waɗannan suna da mai ginin su. Sannan Allah ya ce, "Ko an halicce su ne daga ba komai, ko kuwa su ne masu halittar kansu?" Wannan kuma yana nuna cewa ba zai yiwu bawa ya ƙirƙiri kansa ya halicci kansa ba. Ta yaya mutum zai iya halicci kansa daga rashin wanzuwa? Ba ma zai iya ƙara rayuwarsa ko da awa ɗaya ba, duk da cewa yana da dukkan abubuwan da rayuwa ke buƙata. Ba zai iya miƙe yatsansa ba, ko farcensa, ko ma zare ɗaya daga gashin kansa ba. Tunda duka zaɓuɓɓukan nan ƙarya ne, zaɓi ɗaya tilo da ya rage shi ne cewa suna da Mahalicci wanda ya halicce su, da Mai sura wanda ya siffanta su. Shi ne Allah na gaskiya wanda ya cancanci a bauta masa, a gode masa. Ta yaya za su gode wa wani allah banda Shi, alhali shi ne kaɗai wanda ya halicce su? Idan aka ce, "Menene matsayin maganar Allah 'Ko sun halicci sammai da ƙasa? A'a, ba su da yaƙini a kan Allah' a cikin wannan hujja?", za a amsa da cewa: "Matsayinsa mafi kyau ne. Ta hanyar sassan farko, ya bayyana cewa suna da Mahalicci da Mai sura, kuma cewa an halicce su. Da sashe na uku, ya bayyana cewa ba su iya halitta ba, domin su kansu an halicce su aka kuma kawo su cikin wanzuwa. Ba su halicci kansu ba. Ba su halicci sammai ko ƙasa ba." Shi ne Mai iko, Mai hikima, wanda aka siffanta da cewa: "Babu wani abin bautawa ko Ubangiji sai Shi," wanda ya halicce su. Ya halicci sammai da ƙasa. Ta wurin halittar sararin sama da ƙasa da duk abin da ke cikinsu, Shi kaɗai ne wanda ya halicci mazaunin da mazauna.137
Detailing this argument, Ibn al-Qayyim says, Contemplate the phrasal repetition of the creation term, and the restriction that comprises of establishing evidence in the simplest and most eloquent manner. Allah is essentially saying, “How could have these creations – having not been in existence – been created without a Creator? This would be considered impossible by anyone with understanding and rationality, that there can be something made without a maker, or something created without a creator.” If a person passes by a wasteland without any building, then he passed by it again and saw solid buildings and castles, he would have no doubt that these had a maker. Then Allah said, “Or were they created by nothing, or are they their own creators?”135 This, likewise, shows that it is impossible that a servant invents and creates himself. How can someone be able to create himself out of non-existence? He cannot even increase his own life, not even by an hour, even though he has all the facilities of life. He cannot even extend his finger, fingernail, or even one strand of his hair. Given that both options are false, the only option that remains is that they have a Creator Who created them, and a Fashioner Who fashioned them. He is the True Divine Who is worthy of their worship and thanks. How can they thank a god other than Him when He is the one and only being that created them? If it is said, “What is the place of Allah’s statement ‘Or did they create the heavens and the Earth? In fact, they have no firm belief in Allah’136 in this evidence?”, it would be said in response: “The best place. Through the first couple of segments, He explained that they have a Creator and Fashioner, and that they are created. With the third segment, He explained that they are unable to create, having been created themselves and brought into existence. They did not create themselves. They did not create the heavens or the Earth. It was the One, the Omnipotent, the One described as ‘There is neither any god nor lord besides Him’ Who created them. He created the heavens and the Earth. By creating the upper and lower dominions and everything therein, He alone is the one Who created both residence and resident.”’137
Jubayr ibn Muṭʿim yana da wata kyakkyawar riwaya da ke nuna girman wannan ayar ta Alƙur'ani. Ya ce: "Na ji Manzon Allah ﷺ yana karanta Suratul Ɗur a sallar Magariba. Da ya kai ga wannan ayar: {Ko an halicce su ba daga komai ba, ko kuwa su ne masu halitta?}, zuciyata kusan ta tashi daga jikina." Duk mai yin tunani a kan hanyar Annabawa wajen muhawara da waɗanda suka musunta ubangijintakar Allah suka kuma danganta ta ga kansu, zai lura cewa Annabawa sun koyar da su wannan hanyar hankali don tabbatar da ubangijintakar Allah, sannan cancantarSa ta zama Shi kaɗai abin bautawa.
Jubayr ibn Muṭʿim has a beautiful narration revealing the greatness of this Qur’anic verse. He said, ‘I heard the Prophet read al-Ṭūrin the Maghrib prayer. When he reached this verse: “Or were they created by nothing, or are they their own creators?”138, my heart almost flew out.’139 The one contemplating the method of the Prophets in debating those who denied the lordship of Allah and claimed it for themselves will note that the Prophets instructed them with this rational method to argue for the lordship of Allah , and subsequently His worthiness to be worshipped alone.
Mafi shahara a cikin wadanda suka musanta ubangijintakar Allah shi ne Fir'auna. Ya ce, "Ni ne ubangijinku, mafi girma!"140 Don haka, wani sashe na muhawarar da Mūsā ya yi da shi shi ne amfani da tasirin ikon Allah a matsayin hujja a kansa. Allah ya ce: "Fir'auna ya ce, 'Menene kuma "Ubangijin talikai"?'"141
The most infamous person who denied the lordship of Allah was Pharaoh. He said, ‘I am your lord, the most high!’140 As thus, part of the discussion Mūsā had with him was to use the effects of the power of Allah as an evidence against him. Allah says, ‘Pharaoh asked, “And what is ‘the Lord of all worlds’?”’141
Mūsā ya ba da amsoshi da hujjoji iri-iri. Ya tunatar da Fir'auna game da fitrar ɗan Adam, cewa Allah ya fi bayyana a fili fiye da buƙatar wata ma'ana ta bayani. Ya bayyana cewa dukkan halittun Allah suna dogara ga Shi a wajen wanzuwarsu: dukkan sammai, ƙasa, da duk abin da ke tsakaninsu suna buƙatar Allah domin halitta, arziƙi, da taimako. Maganarsa "Ubangijin gabas da yamma"142 ƙarin bayani ne da kuma jaddada cewa dukkan al'amura suna dogara ga Shi. Duk abin da yake sama da kai da ƙasa da kai, duk abin da yake a gabas da yamma, da duk abin da yake tsakanin haka, wanda yake gabanka da bayanka, duk yana dogara ga Shi.
Mūsā offered a variety of answers and proofs. He reminded Pharaoh of the innate instinct, that Allah is far more recognisable than the need for some definition. He explained that all of Allah’s creation is existentially dependent on Him – all the heavens, the Earth, and everything in between is in need of Allah for creation, sustenance, and assistance. His statement ‘Lord of the east and west’142 is additional information and emphasis that all events are dependent on Him, . Everything above and beneath you, everything in the east and the west, and everything in between that is in front of you and behind you is dependent on Him .
Ibn Taymiyyah ya yi nazari a kan muhawarar da ta faru tsakanin Mūsā da Fir'auna.
