Hoja hii ina majina mengi katika ulimwengu wa kidini kwa ujumla, na katika uwanja wa Kiislamu hasa. Yote yanazunguka wazo kuu kwamba kila kitu kinachoanza kuwepo baada ya kutokuwepo lazima kiwe na sababu iliyopendelea kuwepo kwake kuliko kutokuwepo kwake. Pia yanajumuisha wazo kwamba kila kitu kinachowezekana bila shaka kinategemea sababu isiyotegemea kitu kingine ambayo ndiyo iliyokiumba.122 Sababu hiyo ni Allah . Baadhi ya majina ya hoja hii ni: hoja ya uumbaji, hoja ya uvumbuzi, hoja ya Mwendesha wa Kwanza, hoja ya Kalam, sababu ya ulimwengu wote, hoja ya Sababu ya Kwanza, hoja ya sababu, hoja ya ulimwengu, hoja ya kosmolojia, na nyinginezo.

This argument has multiple names in the religious space generally, and in the Islamic domain in particular. They all revolve around the central idea that whatever comes into existence after having been non-existent must have a cause that preferred its existence over its non-existence. They also comprise of the idea that whatever is possible is most definitely contingent on a non-contingent cause that created it.122 That cause is Allah . Some of the names for this argument are: the argument from creation, the argument from invention, the prime mover argument, the kalam argument, universal causation, the argument from first cause, the causal argument, the argument from the universe, the cosmological argument, and others.

Mtu atakayetafakari hoja hii atakuta kuwa ni kiashiria rahisi zaidi kati ya viashiria vyote vinavyoelekeza kwa Allah (SWT). Hii ndiyo sababu hoja hii imeenea katika ustaarabu, tamaduni na mataifa yote. Kichocheo chake ni swali la kiasili linalotafuta chanzo cha matukio ya kidunia yanayoonekana na kutambulika. Ingawa hali zake na majina yake ni tofauti, msingi wake unatokana na mapendekezo mawili yaliyo wazi sana:

One who ponders over this proof will find it to be the simplest of all the indicators that are suggestive of Allah . This explains why this argument is widespread across all civilisations, cultures, and nations. The motivation behind it is an instinctive question seeking the cause of observable and perceived temporal events. Though its scenarios and names are varied, its basis lies in two extremely clear propositions:

• Pendekezo la kwanza: Matukio ya kidunia yapo. Tukio la kidunia ni lile ambalo lilitanguliwa na kutokuwepo kwake, au kitu chochote kilicho na mwanzo.

• First proposition: Temporal events exist. A temporal event is that which was preceded by its non-existence, or anything that has a beginning.

• Pendekezo la pili: Matukio ya kidunia yanaonyesha kuwepo kwa sababu.

• Second proposition: Temporal events point to the existence of a cause.

• Hitimisho: Matukio ya kidunia yaliyopo lazima yawe na sababu, nayo ni Allah.

• Conclusion: Temporal events in existence must have a cause, which is Allah .

Akifafanua msingi wa hoja hii katika al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij al-Adillah (Kufichua Mbinu za Hoja), Ibn Rushd (Averroes), mjukuu, alisema: Kuhusu hoja ya uvumbuzi, inahusu kuwepo kwa wanyama, mimea na mbingu. Mbinu hii inategemea kanuni mbili ambazo zimo kwa uthabiti katika maumbile ya asili ya watu wote. Ya kwanza ni kwamba viumbe hivi vilivyopo vimevumbuliwa. Hili ni jambo linalojulikana kiotomatiki kutokana na wanyama na mimea, kama Yeye alivyosema: {…hao mnaowaomba badala ya Allah hawawezi hata kuumba nzi mmoja, hata kama watakusanyika kwa ajili hiyo}. Tunaona miili isiyo hai ambamo uhai unaumbwa. Hakika tunajua kwamba yupo kiumbe anayeumba na kuwapa uhai hapa, nao ni Allah (SWT). Kuhusu mbingu, tunajua kutokana na miendo yao isiyoyumba kwamba zimeamrishwa kuutunza uliopo hapa duniani, na kwamba zimetiishwa kwa manufaa yetu. Kitu kinachotiishwa ni lazima kiwe kimevumbuliwa na kuamrishwa na kitu kingine. Kanuni ya pili ni kwamba kila kitu kilichovumbuliwa kina mvumbuzi. Kwa hiyo, kutokana na mapendekezo haya mawili, mtu anaweza kuhitimisha kwa usahihi kwamba kitu kilichopo kina mtendaji aliyekianzisha.126

Explaining the foundation of this argument in al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij al-Adillah (Revealing the Methodologies of the Arguments), Ibn Rushd (Averroes) the grandson123 said, As for the argument from invention, it captures the existence of fauna, flora, and the heavens. This method is based on two principles that are firmly present in the innate predispositions of all people. The first is that these existing entities are invented. This is something automatically known from fauna and flora, as He  said, “…those idols you invoke besides Allah can never create so much as a fly, even if they all were to come together for that.”124 We see inanimate bodies in which life is created. We definitely know that there is an entity that creates and favours them with life here, which is Allah . As for the heavens, we know from their unfaltering movements that they have been commanded to look after what is here in the world, and that they have been subjugated for our benefit. Something that is subjugated is, by necessity, invented and commanded by something else. As for the second principle, it is that every invented thing has an inventor. Therefore, one can correctly deduce from these two propositions that something in existence125 has a doer that originated it.126

Tunaweza kuzingatia uchunguzi unaotolewa na Ibn Rushd. Yeye alitofautisha kati ya jinsi wanyama na mimea wanavyoonyesha kuwa na mwanzo, na jinsi mbingu zinavyoonyesha vivyo hivyo. Kwa wanyama na mimea, aliona jambo hilo kuwa dhahiri kwa yenyewe; kwa mbingu, aliona ishara ya kutiishwa kwake kuwa ishara ya kuwa na mwanzo. Kwa msingi huu, tunaweza kusema kwamba viashiria vya matukio yenye mwanzo kwa Allah (SWT) vipo katika ngazi mbili. Hii inategemea jinsi matukio yenye mwanzo yalivyo karibu au mbali na kuweza kufikiwa na hisi na uchunguzi, na uwezekano wa kuwa yanaonekana na kutambulika kwa hisi yanapojitokeza.

We can note the observation that Ibn Rushd makes. He differentiated between how fauna and flora are indicative of origination, vesus how heavens are indicative of the same. For the former, he considered it self-evident; for the latter he considered the sign of their subjugation as the sign for their origination. Based on this, we can say the indicators of temporal events for Allah  are of two levels. This is based on how close or remote temporal events are from being capturable by the senses and observation, and the potential of them being observable and perceptible to the senses when emerging:

Kutokea kwa vitu vinavyoweza kuonekana kibinafsi kwa mpangilio wa wakati.

• The temporal emergence of individually observable creations.

• Kuibuka kwa ulimwengu kwa mpangilio wa wakati (jenasi ya matukio ya kiwakati).

• The temporal emergence of the world (the genus of temporal events).

Tunapotafakari asili ya jinsi wahyi ulivyoshughulikia hoja hii, tunaona kwamba ngazi ya kwanza ndiyo iliyo dhahiri zaidi. Hii ni kwa sababu inaweza kutambuliwa kwa hisi, ambayo ndiyo njia ya haraka zaidi ya kufikia lengo bila kuhitaji hoja ndefu, mijadala mipana ya kifalsafa, au kuthibitisha kitu ambacho hakipo wala hakionekani. Akieleza mbinu ya Qur'ani hapa, na kuonyesha kwamba matukio ya kidunia yanayoonekana hayahitaji ushahidi wa kuthibitisha kwamba yana mwanzo, Ibn Taymiyyah anasema: "Mbinu iliyotajwa katika Qur'ani ni kutoa hoja juu ya kuwa na mwanzo kwa binadamu na viumbe wengine – ambao kuwa kwao na mwanzo kunajulikana kwa kuona na njia kama hizo – ili kuthibitisha kuwepo kwa Muumbaji. Mwanzilishi anaweza kuthibitishwa kwa kuwepo kwa binadamu kuwa na mwanzo. Kuwa na mwanzo kwa binadamu hakuhitaji kuelezwa kwa kumhusisha na mabadiliko, na kuwa na mwanzo, au kwa kanuni kwamba matukio ya kidunia lazima yawe na mwisho."

When we contemplate the nature of how revelation dealt with this argument, we notice that the first level is more present. This is because it is perceptible by the senses, which is the quickest way to acquiring the aim without the need for lengthy propositions, expansive philosophical argumentation, or proving something that is not present or observable. Explaining the Qur’anic method here, and highlighting that observable temporal events are not in need for evidence to demonstrate their temporality, Ibn Taymiyyah states, ‘The method mentioned in the Qur’an is by reasoning for the temporality of man and other beings – whose temporality is known by observation and similar means – in order to demonstrate the existence of the Creator . The Originator can be argued for by the origination of man. Man’s origination does not need to be reasoned by associating him with change, temporality, or the necessity of temporal events being terminal.

Tofauti kati ya kufikiri kupitia uhadathi wake na kufikiri kwa ajili ya uhadathi wake ni dhahiri. Kilichomo katika Qur'ani ni cha kwanza, si cha pili. Allah {Je, wameumbwa bila chochote, au wao ndio waumbaji?}127 Kwa hiyo, kutokea kwa uhadathi tu wa wanyama, mimea, madini, mvua, mawingu na mfano wake kunajulikana kwa lazima; kwa kweli kunashuhudiwa na hakuhitaji dalili. Ni kile ambacho hakijulikani kwa lazima kupitia hisi ndicho kinachopaswa kujifunzwa kwa dalili. Uhadathi wa viumbe hivi ni maarifa ya kimaumbile yasiyohitaji ushahidi. Yanajulikana kwa hisi au kwa silika, iwe kwa kuelezwa kinachoweza kutoa maarifa ya kimaumbile, au kwa njia nyingine za maarifa ya lazima. Kutokea kwa mwanadamu kutokana na maji ya mbegu ni kama kutokea kwa matunda kutoka miti na mimea kutoka ardhini, n.k. Inajulikana kwa hisi kwamba tunda hili lenyewe ni la kutokea, linaloanza kuwepo baada ya kutokuwepo; vivyo hivyo kwa mwanadamu na wengineo. Allah {Je, watu hawa hawakumbuki kwamba tuliwaumba kabla, hali walikuwa hawana chochote?}128, na Yeye {Malaika akajibu: "Ndivyo itakavyokuwa! Mola wenu Mlezi asema: Ni jepesi kwangu, kama tu nilivyokuumbeni kabla, hali hamkuwa chochote!"}129130

The difference between reasoning through his temporality and reasoning for his temporality is evident. What is in the Qur’an is the first, not the second. Allah  says, “Or were they created by nothing, or are they their own creators?”127 Consequently, the mere temporal emergence of fauna, flora, metals, rain, clouds, and similar is known by necessity; it is in fact witnessed and does not need proof. Only that which is not necessarily known through the senses is to be learned via proof. The temporality of these beings is instinctive knowledge that does not require evidence. It is known either sensorily or instinctively, whether by way of being informed that can offer instinctive knowledge, or by other ways of necessary knowledge. The emergence of man from seminal fluid is like the emergence of fruits from trees and flora from the Earth, etc. It is sensorily known that this same fruit is emergent, coming into existence after having not occurred; the same applies to man and others. Allah  states, “Do such people not remember that We created them before, when they were nothing?”128, and He  says, “An angel replied, ‘So will it be! Your Lord says, “It is easy for Me, just as I created you before, when you were nothing!”129’130

