Hoja ya fitrah kuhusu Allah haikomei tu kwenye kipengele kilichopo katika nafsi, ambacho kinamlazimu mtu kukubali kuwepo kwa Muumba. Badala yake, inawezekana fitrah inafunua ukweli huu wa msingi kwa njia kadhaa na katika ngazi mbalimbali.

The argument from fiṭrah for Allah  is not limited to the element that exists in the soul, which requires a person to affirm that there is a Creator. Rather, it is possible that the fiṭrah reveals this substantial fact in a number of ways and at various levels.

Miongoni mwa mambo ambayo mtu anaweza kuyafahamu moja kwa moja ni baadhi ya ukweli wa kimaumbile na wa kiakili, unaoitwa elimu ya dharura au ukweli dhahiri usiohitaji uthibitisho. Hizi ni elimu zilizomo ndani ya maumbile ya mwanadamu, na nafsi huzipata bila uchambuzi wala kufikiri. Hii inatofautiana na aina ya elimu inayoitwa elimu ya nadharia, ambayo inaweza kupatikana tu kwa njia ya uchambuzi na kufikiri.

Of the issues a person can automatically grasp are certain natural and rational facts, referred to as intuitive knowledge or self-evident truths. These are innately known and are acquired by the soul without any analysis or reasoning. This is in contrast to the type of knowledge that is known as theoretical knowledge, which can be acquired only via analysis and reasoning.

Tofauti kati ya hizi mbili inapaswa kuwa wazi; kwa kweli, inapaswa kuwa dhahiri yenyewe kiasi kwamba kila mtu aitambue mara moja, tofauti na maarifa ya kinadharia ambayo yanaweza kukabiliwa na shaka na pingamizi. Pingamizi kama hizo zinaweza kukataliwa kwa uchambuzi na hoja. Ni asili ya maarifa ya kiangazi kwamba hayategemei ushahidi; badala yake, maarifa ya kiangazi yenyewe hutumika kama ushahidi. Maarifa ya kinadharia hurejeshwa kwa maarifa ya kiangazi ili kuthibitishwa. Akifafanua hili, Ibn Ḥazm anasema, 'Kila kitu kinachoweza kupatikana mara moja kupitia mantiki au hisi hakihitaji ushahidi kabisa. Badala yake, ni aina hizi za ukweli ambazo kila mtu anapaswa kuzitumia kama ushahidi na kukataa, baada ya hapo fikra zake za kinadharia zinaweza kuchukuliwa kuwa sahihi au si sahihi.'42

The difference between the two should be clear; in fact, it should be self evident such that every person must instantly recognise it, as opposed to theoretical knowledge that can be prone to doubt and objection. Such objections may be repelled through analysis and reasoning. It is in the nature of intuitive knowledge that it is not dependent on proof; rather, intuitive knowledge itself is used as evidence. Theoretical knowledge is referred back to intuitive knowledge for verification. Explaining this, Ibn Ḥazm says, ‘Whatever that can be acquired immediately through logic or the senses is not in need of evidence at all. Rather, it is these types of facts that everyone ought to use as evidence and refutation, after which his theoretical reasoning can be deemed to be correct or incorrect.’42

Muʿallimī alisema, ‘Kwa upande wa maarifa ya asili na yanayojidhihirisha yenyewe, wanamantiki wanakubaliana kwamba hayo ndiyo sarafu ya mantiki. Kwa upande mwingine, kupata maarifa kwa njia ya uchambuzi kunaweza kutamaniwa tu pale yanapojengwa juu ya hayo ya kwanza na kuhusishwa nayo.’43 Hoja haiwezi kufanya kazi bila kuwepo kwa maarifa ya moja kwa moja (ya kiakili). Bila hayo, mzunguko wa hoja na kurudi nyuma bila mwisho vingetokea, na hivyo kusababisha kuanguka kwa mfumo wote wa hoja. Akifafanua hili, Ibn Taymiyyah alisema, ‘Maarifa yanayopatikana kwa kuchambua ushahidi lazima yarejee kwenye kauli za moja kwa moja. Maarifa yoyote yasiyo ya moja kwa moja lazima yarejee kwenye maarifa ya moja kwa moja. Ikiwa kauli za kinadharia zinathibitishwa mara kwa mara kwa kufanana nazo, mzunguko wa hoja au kurudi nyuma bila mwisho kwa sababu kungetokea. Kwa lazima na kwa makubaliano ya wanamantiki, yote mawili ni yasiyofaa kwa sababu kadhaa.’

Muʿallimī said, ‘As for instinctive and self-evident information, the logicians agree that it is the currency of logic. On the other hand, deriving information from analytical knowledge can only be aspired when it is based on, and attributed to, the former.’43 Reasoning cannot work without the existence of intuitive information. Without it, circular reasoning and infinite regress would come as a result, causing the collapse of the entire system of reasoning. Explaining this, Ibn Taymiyyah said, ‘Knowledge that is acquired by analysing proof must refer back to intuitive propositions. Any piece of knowledge that is not intuitive must refer back to intuitive knowledge. If theoretical propositions are constantly proven by their like, circular reasoning or infinite regress of causality would ensue. By necessity and the agreement of logicians, both are improper from a number of angles.

Maarifa iliyopatikana kwa nadharia ni ile inayopatikana kutoka kwa kauli zinazojulikana ambazo hazihitaji uchambuzi. Kama kauli hizo nazo zingekuwa za nadharia, zingekuwa kwa upande wake zinategemea kauli nyingine, na hivyo kungesababisha kuwepo kwa kauli za nadharia zisizo na kikomo ndani ya mwanadamu. Mwanadamu ni wa kitambo; alikuja kuwepo baada ya kuwa hakuwepo. Maarifa yaliyomo moyoni mwake ni ya kitambo. Kama maarifa yaliyomo moyoni mwake hayakupatikana bila ya kuwepo kwa maarifa yaliyotangulia, ingemaanisha kwamba moyo wake ungekuwa hauna maarifa tangu mwanzo. Kwa hiyo, ni lazima kuwepo na taarifa za msingi zinazojidhihirisha zenyewe ambazo Allah (SWT) huziweka ndani ya moyo wa mtu. Lengo la hoja yoyote ni kurejea kwenye aina hii ya taarifa zinazojidhihirisha zenyewe. Zaidi ya hayo, taarifa zinazojidhihirisha zenyewe wakati mwingine huwekwa chini ya shaka na minong'ono, kama shaka za wanasafsatai wanaotia dosari taarifa zinazoonekana na zinazojidhihirisha zenyewe. Hizi ni pamoja na, kwa mfano, shaka alizotoa Raazi mwanzoni mwa kitabu chake al-Muḥaṣṣal, ambazo tumezijadili mahali pengine.

Acquired theoretical knowledge is that which is gained from known propositions that do not require analysis. Had those propositions been theoretical as well, they would have in turn been contingent on other propositions, leading to an infinity of theoretical propositions inside man. Man is temporal – he came into existence after having been non-existent. The knowledge in his heart is temporal. If the knowledge in his heart was not acquired without knowledge prior to it, it would mean that his heart would be without knowledge right from the start. Therefore, it is necessary that there are basic self-evident pieces of information that Allah places within a person’s heart. The aim of any proof is to refer back to this type of self-evident information. Furthermore, self-evident information is sometimes subject to doubts and whispers, like the doubts of sophists who cast aspersions on tangible and self-evident information. These include, for example, the doubts cast by Rāzī in the beginning of his al Muḥaṣṣal, which we have discussed elsewhere:

Shaka zinazoharibu maarifa hiyo haziwezi kuondolewa kwa hoja, kwa sababu lengo la hoja ni kurejea kwenye maarifa hayo ya kiasili. Kwa hiyo shaka inapoingia, njia ya uchambuzi na utafiti inafungwa. Ndiyo maana watu wanaokataa maarifa yanayoonekana na ya kiasili hawapaswi kujadiliwa nao. Kwa kweli, ikiwa mtu kama huyo anaendelea kuwa mkaidi, anapaswa kuadhibiwa hadi akubali ukweli. Ikiwa amekosea kutokana na uharibifu unaoyapata hisia zake au akili yake, hawezi tu kuelewa maarifa hayo, au kwa sababu nyingine yoyote, anapaswa kutibiwa ili apate masharti ya kupata elimu na aweze kuondoa mambo yanayoizuia. Ikiwa bado hawezi kufahamu kwa sababu ya uharibifu katika tabia yake, anapaswa kutibiwa kwa dawa zinazoshughulikia hilo, au kwa dua, ruqyah, uangalizi maalum, n.k. Vinginevyo, aachwe peke yake.44

Doubts that are injurious to that information cannot be repelled with proof. This is because the aim of proof is that it refers back to that intuitive information. Therefore, when doubt creeps in, the path to analysis and research is closed off. This is why those who deny tangible and instinctive information are not to be debated. In fact, if such a person is being obstinate, he should be disciplined until he admits the truth. If he is mistaken due to corruption afflicting his senses or his mind, is simply unable to understand that information, or for any other reason, he should be treated so that he can gain the prerequisites of acquiring knowledge and be able to dispel those things that block it. If he is still unable to comprehend because of corruption in his temperament, he should be treated with medicament that deals with this, or with supplication, ruqyah, special attention, etc. Otherwise, he should be left alone.44

Jaribio lolote la kuthibitisha usahihi wa kweli zilizo dhahiri kwa yenyewe kupitia hoja ni gumu sana. Kwa kweli, linaweza kuwa lisilowezekana na linaweza kumpelekea mtu kuzitilia shaka, hivyo kuangukia katika moja ya aina nyingi za upotoshaji wa hoja (safsata). Vyovyote vile, mchakato kama huo ungekuwa sawa na kuiadhibu nafsi bila faida yoyote. Akifafanua jambo hili, Ibn Taymiyyah alitoa mfano mzuri wa kuonyesha asili ya tatizo hili:

Any attempt to demonstrate the veracity of self-evident truths through reasoning is very hard. In fact, it can be impossible and may lead a person to doubt them, thus falling into one of the many types of sophism. In any case, such a process would be tantamount to torturing the soul without any benefit whatsoever. Expounding on this, Ibn Taymiyyah offered a fine example to demonstrate the nature of this problem:

Wakati mambo yanayoeleweka kwa silika yanapojadiliwa kwa njia za kimantiki zisizo za silika, mtu atakuwa anaiumiza nafsi yake bure. Hili linafanana na mtu ambaye ameambiwa agawanye kiasi fulani cha fedha kwa usawa miongoni mwa watu kadhaa – kazi ambayo inapaswa kufanyika bila shida. Mtu fulani anaweza kumwambia, “Subiri, huwezi kuigawanya bila kujua maana ya kugawanya na bila kutofautisha kati ya kugawanya na kuzidisha. Kugawanya ni kinyume cha kuzidisha. Kuzidisha hufanyika kwa kuunganisha vitengo vya namba moja na vitengo vya namba nyingine, ilhali kugawanya hufanyika kwa kugawanya vitengo vya namba moja kwa vitengo vya namba nyingine. Ndiyo maana kigawe kikizidishwa kwa kigawanyo, matokeo ni kigawanyiwa, na namba inayotokana na kuzidisha ikigawanywa kwa mojawapo ya namba mbili zilizozidishwa, matokeo ni namba nyingine…” “Nilichosema kuhusu maana ya kuzidisha si sahihi kwa kuwa kinahusu kuzidisha namba kamili pekee, si namba za sehemu. Maelezo yanayojumuisha yote yangekuwa: Kuzidisha ni jumla ambayo uhusiano wake na mojawapo ya namba zilizozidishwa ni sawa na uhusiano wa namba moja na namba nyingine…” “Kuzidisha nusu kwa robo kunatoa robo ya nusu, yaani moja ya nane. Uhusiano wa moja ya nane na robo ni sawa na uhusiano wa nusu na namba moja.” Ingawa kauli hizi zote ni sahihi, ni wazi kwamba mtu aliye na fedha na anayetaka kuigawa kwa usawa miongoni mwa watu kadhaa angeteseka bure kama angejilazimisha kuelewa haya yote kabla ya kugawanya fedha hizo. Huenda hata asielewe mambo haya na akaona yana ugumu.45