Ibn Taymiyyah analysed the debate between Mūsā and Pharaoh:
Fir'auna ya lulluɓe musunta shi da ƙin yarda da shi a cikin siffar tambaya ta alama. Ba ya tambaya game da siffofin Ubangijin da ya riga ya amince da shi ba, domin yana musun Shi kuma yana ƙin Shi. Shi ya sa a ƙarshen tattaunawar ya ce: "Idan ka riƙi wani ubangiji banda ni, lalle zan sa ka cikin waɗanda aka kurkuku."143
Pharaoh shrouded his denial and rejection in the form of a rhetorical question. He was not asking about the attributes of a Lord he had already acknowledged, as he was in denial of Him and rejected Him. This is why towards the end of the discussion, he said, “If you take any other god besides me, I will certainly have you imprisoned.”143
Ya kuma ce, “…duk da cewa na tabbata shi (Mūsā) maƙaryaci ne.”144 Tambayarsa a zahiri ta kasance don bayyana musun sa da ƙin yarda da shi. Yana nufin, “Duniya ba ta da wani ubangiji da ya aiko ka. Wane ne wannan?” – a matsayin musu. Mūsā ya bayyana cewa shi (Allah) sananne ne ga shi da kuma ga waɗanda ke wurin a fadar sarki, kuma alamomin sa a bayyane suke, a fili, kuma ba za a iya musantawa ba. Ya ce suna musantawa da harsunansu abin da zukatansu suka sani tabbas gaskiya ne. Kamar yadda aka ambata a wani wuri a cikin Alƙur’ani, Mūsā ya ce wa Fir’aunu, “Kai ka san sosai cewa babu wanda ya saukar da waɗannan alamomi sai Ubangijin sammai da ƙasa a matsayin fitilu.”145 Allah ya ce, “Kuma, duk da cewa zukatansu sun tabbatar da cewa alamomin gaskiya ne, sun musanta su da zalunci da girman kai. To ku duba yaya ƙarshen masu ɓarna ya kasance!”146 Fir’aunu bai ce “Wane (arabic = man) ne Ubangijin talikai?” ba, domin man tambaya ce game da wani takamaiman abu. Ana amfani da shi a cikin tambayoyi da ake nufin wani takamaiman mahalli ko abu wanda asalin jinsinsa sananne ne. Kamar lokacin da ake tambayar wani mai aika saƙo daga wurin wani, “Wane (man) ya aiko ka?” Amma mā kuwa, ana amfani da shi a tambayar siffantawa. Fir’aunu yana cewa, “Menene wannan? Kuma menene wannan da kuka kira ‘Ubangijin talikai’?” Ya faɗi haka ne cikin musu da ƙin yarda da shi. Lokacin da ya yi wannan tambayar cikin raina, Mūsā ya amsa cewa shi ya fi sananne da za a iya musanta shi, kuma ya fi bayyana da za a iya shakkar sa. Ya ce, “Shi ne Ubangijin sammai da ƙasa da duk abin da ke tsakaninsu, idan kawai kuna da imani mai tabbas.”147 Bai ce, “…idan kawai kuna da imani mai tabbas ga kaza da kaza” ba – ya bar maganar a buɗe. A taƙaice, idan kana da tabbaci a kan kowane abu, babban abin da ya kamata ya fara cikin tabbatattun abubuwa shi ne imani da wannan Ubangiji – kamar yadda Manzanni suka ce wa mutanensu, “Shin akwai shakka game da Allah?”148 Idan ka ce, “Ba mu da tabbaci a kan kowane abu. Saboda haka, idan mutum ya ce "an kwace mana dukkan ilimi", to wannan da'awa ce ta gama-gari ta sofisanci. Mai faɗin haka a fili yake yana ƙarya, domin ilimi wani sashe ne na kowane ɗan Adam. Kowane mutum mai hankali dole ne yana da wani ilimi. Shi ya sa aka faɗa a cikin ma'anar hankali cewa ilimi ne na ɗabi'a, wanda babu wani mutum mai hankali da ba shi da shi. Sa'ad da Fir'auna ya ce, "Manzonku wanda aka aiko muku lallai mahaukaci ne"149, wannan ƙarya ce a kan Manzon. Sun bar al'adunsu masu kyau, don haka suka danganta Manzanni da hauka. Sun kuma nuna musun ko shakka game da Mahalicci. Wannan ita ce halin talakawansu da addininsu. Wannan addini ne mai kyau a idanunsu, kuma allahn da suke biyayya da shi shi ne Fir'auna: "Manzonku wanda aka aiko muku lallai mahaukaci ne."150 Sai Mūsā ya bayyana masa cewa shi ne wanda aka bar shi babu hankali mai amfani, kuma shi ne ya fi cancantar wannan dangantawa. Ya ce, "Shi ne Ubangijin gabas da yamma, da abin da ke tsakaninsu, idan kuna da hankali."151 Hankali yana buƙatar ilimi na ɗabi'a kuma tabbatacce, wanda mafi girmansa a cikin fiɗrah shi ne sanin Mahalicci. Sannan ya ci gaba da bayyana cewa tabbatar da Shi wata ma'ana ce da hankali ke bi. Duk da haka, ilimi mai amfani abin yabo ne idan mutumin da yake da shi ya yi aiki da shi. Idan bai yi aiki da shi ba, za a ce ya rasa hankali. Haka kuma za a ce wanda bai bi abin da yake ganin ya tabbata a gare shi ba, to ba shi da tabbaci na gaske. Tabbaci kuma yana iya nufin ilimin da ya tsaya a zuciya; yana iya nufin kuma aiki da wannan ilimin. Saboda haka, kalmar mumini (wanda yake da yakini) ba za a faɗe ta ba sai ga waɗanda ilimi da aiki suka tsaya a zukatansu. Mutanen Fir'auna ba su bi ba sa'ad da suka sani. Don haka ba su mallaki hankali ko tabbaci ba. Ma'anar maganar Mūsā tana nuna abubuwa biyu: Idan kana da yakini, za ka san Shi, kuma idan kana da hankali, za ka san Shi. Idan kuma ka ce ba ka da yakini ko hankali, to haka ma mutanenka. Wannan zai zama amincewa daga gare ka cewa an kwace maka ɗan adam. Duk wanda yake haka bai cancanci da'awar allantaka ba. Ko da yake wannan karya ce daga gare ka, har yanzu kana gaskata Shi. Kamar yadda Allah ya ce, {"Kuma duk da cewa zukatansu sun tabbata cewa ayoyin gaskiya ne, sun musanta su ba da gaskiya ba, cikin girman kai."}152 Kana da hankali wanda ta hanyarsa za ka iya gane Shi. Sai dai son zuciyarka yana hana ka bin abin da hankali ke umarta. Kana so ka yi fariya a cikin ƙasa kuma ka yi ɓarna. Saboda haka, daga wannan mahanga, ba ka da hankali.153
Ibrāhīm da Namrūd sun yi wata muhawara irin ta Mūsā da Fir'auna. Allah ya ce: "Ba ka ga wanda ya yi jayayya da Ibrāhīm game da Ubangijinsa ba, saboda Allah ya ba shi mulki? Ka tuna lokacin da Ibrāhīm ya ce: 'Ubangijina shi ne wanda ke da ikon rayarwa da kashewa.' Shi kuwa ya ce: 'Ni ma ina da ikon rayarwa da kashewa.' Ibrāhīm ya ƙalubalance shi: 'Allah yana sa rana ta fito daga gabas. To, ka sa ta fito daga yamma.' Sai kafiri ya tsaya cik. Allah kuma ba ya shiryar da mutane azzalumai."154 Ibn Kathīr ya yi bayanin sassan wannan muhawara da halin Namrūd, yana cewa: Wannan saboda ya musanta cewa akwai wani abin bautawa banda shi, kamar yadda Fir'auna ya ce wa mutanensa: "Ya ku manyan mutane! Ban san wani abin bautawa a gare ku ba face ni."155 Girman kai da dogon mulkinsa ne kawai suka kai shi ga zalunci, kafirci mai tsanani, da taurin kai mai girma. Shi ya sa Allah ya ce: "…saboda Allah ya ba shi mulki?"156 Kamar ya nemi hujja daga wurin Ibrāhīm kan kasancewar Ubangijin da yake kira zuwa gare shi. Ibrāhīm ya ce: "Ubangijina shi ne wanda ke da ikon rayarwa da kashewa."157 Ma'anarsa ita ce: "Hujjar kasancewarsa ita ce bayyanar waɗannan abubuwa da ake gani bayan sun kasance ba su wanzu ba, da kuma rashin wanzuwarsu bayan sun wanzu. Wannan kanta hujja ce ta kasancewar Mai halitta kuma Mai zaɓi, domin ba za su kasance da kansu ba. Saboda haka, dole ne a sami wani wanda ya kawo su wanzuwa. Wannan shi ne Ubangijin da nake bauta masa, domin shi kaɗai ne, babu abokin tarayya." A wannan lokaci, mai muhawarar – Namrūd – ya ce: "Ni ma ina da ikon rayarwa da kashewa."158 Qatādah, Muhammad ibn Isḥāq, Suddī, da wasu suka ce: "Duba – yanzu ga mutum biyu da aka kawo mini. Suna kan layin kisa. Na ba da umarni a kashe ɗaya, a yafe wa ɗayan." Wannan shi ne ma'anar bayar da rai da kashe rai.” Da alama – kuma Allah ne mafi sani – cewa ba abin da Namrūd yake nufi ke nan ba, domin wannan ba amsa kai tsaye ba ce ga Ibrāhīm, kuma ba ta da alaƙa da tambayarsa, domin ba ta hana kasancewar Mahalicci ba. Abin da ya nufa shi ne ya yi shelar wannan matsayi ga kansa saboda taurin kai da girman kai. Ya yi kamar da wannan ne yake bayar da rai da kashe rai. Fir'auna ya bi shi a kan haka: “Ya ku shugabanni! Ba ni da masaniyar wani abin bauta a gare ku in ba ni ba.”159 Shi ya sa, a lokacin da ya yi wannan fariya, Ibrāhīm ya ce masa, “Allah yana fitar da Rana daga gabas. Sai ka fitar da ita daga yamma.”160 Ma'anarsa da haka ita ce: “Idan kana da'awar cewa kana bayar da rai da kashe rai, to wanda yake yin haka shi ne Wanda yake aiwatar da nufinsa a cikin halitta ta hanyar halittar abubuwan da ya zaɓa, da kuma hore taurari da motsinsu. Wannan Rana tana fitowa kowace rana daga gabas – idan kai abin bauta ne mai bayar da rai da kashe rai kamar yadda kake da'awa, to ka fito da ita daga yamma.” Da ya san ba zai iya ba, ba kuma zai iya bayar da amsa ba, sai ya fahimci cewa ba zai ƙara yin fariya a wannan yanayi ba, sai ya zama bebe. Allah ya ce, “Allah ba ya shiryar da mutane azzalumai.”161 Ma'anar wannan ita ce, ba Ya zaburar da su zuwa wata hujja ko dalili ba. A maimakon haka, hujjarsu ba ta da amfani a idon Ubangijinsu. Fushi yana kansu, kuma za su sha azaba mai tsanani. Fahimtar wahayi bisa wannan ma'ana ta fi kyau sosai fiye da abin da yawancin masana ma'anar hankali suke ambata, wato cewa sauyawar Ibrāhīm daga batu na farko zuwa na biyu sauyawa ne daga hujja zuwa wata hujja mafi bayyana. Wasu masana ma'anar hankali suna kiran wannan sauyawa da wata kalma marar daɗi. Duk da haka, ba haka yake ba kamar yadda suka faɗa. A maimakon haka, batu na farko yana kama da ƙudiri ga na biyu, kuma yana bayyana ƙarya na abin da Namrūd ya yi da'awa a cikin batu na farko da na biyu. Kuma ga Allah ne dukkan godiya da yabo.162
Shaida ga shawara da kammalawa
Evidence for the proposition and the conclusion
• Ƙudiri na farko: Abubuwan da suke faruwa cikin lokaci suna wanzuwa.