Jambo moja la hila linalotajwa na Ibn Taymiyyah ni hali ya kuzoeana au kutozoeana na kuyaona jambo fulani, na athari ya hali hii katika mtu kuwa mzembe kwa dalili zilizo karibu yake kabisa. Ibn Taymiyyah anasema, ‘Hii ndiyo sababu fitra ya viumbe imepangwa hivyo kwamba kila wanapoona tukio jipya linalotokea – kama radi, umeme na matetemeko ya ardhi – wanamkumbuka Allah na kumtukuza. Hii ni kwa sababu wanajua kwamba jambo hilo halijitokezi lenyewe, bali kuna Muumba aliyelisababisha lianze. Ingawa wanajua kwamba hali hiyo hiyo inatumika kwa matukio mengine yote mapya, matukio wanayoyazoea tayari wameyazoea, tofauti na yale yanayotokea mara chache. La sivyo, wale wanaomkumbuka na kumtukuza Allah zaidi pale yanapotokea matukio mapya adimu wangekuwa tayari wameshaona zile dalili za Allah zinazojirudia mara kwa mara ambazo ni kubwa zaidi kuliko tukio adimu. Lau Allah asingefanya chochote zaidi ya kumuumba mwanadamu, hilo peke yake lingekuwa dalili kubwa kabisa. Kila mtu anajua kwamba mwanadamu hakujiumba mwenyewe, wala wazazi wake, wala mtu mwingine yeyote miongoni mwa binadamu. Kila mtu anajua kwamba lazima alikuwa na mwanzilishi. Kila mtu anajua kwamba lazima alikuwa na Muumba aliyemuumba, na kwamba Yeye yupo, yu hai, ni Mjuzi wa yote, Mwenye uwezo wa yote, Mwenye kusikia yote, na Mwenye kuona yote. Anayeumba viumbe wengine hai anastahiki zaidi kuwa hai; anayewapa wengine elimu anastahiki zaidi kuwa na elimu; anayewafanya wengine wawe na nguvu anastahiki zaidi kuwa na nguvu. Pia inajulikana kwamba mpangilio wa umahiri ndani yake unaashiria elimu ya Mtendaji, na kwamba muundo maalum unaashiria matakwa ya Mtendaji. Mchakato wa kuanzisha kiumbe wenyewe usingeweza kutokea bila uwezo wa Muanzilishi. Ujuzi wa mtu kuhusu nafsi yake mahususi, binafsi na ya kipekee ungempa ujuzi wa maana hizi za kiungu na mambo mengine, kama Allah (SWT) anavyosema, “…kama vilivyomo ndani yenu. Je, hamuoni?”131’132

One subtle point that Ibn Taymiyyah alluded to is the state of familiarity or the lack thereof vis-à-vis observing a particular event, and the impact this state has on a person becoming heedless of the indicators that are easily accessible to him. Ibn Taymiyyah  says, ‘This is why the fiṭrah of the creation is wired so that whenever they see a newly emerging event – such as thunder, lightning, and earthquakes – they remember and glorify Allah. This is because they know that this recurrence did not recur by itself, but rather there was an Originator who caused it to originate. Though they know the same is applicable to all other newly emerging events, the events they are used to are already familiarised to them, as opposed to the rarely recurring ones. Otherwise, those who mostly remember and glorify Allah when newly emerging events that are rare appear would have already seen those oft-recurring signs of Allah that are far greater than the rare event. Had Allah done nothing other than create man, that alone would be the greatest of signs. Everyone knows that man was not created by himself, his parents, or anyone else from humankind. Everyone knows that he must have had an originator. Everyone knows he must have had a Creator that created him, and that He is present, alive, omniscient, omnipotent, all-hearing, and all seeing. One who creates other living things is worthier of being alive; one who grants other things knowledge is worthier of knowledge; one who makes other things powerful is worthier of power. It is also known that the masterful design therein denotes the knowledge of the Doer, and that the special design denotes the will of the Doer. The process of origination per se could not have occurred without the originator’s power. A person’s knowledge of his own specific, personal, and individual self would offer him the knowledge of these godly meanings and other things, as Allah  states, “…as there are within yourselves. Can you not see?”131’132

Inapaswa kubainishwa kwamba aya nyingi za Qur'ani zinazoonyesha asili ya muda ya matukio ziliteremshwa kuonyesha jambo pana zaidi, si kuthibitisha tu kuwepo kwa Muumba, kama zile aya mbili ambazo Ibn Taymiyyah alihitimisha nazo kauli yake iliyotangulia. Muktadha wa aya hizi unaonyesha kwamba ziliteremshwa kutoa hoja kwa uweza kamili wa Allah, na kwamba Yeye ana uwezo wa kuleta Ufufuo. Kwa maneno mengine, Yule aliyeumba vitu kutoka katika kutokuwepo kabisa ana uwezo zaidi wa kuviumba upya. Kiasi hiki, kama ilivyotajwa hapo awali, kinaashiria kwa njia ya dhahiri ingawa si ya moja kwa moja kwamba Mwenye Uwezo wa kila kitu yupo, na kwamba kuwepo Kwake kunadhihirishwa na kitendo tu cha viumbe kujitokeza kutoka katika kutokuwepo. Aya maarufu zaidi inayobeba hoja hii ya kiakili ni kauli ya Allah: 'Au wameumbwa bila chochote, au wao ndio waumbaji?'133

It should be noted that most Qur’anic passages that reveal the temporal nature of events were brought to demonstrate a wider point, not to merely prove the existence of the Creator, like the two verses Ibn Taymiyyah concluded his previous statement with. The context in these verses show that they were revealed to offer reasoning for the perfect power of Allah , and that He is able to bring about the Resurrection. In other words, one who created things out of nothing is a fortiori able to refashion them. This amount, as mentioned before, implicitly yet self-evidently suggests that the Omnipotent exists, and that His existence is suggested by the mere emergence of the creation out of nothing. The most famous verse that carries this rational argument is Allah’s statement: ‘Or were they created by nothing, or are they their own creators?’133

Kwa suala tunalolishughulikia hapa, aya hii ya ajabu ndiyo ushahidi wenye nguvu zaidi wa kudumu katika Qur'ani. Aya inaanza kwa kuweka wazi ukweli mkuu wa kitheolojia kwa kuelekeza mjadala kwenye uwezekano uliopo, kisha inaonyesha kwa nini chaguo zote hizo hazina uwezekano isipokuwa chaguo moja la kweli: Binadamu ana Muumba aliyemuumba. Aya inawauliza watu wenye akili swali hili: 'Je, wameumbwa bila mtu yeyote kuwasababisha? Au wamejiumba wenyewe? Si hivyo wala si vile, kwani ni Allah aliyewaumba na kuwapa uhai, ilhali hapo awali hawakuwa kitu chochote cha kutajwa.'134

For the issue we are dealing with here, this awe-inspiring verse is the most enduring proof in the Qur’an. The verse starts off by setting out the great theological reality by focusing the discussion to what are the possibilities, after which it proceeds to demonstrate why all the options are impossible save for the only true option: Man has a Creator Who created him. The verse poses a question to rational people: ‘Were they brought into existence without anyone causing it? Or did they bring themselves into existence? It is neither, for it is Allah Who created them and gave them life, having previously been nothing worth mentioning.’134

Akifafanua hoja hii, Ibn al-Qayyim anasema: Tafakari kurudiwa kwa neno "kuumba" kwa maneno, pamoja na kizuizi kinachojumuisha kuthibitisha ushahidi kwa njia rahisi na yenye ufasaha zaidi. Allah (SWT) kwa kweli anasema: "Je, viumbe hivi – visivyokuwepo – vingeweza kuumbwa bila Muumba? Hili lingeonekana kuwa lisilowezekana kwa yeyote mwenye akili na busara, kwamba kunaweza kuwepo kitu kilichotengenezwa bila mtengenezaji, au kitu kilichoumbwa bila muumba." Ikiwa mtu atapita katika jangwa lisilo na jengo lolote, kisha akapita tena na kuona majengo imara na ngome, hatakuwa na shaka kwamba hivi vilikuwa na mjenzi. Kisha Allah akasema: "Au waliumbwa bila kitu, au wao ndio waumbaji?" Hili pia linaonyesha kwamba haiwezekani mja kujiumba mwenyewe. Mtu anawezaje kujiumba kutoka kwenye kutokuwepo? Hata hawezi kuongeza maisha yake mwenyewe, hata kwa saa moja, ingawa ana vyote vya kuendeleza uhai. Hawezi hata kunyoosha kidole chake, kucha yake, wala hata nywele moja ya kichwa chake. Kwa kuwa chaguo zote mbili si za kweli, chaguo pekee lililobaki ni kwamba wana Muumba aliyewaumba, na Mfinyanzi aliyewatengeneza. Yeye ndiye Mungu wa kweli anayestahili kuabudiwa na kushukuriwa. Wataweza vipi kumshukuru mungu mwingine badala Yake, wakati Yeye ndiye Mmoja pekee aliyewaumba? Ikiwa itasemwa: "Nafasi ya kauli ya Allah 'Au waliumba mbingu na ardhi? Bali hawana imani thabiti kwa Allah' katika ushahidi huu ni ipi?", jibu litakuwa: "Ni nafasi bora kabisa. Kupitia sehemu mbili za kwanza, Allah alieleza kwamba wana Muumba na Mfinyanzi, na kwamba wao ni viumbe. Kwa sehemu ya tatu, alieleza kwamba hawawezi kuumba, kwa kuwa wenyewe waliumbwa na kuletwa katika kuwepo. Hawakujiumba wenyewe. Hawakuziumba mbingu wala ardhi." Ni Yeye, Mwenye Nguvu, Mwenye kushinda yote, Yule aliyeelezwa kwa maneno ‘Hakuna mungu wala bwana isipokuwa Yeye’, ndiye aliyewaumba. Aliumba mbingu na ardhi. Kwa kuumba himaya za juu na za chini na kila kilichomo ndani yake, Yeye peke yake ndiye aliyeumba makazi pamoja na mkazi.”137

Detailing this argument, Ibn al-Qayyim says, Contemplate the phrasal repetition of the creation term, and the restriction that comprises of establishing evidence in the simplest and most eloquent manner. Allah  is essentially saying, “How could have these creations – having not been in existence – been created without a Creator? This would be considered impossible by anyone with understanding and rationality, that there can be something made without a maker, or something created without a creator.” If a person passes by a wasteland without any building, then he passed by it again and saw solid buildings and castles, he would have no doubt that these had a maker. Then Allah said, “Or were they created by nothing, or are they their own creators?”135 This, likewise, shows that it is impossible that a servant invents and creates himself. How can someone be able to create himself out of non-existence? He cannot even increase his own life, not even by an hour, even though he has all the facilities of life. He cannot even extend his finger, fingernail, or even one strand of his hair. Given that both options are false, the only option that remains is that they have a Creator Who created them, and a Fashioner Who fashioned them. He is the True Divine Who is worthy of their worship and thanks. How can they thank a god other than Him when He is the one and only being that created them? If it is said, “What is the place of Allah’s statement ‘Or did they create the heavens and the Earth? In fact, they have no firm belief in Allah’136 in this evidence?”, it would be said in response: “The best place. Through the first couple of segments, He explained that they have a Creator and Fashioner, and that they are created. With the third segment, He explained that they are unable to create, having been created themselves and brought into existence. They did not create themselves. They did not create the heavens or the Earth. It was the One, the Omnipotent, the One described as ‘There is neither any god nor lord besides Him’ Who created them. He created the heavens and the Earth. By creating the upper and lower dominions and everything therein, He alone is the one Who created both residence and resident.”’137

Jubayr ibn Muṭʿim ana simulizi nzuri inayodhihirisha ukuu wa aya hii ya Qur'ani. Alisema: "Nilimsikia Mtume ﷺ akisoma Sura al-Ṭūr katika sala ya Maghrib. Alipofika kwenye aya hii: {Au wameumbwa bila kitu, au wao ndio waumbaji?}, moyo wangu karibu ukaruka." Yeyote atakayetafakari mbinu ya Manabii katika kujadiliana na wale waliokataa ubwana wa Allah (SWT) na kujidai wenyewe ubwana huo, ataona kwamba Manabii waliwafundisha kwa mbinu hii ya kiakili ya kuthibitisha ubwana wa Allah (SWT), na kisha kustahiki kwake kuabudiwa peke yake.