When instinctively comprehended matters are reasoned through non instinctive means, one will be tormenting the soul in vain. This is similar to a man who is told to divide a certain sum of money into equal portions among a number of individuals – a task that should be performed without difficulty. Someone may say to him, “Wait, you cannot divide it without knowing the definition of division and without drawing a distinction between division and multiplication. Division is the opposite of multiplication. The latter is carried out by compounding the units of one number by the units of the other, whereas the former is achieved by dividing the units of one number by the units of the other. This is why when the quotient is multiplied by the divisor, the result is the dividend, and when the number resulting from multiplication is divided by one of the two numbers multiplied, the result is the other number… “What I have said about the definition of multiplication is not valid because it applies to the multiplication of integers, not fractional numbers. An all-inclusive definition would be: Multiplication is the sum total whose relation to one of the numbers multiplied is the same as the relation of figure one to the other number… “The multiplication of one-half by one quarter results in one-eighth. The relation of one-eighth to one quarter is the same as the relation of one-half to the figure one.” Although these are all valid statements, it is clear that the person who has money and wishes to distribute it equally among a number of individuals would agonise in vain if he were to force himself to understand all this before he divided the money. He may not even understand these matters and may find them problematic.’45

Akieleza kile ambacho mchakato wa kufikiri kwa ajili ya ukweli dhahiri unaweza kupelekea, anaongeza: "Taarifa nyingi ni za lazima na za kiasili. Mtu akijilazimisha kutoa hoja kwa ajili ya hizo, atapata shida. Atajiingiza katika shaka, iwe kwa sababu itapelekea kauli ndefu, kwa sababu ni vigumu kuzifungua, au kwa sababu zote mbili."46

Explaining what the process of reasoning for self-evident truth can lead to, he adds: ‘A lot of information is necessary and instinctive. If a person wants to force himself to offer reasoning for that, it would be difficult for him. He would land himself into doubt, whether because it would lead to lengthy propositions, because they are difficult to unlock, or both.46

Ikiwa kuna wakati ambapo mambo ambayo ni dhahiri yenyewe yanahitaji kufanyiwa hoja, basi hilo kwa kweli linaonyesha kwamba mambo hayo ni ya kimaumbile na ya kiasili, si kwamba yanathibitisha kwamba ni sahihi. Kuna tofauti kati ya kufichua asili ya kitu na kujaribu kutoa ushahidi wa ukweli wake. Ya kwanza ni sawa na kuwakumbusha wasiojali na wasahaulifu. Ndiyo maana Ibn Taymiyyah, alipozungumzia ushahidi unaothibitisha kuwepo kwa Allah (SWT), alisema: "Basi anapoona alama zinazolazimu kuwepo Kwake, zitakuwa ni kitu cha kufumbua macho kutoka katika wigo huo, kama alivyosema Yeye: {Hakika Shetani anapowanong'oneza wale wanaomcha Allah, wao hukumbuka, basi ghafla wanaona kwa uwazi}. Pia itakuwa ni ukumbusho wa kumkumbuka Allah wakati usahaulifu na kutojali vinapowashinda. Kwa hiyo, ni kitu cha kufumbua macho ili kuondoa ujinga ambao mtu anaweza kuupata, na ukumbusho wa kuondoa kutojali kwake. Hii ni licha ya ukweli kwamba utambuzi wa msingi wa kuwepo kwa Allah umo ndani ya nafsi kwa kimaumbile bila njia yoyote ya nje kabisa."48

If there is ever a case that self-evident facts need to be reasoned, then that would actually be to demonstrate that they are indeed innate and instinctive, not to prove they are correct. There is a difference between revealing the nature of something and the attempt to offer evidence for its veracity – the former is akin to reminding the heedless and forgetful. This is why when discussing the evidence that proves the existence of Allah , Ibn Taymiyyah said, So when he sees the signs that necessitate His existence, they would be an eye-opener from that spectrum, just as He  said, “Indeed, when Satan whispers to those mindful of Allah, they remember their Lord then they start to see things clearly.”47 It would also be a reminder to remember Allah when forgetfulness and heedlessness overcome. Therefore, it is an eye-opener to dispel the ignorance one may experience, and a reminder to remove one’s heedlessness. This is despite the fact that the core recognition of Allah’s existence is instinctively found in the soul without any external means whatsoever.48

Hii inazua maswali mawili halali:

This brings about two valid questions:

1. Roho ilipata wapi elimu ya kiasili ya moja kwa moja?

1. Where did the soul gain intuitive knowledge?.

2. Maarifa ya kiintuitivu (ya moja kwa moja) hupata wapi usawa wake wa ulimwengu wote na ukamilifu wake wa lengo?

2. From where does intuitive knowledge acquire its universal and absolute objectivity?.

Kutoka kwenye majadiliano yaliyotangulia, ilidhihirika kwamba maarifa ya kiasili (ya kawaida ya moyo) tayari yamo moyoni. Hayapatikani kupitia mchakato wa elimu. Si maarifa yanayopatikana kutoka chanzo chochote cha nje. Kwa hiyo ni jambo la kawaida kabisa kuuliza swali lifuatalo: Ni nani au nini kiliweka mawazo haya ya kiasili moyoni? Jibu la kimantiki ni Allah. Ili kukwepa swali hili, mjadala wa kiatheisti umejitahidi kutilia shaka asili ya kiasili ya maarifa haya, ukidai kwamba maarifa kama hayo yanatokana na elimu inayopokelewa kupitia hisi kwa njia ya uchunguzi wa kiuchanganuzi (istiqrā’). Wao wanatoa mfano ufuatao: Mtu akiongeza tufaha moja kwa jingine, patakuwa na tufaha mbili; akiongeza chungwa moja kwa jingine, patakuwa na machungwa mawili. Hii ni kanuni ya jumla: 1+1=2. Wanaongeza kwamba kanuni ya sababu na matokeo inatokana na mchakato wa chanzo na matokeo ambao mwanadamu anauona kwa hisi zake. Kwa ufupi, wanadai kwamba maarifa haya yanatokana na uzoefu huu, si kwa sababu ya maarifa ya kiasili yanayotangulia hisi. Mtazamo huu wa kifalsafa, yaani kufasiri maarifa ya kiakili kwa kuyarudisha kwenye maarifa ya hisi na kupuuza mwelekeo wowote wa asili ndani ya mwanadamu, unaleta matatizo kadhaa ya kiakili. Unafungua mlango wa kutilia shaka ukweli wa kudumu na unaojirudia ambao dhana hizi kwa kweli ni. Njia ya ‘jaribu-na-pima’ inayoyahusu kila uzoefu wa kibinadamu haiwezekani kutimizwa kikamilifu. Kwa hiyo, inawezekana mtu bado akawa na shaka juu ya kanuni hii ya jumla, kwa kuwa huenda ikavunjwa mahali fulani nje ya jaribio lake dogo la ‘jaribu-na-pima’. Kwa mfano, hatajua kwamba kuna tukio, mahali fulani ulimwenguni, lililotokea bila chanzo chochote cha nje kulisababisha.

From the previous discussion, it was made clear that intuitive information is already present in the heart. It is not acquired through the process of education. It is not information accessed from any external source. Therefore, it is perfectly natural to ask the following question: What or who placed these instinctive ideas in the heart? The logical answer is Allah. In order to sidestep this question, atheist discourse has strived to cast doubt on the instinctive nature of this cognition, claiming that such information is borne out of the education received by the senses via the process of induction (istiqrā’). They propose the following: If a man adds an apple to another, it would be two apples; if he adds an orange to another, it would be two oranges. This is a universal rule: 1+1=2. They add that the rule of causality is borne out of the cause-effect process that man perceives through his senses. In a nutshell, they claim that this knowledge is borne out of this experience, not because of any instinctive knowledge in this regard that precludes the senses. This philosophical outlook – interpreting rational information by referring them back to sensory knowledge and disregarding any innate predisposition – leads to a number of cognitive problems. It opens up the door of doubting the instinctive and recurring truths that these concepts actually are. The ‘try-and-test’ method that covers every human experience is impossible to achieve. Therefore, it is possible that a man can still have doubts about this universal law, as it might be broken somewhere outside of his limited ‘try-and-test’ experiment. For example, he would not know that there is an event, somewhere in the universe, that came to pass without any external cause triggering it.

Tatizo hili liliwafanya baadhi ya wanaoamini kwamba hakuna Mungu kupendekeza mtazamo unaokubali kwamba dhana hizi za kiakili zinajitokeza kila mahali katika vitendo, bila kujaribu kuzieleza kwa mtazamo wa kifalsafa au wa kinadharia. Wanafalsafa hawa wanakubali kwamba kuna makubaliano ya kivitendo ya kubadilishana katika ulimwengu: Mwanadamu hushughulika na maisha yake ya kila siku akiamini kwamba haya ni ukweli wa asili na dhahiri, ilhali kwa kweli, hali yake ya kuwa dhahiri, ya asili na ya kisilika ni kitu ambacho hakiwezi kuthibitishwa wala kujadiliwa kwa ushahidi. Tatizo linazidi kuwa kubwa pale baadhi ya wanaoamini kwamba hakuna Mungu wanapochukua msimamo wa shaka kuhusu dhana dhahiri na za lazima: kwamba hakuna maarifa ya kinadharia yanayoweza kupatikana kutokana nazo, wala hazipaswi kukubaliwa kama ukweli dhahiri.

This problem led some atheists to propose a view that acknowledges the universal recurrence of these rational concepts in practice, without attempting to explain them from a philosophical or theoretical viewpoint. These philosophers acknowledge a pragmatic quid pro quo arrangement in the universe: Man engages with his daily life believing these are innate and self-evident truths, while in reality, their self-evidentiary, innate, and instinctive nature is something that cannot be demonstrated or reasoned with proof. The problem is compounded when some atheists actually adopt a sceptical approach to self-evident and necessary concepts: that there cannot be any theoretical knowledge that could be gained from them, nor should they be accepted as self-evident facts.