• First proposition: Temporal events exist.
• Ƙudurin na biyu: Kowane abu da ya faru a lokaci yana da wanda ya jawo shi.
• Second proposition: Every temporal event has someone who caused it.
Ƙarshe: Allah ne sanadin abubuwan da ke faruwa a cikin lokaci.
• Conclusion: Allah is the cause of temporal events.
Ana buƙatar shaida ga waɗannan shawarwari guda biyu, da kuma yadda suke kai ga wannan matsaya da aka ambata a baya.
Evidence for these two propositions, and how they lead to the aforementioned conclusion, is required.
Hujja ga farkon shawara: ‘Abubuwan da ke faruwa a lokaci suna wanzuwa’
Proof for the first proposition: ‘Temporal events exist’
Hujjar wannan magana ita ce hankula da lura, kamar yadda Ghazali, Ibn Rushd, Ibn Taimiyya da wasu suka nuna dangane da abubuwan da ake gani wadanda ke da farawa da karshe a lokaci. Game da sabuwar halittar duniya (da duk abin da ke cikinta), ana iya tunanin samuwarta da rashin samuwarta, saboda haka ba a dauke samuwarta a matsayin wajibi ba, illa dai mai yiwuwa ne kawai. Abubuwan da ke da yiwuwar samuwa tabbas abubuwa ne na lokaci, domin suna bukatar samuwar wani mai wajibi wanda ba ya bukatar wani, don su samu. Za a tattauna sabuwar halittar duniya da cikakken bayani a sashe na gaba, in Allah ya so.
The proof of this proposition is the senses and observation, which is what Ghazālī, Ibn Rushd, Ibn Taymiyyah, and others pointed out in relation to perceptible temporal events. On the temporality of the universe (and everything within it), both its existence and non-existence can be envisaged, and thus its existence is not considered necessary – it is only contingent. Contingent entities are most certainly temporal, as they require the existence of a non-contingent being for them to come into existence. The temporality of the universe will be discussed in more detail in the next section, by the permission of Allah.
Hankula suna masu isar da ilimi ne, ba masu yanke hukunci a kan ilimi ba. Sanin mutum game da abubuwan da ke bayyana, waɗanda yake gani kuma yake ji a kewayensa, wajibi ne. Ibn Taimiyyah ya ce: Hanyar kawo hujja ta amfani da abin da lokacin fara samuwarsa ke iya gani tana cikin Alƙur'ani, kuma malamai da Imamai na da can sun amince da ita, to amma tare da hankali na asali da kuma gaɓoɓin ji. Saboda haka, babu buƙatar kawo hujja game da fara samuwar wasu abubuwa waɗanda ana iya ganin farawarsu. Shakka game da fara samuwar abubuwan da ake iya gani suna farawa yana kai ga ruɗi, wanda ke rufe kofar duk wani ilimi. Yana kuma kai ga daidaita tsakanin mutum mai hankali da mahaukaci.
The senses are cognitive transmitters, not cognitive arbiters. A man’s recognition of the emerging things he witnesses and senses around him is necessary. Ibn Taymiyyah said, The method of bringing evidence by using that whose temporality is observable is in the Qur’an, and the ancient scholars and Imams have agreed to it, though in conjunction with instinct and the senses. With this, there is no need to offer evidence for the temporality of specific Doubting the temporality of those things whose emergence can be observed leads to sophism, which shuts down the possibility of any knowledge. It results in the equalisation of a sane person and a madman.
Hujja ga shawara ta biyu: "Kowane abin da ya faru a cikin lokaci dole ne yana da wanda ya haddasa shi"
Proof for the second proposition: ‘Every temporal event must have someone who caused it’
Hujja a nan ita ce ilhamin hankali na halitta, kamar yadda yake a cikin ka'idar dalili (causality). Lamari ne bayyananne kuma na halitta wanda ba zai yiwu a yi tunanin akasinsa ba: Ba zai yiwu a yi tunanin wanzuwar wani abu mai farawa ba tare da sanin cewa akwai dalilin da ya haifar da bayyanarsa. Ibn Taymiyyah ya ce, 'Sanin cewa abin da aka samar dole ne yana da mai samar da shi ilimi ne na halitta kuma na ilhami.' Saboda haka, wannan lamari ne da ba ya bukatar tsarin tunani bisa hujja. Maimakon haka, za a karɓe shi a matsayin gaskiya, domin ilimi ne na asali wanda ilimin ka'ida ya ginu a kansa. Abubuwan da hankali ke bukata sune ake amfani da su a matsayin hujja ga wasu abubuwa. Ba a samo su ne don a tabbatar da su ba. Suna samun tabbacinsu ne daga halittarsu. Idan ba a tabbatar da ilhamarsu ba, tushen ilimi zai zama jerin da ba shi da ƙarshe, wanda hakan zai kawo karshen yiwuwar samun wani ilimi. Saboda haka, dole ne a sami wasu gaskiyoyi na asali – ko ra'ayoyin fahimta – wadanda tsarin tunani bisa hujja ya ginu a kansu. Daya daga cikin wadannan ra'ayoyin fahimta na ilhami shi ne ka'idar dalili.
The proof for this is rational instinctiveness, as represented in the principle of causality. It is a self-evident and instinctive issue whose opposite scenario cannot be envisaged: It is not possible to imagine the existence of a temporal matter without knowing there was a cause that brought about its emergence. Ibn Taymiyyah said, ‘Knowing that an originated entity must have an originator is innate and instinctive knowledge.’164 Therefore, this is an issue that does not require a process of evidence-based reasoning. Rather, it would be accepted as fact, for it is basic knowledge, upon which theoretical knowledge is based. Rational necessities are to be used as evidence for other things. They are not there to be proven. They acquire their decisiveness from their innateness. Without affirming their instinctiveness, the basis of knowledge would become an infinite series, causing the collapse of the possibility of gaining any knowledge. Therefore, there must be some basic facts – or cognitive concepts – upon which the process of evidence-based reasoning is founded. One of these instinctive cognitive concepts is the principle of causality.
Abin sha'awa ne cewa tsarin tunani bisa shaida yana bukatar a amince da larurar hankali. Dangantakar da ke tsakanin shaida da abin da take nunawa tana karkashin wannan ka'ida, domin shaida ita ce sanadin samun ilimi game da abin da take nunawa. Kokarin abokin muhawara na kore ka'idar sanadi kawai yana nuna, a boye, cewa ya amince da ita. Game da zurfin tasirin wannan ka'ida a kan tsarin hankalin dan Adam, Ibn Taymiyyah ya ce: "Ana sane da shi ta hanyar fitrah – wadda Allah ya halicci bayinsa a kanta tare da bayyanannen hankali – cewa wani abu da ya faru bai faru ba sai da wani abu da ya jawo shi, kuma faruwar wani abu mai farawa ba tare da mai jawo shi ba za a iya kore shi nan take a matsayin karya. Wannan yana cikin dukkan 'ya'yan Adam, har kananan yara. Idan aka bugi yaro sai ya ce, 'Wane ne ya buge ni?', aka ce masa, 'Babu kowa', hankalinsa ba zai karbi cewa bugun ya faru ba tare da wanda ya aikata shi ba. Saboda haka idan wani ya tabbatar da cewa rubutu, gini, dasawa, ko irin wadannan za su iya faruwa ba tare da wanda ya yi su ba, mutane masu hankali za su dauke shi a matsayin mahaukaci ko mai yaudarar tunani, kamar wanda ya musanta abin da ake gani da kansa da ilimin dabi'a."165
Mataki na biyu na hujjar halitta da ƙirƙira: Hujjar Kosmologiya
The second level of the argument from creation and invention: The cosmological argument
Wannan hujja an santa ta da sunaye daban-daban: hujjar lokaci (argument from temporality), hujjar Kalam, hujjar duniya (argument from the universe), ko kuma hujjar sanadi ta duniya (cosmological argument). Muhimman gabatarwa da kammalawar wannan hujja suna kama da na matakin farko da muka yi bayani a kai yanzu haka.
This proof is known as the argument from temporality, the kalam argument, the argument from the universe, or the cosmological argument. The propositions and conclusion of this proof are similar to those of the first level that we just dealt with:
• Hujja ta farko: Duk abin da yake da farko dole ne yana da sanadi.
• First proposition: Anything with a beginning must have a cause.
• Hujja ta biyu: Duniya tana da farko.
• Second proposition: The universe has a beginning.
Kammalawa: Saboda haka, dole ne duniya ta kasance tana da wani dalili (sanadi).
• Conclusion: Therefore, the universe must have a cause.
Dalilin da ya fi son wanzuwarsa a kan rashin wanzuwarsa shi ne Allah.
The cause that preferred its existence over its non-existence is Allah .