Jubayr ibn Muṭʿim  has a beautiful narration revealing the greatness of this Qur’anic verse. He said, ‘I heard the Prophet  read al-Ṭūrin the Maghrib prayer. When he reached this verse: “Or were they created by nothing, or are they their own creators?”138, my heart almost flew out.’139 The one contemplating the method of the Prophets in debating those who denied the lordship of Allah  and claimed it for themselves will note that the Prophets instructed them with this rational method to argue for the lordship of Allah , and subsequently His worthiness to be worshipped alone.

Mtu mashuhuri kuliko wote aliyekataa uungu wa Allah alikuwa Firauni. Alisema, ‘Mimi ndiye Mola wenu, Mkuu kabisa!’140 Hivyo, sehemu ya mazungumzo aliyokuwa nayo Mūsā naye ilikuwa ni kutumia athari za nguvu za Allah kama ushahidi dhidi yake. Allah anasema: ‘Firauni akasema, “Na ni nini Mola wa walimwengu wote?”’141

The most infamous person who denied the lordship of Allah  was Pharaoh. He said, ‘I am your lord, the most high!’140 As thus, part of the discussion Mūsā had with him was to use the effects of the power of Allah  as an evidence against him. Allah  says, ‘Pharaoh asked, “And what is ‘the Lord of all worlds’?”’141

Mūsā alitoa majibu na hoja mbalimbali. Alimkumbusha Firauni silika ya asili (fitra), kwamba Allah anatambulika zaidi kuliko haja ya kutoa ufafanuzi wowote. Alieleza kwamba viumbe vyote vya Allah vinategemea Yeye kwa uwepo wao: mbingu zote, ardhi, na kila kitu kilicho kati yake vinahitaji Allah kwa kuumbwa, kuruzukiwa na kusaidiwa. Kauli yake "Mola wa mashariki na magharibi"142 ni taarifa ya ziada na msisitizo kwamba matukio yote yanamtegemea Yeye. Kila kilicho juu yako na chini yako, kila kilicho mashariki na magharibi, na kila kilicho kati yake, kilicho mbele yako na nyuma yako, kinamtegemea Yeye.

Mūsā  offered a variety of answers and proofs. He reminded Pharaoh of the innate instinct, that Allah is far more recognisable than the need for some definition. He explained that all of Allah’s creation is existentially dependent on Him – all the heavens, the Earth, and everything in between is in need of Allah  for creation, sustenance, and assistance. His statement ‘Lord of the east and west’142 is additional information and emphasis that all events are dependent on Him, . Everything above and beneath you, everything in the east and the west, and everything in between that is in front of you and behind you is dependent on Him .

Ibn Taymiyyah alichambua mjadala kati ya Mūsā na Firauni:

Ibn Taymiyyah analysed the debate between Mūsā and Pharaoh:

Firauni alificha ukanushi na ukataaji wake kwa namna ya swali la kejeli. Hakuwa anauliza kuhusu sifa za Mola ambaye tayari alikwisha kumkubali, kwa kuwa alikuwa anamkataa na kumkanusha. Ndiyo maana mwishoni mwa mazungumzo alisema: "Ukimchukua mungu mwingine badala yangu, hakika nitakufunga gerezani."143

Pharaoh shrouded his denial and rejection in the form of a rhetorical question. He was not asking about the attributes of a Lord he had already acknowledged, as he was in denial of Him and rejected Him. This is why towards the end of the discussion, he said, “If you take any other god besides me, I will certainly have you imprisoned.”143

Pia alisema, “…ingawa nina hakika kwamba yeye (Mūsā) ni mwongo.”144 Swali lake kwa kweli lilikusudia kuonyesha kukataa kwake na kumkataa. Alikuwa akisema kwa msingi, “Dunia haina Mola aliyekutuma wewe. Huyu ni nani?” – kama hoja ya kukanusha. Mūsā alieleza kwamba Yeye anajulikana kwake yeye na kwa wale waliokuwepo mahakamani, na kwamba ishara Zake zilikuwa dhahiri, wazi, na zisizoweza kukanushwa. Alisema kwamba walikuwa wakikataa kwa ndimi zao kile ambacho silika zao zilijua kuwa ni kweli. Kama ilivyosimuliwa mahali pengine katika Qur’ani, Mūsā alimwambia Firauni, “Unajua vizuri kwamba hakuna aliyeteremsha ishara hizi isipokuwa Mola wa mbingu na ardhi kama mwangaza wa busara.”145 Allah akasema, “Na ingawa nyoyo zao zilikuwa na yakini kwamba ishara hizo ni za kweli, bado walizikanusha kwa dhulma na kiburi. Basi angalia mwisho wa wafisadi ulikuwa vipi!”146 Firauni hakusema “Nani (Kiarabu = man) ni Mola wa viumbe vyote?”, kwa sababu man ni swali kuhusu kiumbe maalum. Hutumika katika maswali ambayo kiumbe halisi na maalum kinaulizwa, huku jina lake la jumla likiwa tayari linajulikana. Ni kama mtu anapouliza mjumbe anapotoka kwa nani, “Nani (man) amekutuma?” Kuhusu mā, hutumika katika swali la kuelezea. Firauni alikuwa akisema, “Hii ni nini? Na hiki ni nini mlichokiita ‘Mola wa viumbe vyote’?” Alisema hivyo kwa kukataa na kumkataa Yeye. Alipouliza hivi kwa dharau, Mūsā alijibu kwamba Yeye yuko wazi mno kiasi cha kutoweza kukanushwa, na ni dhahiri mno kiasi cha kutoweza kutiliwa shaka. Alisema, “Yeye ndiye Mola wa mbingu na ardhi na kila kilichomo baina yake, endapo mngekuwa na imani ya yakini.”147 Hakusema, “…endapo mngekuwa na imani ya yakini juu ya fulani” – aliliacha wazi. Kwa ufupi, ikiwa unayo yakini juu ya chochote, ya kwanza katika orodha ya yakini hizo inapaswa kuwa imani kwa Mola huyu – kama vile Mitume walipowaambia watu wao, “Je, kuna shaka juu ya Allah?”148 Ukisema, “Hatuna yakini juu ya chochote.” Kwa hakika, maarifa yote yamechukuliwa kutoka kwetu”, basi hili ni dai la jumla la usofista. Mdai wake yuko wazi kuwa anasema uongo, kwa kuwa maarifa ni sehemu ya kila binadamu. Kila binadamu mwenye akili lazima awe na maarifa fulani. Hii ndiyo sababu imetajwa katika ufafanuzi wa akili kuwa ni maarifa ya kiasili, ambayo hakuna mtu mwenye akili asiyekuwa nayo. Kwa hiyo Firaun alipesema, “Mtume wenu aliyetumwa kwenu hakika ni mwendawazimu”, ilikuwa ni uongo juu ya Mtume. Walikuwa wameacha mapokeo yao yanayosifiwa, na hivyo wakawahusisha Mitume na wazimu. Pia walionyesha kukataa au kutilia shaka Muumba. Hii ndiyo ilikuwa hali ya watu wao wa kawaida na dini yao. Hii ilikuwa dini nzuri machoni pao, na mungu waliyemtii alikuwa Firaun: “Mtume wenu aliyetumwa kwenu hakika ni mwendawazimu.” Kwa hiyo Mūsā akamweleza kwamba yeye ndiye aliyeachwa bila mantiki yenye manufaa, na yeye ndiye anastahili zaidi kuhusishwa na jambo hili. Akasema, “Yeye ni Mola wa mashariki na magharibi, na kila kilichomo baina yake, kama mngekuwa na akili.” Mantiki inahitaji maarifa ya kiasili na yenye uhakika, ambayo kubwa zaidi katika fitra ni kukiri Muumba. Kisha akaendelea kueleza kwamba kumthibitisha Yeye ni matokeo ya kimantiki. Hata hivyo, maarifa yenye manufaa yanasifiwa pale mtu mwenye maarifa hayo anapoyatendea kazi. Asipoyatendea kazi, itasemwa kwamba hana mantiki. Pia itasemwa kwamba yule asiyefuata anachoonekana kuwa na uhakika nacho, kwa kweli hana uhakika huo. Uhakika (yaqīn) unaweza pia kumaanisha maarifa yaliyotulia moyoni; unaweza pia kumaanisha kuyatendea kazi maarifa hayo. Kwa hiyo, neno mwamini (yule mwenye yakini) litasemwa tu kwa wale ambao maarifa na matendo yao yametulia mioyoni mwao. Watu wa Firaun hawakufuata walipojua. Kwa hiyo hawakuwa na mantiki wala uhakika. Kauli ya Mūsā inaonyesha mambo yote mawili: Ikiwa mna yakini, mtamjua Yeye, na ikiwa mna akili ya kufikiri, mtamjua Yeye. Ikiwa mnadai kwamba hamna yakini wala akili, basi vivyo hivyo watu wenu. Hili kwa hiyo litakuwa ni kukiri kwenu kwamba ubinadamu wenu umeondolewa kwenu. Yeyote aliye hivi hafai kudai uungu. Ingawa hili ni la uongo kwa upande wenu, bado mnamwamini Yeye. Ni kama alivyosema Allah (SWT): "Nao walizikanusha kwa dhulma na kiburi, ilhali nafsi zao zilikuwa zimeziamini."152 Mna akili ambayo kwayo mnaweza kumtambua Yeye. Hata hivyo, matamanio yenu yanawazuia kufuata yale ambayo akili inayaamuru. Mnataka kujivunia katika ardhi na kufanya uovu. Kwa hiyo, kwa mtazamo huu, hamna akili.153