Mwanasayansi maarufu asiyeamini kuwepo kwa Mungu, Lawrence Krauss, ameeleza mara kadhaa kwamba akili ya binadamu ni ya kizamani na inabadilika – kwa mujibu wa nadharia ya Darwin – ili iweze kushughulikiana salama na hatari za savannah; hata hivyo, ni akili ambazo si lazima ziweze kuelewa asili ya ulimwengu huu au uhalisia wa kuwepo. Kwa hiyo, anadai, ni lazima ulimwengu ueleweke kupitia ulimwengu wenyewe – kwa njia ya uchunguzi na uzoefu wa kimajaribio, bila kutegemea chochote kinachojulikana kama dhana za kimantiki, achilia mbali kuzitaja kama waamuzi wa ukweli. Ukweli, anadai, ni kile tu tunachoweza kukifikia kupitia uchunguzi na hisi kwa mujibu wa mbinu ya kisayansi, bila kujali jinsi unavyoweza kuonekana ajabu – au hata kinzani – kwa akili zetu za asili. Krauss alieleza haya katika kitabu chake *A Universe from Nothing: Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing*, ambacho kinatokana na wazo kwamba, ingawa ulimwengu ulitokana na kisicho chochote, unaweza kujiumba wenyewe kutoka ndani yake wenyewe kwa mujibu wa sheria za fizikia. Dai hili pamoja na maelezo yake linazua matatizo makubwa sana ya kiakili ambayo ni hatari sana. Baadhi ya machafuko haya ya kifikra yalidhihirika katika mdahalo wake na Hamza Tzortzis, *Islam or Atheism: Which Makes More Sense?* Katika mdahalo huo, msimamo unaopingana na wenye mkanganyiko wa Krauss ulifichuliwa, kwani ilionekana wazi kwamba alishindwa kujenga msimamo wowote thabiti wa kifikra. Matatizo yake yanaanzia katika kukataa dhana za msingi za kimantiki. Kuzikataa kunapelekea kuachwa kwa imani si tu katika zana za uchunguzi, bali pia kupotea kwa imani katika mbinu ya kisayansi yenyewe. Mbinu ya kisayansi ndiyo njia pekee ya kupata maarifa, kwa mujibu wa mtazamo unaoshikiliwa na sayansi-kupita-kiasi (*extreme scientism*). Mbinu ya kisayansi inategemea madai ambayo ushahidi wake hauwezi kuonyeshwa kupitia mbinu ya kisayansi yenyewe; vinginevyo, itapelekea mzunguko usio na mwisho wa hoja (*circularity*). Msimamo kwamba maarifa yanaweza kutegemea tu taarifa za kimaumbile na kisayansi ni msimamo unaojipinga wenyewe ambao hauwezi kukubalika kimantiki. Hata hivyo, tufanye nini pale pingamizi la aina hii linapoelekezwa kwa wale wanaokataa dhana za msingi za kimantiki, ilhali – kama unavyoona – pingamizi lenyewe linategemea dhana hizo? Je, inawezaje kuwa na mashiko kwa wale ambao hawaoni tatizo lolote katika kukubali kwamba ulimwengu umejiumba wenyewe? Ikiwa wako tayari kukubali aina hii ya 27

The famous atheist Lawrence Krauss has stated on multiple occasions that the human mind is primitive and evolving – in Darwinist terms – to safely interact with the dangers in the savannah; however, they are minds that are not necessarily able to understand the nature of this universe or existential reality. Therefore, he claims, it is necessary that the world is understood through the world itself – via observation and empiricism, without relying on anything known as rational concepts, let alone referring to them as arbiters of truth. Truth, he claims, is only that which we can access via observation and the senses according to the scientific method, no matter how strange it may appear – or contradictory even – to our instinctive minds. Krauss mentioned this in his book A Universe from Nothing: Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing, which is based on the idea that even though the universe came from nothing, it can create itself from itself as per the laws of physics. This assertion with the detail it entails is extremely problematic, as it leads to multiple cognitive problems that are extremely dangerous. Some of this cognitive disorder became apparent in Krauss’s debate with Hamza Tzortzis, Islam or Atheism: Which Makes More Sense? In this debate, the self-conflicting and confused position of Krauss was exposed, as it was revealed that he was unable to construct any sound cognitive viewpoint. Its problems begin in that it discards basic rational concepts. Discarding them leads to the abandonment of not only trust in the tools of observation, but also a loss of trust in the scientific method itself. The scientific method is the sole path to knowledge, as per the view purported by extreme scientism. The scientific method is based on assertions whose evidence cannot be demonstrated through the scientific method itself; otherwise, it will lead to circularity. The position that knowledge can only be based on natural and scientific information is a self-contradictory one that cannot be deemed rationally acceptable. However, what are we to do if this type of objection is directed at those who deny basic rational concepts, when – as you can see – the objection is based on them? How can it be convincing to those who do not see any problem in accepting that the universe created itself? If they are willing to accept this type of 27

Kwa mtazamo huo, ni nini kinachowazuia kudai kwamba "mbinu ya kisayansi ni sahihi kwa sababu ya...mbinu ya kisayansi yenyewe"? Hakuna shaka kwamba kupendekeza dhana ya namna hii kunaelekea kwenye ujanja wa maneno (sophistry). Kwa hakika, baadhi ya wasioamini Mungu wameangukia katika aina hii ya fikra.

view, then what is stopping them from claiming that ‘the scientific method is correct because of…the scientific method’? There is little doubt that the proposal of such a conceptualisation leads to sophistry. Indeed, some atheists have fallen victim to this type of mentality.

Siku moja, nilikuwa katika majadiliano na baadhi ya vijana waliokumbwa na mawazo ya kutokuamini kuwepo kwa Mungu. Majadiliano hayo yalitupeleka kwenye mijadala ya mtindo wa Kimagharibi kuhusu mada hiyo, hivyo niliona ni lazima kuyarudisha majadiliano kwenye msingi wa pamoja. Nilianza kuzungumzia vyanzo vya taarifa vya kibinadamu. Nilisema kwamba, kwa ujumla, vyanzo hivyo ni vitatu.

On one occasion, I was in a discussion with some youth who were afflicted by atheist ideas. The discussion led us to Western-style polemics on the subject, so I saw that it was necessary for the discussion to be brought back to a common ground. I started to speak on the human sources of information. I said that, broadly speaking, these sources are three:

1. Hisi.

1. The senses.

2. Mantiki

2. Logic.

3. Taarifa zilizopokewa.

3. Transmitted information.

Fikiria jinsi nilivyoshangaa nilipojifunza kwamba chanzo cha kupata maarifa, kwa mujibu wao, ni hisia pekee, si mambo ya kiakili (ya kinadharia au ya kiasili)! Nilitaka kuhakikisha kwamba tatizo hili kweli lipo katika mtazamo wao. Niliwauliza maswali kadhaa ili nithibitishe imani zao kuhusu jambo hili, na kwa nini wangependekeza kanuni muhimu kama hiyo. Nilichosema kilikuwa hiki: ‘Dhana moja ya msingi ya kiakili ni kwamba “sehemu < jumla”. Tuchukulie kuna chungwa mbele yetu, nalo tukalikatakata vipande vinne. Je, robo hiyo moja itakuwa ndogo kuliko, sawa na, au kubwa kuliko chungwa zima?’ Nilishangaa sana waliponijibu: ‘Hatuwezi kujua mpaka tuone chungwa hili na sisi wenyewe tulikate.’ Niliwaambia, ‘Nyumbani kwangu kuna kitabu chenye kichwa Majmūʿ Fatāwā Ibn Taymiyyah chenye juzuu 37. Je, juzuu la kwanza ni dogo kuliko, sawa na, au kubwa kuliko mkusanyiko wote?’ Walisema, ‘Hatutajua mpaka tutembelee nyumbani kwako na kukiona.’ Kulikuwa na chungu cha kahawa mbele yetu. Nilimwambia mmoja wao, ‘Inua chungu hicho.’ Alipokiinua, nikasema, ‘Je, utaweza kuinua kikombe cha kahawa – ambacho ni chepesi zaidi – kwa kutegemea ujuzi wako kwamba unaweza kuinua kitu kizito zaidi?’ Alinyoosha mkono kwenye kikombe – nikamwambia, ‘Sitaki ufanye jaribio.’ Akasema, ‘Sitajua jibu mpaka nifanye jaribio.’ Nilimaliza mfululizo wa maswali yangu kwa kumuuliza mmoja wao, ‘Je, wewe upo au huwepo?’ Akasema, ‘Nipo.’ Nikasema, ‘Je, inawezekana kwamba sayansi siku za usoni itaweza kuthibitisha kwamba wewe kwa kweli huwepo?’ Akasema, ‘Inawezekana.’ Mjadala ukaishia hapo.

Imagine how surprised I was when I learned that the source of gaining information according to them was sensory only, not rational issues (whether theoretical or instinctive)! I wanted to be certain that this problem actually existed in their mindset. I asked them a number of questions to ascertain their convictions on the topic, and why they would propose such a key principle. What I said was the following: ‘One basic rational concept is that “part < whole”. Imagine we have an orange in front of us and we split it into quarters. Would that one quarter be smaller than, equal to, or larger than the whole orange?’ I was shocked when they replied: ‘We cannot know until we see this orange and cut it ourselves.’ I told them, ‘At home, I have a book titled as Majmūʿ Fatāwā Ibn Taymiyyah in 37 volumes. Is the first volume smaller than, equal to, or larger than the whole collection?’ They said, ‘We would not know until we visited you at your home and saw it.’ There was a coffee pot in front of us. I said to one of them, ‘Lift the pot up.’ When he raised it, I said, ‘Will you be able to raise the coffee cup – which is lighter – based on your knowledge that you can lift something heavier?’ He reached out to the cup – I said to him, ‘I do not want you to experiment.’ He said, ‘I would not know the answer until I experiment.’ I finished my line of questioning by asking one of them, ‘Do you exist or not?’ He said, ‘I exist.’ I said, ‘Is it possible that science in the future will be able to prove that you are in fact non-existent?’ He said, ‘It is possible.’ The discussion ended at this.

Kwa haki, kulikuwa na baadhi yao waliokuwa hawakubaliani na wenzao juu ya kukataa dhana za msingi za kiakili, na walikuwa na maoni kwamba aina hii ya nadharia na msingi wa kimsingi ungemaliza mjadala. Hata hivyo, marafiki zake walipinga hili. Ukweli ni kwamba baadhi ya mapendekezo yao hayakutokana kwa lazima na ukaidi au kiburi. Badala yake, walitegemea data, baadhi yake zikirejea kwenye kanuni kwamba elimu haiwezi kuanzishwa kwa silika bila kupitia hisia. Pia wanategemea madai ya kisayansi – hasa katika uwanja wa fizikia ya quantum – ambayo yaliwadanganya na kuwafanya waamini kwamba hakuna njia ya kuunganisha madai ya kiakili na ya kisayansi.

To be fair, there were some among them who did not agree with their fellows’ denial of basic rational concepts, and were of the view that this type of theorising and foundational basis would end the discussion. However, his friends were opposed to this. The truth is that some of their proposals did not necessarily arise from obstinacy or haughtiness. Rather, they based this on data, some of which goes back to the rule that knowledge cannot be instinctively established without the intermediary of the senses. They also rely on scientific assertions – especially in the field of quantum physics – that duped them into believing that there is no way to marry rational and scientific assertions.

Yeyote ambaye amesoma fizikia ya quantum atajua jinsi ilivyo na utata, na jinsi ilivyo ngumu kwa akili ya binadamu kupitia mambo yake mengi. John Wheeler alisema, ‘Ukiwa hujachanganyikiwa kabisa na mekaniki ya quantum, basi hujaielewa.’49 Roger Penrose alisema, ‘Mekaniki ya quantum haina maana kabisa.’50 Richard Feynman alisema, ‘Nadhani naweza kusema kwa uhakika kwamba hakuna mtu anayeelewa mekaniki ya quantum.’51

Whoever has read quantum physics will know how ambiguous it is, and how complex it is for a human mind to navigate its many aspects. John Wheeler said, ‘If you are not completely confused by quantum mechanics, you do not understand it.’49 Roger Penrose said, ‘Quantum mechanics makes absolutely no sense.’50 Richard Feynman said, ‘I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics.’51

Naamini kuwa si sahihi kwa mtu kuyatupa maarifa ya wazi kwa dhahiri na thamani yake ya kweli kwa ajili tu ya maarifa ya kimaumbile. Kinachowajibika ni maarifa ya kimaumbile kutawaliwa na maarifa ya wazi kwa dhahiri; chochote katika cha kwanza kilicho na utata au kinachopingana na cha mwisho kinapaswa kutupwa kando. Lazima tuamini kwamba hatujui uhalisia; ujinga huo ukiondolewa, basi bila shaka yale ya kuhisiwa na yanayoonekana kwa mwili yatakubaliana na yale ya kiakili. Bila mbinu hii, tutabaki bila maarifa yoyote, yawe ya kuonekana kwa mwili au ya kiakili. Hivyo imethibitishwa kwa hakika kwamba kuna tatizo halisi linalowakabili wengi wasioamini kuwepo kwa Mungu, na kwamba wana kiwango fulani cha kushindwa kuyapatanisha mambo hayo mawili, jambo linalowapelekea kwenye hitimisho hatari sana.