Trong gaskiya, wannan hanyar tunani ba sabuwa ba ce a fagen falsafa ko ilmin kalam. A zahiri, ita ce mafi shahara a matsayin hanyar shigar ilmin kalam cikin batun wanzuwar Allah. Shi ya sa ma wasu daga cikin waɗanda suka yi amfani da wannan tunani a fagen Yammacin zamani – kamar fitaccen mai muhawara Kirista William Lane Craig – suka kira shi 'hujjar kalam ta sararin samaniya' (kalam cosmological argument); ma shi ma yana da littafi mai suna iri ɗaya. A farkon wannan littafi, ya yi wannan muhimmin amincewa: 'Wataƙila babu wani babi a tarihin hujjar sararin samaniya da yake da muhimmanci – kuma da aka fi watsi da shi a duniya – kamar na malaman tauhidi da masana falsafa na Larabawa. Ko da yake muna samun a wurinsu asali da ci gaban manyan nau'ikan hujjar sararin samaniya guda biyu, wato hujjar koma baya ta lokaci (argument from temporal regress) da hujjar dogara (argument from contingency), gudummawar waɗannan masana Musulunci kusan ana watsi da ita gaba ɗaya a cikin tarin littattafan Yammaci da littattafan da ke magana a kan wannan batu.'168
In actuality, this method of reasoning is not new in the philosophy or kalam space. In fact, it is the most famous entry point of kalam into the issue of the existence of Allah . This is why even some of those who have used this reasoning within the contemporary Western arena – such as the famous Christian debater William Lane Craig – have called it the ‘kalam cosmological argument’; he also has a book with the same name. In the beginning of this book, he makes the following important acknowledgement: ‘Probably no chapter in the history of the cosmological argument is as significant – or as universally ignored – as that of the Arabic theologians and philosophers. Although we find in them the origin and development of two of the most important versions of the cosmological argument, namely the argument from temporal regress and the argument from contingency, the contribution of these Islamic thinkers is virtually ignored in western anthologies and books on the subject.’168
Ra'ayi na farko: Faɗaɗar duniya
First concept: Expansion of the universe
A farkon tarihin ilimin sararin samaniya (cosmology), an sami wata irin yarjejeniya a kan manyan ra'ayoyi guda biyu masu alaka da yanayin duniya:
During the early stages of the history of cosmology, there was an agreement of sorts on two fundamental notions related to the nature of the universe:
1. Duniya tana da kamanni iri ɗaya, tana da halaye iri ɗaya – ita ce ɗaya a dukkan sassanta.
1. The universe is homogeneous with the same characteristics – it is the same across all its constituent parts.
2. Duniya tana cikin tsarin da aka kafa kuma ba ya canzawa.
2. The universe is in a fixed and constant pattern.
Lokacin da Einstein ya zo ya gabatar da ka'idar relativity, waɗannan zato guda biyu sun bayyana kamar suna karo da sigar farko ta dokar relativity da ya gabatar. Don magance wannan matsala, ya ba da shawarar wata madaidaiciyar lamba mai ɗorewa da ya kira "cosmological constant", domin ya daidaita tasirin nauyi. Ta haka, za a samu daidaito a sabuwar ka'idar sararin duniya da ya gabatar, wadda ita ce cewa duniya a tsaye take. Wannan ita ce ra'ayin da mafi yawan masana kimiyya suka yarda da shi game da duniya a lokacin: an siffanta duniya da kasancewa a tsaye kuma ba ta canjawa.
When Einstein came and introduced relativity, these two assumptions appeared to contradict the first iteration of the law of relativity that he theorised. To deal with this problem, he proposed a constant coefficient he called the cosmological constant in order to counterbalance the effect of gravity. That way, there would be balance in the new theory of the universe that he had proposed, which was that the universe is static. This was the generally accepted view on the universe in most scientific circles back then: The universe was characterised as being static and constant.
Daga nan, sai Firist ɗan ƙasar Belgium kuma masanin kimiyyar lissafi Georges Lemaître da masanin kimiyya ɗan ƙasar Rasha Alexander Friedmann suka fito. Suka gabatar da sabon ra'ayi game da duniya: Duniya tana faɗaɗa, kuma ta fara ne daga wani yanayi mai matuƙar yawa da matsewa. Babban goyon baya ga ra'ayin faɗaɗar duniya ya fito ne daga Edwin Hubble. A shekarar 1929, ya yi wani muhimmin bincike: Taurarin galaxies da ke kewaye da mu suna ƙara nisa daga gare mu da gudu wanda ya yi daidai da nisan da ke tsakaninmu da su; gudunsu yana ƙaruwa yayin da nisan ke ƙaruwa. An gano faɗaɗar ta hanyar hasken taurarin nan – suna bayyana da jan launi, wanda ke nuna cewa suna tafiya nesa da mu, sabanin lokacin da wani abu ke gabatowa, wanda a idon mai kallo yake bayyana da ɗan shuɗi. A shekarar 1946, George Gamow ya yi hasashen cewa, tare da faɗaɗar duniya da raguwar zafin jiki, photons sun rabu daga kwayoyin halitta cikin nasara. Wannan an wakilta shi a matsayin hasken haske da Gamow ya ɗauka yana wanzuwa, kuma yana ci gaba da haskakawa a faɗin duniya. Arno Penzias da Robert Wilson ne suka gano wannan ba da gangan ba. Daga baya an sanya wa wannan lamari suna cosmic microwave background radiation, wanda ke wakiltar ɗaya daga cikin manyan hujjoji ga ka'idar Big Bang. Wannan radiation ya bayyana kasancewar yanayin zafi mai girma fiye da kima tsakanin taurarin galaxies, kuma cewa sararin samaniya ba shi da zafin jiki na absolute zero. Maimakon haka, zafin sararin samaniya yana kusan 3 Kelvin – wannan radiation ragowar zafin Big Bang ne. Saboda wannan gano, masu binciken biyu sun lashe kyautar Nobel a fannin Physics a shekarar 1978. Wannan batu ya nuna sauyi a fagen kimiyya: ƙin yarda da Big Bang ya koma karɓuwa gabaɗaya. Abin lura shi ne cewa wannan gano daga ɓangarensu ya kasance ta hanyar haɗari. Sun ce, ‘Ko dai mun ga haihuwar duniya, ko kuma (kamar yadda wani labarin almara na astrophysics ya ce) mun ga wani tarin 81
Ƙa'ida ta biyu: Dokar thermodynamics ta biyu
Second concept: The second law of thermodynamics
A tsakiyar shekarun 1990, masana kimiyya sun yi ƙoƙarin gano wata doka da za ta bayyana dukkan al'amuran da ba sa iya komawa baya a sararin duniya. Sakamakon waɗannan ƙoƙarce-ƙoƙarce, an gano dokar thermodynamics ta biyu. Mataki na farko wajen cimma wannan shi ne lura da cewa zafi koyaushe yana tafiya daga jiki mai zafi fiye da kima zuwa jiki mai ƙarancin zafi, kuma zafin yana ci gaba da tafiya har sai duk jikunan da ke haɗe sun kai ga daidaiton zafi. Gaskiyar magana ita ce, canjin zafi misali ɗaya ne daga cikin da yawa, wanda za a iya siffanta shi da ra'ayin daidaito ko daidaiton yanayi. Haka abin yake a yaɗuwar iskar gas don cimma daidaito, da wutar lantarki, da sauran lamuran ma. Da ba a samu waɗannan al'amura a yanayi ba, da rayuwa ta zama ba zai yiwu ba. Ta wannan al'amari, iska – misali – ba ta rabuwa har iskar oxygen ta taru a gefe ɗaya na ɗakin kawai, sannan nitrogen ya taru a ɗayan gefen. Wani muhimmin ci gaba wajen siffanta wannan doka shi ne haɗinta da ra'ayin entropy. Kalma ce ta fasaha da ake amfani da ita wajen nuna adadin rikici. Duk lokacin da sikelin rashin tsari ya ƙaru a cikin wani tsari, jimlar entropies ɗin da ke cikinsa tana ƙaruwa; haka nan, idan sikelin rashin tsari ya ragu, jimlar entropies ɗin tana raguwa. Shi ya sa dokar thermodynamics take da tanadin da ya ce tsarin yana da karkata wajen canzawa daga ƙarancin entropy zuwa mafi girman entropy. A wata ma'ana, suna canzawa daga tsari zuwa rashin tsari. Abin da ya fi damunmu a nan shi ne haɗin wannan doka da sararin duniya. Sararin duniya tsari ne da aka rufe. Shi ya sa dokar thermodynamics ta biyu take aiki a kansa. A matsayinsa na tsari da aka rufe, sararin duniya yana ƙoƙarin cimma daidaito a fagage da dama. Zafi yana yaɗuwa har ya kai ga daidaito, haka nan ana samun irin wannan a rarraba makamashi, entropy, da sauran su.