Kulikuwa na mabishano kati ya Ibrāhīm na Namrūd (Nimrod) yanayofanana na yale ya Mūsā na Firauni. Allah (SWT) anasema: "Je, hujamuona yule aliyebishana na Ibrahim kuhusu Mola wake, kwa sababu Allah alikuwa amempa ufalme? Kumbuka alipomwambia Ibrahim: 'Mola wangu ndiye anayeweza kuhuisha na kufisha.' Akasema: 'Mimi pia naweza kuhuisha na kufisha.' Ibrahim akasema: 'Allah huliinua jua kutoka mashariki. Basi lete wewe kutoka magharibi.' Basi yule kafiri akashikwa na butwaa. Na Allah hawaongoi watu madhalimu." Akifafanua sehemu za mdahalo huu na hali ya Namrūd, Ibn Kathīr alisema: Hilo ni kwa sababu alikana kuwepo mungu mwingine isipokuwa yeye, kama vile Firauni alivyowaambia watu wake: "Enyi wakuu! Sijui mungu mwingine kwenu isipokuwa mimi." Ni kiburi chake na utawala wake wa muda mrefu ndio vilivyomfikisha kwenye udhalimu wake, ukafiri mkubwa na ukaidi mkali. Ndiyo maana Allah alisema: "...kwa sababu Allah alikuwa amempa ufalme?" Ni kama vile alidai ushahidi kutoka kwa Ibrahim juu ya kuwepo kwa Mola ambaye yeye alikuwa akimlingania. Ibrahim akasema: "Mola wangu ndiye anayeweza kuhuisha na kufisha." Kwa maneno haya alimaanisha: "Ushahidi wa kuwepo kwake ni kutokea kwa vitu hivi vinavyoonekana baada ya kuwa havikuwepo kabla, na kutoweka kwake baada ya kuwepo. Hii ni dalili ya moja kwa moja ya kuwepo kwa Mtendaji na Mchagua, kwani vitu hivyo visingeweza kutokea vyenyewe. Kwa hiyo ni lazima yupo kiumbe aliyevileta kuwepo. Huyo ndiye Mola ambaye ninamwabudu, kwani yeye peke yake hana mshirika." Wakati huo, mjibu hoja – Namrūd – alisema: "Mimi pia naweza kuhuisha na kufisha." Qatādah, Muhammad bin Isḥāq, Suddī na wengine walisema: "Tazama – sasa nina watu wawili walioletwa kwangu. Wako katika adhabu ya kifo. Ninaamuru mmoja auawe na mwingine asamehewe." Huu ni maana ya kutoa uhai na kufisha.” Inaonekana – na Mwenyezi Mungu ndiye anayejua zaidi – kwamba hii haikuwa ndiyo aliyomaanisha Namrūd, kwa kuwa hiki si jibu la moja kwa moja kwa Ibrāhīm, wala hakihusiani na swali lake, kwani hakizuii kuwepo kwa Muumba. Badala yake, alichokusudia ni kujidai kwa cheo hiki kwa sababu ya ukaidi na kiburi. Alijifanya kwamba kwa kufanya hivyo, yeye ndiye anayetoa uhai na kufisha. Firauni alimfuata katika hili: “Enyi wakuu! Sijui mungu mwingine kwenu isipokuwa mimi mwenyewe.”159 Ndiyo maana alipodai majigambo haya, Ibrāhīm alimwambia, “Mwenyezi Mungu huiinua jua kutoka mashariki. Basi,liinue kutoka magharibi.”160 Kwa hili alimaanisha: “Ikiwa unadai kwamba wewe unatoa uhai na kufisha, basi Yule anayefanya hivi ndiye Anayetekeleza mapenzi Yake katika uwepo kwa kuumba viumbe Aliowachagua, na kuvitiisha sayari na mienendo yake. Jua hili huchomoza kila siku kutoka mashariki – ikiwa wewe ni mungu anayetoa uhai na kufisha kama unavyodai, basi lilete kutoka magharibi.” Alipojua kwamba hawezi na hakuweza kutoa jibu, alitambua kwamba hawezi tena kujigamba katika hali hii, akabaki bubu. Mwenyezi Mungu amesema, “Na Mwenyezi Mungu haiongozi kaumu ya madhalimu.”161 Maana yake ni kwamba Yeye hawapi msukumo wa kupata ushahidi wowote au hoja yoyote. Badala yake, ushahidi wao ni batili machoni pa Mola wao. Juu yao kuna ghadhabu, nao watapata adhabu kali. Ufafanuzi wa aya kwa maana hii ni bora zaidi kuliko kile ambacho wanamantiki wengi wanakitaja, yaani kwamba kuhama kwa Ibrāhīm kutoka suala la kwanza hadi la pili kulikuwa ni kuhama kutoka hoja moja hadi nyingine iliyo wazi zaidi. Baadhi ya wanamantiki wanaitaja hii kuhama kwa usemi usiopendeza. Hata hivyo, si kama walivyoeleza. Badala yake, suala la kwanza ni kama pendekezo la pili na linaonyesha upotofu wa alichodai Namrūd katika suala la kwanza na la pili. Sifa zote na shukrani ni za Mwenyezi Mungu.162

• Pendekezo la kwanza: Matukio ya kimuda yapo.

• First proposition: Temporal events exist.

• Pendekezo la pili: Kila tukio la kidunia lina mtu aliyelisababisha.

• Second proposition: Every temporal event has someone who caused it.

• Hitimisho: Allah ndiye sababu ya matukio ya kidunia.

• Conclusion: Allah  is the cause of temporal events.

Ushahidi wa mapendekezo haya mawili, na jinsi yanavyoongoza kwenye hitimisho lililotajwa hapo awali, unahitajika.

Evidence for these two propositions, and how they lead to the aforementioned conclusion, is required.

Ushahidi wa jambo hili ni hisia na uchunguzi, ambao ndio waliouonyesha Ghazālī, Ibn Rushd, Ibn Taymiyyah na wengineo kuhusiana na matukio ya muda yanayoonekana kwa hisia. Kuhusu kuwa na mwanzo wa ulimwengu (na kila kilichomo ndani yake), uwepo wake na kutokuwepo kwake vyote vinaweza kuwazika, na hivyo kuwepo kwake hakuchukuliwi kuwa ni lazima; ni cha kujitegemea tu. Vitu vya kujitegemea kwa hakika ni vya mwanzo, kwa kuwa vinahitaji kuwepo kwa kiumbe kisichojitegemea ili kuweza kuja kuwepo. Mwanzo wa ulimwengu utajadiliwa kwa undani zaidi katika sehemu inayofuata, kwa idhini ya Allah.

The proof of this proposition is the senses and observation, which is what Ghazālī, Ibn Rushd, Ibn Taymiyyah, and others pointed out in relation to perceptible temporal events. On the temporality of the universe (and everything within it), both its existence and non-existence can be envisaged, and thus its existence is not considered necessary – it is only contingent. Contingent entities are most certainly temporal, as they require the existence of a non-contingent being for them to come into existence. The temporality of the universe will be discussed in more detail in the next section, by the permission of Allah.

Hisia ni visambazaji vya kiakili, si wahukumu wa kiakili. Utambuzi wa mtu juu ya mambo yanayojitokeza anayoyashuhudia na kuyahisi karibu naye ni jambo la lazima. Ibn Taymiyyah amesema: "Mbinu ya kutoa ushahidi kwa kutumia kile ambacho uanzo wake (kutokuwa wa milele) unaonekana ni katika Qur'an, na wanazuoni wa kale na Maimamu wamekubaliana nayo, ingawa pamoja na silika na hisia. Kwa hili, hakuna haja ya kutoa ushahidi wa kuanzwa kwa mambo mahususi. Kutilia shaka uanzo wa mambo yale ambayo kujitokeza kwake kunaweza kuonekana kunapelekea katika udanganyifu wa kimantiki (sophism), unaozifunga njia zote za kupata elimu yoyote. Matokeo yake ni kulinganisha mtu mwenye akili timamu na mwendawazimu."

The senses are cognitive transmitters, not cognitive arbiters. A man’s recognition of the emerging things he witnesses and senses around him is necessary. Ibn Taymiyyah  said, The method of bringing evidence by using that whose temporality is observable is in the Qur’an, and the ancient scholars and Imams have agreed to it, though in conjunction with instinct and the senses. With this, there is no need to offer evidence for the temporality of specific Doubting the temporality of those things whose emergence can be observed leads to sophism, which shuts down the possibility of any knowledge. It results in the equalisation of a sane person and a madman.

Ushahidi wa jambo hili ni silika ya kiakili, kama inavyowakilishwa katika kanuni ya sababu. Ni jambo la wazi kwa nafsi na la kisilika ambalo kinyume chake hakiwezi kufikirika: Haiwezekani kuwazia kuwepo kwa kitu cha kidunia bila kujua kwamba kulikuwa na sababu iliyoleta kuibuka kwake. Ibn Taymiyyah alisema, ‘Kujua kwamba kitu kilichoanzishwa lazima kiwe na mwanzishaji ni elimu ya asili na ya kisilika.’164 Kwa hiyo, hili ni jambo lisilohitaji mchakato wa kufikiri kwa kutegemea ushahidi. Badala yake, lingekubaliwa kama ukweli, kwa kuwa ni elimu ya msingi, ambayo elimu ya kinadharia imejengwa juu yake. Mambo ya lazima ya kiakili yanatumika kama ushahidi wa mambo mengine. Hayako hapo ili yathibitishwe. Yanapata uthabiti wake kutokana na asili yake. Bila kuthibitisha usilika wake, msingi wa elimu ungegeuka kuwa msururu usio na mwisho, jambo ambalo lingeharibu uwezekano wa kupata elimu yoyote. Kwa hiyo, lazima kuwepo na ukweli fulani wa msingi – au dhana za kiakili – ambao mchakato wa kufikiri kwa kutegemea ushahidi umejengwa juu yake. Mojawapo ya dhana hizi za kiakili za kisilika ni kanuni ya sababu.

The proof for this is rational instinctiveness, as represented in the principle of causality. It is a self-evident and instinctive issue whose opposite scenario cannot be envisaged: It is not possible to imagine the existence of a temporal matter without knowing there was a cause that brought about its emergence. Ibn Taymiyyah said, ‘Knowing that an originated entity must have an originator is innate and instinctive knowledge.’164 Therefore, this is an issue that does not require a process of evidence-based reasoning. Rather, it would be accepted as fact, for it is basic knowledge, upon which theoretical knowledge is based. Rational necessities are to be used as evidence for other things. They are not there to be proven. They acquire their decisiveness from their innateness. Without affirming their instinctiveness, the basis of knowledge would become an infinite series, causing the collapse of the possibility of gaining any knowledge. Therefore, there must be some basic facts – or cognitive concepts – upon which the process of evidence-based reasoning is founded. One of these instinctive cognitive concepts is the principle of causality.