I believe that it is not proper for a person to discard self-evident knowledge and their objective value just for natural knowledge. What is incumbent is to have natural knowledge governed by self-evident knowledge – whatever from the former is ambiguous or contradicts the latter should be cast aside. We must believe that we are ignorant of reality; if that ignorance is dispelled, then most certainly the sensory and tangible would be in alignment with the rational. Without this approach, we will be left without any knowledge, whether tangible or rational. It has thus been conclusively proven that there is a real problem facing many atheists, and that there is a degree of inability on their part to reconcile the two, leading to extremely dangerous conclusions.

Katika kitabu chake The Grand Design, ambacho kiliandikwa pamoja na Leonard Mlodinow, Stephen Hawking alisema, ‘Hakika, kama dhana nyingi za sayansi ya leo, inaonekana kupingana na akili ya kawaida. Lakini akili ya kawaida inategemea uzoefu wa kila siku, si ulimwengu kama unavyofunuliwa kupitia maajabu ya teknolojia, kama zile zinazotuwezesha kutazama ndani kabisa ya atomu au nyuma hadi ulimwengu wa mwanzo.’52 Tatizo la kifungu hiki ni utata unaozunguka wazo la ‘akili ya kawaida’. Je, inamaanisha kwamba dhana za msingi za kimantiki zinapaswa kukataliwa, au inamaanisha tu kutowezekana kwa kanuni za kimaumbile (nomological impossibilities)?

In his book The Grand Design, which was co-authored with Leonard Mlodinow, Stephen Hawking said, ‘Indeed, like many notions in today’s science, it appears to violate common sense. But common sense is based upon everyday experience, not upon the universe as it is revealed through the marvels of technologies, such as those that allow us to gaze deep into the atom or back to the early universe.’52 The problem with this passage is the ambiguity surrounding the idea of ‘common sense’. Does it mean that basic rational concepts are to be denied, or does it simply mean nomological impossibilities?

Mtu anaweza kudhani kimakosa kwamba kitu kisichowezekana kinomolojia pia hakiwezekani kimantiki, kisha baadaye akagundua kwamba hakiko kisichowezekana kimantiki. Hata hivyo, kuna kundi la dhana za msingi za kiasili ambazo zinaonekana kuwa juu kuliko hata kuwepo kwa mwanadamu. Taarifa za kiasili za aina hii hazipatikani kwa uzoefu wa kibinadamu pekee. Ndiyo maana ni kosa kukataa mambo yasiyowezekana kimantiki, ambayo kwa kweli ni hali zinazopelekea mgongano, kama vile duara la mraba, mwili unaosogea ukiwa tuli, au kitu ambacho hakipo wala hakiko katika hali ya kutokuwepo, n.k. Aina hizi za picha hazitokani na kundi la yasiyowezekana kinomolojia, kwa maana kwamba ufahamu wetu wa yasiyowezekana kinomolojia unarejea kwa uzoefu wa kibinadamu pekee. Badala yake, hizi ni yasiyowezekana kimantiki ambayo haiwezekani kabisa kuwazwa katika ulimwengu wa nje.

A person might mistakenly assume that something nomologically impossible is also rationally impossible, only to later find out that it is not rationally impossible. However, there is a package of basic instinctive concepts that appear to be higher than the very existence of man. Such instinctive information is not gained by mere human experience. This is why it is an error to deny logical impossibilities, which in reality are those scenarios that lead to a contradiction, such as a squared circle, a moving motionless body, something that is neither in existence nor in non-existence, etc. These sorts of images are not from the family of nomological impossibilities – such that our understanding of nomological impossibilities goes back solely to our human experience. Rather, these are logical impossibilities that cannot ever be envisaged in the external world at all.

Tatizo la kifungu cha Hawking linafafanuliwa zaidi kwa kile alichotaja katika kitabu hicho hicho: ‘Fizikia ya quantum inaweza kuonekana kudhoofisha wazo kwamba maumbile yanatawaliwa na sheria, lakini sivyo ilivyo.’53 Ikiwa hili linaonekana kuwa hivyo, basi kwa nini si hivyo katika ukweli halisi? Sababu yake ni kwamba kile kinachoonekana kuwa cha kupingana kingerejeshwa kwenye dhana na madai mengine, ili tatizo la mgongano litatuliwe. Mojawapo ya dhana hizo ni dhana za kiakili za kimaumbile.

The problem with Hawking’s passage is further clarified with what he mentions in the same book: ‘Quantum physics might seem to undermine the idea that nature is governed by laws, but that is not the case.’53 If this appears to be the case, then why is it not like that then in actual truth? The reason for that is what appears to be contradictory would be referred back to other concepts and assertions, so that the problem of contradiction is solved. One of these concepts are the instinctive rational concepts.

Ukweli ni kwamba fizikia ya quantum, pamoja na athari zake zote za kisayansi na kimantiki, ni uwanja muhimu wa utafiti. Inahitaji kukutana kwa wataalamu wengi ili kufafanua uhalisia wa madai yanayotolewa katika fizikia, ili kutoa majibu kwa dhana zinazoibuliwa na madai hayo.

The truth is that quantum physics, with all its scientific and rational implications, is an important field of study. It requires the convergence of many specialists to clarify the reality of assertions made in physics in order to offer answers to concepts brought up by those assertions.

Tatizo linalowakabili wasioamini Mungu kuhusu kanuni za msingi za kimantiki linarudi, kwa sehemu kubwa, kwenye mtazamo wao wa kimaada na wa Kidarwin kuhusu kuwepo kwetu. Kama tungeweza kutatua mkwamo unaosababishwa na dhana kwamba maada inaweza kuzaa mantiki, na kwamba mageuzi ya Kidarwin yanaweza kuunda zao hili, basi swali moja ambalo Darwinism inaliibua kuhusiana na uwezo wetu wa kufikiri ni hili: Je, maumbile yaliibua na kukuza akili kwa ajili yetu zenye uwezo wa kufikia hakika za kiukweli, au yaliibua na kuzikuza ili tuishi na tuendelee kuwepo, bila kujali uwezekano wa kufichua hali halisi ya mambo? Je, inawezekana kwamba akili zetu zinatuambia jambo na kulifanya lionekane kuwa ni la lazima kwetu ili tuweze kuishi na kuendelea kuwepo, ingawa jambo hilo huenda likawa ni ndoto tu?

The problem faced by atheists vis-à-vis basic rational principles goes back, for the large part, to their materialistic and Darwinist outlook on our existence. If we could negotiate the deadlock caused by the notion that matter is able to produce logic, and that Darwinist evolution is able to create this product, then one question that Darwinism poses vis-à-vis our rational capabilities is this: Did nature evolve and develop minds for us that are able to reach objective realities, or did it evolve and develop them for us to live and survive, regardless of the possibilities in revealing the actual true nature of things? Is it possible that our minds tell us something and make it out as if it is necessary for us so that we can live and survive, even though this might just be a fantasy?

Hili hili ni tatizo kubwa la nadharia ya Darwin. Linaleta matatizo mapana katika mijadala ya jumla ya wanaoamini kwamba hakuna Mungu katika masuala kadhaa, kama vile kuzaliwa nayo kwa imani kwa Mungu, hamu ya dini, hisia ya maadili, mwelekeo wa hiari ya mtu. Hii ni kwa sababu yote haya yanaelezwa kupitia mtazamo wa Darwin, unaotegemea either a) faida za kuishi kwa viumbe hai au b) sababu za kuwepo kwao ikiwa faida hizo si lengo kuu au zinachukuliwa kuwa si za maana, bali ni tu bidhaa ya mchakato wa uteuzi wa asili kwa ajili ya uhai na kuendelea kuishi kwa binadamu. Mantiki haikuwa ya kwanza kufikiri hivi. Kwa mujibu wa mtazamo wa Darwin, maumbile yalibuni akili zetu ili tuweze kuishi. Kuhusu ukweli kwamba akili hizi zinaweza kujifunza kuhusu uhalisia, hiyo ni bidhaa tu ikiwa ipo; vinginevyo, inawezekana kabisa kudhani kwamba akili zetu zimetudanganya, ili tu tuweze kuishi. Tatizo hili la kina lilikubaliwa na Darwin mwenyewe. Alielezea mashaka yake kuhusu suala hili, akisema: 'Lakini kwangu daima huja hofu ya kutisha kama imani za akili ya binadamu, ambayo imekua kutoka kwa akili ya wanyama wa chini, zina thamani yoyote au kama zinaaminika kabisa.'54 53 The Grand Design, uk. 93.

This is one of the deep problems with Darwinism. It leads to wide problems in general atheist discourse across a number of issues, such as the innateness of faith in God, the desire for religion, the sense of morality, the tendency of free will, etc. This is because all of these are explained through the Darwinist lens, that is based on either a) the advantages of living for living beings or b) the causes of their existence if those advantages are not primarily intended or are considered inconsequential, but are rather just a by-product of the natural selection process for life and the survival of humankind. Logic is not the first to think this. Nature – as per the Darwinist view – evolved our minds so we can survive. As for the fact that these minds are able to learn about reality, then that is a by-product if it exists; otherwise, it is quite possible to assume that our minds have duped us, simply so that we may survive. This deep problem was something acknowledged by Darwin himself. He expressed his confusion on the issue, saying, ‘But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy.’54 The 53 The Grand Design, p. 93.

54 Darwin Correspondence Project, Letter to William Graham, 3 July 1881, https://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/DCP-LETT-13230.xml 30

54 Darwin Correspondence Project, Letter to William Graham, 3 July 1881, https://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/DCP-LETT-13230.xml 30

Kukataa na kupunguza umuhimu wa kweli hizi za kiakili na za lazima – iwe ni kweli zile ambazo wakati mwingine ni dhahiri mno, au zile kweli zisizopingika ambazo kwa asili yake ni za kina zaidi – kumeleta upinzani mkali dhidi ya falsafa na nadharia ya kiakili, iwe inaongozwa na mtazamo wa kidini au la.

rejection and downplaying of these rational and necessary truths – whether they are those truths that are sometimes incredibly self-evident, or those undeniable truths that are somewhat reserved by nature – has created a severe pushback against philosophy and rational theory, whether that is governed by the religious mindset or not.

Hii ndiyo sababu watu wengi, katika mazingira mbalimbali, wamesema kwamba falsafa imekufa na haina faida yoyote. Nukuu moja maarufu ni ya Hawking mwanzoni mwa kitabu chake The Great Design: ‘Kijadi haya ni maswali ya falsafa, lakini falsafa imekufa. Falsafa haijaendana na maendeleo ya kisasa ya sayansi, hasa fizikia. Wanasayansi wamekuwa wabebaji wa mwenge wa ugunduzi katika harakati zetu za kutafuta maarifa.’55 PZ Myers alisema, ‘Falsafa nyingi zinaweza kukuangamiza.’56 Krauss alisema, Falsafa ni uwanja ambao, kwa bahati mbaya, unanikumbusha ule utani wa zamani wa Woody Allen, “wale wasioweza kufanya, hufundisha, na wale wasioweza kufundisha, hufundisha mazoezi ya viungo.” Na sehemu mbaya zaidi ya falsafa ni falsafa ya sayansi; watu pekee, kwa kadiri ninavyoweza kuona, wanaosoma kazi za wanafalsafa wa sayansi ni wanafalsafa wengine wa sayansi. Haina athari yoyote kwa fizikia hata kidogo, na nina shaka kama wanafalsafa wengine wanaisoma kwa sababu ni ya kiufundi kiasi. Kwa hiyo ni vigumu sana kuelewa kinachoihalalisha. Kwa hiyo ningesema kwamba mvutano huu unatokea kwa sababu watu wa falsafa wanajihisi kutishiwa, nao wana kila haki ya kujihisi hivyo, kwa sababu sayansi inaendelea na falsafa haiendelei.57

This is why many people, in various contexts, have declared that philosophy is dead and offers no benefit. One famous quotation is by Hawking in the beginning of The Great Design: ‘Traditionally these are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics. Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge.’55 PZ Myers said, ‘A lot of philosophy can destroy you.’56 Krauss said, Philosophy is a field that, unfortunately, reminds me of that old Woody Allen joke, “those that can’t do, teach, and those that can’t teach, teach gym.” And the worst part of philosophy is the philosophy of science; the only people, as far as I can tell, that read work by philosophers of science are other philosophers of science. It has no impact on physics what so ever, and I doubt that other philosophers read it because it’s fairly technical. And so it’s really hard to understand what justifies it. And so I’d say that this tension occurs because people in philosophy feel threatened, and they have every right to feel threatened, because science progresses and philosophy doesn’t.57

Kukataa nafasi ya busara huku kukiwa na madai yake ya kiasili na kinadharia, pamoja na athari zake, kunaelekea kwenye usofistai, kama ilivyoelezwa hapo awali. Katika kivuli chake cha giza, uwezekano wowote wa kupata maarifa na ujuzi ungeanguka. Kwa kawaida, ingeharibu kanuni ambayo sayansi asilia na ya kimajaribio zimejengwa juu yake.