In the mid-90s, scientists attempted to uncover a rule that explains all irreversible processes in the universe. As a result of those efforts, the second law of thermodynamics was discovered. The first step to realising this was to note that heat always transfers from a more heated body to a less heated one, and heat keeps on transferring until all connected bodies reach thermal equilibrium. The fact of the matter is that the thermal transfer is just one example of many, which can be described as the equilibrium concept or the balance of nature. The same can be seen vis-à-vis the spread of gases to achieve equilibrium, electricity, and other cases as well. Had these phenomena not occurred in nature, life would have been impossible. By this phenomenon, the air – for example – does not separate out so that oxygen gathers only on one side of the room and nitrogen on the other side. One significant development in the shaping of this law is its connection with the concept of entropy. It is a technical term used to denote the amount of chaos. Anytime there is an increase in the scale of disorder within a system, the sum of the entropies rises therein; likewise, when there is a disorder scale decrease, the sum of the entropies decreases. This is why the law of thermodynamics has within it a provision that states that systems are inclined to switch from low entropy to higher entropy. In other words, they switch from order to disorder. What concerns us here is the connection of this law to the universe. The universe is a closed system. This is why the second law of thermodynamics is applicable to it. As a closed system, the universe strives to achieve equilibrium in multiple fields. Heat spreads until it reaches equilibrium, and likewise the same occurs in the distribution of energy, entropy, and others as well.
Mafi shaharar ƙin yarda da hujjar halitta
The most famous objections to the argument from creation
Duk wanda ya musanta wanzuwar Allah ba zai karɓi shaidar dabi'ar wannan hujja ba, sai ya jefa jerin shakku a kanta. Waɗannan shakku ko dai suna komawa ga ƙudirin farko na hujjar, ko ƙudiri na biyu, ko kuma ga kammalawar hujjar. Anan, zan ambaci mafi muhimman shakku da suka tsaya a cikin jerin ƙin yarda da aka lissafa.
One who denies the existence of Allah would not accept the instinctive indication of this argument, and would instead cast a set of doubts on it. These doubts either go back to the argument’s first proposition, second proposition, or conclusion. Here, I shall mention the most important doubts and objections that have been listed.
Ƙin amincewa da ƙudiri na farko: "Duk abin da yake da farko dole ne yana da dalili"
Objections to the first proposition: ‘Everything that has a beginning must have a cause’
Hanya mafi shahara na shakka ga wannan tabbaci ita ce da'awar cewa wani abu na iya fitowa zuwa wanzuwa ba tare da wani dalili ba, kuma cewa yana yiwuwa wani abu mai yiwuwa ya zama wanda aka zaɓa don wanzuwa – a maimakon rashin wanzuwa – ba tare da mai zaɓi ba. Bisa wannan, yana yiwuwa duniya ta fito kawai zuwa wanzuwa ba tare da dalili ba; saboda haka, ba ta buƙatar dalilin da ya fifita wanzuwarta. Ta haka, wannan da'awa za ta sa buƙatar wani mahalicci mai zaman kansa ta zama ba ta da muhimmanci. Hujjar shakka mafi shahara tana ƙoƙarin ƙaryata abin da ke cikin ɗan adam na ilhami. Wannan ilhami yana nuna ƙa'idar dalilai (causality). An riga an bayyana cewa wannan ƙa'ida ce ta hankali ta ilhami kuma bayyananniya wadda ba ta buƙatar tabbatarwa daga waje. Mafi shahara a cikin masu shakkar wannan ƙa'ida shi ne masanin falsafar Ingilishi David Hume. Shi ne majagaba na makarantar empiricism, wadda ta bayyana cewa hankula kaɗai ne tushen ilimin ɗan adam. Ya ce.
The main way of casting doubt to this proposition is through the claim that something can come into existence without any cause, and that it is possible for a contingent entity to be chosen for existence – versus non-existence – without a chooser. Based on this, it is possible that the universe just came into existence without cause; therefore, it is not in need for a cause that preferred it to exist. As thus, this claim would make the need for an independent creator irrelevant. The most famous sceptic argument strives to negate man’s instinctive element. That instinct denotes the principle of causality. It has been previously highlighted that this principle is an instinctive and self-evident rational concept that does not require external veracity. The most famous sceptic of this principle is the English philosopher David Hume. He is a pioneer of the empiricist school, that declares that only the senses can be the source for human knowledge. He states.
Saboda haka, domin mu san ra'ayin iko ko haɗin dole sosai, bari mu bincika tasirinsa; kuma domin mu sami wannan tasiri da tabbaci mafi girma, bari mu nemo shi a dukkan tushen da zai iya fitowa daga gare su. Idan muka duba abubuwan waje a kewayenmu, muka yi la'akari da aikin dalilai, ba mu taɓa iya gano, a misali ɗaya ko guda ɗaya ba, wani iko ko haɗin dole; wata siffa da ta ɗaure sakamako da dalili, ta kuma mayar da ɗayan tabbataccen sakamakon ɗayan. Abin da kawai muka samu shi ne, ɗayan yana biyo bayan ɗayan a zahiri. Motsin ƙwallon billiard ɗaya yana tare da motsin ƙwallo na biyu. Wannan shi ne duka abin da ya bayyana ga hankula na waje. Hankali ba ya jin wani ji ko tasiri na cikin gida daga wannan jerin abubuwa; saboda haka, a kowane misali ɗaya na musamman na dalili da sakamako, babu abin da zai iya haifar da ra'ayin iko ko haɗin dole.176
To be fully acquainted, therefore, with the idea of power or necessary connexion, let us examine its impression; and in order to find the impression with greater certainty, let us search for it in all the sources, from which it may possibly be derived. When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects: consequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, anything which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion.176
Ƙin amincewa da shawara ta biyu: "Duniya tana da farko"
Objections to the second proposition: ‘The universe has a beginning’
Babban abin da ke cikin wannan magana shi ne yunkurin gabatar da wasu ra'ayoyi da za su maye gurbin ka'idar Babban Fashewa (Big Bang) ta gargajiya. Wannan ƙin yarda yana ɗauke da ra'ayin cewa sararin duniya ba shi da farko, kamar yadda yake a tsarin tsaye (static model), ko kuma yana ba da fassarar juyin halitta ga Babban Fashewa, ta yadda ya zama farkon duniyarmu kawai, amma ba farkon ƙarshe ba. Da alama ƙoƙarin gabatar da irin waɗannan ka'idoji yana da nasaba da ƙin yarda da abubuwan da ka'idar Babban Fashewa ta ƙunsa a fannin ilimi. Akwai wani masanin kimiyyar lissafi da ya nuna matuƙar ƙyama ga wannan ka'ida, kamar dai makirci ne da addini ya ƙulla. Ya ce: 'Manufar da ke ƙasa ita ce, shigo da Allah a matsayin mahalicci. Kamar dai dama ce da ilimin tauhidin Kiristanci ya jira tun lokacin da kimiyya ta fara kawar da addini daga tunanin mutane masu hankali a karni na sha bakwai.' Ra'ayin Babban Fashewa ya ba Einstein mamaki da farko, domin abin da yake nufi shi ne cewa sararin duniya – kamar yadda muke ganinsa a yau – yana da farko. Ya ce: 'Wannan yanayi (watau na faɗaɗa sararin duniya) yana damuna.' Robert Jastrow ya lura: 'Einstein bai taɓa son ra'ayin Babban Fashewa ba, saboda yana nuna farko da halitta, kuma halitta tana nuna Mahalicci.' Ya kuma ambato Eddington yana cewa: 'A matsayina na masanin kimiyya, ba na yarda kwata-kwata cewa tsarin abubuwa na yanzu ya fara da fashewa.' Jastrow ya ƙara da cewa: 'Lallai, ma'anar kwatanci a nan ita ce, yanzu mun sani cewa sararin duniya yana da farko, kuma dukkan abubuwan da ke cikinta – rayuwa, duniyoyi, taurari – ana iya komawa da su zuwa wannan farkon, kuma wannan sakamako ne na ilimin tauhidi da ya fito daga kimiyya.' Hoton da nake da shi a zuciya yayin da na rubuta wannan shi ne na ƙungiyar masana kimiyya da masana taurari suna hawan tsaunuka, har su isa kololuwa mafi tsayi, a can kuma sai su tarar da wata ƙungiyar masana tauhidi da suka zauna shekaru aru-aru suna jiransu.185
The most significant objection here is the attempt to offer alternative viewpoints that would replace the traditional theory of the Big Bang. The objection firstly entails – and maintains – the notion that the universe is pre-eternal, like the static model, or that it assigns an evolutionary angle to the Big Bang in the sense that it was the beginning relative to our universe, but not the absolute beginning. It would appear that the attempt to propose such alternative theories is ideologically driven by the rejection of the theoretical implications of the Big Bang. We have one physicist express deep resentment of this theory, as if it were a religiously driven conspiracy. He said, ‘The underlying motive is, of course, to bring in God as creator. It seems like the opportunity Christian theology has been waiting for ever since science began to depose religion from the minds of rational men in the seventeenth century.’184 The idea of the Big Bang made Einstein initially uncomfortable, as its implication was that the universe – as we see it today – has a beginning. He said, ‘This circumstance (i.e., of an expanding universe) irritates me.’ Robert Jastrow notes: Einstein never liked the idea of a big bang because it suggested a beginning and a creation, and a creation suggested a Creator.’ He quoted Eddington by saying, ‘As a scientist I simply do not believe that the present order of things started off with a bang.’ Jastrow adds: ‘Oh yes, the metaphor there was that we know now that the universe had a beginning, and that all things that exist in this universe – life, planets, stars – can be traced back to that beginning, and it’s a curiously theological result to come out of science. The image that I had in my mind as I wrote about this was a group of scientists and astronomers who are climbing up a range of mountain peaks and they come to the highest peak and the very top, and there they meet a band of theologians who have been sitting for centuries waiting for them.185
Samfurin sararin duniya mai jujjuyawa
The oscillating universe model
Samfurin duniya mai jujjuyawa ya dogara ne akan ra'ayin cewa duniya tana faɗaɗa na wani lokaci, sannan ta ruguje ta yi kwangila, sannan ta sake faɗaɗa. Wannan tsari yana maimaita kansa, yana kama da "murkushewa da tsalle-tsalle". Wannan ra'ayi yana cewa duniya a asalinta tana da zaman azal kafin, ba tare da wani ƙayyadaddun farko ba, amma tana cikin yanayin sauyi akai-akai na faɗaɗawa da kwangila. Wannan samfuri yana da matsaloli da dama. Bugu da ƙari, yana ɗauke da tunanin zaman azal kafin na duniya wanda ya yaɗu amma ba a tabbatar da shi ba. Ana iya gane wannan a cikin abin da John Gribbin ya faɗa:
The oscillating universe model is based on the idea that the universe expands for a period, then collapses and contracts, and then expands again. The process repeats itself, resembling a ‘crunch and bounce’. This view states that the universe at its core is pre-eternal without any definitive beginning, but it is in a constant state of volatility of expansion and contraction. This model has a number of problems. In addition, it carries the pervading yet unsubstantiated mentality of the pre-eternality of the universe. One can detect this in what John Gribbin said:
Babbar matsalar ka'idar Big Bang game da asalin Duniya ita ce ta falsafa – wataƙila ma ta tauhidi – me ya kasance kafin fashewar? Wannan matsala kaɗai ta isa ta ba ka'idar Steady State babban kwarin gwiwa a farko; amma yanzu da wannan ka'ida ta shiga rikici da abubuwan da ake lura da su, hanya mafi kyau ta kewaye wannan matsala ta farko ita ce wani samfuri da duniya take faɗaɗa daga wani singularity, sannan ta sake ruɗewa, kuma tana maimaita wannan zagayowar ba tare da ƙarewa ba.190
The biggest problem with the Big Bang theory of the origin of the Universe is philosophical – perhaps even theological – what was there before the bang? This problem alone was sufficient to give a great initial impetus to the Steady State theory; but with that theory now sadly in conflict with the observations, the best way round this initial difficulty is provided by a model in which the universe expands from a singularity, collapses back again, and repeats the cycle indefinitely.190
Ɗaya daga cikin ƙin yarda da ka'idar duniyar da ke jujjuyawa shi ne cewa ra'ayin ƙunƙushewa batu ne mai matuƙar muhawara a cikin al'ummar kimiyya. Alan Guth da Marc Sher sun rubuta takardar kimiyya mai taken ‘The Impossibility of a Bouncing Universe’, inda suka ambata cewa ko da an ɗauka cewa duniya tana ƙunƙushewa, ba za ta iya sake yin wani fashewa ba.