Ni jambo la kuvutia kwamba mchakato wa kufikiri kwa kutegemea ushahidi unahitaji kukubali umuhimu wa lazima wa kimantiki. Uhusiano kati ya ushahidi na kile unachoonyesha unatawaliwa na kanuni hii, kwa kuwa ushahidi ndio sababu ya kupata maarifa kuhusu kile unachoonyesha. Jaribio la mpinzani la kukanusha kanuni ya sababu na athari ni, kwa kimya kimya, kukiri kwake kuiunga mkono kanuni hiyo. Kuhusu athari kubwa ya kanuni hii katika muundo wa akili ya binadamu, Ibn Taymiyyah alisema: "Inajulikana kwa fitra – ambayo Allah amewaandaa waja wake nayo kwa mantiki iliyo wazi – kwamba tukio linalojitokeza haliwezi kutokea bila kitu kinachololeta, na kwamba kujitokeza kwa tukio la kimuda bila mwanzilishi kunaweza kukataliwa moja kwa moja kuwa si kweli. Hili limejikita katika watoto wote wa Adam, hata watoto wadogo. Mtoto akipigwa na kusema, 'Ni nani aliyenipiga?', na akaambiwa, 'Hakuna mtu', akili yake haitakubali kwamba pigo lilitokea bila mtu aliyelitekeleza. Ndiyo maana mtu akidai kwamba uandishi, ujenzi, upandikizaji au mambo kama hayo yanaweza kutokea bila mtu kuyafanya, watu wenye akili timamu wangemchukulia kuwa either mwendawazimu au mwongo wa hoja, sawa kabisa na mtu anayekataa ukweli dhahiri na maarifa ya asili."165

Hoja hii inajulikana kama hoja ya muda (argument from temporality), hoja ya kalam, hoja ya ulimwengu (argument from the universe), au hoja ya kosmolojia (cosmological argument). Mapendekezo na hitimisho la hoja hii yanafanana na yale ya kiwango cha kwanza tuliyoyashughulikia hivi punde:

This proof is known as the argument from temporality, the kalam argument, the argument from the universe, or the cosmological argument. The propositions and conclusion of this proof are similar to those of the first level that we just dealt with:

• Pendekezo la kwanza: Kila kitu chenye mwanzo lazima kiwe na sababu.

• First proposition: Anything with a beginning must have a cause.

• Pendekezo la pili: Ulimwengu una mwanzo.

• Second proposition: The universe has a beginning.

Hitimisho: Kwa hiyo, ulimwengu lazima uwe na sababu.

• Conclusion: Therefore, the universe must have a cause.

Sababu iliyopendelea kuwepo kwake badala ya kutokuwepo kwake ni Allah.

The cause that preferred its existence over its non-existence is Allah .

Kwa kweli, mbinu hii ya kufikiri si mpya katika uwanja wa falsafa wala wa ilmu al-kalam. Kwa hakika, ndiyo njia maarufu zaidi iliyotumiwa na ilmu al-kalam kuingia katika suala la kuwepo kwa Allah (SWT). Ndiyo maana hata baadhi ya wale waliotumia hoja hii katika ulimwengu wa kisasa wa Magharibi – kama mjadili maarufu wa Kikristo William Lane Craig – wameiita 'hoja ya kalam ya cosmological'; na yeye pia ana kitabu chenye jina hilohilo. Mwanzoni mwa kitabu hicho, anatoa kauli hii muhimu: 'Pengine hakuna sura yoyote katika historia ya hoja ya cosmological iliyo muhimu – au iliyopuuzwa kwa kiwango hicho – kama ile ya wanatheolojia na wanafalsafa wa Kiarabu. Ingawa tunaona ndani yao chimbuko na maendeleo ya matoleo mawili muhimu zaidi ya hoja ya cosmological, yaani hoja ya kurudi nyuma kwa wakati na hoja ya utegemezi, mchango wa wanafikra hawa wa Kiislamu umepuuzwa karibu kabisa katika makusanyo na vitabu vya Magharibi kuhusu somo hili.'168

In actuality, this method of reasoning is not new in the philosophy or kalam space. In fact, it is the most famous entry point of kalam into the issue of the existence of Allah . This is why even some of those who have used this reasoning within the contemporary Western arena – such as the famous Christian debater William Lane Craig – have called it the ‘kalam cosmological argument’; he also has a book with the same name. In the beginning of this book, he makes the following important acknowledgement: ‘Probably no chapter in the history of the cosmological argument is as significant – or as universally ignored – as that of the Arabic theologians and philosophers. Although we find in them the origin and development of two of the most important versions of the cosmological argument, namely the argument from temporal regress and the argument from contingency, the contribution of these Islamic thinkers is virtually ignored in western anthologies and books on the subject.’168

Katika hatua za mwanzo za historia ya elimu ya ulimwengu (cosmology), kulikuwa na makubaliano fulani kuhusu mambo mawili ya msingi yanayohusu asili ya ulimwengu:

During the early stages of the history of cosmology, there was an agreement of sorts on two fundamental notions related to the nature of the universe:

1. Ulimwengu ni wa aina moja, wenye sifa zile zile – ni uleule katika sehemu zake zote zinazoundwa nao.

1. The universe is homogeneous with the same characteristics – it is the same across all its constituent parts.

2. Ulimwengu uko katika mpangilio maalum na wa kudumu.

2. The universe is in a fixed and constant pattern.

Einstein alipokuja na kuwasilisha nadharia ya uhusiano, mawazo haya mawili yalionekana kupingana na toleo la kwanza la sheria ya uhusiano aliyoinadharia. Ili kutatua tatizo hili, alipendekeza mgawo wa mara kwa mara aliouita kosmolojia ya mara kwa mara, ili kusawazisha athari ya mvuto. Kwa njia hiyo, kungekuwa na usawa katika nadharia mpya ya ulimwengu aliyoipendekeza, ambayo ilikuwa kwamba ulimwengu ni tuli. Huu ulikuwa mtazamo uliokubalika kwa ujumla juu ya ulimwengu katika duru nyingi za kisayansi wakati huo: Ulimwengu ulielezwa kuwa tuli na wa kudumu.

When Einstein came and introduced relativity, these two assumptions appeared to contradict the first iteration of the law of relativity that he theorised. To deal with this problem, he proposed a constant coefficient he called the cosmological constant in order to counterbalance the effect of gravity. That way, there would be balance in the new theory of the universe that he had proposed, which was that the universe is static. This was the generally accepted view on the universe in most scientific circles back then: The universe was characterised as being static and constant.

Baadaye, padri Mkatoliki wa Ubelgiji na mwanafizikia Georges Lemaître pamoja na mwanasayansi wa Kirusi Alexander Friedmann walijitokeza. Walitoa nadharia mpya kuhusu ulimwengu: ulimwengu unapanuka, na ulianza kutoka katika hali yenye msongamano mkubwa sana na ya kubana sana. Ushahidi mkuu wa nadharia ya upanuzi wa ulimwengu ulitoka kwa Edwin Hubble. Mwaka 1929, aligundua jambo muhimu: magalaksi yaliyo karibu nasi yanasogea mbali nasi kwa kasi inayolingana na umbali kati yao na sisi; kasi yao huongezeka umbali unapozidi kuwa mkubwa. Upanuzi huu ulibainishwa kupitia wigo wa mwanga wa magalaksi hayo – yanaonekana kuwa na rangi nyekundu, jambo linaloashiria kwamba yanasogea mbali zaidi, tofauti na kitu kinapokaribia, ambapo kinaonekana kwa mtazamaji kuwa na ukungu wa rangi ya buluu. Mwaka 1946, George Gamow alidhani kwamba, sambamba na upanuzi wa ulimwengu na kushuka kwa joto, fotoni zilijitenga kwa mafanikio na maada. Hili liliwakilishwa kwa namna ya mwale wa mwanga ambao Gamow alidhani upo, na kwamba uliendelea kung'aa katika ulimwengu wote. Hili liligunduliwa kwa bahati na Arno Penzias na Robert Wilson. Jambo hili baadaye lilipewa jina la mionzi ya mandharinyuma ya microwave ya kikosmiki, ambayo ni mojawapo ya ushahidi wenye nguvu zaidi wa nadharia ya Big Bang. Mionzi hii ilifichua kuwepo kwa viwango vya juu isivyo kawaida vya joto kati ya magalaksi, na kwamba nafasi haina joto la sifuri kabisa. Badala yake, joto la nafasi ni karibu 3 Kelvin – mionzi hii ni mabaki ya joto ya Big Bang. Kutokana na ugunduzi huu, watafiti hao wawili walishinda Tuzo ya Nobel ya Amani katika Fizikia mwaka 1978. Hatua hii iliashiria mabadiliko katika jumuiya ya kisayansi: kukataliwa kwa nadharia ya Big Bang kiligeuka kuwa kukubalika kwa jumla. Inavutia kutambua kwamba ugunduzi huu kwa upande wao ulikuwa wa bahati. Walisema, 'Either we've seen the birth of the universe, or (as one astrophysical folk tale would have it) we've seen a pile of 81

Katika miaka ya katikati ya tisini, wanasayansi walijaribu kugundua kanuni inayoeleza michakato yote isiyoweza kurudishwa katika ulimwengu. Kutokana na juhudi hizo, sheria ya pili ya thermodynamics iligunduliwa. Hatua ya kwanza ya kufikia hili ilikuwa kubaini kwamba joto daima huhamia kutoka kwenye kitu chenye joto zaidi kwenda kwenye kile chenye joto kidogo, na joto huendelea kuhamia hadi vitu vyote vilivyounganishwa vifikie usawa wa joto. Ukweli ni kwamba uhamishaji wa joto ni mfano mmoja tu kati ya mingi, ambayo inaweza kuelezwa kama dhana ya usawa au mizani ya maumbile. Jambo hilo hilo linaonekana katika kusambaa kwa gesi ili kufikia usawa, katika umeme, na katika mifano mingineyo pia. Kama matukio haya yasingetokea katika maumbile, uhai usingewezekana. Kwa mfano, kwa sababu ya jambo hili, hewa haijitenganishi ili oksijeni ikusanyike upande mmoja wa chumba na naitrojeni upande wa pili. Maendeleo moja muhimu katika kuundwa kwa sheria hii ni uhusiano wake na dhana ya entropy. Hili ni neno la kitaalamu linalotumika kuonyesha kiwango cha machafuko. Wakati wowote kiwango cha mvurugano ndani ya mfumo kinapoongezeka, jumla ya entropy ndani yake huongezeka; vivyo hivyo, kiwango cha mvurugano kinapopungua, jumla ya entropy hupungua. Ndiyo sababu sheria ya thermodynamics ina kifungu kinachosema kwamba mifumo huelekea kubadilika kutoka entropy ya chini kwenda entropy ya juu. Kwa maneno mengine, hubadilika kutoka mpangilio kwenda kwenye mvurugano. Kinachotuhusu hapa ni uhusiano wa sheria hii na ulimwengu. Ulimwengu ni mfumo funge. Ndiyo maana sheria ya pili ya thermodynamics inautumika. Kama mfumo funge, ulimwengu hujitahidi kufikia usawa katika nyanja nyingi. Joto husambaa hadi lifikie usawa, na vivyo hivyo mgawanyo wa nishati, entropy, na mengineyo hutokea pia.

In the mid-90s, scientists attempted to uncover a rule that explains all irreversible processes in the universe. As a result of those efforts, the second law of thermodynamics was discovered. The first step to realising this was to note that heat always transfers from a more heated body to a less heated one, and heat keeps on transferring until all connected bodies reach thermal equilibrium. The fact of the matter is that the thermal transfer is just one example of many, which can be described as the equilibrium concept or the balance of nature. The same can be seen vis-à-vis the spread of gases to achieve equilibrium, electricity, and other cases as well. Had these phenomena not occurred in nature, life would have been impossible. By this phenomenon, the air – for example – does not separate out so that oxygen gathers only on one side of the room and nitrogen on the other side. One significant development in the shaping of this law is its connection with the concept of entropy. It is a technical term used to denote the amount of chaos. Anytime there is an increase in the scale of disorder within a system, the sum of the entropies rises therein; likewise, when there is a disorder scale decrease, the sum of the entropies decreases. This is why the law of thermodynamics has within it a provision that states that systems are inclined to switch from low entropy to higher entropy. In other words, they switch from order to disorder. What concerns us here is the connection of this law to the universe. The universe is a closed system. This is why the second law of thermodynamics is applicable to it. As a closed system, the universe strives to achieve equilibrium in multiple fields. Heat spreads until it reaches equilibrium, and likewise the same occurs in the distribution of energy, entropy, and others as well.