This denial of the space for rationality, along with its instinctive and theoretical assertions, when taken with its implications, leads to sophistry, as has been explained before. In its dark shadow, any possibility to access cognition and knowledge would fall apart. Naturally, it would destroy the rule upon which the natural and empirical sciences are founded.

Ni jambo la ajabu kwamba, ingawa wanatukuza na kuzidisha umuhimu wa sayansi ya kimajaribio, wao bila kujua wanafanya kazi kwa kutumia seti ya mawazo ya awali ambayo hayawezi kuthibitishwa kwa sayansi ya kimajaribio. Mfano wa hili ni hatua ya kuanzia kwamba ulimwengu una uhalisia unaojitegemea na mtazamo wetu, kwamba unaweza kusomwa, kwamba unatawaliwa na seti maalum ya sheria, na kwamba sheria hizo ni thabiti. Hivyo, kile kinachochukuliwa leo kuwa miongoni mwa sheria za kimaumbile kitakuwa uhalisia unaokubalika kesho. Kufanya kazi kutokana na mfumo wa mawazo ya awali si jambo la ajabu wala gumu kulifikiria. Kinachochekesha zaidi ni kwamba hawawezi kujitenga na kweli za kiakili za asili, ingawa wanadai kuzikataa. Kitendo tu cha kufanya hoja zinazotegemea ushahidi kinaonyesha kwamba wanakubali dhana ya sababu na matokeo, na kwamba kuna uhusiano kati ya ushahidi na kile unachokielekeza, kwa kuwa ushahidi wenyewe ni sababu ya kujua kile unachokielekeza.

It is strange that even though they magnify and exaggerate the importance of empirical science, they unknowingly operate from a set of preconceived notions that cannot be proven by empirical science. An example of this is the initial starting point that the universe has a reality that is separate from our perception, that it can be studied, that it is subjected to a particular set of laws, and that these laws are fixed. So, whatever is considered to be from the natural laws today will become an accepted reality tomorrow. Operating from a preconceived framework is neither strange nor hard to envisage. What is more amusing is that they cannot divorce themselves from instinctive rational truths, even though they claim to deny them. Merely exercising the process of evidence-based reasoning speaks to the fact that they accept the concept of causality, and that there is a link between evidence and that which it points to, because evidence really is a cause of knowing that which the evidence points towards.

Katika mjadala wa kuvutia kati ya Frank Turek na mtu asiyeamini kuwepo kwa Mungu (Michael), uliopatikana katika moja ya mihadhara ya Turek katika Chuo Kikuu cha Wisconsin-Madison, mtu huyo asiyeamini aliweka wazi shaka yake juu ya kuwepo kwa dhana za kiakili za kawaida (instinctive rational concepts).

In an interesting discussion between Frank Turek and an atheist (Michael) found in one of Turek’s lectures at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the atheist explicitly doubted the existence of instinctive rational concepts:

Michael: Ningesema kwamba sheria za mantiki basi hazipo kweli.

Michael: I would argue that the laws of logic really don’t exist then.

Frank: Kwa hiyo unasema kwamba wao kweli wapo.

Frank: So you’re saying that they do really exist.

Michael: Hapana.

Michael: No.

Frank: Ndiyo, unasema wanafanya hivyo.

Frank: Yes, you’re saying they do.

Michael: Ninasemaje kwamba wao wanafanya hivyo?

Michael: How am I saying they do?.

Frank: Kwa sababu unatumia sheria ya kutopingana (law of non-contradiction) sasa hivi kusema kwamba nimekosea.

Frank: Because you’re using the law of non-contradiction right now to say that I’m wrong.

Sheria ya kutopingana – ambayo inasema kwamba mawazo yanayopingana hayawezi kuwa yote mawili kweli kwa wakati mmoja na kwa maana moja – ni mojawapo ya sheria za msingi za mantiki. Licha ya kutumia sheria hiyo na nyinginezo, Michael aliendelea kusisitiza kwamba sheria za mantiki hazipo kweli. Ilionekana kama anasema kwamba sheria za mantiki ni makubaliano tu ya kibinadamu; kwamba sisi wanadamu tunazibuni tu akilini mwetu lakini hazipo kweli nje ya akili zetu. Wanaharakati kadhaa wa kutoamini Mungu wamesimamia msimamo huu, akiwemo Dkt. Stein. Nilipomuuliza Michael kama hilo ndilo msimamo wake, alisema "Ndiyo." Kwa hiyo nikamuuliza, "Kabla ya kuwepo kwa binadamu yeyote duniani, je, kauli 'Hakuna binadamu duniani' ilikuwa kweli?" Baada ya kimya kirefu, Michael alitoa jibu lisilo wazi. Baada ya kusukumwa kidogo, alikubali kwa shingo upande kwamba kauli hiyo "huenda" ingekuwa kweli (lakini bado alishikilia wazo kwamba sheria za mantiki ni makubaliano tu ya kibinadamu). Kwa hakika, kauli hiyo ingekuwa kweli. Na kwa kuwa hakukuwa na akili za kibinadamu za kuifikiria, sheria za mantiki haziwezi kuwa makubaliano tu ya kibinadamu. Zaidi ya hayo, zipo sababu nyingine kadhaa za kuamini kwamba sheria za mantiki si makubaliano ya kibinadamu, bali zipo kwa kujitegemea, bila kutegemea akili za binadamu.58

The law of non-contradiction – which says that opposite ideas cannot both be true at the same time and in the same sense – is one of the fundamental laws of logic. Despite using that law and others, Michael continued to assert that the laws of logic don’t really exist. It sounded like he was saying that the laws of logic are just a human convention; that we human beings simply invent these laws in our minds but they don’t really exist outside of our minds. Several atheists have held this position, including Dr. Stein. When I asked Michael if that was his position, he said “Yes.” So I then asked him, “Before there were any humans on the Earth, was the statement, ‘There are no human beings on the Earth’, true?” Following a long pause, Michael gave a meandering response. After some prompting, he reluctantly admitted that the statement “likely” would be true (yet he continued to cling to the idea that the laws of logic were mere human conventions). Well, of course the statement would be true. And since there were no human minds to conceptualize it, the laws of logic cannot be a mere human convention. In addition, there are several other reasons to believe that the laws of logic are not human conventions that they exist independently of human minds.58

Mjadala huu unaonyesha mkanganyiko wa kimantiki wa wanaoamini kutokuwepo kwa Mungu katika kubainisha asili ya dhana za asili (innate) zenyewe. Je, dhana hizo ni za lengo na kamili, au ni za kulinganisha kulingana na hisia za mtu? Kwa kuzingatia kauli zilizotangulia, wanaoamini kutokuwepo kwa Mungu wengi wanasema si lazima kufuata dhana hizi za silika. Zaidi ya hayo, wanataja waziwazi kwamba wanazipinga kwa sababu ya mawazo kutoka sayansi ya asili inayohusiana na fizikia ya quantum na nyanja nyingine. Wanadai kwamba uhalisia unaweza kuwa, au hakika ni, kinyume na maarifa ya asili na ya silika. Madhara ya kauli hii, kwamba dhana za msingi za kimantiki ni matokeo tu ya utendaji wa akili zetu, bila ukweli wa lengo wa nje unaohusiana nazo, ni mengi na ni hatari. Mawasiliano ya kibinadamu yanayolenga kuleta kuridhika kwa kila mtu ni, kwa asili yake, jaribio la kufikia imani ya kila mtu kwa msingi wa uwanja wa pamoja wa kiakili. Kanuni inayojenga utambuzi huu lazima iwe ya kiasili na ya ulimwengu wote, isiyolingana na mtu fulani. Kwa kanuni hii inawezekana kuziunganisha pande mbili za utambuzi na kuleta kuridhika. Bila hii, kila mtu angebaki amefungwa ndani ya ulimwengu wake wa kiakili, asiweze kuingiliana kwa manufaa na mwenzake, kwa sababu maana zinazovuka wote wawili – ambazo kwazo wangeweza kujenga mwingiliano wenye msingi wa pamoja – zingekosekana.

This discussion reveals the atheistic dilemma in determining the nature of innate concepts in and of themselves. So are they objective and absolute, or are they relative based on a person’s senses? In light of previous statements, many atheists state it is not necessary to follow these instinctive concepts. In fact, they explicitly mention they are opposed to them because of ideas from natural science related to quantum physics and other fields. They set out that reality might be, or indeed is, in conflict with innate and instinctive knowledge. The implications of this sort of assertion – that basic rational concepts are merely a result of the workings of our minds, with no external objective truth associated with them – are numerous and dangerous. Having human interaction to bring about conviction is at its essence an attempt to bring about conviction to every person on the basis of a common cognitive playing field. The rule upon which this cognition is built must be natural and universal, not relative to x person. With this rule, it is possible to bridge the cognitive identity between the two sides to bring about conviction. Without this, each person would remain confined to their own cognitive realm, unable to fruitfully interact with the next person, as those meanings that transcend both of them – by which they would have been able to forge interaction with a degree of commonality – would be absent.

Kama dhana hizo za kiasili zingekuwa ni bidhaa tu ya akili ya binadamu, basi kila wazo la kibinadamu pia lingekuwa bidhaa ya akili zetu, na hivyo maarifa yangerudi kuwa ya kinisbi. Katika hali hiyo, tungepoteza nguvu na imani ya kuwahi kupata uhakika wa kitu chochote kile. Hili lingekuwa tatizo la maafa. Bila kweli za lazima ambazo maarifa ya kinadharia yanaweza kujengwa juu yake, hakungekuwa na njia ya kuweka msimamo wa kifalsafa unaoshikamana ambao kupitia kwake mchakato wa hoja za kiushahidi au matumizi ya hoja za kithibitisho ungewezekana. Matokeo ya msimamo kama huo ni kwamba mtu angeishia kupitisha mbinu ya kisofista inayotupilia mbali imani kwa maarifa yote ya kibinadamu. Dai la namna hii ndilo mazingira hasa ambamo dai hilo la uongo linaweza kupata uaminifu. Linadai kwamba maarifa yote ni ya kinisbi, kwamba hakuna njia ya kupata taarifa za kiakili zilizo thabiti na za hakika, na kwamba hakuna mtu anayemiliki uhalisia wa lengo. Dai kama hilo linajipinga lenyewe, kwani linadhani kwamba linapaswa kuwa hakimu wa nafsi yake, jambo linalofichua uongo na makosa yake. Kupuuza dhana za kiasili za kiakili na asili yake ya lengo ni, kwa uhalisia, kupuuza a) kila shughuli ya akili ya binadamu, b) uwezekano wa mwingiliano wa kibinadamu, c) uwezo wa kushawishiana, na d) sayansi asilia za kiuzoefu. Yote haya yanaweza kudumu tu chini ya kanuni inayokubali dhana za kiasili na kuthibitisha thamani yake ya juu inayovuka uwepo wa binadamu. Ukweli ni kwamba aina hizi za madai ni matokeo ya kawaida ya kukubali msimamo wa kiatheist. Bila kukiri Muumba wa ulimwengu huu – Muumba anayeelezwa kwa ukamilifu kabisa – uwezekano wa kuthibitisha kweli kamili usingewezekana. Na ikiwa hatuwezi kuthibitisha ukweli wa kudumu, basi hakuna nafasi ya kuthibitisha kuwepo kwa elimu kamili na ya kimaumbile, kwa kuwa ni asili ya elimu ya kimaumbile kuwa kamili na isiyotegemea wakati, mahali, mazingira wala watu. Elimu ya namna hiyo kwa hakika iko juu ya kuwepo kwa binadamu na zaidi yake. Kanuni ya kutopingana ni ya lazima na ni kweli kwa ulimwengu wote, iwe binadamu yupo au hayupo. Kanuni ya sababu na matokeo ilikuwa ni ukweli kamili kabla ya binadamu kuja kuwepo kabisa. Vivyo hivyo kwa dhana kwamba ‘sehemu < jumla’, n.k. Hakuna njia ya kuthibitisha kanuni hizi kamili bila kuthibitisha kuwepo kamili, ambaye ni Allah.