One objection to the oscillating universe theory is that the notion of contraction is an area of great debate in the scientific community. Alan Guth and Marc Sher wrote a scientific paper titled ‘The Impossibility of a Bouncing Universe’, in which they mentioned that even if it is assumed that the universes contracts, it would be unable to repeat another bang.
Samfurin hauhawar farashi mara ƙarewa
The eternal inflation model
Wannan samfurin sigar ci gaba ce ta ka'idar Big Bang. Yana tabbatar da cewa sararin duniyarmu yana da farko, amma yana ƙara da cewa hakan ba yana nufin wannan ita ce cikakkiyar farkon dukkan abu da makamashi ba. Wannan ra'ayi yana cewa abu da makamashi sun kasance tun kafin zamani. Domin bayyanawa, wannan ka'idar tana nuna cewa sassan da suka ƙunshi sararin duniya suna faɗaɗa da kuma matsewa a gudu daban-daban. Ana iya ɗaukar waɗannan sassa a matsayin sararin duniya daban-daban, ko kuma multiverse. Ko da yake yana yiwuwa sararin duniyarmu tana da wurin farko, hakan ba yana nufin dukkan sararin duniya haka suke ba. Masana kimiyya sun lura cewa wannan ka'idar ma tana fuskantar matsaloli da dama. Shi ya sa masanin sararin samaniya Andrei Linde ya yi ƙoƙarin warware matsalar da ke fuskantar wannan samfurin ta hanyar gabatar da wani gyararren sigarsa, mai suna new inflation. Amma shi kansa ya lura cewa akwai lahani a cikinta, wanda ya sa ya gabatar da shahararren samfurinsa mai suna chaotic inflation. A takaice, yana tabbatar da cewa akwai wani 'sararin uwa' wanda daga cikinsa ake haifar da sabbin sararin duniya da yawa, kuma daga cikinsu ake haifar da wasu – kamar kumfa. Wannan tsari zai ci gaba har abada. Wannan ka'ida tana nuna cewa ko da yake sabbin sararin duniya suna da farko, babban sararin duniya ba shi da farko. Yayin magana game da cikakkiyar rashin farko ta sararin duniya, ya ce: 'Mafi wahalar wannan matsala ba wanzuwar singularity kanta ba ce, a'a tambayar abin da ya kasance kafin singularity… Wannan matsala tana tsakanin physics da metaphysics.'194 Saboda wannan matsala, da kuma rashin dalilin tabbatar da wani abu fiye da fagen physics, Linde ya ɗauki samfurin da ya musanta farko da ƙarshen lokaci. Kamar yadda babban sararin duniya ba shi da farko, ya bayar da hujjar cewa sabbin sararin duniya za su ci gaba da kasancewa ba tare da ƙarewa ba. Ta haka ne ya tsere daga ra'ayin singularity da tambayoyin a priori da ke tare da shi. A ma'ana, ya guje wa neman dalili game da asalin samuwar duniya ta hanyar sanya ta ta kasance tun kafin lokaci har zuwa wani matsayi. Idan muka yi nazari kan wannan tsari – da kuma dukkan tsare-tsaren da suka gabata – za mu ga cewa babu ɗaya daga cikinsu da aka gina shi a kan kimiyya. A mafi kyawun hali, zato ne kawai. Ma'ana, hasashe ne kawai da aka tsara don kauce wa matsalar cewa duniya tana da farko mara iyaka. Shi ya sa masana kimiyyar lissafi da yawa suka yi imani cewa ba zai yiwu a tabbatar da – balle a gwada – ingancin waɗannan ra'ayoyi ta hanyar shaida ba.
This model is an evolved version of the Big Bang theory. It affirms that our universe has an origin, but it adds that this does not mean that this is the absolute beginning of all matter and energy. This view states that matter and energy are pre-eternal. To clarify, this theory proposes that the constituent parts of the universe expand and contract at varying rates. It is possible to treat these parts as various universes, or the multiverse. Though it could be the case that our universe has an origin point, this does not mean that all universes are like this. Scientists have noted that this theory has also been beset by a number of problems. This is why the cosmologist Andrei Linde attempted to solve the problem facing this model by offering a refined version of it, called new inflation. However, he himself noted that there are faults in this, which led him to propose his most famous model called chaotic inflation. In brief, it proposes that there is a ‘mother universe’ from which many new universes are spawned, and from them other universes are born – like bubbles. This process would continue forever. This theory suggests that though the new universes have a beginning, the principal universe does not. Speaking on the overall pre-eternality of the universe, he said, ‘The most difficult aspect of this problem is not the existence of the singularity itself, but the question of what was before the singularity…This problem lies somewhere at the boundary between physics and metaphysics.’194 Because of this problem, and because of the lack of impetus to affirm anything beyond the realm of physics, Linde assumed a model that negated a beginning and end for time. Just as the principal universe is pre-eternal, he argued that new universes would endlessly continue to be made. As thus, he could escape the notion of singularity and the a priori questions that come with it. In other words, he evaded searching for a cause for the emergence of the universe by making it (somewhat) pre-eternal. When we analyse this model – and all previous models – we can see that none of them are based on science. They are at best assumptions. In fact, they are just hypotheses that are designed to avoid the problem of an absolute beginning for the universe. This is why many physicists believe it is impossible to demonstrate – let alone test – the validity of these theories through evidence.
Ƙin amincewa da ƙarshen cewa: "Allah ne Wanda Ya fito da duniya daga babu zuwa wanzuwa" Wannan ma'anar: Allah ne Ya fito da duniya daga babu zuwa wanzuwa.
Objections to the conclusion ‘God is the One Who brought the universe out of nothingness into existence’
Ƙin farko: Me yasa Allah?
First objection: Why Allah?
Asalin wannan ƙin yarda shi ne: Ko da an ɗauka cewa akwai wani dalili a bayan bayyanar duniya, ta yaya ake ɗaukar Allah ta atomatik a matsayin wannan dalili? Wannan yana cikin ƙin yarda mafi shahara da masu kafirci ke yi. Abin mamaki shi ne cewa lokacin da Richard Dawkins ya tattauna hujjar lokaci (argument from temporality) don tabbatar da kasancewar Allah a cikin littafinsa mai suna The God Delusion, sai ya gabatar da wannan ƙin yarda kawai.