Yeyote anayekanusha kuwepo kwa Mwenyezi Mungu hangekubali dalili ya kawaida ya hoja hii, badala yake angeweka mfululizo wa mashaka juu yake. Mashaka haya hurejea either kwenye pendekezo la kwanza la hoja, pendekezo la pili, au hitimisho. Hapa, nitataja mashaka na pingamizi muhimu zaidi ambazo zimeorodheshwa.

One who denies the existence of Allah  would not accept the instinctive indication of this argument, and would instead cast a set of doubts on it. These doubts either go back to the argument’s first proposition, second proposition, or conclusion. Here, I shall mention the most important doubts and objections that have been listed.

Njia kuu ya kutilia shaka pendekezo hili ni dai kwamba kitu kinaweza kuwepo bila sababu yoyote, na kwamba inawezekana kwa kiumbe kinachowezekana kuchaguliwa kuwepo – badala ya kutokuwepo – bila kuwepo kwa mchaguzi. Kwa msingi huu, inawezekana kwamba ulimwengu ulitokea tu bila sababu; kwa hiyo, hauhitaji sababu iliyopendelea kuwepo kwake. Hivyo, dai hili lingefanya haja ya muumba huru isiwe na maana. Hoja maarufu zaidi ya wanaoshuku inalenga kukanusha kipengele cha silika ya mwanadamu. Silika hiyo inaashiria kanuni ya sababu na matokeo. Imeshaelezwa hapo awali kwamba kanuni hii ni dhana ya kiakili ya silika na dhahiri, ambayo haihitaji uthibitisho wa nje. Mwanafalsafa maarufu zaidi anayepinga kanuni hii ni Mwingereza David Hume. Yeye ni mwanzilishi wa shule ya empiricism, inayotangaza kwamba hisia pekee ndizo chanzo cha maarifa ya binadamu. Anasema.

The main way of casting doubt to this proposition is through the claim that something can come into existence without any cause, and that it is possible for a contingent entity to be chosen for existence – versus non-existence – without a chooser. Based on this, it is possible that the universe just came into existence without cause; therefore, it is not in need for a cause that preferred it to exist. As thus, this claim would make the need for an independent creator irrelevant. The most famous sceptic argument strives to negate man’s instinctive element. That instinct denotes the principle of causality. It has been previously highlighted that this principle is an instinctive and self-evident rational concept that does not require external veracity. The most famous sceptic of this principle is the English philosopher David Hume. He is a pioneer of the empiricist school, that declares that only the senses can be the source for human knowledge. He states.

Ili kuijua vizuri dhana ya nguvu au uhusiano wa lazima, basi na tuchunguze athari yake katika nafsi. Na ili tuipate athari hiyo kwa uhakika zaidi, na tuitafute katika vyanzo vyote ambavyo inawezekana kuitokana navyo. Tunapotazama vitu vya nje vilivyo karibu nasi, na kufikiria utendaji wa sababu, hatuwezi kamwe, katika tukio hata moja, kugundua nguvu yoyote au uhusiano wowote wa lazima; sifa yoyote inayoifunga athari kwa sababu, na kuifanya moja kuwa matokeo yasiyokosea ya nyingine. Tunachokiona tu ni kwamba jambo moja kwa hakika hufuatiwa na jingine. Mpigo wa mpira mmoja wa bilioni huambatana na mwendo wa mpira wa pili. Hii ndiyo yote inayoonekana kwa hisi za nje. Akili haihisi hisia wala athari yoyote ya ndani kutokana na mfuatano huu wa vitu; kwa hiyo, katika tukio lolote moja mahsusi la sababu na athari, hakuna kitu kinachoweza kuibua wazo la nguvu au uhusiano wa lazima.176

To be fully acquainted, therefore, with the idea of power or necessary connexion, let us examine its impression; and in order to find the impression with greater certainty, let us search for it in all the sources, from which it may possibly be derived. When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects: consequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, anything which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion.176

Pingamizi kubwa zaidi hapa ni jaribio la kutoa mitazamo mbadala inayolenga kuchukua nafasi ya nadharia ya kawaida ya Big Bang. Pingamizi hilo kwanza linahusisha na kushikilia wazo kwamba ulimwengu ni wa milele kabla ya kuwepo kwake, kama ilivyo katika modeli tuli, au kwamba linaipa Big Bang maana ya mabadiliko, kwa maana kwamba ilikuwa mwanzo kwa ulimwengu wetu, lakini si mwanzo kamili. Inaonekana kwamba jaribio la kupendekeza nadharia kama hizo linasukumwa kiitikadi na kukataa athari za kinadharia za Big Bang. Tunao mwanafizikia mmoja anayeonyesha chuki kubwa dhidi ya nadharia hii, kana kwamba ni njama inayoongozwa na dini. Alisema, ‘Nia iliyojificha ni, bila shaka, kumleta Mungu kama muumbaji. Inaonekana kama fursa ambayo theolojia ya Kikristo imekuwa ikiisubiri tangu sayansi ilipoanza kuiondoa dini katika akili za watu wenye busara katika karne ya kumi na saba.’184 Wazo la Big Bang lilimsumbua Einstein mwanzoni, kwa sababu maana yake ilikuwa kwamba ulimwengu – kama tunavyouona leo – una mwanzo. Alisema, ‘Hali hii (yaani, ya ulimwengu unaopanuka) inanikasirisha.’ Robert Jastrow anabainisha: Einstein hakupenda kamwe wazo la big bang kwa sababu lilidokeza mwanzo na uumbaji, na uumbaji ulidokeza Muumbaji.’ Alimnukuu Eddington akisema, ‘Kama mwanasayansi siamini kabisa kwamba mpangilio wa mambo ya sasa ulianza kwa mlipuko.’ Jastrow anaongeza: ‘Ndiyo, sitiari hapo ilikuwa kwamba sasa tunajua kwamba ulimwengu ulikuwa na mwanzo, na kwamba vitu vyote vilivyopo katika ulimwengu huu – uhai, sayari, nyota – vinaweza kufuatiliwa hadi mwanzo huo, na hilo ni matokeo ya ajabu ya kitheolojia yanayotokana na sayansi. Picha niliyokuwa nayo akilini nilipoandika kuhusu jambo hili ilikuwa ya kundi la wanasayansi na wanaastronomia wanaopanda safu ya vilele vya milima, na wanapofika kilele cha juu kabisa, huko wanakutana na kundi la wanatheolojia ambao wamekuwa wakiketi kwa karne nyingi wakiwasubiri.’185

The most significant objection here is the attempt to offer alternative viewpoints that would replace the traditional theory of the Big Bang. The objection firstly entails – and maintains – the notion that the universe is pre-eternal, like the static model, or that it assigns an evolutionary angle to the Big Bang in the sense that it was the beginning relative to our universe, but not the absolute beginning. It would appear that the attempt to propose such alternative theories is ideologically driven by the rejection of the theoretical implications of the Big Bang. We have one physicist express deep resentment of this theory, as if it were a religiously driven conspiracy. He said, ‘The underlying motive is, of course, to bring in God as creator. It seems like the opportunity Christian theology has been waiting for ever since science began to depose religion from the minds of rational men in the seventeenth century.’184 The idea of the Big Bang made Einstein initially uncomfortable, as its implication was that the universe – as we see it today – has a beginning. He said, ‘This circumstance (i.e., of an expanding universe) irritates me.’ Robert Jastrow notes: Einstein never liked the idea of a big bang because it suggested a beginning and a creation, and a creation suggested a Creator.’ He quoted Eddington by saying, ‘As a scientist I simply do not believe that the present order of things started off with a bang.’ Jastrow adds: ‘Oh yes, the metaphor there was that we know now that the universe had a beginning, and that all things that exist in this universe – life, planets, stars – can be traced back to that beginning, and it’s a curiously theological result to come out of science. The image that I had in my mind as I wrote about this was a group of scientists and astronomers who are climbing up a range of mountain peaks and they come to the highest peak and the very top, and there they meet a band of theologians who have been sitting for centuries waiting for them.185

Mfano wa ulimwengu unaoyumba (oscillating universe) unategemea wazo kwamba ulimwengu hupanuka kwa kipindi fulani, kisha hujikunja na kusinyaa, na baadaye hupanuka tena. Mchakato huu hurudiwa wenyewe, ukifanana na 'kukunjika na kurudi nyuma' (crunch and bounce). Mtazamo huu unasema kwamba ulimwengu katika kiini chake ni wa milele kabla ya kuanza, bila mwanzo wowote wa uhakika, lakini uko katika hali ya mabadiliko ya mara kwa mara ya upanuzi na usinyaaji. Mfano huu una matatizo kadhaa. Zaidi ya hayo, unabeba fikra iliyoenea lakini isiyothibitishwa ya kwamba ulimwengu ni wa milele kabla ya kuwepo. Hili linaonekana katika kile alichosema John Gribbin:

The oscillating universe model is based on the idea that the universe expands for a period, then collapses and contracts, and then expands again. The process repeats itself, resembling a ‘crunch and bounce’. This view states that the universe at its core is pre-eternal without any definitive beginning, but it is in a constant state of volatility of expansion and contraction. This model has a number of problems. In addition, it carries the pervading yet unsubstantiated mentality of the pre-eternality of the universe. One can detect this in what John Gribbin said:

Tatizo kubwa zaidi la nadharia ya Big Bang kuhusu asili ya Ulimwengu ni la kifalsafa – labda hata la kitheolojia – kwamba kulikuwa na nini kabla ya mlipuko huo? Tatizo hili peke yake lilitosha kutoa msukumo mkubwa wa awali kwa nadharia ya Steady State; lakini kwa kuwa nadharia hiyo sasa, kwa masikitiko, inapingana na uchunguzi, njia bora ya kukabiliana na ugumu huu wa awali inatolewa na mfano ambapo ulimwengu unapanuka kutoka kwenye singularity, kisha unajikunja tena, na kurudia mzunguko huo bila kikomo.190

The biggest problem with the Big Bang theory of the origin of the Universe is philosophical – perhaps even theological – what was there before the bang? This problem alone was sufficient to give a great initial impetus to the Steady State theory; but with that theory now sadly in conflict with the observations, the best way round this initial difficulty is provided by a model in which the universe expands from a singularity, collapses back again, and repeats the cycle indefinitely.190

Moja ya pingamizi kwa nadharia ya ulimwengu unaoyumbayumba ni kwamba wazo la kusinyaa (contraction) ni eneo lenye mjadala mkubwa ndani ya jumuiya ya wanasayansi. Alan Guth na Marc Sher waliandika karatasi ya kisayansi yenye kichwa ‘The Impossibility of a Bouncing Universe’ (Kutowezekana kwa Ulimwengu Unaorudi Nyuma), ambamo walitaja kwamba hata kama itadhaniwa kwamba ulimwengu unasinyaa, hautaweza kurudia mlipuko mwingine.