Had those instinctive concepts been merely the construct of the human mind, every human idea would also be the construct of our minds, leading knowledge to become relative again. In that case, we would lose both the power and the confidence of ever possibly gaining conviction in virtually anything. This would be a catastrophic problem. Without necessary truths upon which theoretical knowledge can be built, there would be no pathway to offer a coherent philosophical outlook through which the process of evidence-based reasoning or employing proofs would be feasible. The consequences of such an outlook are that one would end up adopting a sophist approach that discards trust in all human knowledge. Such an assertion is the exact environment in which that false claim can gain credence. It asserts that all knowledge is relative, that there is no pathway to gain definitive and conclusive cognitive information, and that nobody possesses objective reality. Such an assertion is self-contradictory, for it assumes that it should be the arbiter unto itself, which exposes its falsehood and error. Disregarding the instinctive rational concepts and their objective nature is in reality to disregard a) every engagement of the human mind, b) the possibility of human interaction, c) the ability to convince one another, and d) the natural empirical sciences. All of these concepts can only survive with the rule that acknowledges instinctive concepts and affirms their higher value that transcends human existence. The truth is that these types of assertions are a natural overflow from adopting the atheist viewpoint. Without affirming a Maker for this universe – a Maker that would be described with absolute perfection – the possibility of affirming absolute truths would not be possible. And if we are unable to affirm absolute truths, there is no chance for proving the existence of absolute and instinctive knowledge, as it is in the nature of instinctive knowledge to be absolute and agnostic of time, place, environment, and persons. Such knowledge is indeed above and beyond the existence of humans. The law of non-contradiction is both necessary and universally true, whether man exists or not. The principle of causality was an absolute truth before man ever came into existence. The same applies to the notion that ‘part < whole’, etc. There is no pathway to affirm these absolutes without affirming an absolute existence, which is Allah .

Mtu anayekataa kuwepo kwake mwenyewe hawezi kuthibitisha kuwepo kwa ukweli wowote kamili. Ingawa anatoa maelewano kwa kudai "ukamilifu wa jamaa" katika baadhi ya vipengele vya maarifa na sayansi, hitimisho hili ni la uongo kabisa, kwa kuwa halina kanuni ambayo utambuzi unaweza kujengwa juu yake tangu mwanzo. Hata hivyo, kwa kweli, ni hitimisho linalokubaliana kwa kiasi kikubwa na mawazo ya kiatheist, ambayo kupitia kwake haiwezekani kueleza kifalsafa maarifa yoyote ya kiakili na ya kiasili. Hii ni kwa sababu muundo wa kiakili wa aina hizi za madai na uthibitisho wake kupitia ushahidi hauwezekani bila kuwa na imani katika kuwepo kwa Allah. Kwa msingi huu, tunaweza kuelewa kauli nzito na yenye kina ya wanazuoni: "Kumjua Allah ndiyo msingi wa kujua chochote." Nilikuwa nikitafakari sana juu ya msemo huu katika harakati zangu za kuelewa uhalisia, vipimo, na utajiri wa maana iliyomo ndani ya mtazamo unaoonyeshwa katika kauli hii, na uhusiano kati ya kumjua Allah na maarifa mengine yote. Baada ya kuelewa ukweli huu, ilidhihirika kwangu kuwa hoja hapa ni hii: maarifa yote haya kwa kweli ni tawi la kumjua Allah. Yeyote asiyefahamu kuwepo Kwake hawezi kuanzisha kifalsafa au kiakili nadharia yoyote madhubuti ya utambuzi inayotueleza kwa nini maarifa haya yapo na jinsi yanavyoweza kupatikana. Kuhusu hili, Ibn Taymiyyah alisema: "Kumjua Yeye (Allah) ni elimu ya juu kuliko zote. Ni lengo, mwisho, kilele, na mzizi wa elimu yote, ingawa elimu ya kitu kingine isiyokuwa Yeye inaweza kutangulia, au kuwa ngazi ya kumjua Yeye. Kumjua Yeye – mbali na kuwa tukufu zaidi, kamili zaidi, na wenye manufaa zaidi – ni hitaji la lazima. Mja hawezi kufikia uadilifu bila Yeye. Hakuna furaha bila Yeye. Yeye ndiye mzizi wa kutambua elimu yote ambayo – kupitia Yeye – inastahili kuitwa hivyo."59

A person in denial of his own existence is unable to prove the existence of any absolute truth. Even though he offers a compromise by claiming ‘relative absolutism’ in some aspects of knowledge and science, this conclusion is totally false, as it does not possess the rule upon which cognition can be based in the first place. However, in reality, it is a conclusion that is largely in line with atheist conceptualisations, through which it is impossible to philosophically set out any rational and instinctive knowledge. This is because the cognitive structure for these types of assertions and the demonstration of them through proof is not possible without having faith in the existence of Allah. Based on this, we can understand the deep and poignant statement of the scholars: ‘Knowing Allah is fundamental to knowing anything.’ I used to ponder quite a bit over this expression in my pursuit of understanding the reality, dimensions, and wealth of meaning behind the outlook expressed in this statement, and the connection between knowing Allah  and all other knowledge. After grasping these facts, it became apparent to me that the point here is this: All this knowledge is actually a branch of knowing Allah . Whosoever does not comprehend His existence is unable to philosophically or rationally establish any coherent cognitive theory that explains to us why this knowledge exists and how it can be acquired. In this regard, Ibn Taymiyyah said, Knowing Him (Allah) is the highest of all knowledge. It is the goal, the end, the culmination, and the root of all knowledge, even though knowledge of other than Him might come first, or might be a precursor to, knowing Him. Knowing Him – in addition to being loftier, more wholesome, and more beneficial – is a necessary need. A servant cannot achieve righteousness without Him. There is no felicity without Him. He is the root to the realisation of all knowledge that – through Him – deserves to be labelled as such.’59

Mwanafunzi wake Ibn al-Qayyim alisema, Fikiria juu ya ulimwengu wote, katika sehemu zake zote, katika tawala zake za juu na za chini. Utaukuta kuwa ni ushahidi wa Muumba, Mwumbaji, na Mfalme. Kumkana Muumba wake na kumkataa akilini na katika silika safi ya asili ni sawa na kukana na kukataa elimu yenyewe. Hakuna tofauti kati ya hizo mbili. Kwa mujibu wa akili safi, zilizoangazwa na zenye hadhi, na fitrah iliyo sahihi, dalili ya Muumba juu ya kiumbe, ya Mtendaji juu ya tendo, na ya Mbunifu juu ya kilichoumbwa ni dhahiri zaidi kuliko msimamo wa kinyume chake. Wenye elimu na busara hutumia Allah kama ushahidi wa vitendo vyake na ubunifu wake, ilhali watu wa kawaida hutumia ubunifu na vitendo vyake kuelekeza kwake. Hakuna shaka kwamba njia zote mbili ni sahihi na kila moja ni ya kweli. Qur’an imejumuisha zote mbili. Ushahidi wa ubunifu ni mwingi. Ushahidi wa Muumba pia upo, na mfano wake uko wazi. Ndiyo aliyoielekeza Mitume walipoyaambia mataifa yao: "Je, kuna shaka juu ya Allah…?"60, yaani, je, tuwe na shaka juu ya Allah mpaka ipatikane dalili ya kuwepo kwake? Ni dalili ipi iliyo sahihi na dhahiri zaidi kuliko hii yenyewe? Vipi kitu kilicho fiche zaidi kitumike kama ushahidi wa kuthibitisha kitu kilicho dhahiri zaidi? Kisha Mitume waliwakumbusha watu dalili hiyo kwa kuongeza: "…Muumbaji wa mbingu na ardhi?"61 Nilimsikia Shaykh al-Islām Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyyah akisema, "Unawezaje kudai ushahidi wa kitu ambacho chenyewe ni ushahidi wa kila kitu?" Alikuwa pia akitoa mfano wa shairi hili fupi: "Hakuna kinachoweza kuonekana kuwa sahihi akilini wakati mchana unahitaji ushahidi." Inajulikana kwamba kuwepo kwa Mola Mlezi ni dhahiri zaidi kwa akili na fitrah kuliko kuwepo kwa mchana. Yeyote asiyeweza kuliona hili katika akili yake na fitrah yake, basi amtilie shaka.62

His student Ibn al-Qayyim  said, Ponder over the whole world, in all its parts across its higher and lower dominions. You will find it to be a testament to the Maker, the Creator, and the King. Denying its Maker and rejecting Him in the minds and the innate predispositions is tantamount to denial and rejection of knowledge itself. There is no difference between the two. According to pure, enlightened, and lofty minds and the sound fiṭrah, the indication of the Creator to the creation, the Doer to the action, and the Designer to the fashioned is more obvious than the opposite view. Those with knowledge and foresight use Allah as evidence for His actions and design, whereas common people use His design and actions to point to Him. No doubt, both are correct methods and each is true. The Qur’an comprises of both. As for the evidence from design, it is plentiful. As for the evidence from the Maker, that has a case in point as well. It is what the Messengers pointed to when they told their nations, “Is there any doubt about Allah…?”60, i.e., should we doubt in Allah until evidence for His existence is presented? Which evidence is more proper and apparent than this itself? How can something that is more obscure be used in evidence to prove something that is more obvious? Then the Messengers alerted people to the evidence by adding: “…the Originator of the heavens and the Earth?”61 I heard Shaykh al-Islām Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyyah  say, “How can you demand proof for something that in itself is proof for everything?” He also used to say the following couplet as an example: “Nothing can be deemed to be correct in the minds when day requires evidence.” It is known that the existence of the Lord  is more apparent to the minds and the fiṭrah than the existence of day. Whosoever cannot see this in his mind and fiṭrah should view them with suspicion.62

Ieleweke kwamba ni Allah Ndiye Mwalimu wa Kwanza. Yeye ndiye aliyewapa viumbe wake neema yake kwa namna ya elimu – iwe bila kati, kama vile mielekeo ya asili na ya kisilika ya watu, Yeye akiwapa uwezo na zana za kuwawezesha kuchambua na kufikiri, au kupitia Manabii na Mitume Wake. Amesema: ‘Soma, ewe Nabii, kwa jina la Mola wako Mlezi aliyeumba.’63 Hivyo, dhana ya Kiislamu kuhusu utambuzi inatangaza kwamba vidhihirisho vya elimu yote vinatokana na Allah ﷻ, na kwamba hakuna njia – kwa mantiki au kifalsafa – ya kuanzisha nadharia ya elimu yenye mshikamano bila kuthibitisha ukweli huu. Kwa hiyo, kuwepo kwa elimu hii ya kisilika kunaashiria kuwepo Kwake ﷻ, kwa kuwa inahisiwa kiintuitive. Ikiwa upande unaopingana unakubali kuwepo kwake kama ukweli wa lengo, utalazimika kuthibitisha kuwepo kwa Allah, kwa kuwa ukweli huu hauwezi kuthibitishwa bila Yeye. Hata hivyo, ikiwa upande unaopingana utakataa, gharama ya kukataa huko itakuwa kubwa, kwani kungefunga kabisa mlango wa upataji wowote wa elimu; kwa kweli, ingekuwa mbaya zaidi ya hapo, sawa na usofista. Zingatia mfano ufuatao – mjadala kati ya Nick Pollard na Richard Dawkins:

Suffice it to say that it is Allah  Who is the First Teacher. He is the one Who bestowed His favour upon His creation in the form of education – whether without an intermediary, such as people’s innate and instinctive predispositions, Him giving the potential and the tools to allow them to analyse and reason, or via His Prophets and Messengers. He  said, ‘Read, O Prophet, in the Name of your Lord Who created.’63 Thus, the Islamic conceptualisation of cognition declares that the manifestations of all knowledge originate from Allah , and that there is no way – whether rationally or philosophically – to establish a coherent theory of knowledge without affirming this fact. So, the existence of this instinctive knowledge points to His existence , as they are intuitively felt. If the opposing side accepts their existence as objective truths, they would be compelled to affirm the existence of Allah, as these truths cannot possibly be established without Him. However, if the opposing side denies it, the price of such a denial would be very high, as it would categorically shut off the door to any knowledge acquisition; in fact, it would be worse than that, on par with sophism. Consider the following example – a discussion between Nick Pollard and Richard Dawkins:

Pollard: 'Susan Blackmore alisema hivi majuzi katika The Skeptic: "Nadhani wazo kwamba tunakuwepo ni udanganyifu... Wazo kwamba kuna nafsi ndani pale inayoamua mambo, inayotenda na inayowajibika... ni udanganyifu mkubwa sana. Nafsi tunayojijengea ni udanganyifu tu kwa sababu kwa kweli kuna ubongo na kemikali tu, na 'nafsi' hii haipo – haijawahi kuwepo – na hakuna mtu wa kufa." Je, ungekubaliana na aina hii ya maelezo ya kupunguza kila kitu (reductionist) kuhusu mke wako ni nani, na wewe ni nani?'

Pollard: ‘Susan Blackmore said recently in The Skeptic: “I think the idea we exist is an illusion...The idea that there is a self in there that decides things, acts and is responsible...is a whopping great illusion. The self we construct is just an illusion because actually there’s only brains and chemicals and this ‘self’ doesn’t exist – it never did and there’s nobody to die.” Would you agree with that kind of reductionist explanation of who your wife is, who you are?’.

Dawkins: 'Na'am. Namaanisha, Susan anatoa hoja yake kwa msimamo mmoja maalum kuhusu nafsi ni nini, na ni msimamo ambao nina mwelekeo wa kufikiri kwamba pengine ni sahihi; lakini sidhani kama tuko bado katika hali ya kuweza kuuthibitisha. Kinachonifanya niuone kuwa wa kuaminika ni mambo mbalimbali. Moja ni kwamba akili zimeingia duniani kupitia mchakato wa taratibu wa mageuzi, na tuna mfululizo unaotuunganisha sisi wenyewe na wanyama wengine wote, hadi wanyama wenye akili rahisi sana, hadi wanyama wasio na akili kabisa, hadi mimea. Hakika, utabiri kwamba hatubaki hai baada ya kifo unaonekana kwangu kuwa wenye uwezekano mkubwa sana. Hiyo ingekuwa jaribio zuri la kiutendaji, si kwamba tunaweza kulifanyia majaribio kweli, bali kwa kanuni: kama nafsi ni kitu kingine kisicho dutu ya ubongo, basi inapaswa kuendelea kuwepo ubongo unapooza, na ningeweka dau kubwa sana (ninalotambua kwamba nisingeweza kushinda kamwe) kwamba ubongo wangu utakapooza, mimi mwenyewe sitakuwepo kwa namna yoyote ile.'

Dawkins: ‘Yes. I mean, Susan is sticking her neck out for one particular view of what a self is, and it’s one that I am inclined to think is probably right; but I don’t think we are yet in a position to substantiate that. What makes it seem plausible to me is various things. One is that brains have come into the world by a gradual process of evolution and we have a continuum from ourselves through all the other animals to animals that have very simple brains, to animals that have no brains at all, to plants. Certainly, the prediction that we don’t survive death seems to me to be overwhelmingly probable. That would be a good operational test – not that we can actually test it, but in principle: if a self is something other than brain stuff, then it should survive when the brain rots – and I’d place a very heavy bet (which I realize I could never actually win) that when my brain rots myself will not in any sense exist.’.

Pollard: ‘Je, unaamini kwamba wazo kwamba mimi nipo ni udanganyifu?’.

Pollard: ‘Do you believe that the idea that I exist is an illusion?’.

Dawkins: ‘Kwa kweli nafurahi kwamba sisi ni matokeo ya ubongo na kwamba ubongo wetu utakapokufa, sisi tunatoweka. Kuyaita maisha yetu udanganyifu huenda ni njia nzuri ya kulieleza jambo hilo. Lakini sipendi kujifunga kusema kwamba hisia yetu ya nafsi ni udanganyifu. Yote inategemea unamaanisha nini. Mimi hakika nahisi kwamba kuna mimi.’64.

Dawkins: ‘Well, I’m certainly happy that we are a product of brains and that when our brains die, we disappear. To call us an illusion is possibly a good way to express it. But I wouldn’t wish to commit myself to saying that our sense of self is an illusion. It depends what you mean. I certainly feel that there’s a me.’64.

Kwa hiyo Dawkins alikuwa tayari kukubali kwamba dhamiri ya mtu binafsi kwa yenyewe, hisia yake ya utambulisho binafsi unaomtofautisha na wengine, na ufahamu wake wa dhana ya 'mimi' vyote ni udanganyifu tu. Ingawa Dawkins alijaribu kujionyesha kama mtu wa busara ili kupunguza uzito wa jibu lake lenye matatizo kwa msomaji, maneno yake yanatosha kuonyesha wazi aina ya mawazo anayoyaunga mkono. Kwa kweli, Dawkins alijaribu kujionyesha kama mtu mwenye akili timamu wakati wa mwisho wa mjadala huu. Hata hivyo, kwa uhalisia, alijaribu kuepuka mada hiyo na hakutoa chochote kingine kinachoweza kupinga dai alilolitoa. Kuhisi tu dhana ya 'mimi' na kuwa na ufahamu wake haikuwa mada ya mjadala hata kidogo, kwani hilo ni jambo dhahiri ambalo kila mtu analiona na kuliamini mwenyewe. Swali lililoulizwa hasa lilikuwa hili: Je, kuna chochote kinachoeleza mwelekeo huu? Kwa maneno mengine: Je, kuna kitu halisi na kilichopo, ambacho kinaweza kuitwa kwa usahihi 'mimi', kinachoeleza jinsi tunavyohisi kuhusu kuwepo kwetu? Au dhana ya 'nafsi', 'mimi', au 'utambulisho binafsi wa kipekee' ni udanganyifu tu usio na uhalisia wa nje?

So Dawkins was quite prepared to accept that the conscience of an individual per se, his sense of personal identity that distinguishes him from others, and his understanding of the ‘me’ concept are all merely illusions. Though Dawkins attempted to come across as diplomatic to downplay the problematic nature of his answer to the reader, his words are sufficient in clearly conveying the type of ideas he espouses. Indeed, Dawkins attempted to portray himself as a rational person during the last moments of this discussion. However, in reality, he tried to sidestep the topic and did not offer anything that would contradict the assertion he made. Merely sensing the concept of ‘me’ and being conscious of it was not the topic of discussion at all, for that is an obvious matter that every person finds and believes for themselves. The posed question actually was the following: Is there anything that explains this tendency? In other words: Is there anything that is real and in existence, which can be correctly classed as ‘me’, that explains how we feel about our existence? Or is the concept of ‘self’, ‘me’, or ‘distinct personal identity’ merely an illusion without any external reality?

Miongoni mwa mambo yanayotokana na fitrah ambayo mwanadamu anayapata ndani yake ni hisia ya kimaadili iliyokita mizizi sana. Kwa hisia hii, mtu anaweza kufahamu si tu ni yapi ni maadili mema na yapi ni maadili mabaya, bali pia huhisi kwa silika kwamba thamani hizi za kimaadili ni za kiukweli kwa asili yake. Kuwa za kiukweli (objective) ndiko kunakozipa maadili haya thamani yake ya kweli na kuziondolea uhusiano wa kinisbi (relativity). Hizi ni hakika za kiukweli zinazovuka si tu uwepo wa binadamu, bali uwepo wote wa kimaada. Iwe mwanadamu na ulimwengu vipo au havipo, thamani hizi za kimaadili zinabaki na sifa yake ya kiukweli.

From the fiṭrah-driven elements that man finds in himself is the deeply entrenched moral instinct. With this, one can grasp not only what are good and bad morals, but one also instinctively feels that these moral values are objective by nature. Being objective is what gives these morals their true value and removes relativity from them. These are objective realities that transcend not only human existence, but all material existence. Whether man and the universe exist or not, these moral values retain their objectivity.

Ufahamu ni wa aina mbili: uwezo wa kutofautisha mema na maovu, na uwezo wa kufahamu uhalisia wa kimalengo uliomo katika thamani za wema na uovu. Muungano huu wa ufahamu unaweza kutumika katika mada hii, ambamo tunajaribu kuthibitisha kuwepo kwa mielekeo ya asili ndani ya nafsi zetu wenyewe inayoashiria kuwepo kwa Mungu. Hii ni kwa sababu mwelekeo huu wa kimaadili hauwezi kuelezwa bila kuthibitisha kuwepo kwa Mungu. Kama dhana za kiakili zinavyotulazimu kuuliza swali la 'Ni nani aliyeziweka katika nafsi?', ndivyo pia mwelekeo wa kimaadili unavyotulazimu kuuliza: 'Ni nani aliyeuweka humo?' Kuna swali jingine lenye kina zaidi: Ni nini kinachoeleza hisia hii ya silika ndani yetu kwamba haki ni thamani ya kimalengo inayoifanya kuwa njema kwa ulimwengu wote, tofauti na dhulma, ambayo kwa lazima tunaiona kuwa tabia ya kimalengo ya uovu? Kwa hiyo, je, inawezekana kutoa msimamo wa kimaadili wenye mshikamano wa kifalsafa kwa kuzingatia mtazamo usiokubali kuwepo kwa Mungu? Kwa maneno mengine: Je, inawezekana kuwepo kwa wema wowote wa kimalengo bila kuwepo kwa Mungu? Kwa namna nyingine tena: Je, inawezekana mtu kuwa mwema na mwadilifu bila kuwepo kwa Mungu?

Comprehension is twofold: the ability to distinguish good from evil, and the ability to comprehend the objectivity found in the values of good and evil. This duet of comprehension can be deployed in this subject, in which we are attempting to demonstrate the existence of innate predispositions in our own selves that point to the existence of God. This is because this moral inclination cannot be explained without affirming the existence of the Divine. Just as the rational concepts require that we ask the question ‘Who placed them in the soul?’, then likewise the moral inclination requires us to ask: ‘Who placed it there?’ There is another question that is deeper: What explains this instinctive feeling in ourselves that justice is an objective value that makes it universally good, as opposed to injustice, which we necessarily consider to be an objectively evil trait? Consequently, is it possible to offer a philosophically coherent moral outlook in light of the view that does not acknowledge the existence of God? In other words, is it possible that there is any objective good without the existence of God? Put in another way: Is it possible that a person can be good and righteous without the existence of God?

Nilipoanza safari yangu ya kusoma, mojawapo ya vitabu vya kwanza nilivyosoma kilikuwa cha Shawkiy Abu Khalil kiitwacho Gharīzah am Taqdīr Ilāhī? (Silika au Qadari ya Mwenyezi Mungu?). Kitabu hiki kinaelezea mandhari nzuri kutoka ulimwengu wa wanyama, ambamo wanyama hufanya kwa silika vitendo maalum vinavyolenga maslahi ya kuishi kwao, bila kamwe kufundishwa, kufunzwa, au kulelewa kufanya hivyo.

When I embarked the world of reading, one of the first books I read was by Shawkiy Abu Khalil titled Gharīzah am Taqdīr Ilāhī? (Instinct or Divine Decree?). This book adopts wonderful scenes from the animal world, in which animals instinctively carry out specific actions that are in their survival interests, without ever being educated, trained, or brought up to do so.

Nani aliongoza mtoto kunyonya matiti ya mama yake? Nani aliweka silika ya umama moyoni mwa mama, hata akawatunza watoto wake? Nani alifundisha ndege kuhama kati ya maeneo maalum? Nani aliweka silika ya kuishi kwa viumbe vyote hai? Nani alipandikia roho upendo wa uzuri? Matukio haya yote, kama yale yaliyotangulia ambayo yamo ndani ya binadamu na viumbe hai kwa asili, yanaibua swali: silika hizi zilitokeaje? Nani aliziumba ndani ya roho? Mwulize mwanaatheist kuhusu haya. Ataanza kuzungumzia Darwinism na jinsi silika hizi zilivyokuwa sehemu ya mchakato wa mageuzi kwa ajili ya kuendelea kuishi kwa viumbe hai. Hata hivyo, swali bado linabaki: silika hizi zilitoka wapi hapo mwanzo? Kwa maneno mengine, kwa mujibu wa mageuzi ya Darwin, silika hii ilijitokezaje, ambayo wakati fulani katika mageuzi haikuwepo, kisha ikatokea ghafla kwa namna iliyokita mizizi ndani ya roho za viumbe? Silika hizi zilionekana lini hasa? Ziliundwaje? Na zinarithishwaje kizazi hadi kizazi? Waatheist hawana jibu la maswali haya. Wanachoweza ni kueleza mshangao wao mkubwa au kurudisha mjadala kwenye selfish gene85 inayomsukuma kiumbe hai kuishi kwa gharama yoyote. Tunaweza tu kucheza kwa mdundo wake, kama Richard Dawkins alivyolieleza kwa maarufu. Fikiria silika ya mama. Niambie – umewahi kuona kitu safi kuliko hicho? Naapa kwa Allah, hakuna kilichopo duniani kinachofanana na moyo wa mama – ishara ya upendo wa kweli na huruma kamili. Nakuomba kwa Allah ujikumbushe hadithi za mama pamoja na watoto wao – ni maajabu yasiyoisha ambayo maneno hayawezi kuyaeleza. Ninapoandika maneno haya, nakabiliwa na hadithi kadhaa:

Who guided a child to take the breast of its mother? Who planted the instinct of motherhood in a mother’s heart, so that she looks after her children? Who taught birds to migrate between specific places? Who instilled the survival instinct in all living things? Who imprinted the love of beauty in the soul? All these phenomena, like their predecessors that are innately found in living humans and creatures, beg the question: How did these instincts come about? Who created them in the soul? Ask the atheist about them. He will go on about Darwinism and how these instincts were part and parcel of the evolution process for the purpose of survival of living creatures. However, the question remains: Where did these instincts come from in the first place? In other words, in light of Darwinist evolution, how did this instinct come about, which at a point of time during evolution did not exist, only to appear all of a sudden in such a deeply embedded manner within creature’s souls? When exactly did these instincts first appear? How did they form? And how are they generationally passed down? Atheists have no answer to these questions. The only thing they have is either to express their utter confoundment or to bring this discussion back to the selfish gene85 that pushes a living being to survive at any cost. We can only dance to its tune, which is how Richard Dawkins famously puts it. Ponder over a mother’s instinct. Pray tell me – have you seen anything purer than that? I swear by Allah, there is nothing in existence like a mother’s heart – a symbol of true love and perfect compassion. I ask you by Allah to remind yourself of the stories of mothers with their children – they are endless wonders that words are unable to describe. As I write these words, I am confronted by dozens of stories:

Tendensi nyingine ya asili iliyopo kwa mwanadamu ni hisia yake ya ndani ya kusudi, au mwelekeo wa kiteleolojia. Ni hisia hii inayomfanya auulize maswali makubwa: "Mimi ni nani? Nimetoka wapi? Kwa nini nipo hapa? Nitaishia wapi?" Maswali haya ya kina ndiyo yanayomtofautisha mwanadamu na wanyama. Wanyama wanapotaka kusonga kwa silika zao za msingi, kinachomsukuma mwanadamu ni mwelekeo wake wa asili wa kutafuta kusudi la kuwepo kwake na la maisha yake. Ndiyo maana majina ya kweli zaidi ni Ḥārith (mkulima) na Hammām (mfanyakazi mwenye bidii), kama alivyosema Mtume ﷺ, kwani yanajumuisha sifa mbili kuu za mwanadamu zinazowakilisha hamu yake ya kutamani na kutafuta. Sifa hizi mbili haziwezekani bila kuwepo kwa kitu kinachoweza kutamaniwa na kutafutwa. Lengo la mwisho linaloweza kutafutwa ni Allah (SWT).

Another innate tendency present in man is his deep emotional sense of purpose, or teleological tendency. It is this feeling that makes him ask the big questions: ‘Who am I? Where did I come from? Why am I here? Where will I end up?’ These deep questions are what distinguish humans from animals. If animals desire to move on their primal instincts, what moves man is his innate tendency to seek out the purpose of his existence and life. This is why the truest of names are Ḥārith (ploughman) and Hammām (energetic worker), as stated by the Prophet 95, as they comprise of two central features of man that represent his desire to wish and to seek. These two traits are not possible without the existence of something that can be wished and sought after. The ultimate aim that can be sought is Allah .

Ni kama alivyosema Ibn Taymiyyah: "Nafsi haiwezi kuwa tupu ya hisia na matamanio. Kwa kweli, utupu kama huo hauwezekani katika nafsi. Hisia na matamanio ni sehemu ya hakika yake. Nafsi haiwezi kufikiriwa bila kuhisi na kutamani. Si sahihi kusema kwamba nafsi inaweza kuwa tupu ya Muumba – tupu ya kuhisi kuwepo kwake au kutokuwepo kwake, au ya mapenzi yake au kukosa kwake. Si sahihi kusema kwamba kumkiri Yeye na kumpenda Yeye si sehemu ya lazima ya kuwepo kwa nafsi, hata kama hakuna kinachopingana nayo. Badala yake, hilo ni la uongo, kwa sababu nafsi hubeba kile inachokitamani kama sehemu ya lazima ya fitrah yake. Kwa kuwa nafsi daima hutamani kama kazi ya lazima ya kiini chake, haiwezi kufikiriwa kwamba nafsi ya mtu inaweza kamwe kuwa tupu ya kutamani kitu fulani. "Ndiyo maana Nabii ﷺ alisema: 'Majina ya kweli zaidi ni Ḥārith na Hammām.' Nafsi ni kiumbe hai – kila kiumbe hai hujisogeza kwa hiari yake. Kwa hiyo, nafsi lazima iwe na mwendo unaoutaka kwa ajili yake yenyewe. Hivyo, kila 'kiumbe chenye kutaka' lazima kiwe na kitu kinachokitaka. Kinachotakwa ni kwa ajili yake yenyewe, au ni njia ya kufikia kitu kingine; kitu kinachotakwa kama njia ya kitu kingine lazima kiishie kwenye matakwa ya msingi. Kwa hiyo, haiwezekani matakwa yote ya mtu yawe njia ya kitu kingine, kwani hilo lingeleta kosa la mfululizo usio na mwisho wa sababu za mwisho, jambo lisilowezekana, kama vile – au hata zaidi kuliko – mfululizo usio na mwisho wa sababu zinazofanya kazi. Kwa kuwa mwanadamu lazima awe na kitu anachokitaka, hatimaye ni Allah ambaye moyo wake unamtamani. Kwa hiyo, kila mja lazima awe na Mungu. Hivyo inafahamika kwamba mja ameumbwa kwa asili kupenda Mungu wake."96

Kipengele cha binadamu ni kwamba wanahisi kwa silika ndani yao tofauti kati ya uchaguzi wa mwanadamu na vitendo vile vinavyotokea kwake bila hiari. Mtu anapoinua glasi ya maji kwenda mdomoni, anapochukua mfuko wake, au anapoingia kwenye gari lake, anaweza kwa silika kutofautisha vitendo hivyo na mapigo ya moyo wake, damu inayotiririka mishipani mwake, na baridi kali anayoisikia mwilini. Mtu anaweza kuacha kupumua kwa muda kwa uchaguzi wake, lakini hawezi kuendelea kufanya hivyo, kwa sababu mwitikio wa mwili usio wa hiari unamlazimu kupumua. Mwelekeo huu wa asili – kwamba watu wana hiari huru, ambayo wanaweza kuihisi kwa silika – unahitaji maelezo. Kwa kweli, kuwepo kwa mwelekeo huu kunahitaji maelezo.

A feature of humans is that they instinctively feel within themselves the differentiation between man’s choices and those acts that emanate involuntarily from him. When a person raises a glass of water to his mouth, picks up his bag, or gets in his car, he can instinctively differentiate between those and his heart pulsing, the blood running in his veins, and the cold shivers his body feels. A person can stop breathing for a while by choice, but he is unable to continue to do so, as the involuntary bodily reaction requires him to breath. This innate tendency – that people have free will, which they can instinctively feel – requires an explanation. In fact, the existence of this tendency requires an explanation.

Inaonekana kwamba uasiolini, kwa kuzingatia mtazamo wake wa kimaada kuhusu uwepo, hauwezi kutoa maelezo yanayoaminika kwa jambo la hiari ya mwanadamu (free will). Ikiwa vitendo vyetu vya kiakili vya hiari ni matokeo tu na pekee ya miingiliano ya kikemikali ya kibayolojia na mapigo ya umeme katika mfumo wa neva na misuli ya mwili, na yote hayo yanatawaliwa na sheria zisizobadilika, basi inawezekanaje kuwepo kwa hiari yoyote? Hili limewafanya wasiomwamini Mungu wengi kukubali falsafa kali ya uamuzi wa awali (determinism). Katika dhana hii, hiari ya mwanadamu ni udanganyifu, na mwanadamu amepangwa kufanya anachofanya, ingawa anaweza kudhani kuwa ana hiari. Katika fasihi ya Kiarabu ya kale, mwanafalsafa mmoja wa uamuzi wa awali alieleza hili kwa maneno: 'Mwanadamu amepangwa kwa taswira ya mtu mwenye hiari.'

It would seem that atheism, in light of its materialistic outlook on existence, is unable to offer a plausible explanation for the phenomenon of free will. If our voluntary actions are merely and exclusively the result of biochemical interactions and electric pulses in the body’s neuromuscular system, and that is all governed by fixed laws, how is it possible for there to be any free will? This has led many atheists to adopt an extreme determinist philosophy. In this conceptualisation, free will is an illusion and man is actually programmed to do what he does, even though he might think he has free will. In classical Arabic literature, one determinist expressed this as ‘Man is programmed with an image of one with free will’.