The background to this objection is this: Even if it is assumed that there is a cause behind the emergence of the world, how is Allah then automatically assumed to be that cause? This is one of the most famous objections of atheists. What is strange is that when Richard Dawkins discussed the argument from temporality for the existence of God in his infamous book The God Delusion, he offered only this objection:
Ko da mun yarda da alatu mai shakka na kirkirar mai-dakatarwa ba tare da iyaka ba, mu sanya masa suna kawai saboda muna bukatarsa, babu wani dalili ko kadan da zai sa mu danganta masa daya daga cikin sifofin da aka saba dangantawa da Allah: iko mara iyaka, ilimi mara iyaka, alheri, kirkira mai tsari, balle sifofin dan Adam kamar sauraron addu'o'i, gafarta zunubai da karanta zukatan mutane.199
Even if we allow the dubious luxury of arbitrarily conjuring up a terminator to an infinite regress and giving it a name, simply because we need one, there is absolutely no reason to endow that terminator with any of the properties normally ascribed to God: omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, creativity of design, to say nothing of such human attributes as listening to prayers, forgiving sins and reading innermost thoughts.199
Daga baya, sai ya mayar da hankali ga siffofin Allah, da yadda zai yiwu waɗannan su zama siffofinsa. Idan aka ƙara bincike, wannan dabara daga gare shi – da kuma daga masu kafirci gabaɗaya – karkatarwa ce ta ɓoye ainihin batun da ake tattaunawa, ta mayar da shi kan wani batu daban gaba ɗaya. Duk wanda ya yi amfani da wannan a matsayin hujja, zai yi haka ne don tabbatar da wanzuwar wanda ba ya bukatar wani, ba siffofinsa ba. Tsallake daga babban batun muhawara zuwa wani al'amari da masu gabatar da hujja ba su taɓa ba, yana nuna ko dai rashin adalci, ko kuma jahilcin ƙa'idojin muhawara da tattaunawar falsafa. Ku yi la'akari da abubuwa masu zuwa:
Then he focuses on the attributes of Allah , and how it is possible for these to be His attributes. Upon further analysis, this strategy on his part – and by atheists in general – is a strategic evasion of the point under discussion, landing it onto a completely separate issue. Whoever uses this in evidence would be doing so to prove the existence of the non-contingent being, not its attributes. Jumping from the central point of the argument to an issue not tackled by its proponents reflects either a lack of impartiality or wanton ignorance of the rules of debate and philosophical discussion. Consider the following:
Ƙin farko: Allah na ƙarya? Ƙi na biyu: Allah na giɓi
Second objection: God of the gaps
Wannan wata kuskure ce daga ɓangaren masu ƙaryata Allah. Atheists suna cewa, "Amsar masu imani ga tambayar 'Mene ne sanadin fitowar duniya?' cewa Allah ne, jahilci ne game da dangantakar sanadi da sakamako. Kamar dai masu imani suna cike giɓin jahilcinsu ne da irin wannan amsa. Masu imani suna jaddada wannan matsayin nasu ta hanyar roƙon jahilci, kuma suna amfani da gazawar abokin hamayyarsu wajen warware shi a matsayin shaida – ba komai ba. Ba su bayar da wata hujja ba don tabbatar da ingancin shaidarsu." Wannan magana ma wata kuskure ce daga ɓangaren masu ƙaryata. Tabbatar da wanzuwar Mahalicci a gare mu ba ya dogara ne akan gazawarmu wajen bayyana ainihin sanadin duniya, kuma ba jifa ce kawai ta makanta ba inda muka shigar da ra'ayin Allah don warware matsalar da ba mu da amsarta. Maimakon haka, imaninmu sakamako ne na jerin dalilai na hankali da na ɗabi'a waɗanda ke kai ga wannan ƙarshe. Imaninmu cewa Allah ne sanadin wanzuwar duniya yana kan ilimi, ba kan jahilci ba. Kamar yadda aka tabbatar a baya, duniya tana da farko da ƙarshe (mahaluƙi ce mai farawa). Saboda haka, ko dai tana da sanadi a bayanta, ko kuwa ba ta da sanadi; na ƙarshen ba zai yiwu ba, domin abubuwan da suke da farawa dole ne su kasance da sanadi. Sanadin kuma ko dai shi kansa abin ne mai farawa, ko kuwa wani abu ne daban; na farkon ba zai yiwu ba, domin da can ya kasance ba ya wanzu kafin fitowarsa, kuma abin da ba shi da wanzuwa daga kansa ba zai iya bayar da wanzuwa ga wani abu ba. Don haka, tunda ya fito daga wani sanadi daban, wannan sanadin ko dai shi ma mai farawa ne ko kuma marar farawa; idan mai farawa ne, to wannan jerin dole ne ya ƙare a sanadi marar farawa, domin jerin sanadoshi marasa iyaka ba zai yiwu ba. Don haka a bayyane yake cewa matsayinmu ba wai kawai sha'awar cike giɓin jahilci ba ne, a'a amsa ce mai tunani da hankali wacce ta dogara da hujjoji bayyanannu da babu buƙatar tabbatarwa.
This is a well-known objection. Atheists say, ‘The theists’ answer to the question “What is the cause for the emergence of the world?” with Allah is ignorance of causality. It is as if theists are filling in the gaps of their ignorance with such an answer. Theists emphasise this ignorant stance of theirs by appealing to ignorance, and thus use as evidence the opponent’s inability to dismantle it – nothing more. They fail to offer any proof for the evidentiary veracity of their statement.’ This rhetoric is another error on the part of atheists. Our affirmation of the existence of the Creator is not based on our inability to explain the ultimate cause of the universe, nor is it merely a blind leap of faith in which we shoved in the concept of God to solve a problem for which we have no answer. Rather, our belief is a result of a set of rational and instinctive propositions that offers this conclusion. Our belief of Allah being the cause for the existence of the universe is based on knowledge, not ignorance. As proven earlier, the universe is temporal. It is therefore either temporal with a cause behind it, or without a cause; the latter is impossible as temporal entities must have a cause. A cause would be either the temporal entity itself or something different; the former is impossible as it would have been non-existent before emergence – something that does not possess existence for itself cannot confer existence onto something else. Therefore, as it emerged from a separate cause, that cause must in itself be temporal or atemporal; if the former, this series must end at an atemporal cause, as infinite causality is impossible. Therefore, it becomes clear that our position is not merely the desire to fill in the gap left by ignorance, but is rather a considered and rational answer that relies on self-evident propositions.
Ƙin ƙarshe: Me yasa aka yi gaggawa? Kimiyya za ta bayyana dalili
Third objection: Why the haste? Science will reveal the cause
Wannan ƙin yarda ainihin haɗuwa ce ta, a gefe guda, takaita ma'anar kimiyya sosai, sannan a gefe guda kuma wuce gona da iri a kanta. Masu musun Allah suna samo falsafar wanzuwarsu daga kallon kayan zahiri kawai: Suna yarda ne kawai da abin da ilimomin gwaji suka tabbatar, kuma suna karɓar bayanin abubuwa na halitta da na zahiri kawai. Saboda haka, babu wuri ga wani bayani na ruhaniya ko na bayan-zahiri. Duba abin da masanin nan mai musun Allah, Scott Todd, ya faɗa – ya bayyana a sarari abin da wannan hanyar tunani ke nufi: ‘Ko da dukkan bayanai suna nuni ga wani mai zane mai hikima, irin wannan zato an fitar da shi daga kimiyya saboda ba na halitta ba ne.’202
This objection is actually a combination of a gross restriction of the definition of science on the one hand, and an exaggeration of it on the other. Atheists draw their existential philosophy from a purely material view: They have faith in only what the empirical sciences dictate, and they accept only natural material explanations for phenomena. As thus, there is no room for any supernatural or metaphysical explanation. Check what the atheist Scott Todd said – he stated in clear terms what this outlook meant: ‘Even if all the data point to an intelligent designer, such a hypothesis is excluded from science because it is not naturalistic.’202
Masanin Darwin kuma marar imani da Allah, Richard Lewontin, ya ce: "Shirinmu na karɓar iƙirarin kimiyya da ke saba wa hankali shi ne mabuɗin fahimtar gwagwarmayar gaske tsakanin kimiyya da abin da ba na zahiri ba. Muna goyon bayan kimiyya duk da bayyananniyar wautar wasu daga cikin ginshiƙanta, duk da gazawarta wajen cika yawancin alkawuranta masu girma na lafiya da rayuwa, duk da yadda ƙungiyar masana kimiyya ke jure labarai marasa tabbaci na 'kamar haka ne kawai', saboda muna da ƙudurin farko, wato ƙudurin kafa komai akan abu. Ba wai hanyoyi da cibiyoyin kimiyya ne ke tilasta mana karɓar bayanin abu na duniyar da ake gani ba, a'a, akasin haka, muna tilasta kanmu, saboda riƙon da muke yi tun farko ga musabbabi na zahiri, mu ƙirƙiri tsarin bincike da jerin ra'ayoyi da ke samar da bayanai na zahiri, ko su saba wa hankali ko su dami wanda ba shi da ilimi. Haka kuma, abu na zahiri shi ne cikakke, domin ba za mu bar 'Ƙafar Allah' ta shiga ƙofa ba."203
The Darwinist and atheist Richard Lewontin said, Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common sense is the key to an understanding of the real struggle between science and the supernatural. We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfil many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door.203
Ƙi na huɗu: Duniya ba ta da wani dalili kwata-kwata, ko kuma ta jawo kanta.
Fourth objection: The universe has no cause at all, or it caused itself
Wannan ra'ayi ya yaɗu a tsakanin ƙungiyoyin masu kafirci kwanan nan. Ya zama babbar hujja ga hujjar halitta da ƙirƙira. Wannan hujja tana ɗaukar duniya a matsayin mai isa ga kanta, ba ta dogara ga mai kafa ta ba, ko kuma tana da ikon yin kanta, ko kuma yana yiwuwa ta fito daga babu komai. Bertrand Russell ne ya gabatar da wannan ra'ayi a littafinsa Why I Am Not a Christian, kuma an yi bayani mai yawa a kansa a The Grand Design, wanda masanin ilimin kimiyyar zahiri mashahuri Stephen Hawking da Leonard Mlodinow suka rubuta tare. Haka kuma wannan ita ce iƙirarin da fitaccen masanin kafirci Lawrence Krauss ya yi a littafinsa A Universe From Nothing, inda yake iƙirarin cewa duniya – bisa la'akari da ilimin kimiyyar zamani – tana iya fitowa daga babu komai ba tare da buƙatar wata halitta ta waje da za ta bayyana wannan fitowa ba; a maimakon haka, fitowar duniya daga babu komai ce. A farkon The Grand Design, akwai tattaunawa a kan irin tambayoyin da littafin ke nufin ba da amsa a kansu, da kuma tushen bayanan da ke ciyar da waɗannan amsoshi:
This idea has spread across atheist circles recently. It has become a key objection to the argument from creation and invention. This objection claims the universe to be self-sufficient and not dependent on a founder, or that it has the power to make itself, or that it is possible it emerged from nothing. This notion was proposed by Bertrand Russell in his book Why I Am Not a Christian, and is covered extensively in The Grand Design, co-authored by the famous theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow. It is the same claim made by the famous atheist Lawrence Krauss in his book A Universe From Nothing, in which he claims that the universe – in light of modern physics – can emerge from nothing without the need for an external entity that would explain this emergence; rather, the emergence of the universe is from nothing. In the beginning of The Grand Design, there is a discussion on the type of questions that the book seeks to offer an answer to, and the source of information that feeds into these answers:
Kowannenmu yana wanzuwa ne na ɗan lokaci kaɗan, kuma a cikin wannan lokacin muna binciko ƙaramin sashe ne kawai na dukan duniya. Amma ɗan adam halitta ce mai son sanin abubuwa. Muna mamaki, muna neman amsoshi. Muna rayuwa a wannan babbar duniya wadda a wasu lokuta take da kirki, a wasu lokuta kuma da zalunci, kuma idan muka dubi sammai masu girma a sama, mutane sun kasance suna tambayar tambayoyi masu yawa: Ta yaya za mu fahimci duniyar da muke ciki? Yaya sararin samaniya yake aiki? Menene ainihin gaskiya? Daga ina duk wannan ya fito? Shin sararin samaniya yana buƙatar mahalicci? Yawancinmu ba ma ciyar da mafi yawan lokacinmu muna damuwa da waɗannan tambayoyi ba, amma kusan dukanmu muna damuwa da su a wasu lokuta. Bisa al'ada waɗannan tambayoyi ne na falsafa, amma falsafa ta mutu. Falsafa ba ta ci gaba da ci gaban zamani na kimiyya ba, musamman ilimin kimiyyar lissafi. Masana kimiyya sun zama masu ɗaukar fitilar bincike a cikin neman ilimin mu. Manufar wannan littafi ita ce bayar da amsoshin da sabbin gano-gano da ci gaban ka'idoji suka nuna. Suna kai mu ga sabon hoto na sararin samaniya da matsayinmu a cikinta wanda ya bambanta sosai da na gargajiya, har ma ya bambanta da hoton da za mu iya zana shekaru goma ko ashirin da suka wuce.209
Ƙin ƙarshe: To wa ya halicci Allah?
Fifth objection: So who created Allah?
Wannan na ɗaya daga cikin shahararrun ƙin yarda da masu ƙaryata Allah ke yi wa masu imani. Yana ɗaya daga cikin manyan shakku na hankali da masu ƙaryata Allah ke gabatarwa game da akida ta Allah a cikin tattaunawarsu. Idan an yi tunani a kai sosai, sai a ga cewa kawai maganganun jayayya ne – ba wani abu fiye da haka ba. Tsarin imaninsu gabaɗaya yana dogara ne a kan ra'ayin cewa Allah bai halicci duniya ba. Saboda haka, tambayar 'To wa ya halicci Allah?' za ta zama irin abin da masu imani sukan fuskanta. A mafi yawan yanayi, waɗannan tambayoyi kayan aiki ne kawai na jayayya marar amfani da ƙin yarda.
This is one of the most famous atheist objections against believers. It is a key rational doubt against theism in atheist discourse. Upon contemplation, it is just sparring rhetoric – nothing more. Their entire belief system rests upon the notion that Allah did not create the world. Therefore, their objection ‘So who created Allah?’ would be typical of believers’ experiences. In most contexts, these are simply tools for unfruitful quarrel and objection.
Lokacin nazarin yawancin masu tsattsauran ra'ayin rashin imani da suka shuɗe, za mu iya gano cewa da yawa daga cikinsu suna da wannan ƙin yarda, kuma yadda wannan tambaya ta mamaye tunani da matsa lamba ga yawancin mutane. Tana daga cikin manyan shakku da suka haifar da karkata zuwa rashin imani a zukatan mutane da yawa. John Stuart Mill, Bertrand Russell, David Hume, da Stephen Hawking duk sun bayyana cewa wannan tambaya tana wakiltar matsala ga akidar imani da Allah, wadda a ƙarshe ta sa su karɓi rashin imani, ko kuma su gamsu da shi. An lura cewa wannan ita ce babbar tambaya a littafin The God Delusion. Kusan a kowane hali, wannan tambaya tana bayyana sosai, kuma tana kan gaba, a cikin maganganun New Atheism, wanda za a iya gane shi ta hanyar nazarin rubuce-rubucensa, kasidunsa, muhawararsa, da sauran kayan aikinsa. Matsalolin da wannan tambaya ta haifar za a iya kawar da su ta hanyar abubuwa masu zuwa:
When studying the many atheist personalities that have gone by, we can easily uncover how many had this objection, and how this question took control and pressurised many minds. It is one of the most important doubts that introduced the inclination to atheism in many people. John Stuart Mill, Bertrand Russell, David Hume, and Stephen Hawking have all stated that this question represents a problem in theism, which ultimately led them to adopt, or become convinced by, atheism. It is noted that this is also the central question in the book The God Delusion. In almost every instance, this question is heavily present in, and at the forefront of, New Atheism discourse, which one can detect by studying its writings, articles, debates, and other materials. The problems brought about by this question can be dispelled by the following points:
1. Wannan tambaya ba sabuwa ba ce ko kaɗan. A gaskiya, tambaya ce ta al'ada da mutane kan yi tunani a kanta. A ƙarshe dai wata shawara ce ta mugun shaiɗan, kuma tana kan tushen wata hujja mai matuƙar kuskure. 2. Wannan tambaya ta dogara ne a kan kuskuren da maganganun masu kafircin Allah (atheist) suka haifar. Babban rashin fahimta ne game da ainihin yanayin hujjar hankali ga imani da masu imani ke gabatarwa. Tambayar tana ɗauke da wannan tsari na tunani game da hujjar halitta da ƙirƙira domin tabbatar da wanzuwar Allah:
Ana ambaton hujjar dogaro (al-hujjah min al-imkan) tare da hujjar wucin-gadi (al-hujjah min al-hadith), domin suna da jigo guda da kamanceceniya a tsakaninsu. Duk da cewa suna kai ga sakamako guda, a zahiri hujjoji ne guda biyu daban.
122 The argument from contingency was mentioned alongside the argument from temporality, as they have common themes and are mutually similar. Though they lead to the same outcome, they are actually two separate proofs.
123 Bayanin mai fassara: Ya bambanta da kakansa, wanda shi ma ana kiransa Ibn Rushd.
123 Translator’s note: As opposed to his grandfather, who was also known as Ibn Rushd.
124 Al-Ḥajj, 73.
124 Al-Ḥajj, 73.
Zai fi daidai a ce, "halittar da aka ƙirƙira wadda take wanzuwa", kamar yadda mahallin magana ya nuna a fili.
125 It would have been more accurate to say, ‘the invented existing entity’, as is clear from the context.
126 Al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij al-Adillah, shafi na 119. 127 Al-Ṭūr, 35.
126 Al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij al-Adillah, p. 119. 127 Al-Ṭūr, 35.
128 Maryam, 67.
128 Maryam, 67.
Maryam, 9.
129 Maryam, 9.
130 Dar' Ta'āruḍ al-'Aql wa al-Naql, 7/219. Duba kuma Sharḥ al-'Aqīdah al-Aṣbahāniyyah, shafi na 51.
130 Dar’ Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wa al-Naql, 7/219. See also Sharḥ al-ʿAqīdah al-Aṣbahāniyyah, p. 51.
131 Al-Dhāriyāt, 21.
131 Al-Dhāriyāt, 21.
Dar' Ta'aruḍ al-'Aql wa al-Naql, 3/123.
132 Dar’ Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wa al-Naql, 3/123.
133 Al-Ṭūr, 35.
133 Al-Ṭūr, 35.
134 Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr, 7/437.
134 Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr, 7/437.
Suratut-Tur, aya ta 35.
135 Al-Ṭūr, 35.
136 Al-Ṭūr, 36.