One objection to the oscillating universe theory is that the notion of contraction is an area of great debate in the scientific community. Alan Guth and Marc Sher wrote a scientific paper titled ‘The Impossibility of a Bouncing Universe’, in which they mentioned that even if it is assumed that the universes contracts, it would be unable to repeat another bang.

Mfano huu ni toleo lililoboreshwa la nadharia ya Big Bang. Unakubali kwamba ulimwengu wetu una mwanzo, lakini unaongeza kwamba hii haimaanishi kuwa ndio mwanzo kamili wa jambo na nishati yote. Mtazamo huu unasema kwamba jambo na nishati ni vya milele kabla ya chochote. Ili kufafanua, nadharia hii inapendekeza kwamba sehemu zinazounda ulimwengu hupanuka na kujikunja kwa kasi tofauti. Sehemu hizi zinaweza kuchukuliwa kama ulimwengu mbalimbali, au multiverse. Ingawa inaweza kuwa kweli kwamba ulimwengu wetu una mahali pa mwanzo, hii haimaanishi kwamba ulimwengu wote ni kama huo. Wanasayansi wamebaini kwamba nadharia hii pia imekumbwa na matatizo kadhaa. Ndiyo sababu mwanakosmolojia Andrei Linde alijaribu kutatua tatizo linalokabili mfano huu kwa kutoa toleo lake lililoboreshwa, linaloitwa new inflation. Hata hivyo, yeye mwenyewe alibaini kuwa kuna kasoro ndani yake, jambo lililomsukuma kupendekeza mfano wake maarufu zaidi unaoitwa chaotic inflation. Kwa kifupi, unapendekeza kuwepo kwa ‘ulimwengu mama’ ambao kutoka kwake ulimwengu mwingi mpya huzaliwa, na kutoka kwao ulimwengu mwingine huzaliwa – kama Mapovu. Mchakato huu ungeendelea milele. Nadharia hii inapendekeza kwamba ingawa ulimwengu mpya una mwanzo, ulimwengu mkuu hauna mwanzo. Akizungumzia kwa ujumla kutokuwa na mwanzo kwa ulimwengu, alisema: ‘Kipengele kigumu zaidi cha tatizo hili si kuwepo kwa singularity yenyewe, bali swali la nini kilikuwepo kabla ya singularity…Tatizo hili liko mahali fulani kwenye mpaka kati ya fizikia na metafizikia.’194 Kwa sababu ya tatizo hili, na kwa sababu hakuna msukumo wa kuthibitisha chochote nje ya ulimwengu wa fizikia, Linde alikubali mfano unaokataa mwanzo na mwisho wa wakati. Kama vile ulimwengu mkuu ulivyo wa milele, alisema kuwa ulimwengu mpya utaendelea kuundwa bila mwisho. Hivyo, angeweza kuepuka wazo la singularity na maswali ya kiapriori yanayoambatana nalo. Kwa maneno mengine, alikwepa kutafuta sababu ya kuwepo kwa ulimwengu kwa kuufanya (kwa kiasi fulani) kuwa wa milele kabla ya wakati. Tunapochambua muundo huu – na miundo yote iliyotangulia – tunaona kwamba hakuna hata mmoja wao unaotegemea sayansi. Kwa kiwango cha juu zaidi ni dhana tu. Kwa hakika, ni nadharia tu zilizobuniwa ili kuepuka tatizo la mwanzo kamili wa ulimwengu. Ndiyo maana wanafizikia wengi wanaamini kwamba haiwezekani kuthibitisha – achilia mbali kujaribu – usahihi wa nadharia hizi kwa ushahidi.

This model is an evolved version of the Big Bang theory. It affirms that our universe has an origin, but it adds that this does not mean that this is the absolute beginning of all matter and energy. This view states that matter and energy are pre-eternal. To clarify, this theory proposes that the constituent parts of the universe expand and contract at varying rates. It is possible to treat these parts as various universes, or the multiverse. Though it could be the case that our universe has an origin point, this does not mean that all universes are like this. Scientists have noted that this theory has also been beset by a number of problems. This is why the cosmologist Andrei Linde attempted to solve the problem facing this model by offering a refined version of it, called new inflation. However, he himself noted that there are faults in this, which led him to propose his most famous model called chaotic inflation. In brief, it proposes that there is a ‘mother universe’ from which many new universes are spawned, and from them other universes are born – like bubbles. This process would continue forever. This theory suggests that though the new universes have a beginning, the principal universe does not. Speaking on the overall pre-eternality of the universe, he said, ‘The most difficult aspect of this problem is not the existence of the singularity itself, but the question of what was before the singularity…This problem lies somewhere at the boundary between physics and metaphysics.’194 Because of this problem, and because of the lack of impetus to affirm anything beyond the realm of physics, Linde assumed a model that negated a beginning and end for time. Just as the principal universe is pre-eternal, he argued that new universes would endlessly continue to be made. As thus, he could escape the notion of singularity and the a priori questions that come with it. In other words, he evaded searching for a cause for the emergence of the universe by making it (somewhat) pre-eternal. When we analyse this model – and all previous models – we can see that none of them are based on science. They are at best assumptions. In fact, they are just hypotheses that are designed to avoid the problem of an absolute beginning for the universe. This is why many physicists believe it is impossible to demonstrate – let alone test – the validity of these theories through evidence.

Msingi wa pingamizi hili ni huu: Hata kama tukidhani kwamba kuna sababu nyuma ya kuibuka kwa ulimwengu, je, inakuwaje Mwenyezi Mungu anadhaniwa moja kwa moja kuwa sababu hiyo? Huu ni mmoja wa pingamizi maarufu zaidi za wanaoamini kwamba Mungu hayupo. La ajabu ni kwamba Richard Dawkins alipojadili hoja ya muda (argument from temporality) kwa ajili ya kuthibitisha kuwepo kwa Mungu katika kitabu chake chenye utata The God Delusion, alitoa pingamizi hili pekee.

The background to this objection is this: Even if it is assumed that there is a cause behind the emergence of the world, how is Allah then automatically assumed to be that cause? This is one of the most famous objections of atheists. What is strange is that when Richard Dawkins discussed the argument from temporality for the existence of God in his infamous book The God Delusion, he offered only this objection:

Hata kama tutaruhusu anasa isiyo na uhakika ya kubuni kiholela kisababishi cha mwisho kisicho na mwisho wa msururu na kukipa jina, kwa sababu tu tunalihitaji, bado hakuna sababu yoyote ya kukipa kisababishi hicho sifa zozote zinazohusishwa kwa kawaida na Mungu: uwezo wote, ujuzi wote, wema, ubunifu wa usanifu, achilia mbali sifa za kibinadamu kama vile kusikiliza dua, kusamehe dhambi na kusoma mawazo ya ndani kabisa.199

Even if we allow the dubious luxury of arbitrarily conjuring up a terminator to an infinite regress and giving it a name, simply because we need one, there is absolutely no reason to endow that terminator with any of the properties normally ascribed to God: omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, creativity of design, to say nothing of such human attributes as listening to prayers, forgiving sins and reading innermost thoughts.199

Kisha anaangazia sifa za Allah, na jinsi inavyowezekana kwa hizi kuwa sifa Zake. Kwa uchambuzi zaidi, mkakati huu kwa upande wake – na wa wasioamini Mungu kwa ujumla – ni kukwepa kwa makusudi hoja inayojadiliwa, kuihamishia kwenye suala jingine kabisa. Yeyote anayetumia hili kama ushahidi angekuwa anafanya hivyo ili kuthibitisha kuwepo kwa kiumbe kisichotegemea, si sifa zake. Kuruka kutoka kwenye hoja kuu ya mjadala hadi suala ambalo wanaoliunga mkono hawalishughulikii kunaakisi ama ukosefu wa uadilifu au kutojali kwa makusudi kanuni za mdahalo na majadiliano ya kifalsafa. Zingatia yafuatayo:

Then he focuses on the attributes of Allah , and how it is possible for these to be His attributes. Upon further analysis, this strategy on his part – and by atheists in general – is a strategic evasion of the point under discussion, landing it onto a completely separate issue. Whoever uses this in evidence would be doing so to prove the existence of the non-contingent being, not its attributes. Jumping from the central point of the argument to an issue not tackled by its proponents reflects either a lack of impartiality or wanton ignorance of the rules of debate and philosophical discussion. Consider the following:

Wanasayansi wasioamini kuwepo kwa Mungu husema: "Jibu la waumini kwa swali 'Ni nini chanzo cha kuibuka kwa ulimwengu?' kwamba ni Allah, ni kukosa ujuzi wa sababu. Ni kana kwamba waumini wanajaza mapengo ya ujinga wao kwa jibu kama hilo. Waumini wanasisitiza msimamo huu wa ujinga kwa kukata rufaa kwa ujinga, na hivyo wanatumia kama ushahidi kutoweza kwa mpinzani wao kuuvunja, si zaidi ya hapo. Hawatoi uthibitisho wowote wa usahihi wa kiushahidi wa kauli yao." Hoja hii ni kosa jingine kwa upande wa wanasayansi wasioamini. Kukubali kwetu kuwepo kwa Muumba hakutegemei kushindwa kwetu kueleza chanzo cha mwisho cha ulimwengu, wala si imani ya kipofu ya kuruka ambapo tumeweka dhana ya Mungu ili kutatua tatizo ambalo hatuna jibu lake. Badala yake, imani yetu ni matokeo ya seti ya hoja za kiakili na za kiasili zinazofikia hitimisho hili. Imani yetu kwamba Allah ndiye chanzo cha kuwepo kwa ulimwengu imejengwa juu ya elimu, si juu ya ujinga. Kama tulivyothibitisha awali, ulimwengu una mwanzo. Kwa hiyo, either una mwanzo na una chanzo nyuma yake, au hauna chanzo; la pili haliwezekani, kwa kuwa vitu vyenye mwanzo lazima viwe na chanzo. Chanzo kingekuwa either kitu chenyewe chenye mwanzo au kitu tofauti; la kwanza haliwezekani kwa sababu kingekuwa hakipo kabla ya kuibuka, na kitu ambacho hakina uwepo kwa nafsi yake hakiwezi kutoa uwepo kwa kitu kingine. Kwa hiyo, kwa kuwa kiliibuka kutoka chanzo tofauti, chanzo hicho lazima kiwe chenyewe kina mwanzo au hakina mwanzo; kikiwa na mwanzo, mfululizo huu lazima uishie kwenye chanzo kisicho na mwanzo, kwa kuwa sababu zisizo na mwisho haziwezekani. Hivyo, inadhihirika wazi kwamba msimamo wetu si tamaa tu ya kujaza pengo lililoachwa na ujinga, bali ni jibu la kufikiri na la kimantiki linalotegemea kanuni zinazojidhihirisha zenyewe.

This is a well-known objection. Atheists say, ‘The theists’ answer to the question “What is the cause for the emergence of the world?” with Allah is ignorance of causality. It is as if theists are filling in the gaps of their ignorance with such an answer. Theists emphasise this ignorant stance of theirs by appealing to ignorance, and thus use as evidence the opponent’s inability to dismantle it – nothing more. They fail to offer any proof for the evidentiary veracity of their statement.’ This rhetoric is another error on the part of atheists. Our affirmation of the existence of the Creator is not based on our inability to explain the ultimate cause of the universe, nor is it merely a blind leap of faith in which we shoved in the concept of God to solve a problem for which we have no answer. Rather, our belief is a result of a set of rational and instinctive propositions that offers this conclusion. Our belief of Allah being the cause for the existence of the universe is based on knowledge, not ignorance. As proven earlier, the universe is temporal. It is therefore either temporal with a cause behind it, or without a cause; the latter is impossible as temporal entities must have a cause. A cause would be either the temporal entity itself or something different; the former is impossible as it would have been non-existent before emergence – something that does not possess existence for itself cannot confer existence onto something else. Therefore, as it emerged from a separate cause, that cause must in itself be temporal or atemporal; if the former, this series must end at an atemporal cause, as infinite causality is impossible. Therefore, it becomes clear that our position is not merely the desire to fill in the gap left by ignorance, but is rather a considered and rational answer that relies on self-evident propositions.

Hoja hii inakosoa mchanganyiko wa pande mbili: kwa upande mmoja, kupunguza kwa kiwango kikubwa maana ya sayansi, na kwa upande mwingine, kuikuza kupita kiasi. Wanaoamini kutokuwepo kwa Mungu (wasioamini Mungu) hujenga falsafa yao ya maisha juu ya mtazamo wa kimaada tu: wanaamini tu kile ambacho sayansi za kimajaribio zinaagiza, na wanakubali tu maelezo ya kiasili ya kimaada kwa matukio. Kwa hiyo, hakuna nafasi yoyote kwa maelezo ya kimaumbile au ya kimetafizikia. Angalia alichosema mwanasayansi asiyeamini Mungu Scott Todd, ambaye alieleza wazi maana ya mtazamo huu: "Hata kama data zote zinaashiria muumbaji mwenye akili, dhana kama hiyo imetengwa kutoka sayansi kwa sababu si ya kinaturalisti."202

This objection is actually a combination of a gross restriction of the definition of science on the one hand, and an exaggeration of it on the other. Atheists draw their existential philosophy from a purely material view: They have faith in only what the empirical sciences dictate, and they accept only natural material explanations for phenomena. As thus, there is no room for any supernatural or metaphysical explanation. Check what the atheist Scott Todd said – he stated in clear terms what this outlook meant: ‘Even if all the data point to an intelligent designer, such a hypothesis is excluded from science because it is not naturalistic.’202

Mwanasayansi wa Kidarwin na mpinga-Mungu Richard Lewontin alisema, "Utayari wetu wa kukubali madai ya kisayansi yanayopingana na akili ya kawaida ndio ufunguo wa kuelewa mapambano halisi kati ya sayansi na yasiyo ya kawaida. Tunachukua upande wa sayansi licha ya upuuzi dhahiri wa baadhi ya dhana zake, licha ya kushindwa kwake kutimiza ahadi zake nyingi kubwa za afya na uhai, licha ya uvumilivu wa jumuiya ya kisayansi kwa hadithi zisizothibitishwa za 'ndivyo ilivyokuwa tu', kwa sababu tuna msimamo wa awali, ahadi ya kuamini ujamaa wa vitu (materialism). Si kwamba mbinu na taasisi za sayansi zinatulazimisha kwa namna fulani kukubali maelezo ya kimaada ya ulimwengu unaoonekana, bali, kinyume chake, kwamba tunalazimishwa na kujitoa kwetu kwa kabla ya kujaribu (a priori) kwa sababu za kimaada kuunda mfumo wa uchunguzi na seti ya dhana zinazozalisha maelezo ya kimaada, bila kujali yanavyopingana na hisia za kawaida, bila kujali yanavyowachanganya wasiofahamu. Zaidi ya hayo, ujamaa wa vitu ni wa kabisa, kwa sababu hatuwezi kuruhusu 'Mguu wa Kiungu' kuingia mlangoni."203

The Darwinist and atheist Richard Lewontin said, Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common sense is the key to an understanding of the real struggle between science and the supernatural. We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfil many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door.203

Wazo hili limeenea hivi karibuni katika jamii za wasioamini kuwa Mungu yupo. Limekuwa pingamizi kuu dhidi ya hoja ya uumbaji na uvumbuzi. Pingamizi hili linadai kwamba ulimwengu unajitosheleza na hautegemei mwanzilishi, au kwamba una uwezo wa kujifanya wenyewe, au kwamba inawezekana ulitokea kutoka kwenye kutokuwepo kabisa. Wazo hili lilipendekezwa na Bertrand Russell katika kitabu chake Why I Am Not a Christian, na limefafanuliwa kwa kina katika The Grand Design, kilichoandikwa kwa pamoja na mwanafizikia maarufu wa kinadharia Stephen Hawking na Leonard Mlodinow. Ni dai hilo hilo alilolitoa mwanaatheisti maarufu Lawrence Krauss katika kitabu chake A Universe From Nothing, ambamo anadai kwamba ulimwengu – kwa kuzingatia fizikia ya kisasa – unaweza kutokea kutoka kwenye kutokuwepo kabisa bila haja ya chombo cha nje kitakachoeleza kutokea huku; badala yake, ulimwengu unatokea kutoka kwenye kitu kisichokuwepo. Mwanzoni mwa The Grand Design, kuna majadiliano kuhusu aina ya maswali ambayo kitabu kinalenga kutoa majibu kwayo, na chanzo cha taarifa zinazolisha majibu haya:

This idea has spread across atheist circles recently. It has become a key objection to the argument from creation and invention. This objection claims the universe to be self-sufficient and not dependent on a founder, or that it has the power to make itself, or that it is possible it emerged from nothing. This notion was proposed by Bertrand Russell in his book Why I Am Not a Christian, and is covered extensively in The Grand Design, co-authored by the famous theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow. It is the same claim made by the famous atheist Lawrence Krauss in his book A Universe From Nothing, in which he claims that the universe – in light of modern physics – can emerge from nothing without the need for an external entity that would explain this emergence; rather, the emergence of the universe is from nothing. In the beginning of The Grand Design, there is a discussion on the type of questions that the book seeks to offer an answer to, and the source of information that feeds into these answers:

Sisi kila mmoja wetu tupo kwa kipindi kifupi tu cha muda, na katika kipindi hicho tunachunguza sehemu ndogo tu ya ulimwengu mzima. Lakini binadamu ni spishi yenye udadisi. Tunashangaa, tunatafuta majibu. Tukiishi katika ulimwengu huu mkubwa ambao wakati mwingine ni wa fadhili na wakati mwingine ni wa ukatili, na tukitazama mbingu kubwa iliyo juu yetu, watu daima wamekuwa wakiuliza maswali mengi: Tunawezaje kuelewa ulimwengu ambamo tumejikuta? Ulimwengu unaendeshwaje? Hali halisi ya uhalisia ni ipi? Haya yote yalitoka wapi? Je, ulimwengu ulihitaji muumbaji? Wengi wetu hatutumii muda wetu mwingi kuhangaika na maswali haya, lakini karibu sote tunayahangaikia wakati fulani. Kwa jadi haya ni maswali ya falsafa, lakini falsafa imekufa. Falsafa haijaendana na maendeleo ya kisasa ya sayansi, hasa fizikia. Wanasayansi wamekuwa wabebaji wa mwenge wa ugunduzi katika safari yetu ya kutafuta maarifa. Madhumuni ya kitabu hiki ni kutoa majibu yanayopendekezwa na ugunduzi wa hivi karibuni na maendeleo ya kinadharia. Majibu hayo yanatuongoza kwenye picha mpya ya ulimwengu na nafasi yetu ndani yake, picha tofauti sana na ile ya jadi, na tofauti hata na picha ambayo tungeweza kuichora miongo kadhaa iliyopita.209

Hii ni mojawapo ya pingamizi maarufu zaidi za wasioamini Mungu dhidi ya waumini. Ni shaka kuu ya kiakili dhidi ya uthiski katika mijadala ya wasioamini Mungu. Ukiitafakari kwa makini, ni hoja ya ushindani wa maneno tu – si zaidi ya hapo. Mfumo wao mzima wa imani unasimama juu ya wazo kwamba Mwenyezi Mungu hakuumba dunia. Kwa hiyo, pingamizi lao 'Basi nani alimuumba Mwenyezi Mungu?' lingekuwa la kawaida kwa uzoefu wa waumini. Katika miktadha mingi, hizi ni zana tu za ubishi na pingamizi zisizozaa matunda.

This is one of the most famous atheist objections against believers. It is a key rational doubt against theism in atheist discourse. Upon contemplation, it is just sparring rhetoric – nothing more. Their entire belief system rests upon the notion that Allah did not create the world. Therefore, their objection ‘So who created Allah?’ would be typical of believers’ experiences. In most contexts, these are simply tools for unfruitful quarrel and objection.

Unapotafakari wanafalsafa wengi wasioamini Mungu waliopita, tunaweza kwa urahisi kugundua ni wangapi kati yao walikuwa na pingamizi hili, na jinsi swali hili lilivyochukua udhibiti na kuweka shinikizo akilini mwa wengi. Ni mojawapo ya mashaka muhimu zaidi yaliyoleta mwelekeo wa kutoamini Mungu kwa watu wengi. John Stuart Mill, Bertrand Russell, David Hume, na Stephen Hawking wote wameeleza kwamba swali hili ni tatizo katika imani ya Mungu, jambo lililowapelekea hatimaye kukubali, au kushawishika na, kutoamini Mungu. Imebainika kwamba hili pia ndilo swali kuu katika kitabu The God Delusion. Karibu katika kila tukio, swali hili lipo kwa wingi na liko mstari wa mbele katika mijadala ya New Atheism, jambo linaloweza kutambulika kwa kuchunguza maandishi yake, makala, midahalo, na nyenzo nyingine. Matatizo yanayoletwa na swali hili yanaweza kuondolewa kwa mambo yafuatayo:

When studying the many atheist personalities that have gone by, we can easily uncover how many had this objection, and how this question took control and pressurised many minds. It is one of the most important doubts that introduced the inclination to atheism in many people. John Stuart Mill, Bertrand Russell, David Hume, and Stephen Hawking have all stated that this question represents a problem in theism, which ultimately led them to adopt, or become convinced by, atheism. It is noted that this is also the central question in the book The God Delusion. In almost every instance, this question is heavily present in, and at the forefront of, New Atheism discourse, which one can detect by studying its writings, articles, debates, and other materials. The problems brought about by this question can be dispelled by the following points:

1. Hili si swali jipya kabisa. Kwa kweli, ni swali la kawaida ambalo watu wengi hulifikiria. Hatimaye ni mojawapo ya wasiwasi wa shetani, na linatokana na pendekezo lenye makosa makubwa. 2. Swali hili limejengwa juu ya kosa linalotolewa na mjadala wa wanaoamini hakuna Mungu. Ni kutoelewa kikamilifu asili halisi ya ushahidi wa kiakili wa imani unaotolewa na wanaoamini kuwepo kwa Mungu. Swali hili linabeba dhana ifuatayo ya hoja ya uumbaji na uvumbuzi kuthibitisha kuwepo kwa Allah: