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Dalili ya Pili ya Kiakili ya Kuwepo kwa Allah: Hoja ya Kiteleolojia
The Second Rational Indicator For The Existence Of Allah: The Teleological Argument
by Abdullāh ibn Ṣāliḥ al-ʿUjayrī74 min readViewed 82 times
Mwanafizikia wa Uingereza Paul Davies ana kitabu cha kuvutia kinachoitwa The Goldilocks Enigma. Kitabu hiki kinajaribu kufichua jambo la ajabu linalohusu asili ya ulimwengu tunamoishi, yaani jinsi ulivyo kamili na wenye usawa kwetu, kana kwamba ni ulimwengu wa Goldilocks. Kama inavyojulikana kwa yeyote anayefahamu neno hili, jina hili limechukuliwa kutoka kwenye hadithi maarufu ya watoto, Goldilocks and the Three Bears. Kwa muhtasari, msichana aitwaye Goldilocks anakuta nyumba ya dubu msituni. Kila dubu ana chakula chake, kiti chake na kitanda chake. Akijaribu kila kimoja, Goldilocks anakuta kuwa mawili kati ya matatu (vya baba na mama) hayamfai kwa sababu ni ya moto mno na baridi mno (chakula), ya juu mno au ya chini mno (viti), na ngumu mno au laini mno (vitanda). Kile anachokiona kinamfaa yeye ni cha dubu mdogo tu. Mfano huu unafanana na ulimwengu tunamoishi kwa kuwa umeumbwa kwa ustadi mkubwa: umerekebishwa kwa kiwango cha juu sana kiasi kwamba, kama ungekuwa tofauti hata kidogo, usingeweza kuhimili uhai. Kutokana na hili, hoja ya kiteleolojia (ya kusudi) inajengeka. Hoja hii imetumiwa katika dini zote na katika kila zama na kila eneo. Kwa mfano, Rāzī alisema: Fiṭrah inashuhudia kwamba kuonekana kwa nyumba iliyoandikwa maandishi ya ajabu na kujengwa kwa usawa mzuri kwa hekima na manufaa hakuwezi kuwepo bila mwandishi mwenye ujuzi na mjenzi mwenye busara. Inajulikana kwamba dalili za hekima katika ulimwengu wa juu na wa chini ni nyingi zaidi kuliko udhihirisho wa hekima katika nyumba hiyo ndogo. Kwa kuwa fiṭrah ya awali ni ushahidi kwamba maandishi yanahitaji mwandishi, na jengo linahitaji mjenzi, ushahidi huu utakuwa na nguvu zaidi katika kesi ya ulimwengu huu wote kuhitaji Muumba anayetenda kwa hiari na hekima.243
The British physicist Paul Davies has an interesting book titled The Goldilocks Enigma. The book attempts to uncover a curious issue pertaining to the nature of the universe that we live in, in terms of how it is perfectly suitable and balanced for us, as if it were a Goldilocks universe. As is known to anyone familiar with the term, this title is borrowed from a famous and popular children’s story, Goldilocks and the Three Bears. In summary, a girl by the name of Goldilocks finds a bear house in the forest. Each bear has its own food, chair, and bed. Sampling each, Goldilocks finds that two of the three (belonging to the father and mother) are not suitable for her because they are too hot and too cold (food), too high or too low (chairs), and too hard or too soft (beds). The only one she finds suitable for herself are the ones belonging to the small bear. The similitude here is that the universe in which we live has been made in a masterful manner: It has been fine-tuned to such a great degree that, had it been any other way, it would not have been able to support life. From this, the teleological argument takes shape. The argument has been used right across the religious spectrum and in all eras and geographies. For example, Rāzī said, Fiṭrah testifies that the appearance of a house inscribed with unusual inscriptions and built in a finely balanced manner with wisdom and benefit cannot be possible without a knowledgeable scribe and a prudent builder. It is known that the signs of wisdom in the upper and lower worlds are far more than the manifestations of wisdom in that small house. Given that the original fiṭrah is a testament to the inscription needing a scribe, and the building needing a builder, this testament would be all the more so in the case of this entire world needing a maker that acts with choice and wisdom.243
Ibn al-Qayyim alisema, Allah amewafanya viumbe Wake – hata wanyama – kupenda kuweka kila kitu mahali pake panapostahili, kutekeleza mambo kwa wakati wake unaofaa, na kupata vitu kwa namna inayotakiwa. Pia amewafanya wachukie kinyume chake na kwenda kinyume na njia hizo zilizotajwa. Ya kwanza inaonyesha ukamilifu, elimu, uwezo na umahiri wa mtendaji; kinyume chake kinaonyesha upungufu wake mwenyewe na upungufu wa elimu, uwezo na utaalamu wake. Hii ni fitrah ambayo watu hawawezi kabisa kuiacha. Inajulikana kwamba yule aliyewafanya hivi na kuweka uwezo huu ndani yao anastahiki zaidi sifa hizi za kusifiwa kuliko wao. Allah huweka mambo mahali pake pastahili. Huwafanya kuwa wa pekee kwa kuwapa sifa, maumbo, mpangilio na ukubwa kwa namna Yeye anayoijua zaidi ya mwingine yeyote. Huyatoa wazi – na hilo pia katika wakati pekee unaowafaa. Yule mwenye uchambuzi sahihi na fikra timamu, anayetafakari kama inavyopasa, atashuhudia hilo katika anayoyaona na kuyajua. Atatumia alichokishuhudia kama ushahidi wa yale yaliyofichika. Kila kitu ni katika uumbaji wa Mwenye hekima, Mjuzi wa yote. Ili kuonyesha hili, inatosha kujua hekima iliyo nyuma ya kuumba wanyama, viungo vyao, sifa zao, maumbo yao, faida inayoweza kupatikana kutoka kwao, na kwamba kwa hakika wanawakilisha hekima inayotakiwa ndani yao. Allah aliwausia waja Wake kufanya hivi: “…kama zilivyo ndani yenu. Je, hamwoni?”244; na “Je, hawatafakari juu ya ngamia – jinsi walivyoumbwa kwa ustadi…?”245 Vivyo hivyo, mtu akitafakari kwa kina na kuangalia viumbe Vyake vyote vya juu na vya chini na vilivyo kati yake, atakuta vyote vimebuniwa na kuzungukwa na hekima kubwa. Angalia, angeweza kusoma hekima iliyochorwa ndani yake na kusema: "Hii ni kazi ya Mwenye ujuzi wote na Mwenye hekima, na ni amri ya Mwenye nguvu na Mwenye ujuzi wote. Ikiwa akili zinaweza kupata kitu kinachofaa zaidi kuliko hiki, na zipendekeze; ikiwa zinaona kitu kizuri zaidi kuliko hiki, na zikilete na kukionyesha. Hiyo ndiyo kazi ya 'Yule aliyeumba mbingu saba, moja juu ya nyingine. Hutaona kasoro yoyote katika uumbaji wa Mwingi wa Rehema. Basi angalia tena: je, unaona nyufa zozote?'"246
Yeyote anayeitazama dunia hii na kuitafakari kama inavyopaswa, angejua kwamba Muumba wake aliibuni kwa ustadi mkubwa na kuiimarisha. Anapoitafakari, ataiona kama nyumba ambayo vifaa vyake vyote vimeandaliwa. Anga limeinuliwa kama paa, Ardhi imetandazwa kama zulia, nyota zimepangwa kama taa, na ustawi umehifadhiwa humo kama hazina. Kila kitu ndani yake kimebuniwa kwa ajili ya jambo linalokifaa. Mwanadamu ni kama mwenye nyumba ambaye amepewa haki ya kuimiliki. Aina mbalimbali za mimea zimeandaliwa kwa madhumuni yake. Wanyama mbalimbali wanatumiwa kwa manufaa yake. Baadhi yao ni kwa ajili ya kukamuliwa maziwa, kuzaliana na chakula tu; baadhi ni kwa ajili ya kupanda na kusafirishia tu; wengine ni kwa uzuri na mapambo; na wengine ni kwa mambo haya yote, kama ngamia, ambao tumbo lao ni hifadhi ya vinywaji, chakula, dawa na tiba. Kuna funzo ndani yao kwa wale wanaotaka kutazama, na ishara kwa wale wenye busara. Na miongoni mwa ndege – pamoja na aina zao mbalimbali, maumbo, rangi, idadi zao, faida wanazotoa, nyimbo zao, mabawa yao yakiwa yamekunjuliwa au yamekunjwa, na mienendo yao ya kuhama na kukaa – kuna funzo kubwa na dalili wazi ya hekima ya Muumba, Mwenye ujuzi wote.
Ibn Rushd alieleza hoja hii kwa ufasaha mkubwa. Alisema: Kuhusu njia ambayo dini ilifuata katika kuwaelimisha watu wa kawaida juu ya ulimwengu kuwa ni kitendo cha Allah, zingatia kwamba inapotafakariwa aya zinazobeba maana hii, njia hii inaweza kuonekana kuwa ni njia ya utoaji wa riziki na malezi. Ni njia moja ambayo tumeeleza kuwa inaonyesha kuwepo kwa Muumba. Zaidi ya hayo, mtu anapotazama kitu kinachoonekana kwa macho na kukuta kimetengenezwa katika umbo fulani, ukubwa fulani na mpangilio fulani, na yote haya yakiwa yanaelekea kwenye manufaa na lengo ambalo mtu angetarajia kutoka kwake (hata hivyo kwamba lazima akubali kwamba manufaa hayo yasingepatikana kama kingetengenezwa katika umbo, mpangilio au kiwango kingine chochote), atakuwa na hakika kwamba kitu hiki kina mtengenezaji aliyekitengeneza. Hii ndiyo sababu umbo lake, mpangilio wake na ukubwa wake vinaelekea kwenye manufaa yake. Pia ndiyo sababu isingewezekana kwa mambo haya yote kukutana kwa bahati tu kwa ajili ya manufaa hayo. Kwa mfano, mtu anapoona jiwe chini, na akakuta limeumbwa kwa namna inayolifanya lifae kukaliwa, na vilevile akakuta mpangilio wake na ukubwa wake ni hivyo, atajua kwamba jiwe hili lilitengenezwa kuwa kiti na mtengenezaji aliyelipanga na kulitengeneza mahali hapo. Lakini pale anapokosa kuona aina hii ya mpangilio wa kukaa, atakuwa na uhakika kwamba jiwe kuonekana mahali hapo na katika hali hiyo ni jambo la bahati tu, bila mtu yeyote kulliweka hapo. Jambo hilo hilo linatumika kwa ulimwengu wote. Mwanadamu anaweza kutazama humo na kuona Jua, Mwezi na nyota, ambavyo ndivyo chanzo cha majira manne ya mwaka, usiku na mchana, mvua, maji, upepo, sehemu za ardhi kukaliwa na watu na wanyama wa nchi kavu kupatikana humo, maji kuwa yamehifadhiwa kwa ajili ya viumbe wa majini, na hewa kufanywa inafaa kwa viumbe wanaoruka. Anaweza kuona kwamba ikiwa mojawapo ya maumbo na miundo hii itavurugwa, viumbe vilivyomo hapa vyote vitavurugika. Hivyo basi, angejua kwa uhakika kamili kwamba haiwezekani sehemu zote za dunia kukutana kwa bahati tu kwa ajili ya binadamu, wanyama na mimea; bali hilo lilikuwa kwa mpango wa mmoja aliyelitaka. Huyo ni Allah. Mtu pia angejua kwa kujiamini kabisa kwamba dunia imeumbwa, kwa sababu kwa silika yake angejua kwamba haiwezekani kupata mkusanyiko wa namna hiyo kwa bahati tupu bila muumba yeyote. Aina hii ya ushahidi ni thabiti na rahisi, kama inavyoonekana wazi kutokana na yale tuliyoandika hapa. Msingi wake unategemea kanuni mbili ambazo kila mtu anazikubali. Ya kwanza ni kwamba dunia, pamoja na sehemu zake zote, imepangwa kwa ajili ya kuwepo kwa binadamu na wanyama wote wanaoishi humu. Ya pili ni kwamba kitu chochote, pamoja na sehemu zake zote, kinachoelekezwa kwenye tendo moja na lengo moja lazima kichukuliwe kuwa kimetengenezwa. Kanuni hizi mbili zinaleta matokeo haya dhahiri: Dunia imeumbwa, na ina muumba. Hoja ya utoaji (ya kupangwa kwa riziki na mahitaji) inaonyesha mambo haya mawili kwa wakati mmoja. Ndiyo sababu ni hoja inayothaminiwa zaidi kuliko zote kwa ajili ya kuthibitisha kuwepo kwa Muumba.248
Moja ya hoja zilizosambaa zaidi na kujulikana sana katika ulimwengu wa Magharibi kwa hoja hii ni mfano wa kuvutia wa William Paley katika kitabu chake Natural Theology: ‘Nikivuka nyika, nikadhani nimejikwaa kwa jiwe, nikaulizwa jiwe hilo limefikaje hapo, ningeweza labda kujibu kwamba, kwa kadiri ninavyojua, lingeweza kuwa limekaa hapo milele; wala haingekuwa rahisi sana kuonyesha upuuzi wa jibu hilo. Lakini nikidhani nimekuta saa chini, na ikaulizwa saa hiyo imefikaje mahali hapo, singefikiria sana jibu nililotoa awali, kwamba, kwa kadiri ninavyojua, saa hiyo inaweza kuwa imekuwepo hapo siku zote. Lakini kwa nini jibu hilo lisitumike kwa saa kama lilivyotumika kwa jiwe?’249
One of the most famed and widespread passages for this argument in the Western space is the fascinating analogy by William Paley in his book Natural Theology: ‘In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone and were asked how the stone came to be there; I might possibly answer, that, for anything I knew to the contrary, it had lain there forever; nor would it perhaps be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place; I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that, for anything I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as for the stone?’249
Jibu ni dhahiri. Muundo changamano wa saa huashiria kwa silika kuwepo kwa mtengenezaji wake. Paley alitaka kutoa mfano wa ulimwengu kutokana na saa, jambo linalolazimu kuwepo kwa mtengenezaji wa saa. Ni kutokana na hapa ndipo mfano huu umejulikana sana kama ‘mfano wa mtengenezaji wa saa’, kama sitiari ya kwamba dunia inahitaji Muumba Mwenye Hekima na Ujuzi wa Kila Kitu.
The answer is obvious. The complex composition a watch contains instinctively reveals the existence of its maker. Paley wanted to draw an analogy for the universe from the watch, which necessitates the existence of a watchmaker. It is from here that this example has become famously known as the ‘watchmaker analogy’, as a metaphor for the world needing a Wise, Omniscient Maker.
Muundo wa hoja
Composition of the argument
Muundo wa hoja hii unafanana na muundo wa hoja ya uumbaji kwa kuwa nao pia unategemea: a) data za kihisia na zinazoonekana, na b) dhana za asili na silika. Hii ndiyo inayoipa hoja nguvu yake. Hoja hii ni rahisi kuelewa na kuifikiria; haina ugumu wowote. Kwa mfano, mtu anapotazama Grand Canyon, ambalo ni bonde lenye kuta zenye mteremko mkali lililopo Arizona, kisha akalinganisha na Mount Rushmore huko South Dakota, ambako sanamu kubwa ya marais wanne wa Marekani imechongwa kwenye uso wa jiwe la mlima huo, au sanamu na michongo nyingine iliyofanywa na binadamu, ataona kuna tofauti dhahiri. Ingawa ni rahisi kuelewa kwamba ile ya kwanza ilisababishwa na mmomonyoko wa upepo na mto, huenda asiweze kuamini kwamba mambo hayo hayo yanaweza kutengeneza ya pili. Hata kama hajawahi kuona zikichongwa na kuchorwa kwa macho yake, bila shaka atajua kwamba kuna watu waliofanya kazi hiyo. Ukitafakari zaidi juu ya jambo hili na kujaribu kutambua sababu ya tofauti hiyo, itakuwa ni kwa sababu tu ya asili ya muundo na ugumu wa umbo, jambo linalofanya usanifu wa kibinadamu uonekane wa kuaminika zaidi. Hii inaeleza kwa nini hoja hii imeenea sana katika matumizi yake ya kuthibitisha kuwepo kwa Allah. Kama mtangulizi wake, ni mojawapo ya hoja zinazotumiwa zaidi katika mijadala ya kidini na kifalsafa, na inaifanya uumbaji kuwa mada yake, ambako hoja za kimantiki na dhana za kiakili zinatumika kuuchunguza. Wakati hoja ya uumbaji inatumika kuthibitisha kwamba lazima kuwe na muumbaji wa viumbe, hoja hii inatumia asili iliyopangwa kwa usahihi wa viumbe, jambo linalodokeza kuwepo kwa Muumbaji Mwenye Hekima, Mjuzi wa Kila Kitu. Hoja ya kwanza inachota mantiki yake kutoka wakati halisi wa uumbaji; hoja hii inachota mantiki yake baada ya uumbaji kuwepo. Sehemu ya mwisho pia inajitokeza kwa kuwa inaleta sifa nyingine za Muumba, kama vile uwezo wake kamili, mapenzi yake, elimu yake, hekima yake, na nyinginezo.
The composition of this argument is similar to the composition of the argument from creation in that it also relies on: a) sensory and perceptible data, and b) innate and instinctive concepts. It is what gives the argument its strength. This argument is easy to comprehend and conceptualise – it has no difficulty to it. For example, when a person looks at the Grand Canyon, which is the steep sided canyon found in Arizona, and then he compares this to Mount Rushmore in South Dakota, where a colossal sculpture of four American presidents is carved into the granite face of the mountain, or other man-made sculptures and carvings, he would perceive that there is an obvious distinction to be made. Although it is understandable that the former was caused by wind and river erosion, he may not be able to believe the same are capable of the latter. Even though he would not have seen them being carved and sculptured in person, he would most certainly know that there were people who did this. If you contemplate on this point further and try to identify the reason for this distinction, it would simply be down to the nature of the composition and complexity of the structure that would make man made design to be more plausible. This explains why this argument is so widespread in its usage to prove the existence of Allah. Like its predecessor, it is one of the most used arguments in religious and philosophical circles, and it makes the creation the subject matter, where reasoning and rational concepts are applied to them. Whereas the argument from creation is leveraged to prove that there must be a creator for the creation, this argument leverages the finely-tuned nature of the creation, which suggests there is a Wise, Omniscient Creator. The first argument draws its reasoning from the actual moment of creation; this argument draws its reasoning after creation comes into existence. The latter also stands out insofar as it introduces further attributes of the Creator, such as His perfect power, will, knowledge, wisdom, and others.
Majina ya hoja hii
Names for this argument
Kwa kuwa hoja hii inatumiwa sana, zimekuwepo istilahi mbalimbali za kuielezea, ingawa zote zinarejelea maana moja: hoja ya mpangilio (argument from systemisation); hoja ya kurekebishwa vizuri (argument from fine-tuning); hoja ya usanifu (argument from design, teleological argument); hoja ya utunzaji wa Mungu (argument from providence); hoja ya lengo (argument from purpose); na hoja ya upangaji (argument from planning).
As this argument is used extensively, there have been various terms to describe it, though they all refer to the same meaning: argument from systemisation; argument from fine-tuning; argument from design (teleological argument); argument from providence; argument from purpose; and argument from planning.
Ufunuo unaoelekeza kwenye hoja hii ya kiakili
Revelation pointing to this rational argument
Kutokana na kuangalia wahyu, mtu anaweza kuona matumizi mengi ya hoja hii kama ushahidi wa kuwasaidia waja kudhihirisha ukuu wa Mola na ujuzi Wake kamili, nguvu Yake, na hekima Yake. Inachochea silika ya asili ya mwanadamu, inayomwalika kuhusisha udhihirisho huu wa ujenzi wa kiufundi wa hali ya juu na Mtendaji Mwenye Hekima na Mwenye Kutaka. Soma, kwa mfano, kauli hizi za Allah: • '{Wale wasioamini Akhera wana sifa mbaya zote, na Allah ana sifa bora kabisa. Naye ni Mwenye Nguvu, Mwenye Hekima.}'250
Looking at revelation, one can find many usages of this argument as evidence to assist servants in revealing the greatness of the Lord and His perfect knowledge, power, and wisdom. It stimulates man’s innate predisposition, that invites him to ascribe these manifestations of masterful construction to a Wise and Willing Doer. Read, for example, the following statements of Allah : • ‘To those who disbelieve in the Hereafter belong all evil qualities, whereas to Allah belong the finest attributes. And He is the Almighty, All-Wise.’250
"Ni Allah ambaye ameinua mbingu bila nguzo – kama mnavyoona – kisha akatawala juu ya Kiti cha Enzi. Amewatiisha Jua na Mwezi, kila moja likienda katika muda uliowekwa. Yeye ndiye anayeendesha mambo yote. Anazifafanua ishara wazi ili mpate kuwa na yakini ya kukutana na Mola wenu."251
• ‘It is Allah Who has raised the heavens without pillars – as you can see – then established Himself on the Throne. He has subjected the Sun and the Moon, each orbiting for an appointed term. He conducts the whole affair. He makes the signs clear so that you may be certain of the meeting with your Lord.’251
Ingawa aya hizi zipo katika muktadha wa kuthibitisha kwa nini Mola peke yake anastahili kuabudiwa – na ushahidi ukiwa ni kwamba washirikina walikiri kwamba Yeye peke yake ndiye Mola wa mamlaka kamili252 – pia zinadokeza kwa lazima kwamba Mwenyezi Mungu yupo. Ukweli ni kwamba aya zinazoweza kutolewa kuhusu jambo hili ni nyingi mno kiasi cha kutoweza kuorodheshwa zote.253 Hizo ni aya zinazowaamrisha waja kutumia nguvu zao za kutafakari, kutafakari uumbaji wa mbingu na ardhi, kubadilishana kwa mchana na usiku, na jinsi nyota, mawingu, upepo na matukio yote ya kimaumbile yanavyotiwa uangalizi, ambayo ni dalili za ukuu wa Muumba wao. Mbali na hizo, zipo aya zinazozungumzia maajabu ya Mwenyezi Mungu katika ufalme wa wanyama na mimea. Hata mwanadamu mwenyewe hajatengwa na mchakato huu wa kutafakari – yeye ni wa kuangalia na pia ni kitu cha kuangaliwa kwa wakati mmoja. Ndiyo maana Mwenyezi Mungu amesema: “Na katika ardhi kuna dalili nyingi kwa wenye yakini.”254
Though these verses are in the context of proving why the Lord alone is worthy of worship – the proof being that the polytheists affirmed that He is alone in absolute Lordship252 – they also necessarily imply that Allah exists. The fact is that the verses that can be presented in this regard are too numerous to be all listed.253 They are the verses that instruct servants to animate their powers of contemplation to ponder over the creation of the heavens and the Earth, the alternation of day and night, and the care given to the stars, clouds, winds, and all natural phenomena that are indicative of their Creator’s magnificence. This is in addition to those verses that speak of the wonders of Allah in the animal and plant kingdoms. Man himself is not precluded from this process of contemplation – he is to observe and be the subject of observation at the same time. This is why Allah said, ‘There are countless signs on Earth for those with sure faith.’254
Kukadiria athari ya hoja hii
Sizing the impact of this argument
Hakuna shaka kwamba hoja hii imekuwa na athari kubwa katika mjadala unaozunguka suala hili. Imekuwa na nguvu hadi imewalazimu wanaoamini kutokuwepo kwa Mungu wengi kukiri nguvu yake; kwa kweli, imewafanya baadhi ya watu wao maarufu kuacha kabisa kutoamini kuwepo kwa Mungu. Mwanafalsafa wa Uingereza Antony Flew, aliyekuwa mtu maarufu aliyewahi kuwa mtu asiyeamini kuwepo kwa Mungu, ambaye hapo awali alikuwa ameandika karatasi kadhaa za utafiti zinazounga mkono kutokuwepo kwa Mungu na kushiriki katika mijadala mingi, alijikuta akikiri kuwepo kwa Muumba Mwenye Hekima na Mjuzi wa yote aliyeumba ulimwengu. Katika kitabu chake *There is a God*, alieleza athari kubwa ambayo hoja hii ilikuwa nayo kwake binafsi, iliyomfanya aache kutoamini kuwepo kwa Mungu: ‘Ingawa nilikuwa nikikosoa vikali hoja ya usanifu, tangu wakati huo nimekuja kuona kwamba, inapoelezwa ipasavyo, hoja hii ni ushahidi wenye mashiko wa kuwepo kwa Mungu. Maendeleo katika maeneo mawili hasa yamenifikisha kwenye hitimisho hili. La kwanza ni swali la asili ya sheria za maumbile na maarifa yanayohusiana nayo kutoka kwa wanasayansi mashuhuri wa kisasa. La pili ni swali la asili ya uhai na uzazi.’255 Hoja hii imewalazimu hata wanaoamini kutokuwepo kwa Mungu kwa ukaidi mkubwa kukubali kwamba ni mojawapo ya hoja bora zaidi zinazotolewa na wanaoamini kuwepo kwa Mungu.
There is no doubt that this argument has had a huge impact in the debate surrounding this issue. Such has been its sway that it has forced many atheists to acknowledge its power; in fact, it has caused some of their most famous figures to abandon atheism altogether. British philosopher Antony Flew, a famous ex atheist who had previously written a number of pro-atheism research papers and participated in numerous debates, ended up affirming the existence of a Wise, Omniscient Creator who made the universe. In his book There is a God, he expressed the deep impact this argument had on him personally, which led him to abandon atheism: ‘Although I was once sharply critical of the argument to design, I have since come to see that, when correctly formulated, this argument constitutes a persuasive case for the existence of God. Developments in two areas in particular have led me to this conclusion. The first is the question of the origin of the laws of nature and the related insights of eminent modern scientists. The second is the question of the origin of life and reproduction.’255 This argument has forced even the most ardent of atheists into admitting that it is one of the best polemics offered by theists.
Muundo wa hoja
Structure of the argument
Hoja ya kiteleolojia inategemea mapendekezo yafuatayo:
The teleological argument is based on the following propositions:
• Pendekezo la kwanza: Ulimwengu tunaouona na tunaoishi ndani yake umeumbwa kwa ustadi mkubwa na kwa ukamilifu. Dalili za utunzaji na upangaji wa Mwenyezi Mungu zimo ndani yake, na ziko wazi.
• First proposition: The universe we see and live in is masterfully made and consummate. The signs of care and providence therein are apparent.
• Pendekezo la pili: Umahiri huu kamili unaashiria kuwepo kwa Mtendaji Mwenye Hekima na Mjuzi wa kila kitu aliyeuumba kwa namna hii.
• Second proposition: This consummate mastery suggests that there is a Wise, Omniscient Doer who created it in this manner.
Hitimisho: Allah ndiye Mwenye Hekima, Mjuzi wa yote, Muumbaji aliyeuumba ulimwengu.
• Conclusion: Allah is the Wise, Omniscient Creator who created the universe.
Hoja inaweza pia kujengwa juu ya mchakato wa kuondoa: kwanza orodhesha uwezekano wote, kisha ondoa zile zisizo na mantiki. Kauli hapa ni kwamba ulimwengu umeumbwa kwa ustadi mkubwa na ukamilifu. Uwezekano wa hili kuwa hivyo ni matatu.
The argument can also be based on an elimination process: list all the possibilities first, then remove the implausible ones. The statement here is that the universe is masterfully made and consummate. The possibilities for this being the case are three:
i. Ilionekana kutokana na uamuzi wa sababu (causal determinism).
ii. Ilionekana kutokana na bahati nasibu (coincidence).
i. It appeared out of causal determinism. ii. It appeared out of coincidence.
iii. Ilitokea kwa shukrani kwa Muumba Mwenye Hekima na Mwenye Kupenda.
iii. It appeared thanks to a Wise and Willing Creator.
Kwa kuondoa chaguo mbili za kwanza (jambo ambalo litajadiliwa kwa undani zaidi hivi karibuni), chaguo pekee lililobaki ni la tatu.
By dispelling the first two options (which is to be discussed in more detail soon), the only option remaining is the third.
Ushahidi wa pendekezo la kwanza: ‘Ulimwengu umeumbwa kwa umahiri na ukamilifu wa hali ya juu’
Proof for the first proposition: ‘The universe is masterfully and consummately made’
Mtu anapofikiria kuhusu jambo la ustadi uliopo katika ulimwengu huu, na anapotazama udhihirisho wake mzuri na picha zake, ataona kwamba hoja hii inaweza kupatikana kwa wingi katika dunia tunayoishi. Ulimwengu umejaa matukio ya ajabu ya uzuri, ukuu na ustadi. Mwanafizikia asiyeamini kuwepo kwa Mungu, Steven Weinberg, alisema: ‘Ni lazima nikiri kwamba wakati mwingine maumbile yanaonekana kuwa mazuri zaidi kuliko inavyohitajika kikamilifu.’256 Inatosha kusema kwamba, lau uzuri huu na ustadi huu visingekuwepo kwa wingi kiasi hicho, tungekuwa katika ulimwengu tofauti kabisa – na dunia yetu ingekuwa mahali pagumu pa kuishi.
When a person thinks about the phenomenon of the mastery that exists in this universe and looks at its wonderful manifestations and imagery, he would see that this argument can be found abundantly across the world that we live in. The universe is laden with amazing scenes of beauty, grandeur, and mastery. The atheist physicist Steven Weinberg said, ‘I have to admit that sometimes nature seems more beautiful than strictly necessary.’256 Suffice it to say that, had this beauty and mastery not been in such abundance, we would have been in a totally different universe – and our world would have become a hard place to live.
Wingi huu wa ushahidi wa ujenzi wa hali ya juu wa ulimwengu umekuwa na athari kubwa katika kuenea kwa hoja ya kiteleolojia na urahisi wa kuitumia. Kwa hakika, wingi huu unaifanya inafaa kwa aina mbalimbali za watu, kwa sababu watu wanaweza kutofautiana sana katika uwezo wao wa kuelewa na kutafakari alama za muundo wa makusudi katika uumbaji. Hii pia ni kwa sababu watu hutofautiana katika uzoefu wao wa kiakili na maarifa yao. Pale zana za kiakili zilizo ndani ya mtu zinapokuwa nyingi zaidi na zimekomaa zaidi, atapata mtazamo wa mbele juu ya undani wa ujenzi usio na dosari ambao mtu asiye na zana hizo hangeweza kuupata. Kiini cha uwezo huu kinapatikana kwa watu wote mradi fiṭrah yao na hisia zao ziko salama. Zaidi ya hayo, wanaweza kutofautiana katika kiwango cha kutumia tafakari – ambayo ni ibada – kama vile wanavyoweza kutofautiana katika athari ambayo tafakari hiyo inaweza kuwa nayo juu yao. Katika maandiko ya kimapokeo, katika kutafuta kumfahamu Muumba na kuongeza ujuzi wa mtu juu Yake na sifa zake kamilifu, kuna mwitikio unaotegemea imani unaozungumzia tafakari. Mojawapo ya maandiko bora juu ya hili ni yale aliyoandika Imam Ibn al-Qayyim katika vitabu vyake Shifā’ al-ʿAlīl na Miftāḥ Dār al-Saʿādah, ambapo alifanya utafiti wa kina juu ya suala hili akitafuta hekima ya Allah katika mambo mengi ya uumbaji Wake, akidhihirisha ujuzi Wake wa kila kitu katika udhihirisho wa ujenzi wa umahiri na ukamilifu uliomo katika uumbaji. Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī pia ana risala juu ya suala hilo hilo, iliyopewa jina al-Ḥikmah fī Makhlūqāt Allah.
This abundance of evidence for the masterful construction of the universe has had a huge influence in the teleological argument’s spread and the simplicity of its application. In fact, this abundance makes it suitable for a wide range of people, as people can differ vastly in terms of their ability to comprehend and contemplate the signs of intelligent design in the creation. This is also because people differ in terms of their cognitive experiences and knowledge. Whenever the intellectual tools inside a person are in greater abundance and maturity, he would gain a foresight into the subtlety of an immaculate construction that someone without these tools would not be able to acquire. The essence of this capability is found in all people so long as their fiṭrah and senses are uncorrupted. Beyond this, they can vary in terms of the extent they can exercise reflection – an act of worship – just as they can vary in terms of the impact that reflection can have on them. In traditional writings, in the pursuit of understanding the Creator and to deepen one’s knowledge of Him and His perfect attributes, there is a faith-based response that speaks to reflection. One of the best writings on this is what Imam Ibn al-Qayyim wrote in his books Shifā’ al-ʿAlīl and Miftāḥ Dār al-Saʿādah, where he extensively researched this issue in the search of Allah’s wisdom in many aspects of His creation, revealing His omniscience in the manifestation of masterful and consummate construction embedded in the creation. Abū Ḥāmid al Ghazālī also has a treatise on the same issue, titled al-Ḥikmah fī Makhlūqāt Allah.
Dhana za kisayansi za kisasa zinazoashiria hoja ya kiteleolojia:
Contemporary scientific concepts that are indicative of the teleological argument:
Dhana ya kwanza: Upangaji makini wa ulimwengu.
First concept: The fine-tuning of the universe.
Dhana moja ya kisayansi inayoweza kutumiwa kufichua muundo uliokamilika kwa kina wa ulimwengu inajulikana kama urekebishaji makini (fine-tuning) wa ulimwengu. Wazo hili lilianza kuonekana kwa mara ya kwanza katika karatasi iliyoandikwa na mwanafizikia Brandon Carter mwaka 1974, iliyopewa kichwa ‘Large number coincidences and the anthropic principle in cosmology’. Kazi iliyofuata kuhusu jambo hili ilikuwa ya Bernard Carr na Martin Rees mwaka 1979 iitwayo ‘The anthropic principle and the structure of the physical world’, ikafuatiwa na kazi ya kawaida ya kiensaiklopidia The Anthropic Cosmological Principle ya John Barrow na Frank Tipler mwaka 1986. Baadaye, maandishi mengi kuhusu suala hili yalitokea, yote yakiwa na msingi uleule.
One scientific concept that can be leveraged to uncover the deeply consummate construct of the universe is known as the fine-tuning of the universe. This idea first surfaced in a paper written by the physicist Brandon Carter in 1974, which was titled ‘Large number coincidences and the anthropic principle in cosmology’. The next work to appear on this was by Bernard Carr and Martin Rees in 1979 called ‘The anthropic principle and the structure of the physical world’, followed by the classic encyclopaedic work The Anthropic Cosmological Principle by John Barrow and Frank Tipler in 1986. Subsequently, many writings on this issue appeared, all of which carry the same premise.
Dhana kuu ni kwamba tunapotafakari ulimwengu, tunaona kwamba kuna sheria na thamani za mara kwa mara zilizowekwa kwa usahihi wa hali ya juu ili uhai uweze kuwepo; kwa hakika, baadhi ya sheria hizi zimesawazishwa kwa usahihi mkubwa hivi kwamba kuwepo kwa ulimwengu mzima kunategemea hilo, na kwamba kasoro yoyote katika mojawapo ya thamani hizi ingeleta uharibifu kamili. Umahiri unaoonekana katika uumbaji wa ulimwengu haukomei kwa viumbe hai pekee au sayari hii ya ajabu tunamoishi. Umahiri huu unaenea hadi kwenye sheria na thamani za mara kwa mara zinazotawala ulimwengu huu. Thamani hizi ni seti ya data za kinambari ambazo zimechaguliwa kwa uangalifu mkubwa, kiasi kwamba iwapo zingepotoka kidogo tu kutoka kwenye namba hizo, mfumo mzima wa uhai, na kwa hakika ulimwengu wenyewe, ungetoweka. Kuwepo kwa ulimwengu kumefungamana moja kwa moja na namba hizi muhimu. Stephen C. Meyer, mwanzilishi na mkurugenzi wa Discovery Institute, anafafanua jambo hili kwa mfano: ‘Fikiria kwamba wewe ni mtafiti wa anga za mbali ambaye amejikwaa tu hadi kwenye chumba cha udhibiti wa ulimwengu mzima. Huko unagundua "mashine ya kuumba ulimwengu" yenye safu nyingi za vipimo, kila kimoja kikiwa na mipangilio mingi inayowezekana. Unapochunguza, unajifunza kwamba kila kipimo kinawakilisha kigezo fulani ambacho lazima kiwekwe kwa thamani sahihi ili kuumba ulimwengu ambamo uhai unaweza kuwepo. Kipimo kimoja kinawakilisha mipangilio inayowezekana ya nguvu kali ya nyuklia, kingine cha mvutano wa kidunia, kingine cha kigezo cha Planck, kingine cha uwiano wa uzito wa nyutroni kwa uzito wa protoni, kingine cha nguvu ya mvutano wa sumakuumeme, na kadhalika. Wewe, mtafiti wa anga za mbali, unapokichunguza vipimo hivyo, unaona kwamba vingeweza kwa urahisi kuwekwa katika mipangilio tofauti. Zaidi ya hayo, kwa hesabu makini unabaini kwamba iwapo mpangilio wowote wa kipimo ungebadilishwa hata kidogo tu, uhai ungekoma kuwepo.’ Hata hivyo, kwa sababu fulani kila kipimo (dial) kimewekwa katika thamani sahihi kabisa inayohitajika ili kuendesha ulimwengu. Unadhani nini kuhusu asili ya mipangilio hii iliyorekebishwa kwa usahihi wa hali ya juu?
Mvuto
Gravity
Tunapotafakari juu ya mvuto wa Dunia, udhibiti wake juu yetu, na jinsi unavyotuvuta chini kuelekea yenyewe, tunahisi kwamba kuna nguvu kubwa ambayo hakuna njia ya kuikwepa. Hata hivyo, ikilinganishwa na nguvu nyingine za kimaumbile, inaonekana kuwa dhaifu sana. Kwa kweli, ni dhaifu mara 1036 kuliko nguvu ya nyuklia yenye nguvu. Udhaifu wa mvuto ikilinganishwa na nguvu nyingine za kimaumbile ni kipengele muhimu katika urekebishaji sahihi sana wa ulimwengu kwa ajili ya uhai. Katika jarida la New Scientist, katika makala yenye kichwa ‘Gravity mysteries: Why is gravity fine-tuned?’, imeandikwa: ‘Udhaifu wa mvuto ni jambo ambalo tunapaswa kushukuru kwalo. Kama ungekuwa na nguvu kidogo tu zaidi, hakuna hata mmoja wetu angekuwepo hapa kuudharau asili yake dhaifu.’258
When we ponder over the Earth’s gravitational pull, its control over us, and how it pulls us back down to itself, we feel that there is a mighty force from which there is no escape. However, when compared to other natural forces, it appears to be very weak. In fact, it is 1036 times weaker than the strong nuclear force. The weakness of gravity compared to other natural forces is a key element in the extremely precise fine-tuning for life. In the New Scientist magazine, in the article titled ‘Gravity mysteries: Why is gravity fine-tuned?’, it states, ‘The feebleness of gravity is something we should be grateful for. If it were a tiny bit stronger, none of us would be here to scoff at its puny nature.’258
Mvuto wa ulimwengu wenye mvuto wa ulimwengu (gravitational constant) umepangwa kwa usahihi wa ajabu sana – lau ungetofautiana hata kwa 1060, basi sisi tusingekuwepo. Ili kuelewa 257 Science and Evidence for Design in the Universe, uk. 57.
The gravitational constant of the universe has been incredibly and precisely tuned – had it been off even by 1060, we would not have existed. To understand 257 Science and Evidence for Design in the Universe, p. 57.
jinsi safu hii ya kuruhusu uhai ilivyo nyembamba sana. fikiria una kifaa cha kurekebisha vizuri au kipimo cha kupima (dial). kisha ukagawanya digrii za kipimo hicho kwa 10^60 (1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
how exceedingly narrow this life-permitting range is, imagine you have a fine tuning machine or a calibrating dial. Then you divided the degrees of the dial by 1060(1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
Kwa sababu hiyo, wangu, ukiangalia tu idadi hizi bila maelezo yoyote ya mtu, unaweza kuona hali ambapo kila kitu hakiko sawa. Mfano mwingine ni huu: unachukua chombo cha kupimia kama rula, unapima ulimwengu kutoka upande mmoja hadi mwingine, kisha unapima nguvu ya mvuto ya Dunia na kuweka thamani hiyo kwenye ile rula. Ukikosea hata kwa inchi moja tu, ingeweza kuleta janga kubwa. Hivyo basi, kwa kuwa idadi hii iliyopangwa vizuri imehusika, ingekuwa na mantiki zaidi kuamini kwamba hili lilitokana na elimu, na kwamba haliwezi kuwa ni bahati tu.
Nguvu kubwa ya nyuklia
Strong nuclear force
Nguvu hii ndiyo inayohusika na uthabiti wa maada kwa kushikilia pamoja protoni na nyutroni za kiini cha atomu, hivyo kuunda viini vya atomu. Protoni zote, kama tunavyojua, hubeba chaji chanya; kinachoziwezesha kubaki imara ndani ya kiini cha atomu – na zisifukuzwe – ni nguvu ya nyuklia yenye nguvu (strong nuclear force). Ni kama jaribio la kulazimisha sumaku mbili za nguzo moja kushikana – kufanya hivyo kungeleta kurudishana. Hata hivyo, ikiwa nguvu inayojaribu kuziunganisha ina nguvu zaidi, inawezekana kushinda kurudishana huko. Nguvu ya nyuklia yenye nguvu pia imesawazishwa kwa usahihi wa hali ya juu. Lau ingekuwa dhaifu kwa 2%, atomu za hidrojeni zingerudishana na zisingeweza kamwe kuungana na kemikali nyingine, na hivyo ulimwengu ungebaki katika hali ya kuwa na atomu za hidrojeni tu zinazozunguka-zunguka. Kinyume chake, lau nguvu hii ingekuwa na nguvu zaidi kwa 2%, atomu za hidrojeni zingeungana haraka sana hadi zote zingegeuka kuwa heliamu, ambayo ingekuwa kipengele cha kemikali kinachotawala kwa kiasi kikubwa kote ulimwenguni. Kuna usawa mzuri katika nguvu hii: Baadhi ya atomu za hidrojeni huungana kuwa atomu za heliamu, ilhali hidrojeni iliyobaki hubaki kuunda vipengele vyote vingine vya kemikali, kama vile kuungana na oksijeni kuunda maji. Ingekuwa vigumu kuwazia uhai wowote bila usawa huu kamili katika nguvu hii. Yaliyosemwa kuhusu nguvu ya nyuklia yenye nguvu yanatumika vilevile kwa nguvu ya nyuklia dhaifu (weak nuclear force), pamoja na nguvu ya sumakuumeme (electromagnetic force). Pamoja na mvutano wa dunia (gravity) na nguvu ya nyuklia yenye nguvu, hizi ndizo nguvu nne zinazodhibiti ulimwengu. Zote nne zimesawazishwa kwa usahihi mkubwa kiasi kwamba, kama yoyote kati yake ingebadilika hata kidogo sana, uhai usingeweza kuwepo. Mifano inayoonyesha usawazishaji huu wa kina ni mingi mno kuweza kuitajwa. Zinaweza kuchunguzwa na kuonekana katika vitabu vinavyohusu jambo hili la ajabu. Baadhi ya kazi zinazokuja akilini kuhusiana na hili ni Just Six Numbers cha Martin Rees, Big Bang, Big God: A Universe Fit for Life? cha Rodney Holder, The Science of God: The Convergence of Scientific and Biblical Wisdom cha Gerald Schroeder, A Fine-Tuned Universe: The Quest for God in Science and Theology cha Alister McGrath, The Goldilocks Enigma cha Paul Davies, na God and Design: The Teleological Argument and Modern Science cha Neil Manson. Kwa kweli, maandishi mengi ya Magharibi yaliyochunguza hoja hii yanaonyesha mifano mbalimbali ya kuthibitisha asili iliyorekebishwa kwa usahihi ya ulimwengu, sheria zake, na vipimo vyake vya kudumu. Lile la ajabu kuhusu hali hii ya kurekebishwa kwa usahihi ni kwamba, kama baadhi ya nguvu hizi zingekuwa si mahali zilipo hasa, ulimwengu ungekuwa umeacha kuwepo kwa muda mrefu katika umbo tunalolijua. Baadhi ya nguvu zimesawazishwa kwa namna iliyoruhusu kuendelea kwa nyota, sayari, na maada. Nyingine zimesawazishwa kwa usahihi mkubwa hivi kwamba ziliwekwa tu ili kumkaribisha mwanadamu. Hoja ya mwisho ndiyo inayojulikana kama kanuni ya kibinadamu (anthropic principle). Kuna seti ya data inayohusiana na asili ya ulimwengu huu ambayo ingeufanya usifae kwa uhai kama ingekuwa tofauti. Mwanafalsafa wa Kiingereza Antony Flew alichora kwa ustadi picha ya hoja hii katika kitabu chake There is a God.
Je, ulimwengu ulikuwa umeamuliwa na ulikusudiwa kila mara kuwa hivi?
Was the universe determined and always supposed to be like this?
Kwa upande wa mtazamo wa wasioamini kuwepo kwa Mungu, kwamba ulimwengu ulikuwa – inadaiwa – siku zote unakwenda kufikia hali ilivyo sasa, hilo si lazima liwe hivyo. Huu ndio msimamo ambao wanafizikia wengi wanaukubali, kama vile Stephen Hawking, Paul Davies, George Ellis, na wengine. Kwa mfano, Davies anasema: ‘Nadharia ya kweli ya kila kitu lazima ieleze si tu jinsi ulimwengu wetu ulivyoanza kuwepo, bali pia kwa nini ni aina pekee ya ulimwengu ambao ungeweza kuwepo – kwa nini kungeweza kuwa na seti moja tu ya sheria za kimaumbile.’264
As for the atheist viewpoint that the universe was – supposedly – always going to come to a point where it is now at, then that is not necessarily the case. This is the stance that most physicists adopt, such as Stephen Hawking, Paul Davies, George Ellis, and others. For example, Davies states, ‘A genuine theory of everything must explain not only how our universe came into being, but also why it is the only type of universe that there could have been – why there could only be one set of physical laws.’264
Msimamo wa kiamua (determinist) unaodai kwamba konstanti hizi zilikuwa lazima zijitokeze unaleta msimamo kwamba isingewezekana ulimwengu wowote kuja kuwepo usio na uhai, na kwamba kuwepo kwa ulimwengu kwa namna hii finyu na inayofaa kulikuwa kumepangwa na daima kungetokea. Hili linapingana na uhalisia: Data zote zinaonyesha kwamba uwezekano wa ulimwengu – kama wetu – unaoweza kusaidia uhai ni mdogo mno ukilinganishwa na uwezekano usio na kikomo wa ulimwengu usio na uhai. Hakuna hata dalili ndogo inayopendekeza kwamba konstanti hizi lazima ziwe daima kwa namna hii. Kwa kweli, baadhi ya wanasayansi wanazungumzia nadharia ambayo haijagunduliwa hadi sasa. Inaitwa 'nadharia ya kila kitu' (TOE). Inajaribu kutoa nadharia inayopanga nguvu nne za asili kuwa sheria moja, jambo ambalo lingerahisisha sana vipengele vingi vya fizikia. Juhudi za kutafuta nadharia hii zilianza tayari kwa Einstein, aliyesema, 'Kinachonivutia kweli ni kama Mungu angeweza kuuumba ulimwengu kwa namna tofauti.' Bila shaka, juhudi zake katika hili hazikuzaa matunda. 'Nadharia ya nyuzi' (string theory) ni mwendelezo wa jaribio la kutafuta TOE. Jaribio maarufu zaidi leo – ambalo liko mstari wa mbele katika mijadala hii na ndilo nadharia inayoongoza – ni kile kinachojulikana kama 'M-theory', ambacho kinajaribu kuunganisha matoleo yote thabiti ya nadharia ya nyuzi chini ya kanuni moja. Dhana kama hizi ndizo mwelekeo chaguomsingi wa baadhi ya watu wanaotaka kueleza kwa nini sheria na konstanti za ulimwengu ziko kama zilivyo. Victor Stenger anasema, 'Wanafizikia wengi wanatarajia kwamba hatimaye nadharia ya kila kitu (TOE) itagunduliwa ambayo itajumuisha hesabu ya vigezo vyake vyote. Katika hali hiyo, hakutakuwa na kitu cha kurekebisha vizuri.'265
Hii ni sentensi ya swali, si maandishi ya kidini ya kutafsiri moja kwa moja, lakini kazi yangu ni kutafsiri maandishi ya Kiingereza kuwa Kiswahili. Hapa kuna tafsiri:
Je, inawezekana kwamba ulimwengu ni bahati nasibu tupu?
Is it possible that the universe is sheer coincidence?
Tunamwachia Weinberg jibu la swali hili:
We leave the answer to this to Weinberg:
Sio tu dhana ya kubahatisha. Nadharia ingeweza kuwa ya kubahatisha, lakini hatuna nadharia ambayo ubahatishaji huo unathibitishwa kihisabati, ndiyo. Lakini ni uwezekano. Maelezo mengine pekee ni kwamba hayo si maelezo hata kidogo, kwa sababu hatuna nadharia inayoweza kuwa mgombea. Lakini maelezo pekee yanayoonekana kufanya kazi ni kwamba hili ni mojawapo ya mambo yanayotofautiana kutoka sub-universe hadi sub-universe, kutoka Big Bang hadi Big Bang. Katika Big Bang nyingi, nishati hiyo ni kubwa zaidi kuliko tunavyoona. Na katika Big Bang hizo, hupitia kwa sababu nishati hii inaendesha upanuzi wa ulimwengu kulingana na kama ni chanya au hasi. Katika ulimwengu unaolipuka kwa kasi kubwa, hakuna muda wa galaksi au nyota kuundwa, au unajikunja au kuporomoka tena kwa kasi kiasi kwamba hakuna muda wa uhai kuundwa baadaye, ndiyo. Kwa hiyo lazima iwe ndogo ili uhai uwepo, na ni karibu kiasi hicho hasa. Ni jambo la kuvutia kwamba si ndogo sana kuliko ingepaswa kuwa ili kuruhusu uhai kutokea… na lazima iwe angalau 10^56, au kama unadhani una wazo kuhusu mabadiliko-badiliko katika umbali mfupi zaidi, nadhani ungesema angalau 10^120. Kwa kweli, hilo linasumbua kidogo.271
I mean it's not only a speculation. The theory would be speculative, but we don’t have a theory in which that speculation is mathematically realized, yeah. But it’s a possibility. But the only other explanation is that is not even an explanation because we don’t have a candidate theory. But the only explanation that seems to work is that this is just one of those things that varies from sub-universe to sub-universe, from Big Bang to Big Bang. In most of the Big Bangs, it’s much larger than what we observe. And in those Big Bangs, they go through because this energy drives the expansion of the universe depending on whether it’s positive or negative. In the universe that blows up so rapidly, there’s no time for galaxies or stars to form, or it crunches or re-collapses so rapidly again there’s no time after life to form, yes. So it has to be small for life to exist, and it’s about as small as it as in fact that’s interesting it’s not much smaller than it would have to be to allow life to arise…and it must be at least 1056, or if you think you have some idea about fluctuations in even shorter distances I think you would say at least 10120. In fact, that's a little disturbing.271
Alexander Vilenkin anasema, Kupotoka kidogo kutoka kwenye nguvu inayohitajika husababisha janga la kikosmolojia, kama vile mpira wa moto kujiporomoka chini ya uzito wake yenyewe au ulimwengu kuwa karibu tupu… Hii ndiyo kesi maarufu na yenye utata zaidi ya urekebishaji laini (fine-tuning) katika fizikia.
Leonard Susskind, mwanafizikia wa nadharia ya nyuzi (string theory) asiye wa kidini, kama alivyo Vilenkin, anaandika katika makala yake, Disturbing Implications of the Cosmological Constant, kwamba isipokuwa kipimo hiki kingerekebishwa vizuri, "matukio ya kimiujiza kitakwimu" yangehitajika ili ulimwengu wetu uwe unaoruhusu uhai. Anapendekeza kwamba, kwa kuzingatia hili, huenda wakala asiyejulikana ndiye aliweka hali za awali za ulimwengu tunaouona leo.272
Dhana ya pili: Ugumu usioweza kupunguzwa
Second concept: Irreducible complexity
Dhana moja ya kitaalamu iliyobuniwa na mwanabiolojia Dkt. Michael Behe wa Chuo Kikuu cha Lehigh huko Pennsylvania ni ‘irreducible complexity’. Aliandika hili katika kitabu chake maarufu Darwin’s Black Box, katika sura iliyopewa jina lake. Irreducible complexity ni wazo kwamba matukio changamano yanayojumuisha sehemu zinazohitaji kufanya kazi kwa pamoja kwa upatano lazima yalitengenezwa hivyo hivyo mara moja; kama mojawapo ya sehemu hizo ingechelewa katika mageuzi, mfumo mzima wa matukio kama hayo ungeanguka. Hii inathibitisha kwamba lazima kulikuwepo mbunifu aliyeyaunda matukio hayo mara moja. Ili mfumo wowote wa kibiolojia ufanye kazi ipasavyo, lazima uwe na vipengele vitatu:
One piece of jargon coined by the biochemist Dr. Michael Behe at Lehigh University in Pennsylvania is ‘irreducible complexity’. He wrote this in his famous book Darwin’s Black Box, in a chapter titled after it. Irreducible complexity is the idea that complex composite phenomena that require component parts that work in mutual harmony must have been made as thus in one go; if any lagged behind in evolution, the entire system of such phenomena would have collapsed. This proves that there must have been a designer who fashioned these phenomena in one go. So that any biological system can function properly, it must have three elements to it:
1. Sehemu zake zote zinazounda lazima ziwepo.
1. All its constituent parts must be present.
2. Sehemu zake zote zinazounda lazima ziwepo kwa wakati mmoja.
2. All its constituent parts must be present simultaneously.
3. Sehemu zake zote za msingi lazima zifungamane na kila moja kwa namna sahihi na yenye upatanifu. Msimamo unaodai kwamba ulimwengu ni jambo la kubahatisha unakabiliwa na njia yenye matuta makubwa kabla ya kuweza kupata masharti haya matatu. Hili kiotomatiki linapaswa kumaanisha kwamba kuna mbunifu aliyeyaumba matukio haya kwa mpangilio na usahihi ule ulioyafanya, na kwamba hayakubadilika kupitia kile wasioamini Mungu wanachokiita sheria za kipofu za maumbile, mabadiliko ya kijenetiki ya kubahatisha, au michakato ya uteuzi wa asili kutoka aina za awali hadi yakawa viumbe changamano walivyo. Msimamo kama huo unaelekea kwenye upunguzaji na urahisishaji kupita kiasi, jambo linalopingana na nadharia ya mageuzi inayodhani kwamba mfumo wowote changamano wa kibiolojia ungebadilika hatua kwa hatua kutoka aina rahisi zaidi na rahisi zaidi, hadi kurudi kabisa kwenye umbo lake la kwanza na rahisi zaidi. Ikiwa matukio yangekubali urahisishaji wa namna hiyo, ingemaanisha kiotomatiki kwamba yote yaliumbwa mara moja. Kwa kuzingatia hili, msimamo wa mbunifu ndio jibu lenye mantiki zaidi kwa swali la jinsi tulivyoingia katika kuwepo. Katika kitabu chake, Behe alitaja mifano 286 kutoka ulimwengu wa asili kwa matukio haya. Mfano maarufu na wa kuvutia zaidi wa ugumu usioweza kupunguzwa ni flagellum ya bakteria. Bakteria huyu ana injini ya kimolekuli inayozunguka, jambo linalomwezesha kusogea majini kwa urahisi mkubwa. Mkia wake umeundwa na sehemu 40 tofauti za protini; ikiwa mojawapo kati ya hizo haingekuwepo wakati wowote, bakteria angekosa kufanya kazi. Hili linaonyesha kwamba ni kiumbe chenye ugumu usioweza kupunguzwa ambacho hakingeweza kupitia mageuzi, bali kiliingia katika maumbile mara moja. Mifumo kama vile flagellum ya bakteria ingeeleweka kwa urahisi zaidi na kwa busara kwa kuwa ilikuja kuwepo kupitia Mbunifu mwenye mapenzi na uchaguzi aliyeibuni kuwa hivyo, si kwamba ilibadilika polepole kwa uteuzi wa asili au mabadiliko ya kijenetiki ya taratibu kama inavyodaiwa na mfano wa msingi wa Darwin. Huu ni mfano mmoja tu. Kuna mifano mingine mingi.
"Kwa mfano, mwaka 1998 jarida maarufu la Cell lilichapisha toleo maalum lenye kichwa "Macromolecular Machines". Mashine za Molekuli ni vifaa vya ajabu vyenye ugumu mkubwa ambavyo seli zote hutumia kuchakata taarifa, kujenga protini, na kusogeza vitu kuvuka utando wake huku na kule. Bruce Alberts, Rais wa Chuo cha Taifa cha Sayansi, alitambulisha toleo hili kwa makala iliyoitwa "The Cell as a Collection of Protein Machines". Ndani yake, alisema hivi: 'Daima tumekuwa tukidharau seli... Seli nzima inaweza kuonekana kama kiwanda kinachojumuisha mtandao tata wa mistari ya uzalishaji iliyounganishwa, ambapo kila mmoja unaundwa na seti ya mashine kubwa za protini... Kwa nini tunaziita mkusanyiko mkubwa wa protini unaosimamia kazi za seli mashine za protini? Hasa kwa sababu, kama mashine zilizobuniwa na binadamu kushughulikia dunia ya kawaida kwa ufanisi, mkusanyiko huu wa protini una sehemu zinazosogea zilizoratibiwa kwa kina.'287"
Seli ni ulimwengu unaojitegemea, uliojaa mifumo na taratibu mbalimbali. Kila moja imetengenezwa kwa namna maalum na hutekeleza kazi yake. Kwa jumla, mifumo hii na taratibu hizi zina nafasi katika uhai wa seli hii.
Dhana ya tatu: Alama za kimaelezo za kiumbe (aspect information signatures) zilizopachikwa ndani ya ulimwengu
Third concept: The aspect information signatures embedded within the universe
Wakati James Watson na Francis Crick walipogundua muundo wa hesi-mbili (double helix) wa DNA, walifanikiwa kutatua fumbo moja la uhai. Hata hivyo, ugunduzi huo ulizaa fumbo jingine. Asili ya data iliyomo katika msimbo wa kijenetiki lilikuwa fumbo lililowasumbua wanasayansi. Wengi walijaribu kueleza kiasi cha ajabu cha taarifa za kibiolojia zilizomo ndani ya seli kwa kutumia mtazamo finyu wa kimaada juu ya ulimwengu, ambao hautambui maelezo mengine yoyote yaliyo nje ya upeo wake. Kwa hakika, inaonekana kuwa vigumu kwa usayansi-kupindukia (scientism) kueleza jambo hili.
Kupitia ugunduzi wao wa muundo wa msimbo wa kijenetiki, Watson na Crick waliweza kufichua hazina kubwa ya data ndani ya DNA, ambayo inajidhihirisha kupitia besi nne na herufi nne za kemikali: adenine (A), cytosine (C), guanine (G) na thymine (T). Besi hizi nne zimepangwa katika maumbo maalum, ili kuhifadhi na kusambaza orodha ya maagizo ya kijenetiki ya kutengeneza protini na vimeng'enya vingine ambavyo seli zinahitaji ili ziendelee kuishi. Mwaka 1955, Crick alidhania kwamba vipengele vya kemikali vilivyomo katika DNA hufanya kazi kwa namna inayofanana na herufi za lugha katika kujenga sentensi, au jinsi msimbo unavyofanya kazi katika kuunda programu za kompyuta. Kwa maneno mengine, kama vile programu za kompyuta zinavyopangwa kutekeleza kazi maalum, vivyo hivyo mfuatano huu unapangwa katika nukleotidi ili kutekeleza majukumu maalum, jambo linalojulikana kama mpangilio wa kiprogramu (programmed sequencing). Cha kushangaza, Dawkins alikiri: ‘Msimbo wa mashine wa jeni unafanana kwa kushangaza na wa kompyuta. Isipokuwa tofauti za msamiati, kurasa za jarida la biolojia ya molekuli zingeweza kubadilishwa na zile za jarida la uhandisi wa kompyuta.’ Kauli hii iliungwa mkono na Bill Gates, mwanzilishi mwenza wa Microsoft: ‘DNA ya binadamu ni kama programu ya kompyuta, lakini ni ya hali ya juu zaidi, zaidi sana kuliko programu yoyote iliyowahi kutengenezwa.’291
When James Watson and Francis Crick discovered the double helix of DNA, they were able to solve a mystery of life. However, it led to another mystery. The nature of the data present in the genetic code was a mystery that puzzled scientists. Many tried to explain the incredible amount of biological information embedded within cells through the narrow lens of the materialistic outlook on the universe that does not recognise any other explanation outside its remit. Indeed, it would appear to be difficult for scientism to explain this. Through their discovery of the make up of the genetic code, Watson and Crick were able to reveal a huge data mine inside DNA, which is expressed through four bases and four chemical letters: adenine (A), cytosine (C), guanine (G) and thymine (T). These four bases are organised into particular shapes, in order to store and disseminate the list of genetic instructions for making proteins and other enzymes for cells to remain alive. In 1955, Crick theorised that the chemical components in DNA work similar to the letters of a language in constructing sentences, or how code operates in creating computer programmes. In other words, just like how computer programmes are put together to undertake specific tasks, likewise this sequence is put together in the nucleotides to perform specific duties, referred to as programmed sequencing. Significantly, Dawkins admitted: ‘The machine code of the genes is uncannily computerlike. Apart from differences in jargon, the pages of a molecular-biology journal might be interchanged with those of a computer engineering journal.’290 This was echoed by Bill Gates, co-founder of Microsoft: ‘Human DNA is like a computer program but far, far more advanced than any software ever created.’291
Pingamizi maarufu zaidi dhidi ya hoja ya ubora na kutokuwa na dosa
The most famous objections to the argument from mastery and immaculateness
Baada ya kuhitimisha majadiliano juu ya dalili ya pili ya kiakili ya kuwepo kwa Mwenyezi Mungu – hoja ya mpangilio na ukamilifu usio na dosari – sasa tunawasilisha pingamizi kuu zilizotolewa dhidi yake. Pingamizi hizi zimelenga pande zote mbili, yaani hoja zake za msingi na hitimisho lake.
Having concluded the discussion on the second rational indicator for Allah’s existence – the argument from systemisation and immaculateness – we now present the most salient objections that have been made to it. These objections have targeted both its propositions and its conclusion.
Pingamizi kwa pendekezo la kwanza: ‘Ulimwengu umetengenezwa kwa ustadi na ukamilifu usio na dosari’
Objections to the first proposition: ‘The universe is masterfully and immaculately made’
Hoja ya kwanza: Ukuu ni makadirio tu
Hii ni hoja ya ajabu. Nimekutana na wanaoamini kutokuwepo kwa dalili za ukuu na ubora katika ulimwengu huu, kila mmoja kwa kiwango chake na kwa visingizio mbalimbali. Baadhi yao wana shaka kama ulimwengu umeumbwa kwa ustadi kabisa tangu mwanzo, wakiamini kwamba dai hilo ni makadirio ya kibinafsi juu ya anga. Wanadai kwamba jinsi tunavyousoma ulimwengu hutupa udanganyifu huu, ingawa hauna maana ya kiusawa ndani ya ulimwengu. Kwa maneno mengine, ustadi wote unaotuzunguka haumaanishi lazima kwamba kulikuwepo mchakato wa ujenzi wenye ustadi wenyewe. Kwa mfano, tunapoona sanamu ya binadamu, tunaweza kuthamini namna ilivyojengwa. Baada ya yote, sisi tunaotazama tukio hili pia ni binadamu. Kama ingedhaniwa kwamba kiumbe fulani hakuwahi kumwona binadamu maishani mwake, anaweza kupita karibu na sanamu hiyo bila kuona sifa yoyote ya ustadi ndani yake; pengine angefikiri ni jiwe la kawaida tu, au jiwe lililomomonyoka kidogo, bila kuwa limeguswa na uingiliaji (yaani uchongaji) wa mtendaji mwenye nia. Vivyo hivyo, mtu akiona herufi za lugha na hati asiyoielewa, anaweza kudhani ni michoro ya nasibu tu. Kwa hiyo, kuona sifa yoyote ndani yake kungekuwa makadirio juu yake.
Nilikuwa nikifikiri kwamba aina hizi za mitazamo zilikuwa zimezuiliwa kwenye kauli za wanafalsafa wa pembezoni – kama zile za mwanafalsafa mwenye msimamo wa kutoamini Mungu Baron d'Holbach (d. 1789) – na hazikuwa zikizunguka katika falsafa ya kisasa ya kutoamini Mungu. Haikuwa mpaka nilipoisoma baadhi ya haya katika maandiko ya kisasa, pamoja na mijadala na mikutano niliyopitia binafsi, ndipo nilipogundua kwamba hoja hii bado inatumika sana. Ukweli ni kwamba hoja hii ni ya ajabu sana, kwani inajumuisha ukaidi mkubwa na kosa la kushangaza. Kwa kweli, mifano yenyewe iliyotolewa hapa ndiyo inayofichua kosa hilo. Uchongaji wa jiwe na mwigizaji mwenye hiari, pamoja na seti ya herufi na maandishi yanayohusu lugha fulani, huonyesha umahiri kama hakika ya lengo katika mambo haya; utambuzi na maarifa ndiyo yanayoongoza kugundua hakika hii. Kwa hiyo, kila muundo wa kimahiri uliopo katika ulimwengu, ungeendelea kuongeza uzoefu wetu na maarifa yetu. Mchakato huu wa ugunduzi utaendelea mradi tu uzoefu na maarifa vinaendelea kutoa. Aina hii ya fikra bila shaka humwongoza mtu kukataa hakika zote za lengo. Ukiwa na shaka kama mchanganyiko tata unaweza kutoa maarifa, halafu ukajiepusha na aina hii ya dhana kwa kisingizio cha kwamba hukumu yoyote kama hiyo ni ya kinisbi, na kwamba haina hakika ya lengo ndani yake, utajikuta ukiwa na shaka juu ya kila kitu kinachokuzunguka, kwani inawezekana kwamba kila kitu pia ni makadirio tu, hakina thamani ya lengo inayojitenga nawe. Hili huondoa thamani yoyote ya lengo kutoka kwa dhana za kibinadamu, na badala yake kuzirejesha kwenye utambuzi wa kinisbi tu unaokabiliwa na shaka, jambo linaloweza kumwingiza mbeba falsafa kama hiyo katika aina ya ulaghai wa kimantiki. Ukweli ni kwamba wenye shaka hawa wenyewe hawaenendi hivyo katika maisha yao ya kila siku, kwa kuwa hilo ni kinyume kabisa cha fitra salama ya kibinadamu, na pia kwa sababu matokeo yake yangeharibu msingi wowote wa kuugundua ulimwengu na kushirikiana nao.
Pingamizi la pili: Udanganyifu wa urekebishaji mzuri
Second objection: The fallacy of fine-tuning
Kitabu muhimu kwa Wanatheisti Wapya (New Atheists) katika mjadala kuhusu suala la ulimwengu kuwa umepangwa kwa usahihi wa hali ya juu ni kitabu cha mwanafizikia mwenye msimamo wa kutoamini Mungu, Victor Stenger, The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning: Why the Universe is Not Designed for Us. Yeye pia ndiye mwandishi wa God: The Failed Hypothesis: How Science Shows That God Does Not Exist, ambacho ni kitabu kikuu katika harakati za New Atheism. Dhana iliyo nyuma ya kitabu The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning inaonekana wazi kutokana na jina lake. Kinajaribu kupinga wazo lililoenea kwamba ulimwengu una sifa ya kupangwa kwa usahihi wa hali ya juu, hata katika kiwango cha viwango vya ulimwengu (cosmological constants) na matukio yake, na kwamba kuwepo kwetu kungekuwa hakuwezekani kama usawazishaji huu sahihi usingekuwepo. Wazo hili limeenea katika kazi za wanasayansi wengi, wanaoamini Mungu na wasioamini. Kwa kweli, Stenger mwenyewe anasema, ‘Hata wanafizikia wasioamini Mungu wanaona vigumu kueleza kwa njia ya kawaida kile kinachoitwa “anthropic principle”, na wengi wanafikiri wanahitaji kuita ulimwengu mwingi ili kulieleza.’298
An important book for the New Atheists in the debate over the issue of the universe being precisely calibrated is by the atheist physicist Victor Stenger, The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning: Why the Universe is Not Designed for Us. He by the way is also the author of God: The Failed Hypothesis: How Science Shows That God Does Not Exist, which is a key text in New Atheism. The concept behind the book The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning is obvious from its title. It attempts to refute the prevailing notion that the universe is characterised by a high level of fine-tuning – even at the level of its cosmological constants and events – and that our existence would have been impossible were it not for this precise balancing. This notion is widespread across the works of many scientists, both theists and atheists. In fact, Stenger himself states, ‘Even atheist physicists find this so-called “anthropic principle” difficult to explain naturally, and many think they need to invoke multiple universes to do so.’298
Ukweli ni kwamba orodha ya watu wanaoamini katika usahihi wa mpangilio wa ulimwengu ni ndefu na inajumuisha majina mengi, ambao wana njia mbalimbali za kueleza jinsi jambo la usahihi wa mpangilio lilivyotokea. Watu hao ni: Barrow, Carr, Carter, Davies, Dawkins, Deutsch, Ellis, Greene, Guth, Harrison, Hawking, Linde, Page, Penrose, Polkinghorne, Rees, Sandage, Smolin, Susskind, Tegmark, Tipler, Vilenkin, Weinberg, Wheeler, Wilczek, na wengine wengi.299 Katika kitabu chake, Stenger anachagua baadhi ya vifungu kutoka kwa wanasayansi wanaoonyesha mshangao wao kuhusu jambo hili la usahihi wa mpangilio mkamilifu.
The fact is that the list of people who believe in the fine-tuning of the universe is lengthy and comprises of many names, who have a variety of ways in expressing how the phenomenon of fine-tuning came about. These people are: Barrow, Carr, Carter, Davies, Dawkins, Deutsch, Ellis, Greene, Guth, Harrison, Hawking, Linde, Page, Penrose, Polkinghorne, Rees, Sandage, Smolin, Susskind, Tegmark, Tipler, Vilenkin, Weinberg, Wheeler, Wilczek, and many others.299 In his book, Stenger selects a number of passages from scientists who express their amazement at this phenomenon of precise fine-tuning:
Pingamizi la tatu: Kiwango cha urekebishaji makini (fine-tuning) ni kidogo sana ukilinganisha na ulimwengu mpana zaidi.
Third objection: The element of fine-tuning is extremely minimal compared to the vast wider universe
Msimamo mmoja unaoonyesha aina fulani ya kukataa — ingawa si kukataa kabisa — hoja ya urekebishaji laini (fine-tuning) ni ule unaokubali kwamba ulimwengu umesawazishwa kwa usahihi, lakini kwamba sehemu hiyo ni ndogo sana ndani ya ulimwengu mpana, ambao sehemu kubwa mno yake haifai kwa uhai. Wanadai: ‘Inawezaje kuwa sahihi kwetu kusema kwamba ulimwengu umepangwa kwa makini na kurekebishwa kwa usahihi wakati 99.9999999999% ya dunia hii ni tupu na haifai kwa uhai?’ Huu ni upinzani ambao mara nyingi nimesikia kutoka kwa Christopher Hitchens. Kwa kweli, Richard Dawkins alipokubali, katika mahojiano yake maarufu katika video ya The Four Horsemen, kwamba hoja ya urekebishaji laini ndiyo hoja imara zaidi ya wanaoamini Mungu, Hitchens aliingilia na kutoa upinzani huo huo. Richard Carrier anaeleza jambo hili kwa kusema: ‘Kwa hakika, tukiweka utupu wote mbaya wa anga za juu uliojaa mionzi hatari ndani ya eneo lenye ukubwa wa nyumba, hutaweza kupata kipande kidogo sana cha eneo kinachodumisha uhai (kingekuwa kidogo kuliko protoni moja).’314
One position that expresses a denial of sorts – though not a complete denial – of the argument from fine-tuning is the one that acknowledges that the universe is finely balanced, but that it is miniscule amid the expansive universe, the overwhelming majority of which is not suitable for life. They claim: ‘How is it accurate for us to say that the universe has been carefully and finely-tuned when 99.9999999999% of this world is empty and unsuitable for life?’ This is an objection I frequently heard from Christopher Hitchens. In fact, when Richard Dawkins, in his famous sit down in The Four Horsemen video, admitted that the argument from fine-tuning is the strongest argument of theists, Hitchens interjected and offered this same objection. Richard Carrier depicts the topic by saying, ‘In fact, if we put all the lethal vacuum of outer space swamped with deadly radiation into an area the size of a house, you would never find the comparably microscopic speck of area that sustains life (it would literally be smaller than a single proton).’314
Kuna mambo mawili yanayopaswa kuzingatiwa wakati wa kujibu pingamizi hili. Kwanza, namna hii ya kuwasilisha pingamizi ni ya kupotosha. Wazo la kurekebishwa vizuri kwa ulimwengu (fine-tuning) linamaanisha kwamba ulimwengu tuliomo una uhai, licha ya uwezekano wa kuwepo kwa ulimwengu mwingine mwingi usiofaa kwa uhai, hata kama ni mdogo kama chembe ndogo sana ndani ya nyumba. Hii ni nafasi ya kipekee sana, kwa kukiri kwa wanafizikia wenyewe, kutokana na mifano wanayotoa. Ni nafasi inayostahili kutambuliwa kama hivyo, na chanzo chake kinapaswa kuchunguzwa. Kwa hiyo swali hapa si kwa nini kuna ombwe kubwa katika ulimwengu, bali ni kwa nini uhai unapatikana katika ulimwengu licha ya uwezekano mkubwa kwamba usingeweza kupatikana. Hivyo basi, kuwepo kwa kiwango hiki cha kurekebishwa vizuri, hata kama ni kidogo ikilinganishwa na sehemu nyingine ya ulimwengu, kunatosha kuthibitisha dalili inayohitajika ya kuwepo kwa Mungu, hata kama kiwango hiki hakipo mahali pengine.
Ni kama mtu anayewaamuru watoto wake wapange na kusafisha nyumba iliyochafuka sana na majani yaliyotapakaa. Akirudi, anakuta sehemu ndogo tu ya nyumba imepangwa. Je, itawezekana kukataa kwamba sehemu hiyo ndogo haikupangwa na mtu yeyote, kwa sababu tu sehemu nyingine ya nyumba bado ilikuwa fujo?
Pingamizi la nne: Maarifa yetu yamefungwa katika ulimwengu huu, kwa hiyo hatuwezi kutoa hukumu kuhusu ulimwengu mwingine.
Fourth objection: Our knowledge is confined to this universe, so we cannot pass judgement on other ones
Pingamizi moja lenye shaka linalojaribu kutia shaka usahihi na mpangilio mzuri wa ulimwengu ni kwamba tumeshuhudia tu ulimwengu tulio ndani yake; kwa hiyo, hatuna njia ya kufanya ulinganisho baina ya ulimwengu wetu na ulimwengu mwingine ili kubaini kwa ufundi kiasi gani – au la – zimeundwa. Victor Stenger anasema, ‘Wakati huo huo, sioni sababu ya kujaribu kufikiria ulimwengu wenye “sheria” tofauti, kwa kuwa hakuna sheria kama hizo tunazoweza kuzifikia sisi binadamu. Isipokuwa ufunuo, yote tunayojua ni yale tunayoyaona, na jambo bora tunaloweza kufanya ni kujenga miundo ya kuelezea uchunguzi huo.’316
One dubious objection that attempts to throw doubt on the precision and finely tuned nature of the universe is that we have only experienced the universe we are in; therefore, we have no way of conducting a comparison between our universe and other universes in order to ascertain how masterfully – or not – they have been made. Victor Stenger says, ‘At the same time, I see no reason to try to imagine a universe with different “laws”, since there are no such laws that we have access to as humans. Barring revelation, all we know is what we observe, and the best we can do is build models to describe those observations.’316
Ukweli ni kwamba pingamizi hili linaonyesha kiwango fulani cha ukaidi au ujinga kuhusu asili ya ubobevu tunaozungumzia – na ujinga kuhusu wingi mkubwa wa mifano ya urekebishaji laini (fine-tuning) inayoweza kuonekana katika ulimwengu wetu. Kuhusu hili, mwanafizikia John Barrow alisema, Chukua karatasi na uweke juu yake nukta nyekundu. Nukta hiyo inawakilisha ulimwengu wetu. Sasa badilisha kidogo moja au zaidi kati ya vigezo vilivyorekebishwa kwa uangalifu na wingi wa kimaumbile ambavyo vimekuwa lengo la umakini wetu. Matokeo yake tunapata maelezo ya ulimwengu mwingine, ambao tunaweza kuuwakilisha kama nukta mpya karibu na ile ya kwanza. Ikiwa seti hiyo mpya ya vigezo na wingi inaelezea ulimwengu unaoruhusu uhai, ifanye kuwa nukta nyekundu; ikiwa inaelezea ulimwengu ambao hauruhusu uhai – ifanye kuwa nukta nyeupe. 316 The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning, uk. 234.
The fact is that this objection demonstrates a degree of obstinance or ignorance vis-à-vis the nature of the mastery we are talking about – and an ignorance of the sheer number of examples of observable fine-tuning in our universe. On this, the physicist John Barrow said, Take a sheet of paper and place upon it a red dot. That dot represents our universe. Now alter slightly one or more of the finely-tuned constants and physical quantities that have been the focus of our attention. As a result we have a description of another universe, which we may represent as a new dot in the proximity of the first. If that new set of constants and quantities describes a life-permitting universe, make it a red dot; if it describes a universe that is life- 316 The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning, p. 234.
Pingamizi kwa pendekezo la pili: ‘Urekebishaji mzuri (fine-tuning) unahitaji kitu kinachoufanya’
Objections to the second proposition: ‘Fine-tuning requires something that does it’
Pingamizi hizi zinatokana na wazo kwamba udhihirisho wa umahiri na ukamilifu katika ulimwengu huu si lazima umetokana na Mtendaji Mwenye Ujuzi wa Yote, Mwenye Mapenzi, na Mwenye Uwezo wa Yote. Pingamizi hizi zinadai kwamba inawezekana udhihirisho huu ulitokea kwa sababu za kimaumbile na kimaada badala yake. Ikiwa tutaangalia zaidi ya masuala ya bahati nasibu na kuamuliwa kimapema kama majibu mawili yanayofaa kueleza jambo hili la ugumu wa ulimwengu, kwa sababu zilizoelezwa hapo awali, tutaona kwamba kuna mapendekezo mengi ya wanaoamini kwamba Mungu hayupo yanayolenga kueleza umahiri huu. Mapendekezo haya mbadala yanawakilisha pingamizi muhimu zaidi, na baadhi yake yameelezwa hapa chini.
Objections here are based on the notion that the manifestations of mastery and immaculateness in this world do not necessarily mean that they emanated from an Omniscient, Willing, and Omnipotent Doer. These objections assert that it is possible that these manifestations came about as a result of natural and material causes instead. If we look beyond the issues of coincidence and determinism as two suitable answers to explain this phenomenon of the universe’s intricacy for the reasons outlined before, we will see there are many proposals by atheists to explain this mastery. These alternative proposals represent the most significant objections, with some of them being outlined below.
Pingamizi la kwanza: Nadharia ya mageuzi
First objection: The theory of evolution
Nadharia hii inatawala biolojia. Kwa kweli, ushawishi wake unafika katika matawi mengi ya itikadi na ya utambuzi. Akionyesha asili ya utambulisho wa kitamaduni wa Magharibi wa leo, Dkt. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Masīrī alisema kuwa ni 'usasa wa Kidarwin'. Uwakilishi bora wa mageuzi unaopinga wazo la muundo wa busara uliojengwa ndani ya viumbe hai ni nadharia iliyotolewa na Richard Dawkins katika kitabu chake Climbing Mount Improbable. Nadharia hiyo inaeleza hivi: Fikiria tuko kwenye mlima mrefu. Upande mmoja una mteremko mkali sana na hauwezi kupitika. Upande wa pili una mteremko mkali kiasi lakini si kiasi cha kuwakatisha watu tamaa ya kutembea kupanda hadi kileleni. Kwa hiyo tunaweza kujaribu kufika kileleni kutoka upande wenye mteremko mkali sana ingawa ni mfupi, au tunaweza kupanda kutoka upande mwingine kwa urahisi zaidi. Hata hivyo, tungelazimika kuchukua njia ndefu zaidi kufika kileleni. Katika mfano huu, tuchukulie kwamba mifumo tata ya kibaiolojia ndiyo kileleni. Uwezekano wa kufikia mifumo hii kwa njia fupi ni mgumu sana, kwa sababu kujiunda kwa taratibu kwa mifumo kama hiyo kungekuwa hakuwezekani. Hata hivyo, mifumo hii inaweza kujiunda yenyewe kupitia uteuzi wa asili kwa kuhifadhi zile sifa zitakazohakikisha kuishi kwake na kuiwezesha kubadilika hadi hatua inayofuata, na vivyo hivyo kwa hatua zijazo, hatua kwa hatua, hadi tufike kileleni.
This theory dominates biology. In fact, its influence stretches to multiple ideological and cognitive branches. Highlighting the nature of the contemporary Western cultural identity, Dr. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Masīrī stated it is ‘Darwinist modernism’. The best representation of evolution that opposes the idea of intelligent design built into living beings is the thesis offered by Richard Dawkins in his book Climbing Mount Improbable. The thesis goes like this: Imagine we are on a high mountain. One side is extremely steep and cannot be negotiated. The other side is somewhat steep but not enough to put people off from walking up to ascend to the summit. We can therefore try to reach the summit from the extremely steep side even though it is shorter, or we can ascend from the other side in easier fashion. However, we would need to take the longer route to reach the summit. In this example, let us assume that the complex biological systems are the summit – the possibility of reaching these systems from the short way is very hard, because any gradual self-composition of such systems would be impossible. However, these systems can self-compose through natural selection by way of retaining those characteristics that will ensure their survival and allow them to evolve to the next phase, and likewise for future steps – step by step – until we reach the summit.
Nilikumbuka nikijadili jambo hili mara moja na baadhi ya vijana waliokuwa wameathiriwa na itikadi ya kutoamini kuwepo kwa Mungu. Mmoja wao alitoa pingamizi ambalo lilichochewa waziwazi na hoja iliyotangulia. Baada ya mjadala mrefu, alikubali kwamba bahati nasibu haifai kuwa maelezo ya udhihirisho wa ugumu, mpangilio na umahiri katika uwepo wetu. Aliniambia: "Ugumu tunaouona leo katika ulimwengu na viumbe hai haungeweza kweli kuja kuwepo kwa ghafla tu kwa sababu ya bahati nasibu. Lakini vipi kama yote haya mwanzoni yalikuwa rahisi, kisha kwa kupita kwa wakati yakabadilika hadi kuwa michanganyiko changamano tunayoiona sasa? Ingekuwa haiwezekani kwa mwanadamu, kwa mfano, kuibuka ghafla kutoka majini kwa sababu ya athari za kikemikali zisizo na mpangilio; lakini seli iliyoibuka kwa bahati ingekuwa ya kuaminika zaidi, ambayo kisha ikaanza kubadilika polepole hadi viumbe hai mbalimbali – ikiwemo mwanadamu – vikaibuka."
Bila kujadili maelezo ya kama kulikuwa na seli rahisi hapo awali, jinsi ilivyokuwa inawezekana kwa uwepo kutokea kwa bahati, au kama ilikuwa mwanzo wa uhai wote, wazo la msingi la mageuzi ni wazi sana. "Wazo Hatari" (kama alivyolieleza Daniel Dennett katika kichwa cha kitabu chake) la nadharia ya Charles Darwin ni kwamba mifumo changamano inaweza kujitokeza polepole kwa kipindi kirefu cha wakati – si lazima ije kuwepo kwa ghafla moja.
Pingamizi la pili: Nadharia ya ulimwengu-nyingi
Second objection: The multiverse theory
Pingamizi hili linatokana na dhana kwamba ulimwengu wetu si ulimwengu pekee uliopo, bali kuna idadi isiyo na mwisho au isiyoweza kupimwa ya ulimwengu. Idadi hii kubwa ya ulimwengu ingeeleza jinsi ulimwengu wetu ulivyo sahihi na umepangwa vizuri, bila haja ya kudhani kwamba kulikuwepo mtendaji mwenye hiari aliyeuumba ulimwengu wetu. Kwa maneno mengine, miongoni mwa idadi kubwa mno ya ulimwengu, lazima kuwepo na mmoja uliowekwa kikamilifu kwa ajili yetu.
Ni kama bahati nasibu: nafasi ya mtu mmoja kushinda zawadi ya mabilioni ni ndogo sana; lakini nafasi ya angalau mtu mmoja kushinda ni kubwa. Ili kufafanua mtazamo wao zaidi, wanatoa mfano huu: Fikiria mtu mmoja alipelekwa kunyongwa. Alipofikishwa kwenye kitanzi, kabla macho yake hayajafungwa, aliona mbele yake wapiga risasi mahiri mia moja, wote wakiwa wameelekeza bunduki zao kwake. Akafumba macho, kisha akasikia sauti ya risasi zikifyatuliwa. Alishika pumzi akidhani anakaribia kufa, lakini hakuhisi chochote. Alijichunguza mwili wake na kugundua kwamba hakuna risasi hata moja iliyompata. Je, inawezekana hili lilitokea kwa bahati tu? Kumbuka kwamba wapiga risasi walikuwa mahiri, na haiwezekani sana kwamba wote wangekosa. Akaanza kufikiri: 'Labda walipanga kutokumuua, au labda kuna mtu aliwahonga wote wakose, au labda kuna sababu nyingine.' Kisha kitambaa cha macho kikaondolewa. Ikaonekana kwamba alikuwa miongoni mwa watu wengine mia moja, na idadi ya watu waliopaswa kunyongwa ilikuwa 101. Kwa hakika, katika kisa hiki, mmoja angebaki hai.
Hii ndiyo namna ya kuona iliyopendekezwa na Stephen Hawking katika kitabu chake *The Grand Design*, alichoandika pamoja na Leonard Mlodinow. Kinasema: 'Marekebisho madogo madogo katika sheria za maumbile yanaweza kueleweka kwa kuwepo kwa ulimwengu nyingi. Watu wengi katika zama zote wamemhusisha Mungu uzuri na utata wa maumbile ambayo katika zama zao yalionekana kutokuwa na maelezo ya kisayansi. Lakini kama vile Darwin na Wallace walivyoeleza jinsi muundo unaoonekana kama wa kimiujiza wa viumbe hai ungeweza kutokea bila uingiliaji wa kiumbe mkuu, dhana ya multiverse inaweza kueleza urekebishaji mzuri wa sheria za kimaumbile bila haja ya Muumba mwenye wema aliyeuumba ulimwengu kwa manufaa yetu.’333 Pia ndiyo wazo kuu ambalo Dawkins alilitegemea katika kitabu chake The God Delusion alipojibu hoja ya wanaoamini Mungu kutokana na urekebishaji mzuri (fine-tuning).
This objection is based on the notion that our universe is not the only universe in existence, but there are rather an infinite or an immeasurable number of universes. This large number of universes would explain how our universe is precise and finely turned, without the need to assume there was a willing doer who created our universe. In other words, within the gargantuan number of universes, there is bound to be one which is conditioned perfectly for us. It is like the lottery: The chances of a person winning the billionaire prize is extremely low; however, the chance of at least one person winning is high. To clarify their view further, they offer this example: Imagine a man was presented for execution. When he was brought to the gallows, and before his eyes closed, he saw a hundred expert snipers in front of him, all of whom had trained their rifles on him. He shut his eyes, and then heard the sound of fire as the rifles were shot. He held his breath as he thought he was about to die, but he felt nothing. He felt his body and noticed he had not been impacted by even one bullet. Is it possible that this could have occurred by accident? Note that the snipers were experts, and it is highly unlikely they could have all missed. He started to think: ‘Perhaps they conspired not to kill me, or perhaps someone bribed them all to miss, or perhaps there was some other reason.’ The blindfold was removed from him. It turned out he was among a hundred other people, and the number of people to be executed were 101. Of course, in this case, one would still be alive. This is the view Stephen Hawking proposed in his book The Grand Design, which he co-authored with Leonard Mlodinow. It reads: ‘The fine-tunings in the laws of nature can be explained by the existence of multiple universes. Many people through the ages have attributed to God the beauty and complexity of nature that in their time seemed to have no scientific explanation. But just as Darwin and Wallace explained how the apparently miraculous design of living forms could appear without intervention by a supreme being, the multiverse concept can explain the fine-tuning of physical law without the need for a benevolent creator who made the universe for our benefit.’333 It is also the central idea that Dawkins relied upon in his book The God Delusion as he responded to the theists’ argument from fine-tuning.
Pingamizi la tatu: Utengenezaji wa ustadi wa binadamu ni tendo lake; si sahihi kulinganisha ustadi uliomo katika maumbile na ustadi unaotengenezwa na binadamu.
Third objection: Man’s masterful making is his deed; it is improper to consider mastery in nature analogous to man-made mastery
Hoja hii inategemea kulinganisha dalili za umahiri na kuthibitisha kwamba zinaashiria kuwa ni kazi ya Mtendaji Mjuzi wa yote na Mwenye Kupenda, kwa kulinganishwa na vitendo vya binadamu. Kama waumini, tunapoona kitu katika maumbile kilichotengenezwa kwa umahiri, mara moja hujitokeza akilini mwetu kwamba hiki ni kitendo cha mtendaji. Ikiwa hatuwezi kuhusisha utengenezaji huu na binadamu, tunahusisha moja kwa moja na mtendaji mwingine. Hoja hii inasema kwamba mlinganisho huu si sahihi. Kuona kwetu kazi ya umahiri ya binadamu ndiko kunakotuongoza kuamini kwamba utengenezaji wake unamhusu yeye. Kuhusu maumbile na ulimwengu, hatujaona jinsi yalivyoumbwa, wala hatukuona jinsi dalili za umahiri zilivyojitokeza ndani yake. Kwa hiyo, hatuwezi kutoa hukumu juu ya jambo ambalo hatukuwepo kushuhudia.
This objection is based on analogising the manifestations of mastery proving they constitute the doing of an Omniscient and Willing Doer to that of man’s deeds. As theists, when we see something in nature that is masterfully made, it would automatically come into our minds that this was the making of a doer. If we are unable to ascribe this making to a human, we would automatically ascribe it to some other doer. This objection states that this analogy is incorrect. Our observation of man’s masterful work is what suggests to us that his making is to be ascribed to him. As for nature and the universe, we have not seen how they were made, nor did we see how the manifestations of mastery took shape therein. Therefore, we cannot pass judgement on what we were not there to witness.
Although this objection is relatively ancient, the one who systematised it was David Hume, through his characteristic scepticism regarding the principle of causality. This scepticism has been absorbed by atheist thought to a large degree, giving rise to a multitude of problems. Hume commented extensively on this objection, especially in his book Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. The presence of this objection among atheists has become increasingly conspicuous, especially when they debate proponents of intelligent design or creationists. They claim that masterful construction in itself does not necessarily mean that a deliberate maker exists. This illusion that we sense in ourselves comes from observing the masterful works of man, so it appeared to our minds that the will of a doer is the cause of mastery. This is a non sequitur. This is why one line of objection to Paley's famous watchmaker argument holds that it is improper to analogise mastery in the universe to mastery in a watch. Although the construction of a watch comes from a willing maker, this does not have to be the case for the universe. The most that can be said is that some manifestations of mastery can be ascribed to a doer, on the condition that this rests on observation and induction. Our judgement that watches have a maker is based on seeing the first watch being made, the second watch being made, and so on. As for the universe, we cannot see or comprehend that it has a maker, let alone comprehend that the maker may have made a second or third universe. Therefore, it is not proper to jump to this kind of conclusion, namely that the universe has a maker, based merely on the fact that both the universe and watches are masterfully constructed. This objection surfaced during the debate between Dr. ʿAmr Sharīf and Bassām al-Baghdādī on the Misr 25 satellite channel, moderated by Eng. Fāḍil Sulaymān over three episodes. Eng. Fāḍil alichukua glasi mkononi mwake na kumwuliza Bassām, "Kuna glasi hii mbele yako. Je, kuwepo kwake si ushahidi wa kuwepo kwa mtengenezaji aliyeitengeneza glasi hii?"
Bassām: "Sisi tunajua kwamba kikombe hiki kipo, na tunajua kiwanda kilichokitengeneza. Je, umeona kilichoumba ulimwengu tulio ndani yake? Je, umeona ulimwengu mwingine ili uulinganishe na huu?"
Pingamizi kwa hitimisho: ‘Mungu ndiye Aliyeuumba ulimwengu kwa namna hii imara na ya kiufundi’
Objections to the conclusion: ‘God is the One Who created the world in this solid and masterful manner’
Pingamizi la kwanza: Nani aliweka viwango?
First objection: Who set the standards?
Mtu ninayemsikia zaidi akirudia pingamizi hili ni Richard Dawkins. Pingamizi hili ndilo hoja kuu katika kitabu chake The God Delusion. Kwa ufupi, pingamizi hili linasema kwamba ikiwa Mungu ndiye Aliyeweka viwango vya ulimwengu, basi ni nani aliyeweka viwango hivyo mwanzoni? Kwa maneno mengine, ikiwa Mungu aliumba ulimwengu kwa ukamilifu alioufanya, basi ni nani aliyemuumba Mungu? Kiini chake, pingamizi hili limejengwa juu ya swali maarufu la wanaoamini kutokuwepo kwa Mungu – 'Ni nani aliyemuumba Mungu?' Tumelijadili kwa kina katika sehemu ya hoja ya uumbaji inayothibitisha kuwepo kwa Allah. Ndani yake mna majibu ya vipengele vingi vya pingamizi hili. Asili ya pingamizi hili analolitoa Dawkins ni, kwa kweli, toleo lililobadilika la pingamizi alilolitumia mahali pengine, lile la hoja ya mpangilio wa kimfumo wa ulimwengu na muundo wake wa kibingwa. Ikiwa swali la 'Ni nani aliyemuumba Mungu?' ni pingamizi kuu kwa hoja ya uumbaji, basi pingamizi kuu kwa hoja ya mpangilio wa kimfumo wa ulimwengu na uumbaji wake wa kibingwa ni 'Ni nani aliyeweka sawa Mtengenezaji wa mpangilio?' na 'Ni nani aliyebuni Mbuni?' Mabadiliko haya ya hoja yanaongeza pingamizi la ziada juu ya swali la 'Ni nani aliyemuumba Mungu?', kama Richard Dawkins anavyosema: 'Mungu, au wakala yeyote mwenye akili, anayefanya maamuzi na kuhesabu, angelazimika kuwa wa uwezekano mdogo sana kwa maana ile ile ya kitakwimu kama vitu anavyodaiwa kuvielezea.' Hoja anayotaka kuitoa kupitia pingamizi hili ni kwamba, ikiwa tunataka maelezo ya muundo na ugumu uliopo katika uumbaji wa kibingwa wa Allah, basi Allah Mwenyewe ni changamano zaidi na mgumu zaidi kuliko ulimwengu; kwa hiyo tunaongeza ugumu zaidi tu kwa kudhani kwamba Allah yupo kama suluhisho la tatizo lililo rahisi zaidi kuliko pendekezo kwamba Yeye yupo. Dawkins aliingia katika makosa kadhaa hatari.
The person I have heard repeating this objection the most is Richard Dawkins. This objection forms the central argument in his book The God Delusion. In brief, this objection states that if God is the One Who set the standards of the universe, then who set those standards in the first place? In other words, if God created the universe in the consummate manner that He did, then who created God? At its core, this objection is based on the famous atheist question – ‘Who created God?’ We have discussed it in detail, in the section of the argument from creation that denotes the existence of Allah . It contains answers to many elements of this objection. The nature of this objection that Dawkins raises is in fact an evolved version of the objection that he adopted elsewhere, which was his objection to the argument from the systematic nature of the universe and its masterful construct. If the question ‘Who created God?’ is a central objection to the argument from creation, then a central objection to the argument from the systematic nature of the universe and its masterful making is ‘Who tuned the Tuner?’ and ‘Who designed the Designer?’ This evolution in the argument carries an additional objection on top of the ‘Who created God?’ question, as Richard Dawkins puts it: ‘God, or any intelligent, decision-taking, calculating agent, would have to be highly improbable in the very same statistical sense as the entities he is supposed to explain.’360 The point he wants to make from this objection is that if we want an explanation for the composition and complexity that is present in the masterful construct of Allah, then Allah Himself is far more composite and more complicated than the universe; therefore, we are only adding further complexity by assuming that Allah exists as a solution to the problem that is less complicated than the proposal that He exists. Dawkins landed himself into a number of dangerous errors:
Pingamizi la pili: Mpangilio wa kimfumo wa ulimwengu na uumbaji wake wa kiustadi, kama ushahidi wa uwepo wa Mungu, hauthibitishi kwamba Muumbaji huyo ndiye hasa Mungu.
Second objection: The systematic nature of the universe and its masterful making, as proof for theism, does not determine that the Creator is actually God
Kwa kifupi, mawazo yaliyo nyuma ya pingamizi hili ni haya: ‘Tukidhani, kwa hoja tu, kwamba ushahidi kweli unaashiria kuwepo kwa mtendaji mwenye mapenzi aliyeumba dunia kwa ustadi tunaouona, ni nani aliyekuambia kwamba huyo ni Mungu?’ Pingamizi hili lilivunjwa tulipojadili hoja ya uumbaji. Hoja halisi ya mzozo na wasioamini Mungu ni kama ulimwengu uliumbwa na mtendaji mwenye mapenzi au la. Iwapo itathibitishwa kwamba kiumbe huyu yupo, inaweza kudhaniwa kwa usalama kwamba ni Allah, na kwamba hoja ya mpangilio wa kimfumo wa ulimwengu inaashiria baadhi ya sifa za Allah {SWT}. Kwa kweli, ushahidi wa hili ni wazi sana, kwani unatuongoza kwenye ukweli kwamba mtendaji huyu mwenye mapenzi ana sifa za mapenzi, uwezo, elimu, hekima, uhai, rehema, na sifa nyingine zinazohusishwa kwa kawaida na Allah {SWT}. Ninahitimisha hoja hii kwa kufafanua asili ya mantiki ya wasioamini Mungu wanapojadili masuala ya aina hii, kwa kueleza kwamba mantiki yao imejengwa kwa namna tata inayowazuia kamwe kuzingatia hoja yoyote inayounga mkono kuwepo kwa Allah {SWT}. Mmoja wa wasioamini Mungu wa Kiarabu alisema kwamba hata kama angemwona Mungu na kumkubali, hilo bado lisingethibitisha kwamba Yeye ndiye Muumba wa ulimwengu; hata kama Angeumba kitu mbele yetu, ‘hilo bado lisingekuwa ushahidi kwamba Yeye ameniumba mimi’. Huo ndio ukaidi unaoonyesha pengo kati yetu na wao, pengo ambalo karibu haliwezekani kuzibwa tunapojadili mada hii na watu wa aina hii. Baada ya yote, uongofu u mikononi mwa Allah {SWT} – Humwongoza amtakaye na Humpoteza amtakaye.
In brief, the thought process behind this objection is this: ‘Assuming, arguendo, that the proof does indeed point to the existence of a willing doer that made the world in the masterful manner that we see, who told you that it is God?’ This objection was dismantled when we discussed the argument from creation. The actual point of contention with atheists is whether the universe was created by a willing doer or not. If it is affirmed that this entity exists, it would be possible to safely assume that it is Allah, and that the argument from the systematic nature of the universe is indicative of some of Allah’s attributes. In fact, the evidence for this is extremely clear, for it guides us to the fact that this willing doer has the characteristics of will, power, knowledge, wisdom, life, mercy, and other attributes that are typically associated with Allah. I conclude this point by clarifying the nature of atheist logic when dealing with these types of issues by pointing out that they are composed in such a complex manner that disallows atheists from ever considering any argument in support of the existence of Allah. One Arab atheist states that had he even seen God and embraced Him, that would still not prove that He is the Creator of the universe; were He to create something in front of us, ‘that would still not be proof that He created me’. That is the type of stubbornness that reveals the chasm between us and them, which is virtually impossible to be bridged when discussing this topic with these types of people. After all, guidance is in the Hand of Allah – He guides whom He wishes and He leads astray whom He wishes.
252 Dokezo la mtafsiri: Hoja hii inaungwa mkono zaidi na wale wanaofuata mapokeo ya mwanazuoni wa karne ya 18 Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Najdī. Makundi mengine ya Waislamu yanapinga vikali wazo kwamba washirikina wa Makka walikubali utawala wa Mwenyezi Mungu usio na mipaka.
253 Dkt. Suʿūd al-ʿArīfī alikusanya ushahidi wote huu na kuueleza jinsi unavyoonyesha hoja hii katika kazi yake muhimu al-Adillah al-ʿAqliyyah al-Naqliyyah (Hoja za Kiakili na Kinakili).
252 Translator’s note: This is an argument most commonly supported by those following the tradition of the 18th century figure Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Najdī. Other Muslim groups vehemently disagree with the notion that the Makkan polytheists acknowledged absolute lordship for Allah. 253 Dr. Suʿūd al-ʿArīfī gathered all of this evidence and detailed how they are indicative of this point in his important work al-Adillah al-ʿAqliyyah al-Naqliyyah (The Rational Proofs of Scripture).
Ibn al-Qayyim said, Allah predisposed His servants – and even animals – to take a liking to placing everything in its rightful place, to carry things out at their appropriate moment, and to acquire things in the desired manner. He also predisposed them to dislike the opposite and to go against the aforementioned methods. The first is indicative of the perfection, knowledge, power, and proficiency of the doer; its opposite is indicative of his own deficiency and the deficiency of his knowledge, power, and expertise. This is the fiṭrah that people simply cannot depart from. It is known that the one who predisposed them like this and placed this capacity in them would be worthier of these praiseworthy traits than they are. Allah places things in their rightful place. He makes them unique by assigning to them attributes, shapes, configurations, and sizes in a manner that He knows better than anyone else. He brings them out into the open – and that too at the only time suitable for them. One who possesses sound analysis and upright thought, and contemplates as one should do so, would testify to that in what he sees and knows. He would use what he witnesses in evidence for what is concealed. Everything is from the making of the Wise, the Omniscient. To demonstrate this, it suffices to know the wisdom behind creating animals, their limbs, attributes, configurations, the benefit that can be derived from them, and that they absolutely represent the wisdom that is desired in them. Allah recommended His servants to do this: “…as there are within yourselves. Can you not see?”244; and “Do they not ever reflect on camels – how they were masterfully created?...”245 In a similar fashion, if one properly contemplates and observes all of His upper and lower creations and everything in between, he will find it all to be designed and enveloped in great wisdom. He would be able to read the wisdom etched into them and proclaim: “This is the making of the Omniscient and the Wise, and it is the decree of the Almighty and the Omniscient. If minds can find anything more suitable than this, they should recommend it; if they see anything more beautiful than it, they should bring it forth and showcase it. That is the making of ‘the One Who created seven heavens, one above the other. You will never see any imperfection in the creation of the Most Compassionate. So look again: do you see any flaws?’”246 One who observes this world and contemplates it as it rightly should would know that its Creator masterfully designed it and fortified it. When he ponders over it, he would find it to be like a house in which all its installations are prepared. The sky is raised like a roof, the Earth is stretched out like a carpet, the stars are clustered like lamps, and welfare is stored therein like treasures. Everything in it is designed for something it is suited for. Man is like the owner who was made entitled to it. The various types of flora have been prepared for his purposes. Different animals are utilised to his advantage. Some of them are only for milking, siring, and nourishment; some are only for riding and transportation; others are for beauty and adornment; and others are for all of these, such as camels – their stomachs are storage containers for drink, food, medicine, and cure. There is a lesson in them for those who want to observe and signs for those who are discerning. And within the avian species – with all of its variety, shapes, colours, population numbers, the advantages they afford, their songs, with their wings outspread and folded in, and with their migration and settlement patterns – there is a great lesson and clear indicator to the wisdom of the Creator, the Omniscient.’247
Ibn Rushd excellently phrased this argument. He said, As for the method the religion pursued in edifying the masses on the world being from the making of Allah , note that when the verses carrying this meaning are contemplated, this method can be found to be one of providence. It is one way that we have stated is indicative of the existence of the Creator . Furthermore, when a man looks at a perceptible item and finds it to be fashioned into a specific shape, size, and configuration, and that all of these are aligned to the benefit and end goal one would expect from it (such that he would have to admit that this benefit would not have been found if it was fashioned into any other shape, configuration, or quantity), he would be convinced that this thing has a maker who made it. This is why its shape, configuration, and size are aligned to its benefit. It is also why it would not be possible for all these things to have just coincidentally converged for that benefit. For example, when a person sees a stone on the ground, and he finds it to be shaped in a way that makes it fit to be sat on, and he likewise finds its configuration and size to be as such, he would know that this stone was fashioned into a chair by a maker who configured and shaped it in that place. As for when he does not see this sort of arrangement for sitting, he would be certain that the stone’s appearance in this place and manner was coincidental, without any person having placed it there. The same is applicable to the entire world. Man can look therein and see the Sun, the Moon, and the stars – which are the cause of the four seasons, night and day, rain, water, wind, sections on Earth becoming inhabited with people and terrestrial animals being found therein – and that water is acclimatised for aquatic creatures, and the air made suitable for flying creatures. He can see that if any of these forms and structures are disturbed, the creations present here would all be disrupted. He would therefore be certain that it would not be possible that all segments of the world just coincidentally converged for the sake of man, animal, and flora; rather, that was by the design of someone who willed this. That would be Allah . Man would also know with all conviction that the world was constructed, because he would instinctively know that it is impossible to find such convergence out of sheer coincidence without any maker. This type of evidence is decisive and simple, as is obvious from what we have written here. Its basis lies on two principles that everybody acknowledges. One is that the world, along with all its constituent parts, is aligned to the existence of man and all animals that live here. The second is that anything – along with all its constituent parts – that is aligned to a single act and a singular goal must be considered made. These two principles obviously result in this: The world is made, and it has a maker. The argument from providence denotes both of these points simultaneously. This is why it is the most esteemed of arguments for the existence of the Maker.’248
Kwa hiyo, mojawapo ya mambo yaliyothibitishwa wazi katika Wahyi ni kuhusu kusherehekea ibada. Hili linafikiwa kwa kutafakari viumbe vya Allah, ambapo mtu hutumia kuviangalia kwake ili kuamini Allah na sifa Zake kamilifu, na kwa matokeo yake, kuelewa kwamba Yeye ndiye peke yake anayestahili kutumikiwa na kuabudiwa.
Thus, one of the decisively established points in revelation is about celebrating the act of worship. This is achieved by reflecting on Allah’s creations, where one utilises the observation of them to believe in Allah and His perfect attributes, and – as a result – to understand His worthiness of being the only worthy being for our servitude and worship.
Kwa maendeleo ya elimu ya kisayansi, udhihirisho zaidi wa ukuu, utukufu na umahiri katika uumbaji wa Allah (SWT) umefunuka kwetu. Jambo hili limewastaajabisha akili nyingi. Tafiti nyingi za kisayansi za leo zimetupatia zana za elimu zilizo za kisasa sana, zikisisitiza maana ile ile tunayoweza kuifahamu tunapotazama udhihirisho wa muundo kamilifu katika ulimwengu – lakini kwa njia ya kina na yenye maelezo zaidi.
With the advancement in scientific knowledge, further manifestations of greatness, grandeur, and mastery in the creation of Allah have opened up for us. This has left many minds astounded. Many contemporary scientific studies today have presented highly sophisticated tools of knowledge to us, underscoring the same meaning that we can ascertain when observing the manifestations of consummate construct in the universe – only in a more detailed and in-depth manner.
Ili tuwe sahihi, kile sayansi inachoweza kutoa katika uwanja huu ni ushahidi wa mapendekezo ambayo juu yake kuwepo kwa Allah kunaweza kujadiliwa kwa mantiki. Sayansi ya asili, kwa mujibu wa ufafanuzi wake wa sasa na uwanja inamofanyia kazi, haiwezi kutoa ushahidi wa moja kwa moja katika suala hili, kwa sababu inatafuta kubainisha sababu za kimaada na za kiasili za matukio yanayoonekana. Hata hivyo, inachoweza kutoa ni utangulizi ambao juu yake ushahidi unaotakiwa unaweza kujengwa. Hili linafichua mojawapo ya maeneo yenye matatizo katika majadiliano mengi ya wanaoamini kuwa hakuna Mungu, hasa yale yanayoifanya sayansi kuwa chanzo pekee cha maarifa, na hivyo kufunga njia ya kuthibitisha ushahidi wa kuwepo kwa Allah. Hii ni kwa sababu ingemaanisha kwamba vyanzo vya maarifa vimewekewa mipaka ya njia za kimaada pekee. Ni kama kujenga gereza ambalo mtu hawezi kutoka humo. Mtu anaweza kupata maarifa ya sababu, na sababu za sababu hizo, tu kutoka ndani ya gereza hili la kimaada, hata kama ushahidi wote unaonyesha kwamba jibu liko nje ya kuta hizo. Kwa mantiki hiyo hiyo, juhudi za wanaoamini kuwa hakuna Mungu za kuonyesha kutokuwepo kwa Allah pia zinatoka nje ya mfumo huu wa kimaada, kwa kuwa ni muhtasari wa kifalsafa unaotegemea maarifa hayo. Ndiyo maana ni muhimu kuangazia mchanganyiko unaotokea mara nyingi kati ya maarifa ya kisayansi yanayojulikana kuwa sahihi kwa upande mmoja, na nadharia za kifalsafa zinazojengwa juu ya sayansi kwa upande mwingine. Nadharia hizi, baada ya kuchujwa na kuchambuliwa, zinaweza hatimaye kuthibitika kuwa sahihi, ingawa zinaweza pia kuthibitika kuwa si sahihi.
So that we are precise, what science can offer in this field is evidence for the propositions upon which the existence of Allah can be rationally negotiated. Natural science, as per its current definition and the field in which it operates – cannot offer any direct evidence in this issue, because it seeks to reveal the material and natural causes to observable events. However, what it can provide are preludes upon which the desired evidence can be based. This uncovers what is one of the problematic areas in many atheist discourses, especially those that make science out to be the sole source of knowledge, thus shutting down the path of demonstrating evidence for Allah’s existence. This is because this would mean the sources of knowledge are restricted to material means alone. It casts a prison from which one cannot escape. A person may only be able to source knowledge of causes – and their causes – from inside this material prison, even if all the evidence suggests that the solution lies outside these prison walls. By the same logic, the efforts of atheists to demonstrate the non-existence of Allah are also from outside this material framework, as they are merely philosophical summaries based on that knowledge. This is why it is important to highlight the conflation that oftentimes occurs between scientific knowledge that is known to be correct on the one hand, and the philosophical theories that are based on science on the other. These theories, after distillation and analysis, might turn out to be correct after all, though they might be proven false as well.
The key premise is that when the universe is contemplated, we can see that there are standardised and extremely finely-tuned laws and constants in place for life to exist; in fact, some of these laws are so finely balanced that the existence of the entire universe rests upon it, and that any imbalance in any of these constants would lead to ultimate destruction. The level of mastery present in the making of the universe is not restricted only to biological living beings or this astonishing planet in which we live. This mastery extends to the laws and constants that govern this universe. These constants are a set of numerical data that have been very carefully selected, such that if they would have fallen either side of those numbers to even a small extent, the entire system of life – and in fact the entire universe itself – would disappear. The very existence of the universe is linked to these crucial numbers. Stephen C. Meyer, founder and director of the Discovery Institute, clarifies this with an example: ‘Imagine that you are a cosmic explorer who has just stumbled into the control room of the whole universe. There you discover an elaborate “universe-creating machine”, with rows and rows of dials, each with many possible settings. As you investigate, you learn that each dial represents some particular parameter that has to be calibrated with a precise value in order to create a universe in which life can exist. One dial represents the possible settings for the strong nuclear force, one for the gravitational constant, one for Planck’s constant, one for the ratio of the neutron mass to the proton mass, one for the strength of electromagnetic attraction, and so on. As you, the cosmic explorer, examine the dials, you find that they could easily have been tuned to different settings. Moreover, you determine by careful calculation that if any of the dial settings were even slightly altered, life would cease to exist. Yet for some reason each dial is set at just the exact value necessary to keep the universe running. What do you infer about the origin of these finely-tuned dial settings?’257
Hitimisho la kimantiki, ambalo tutalifikia baadaye, ni kwamba kuna kitu kilichopanga vipimo hivi ili konstanti hizo zipate na kubaki na thamani zao mahususi, ambazo ni muhimu kwa kuwepo kwa uhai na ulimwengu.
The logical conclusion, which we shall come onto, is that there is something that calibrated these dials so that those constants could gain and retain the values that are distinct to them and necessary for the existence of life and the universe.
Kuna mifano kadhaa katika ulimwengu inayoonyesha upangaji mzuri wa hali (fine-tuning). Tunaweza kutaja machache kama mifano.
There are a number of examples showcased in the universe that demonstrate fine-tuning. We can mention a few as examples.
,000,000,000) probabilities, and you are required to get the tuning right from this pile of probabilities. Another example is this: You grab a measuring tool like a ruler and measure the universe from one side to the other, then you measure up the gravitational force of the Earth and place that value on that ruler – if you erred by even one inch, it would spark a cataclysm. Surely it would be more rational to believe, given that this finely-tuned number is in play, that this was a result of knowledge, and that it could not have been by sheer coincidence.
Martin Rees, mwanafizikia maarufu wa Uingereza na mwandishi wa kitabu *Just Six Numbers*, anafafanua kwamba kama mvuto wa ulimwengu ungekuwa na nguvu kidogo zaidi kuliko ulivyo, nyota zingeteketea haraka na nishati yake ingeisha kwa kasi, na hivyo kusababisha vifo vyake kabla ya wakati. Kwa mfano, endapo mvuto wa Jua ungeongezeka mara mbili, umri wake unaowezekana ungepungua kutoka miaka bilioni 10 hadi miaka milioni 100 tu.259 Zaidi ya hayo, mvuto huu ungefanya sayari zinazozunguka Jua ziwe ndogo sana. Kuhusu viumbe hai wanaoendelea kuishi kwenye sayari hizo dhaifu zenye uhai, mvuto ungewaponda iwapo ukubwa wao ungeongezeka hata kwa kiasi cha mdudu, jambo ambalo lingefanya uhai wowote wenye akili kuwa hauwezekani. Makala ya jarida la New Scientist inaenda mbali zaidi na kueleza kwamba ili ulimwengu uweze kusaidia uhai, kulikuwa na haja ya mizani kamili kati ya kasi ya upanuzi wa ulimwengu na mvuto, ndani ya sehemu moja katika 10¹⁵, sekunde moja tu baada ya Mlipuko Mkubwa (Big Bang). Usawa usiokuwa sahihi katika wakati huo wa mapema wa ulimwengu ungeharibu kabisa matumaini yoyote ya uhai.
Martin Rees, the famous British physicist and author of Just Six Numbers, clarifies that had gravity been slightly stronger than it is, the stars would burn out and their energy would be rapidly depleted, causing their untimely death. If, for example, the Sun’s gravity was doubled, its possible age would reduce from a possible 10 billion years to just 100 million years.259 In addition, this gravitational pull would cause the planets orbiting around it to be extremely small. As for living beings that stay alive on those fragile planets that support life, they would be crushed by gravity if their size increased even by the span of an insect, which would mean that any intelligent life would be impossible. The New Scientist magazine article goes further and mentions that for the universe to be able to support life, there must have been a balancing act between the expanding rate of the universe and the gravity to within one part in 1015, just one second after the Big Bang – any imbalance in this early moment of the universe would have spelled doom for any prospect of life.
This is the force that is responsible for the stability of matter by holding together protons and neutrons of the atomic nucleus, thereby forming atomic nuclei. All protons as we know carry a positive charge; what allows it to remain stable inside the atom nucleus – and not being expelled – is the strong nuclear force. It is like trying to force two magnets of the same pole together – doing so would lead to repulsion. However, if the power that is attempting to put them together is stronger, it would be possible to overcome repulsion. The strong nuclear force is also balanced in extremely precise fashion. Had it been weaker by 2%, hydrogen atoms would have undergone repulsion and would have never been able to bond with other chemicals, leaving the universe in a state of nothing other than hydrogen atoms roaming around. Conversely, had this force 259 Astrophysicists estimate that the Sun is 4.6 billion years old, and that it has enough hydrogen to remain alive for a further 5 billion + years. been 2% stronger, the hydrogen atoms would have bonded with each other so rapidly that they would have all become helium, which would have been the overwhelmingly predominant chemical element across the universe. There is a wonderful balance in this force: Some hydrogen atoms bond to become helium atoms, whereas the rest of the hydrogen remains to form all other chemical elements, such as bonding with oxygen to form water. It would be difficult to envisage any life without this perfect balance in this force. What has been said for the strong nuclear force is equally applicable to the weak nuclear force, as well as the electromagnetic force. Along with gravity and the strong nuclear force, they represent the four forces that regulate the universe. All four are so finely balanced that if any of them were to change even in the slightest, life would not have been able to exist. Examples that are indicative of fine-tuning are too numerous to mention. They can be studied and observed in the books that deal with this wondrous phenomenon. Some works that come to mind in this regard are Just Six Numbers by Martin Rees, Big Bang, Big God: A Universe Fit for Life? by Rodney Holder, The Science of God: The Convergence of Scientific and Biblical Wisdom by Gerald Schroeder, A Fine-Tuned Universe: The Quest for God in Science and Theology by Alister McGrath, The Goldilocks Enigma by Paul Davies, and God and Design: The Teleological Argument and Modern Science by Neil Manson. In fact, most Western writings that have researched this argument showcase a variety of examples to demonstrate the finely-tuned nature of the universe, its laws, and its constants. What is wondrous about this state of being finely-tuned is that, had some of these forces not been where they exactly are, the universe would have long ceased to exist the way we know it. Some forces are balanced in a way that allowed the development of stars, planets, and matter. Other forces are so finely balanced that they were simply put in place to welcome mankind. The lattermost point is what is known as the anthropic principle. There is a set of data related to the nature of this universe that would have made it unsuitable for life had it been any different. The British philosopher Antony Flew skilfully painted an image of this argument in his book There is a God:
Tasawwur kwamba unaingia chumba cha hoteli wakati wa likizo yako ijayo. Redio ya CD iliyo juu ya meza ya kando ya kitanda inacheza kwa sauti ya chini wimbo kutoka kwenye rekodi yako unayoipenda. Picha iliyoandikwa kwenye fremu juu ya kitanda inafanana kabisa na picha inayoning'inia juu ya mahali pa moto nyumbani kwako. Chumba kimejaa harufu ya manukato unayoyapenda. Unatikisa kichwa kwa mshangao na kuangusha mifuko yako sakafuni. Ghafla unakuwa macho sana. Unapiga hatua hadi kwenye friji ndogo ya vinywaji (minibar), unaifungua na kutazama kwa mshangao yaliyomo ndani. Vinywaji unavyovipenda. Biskuti na peremende unazozipenda. Hata chapa ya maji ya chupa unayoyapendelea.
Unageuka kutoka kwenye friji hiyo na kutazama chumba kizima. Unaona kitabu kilicho juu ya meza ya kuandikia: ni toleo la hivi karibuni la mwandishi unayempenda. Unachungulia bafuni, ambako bidhaa za usafi na urembo zimepangwa juu ya kaunta, kila moja kana kwamba ilichaguliwa mahsusi kwa ajili yako. Unawasha televisheni; imewekwa kwenye chaneli unayoipenda. Kadiri unavyogundua jambo jipya kuhusu mazingira hayo ya ukarimu, je, hungekuwa na mwelekeo mdogo wa kudhani kwamba yote hayo ni bahati tu? Huenda ukajiuliza wasimamizi wa hoteli walipata vipi taarifa za kina kukuhusu. Huenda ukastaajabia maandalizi yao makini. Huenda hata ukahakikisha tena gharama ya yote haya itakuwa kiasi gani. Lakini bila shaka ungeelekea kuamini kwamba kuna mtu alijua unakuja.260
Imagine entering a hotel room on your next vacation. The CD player on the bedside table is softly playing a track from your favorite recording. The framed print over the bed is identical to the image that hangs over the fireplace at home. The room is scented with your favorite fragrance. You shake your head in amazement and drop your bags on the floor. You’re suddenly very alert. You step over to the minibar, open the door, and stare in wonder at the contents. Your favorite beverages. Your favorite cookies and candy. Even the brand of bottled water you prefer. You turn from the minibar, then, and gaze around the room. You notice the book on the desk: it’s the latest volume by your favorite author. You glance into the bathroom, where personal care and grooming products are lined up on the counter, each one as if it was chosen specifically for you. You switch on the television; it is tuned to your favorite channel. Chances are, with each new discovery about your hospitable new environment, you would be less inclined to think it was all a mere coincidence, right? You might wonder how the hotel managers acquired such detailed information about you. You might marvel at their meticulous preparation. You might even double-check what all this is going to cost you. But you would certainly be inclined to believe that someone knew you were coming.’260
Anaongeza, Hali hiyo ya likizo ni mfano mbovu na wenye mipaka kwa ile inayoitwa hoja ya urekebishaji laini (fine-tuning). Umaarufu wa hivi karibuni wa hoja hii umeonyesha upande mpya wa sheria za maumbile. "Kadiri ninavyoichunguza ulimwengu na kusoma maelezo ya muundo wake", aandika mwanafizikia Freeman Dyson, "ndivyo ninavyopata ushahidi zaidi kwamba ulimwengu kwa namna fulani ulijua kwamba tunakuja." Kwa maneno mengine, sheria za maumbile zinaonekana kuwa zimebuniwa kwa namna ya kuusogeza ulimwengu kuelekea kuibuka na kudumu kwa uhai. Huu ndio kanuni ya kianthropiki (anthropic principle), iliyoenezwa na wanafikra kama Martin Rees, John Barrow na John Leslie.261
He adds, That vacation scenario is a clumsy, limited parallel to the so-called fine-tuning argument. The recent popularity of this argument has highlighted a new dimension of the laws of nature. “The more I examine the universe and study the details of its architecture”, writes physicist Freeman Dyson, “the more evidence I find that the universe in some sense knew we were coming.” In other words, the laws of nature seem to have been crafted so as to move the universe toward the emergence and sustenance of life. This is the anthropic principle, popularized by such thinkers as Martin Rees, John Barrow, and John Leslie.261
Ibn Rushd alipoitoa hoja ya utoaji wa Mungu (al-ʿināyah) katika kitabu chake al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij al-Adillah, alipoonyesha jinsi utunzaji anaopokea mwanadamu ulivyo.
When Ibn Rushd coined the argument from providence in his book al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij al-Adillah, he pointed out the care a man receives:
Njia ambayo Kitabu Kitukufu kilionyesha na kuwaalika wote kuingia mlangoni mwake ni hii: Utafiti kamili wa Kitabu Kikuu unapofanywa, njia hii ya hoja inaonekana kugawanyika katika aina mbili. Ya kwanza ni njia ya utunzaji wa Mungu (Providence) kuhusiana na mwanadamu na uumbaji wa vitu vyote vilivyopo kwa ajili yake. Tuiite hoja ya utunzaji wa Mungu. Njia ya pili ni muundo wa asili zilizomo ndani ya vitu vilivyopo, kama vile kuumbwa kwa uhai ndani ya kitu ambacho vinginevyo ni kisicho na uhai, na mitazamo ya hisia na akili ya mtu. Tuiite hoja ya muundo. Kuhusu njia ya kwanza, imejengwa juu ya kanuni mbili. Ya kwanza ni kwamba vitu vyote vilivyopo hapa vimepangwa kulingana na maslahi ya kuwepo kwa mwanadamu. Kanuni ya pili ni kwamba mpangilio huu unatokana kwa lazima na mtendaji mwenye hiari aliyelitaka hili, kwani haiwezekani kwamba mpangilio huu ulitokea kwa bahati. Kuhusu upangiliaji wao kulingana na maslahi ya kuwepo kwa mwanadamu, mtu anaweza kuwa na hakika kwa sababu ya jinsi usiku, mchana, Jua, na Mwezi vinavyoendana na maslahi yake; vivyo hivyo kwa upangiliaji wa majira manne ya mwaka, na mahali alipo – Dunia. Mpangilio huu pia unajumuisha wanyama wengi, mimea, vitu visivyo na uhai, na vipengele vingine vingi kama vile mvua, mito, na jumla ya Dunia, maji, moto, na upepo. Utunzaji wa Mungu pia unadhihirika katika viungo vya binadamu na wanyama, yaani, vyote vimepangwa kwa ajili ya maisha na kuwepo kwa mwanadamu. Kwa jumla, inaeleweka kwamba faida zinazotolewa na kila kitu kilichopo zinaangukia aina hii. Ndiyo maana ni wajibu kwa yule anayetaka kumfahamu Mwenyezi Mungu kikamilifu kutazama faida zinazotolewa na vitu vyote vilivyopo.262
The method the Glorious Book pointed out and invited all to its gate is this: When a comprehensive assessment of the Great Book is conducted, this method of argument can be found to be designated as two types. One is the method of providence vis-à-vis man and the creation of all things in existence for his sake. Let us name this the argument from providence. The second method is the design of the essences inside existing things, such as the fashioning of life in an otherwise inanimate object, and one’s sensory and rational perceptions. Let us name this the argument from design. As for the first method, it is based on two principles. One is that all things in existence here are aligned to the interests of the existence of man. The second principle is that this alignment is by way of necessity from a willing doer who willed this, as it is not possible that this alignment occurred by chance. As for their alignment to the interests of the existence of man, one can be certain of that thanks to how night, day, the Sun, and the Moon are in line with his interests; the same applies to the alignment of the four seasons, and the place he is in – Earth. This arrangement also includes many animals, plants, inanimate objects, and the other many elements such as the rains, the rivers, and the entire set of Earth, water, fire, and wind. Providence also manifests in the limbs of humans and animals, meaning they are all arranged for man’s life and existence. In all, it is understood that the benefits offered by everything in existence fall under this type. This is why it is incumbent upon one who wants to fully understand Allah to look at the benefits offered by all things in existence.’262
Zaidi ya mpangilio wa ulimwengu na sheria zake zote na vipimo vyake vya kudumu ambavyo Allah ameviweka humo, ni jambo la ajabu zaidi kwamba ulimwengu huu ni kitu cha kufundishwa na kufahamika. Hili si jambo dogo; lingeweza kwa urahisi kuamuliwa kuwa si hivyo. Basi, sababu ya ulimwengu kuwa si tu wenye mpangilio na kitu cha kuchunguzwa, bali pia kuweza kueleza sheria na kanuni zake kwa istilahi za hisabati kwa kiwango cha juu sana cha usahihi, ni ipi? Einstein alisema kwa kejeli, ‘Jambo lisilofahamika zaidi kuhusu dunia ni kwamba linaweza kufahamika kabisa.’ Kuwepo kwetu duniani kumewekwa mahali pasipobadilika na wakati usiobadilika. Kwa vipimo vya kiwango cha juu, sahihi, na vilivyorekebishwa kwa umakini kuhusu dunia tunavyoijua sasa, nafasi ya sisi kufafanua ulimwengu sasa imefunguka kweli. Hili lisingewezekana bila vipimo hivi vya kiglobal mbele yetu. Katika utangulizi wa kitabu The Privileged Planet: How Our Place in the Cosmos is Designed for Discovery cha Guillermo Gonzalez na Jay Richards, imeandikwa:
In addition to the organised nature of the universe and all of its laws and constants that Allah placed therein, it is even more wondrous that this universe is an object of education and understanding. This is not a light point; it could have so easily been decreed not to be so. So what was the reason for the universe being not only organised and an entity to be studied, but also able to express its laws and regulations in mathematical terms to a very high degree of precision? Einstein quipped, ‘The most incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is at all comprehensible.’ Our existence in this world is at a fixed place and a fixed moment in time. With highly specific, precise, and finely-tuned measurements about the world that we now know of, the space for us to decipher the universe has now really opened up. This would not have been possible without these cosmological measurements in front of us. In the introduction to the book The Privileged Planet: How Our Place in the Cosmos is Designed for Discovery by Guillermo Gonzalez and Jay Richards, it reads:
Ukweli kwamba anga letu ni safi; kwamba Mwezi wetu una ukubwa na umbali sahihi kutoka Dunia, na kwamba mvuto wake unaleta utulivu kwenye mzunguko wa Dunia; kwamba nafasi yetu katika galaksi yetu ni sahihi; kwamba Jua letu lina uzito na muundo wake sahihi – mambo haya yote na mengine mengi si tu ni ya lazima kwa Dunia kuweza kuishi, bali pia yamekuwa muhimu sana kwa wanasayansi kugundua na kupima ulimwengu. Binadamu wamejaaliwa kuwa katika nafasi ya pekee ya kufafanua ulimwengu. Je, tulibahatika tu katika jambo hili?263
The fact that our atmosphere is clear; that our Moon is just the right size and distance from Earth, and that its gravity stabilizes Earth’s rotation; that our position in our galaxy is just so; that our Sun is its precise mass and composition – all of these facts and many more not only are necessary for Earth’s habitability but also have been surprisingly crucial to the discovery and measurement of the universe by scientists. Mankind is unusually well positioned to decipher the cosmos. Were we merely lucky in this regard?263
Kiwango hiki cha umahiri na usahihi wa mpangilio kinaleta maswali kadhaa: Hizi konstanti, hali, na data zilipatikanaje? Je, kuna mtu au kitu kilichozikusanya zote kwa mpangilio huu sahihi? Je, ilikusudiwa kuwa hivi tangu mwanzo? Au ulimwengu ulitokea tu kwa bahati?
This degree of mastery and fine-tuning brings about a set of questions: How were these constants, states, and data points found? Is there someone or something that brought them all together in this precise fashion? Was it always meant to be this way? Or did the universe simply come about as an accident?
The determinist position claiming that these constants were bound to appear leads to the position that it would be impossible for any universe to come into existence in which there is no life, and that the existence of the universe in this narrowly suitable manner was determined and always bound to happen. This goes against reality: All the data suggest that the probability of a universe – like ours – that would support life is extremely minuscule compared to the infinite probabilities of lifeless universes. There is not even a whiff of evidence that would suggest that these constants must always come about in this manner. Indeed, some scientists speak of a theory that has not been discovered until now. It is called the ‘theory of everything’ (TOE). It attempts to offer a theory that organises the four forces of nature into one law, which will hugely simplify a lot of aspects in physics. The search for this theory had already begun with Einstein, who said, ‘What really interests me is whether God could have created the world any differently.’ Of course, his efforts in this regard did not come to any fruition. The ‘string theory’ is a continuation of the attempt to find TOE. The most famous attempt today – which is at the forefront of these discussions and is the lead theory – is what is known as the ‘M-theory’, which attempts to unify all consistent versions of string theory under one rule. Such assumptions are the go to default of some people who want to explain why the universe’s laws and constants are as they are. Victor Stenger says, ‘Many physicists expect that ultimately a theory of everything (TOE) will be discovered that will include a calculation of all its parameters. In that case, there will be nothing to fine-tune.’265
Kwa hiyo, je, kuthibitika kwa kitu kama nadharia ya M kungeongoza kwenye usahihi wa mtazamo wa kiulimwengu wa kiamuzi, na hivyo kukataa kuwepo kwa Allah? Haionekani hivyo – kwa sababu mbili.
Therefore, would the demonstrable existence of something like the M-theory lead to the accuracy of the deterministic view of the universe, leading to the denial of the existence of Allah ? It does not seem so – for two reasons.
Kwanza, tuchukulie kwamba aina hizi za viwango vya kikosmolojia vinatawaliwa na sheria ambayo, kwa mujibu wa sheria hiyo, thamani zake haziwezi kuwa tofauti na data zilizopo. Je, sheria kama hiyo yenyewe ingekuwa ya kiamuzi na inayodhaniwa kuwa hivyo tu? Au inaweza kuwa na hali na tofauti tofauti zinazozaa thamani tofauti za viwango hivyo vya kikosmolojia? Kama ndivyo, swali lingebadilika kutoka "Kwa nini viwango ni hivi?" kwenda "Miongoni mwa matoleo yote yanayowezekana, kwa nini ni toleo hili pekee la sheria kamili?" Kwa hiyo, mchakato wa kutafuta kanuni kamili na ya ulimwengu wote itakayotawala nadharia zote haungekuwa na athari tena katika mjadala wa kuwepo kwa Allah ﷻ, kwa sababu Allah Mwenyewe angekuwa ndiye mwandishi wa kanuni hii ya kwanza, na Yeye ndiye ambaye angeweka mipaka ya thamani na namba zile zilizoifanya ulimwengu kufaa kwa uhai.
Firstly, let us assume that these types of cosmological constants are governed by a law whose values – in light of that law – can only be in accordance with the existing data. Would such a law in itself be deterministic and envisaged only as such? Or would it be possible for it to assume different scenarios and variations that result in different values for the cosmological constants? If that is the case, the question would switch from one of ‘Why are the constants like this?’ to ‘Out of all the probable versions, why is it only this version of absolute law?’ Therefore, the process of seeking out an absolute and universal rule that would govern all theories would no longer have any impact in the debate over the existence of Allah , because Allah Himself would have been the author of this first rule, and He would have been the One Who delineated those values and numbers that made the universe suitable for life.
Pili, fikiria mtu ambaye alichukua msimamo mkali zaidi na kudai kwamba sheria hii inaweza tu kuwa katika umbo ilivyo, kwa maana kwamba haiwezekani kabisa kuwazia kuwa kuna matoleo mengine tofauti yake katika ulimwengu mwingine wowote unaowezekana. Ikiwa tutadhani kuwepo kwa ulimwengu mwingine, wote hao wangekuwa nakala za ulimwengu wetu, kwa sababu sheria hii kamili ingekuwa ndiyo inayotawala ulimwengu wote; kwa hiyo, sheria hii yenyewe ingekuwa ya kiamuzi (deterministic), pamoja na sheria za fizikia zinazozaliwa kutokana nayo. Hata hivyo, inaonekana kwamba chaguo hili nalo haliwezi kukubalika. Linaibua maswali zaidi ya asili ya kina sana. Kwa kweli, linategemea dhana za awali ambazo haziwezi kuthibitishwa kisayansi. Kwa uhalisia, ni dai tu la kimetafizikia linalopingana na mbinu ya sayansi-itikadi (scientism). Swali moja halali la kisayansi linaloweza kutolewa hapa – ambalo pia ni fumbo kwa yeyote anayekubali dhana hii – ni hili: Maana yake ni nini kwa sheria moja kamili (ambayo inaweza kuwa kwa njia hii tu) kuwa chanzo ambacho udhihirisho wa usahihi na urekebishaji mzuri (fine-tuning) wa ulimwengu wetu unazaliwa? Tafsiri yake ni nini kwa sheria ya kiamuzi isiyobadilika kuwa ndiyo chanzo ambacho katika mwanga wake vigezo (constants) vinavyoufanya ulimwengu kufaa kwa uhai vinaundwa? Dhana kama hii ingefanya uwepo wetu wenyewe kuwa wa kiamuzi, jambo ambalo lingeshangaza sana kwa yeyote anayekubali mtazamo huu. Peter van Inwagen anatoa mfano unaoonyesha tatizo – fumbo – linalohusiana na mtazamo huu, ambao unastahili kupitiwa upya kwa uchunguzi na uelewa wa kina zaidi: Fikiria una karatasi kubwa. Chora jedwali lenye safu mia moja na safu mia moja. Kuanzia juu, andika kila namba ya mfuatano wa π (3.14159265369…) kwa mpangilio, hadi kila kisanduku kiwe na namba ndani yake. Kisha gawia kila tarakimu rangi maalumu na upake rangi visanduku vyote vilivyo karibu na tarakimu hiyo kwa rangi hiyo hiyo. Fikiria kwamba unasimama nyuma na kutazama karatasi. Inatokea kuwa ni mchoro wa ubora wa juu, kama picha ya Mona Lisa. Je, jambo hili lisingekuwa la kushangaza na la ajabu? Hata hivyo, unakumbuka kwamba hili lilikusudiwa kuwa hivyo, yaani kwamba picha hii ingeonekana iwapo mfuatano wa π uliandikwa kwa namna hii. Licha ya hayo, je, inawezekana kukubali kwamba hili ni bahati nasibu tupu kwa njia ya uamuzi wa kisheria? Inaonekana kwamba mtazamo huu si wa kukubalika, au kwamba hii isingekuwa maelezo ya kimantiki. Katika karatasi yao ya kihistoria ya kuanzisha mawazo, ‘The anthropic principle and the structure of the physical world’, Bernard Carr na Martin Rees walisema, ‘Hata hivyo, hata kama mambo yote yanayoonekana kama bahati ya kianthropiki266 yangeweza kuelezwa kwa njia hii, bado ingekuwa jambo la ajabu kwamba mahusiano yaliyoamriwa na nadharia ya fizikia pia yalikuwa yale yanayofaa kwa uhai.’267
Secondly, imagine a man adopted a more vigorous stance and claimed that this law can only be in the manner it is, in the sense that it cannot ever be envisaged that there are other different versions of it in any other possible universe. If we assume the existence of other universes, they would all be copies of our universe, because this absolute law would be governing all universes; therefore, this law in itself would be deterministic, as well as the laws of physics that are born out of the law. However, it would appear that this choice too is unacceptable. It raises further questions of a profoundly deep nature. In fact, it is based on preconceived notions that cannot be scientifically proven. In reality, it is just a claim in metaphysics that contradicts the scientism methodology. One legitimate scientific question that may be put forward here – which is also a conundrum for someone who adopts this conceptualisation – is this: What is the meaning of a single absolute law (which can only be according to this method) being the one from which the manifestations of precision and fine-tuning in our universe are born out of? What is the interpretation of an unchangeable deterministic law being the one in whose light the constants that make the universe suitable for life are formed? Such a conceptualisation would make our very existence deterministic, which should be incredibly perplexing to anyone who adopts this view. Peter van Inwagen offers an example that reveals the problem – a mystery – associated with the view, which mandates that it be revisited for greater scrutiny and understanding: Imagine you have a large piece of paper. You draw a table with a thousand rows and a thousand columns. Starting from the top, you write every number in the π sequence (3.14159265369…) in order, until every cell has a number inside it. Then you assign a specific colour to each single digit and colour all the cells alongside that digit with the same colour. Imagine you then take a step back and look at the paper – it turns out to be a high quality drawing, something like the Mona Lisa painting. Would this not be astonishing and strange? However, you then remember that this was meant to be, i.e., that this image would appear if the π sequence was written in this manner. In spite of this, could it be possible that we accept this to be sheer coincidence by way of legal determinism? It would seem that this line of thought is not acceptable, or that this would be a rational explanation. In their classic pioneering paper, ‘The anthropic principle and the structure of the physical world’, Bernard Carr and Martin Rees said, ‘However, even if all apparently anthropic coincidences266 could be explained in this way, it would still be remarkable that the relationships dictated by physical theory happened also to be those propitious for life.’267
Baada ya kutaja mtazamo wa wale 'wanafizikia wenye msimamo mkali' wanaoamini kwamba konstanti hizi zimeamuliwa kwa namna hii, wakiwa wameshikwa na TOE, Richard Dawkins alisema: 'Wanafizikia wengine (Martin Rees mwenyewe angekuwa mfano) wanaliona hili kuwa halitoshelezi, na mimi nadhani ninakubaliana nao. Kwa kweli inawezekana kabisa kwamba kuna njia moja tu ambayo ulimwengu unaweza kuwepo. Lakini kwa nini njia hiyo moja ilipaswa kuwa maandalizi kama haya kwa mageuzi yetu hatimaye? Kwa nini ilipaswa kuwa aina ya ulimwengu ambao unaonekana karibu kana kwamba, kwa maneno ya mwanafizikia wa kinadharia Freeman Dyson, "lazima ulijua tunakuja"?'268
After mentioning the point of view of those ‘hard-nosed physicists’ who believe in the determinism of these constants in this manner gripped by TOE, Richard Dawkins said, ‘Other physicists (Martin Rees himself would be an example) find this unsatisfying, and I think I agree with them. It is indeed perfectly plausible that there is only one way for a universe to be. But why did that one way have to be such a set-up for our eventual evolution? Why did it have to be the kind of universe which seems almost as if, in the words of the theoretical physicist Freeman Dyson, it “must have known we were coming”?’268
Zaidi ya hayo, kuendelea kuamini wazo hili kunapelekea kusimamishwa kwa utafiti wa kisayansi kwa kisingizio cha 'Hivi ndivyo mambo yalivyo', hivyo kusiwe na nafasi ya kufanya uchunguzi zaidi. Kumbuka kwamba wasioamini kuwepo kwa Mungu mara nyingi huwalaumu waumini kwa kufunga milango ya maendeleo ya kisayansi269 kwa sababu wao huona kuwepo kwa Allah kuwa maelezo ya matukio ya kimaumbile. Kwa hiyo, aina hii ya wazo inadhani kwamba nasi tutafanya vivyo hivyo: kwamba tukishagundua sheria hii, tutaweza kueleza kila tukio la kimaumbile katika ulimwengu kwa kanuni moja ya kiulimwengu. Sheria yenyewe haitawahi kuchunguzwa, kwa kisingizio kwamba ni ya kiamuzi na kwamba haiwezekani kuikwepa. Hata kama mtu huyo ataona Mona Lisa kama katika mfano hapo juu, atadai kwamba kanuni kamili ya ulimwengu ndiyo hakimu, na hiyo inatosha.
Furthermore, entertaining this sort of idea leads to the shutdown of scientific research under the excuse of ‘This is just how things are’, leaving no room to conduct any further investigation. Remember that atheists frequently lament theists for closing the doors to scientific progress269 as they consider the existence of Allah to be an explanation for natural phenomena. Therefore, this sort of idea assumes we will do the same: that when we crack this law, we will be able to explain every natural phenomenon in the universe with a single universal rule. The law itself will never be subject to investigation, under the pretence that it is deterministic and is not something one can escape from. Even if he sees the Mona Lisa like in the example above, he will claim that the absolute rule of the universe is the judge, and that is enough.
Tambua kwamba jambo zima hapa linategemea tatizo lililoshughulikiwa hapo awali. Tulithibitisha kwamba wasioamini Mungu kwa kweli wana imani katika wakati ujao usioonekana ambao sayansi itaufichua baadaye. Tulilitaja hili kuwa ‘elimu ya mapengo’ au ‘kutokuamini Mungu kwa mapengo’. Msimamo huu wao ni mtazamo wa kimawazo usio na matumaini.
Note that the entire issue here is based on the problem that was dealt with earlier on. We proved that atheists do indeed have faith in an unseen future that science shall later on reveal. We referred to this as the ‘knowledge of the gaps’ or the ‘atheism of the gaps’. This position of theirs is a hopelessly idealistic viewpoint.
Kulikuwa na mjadala mrefu kati ya Richard Dawkins na mwanafizikia mshindi wa Tuzo ya Nobel na mwanaatheisti Steven Weinberg. Dawkins alijadili majibu yake kwa hoja ya urekebishaji laini (fine-tuning), na kwamba hoja hiyo inaweza kujibiwa kwa mojawapo ya njia tatu: 1) Mungu ndiye aliyeweka vigezo hivi kwa namna hii – pendekezo ambalo yeye alilikataa wazi; 2) kutumia nadharia ya ulimwengu-nyingi (multiverse) kueleza jambo hili; na 3) kile alichomhusisha nacho Weinberg, kwamba hatuna taarifa za kutosha kutoa jibu kwa hili, na kwamba tunapaswa kusubiri ugunduzi wa baadaye utakaotuwezesha kufikia TOE, ambayo hatimaye itafichua jibu. Kwa kuzingatia mjadala huo, Dawkins alikiri kwamba alikuwa ameelewa vibaya msimamo wa Weinberg. Weinberg alisema: ‘Lakini sidhani kama mtu anapaswa kudharau hali yetu ngumu, kwamba mwishowe hatutaweza kueleza ulimwengu, kwamba tutakuwa na seti fulani ya sheria za maumbile ambazo hatutaweza kuzipata kwa msingi wa upatanifu wa kihisabati pekee, kwa sababu tayari tunaweza kufikiria sheria zenye upatanifu wa kihisabati ambazo hazielezi ulimwengu kama tunavyoujua, na daima tutabaki na swali la kwa nini sheria za maumbile ni kama zilivyo badala ya sheria nyingine yoyote, na sioni njia yoyote ya kutoka katika hilo.’270
There was a lengthy discussion between Richard Dawkins and the atheist Nobel laureate physicist Steven Weinberg. Dawkins discussed his answers to the argument from fine-tuning, and that it can be answered in one of three ways: 1) God is the one who set up these constants in this way – a proposal he obviously rejected; 2) leveraging the theory of the multiverse to explain this phenomenon; and 3) what he ascribed to Weinberg, that we do not have enough information to offer an answer to this, and that we should wait for future discoveries that will enable us to reach the TOE, which will ultimately reveal the answer. In light of that discussion, Dawkins admitted he had misunderstood Weinberg’s position. Weinberg noted: ‘But I don’t think one should underestimate the fix we’re in, that in the end we will not be able to explain the world, that we will have some set of laws of nature we will not be able to derive on the ground simply of mathematical consistency, because we can already think of mathematically consistent laws that don’t describe the world as we know it, and we will always be left with a question why are the laws of nature what they are rather than some other laws and I don’t see any way out of that.’270
Alexander Vilenkin says, A tiny deviation from the required power results in a cosmological disaster, such as the fireball collapsing under its own weight or the universe being nearly empty…This is the most notorious and perplexing case of fine-tuning in physics. String theorist Leonard Susskind, a non-religious scientist, as is Vilenkin, writes in his article, Disturbing Implications of the Cosmological Constant, that unless this constant was fine-tuned, “statistically miraculous events” would be needed for our universe to be life-permitting. He suggests that, in light of this, it is possible that an unknown agent set the early conditions of the universe we observe today.272
Mwanafizikia na mtaalamu wa hisabati wa Uingereza Roger Penrose alienda mbali zaidi:
The British physicist and mathematician Roger Penrose went further:
[Yeye] alihesabu kwamba uwezekano wa ulimwengu wetu kuwa na machafuko madogo sana mwanzoni mwa wakati ni 1 kati ya 1010^123, yaani namba yenye sifuri moja ikifuatiwa na sifuri milioni moja za bilioni moja za bilioni moja za bilioni moja za bilioni moja za bilioni moja za bilioni moja za bilioni moja za bilioni moja za bilioni moja za bilioni moja. Namba hii ni kubwa sana hivi kwamba, kama ungeandika sifuri zake zote, zingeenea kote kwenye galaksi. Una uwezekano mkubwa zaidi wa kushinda bahati nasibu 10,000 mfululizo – na kupigwa na radi kila mara uliposhinda – kuliko kupata ulimwengu wenye machafuko madogo mwanzoni mwake.
Mwanamitindo wa kidunia John Loftus alikubaliana na ukweli wa urekebishaji mzuri wa vigezo (fine-tuning). Akinukuu kazi za wanafizikia wengine, anaandika: “Mifano hii inaweza kuongezwa, lakini hoja ni kwamba ‘kwa mabadiliko katika kimoja cha vipengele kadhaa’, ‘ulimwengu ungebadilika kuwa kitu kisicho na uhai, kisicho na fahamu.’”
Don Page wa Taasisi ya Mafunzo ya Juu ya Princeton, New Jersey, alihesabu uwezekano dhidi ya kuundwa kwa ulimwengu wetu. Hesabu yake kamili ilikuwa 10,000,000,000 kwa nguvu ya 124, namba kubwa sana hivi kwamba kuiita “ya kiastronomia” kungekuwa ni kudharau kwa kiwango kikubwa.273
[He] calculated that the odds of our universe having such low disorder at the beginning of time are 1 in 1010^123 power (one followed by a million billion billion billion billion billion billion billion billion billion billion billion billion billion zeroes). This number is so large that if you wrote out all the zeroes it would stretch across the galaxy. You’re more likely to win 10,000 lotteries in a row – and get struck by lightning every time you won – than you ever finding a universe with low disorder at its inception. Atheist John Loftus agreed with the reality of fine-tuning. Citing the work of other physicists, he writes, “These examples can be multiplied, but the point is that ‘with a change in any one of a number of factors’, the ‘universe would have evolved as a lifeless, unconscious entity.’” Don Page of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey, calculated the odds against the formulation of our universe. His exact computation was 10,000,000,000 to the 124th power, a number so large that to call it “astronomical” would be to engage in a wild understatement.273
Paul Davies, mwanafizikia wa kinadharia, anasema, ‘Jambo la kweli la kushangaza si kwamba maisha duniani yamo juu ya ukingo mkali wa kisu, bali kwamba ulimwengu mzima umo juu ya ukingo mkali wa kisu, na ungekuwa machafuko kamili ikiwa mojawapo ya “vigezo” vya kimaumbile vingetofautiana hata kidogo. Unaona, hata kama utamchukulia binadamu kama tukio la bahati tu, ukweli unabaki kwamba ulimwengu unaonekana kufaa kwa uwepo wa maisha kwa namna isiyo ya kawaida – karibu kama ulipangwa kwa makusudi – unaweza kusema ni “kazi iliyopangwa”.’274 Anaongeza: ‘Msemo kwamba “maisha yamo juu ya ukingo mkali wa kisu” ni kauli ya kushangaza ya kupunguza ukubwa wa jambo katika kesi hii: hakuna kisu katika ulimwengu kingeweza kuwa na ukingo mwembamba kiasi hicho.’275
Paul Davies, a theoretical physicist, says, ‘The really amazing thing is not that life on Earth is balanced on a knife-edge, but that the entire universe is balanced on a knife-edge, and would be total chaos if any of the natural “constants” were off even slightly. You see, even if you dismiss man as a chance happening, the fact remains that the universe seems unreasonably suited to the existence of life – almost contrived – you might say a “put-up job”.’274 He adds: ‘The cliche that “life is balanced on a knife-edge” is a staggering understatement in this case: no knife in the universe could have an edge that fine.’275
Ili kuonyesha jinsi usawazishaji wa kubahatisha wa "ukingo wa upanga" ulivyo hauwezekani, fikiria unarusha ndizi juu ya uzi mwembamba sana ulionyooshwa angani, na ndizi inatua juu yake kikamilifu na kusawazika. Baadaye unarusha kijiko juu ya ndizi na kinasawazika wima. Kisha unaweka yai juu ya hicho, na bado linasawazika wima. Kisha unaweka kalamu, na yote yanabaki katika usawa wima, na juu ya kalamu unaweka pini na inasawazika wima, na kadhalika. Ndivyo lilivyo lisilowezekana.
Wanasayansi wanatoa mifano mingine mingi kuonyesha jinsi ilivyo nadra kwa namba za aina hizi kukutana kwa bahati. Kwa mfano, akifafanua kutowezekana kwa seli ya kwanza kabisa kuja kuwepo kwa njia ya machafuko na bahati nasibu, Fred Hoyle alisema: "Jaa la vyuma chakavu lina vipande vyote vya ndege aina ya Boeing 747, vimetenganishwa na kutawanyika. Upepo mkali unapita katika jaa hilo. Ni nafasi gani kwamba baada ya kupita kwake, ndege iliyokamilika kabisa, tayari kuruka, itakutwa imesimama pale? Ni ndogo mno hadi haina maana, hata kama kimbunga kingepita katika majaa ya kutosha kujaza Ulimwengu wote."276
Just to paint a picture of how impossible any coincidental balancing by the aforementioned ‘knife-edge’ would be, imagine you throw a banana onto a very thin piece of thread stretched out in the air and the banana lands on it perfectly and balances. Afterwards you throw a spoon onto the banana and it balances vertically. Then you place an egg on top of that and it still balances vertically. Subsequently, you place a pen and it remains all in vertical balance, and on top of the pen goes a pin and it balances vertically, and so on. It is that impossible. Scientists offer many other examples to demonstrate the improbability of these sorts of numbers converging out of coincidence. For example, clarifying the impossibility of the most primitive of cells coming into existence by way of chaos and coincidence, Fred Hoyle said, ‘A junkyard contains all the bits and pieces of a Boeing 747, dismembered and in disarray. A whirlwind happens to blow through the yard. What is the chance that after its passage a fully assembled 747, ready to fly, will be found standing there? So small as to be negligible, even if a tornado were to blow through enough junkyards to fill the whole Universe.’276
Mwanaastrofizikia Michael Turner alisema kwamba hilo lingefanana na kurusha mshale kutoka ukingo wa ulimwengu ili upige shabaha iliyo upande mwingine, huku kosa la kipimo likiwa milimita moja.277 Mwanaastrofizikia Hugh Ross alisema kwamba tukijaza Marekani sarafu za chuma hadi rundo likafika Mwezini, ambao uko umbali wa kilomita 380,000 kutoka Dunia, kisha tukarudia zoezi hilo kwa mabara bilioni nyingine, tukapaka rangi nyekundu kipande kimoja cha chuma na kukizika chini ya mojawapo ya marundo haya, kisha tukamtuma mtu aliyefunikwa macho na kumwomba achague kipande hicho chekundu, uwezekano wa yeye kukichagua kipande hicho chekundu ni mmoja kati ya 1040.
Astrophysicist Michael Turner said it would be like shooting an arrow from the edge of the universe to hit a target at the other end, with a margin of error of one millimetre.277 Astrophysicist Hugh Ross said that if we filled America with metal currency until the mound reaches the Moon, which is 380,000 kilometres from Earth, repeated the process for a billion other continents, coloured one metal piece in red and buried it under one of these mounds, and then we sent in a blindfolded man and asked him to pick out that red piece, the probabilities of him picking out that red piece is one in 1040.
Linganisha takwimu hii na namba zilizotajwa hapo awali ili kuelewa jinsi isivyowezekana kuwa jambo la bahati tu. Kwa kweli, hata kueleza jinsi uwezekano wake ulivyo mdogo hakungeweza kufikisha kikamilifu kiwango cha kutowezekana kwake.
278 Compare this figure with the aforementioned numbers to understand how improbable this would be as a coincidence. In fact, even expressing how remote a possibility it is would not begin to convey its implausibility.
Antony Flew qala, Mdahalo wangu wa mwisho wa hadharani, mjadala wa pamoja katika Chuo Kikuu cha New York, ulifanyika Mei 2004. Washiriki wengine walikuwa mwanasayansi wa Kiisraeli Gerald Schroeder, mwandishi wa vitabu vilivyouzwa sana kuhusu sayansi na dini, hasa The Science of God, na mwanafalsafa wa Kiskoti John Haldane, ambaye kitabu chake Theism and Atheism kilikuwa mjadala kuhusu kuwepo kwa Mungu na rafiki yangu Jack Smart. Kwa mshangao wa wote waliohusika, nilitangaza mwanzoni kwamba sasa nakubali kuwepo kwa Mungu. Kile ambacho huenda kingekuwa mabadilishano makali ya mitazamo inayopingana kiliishia kuwa uchunguzi wa pamoja wa maendeleo ya sayansi ya kisasa yaliyoonekana kuashiria akili ya juu zaidi. Katika video ya mjadala huo, mtangazaji alipendekeza kwamba kati ya ugunduzi wote mkubwa wa sayansi ya kisasa, mkubwa zaidi ni Mungu. Katika mjadala huu, nilipoulizwa kama kazi ya hivi karibuni kuhusu asili ya uhai inaashiria shughuli ya akili yenye uumbaji, nilisema: "Ndiyo, sasa nafikiri inaashiria... karibu kabisa kutokana na uchunguzi wa DNA. Ninachofikiri nyenzo za DNA zimefanya ni kuonyesha, kwa ugumu usioaminika wa mipangilio inayohitajika kuzalisha (uhai), kwamba akili lazima ilihusika katika kuvifanya vipengele hivi tofauti sana vifanye kazi pamoja. Ni ugumu mkubwa wa idadi ya vipengele na ufundi mkubwa wa namna vinavyofanya kazi pamoja. Kukutana kwa sehemu hizi mbili kwa wakati unaofaa kwa bahati ni kidogo sana. Yote ni suala la ugumu mkubwa ambao kwao matokeo yalipatikana, ambao kwangu ulionekana kama kazi ya akili." Kauli hii iliwakilisha mabadiliko makubwa ya mwelekeo kwangu, lakini hata hivyo ilikuwa sambamba na kanuni niliyoshikilia tangu mwanzo wa maisha yangu ya kifalsafa, ya kufuata hoja popote inapoelekea. Nilivutiwa hasa na hoja ya Gerry Schroeder ya kukanusha kwa kila hatua kile ninachokiita "nadharia ya tumbili." Wazo hili, ambalo limewasilishwa katika namna na tofauti nyingi, linatetea uwezekano wa uhai kutokea kwa bahati kwa kutumia mfano wa nyani wengi wanaogonga vibodi za kompyuta na hatimaye kuandika sonneti ya Shakespeare.
Schroeder alitaja kwanza jaribio lililofanywa na Baraza la Sanaa la Taifa la Uingereza. Kompyuta iliwekwa ndani ya banda pamoja na nyani sita. Baada ya mwezi mmoja wa kugonga kompyuta hiyo (pia wakiitumia kama choo!), nyani hao walizalisha kurasa hamsini zilizoandikwa, lakini hakuna hata neno moja. Schroeder alibainisha kwamba hili lilitokea ingawa neno fupi kabisa katika lugha ya Kiingereza lina herufi moja (a au I). A ni neno tu ikiwa kuna nafasi pande zote mbili za herufi hiyo. Tukichukulia kwamba kibodi ina herufi thelathini (herufi ishirini na sita na alama nyingine), basi uwezekano wa kupata neno la herufi moja ni 30 kwa 30 kwa 30, yaani 27,000. Uwezekano wa kupata neno la herufi moja ni nafasi moja kati ya 27,000.
Kisha Schroeder alitumia uwezekano huo kwenye mfano wa sonneti. "Uwezekano wa kupata sonneti ya Shakespeare ni upi?" aliuliza. Aliendelea: "Sonneti zote zina urefu sawa. Kwa ufafanuzi, zina mistari kumi na minne. Nilichagua ile ninayoijua mstari wake wa kwanza, 'Shall I compare thee to a summer's day?' Nilihesabu idadi ya herufi; kuna herufi 488 katika sonneti hiyo. Uwezekano wa kugonga kwa muda mrefu na kupata herufi 488 zilizo katika mpangilio uleule kama katika 'Shall I Compare Thee to a Summer's Day?' ni upi? Matokeo yake ni 26 kuzidishwa yenyewe mara 488, au 26 kwa nguvu ya 488. Au kwa maneno mengine, katika mfumo wa msingi 10, ni 10 kwa nguvu ya 690. [Sasa] idadi ya chembe katika ulimwengu – si chembe za mchanga, ninazungumzia protoni, elektroni, na nyutroni – ni 10 kwa nguvu ya 80. Kumi kwa nguvu ya 80 ni 1 ikifuatiwa na sifuri 80. Kumi kwa nguvu ya 690 ni 1 ikifuatiwa na sifuri 690. Hakuna chembe za kutosha katika ulimwengu kuandika majaribio hayo; ungekosea kwa kipengele cha 10 kwa nguvu ya 600." Ukisichukua ulimwengu wote na kuugeuza kuwa chipu za kompyuta – acha nyani kando – kila chipu ikiwa na uzito wa milioni moja ya gramu, na kila chipu ya kompyuta ikiweza kutoa majaribio 488 kwa, tuseme, mara milioni moja kwa sekunde; ukiugeuza ulimwengu wote kuwa chipu hizi ndogo za kompyuta na chipu hizi zikizunguka mara milioni moja kwa sekunde [zikizalisha] herufi za kubahatisha, idadi ya majaribio utakayopata tangu mwanzo wa wakati itakuwa 10 hadi nguvu ya 90 ya majaribio. Hesabu hiyo ingekosea tena kwa kipengele cha 10 hadi nguvu ya 600. Huwezi kamwe kupata soneti kwa bahati. Ulimwengu ungelazimika kuwa mkubwa zaidi kwa mara 10 hadi nguvu ya 600. Hata hivyo dunia inadhani tu kwamba nyani wanaweza kulifanya hilo kila mara.”
Baada ya kusikiliza wasilisho la Schroeder, nilimwambia kwamba alikuwa amethibitisha kwa kuridhisha na kwa uamuzi kwamba "nadharia ya nyani" ni upuuzi mtupu, na kwamba ilikuwa vizuri hasa kufanya hivyo kwa soneti tu; nadharia hiyo wakati mwingine hupendekezwa kwa kutumia kazi za Shakespeare au mchezo mmoja, kama Hamlet. Ikiwa nadharia haifanyi kazi kwa soneti moja, basi bila shaka ni upuuzi kabisa kupendekeza kwamba kitendo kikubwa zaidi cha asili ya uhai kingeweza kupatikana kwa bahati.’279
Antony Flew said, The last of my public debates, a symposium at New York University, occurred in May 2004. The other participants were the Israeli scientist Gerald Schroeder, author of best sellers on science and religion, notably The Science of God, and the Scottish philosopher John Haldane, whose Theism and Atheism was a debate on God’s existence with my friend Jack Smart. To the surprise of all concerned, I announced at the start that I now accepted the existence of a God. What might have been an intense exchange of opposing views ended up as a joint exploration of the developments in modern science that seemed to point to a higher intelligence. In the video of the symposium, the announcer suggested that of all the great discoveries of modern science, the greatest was God. In this symposium, when asked if recent work on the origin of life pointed to the activity of a creative intelligence, I said: “Yes, I now think it does…almost entirely because of the DNA investigations. What I think the DNA material has done is that it has shown, by the almost unbelievable complexity of the arrangements which are needed to produce (life), that intelligence must have been involved in getting these extraordinarily diverse elements to work together. It’s the enormous complexity of the number of elements and the enormous subtlety of the ways they work together. The meeting of these two parts at the right time by chance is simply minute. It is all a matter of the enormous complexity by which the results were achieved, which looked to me like the work of intelligence.” This statement represented a major change of course for me, but it was nevertheless consistent with the principle I have embraced since the beginning of my philosophical life – of following the argument no matter where it leads. I was particularly impressed with Gerry Schroeder’s point-by point refutation of what I call the “monkey theorem.” This idea, which has been presented in a number of forms and variations, defends the possibility of life arising by chance using the analogy of a multitude of monkeys banging away on computer keyboards and eventually ending up writing a Shakespearean sonnet. Schroeder first referred to an experiment conducted by the British National Council of Arts. A computer was placed in a cage with six monkeys. After one month of hammering away at it (as well as using it as a bathroom!), the monkeys produced fifty typed pages – but not a single word. Schroeder noted that this was the case even though the shortest word in the English language is one letter (a or I). A is a word only if there is a space on either side of it. If we take it that the keyboard has thirty characters (the twenty-six letters and other symbols), then the likelihood of getting a one-letter word is 30 times 30 times 30, which is 27,000. The likelihood of a getting a one-letter word is one chance out of 27,000. Schroeder then applied the probabilities to the sonnet analogy. “What’s the chance of getting a Shakespearean sonnet?” he asked. He continued: “All the sonnets are the same length. They’re by definition fourteen lines long. I picked the one I knew the opening line for, ‘Shall I compare thee to a summer’s day?’ I counted the number of letters; there are 488 letters in that sonnet. What’s the likelihood of hammering away and getting 488 letters in the exact sequence as in ‘Shall I Compare Thee to a Summer’s Day?’? What you end up with is 26 multiplied by itself 488 times – or 26 to the 488th power. Or, in other words, in base 10, 10 to the 690th.[Now] the number of particles in the universe – not grains of sand, I’m talking about protons, electrons, and neutrons – is 10 to the 80th. Ten to the 80th is 1 with 80 zeros after it. Ten to the 690th is 1 with 690 zeros after it. There are not enough particles in the universe to write down the trials; you’d be off by a factor of 10 to the 600th. If you took the entire universe and converted it to computer chips – forget the monkeys – each one weighing a millionth of a gram and had each computer chip able to spin out 488 trials at, say, a million times a second; if you turn the entire universe into these microcomputer chips and these chips were spinning a million times a second [producing] random letters, the number of trials you would get since the beginning of time would be 10 to the 90th trials. It would be off again by a factor of 10 to the 600th. You will never get a sonnet by chance. The universe would have to be 10 to the 600th times larger. Yet the world just thinks the monkeys can do it every time.” After hearing Schroeder’s presentation, I told him that he had very satisfactorily and decisively established that the “monkey theorem” was a load of rubbish, and that it was particularly good to do it with just a sonnet; the theorem is sometimes proposed using the works of Shakespeare or a single play, such as Hamlet. If the theorem won’t work for a single sonnet, then of course it’s simply absurd to suggest that the more elaborate feat of the origin of life could have been achieved by chance.’279
Gerald Schroeder ana mfano wa kuchekesha wa kuonyesha kwa nini nadharia ya bahati nasibu ya kueleza matukio ya kimaumbile haiwezekani. Mtu mmoja anaenda katika mji mkuu wa kamari duniani, Las Vegas, na kuingia katika kasino. Anaketi kwenye mashine ya kupangua (slot machine). Anaweka sarafu na kuondoa mkono wake, na magurudumu yanaanza kuzunguka. Anapata ushindi mkubwa wa jackpot. Bila shaka atafurahi sana, na watu waliomzunguka pia wangemfurahia na kumpongeza.
Sasa, fikiria mtu huyu anahisi kwamba ni siku yake ya bahati. Anaweka sarafu tena na anapata jackpot tena. Furaha yake ingekuwa isiyoelezeka. Sasa, dhania kwamba jambo hilo hilo limetokea mara ya tatu, ya nne, na ya tano: kila mara anashinda kiasi kikubwa, si zawadi ndogo tu. Ingekuwa lazima kwamba baada ya zamu chache, furaha yake igeuke kuwa shaka. Angeanza kufikiri kwamba hili haliwezekani, na labda kuna kitu kibaya na mashine, au kwamba kuna mtu aliyeamua kwamba ashinde kila zamu.
Schroeder anasema: Katika ulimwengu hatukushinda bahati nasibu moja tu. Tulishinda katika uchaguzi wa nguvu ya nguvu ya sumakuumeme (ambayo huhimiza atomi kuungana kuwa molekuli). Tulishinda katika nguvu ya nguvu ya nyuklia (ambayo hushikilia pamoja viini vya atomi; kama ingekuwa na nguvu kidogo zaidi, diproton na si hidrojeni ingekuwa kiungo kikuu cha ulimwengu, na kukosekana kwa hidrojeni kungemaanisha kukosekana kwa nyota zinazong'aa). Bahati nyingine zilizoshinda ni nguvu ya nyuklia dhaifu na nguvu ya mvuto (ambayo inatawala ulimwengu katika umbali mkubwa kuliko ukubwa wa molekuli na hukusanya wingi kuwa galaksi, nyota na sayari), wingi na nishati ya mlipuko mkubwa (Big Bang), joto la Big Bang, kasi ya upanuzi wa ulimwengu, na mengi zaidi. Bahati nasibu baada ya bahati nasibu, na zote ni washindi. Zimeungana kuzaa ulimwengu mzuri tunamoishi. Kwa bahati? Si kama uelewa wetu wa sheria za maumbile ni sahihi hata kwa kiasi. Kwa mtazamaji huyu wa maumbile, ulimwengu wetu unaonekana kama kazi iliyopangwa.280
Gerald Schroeder has a humorous example to demonstrate why the theory of coincidence to explain the natural phenomena is implausible. A man goes to the gambling capital of the world, Las Vegas, and enters a casino. He sits at a slot machine. He inserts a coin and pulls his arm away and the wheels start spinning. He hits the jackpot. He would most certainly be over the Moon, and those around him would probably be happy for him as well, and would congratulate him. Now, imagine this person felt it was his lucky day. He inserted a coin and hit the jackpot again. His joy would be indescribable. Now, pretend the same happened on the third, fourth, and fifth occasions: every time he is winning big, not just any small prize. It would be inevitable that after a few turns, his joy would turn into doubt. He would start thinking this is not possible, and that maybe there is something wrong with the machine, or that someone determined that he should win on every turn. Schroeder says, With the universe we did not win just one lottery. We won at the choice for the strength of the electromagnetic force (which encourages atoms to join into molecules). We won at the strength of the strong nuclear force (which holds atomic nuclei together; were it a bit stronger the diproton and not hydrogen would be the major component of the universe, and no hydrogen means no shining stars). Other winning lotteries were the strength of the weak nuclear force and the strength of gravity (which dominates the universe at distances greater than the size of molecules and clusters mass into galaxies, stars, and planets), the mass and energy of the big bang, the temperature of the big bang, the rate of expansion of the universe, and much more. Lottery upon lottery, and all winners. They have meshed to produce the wonderful world in which we live. By chance? Not if our understanding of the laws of nature is even approximately correct. To this observer of nature, our universe looks like a put-up job.280
Mwanahisabati wa Kimarekani William Dembski alijaribu kutengeneza mlinganyo wa mambo yasiyowezekana, aliouita kikomo cha uwezekano wa ulimwengu (universal probability bound). Swali alilojaribu kulijibu lilikuwa hili: Je, kiwango cha kutowezekana kwa jambo kinaweza kushuka hadi kufikia kiwango gani, ambapo tukio lililobainishwa lenye kiwango cha kutowezekana cha namna hiyo haliwezi kuhusishwa kwa busara na bahati, bila kujali rasilimali zote za uwezekano zilizopo katika ulimwengu unaojulikana zinavyohesabiwa? Kwa maneno mengine, je, ni katika hatua gani tukio lisilowezekana linaacha kubaki ndani ya mipaka ya uwezekano/kutowezekana, na badala yake lazima lielezwe kwa mapenzi ya nguvu yenye mapenzi iliyochagua litokee kwa namna hii?
Dembski alipata thamani ya juu sana ya mlinganyo, ambayo kwayo inaweza kubainika kwamba jambo fulani haliwezi kuwa limetokea kwa bahati. Pendekezo lake lilikuwa moja kati ya 10^150. Alifikia namba hii kubwa vipi? Alitumia data zifuatazo:
The American mathematician William Dembski attempted to make an equation for improbable things, called the universal probability bound. The question he was attempting to solve was this: To what point can the degree of improbability stoop down to, below which a specified event of that level of improbability cannot reasonably be attributed to chance, regardless of whatever probabilistic resources from the known universe are factored in? In other words, at what point does an improbable occurrence no longer remain within the bounds of probability/improbability, but must be explained through the will of a willing power that chose for it to occur this way? Dembski deduced an extremely high value equation, by which it can be determined that something could not have occurred by coincidence. His proposal was one out of 10150. How did he come up with this massive number? He used the following data:
• Idadi ya chembe msingi ambazo wanasayansi wamekadiria ni 1080.
• The number of elementary particles that scientists have estimated is 1080.
• Ili jambo (maada) libadilike kutoka hali moja hadi nyingine, haliwezi kutokea chini ya muda wa Plank, ambao ni kiasi kidogo sana cha muda, kiasi kwamba kupepesa jicho kunaonekana kama miaka ikilinganishwa nao. Muda wa Plank unakadiriwa kuwa 10⁻⁴⁵. Kwa makadirio haya, inawezekana kwamba maada inaweza kubadilika kwa muda wa 10⁻⁴⁵ wa sekunde tu.
• In order for matter to transform from one state to another, it cannot occur in less than plank time, which is an extremely meagre amount of time that makes an eye blink feel like ages in comparison. Plank time is estimated to be at 1045. By this estimate, it is possible that matter can transform in just 1045 of a second.
• Ulimwengu una umri wa takriban miaka bilioni 14, ambayo inamaanisha kwamba ni mdogo kuliko sekunde 10^25 kwa mamilioni ya miaka.
• The universe is approximately 14 billion years old, which means it is younger than 1025 seconds by millions of years.
• Kulingana na hili, tukio lolote la kimwili kutokea katika ulimwengu lingehitaji angalau chembe moja kubadilika, ambayo ingechukua muda sawa na wakati wa Planck. Tuseme tunataka kuhakikisha kuna muda wa kutosha kwa tukio hili kutokea kwa bahati tu – tuseme umri wa ulimwengu (au zaidi) ndio muda wa kutokea kwake. Tukio hili lingejirudia 1045
• Based on this, for any physical event to occur in the universe would require at least a single particle to transform, which would be as long as the plank time. Let us assume that we want to ensure there is enough time for this event to happen out of coincidence – let us say that the age of the universe (or longer) is the timeframe for this to occur. This event would repeat itself 1045
Wakati mara nyingi ndani ya sekunde moja. Hili lingejirudia kwa kipindi cha muda wa sekunde 1025, muda mrefu kuliko umri wa ulimwengu wenyewe. Kwa hiyo, 1080 × 1045 × 1025 = 10150. 280 The Science of God: The Convergence Of Scientific And Biblical Wisdom, uk. 27.
times within one second. This would repeat itself over a period of time that is 1025 seconds, longer than the age of the universe itself. Therefore, 1080 × 1045 × 1025 =10150. 280 The Science of God: The Convergence Of Scientific And Biblical Wisdom, p. 27.
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Hii inamaanisha kwamba tukio lolote la kimwili la bahati nasibu lenye uwezekano wa chini ya moja katika 10^150 lazima liwe haliwezekani, hata kama tutatumia kila chembe ya mwisho – na kila sekunde – katika ulimwengu huu ili tukio hilo litokee. Ni wazi kwamba namba hizi ni kubwa sana ikilinganishwa na namba halisi ambazo tunahisi zingetuambia kwamba jambo fulani lazima limetokea kwa makusudi na si kwa bahati.281 Hata hivyo, je, tufanye nini na wale wanaokubali uwezekano usioaminika wa bahati nasibu? Hili ni mojawapo ya maeneo yenye matatizo makubwa zaidi kwa wasioamini Mungu. Wasioamini Mungu kadhaa wana imani kubwa katika uwezekano unaodaiwa kuwa mkubwa wa kwamba bahati nasibu ndiyo chanzo cha mpangilio mzuri wa ulimwengu. Naamini hili ni mojawapo ya tofauti kuu kati ya waumini na wasioamini Mungu. Ingawa baadhi ya waumini wanaweza kuamini kwamba mambo fulani yanaweza kutokea kwa bahati, imani yao katika uwezo wa bahati nasibu bado ingebaki imefungwa katika matukio ya mara moja tu. Hili linadhania hata kwamba wana maana moja ya bahati nasibu. Wasioamini Mungu, kwa upande mwingine, wana imani kubwa katika uwezekano wa bahati nasibu kuanzisha uumbaji. Hili linaonekana wazi katika maandishi ya kimafundisho ya wasioamini Mungu, kwa misemo kama: ‘Ulimwengu ulitokeaje? Kwa bahati. Uhai ulianzaje? Kwa bahati. Sheria na kanuni za ulimwengu zilipangwa vizuri namna hii vipi? Kwa bahati’, na kadhalika. Kwa mfano, Dawkins anapozungumzia kanuni ya uhai, dhamiri, na ufahamu, anahusisha yote haya na bahati nasibu. Daniel Dennett alipotaka kueleza kanuni ya dhamiri na ufahamu, alisema, ‘…kisha muujiza unatokea.’282
This means that any coincidental physical event that has the probability of less than one in 10150 must be impossible, even if we exhaust every last particle – and second – in this cosmos for this event to occur. Obviously, these numbers are huge compared to the actual numbers we feel would tell us that something must have occurred by design and not by accident.281 However, what are we to do with those who grant implausible possibility to coincidence? This is precisely one of the greatest problematic areas for atheists. A number of atheists have great faith in the supposedly high probability of an accident being the cause of fine-tuning. I believe this represents one of the key differences between theists and atheists. Although some believers might believe that some things may occur out of coincidence, their faith in the capabilities of accidents would still be highly confined to one-off events. This is even assuming they have the same definition of coincidence. Atheists, on the other hand, have a great faith in the probability of coincidence triggering creation. This comes across quite conspicuously in atheist dogmatic writings – rhetoric like: ‘How did the universe come about? By accident. How did life start? By accident. How did the laws and regulations of the universe become so finely-tuned? By accident’, and so on. For example, when Dawkins speaks about the principle of life, conscience, and understanding, he puts all of these down to accident. When Daniel Dennett wanted to explain the principle of conscience and understanding, he said, ‘…and then the miracle happens.’282
In fact, their belief in the powers of coincidence goes well beyond that. Reflect on this example of Dawkins's faith in the powers of coincidence in deed and act, which makes answering any question on the complexities of life and the universe look easy, and renders coincidence a plausible answer every time. In his book The Blind Watchmaker, he says, A miracle is something that happens, but which is exceedingly surprising. If a marble statue of the Virgin Mary suddenly waved its hand at us we should treat it as a miracle, because all our experience and knowledge tells us that marble doesn't behave like that. I have just uttered the words "May I be struck by lightning this minute". If lightning did strike me in the same minute, it would be treated as a miracle. But actually neither of these two occurrences would be classified by science as utterly impossible. They would simply be judged very improbable, the waving statue much more improbable than the lightning. Lightning does strike people. Any one of us might be struck by lightning, but the probability is pretty low in any one minute…283
Tafsiri:
Kwa kweli, imani yao katika nguvu za bahati nasibu inaenda mbali zaidi ya hapo. Fikiria mfano huu wa imani ya Dawkins katika nguvu za bahati nasibu kwa vitendo na matendo, ambayo inafanya kujibu swali lolote kuhusu ugumu wa maisha na ulimwengu kuonekana rahisi, na kufanya bahati nasibu kuwa jibu linaloaminika kila wakati. Katika kitabu chake The Blind Watchmaker, anasema, Muujiza ni kitu kinachotokea, lakini ambacho ni cha kushangaza sana. Kama sanamu ya marumaru ya Bikira Maria ingeinua mkono wake ghafla kutuelekea, tungeuchukulia kama muujiza, kwa sababu uzoefu wetu wote na maarifa yetu yanatuambia kwamba marumaru haiishi hivyo. Nimesema tu maneno "Nipigwe na radi sasa hivi". Kama radi ingenipiga katika dakika ile ile, ingechukuliwa kama muujiza. Lakini kwa kweli, hakuna kati ya matukio haya mawili ambayo sayansi ingeyaainisha kuwa hayawezekani kabisa. Yangehukumiwa tu kuwa hayana uwezekano mkubwa, sanamu inayoinua mkono ikiwa haina uwezekano zaidi kuliko radi. Radi huwapiga watu. Yeyote kati yetu anaweza kupigwa na radi, lakini uwezekano ni mdogo sana katika dakika yoyote moja…283
In fact, their belief in the powers of coincidence go well beyond that. Reflect on this example of Dawkins’s faith in the powers of coincidence in deed and act, which makes answering any question on the complexities of life and the universe look easy, and renders coincidence a plausible answer every time. In his book The Blind Watchmaker, he says, A miracle is something that happens, but which is exceedingly surprising. If a marble statue of the Virgin Mary suddenly waved its hand at us we should treat it as a miracle, because all our experience and knowledge tells us that marble doesn’t behave like that. I have just uttered the words “May I be struck by lightning this minute”. If lightning did strike me in the same minute, it would be treated as a miracle. But actually neither of these two occurrences would be classified by science as utterly impossible. They would simply be judged very improbable, the waving statue much more improbable than the lightning. Lightning does strike people. Any one of us might be struck by lightning, but the probability is pretty low in any one minute…283
Dawkins anaendelea kufafanua msimamo wake kuhusu mfano wa kwanza:
Dawkins goes on to clarify his stance on the first example:
Katika kesi ya sanamu ya marumaru, chembe za molekuli katika marumaru thabiti zinaendelea kugongana kwa kila upande kwa mpangilio usio maalum. Migongano ya chembe tofauti hufutana, kwa hiyo mkono mzima wa sanamu hubaki tuli. Lakini kama, kwa bahati tu, chembe zote zingesogea upande mmoja kwa wakati mmoja, mkono ungesogea. Kama kisha zingegeuka mwelekeo kwa wakati mmoja, mkono ungerudi nyuma. Kwa njia hii inawezekana kwa sanamu ya marumaru kutupungia mkono. Inaweza kutokea. Uwezekano wa tukio hilo la bahati ni mdogo mno, lakini si mdogo kiasi cha kutohesabika. Mwenzangu mmoja wa fizikia amenihesabia kwa wema uwezekano huo. Namba hiyo ni kubwa sana hata umri wote wa ulimwengu hadi sasa ni mfupi mno kuandika sufuri zake zote! Kinadharia, ng'ombe kuruka juu ya Mwezi pia inawezekana, kwa uwezekano mdogo unaolingana na huo. Hitimisho la sehemu hii ya hoja ni kwamba tunaweza kujihesabu hadi kwenye maeneo ya uwezekano wa kimiujiza mdogo zaidi kuliko tunavyoweza kufikiria kuwa yanawezekana.284
In the case of the marble statue, molecules in solid marble are continuously jostling against one another in random directions. The jostlings of the different molecules cancel one another out, so the whole hand of the statue stays still. But if, by sheer coincidence, all the molecules just happened to move in the same direction at the same moment, the hand would move. If they then all reversed direction at the same moment the hand would move back. In this way it is possible for a marble statue to wave at us. It could happen. The odds against such a coincidence are unimaginably great but they are not incalculably great. A physicist colleague has kindly calculated them for me. The number is so large that the entire age of the universe so far is too short a time to write out all the noughts! It is theoretically possible for a cow to jump over the Moon with something like the same improbability. The conclusion to this part of the argument is that we can calculate our way into regions of miraculous improbability far greater than we can imagine as plausible.284
Alirudia mfano huo huo na mjadala huo huo katika kitabu chake cha baadaye, The God Delusion.
He repeated the same example and discourse in his later book The God Delusion.
Maneno kama haya yanaonyesha imani kubwa walionayo katika mambo kutokea kwa bahati nasibu, na kwamba inawezekana chochote kutokea yenyewe bila sababu. Hata uwezekano mdogo kabisa usioelezeka unamruhusu Dawkins kudai kwamba jambo fulani si la kimuujiza wala lisilowezekana; badala yake, anadai bado ni jambo linaloweza kutokea mradi tu data ziruhusu liendelee kuwa hivyo. Mtu anapokuwa na mtazamo huu na kuukubali kwa kisingizio kwamba ni jambo linalowezekana – hata kama uwezekano wake ni mdogo sana – basi atakuwa tayari kukubali chochote. Ndiyo maana Norman Geisler na Frank Turek walitumia maelezo haya yanayofaa kama jina la kitabu chao, I Don’t Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist (Sina Imani ya Kutosha Kuwa Mtu Asiyeamini Mungu). Katika barua kwa jarida la kimataifa la habari The Economist, msomaji mmoja alitumia wazo hilo hilo kwa namna ya kejeli katika barua aliyoandika kujibu makala inayounga mkono nadharia ya mabadiliko ya viumbe iliyochapishwa na jarida hilo la kila wiki: ‘Nimeshangazwa sana na imani yako katika mageuzi (“The story of man”, 24 Desemba [2005]). Inazidi kwa mbali imani yangu katika uumbaji. Imani yangu inahitaji utaratibu mmoja tu: upendo wa Mungu. Yako inahitaji mitatu: kwamba kitu kinaweza kutokana na kisichokuwepo (“Big Bang”), kwamba miamba inaweza yenyewe kuzaa viumbe hai (uhai kutokana na vitu visivyo hai), na kwamba mabadiliko ya kijenetiki yanaweza kugeuza minyoo bapa kuwa Einstein. Umeshinda; hakuna shaka kwamba imani yako inazidi kwa mbali yangu.’286
285 Such words reveal the deep belief they have in things occurring by coincidence, and that it is possible for anything to occur spontaneously. Even the indescribably remotest of possibilities allows Dawkins to claim something is not miraculous or impossible; instead, he claims it is still possible so long as the data allow it to remain as such. When a person has this attitude and accepts it under the pretence that it is possible – even if its plausibility is highly unlikely – he would be prepared to accept anything. This is why Norman Geisler and Frank Turek use the apt description to title their book, I Don’t Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist. In a letter to The Economist international newspaper magazine, one reader symbolically used the same idea in a somewhat sarcastic letter he penned in response to a pro-evolution article that was published by the weekly periodical: ‘I am amazed at your faith in evolution (“The story of man”, December 24th [2005]). It far outweighs my faith in creation. My faith requires only one mechanism: God's love. Yours requires three: that something can come of nothing (the “Big Bang”), that rocks can spontaneously spawn living things (life from inorganic elements) and that genetic mutations can turn a flatworm into an Einstein. You win; there is no doubt that your faith far outweighs mine.’286
Ukiongeza hili kwenye mtazamo wa kutilia shaka wa wasioamini Mungu kuhusu dhana za msingi za kimantiki (kama tulivyojadili awali), basi hali ya utambuzi wa binadamu ingekuwaje? Dhana za kimantiki zingeanza kutiliwa shaka. Uzoefu wetu wa kuchambua ulimwengu huu nao ungehojiwa. Ulimwengu wa kisayansi na wa kiakili ungekuwa wa giza sana ikiwa hali ingekuwa hivyo. Kwa bahati nzuri, hakuna mtu anayetumia mtazamo huo wa kutilia shaka kwa njia thabiti – hili linapaswa kutosha kuonyesha kasoro yake kubwa.
If we add this to the sceptical attitude that atheists have with basic rational concepts (as discussed earlier), what would then be the state of human cognition? Rational concepts would be doubted. Our experiences through analysing this universe would also be questioned. The scientific and intellectual scene would be extremely gloomy if that were the case. Thankfully, nobody ever applies such scepticism in any consistent way – this should be sufficient to highlight its deep flaw.
3. All its constituent parts must bond with one another in a precise and harmonious manner. The position purporting the universe to be an accident is on a very bumpy road before it could ever acquire these three conditions. This automatically should mean that there was a designer who fashioned these phenomena in the organised and precise manner that it did, and that they did not evolve through what atheists say are the blind laws of nature, random genetic mutations, or natural selection processes from primitive forms until they became the complex entities that they are. Such a position lends itself to reductionism and oversimplification, which contradicts the evolution theory that assumes that any complex biological system would have progressively evolved from simpler and simpler forms, going all the way back to its very first and simplest form. If phenomena lent themselves to such an oversimplification, it would automatically mean that they were all made in one go. Given this, the designer position is the more rational answer to the question of how we came into existence. In his book, Behe mentioned a number of 286 https://www.economist.com/letters/2006/01/19/on-devan-nair-american-poverty-the-death-penalty evolution-deutsche-bank-gay-marriage examples from the natural world for these phenomena. The most famous and most iconic example of irreducible complexity is bacterial flagellum. This bacterium has a molecular motor that spins around, which allows it to move around in liquid with great ease. Its tail is made up of 40 different protein parts – if any one of those was not present at any given time, the bacteria would have been rendered non-functional. This demonstrates that it is an irreducibly complex organism that could not have gone through evolution, but rather came into nature in one go. Systems like the bacterial flagellum would be most easily and rationally explained by having come into existence through the willing and choosing doer that designed them as such, not that they gradually evolved by way of natural selection or slow genetic mutation as per the basic Darwin model. This is just one example. There are many other examples. ‘For example, in 1998 the leading journal, Cell, featured a special issue on “Macromolecular Machines”. Molecular machines are incredibly complex devices that all cells use to process information, build proteins, and move materials back and forth across their membranes. Bruce Alberts, President of the National Academy of Sciences, introduced this issue with an article entitled, “The Cell as a Collection of Protein Machines”. In it, he stated that: ‘We have always underestimated cells…The entire cell can be viewed as a factory that contains an elaborate network of interlocking assembly lines, each of which is composed of a set of large protein machines…Why do we call the large protein assemblies that underlie cell function protein machines? Precisely because, like machines invented by humans to deal efficiently with the macroscopic world, these protein assemblies contain highly coordinated moving parts.’287 The cell is a world unto its own, brimming with systems and various mechanisms. Each has been made in a specific way and carries out its own task. In toto, these systems and mechanisms play a role in the life of this cell.
Dhana iliyo karibu na wazo la utata usiopunguzika (irreducible complexity) lililoendelezwa na Behe ni utata uliobainishwa (specified complexity), uliopendekezwa na William Dembski, mwanafalsafa na mwanahisabati. Utata uliobainishwa ni njia ya kufikiri kwa ajili ya hoja ya usanifu (argument from design) kuhusu kuwepo kwa Mbunifu. Inaonyesha kwamba mahali popote katika maumbile ambapo utata uliobainishwa unapatikana, haiwezekani kwake kuwa umetokea kwa bahati. Badala yake, lazima kuwepo mtu aliyeubainisha kuwa katika mpangilio wake wa kuunganika na wa kina.
Dembski anasema: 'Herufi moja ya alfabeti imebainishwa bila kuwa changamano. Sentensi ndefu ya herufi zisizo na mpangilio ni changamano bila kuwa imebainishwa. Sonneti ya Shakespeare ni changamano na pia imebainishwa.'288
One concept that is close to the notion of irreducible complexity developed by Behe is specified complexity, proposed by William Dembski, a philosopher and mathematician. Specified complexity is a method of reasoning for the argument from design for the existence of a designer. It denotes that wherever in nature any specified complexity is found, it would then be impossible for it to have come about as an accident. Rather, there must be someone who specified it to be in its composite and complex manner. Dembski says, ‘A single letter of the alphabet is specified without being complex. A long sentence of random letters is complex without being specified. A Shakespearean sonnet is both complex and specified.’288
I'm sorry, but I can't tell what the three letter sequences are from your message. Could you paste the English text you'd like translated into Swahili? Once you share it, I'll translate it.
Here are three letter sequences:
1. Dasjf fdafds sdhf dusduewpf bdf dfda.
1. Dasjf fdafds sdhf dusduewpf bdf dfda.
Mbweha mwenye wazimu aliruka juu ya mbwa wavivu.
2. The crazy fox jumped over the lazy dogs.
3. A b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b.289
3. A b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b.289
Kutokana na haya, mtu anaweza kuhitimisha yafuatayo: Katika mifano miwili ya kwanza, herufi zinaonekana kuwa zimeshikamana, zimeunganishwa, na ni changamano, kwa sababu herufi zilizomo ni tofauti, hazirudiwi, na hazina tafsiri nyingi. Mfano wa tatu si changamano lakini unajirudia. Katika mfano wa pili ni dhahiri kwamba lazima kulikuwa na mtendaji mwenye nia aliyepanga herufi kwa mpangilio huo mahsusi ili maana iliyokusudiwa iwasilishwe. Lugha si kuweka herufi pamoja tu; inajumuisha kuweka herufi kwa namna inayounda maneno, na kuunganisha maneno kulingana na kanuni za sarufi. Bila hili, hazina maana yoyote. Mfano wa pili unasimama tofauti na wa kwanza na wa tatu katika jambo hili. Kwa hiyo ingawa wa kwanza unaonekana changamano, hauna umahsusi wowote. Tunaweza kuhitimisha kwamba wa kwanza ulikuwa mkusanyiko wa herufi zilizochanganywa bila nia yoyote mahsusi ya kutoa maana kupitia hizo. Kuhusu wa tatu, ingawa unaonekana kupangwa, urahisi wake unatufanya tuzingatie uwezekano kwamba umetokea kupitia kanuni fulani (kwa mfano) bila nia yoyote ya kuubainisha. Ni mfano wa pili pekee unaoonyesha mtendaji mwenye ujuzi na nia, kama mielekeo yetu ya asili na uzoefu wa kibinadamu unavyotuongoza kuamini. Huu ulikuwa mfano wa kukadiria tu kwa lengo ambalo Dembski alitaka kulionyesha ili kutofautisha kati ya kile ambacho uamuzi wa awali na kanuni zinaweza kuzalisha, na kile ambacho ajali, nasibu, na kutokuwa na uamuzi maalum vinaweza kuzalisha; ni yale ya kwanza pekee yanayoweza kusemwa kuwa yalitokana na mbunifu. Kwa hiyo, kila panapojitokeza udhihirisho changamano na mahsusi wa maumbile, tunapaswa kujua kwamba kulikuwepo mtu aliyeubainisha uwe hivyo.
Looking at this, one can conclude the following: In the first two examples, the letters appear to be compact, adjoined, and complex, because the letters therein are different, not repetitive, and not open to interpretation. The third example is noncomplex but repetitive. It is clear in the second example that there must have been a willing doer who sequenced the letters in that specific manner so that the intended meaning was conveyed. Language is not only about putting letters together; it comprises of placing the letters in a way that form words and linking the words up according to grammatical rules. Without this, they offer no meaning. The second example stands out from the first and third in this regard. So although the first appears to be complex, there is no specificity to it. We can conclude that the first was a composition of randomised letters without any particular will to offer any meaning through them. As for the third, even though it appears to be organised, its simplicity leads us to entertaining the possibility of it having come about through some rule (for example) without any specifying will behind it. It is only the second example that points to a knowledgeable and willing doer, as our innate predispositions and our human experiences would dictate to us. This was just an approximative example to the point that Dembski wished to point out in order to draw a distinction between what determinism and laws can produce, and what accidents, randomness, and indeterminism can produce; only the former can be said to have come about as a result of a designer. Therefore, whenever a complex and specific manifestation of nature shows itself, we should know that there was someone who specified it to be in that way.
Misimbo ya programu inategemea mpangilio mahususi wa tarakimu 0 na 1 ambazo zinatosha kuhifadhi data na kuendesha programu za kompyuta. Na kama herufi za Kiarabu zenye herufi zake 29 zinatosha kuunda sentensi na kuwasilisha maana, DNA hutegemea aina ya mfuatano hafifu wa nyukleotidi nne, yaani ACGT. Besi hizi nne, au herufi nne, ndizo zinazohusika na kuhifadhi na kubeba taarifa za kijenetiki zinazohusu uwepo na ujenzi wa protini maalum. Kwa msingi huu, mpangilio uliopangwa wa programu hauna ugumu mkubwa tu, bali pia majukumu mahususi yaliyopangwa. Hili linaleta swali kubwa zaidi: Mpangilio huu maalum uliopangwa ulitokeaje? Kwa maneno mengine, taarifa hizi za kustaajabisha zilitoka wapi?
Programme codes are based on the specific sequencing of the 0 and 1 digits that suffice to store data and play computer applications. And as Arabic with all its 29 letters is sufficient to compose sentences and convey meanings, DNA relies on a type of subtle series of the four nucleotides, or ACGT. These four bases, or four letters, are responsible for storing and transporting genetic information that deals with the presence and construction of special proteins. Based on this, programmed sequencing comprises not only of great complexity but also specific duty assignments. This leads to a greater question: How did this specified programmed sequencing come about? In other words, from where did this astonishing level of information come?
Hili ni swali lenye umuhimu mkubwa sana. Linaonyesha tatizo kubwa linalowakabili itikadi za kimaada katika harakati zao za kujibu swali la 'Uhai ulianzaje?'. Inaonekana wanaomaada wangefikia matokeo yasiyo sahihi, kwa sababu – kwa kifupi – wanatafuta jibu mahali pasipofaa. Tangu mwishoni mwa miaka ya 1920, wanasayansi hao waliamini kwamba inawezekana kueleza nyakati za kwanza za uhai kulingana na michakato isiyoongozwa na mabadiliko ya kikemikali. Katika kitabu The Origin of Life, kilichochapishwa mwaka 1938, Alexander Oparin aliwasilisha nadharia ya awali ya mabadiliko ya kikemikali iliyojumuisha kuibuka kwa uhai kupitia mabadiliko ya taratibu yaliyoanza na miyeyusho rahisi ya kikemikali ya vitu-hai katika hatua za mwanzo za Dunia. Ilhali Darwinism ilishughulikia tafsiri ya chimbuko la utofauti huu miongoni mwa viumbe hai na jinsi aina nyingi changamano zilivyobadilika kutoka maumbo rahisi, mabadiliko ya kikemikali yanashughulikia kuibuka kwa uhai na seli za kwanza, au kwa maneno sahihi zaidi, mchanganyiko wa kwanza wa kikemikali uliokuwa na uwezo wa kujinakili wenyewe. Tangu mwishoni mwa miaka ya 1970 hadi leo, nadharia za kisayansi kuhusu mabadiliko ya kikemikali zimeshindwa kueleza chimbuko la uhai, achilia mbali ugumu na umahususi wa besi za DNA zinazohitajika kwa seli hai. Mwanakemia na mwanafizikia wa Kibelgiji Ilya Prigogine, mshindi wa Tuzo ya Nobel, alisema, ‘Uwezekano wa kitakwimu kwamba miundo ya kikaboni na miitikio iliyopangwa kwa usahihi wa hali ya juu inayobainisha viumbe hai ungezalishwa kwa bahati ni sifuri.’292
This is a hugely important question. It exposes the great problem facing materialistic ideologies in their quest to answer the ‘How did life come about?’ question. It seems that materialists would arrive at a wrong outcome, because – simply put – they are looking for the answer in the wrong place. Ever since the late 1920s, those scientists believed that it is possible to explain the first moments of life in accordance with processes that are not directed by chemical evolution. In the book The Origin of Life, that was published in 1938, Alexander Oparin presented an early theory of chemical evolution that comprised of the appearance of life through gradual changes that began with simple chemical solutions of organic matter during the early phases of Earth. Whereas Darwinism dealt with the interpretation of the root of this variety across living organisms and how multitudes of complex types evolved from simple forms, chemical evolution deals with the emergence of life and the first cells, or in more precise terms, the first chemical composite that was able to replicate itself. Since the late 1970s up to today, scientific theories on chemical evolution have been unable to explain the origin of life, let alone the complexity and specificity in the DNA bases that are necessary for a live cell. The Belgian chemist and physicist Ilya Prigogine, a Nobel laureate, said, ‘The statistical probability that organic structures and the most precisely harmonized reactions that typify living organisms would be generated by accident, is zero.’292
Profesa Francis Crick alisema, ‘Mtu mwaminifu, akiwa na maarifa yote yanayopatikana kwetu sasa, angeweza tu kusema kwamba kwa namna fulani, asili ya uhai kwa sasa inaonekana kuwa karibu muujiza, kwa kuwa ni masharti mengi sana ambayo yangelazimika kutimizwa ili uhai uanze.’293
Professor Francis Crick said, ‘An honest man, armed with all the knowledge available to us now, could only state that in some sense, the origin of life appears at the moment to be almost a miracle, so many are the conditions which would have had to have been satisfied to get it going.’293
Ili tuanze kuelewa ukubwa wa tatizo linalowakabili wanamaada hapa, na jinsi suala hilo lilivyo tata kwao, fikiria kuwa una kufuli ya mchanganyiko iliyotengenezwa kwa namba nne. Je, ni uwezekano gani wa mwizi kupata mfuatano sahihi? Kila namba ikiwa tarakimu yoyote kati ya 0 na 9, uwezekano wa kupata tarakimu moja sahihi ni moja kati ya 10⁴ = 10,000. Tukidhani kila jaribio linamchukua sekunde 10, atahitaji saa 15 kupitia majaribio 5,000. Tukidhani harudii michanganyiko iliyokosewa, itamchukua upeo wa saa 30 kabla ya kumaliza michanganyiko yote inayowezekana, jambo litakalomhakikishia kwamba hatimaye atapata mchanganyiko sahihi. Kwa uwezekano mkubwa, atapata mchanganyiko sahihi kabla ya kufika 9,999, ndani ya saa chini ya 30. Tukiongeza ugumu zaidi na kudhani kufuli ina tarakimu kumi, idadi ya uwezekano itakuwa 10¹⁰ = bilioni moja. Jaribio lolote la kupata namba sahihi kwa bahati nasibu lingekuwa la polepole sana na huenda likachukua maisha yote.
Sasa tuje kwenye jeni moja ambalo lina jukumu la kutengeneza aina fulani ya protini na kutekeleza kazi nyingine muhimu. Jeni hili lazima lipangwe kwa mpangilio sahihi sana ili kutengeneza protini inayohitajika. Uwezekano wa kosa humo ni 10⁷⁷ – ni moja tu ingekuwa sahihi. Kwa maneno mengine, ili kufikia msimbo wa jeni hili, mtu lazima apate ATGC sahihi kati ya 100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,0
So that we can begin to comprehend the scope of the problem faced by the materialists here, and how complex the issue is for them, imagine you have a combination lock made up of four numbers – what is the probability of a thief getting the right sequence? With each number being any digit between 0 and 9, the probability of getting one digit right is one in 104 = 10,000. If we assume that each attempt would take him 10 seconds, he will need 15 hours to get through 5,000 tries. If we assume he does not repeat erroneous combinations, it would take him a maximum of 30 hours before exhausting all possible combinations, guaranteeing him that he would eventually get the combination right. Most probably, he would get the right combination before reaching 9,999, in under 30 hours. If we complicate this further and assume the lock has ten digits to it, the number of possibilities would be 1010 = a billion. Any attempt to get the number right accidentally would be very slow and possibly consume a lifetime. Let us now come to one gene that is responsible for creating a type of protein and for undertaking some other vital functions. This gene must be sequenced in an extremely precise fashion in order to create the required protein. The probability of fault therein is 1077 – only one would be correct. In other words, in order to access the code of this gene, one must get the ATGC correct out of 100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,0
00,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 uwezekano. Hii ni namba kubwa mno. Ili kuweka katika muktadha, idadi ya atomi katika Galaksi ya Milky Way inakadiriwa kuwa 1065. Hii inaonyesha kwamba bahati nasibu (coincidence) ni maelezo yasiyotosha kabisa kwa misimbo hii ya taarifa.
00,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 possibilities. This is a number of gargantuan proportions. Just to put it into context, the number of atoms in the Milky Way Galaxy is estimated to be at 1065. This demonstrates how coincidence is a wholly inadequate explanation for these information codes.
Uzoefu wa kibinadamu unaonyesha kwamba chanzo cha taarifa yoyote lazima kiwe kiumbe chenye ujuzi. Hifadhi ya kiasi kikubwa mno cha taarifa katika kiini cha kila seli ya binadamu haiwezi kuelezwa bila kuwepo kwa Mwenye Kuweza Kila Kitu, Mwenye Hekima na Mapenzi, aliyeumba na kuweka msimbo huu wote ndani ya seli zetu. Ukweli huu wa wazi unaoendana na fitra ya binadamu ndio uliomsukuma Francis Crick kutoa dhana itakayoeleza jambo hili, au "muujiza" kama alivyouita. Katika kitabu chake Life Itself, alisema kwamba huenda ustaarabu ulioendelea zaidi kuliko sisi kutoka angani ulipanda mbegu ya kwanza ya uhai duniani, na kwamba ndio uliohusika na programu ya kwanza katika viumbe hai. Lakini ukweli ni kwamba Crick hakujibu swali hilo kwa kweli; badala yake alilisukuma kama mpira barabarani kwa mtu mwingine kulijibu. Ustaarabu huo wa angani ulipatikanaje, kama ulipatikana kabisa? Ulikuwa ni nani hasa? Zaidi ya hayo, Crick alitaja anga za juu. Kwa madai ya sayansi yaliyomfikisha kwenye jibu hilo, alilidhoofisha uwezekano wa jibu lake kuwa sahihi kwa kuruhusu uwezekano wa kukanushwa. Ni dhahiri kwamba kinachomsukuma jibu la aina hiyo ni kutaka kuendeleza itikadi ya kutokuwepo kwa Mungu kuonekana kuwa inayowezekana. Dalili za alichokiona zinaashiria wazi Muumba Mwenye Hekima na Mjuzi wa Kila Kitu, lakini hakuweza kukiri hilo. Badala yake, alishikilia mtazamo wake wa kimaada kuhusu uwepo na ulimwengu, na kuhusisha jambo hilo lote na spishi ya juu zaidi. Katika kitabu chake Evolution: A Theory in Crisis, Michael Denton alibainisha: 'Crick pia hivi karibuni amekubali kwamba huenda uhai ni wa kipekee sana, na amegeukia tofauti ya kuvutia ya mbadala wa ghafla, wazo kwamba uhai ulipandwa awali duniani kutoka angani – wazo la panspermia.'294
Our human experience reveals that the source of any information must be a knowledgeable entity. This storage of a colossal amount of information in the nucleus of every human cell cannot be explained without a Willing Omniscient being who created and placed all of this code in our cells. This self-evident truth that aligns with the human fiṭrah is what led Francis Crick to offer a vision that would explain this phenomenon, or ‘miracle’ as he put it. He said in his book Life Itself that it is possible that a civilisation more advanced than us from space planted the first seed of life on Earth, and that it was responsible for the first programme in living beings. But the fact is that Crick did not actually answer the question; rather, he merely kicked the can down the road for someone else to answer it. How were those space civilisations found, if ever? Who were they anyway? Furthermore, Crick referred to space. With the assertions made by science that led him to this answer, he muddled the possibility of it being correct by opening it up the possibility of being falsified. It is clear that the motivator for such an answer is to maintain atheism as a viable ideology. The signs for what he observed are clearly indicative of a Wise and Omniscient Creator, but he was unable to acknowledge Him. Instead, he clinged onto his materialistic outlook on existence and the universe, and ascribed the whole thing to a higher species. In his book Evolution: A Theory in Crisis, Michael Denton noted: ‘Crick has also recently conceded that life may after all be very improbable and has turned to an interesting variation on the saltational alternative, the idea that life was originally seeded on Earth from space – the idea of panspermia.’294
Dhana ya alama za taarifa (information signatures) hairuhusiwi kubaki ndani ya mfumo uliotajwa hapo awali. Badala yake, ipo katika kila kilichopo. Mata na nishati peke yake hazifafanui mifumo, mitambo na mpangilio wa viumbe vilivyopo. Taarifa ina sehemu muhimu katika kuibuka kwa kila kitu katika ulimwengu kwa namna ya ukamilifu tunavyoviona. Hili ni dalili ya Mwenye Hekima Mjuzi wa yote aliyezileta dunia hizi kwa ujuzi wake kamili, uwezo wake na hekima yake timilifu.
Kwa maelezo zaidi kuhusu jambo hili, rejea kitabu bora cha Stephen C. Meyer kiitwacho Signature in the Cell: DNA and the Evidence for Intelligent Design. Kitabu hiki kinaeleza kwa kina alama za taarifa zilizomo ndani ya seli.
William Dembski, Winston Ewert na Robert Marks waliandika kwa pamoja karatasi ya kisayansi mwaka 2015, iliyochapishwa katika jarida la Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). Jina la karatasi hiyo lilikuwa ‘Algorithmic Specified Complexity in the Game of Life’. Ililenga kuweka msingi wa kinadharia utakaofichua maana ya kuwepo kwa maumbile.
Dhihirisho za umahiri zilizotajwa hapo awali zinaonyesha kwamba ulimwengu huu una kusudi. Kutokana na hilo, tunaweza kutambua hekima zilizomo katika mambo. Hali hii ya ulimwengu ni dalili ya Allah, ambaye hakuuumba ulimwengu na yote yaliyomo ndani yake bure. Bali aliuumba kwa hekima kubwa na malengo makubwa.
Bayhaqī amesema: “Unapotafakari kwa macho ya akili jinsi dunia hii ilivyo na kuifikiria, utaiona kama nyumba iliyojengwa yenye kila kitu anachohitaji mtu anayeishi ndani yake. Mbingu zimeinuliwa kama dari; Ardhi imetandazwa kama zulia; nyota zimepangwa kama taa; vito vya thamani vimehifadhiwa humo kama hazina; aina mbalimbali za mimea zimeandaliwa kwa ajili ya kula, kuvaa na matumizi mengine; wanyama mbalimbali wametiishwa kwa ajili ya kupanda na kwa manufaa mengine yenye faida.” Mtu ni kama mmiliki aliyefanywa kuwa na haki juu yake.
The aspect of information signatures is not confined to the aforementioned framework. Rather, it is present in all of existence. Matter and energy alone do not explain the systems, mechanisms, and living orders that are in existence. Information represents a pivotal part in the emergence of all things in the universe in the immaculate manner that we find them in. This is indicative of a Wise Omniscient being who brought these worlds into existence by way of His perfect knowledge, power, and wisdom. For more on this issue, refer to the excellent book by Stephen C. Meyer titled Signature in the Cell: DNA and the Evidence for Intelligent Design. This book is very detailed in dealing with information signatures embedded inside cells. William Dembski, Winston Ewert, and Robert Marks co-wrote a scientific paper in 2015, which was published in the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) journal. The name of the paper was ‘Algorithmic Specified Complexity in the Game of Life’. It sought to place a theoretical framework that would reveal the meaning of existence in nature. The manifestations of mastery that have been mentioned before reveal that this universe has a purpose to it. From this, we are able to detect wisdoms in things. This nature of the universe is indicative of Allah , Who did not create the universe and all that is in it in vain. Rather, He created it for great wisdoms and objectives. Bayhaqī said, ‘When you visually ponder how this world is and think about it, you will find it to be like a built house with everything a person residing in it would be in need of. The sky is raised like a roof; the Earth is spread out like a carpet; the stars are clustered like lamps; precious stones are stored therein like treasures; the various types of flora have been prepared for eating, wearing, and other utilities; different animals have been subjugated for riding and are used for other advantageous purposes. Man is like the owner who was made entitled to it.
"Hapa kuna dalili wazi kwamba dunia imeumbwa kwa mpango, dhamira na upangaji makini, na kwamba ina Muumba Mwenye Hekima Ambaye ni Mwenye Uwezo wote na Mwenye Hekima yote. Nimelisoma hili katika kitabu cha Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī."295
‘There is a clear indication here that the world is created by way of planning, determination, and organisation, and that it has a Wise Maker Who is Omnipotent and the All-Wise. I read this in the book of Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī .’295
Kwa upande wa ushahidi wa pendekezo la pili ("Umahiri na usafi kamili unamaanisha kuwepo kwa Mtendaji Mwenye Hekima na Mjuzi wa Yote"), ushahidi wake ni kanuni ya sababu na athari, ambayo imejadiliwa kwa kina hapo awali. Umahiri na usafi kamili vinamaanisha kwamba kulikuwa na sababu. Sababu hiyo ni Mtendaji Mjuzi wa Yote, ambaye kutoka kwake kulitoka kitendo cha umahiri, kama kinavyodhihirika katika kile alichokiumba kwa umahiri.
Nakumbuka nilijadiliana na baadhi ya vijana waliokana kuwepo kwa Allah. Baada ya mjadala mrefu, walikubali kwamba kuna Nguvu ya Juu juu ya ulimwengu huu, kwamba Nguvu hiyo ya Juu ndiyo sababu ya ulimwengu kuwepo, na kwamba ina uwezo. Lau Angekuwa si hivyo, asingeweza kuwa sababu ya kuibuka kwa dunia. Mjadala uliendelea baadaye katika kuthibitisha na kuonyesha kwamba Mtendaji huyu Mwenye Nguvu Zote pia ni Mjuzi wa Yote. Niliwaambia, 'Mmekubali kwamba kuwepo kwa uumbaji wenye umahiri kunaashiria uwezo wa Muumbaji. Basi mnapaswa pia kukubali kwamba usanifu wenye umahiri unamaanisha ujuzi wa Muumbaji.' Nilishangazwa mmoja wao alipopinga kwamba ujenzi wenye umahiri si lazima uashirie elimu, na kwamba huenda ulitokea kwa bahati. Niliwapa mfano kutoka uzoefu wangu binafsi wa maisha: 'Siku moja, nilikuwa nakaa kwa jamaa. Mmoja wa binti zangu alikuwa pamoja nami. Alikuwa mdogo. Kwa sababu alikuwa mdogo, alikuwa anaweza tu kushika kalamu kwa mshiko wa mviringo wa mkono wake na kuchora-chora kwenye karatasi nzima. Ghafla, aliinua karatasi na kumwambia mama yake, "Mama, pomboo!" Niligeuka kuona kama kweli kulikuwa na pomboo.'
Nilimwambia, 'Je, inawezekana kwangu kusema, kwa kutegemea mchoro huu peke yake, kwamba binti yangu alijua kuchora?' Akasema, 'Inawezekana kabisa.' Nikasema, 'Sawa. Lau ningetaka kuthibitisha kama aliweza kuchora, na kwamba alichokichora hakikuwa bahati tu, ningepaswa angalau kumwomba arudie kuchora picha ile ile mara kadhaa zaidi.' Akasema: "Sawa." Nikasema: "Hebu tuendelee zaidi na hoja hii. Tuseme kwamba umahiri unaorudiwa kila mahali katika ulimwengu unaashiria elimu yote ya Muumba." Yeye alikubali hapa. Kisha nikamwambia: "Fikiria kama ningemwona binti yangu akitengeneza mchoro tata wa nyumba, mawingu, jua, miti, mito, ndege, n.k. – je, itanilazimu kumwomba achore kitu kingine kwa ajili yangu, au picha hizi zingetosha kunijulisha kwamba anaweza kuchora?" Akasema: "Zingetosha." Nikasema: "Basi, tuende mbele kidogo zaidi na tuseme kwamba kujirudia kwa utengenezaji na upangaji wa kimahiri katika ulimwengu wote kunaashiria kwamba Muumba ana elimu yote." Kanuni ya sababu na athari inaonyesha kwamba kazi hizi zisizo na kasoro zinahitaji kuwepo kwa mtendaji ambaye ndiye sababu ya ukamilifu huo, akionyesha athari yake humo. Hili linathibitishwa na ukweli kwamba uwezekano wa jinsi udhihirisho wa ukamilifu unavyotokea ni mojawapo ya tatu: uamuzi wa kimaumbile, bahati nasibu, au mapenzi ya mtendaji mwenye elimu yote. Kwa jambo tunalojadili, haionekani kwamba linaweza kuelezwa kupitia mawimbi ya maumbile, au uamuzi wa kisheria, kama ilivyotajwa hapo awali. Vilevile, haiwezekani kwamba ukamilifu huu ulitokea kwa bahati – pia imejadiliwa hapo awali. Uwezekano wa mwisho – kwamba hili lilitokana na mapenzi ya mtendaji mwenye elimu yote – ndio chaguo pekee lililobaki. Ningependa kuongeza mjadala wa kubuni lakini wenye kuchochea fikira kati ya sheikh na mtu anayeitwa Ḥayrān ibn al-Aḍʿaf (Mchanganyikiwa, mwana wa Mdhaifu zaidi). Hii imo katika kitabu cha Nadīm al-Jisr, Qiṣṣah al-Īmān (Hadithi ya Imani). Anasema: Sheikh: Sasa tuje kwenye sindano. Chukua bamba hili na utobole sindano ndani yake. Kisha tobole sindano nyingine ndani ya shimo hilo. Ḥayrān, ikiwa mtu mwenye akili timamu angeziona sindano hizo mbili na akauliza jinsi sindano ya pili ilivyowekwa ndani ya tundu la ile ya kwanza, kisha mtu anayejulikana kwa uaminifu wake akamwambia kwamba mtu mwenye ujuzi alifanya hivyo akiwa umbali wa mita kumi na akafanikiwa kugonga tundu la sindano ya kwanza, kisha mtu mwingine pia anayejulikana kwa uaminifu akasema kwamba aliyeitupa alikuwa mvulana mdogo aliyezaliwa kipofu, na sindano ya pili ikaingia kwenye tundu kwa bahati tu, basi ni ipi kati ya chaguo hizo mbili ingekuwa yenye uwezekano mkubwa zaidi?
As for the proof of the second proposition (‘Mastery and immaculateness means there is a Wise and Omniscient Doer’), its proof is the principle of causality, which has been discussed in detail previously. Mastery and immaculateness mean there was a cause. That cause is an Omniscient Doer, from whom the act of mastery emanated, as manifested in what He masterfully made. I remember debating some youth who denied the existence of Allah. After a long discussion, they became content that there is a Higher Power over this universe, that this Higher Power is the cause of the universe coming into existence, and that He is ascribed with power. Had He not been this way, He would not have been able to be the cause of the world’s emergence. The discussion continued thereafter in proving and demonstrating that this All Powerful Mover was also Omniscient. I told them, ‘You have admitted that the existence of masterful making is suggestive of the power of the Maker. You should therefore also admit that masterful design means the omniscience of the Maker.’ I was taken aback when one of them objected that masterful construction is not necessarily indicative of knowledge, and that it may have occurred by accident. I offered them an example from my own personal life experience: ‘One day, I was staying with family. One of my daughters was with me. She was small. Because she was small, she was only able to hold a pen with a cylindrical grasp of her hand and scribble all across the paper. All of a sudden, she raised the paper and told her mother, “Mama, dolphin!” I turned around to see what really was a dolphin.’ I said to him, ‘Would it be possible for me to say, based on this drawing alone, that my daughter knew how to draw?’ He said, ‘It is quite possible.’ I said, ‘Alright. If I wanted to ascertain whether she was able to draw, and that what she drew was not an accident, I should have been able to at least ask her to repeat drawing the same picture a few more times. If she was able, we could have said she can draw; otherwise, her first drawing would have occurred by coincidence.’ He said, ‘Yes.’ I said, ‘Let us take the argument further. Let us say that the repeated mastery found all across the universe is indicative of the omniscience of the Maker.’ He agreed at this point. I then said to him, ‘Imagine if I saw my daughter fashioning a complex drawing of a house, clouds, Sun, trees, rivers, birds, etc. – would it be necessary for me to ask her to draw something else for me, or would these pictures be enough for me to know she is able to draw?’ He said, ‘They would be sufficient.’ I said, ‘So let us take this a little further and say that the repeated nature of masterful construction and composition across the universe suggest that the Maker has omniscience.’ The principle of causality reveals that these sorts of immaculate workings require the existence of a doer that is the cause of immaculateness, showing its effect therein. This is underscored by the fact that the probabilities of how manifestations of immaculateness come about are one of three: determinism, accident, or the will of an omniscient doer. For what we are discussing, it would not seem that it can be explained though nature’s ebb and flow, or legal determinism, as has been mentioned before. Likewise, it is not possible that this immaculateness came about by accident – also discussed before. The final possibility – that this came as a result of the will of an omniscient doer – is the only option that remains. I want to add a fictitious yet thought-provoking discussion between a sheikh and a person named Ḥayrān ibn al-Aḍʿaf (Confused, son of the Weakest). This is in Nadīm al-Jisr’s book The Story of Faith (Qiṣṣah al-Īmān). He says: Sheikh: Now to the needles. Take this tablet and stick a needle in it. Then stick another needle in that hole. Tell me Ḥayrān, if a rational human being saw those two needles and asked about how the second needle was placed into the hole of the first, and then a human who is known for his honesty told him that a skilled person did this from a distance of ten meters and managed to hit the hole of the first needle, then another man also known for honesty said that the one who threw it was a little boy who was born blind and the second needle fell into the hole by way of accident, which of the two options would be the most likely?
Ḥayrān: Sina shaka yoyote akilini mwangu kwamba mtu wa kwanza yuko uwezekano zaidi kusema kweli. Lakini kwa kuzingatia uaminifu wa wote wawili, uwezekano wa wa pili (kutupa kwa bahati nasibu kwa kijana kipofu) hauwezi kuondolewa. Kwa hiyo, haiwezekani kudhani kwa uhakika kwamba wa kwanza anasema kweli na wa pili hasemi kweli.
Sheikh: Basi vipi kama mtu huyo ataona sindano ya tatu katika tundu hilo hilo, je, kutokuwa na uhakika huku kutaendelea?
Ḥayrān: I have no doubt in my mind that the first person is more likely. But considering the honesty of both, the possibility of the second (the random throw by the blind boy) cannot be ruled out. Therefore, one cannot firmly assume that the former is speaking the truth and the latter is not. Sheikh: So how about if the man sees a third needle in the same hole, will this indecision remain?
Ḥayrān: Hapana, uwezekano wa kwamba jambo hilo limefanywa kwa kusudi ungeongezeka zaidi kuliko uwezekano wa kwamba ni bahati tu, lakini uwezekano wa kusudi bado ungekuwa wenye nguvu kidogo tu.
Sheikh: Vipi basi mtu anapoona kwamba kuna sindano kumi, kila moja imekwama katika tundu moja baada ya nyingine, zikiingia kutoka sehemu ileile kabisa? Je, hili litaongeza uwezekano wa kwamba jambo hilo ni la makusudi?
Ḥayrān: No, the probability of purpose would grow stronger than that of it being a coincidence, but the chances of it being on purpose still would only be a marginally stronger probability. Sheikh: So how about when a man sees that there are ten needles, each of them stuck in the hole one after the other, entering from exactly the same point. Will it increase the probability of this being intentional?
Ḥayrān: Hapana. Uwezekano wa ajali ungekuwa mdogo sana hadi ungekuwa sawa na kutokuwepo kabisa.
Sheikh: Lakini ikiwa mtu anayelingana na maelezo ya kile Qur’ani inasema: ‘Lakini mwanadamu ndiye mwenye mabishano zaidi kuliko viumbe vyote’296, akaja na kuanza kujadiliana kuhusu maana ya kutowezekana kwa kiakili na kutowezekana kwa kawaida, kisha akaanza kubishana kwamba hili halikutokea kiakili wala kawaida, ingawa anakiri kwamba hili – wakati mwingine – lingekuwa uwezekano wa mbali sana, basi rafiki yetu mwenye akili lazima akubali.
Ḥayrān: Akili inaweza kukubali, lakini moyo bado utaelekea kuamini kwamba kitendo cha makusudi ndicho chenye uwezekano mkubwa zaidi hapa.
Ḥayrān: No. The accident probability would be so weak that it would be tantamount to non-existent. Sheikh: But if a person fitting the description of what the Qur’an says: ‘But humankind is the most argumentative of all beings’296, comes and starts debating what rational impossibility means and what customary impossibility means, then starts arguing that this is neither rationally nor customarily impossible, though he affirms that this – on occasions – would be a very remote possibility, our rational friend must then yield. Ḥayrān: The mind may yield, but the heart will still incline to believe that the intentional act is the most probable of the options here.
Sheikh: Ikiwa tutaongeza ugumu zaidi kwenye kitendawili hiki, tuseme kwamba sindano hizo kumi zimehesabiwa kwa mistari. Kila moja yao ina namba juu yake, kutoka 1 hadi 10. Bila kuona kilichotokea, tunaambiwa kwamba kijana kipofu alipewa mfuko uliokuwa na sindano hizi kumi, ambazo ziliwekwa kwa mpangilio usio maalum. Alilazimika kuingiza mikono yake kwenye mfuko ili kutoa kila sindano kwa mpangilio sahihi wa namba kwa bahati, kisha kuirusha kuelekea kwenye kibao. Ya kwanza ingeanguka kwenye shimo; ya pili ingefuata shimo hilo hilo; ya tatu kwenye shimo hilo hilo; ya nne vivyo hivyo, na kadhalika. Sindano zote zingejipanga moja juu ya nyingine ndani ya shimo hilo kulingana na thamani zake za namba, na yote haya yangetokea kwa bahati. Kama rafiki yetu yule mwenye hoja angekuja kuthibitisha kwamba uwezekano wa haya yote kuwa ajali ya bahati bado upo, na kwamba bado ni jambo linalowezekana kimantiki, tungesema nini kuhusu mtu huyu mwenye hoja?
Sheikh: If we are to complicate the riddle further, let us say that the ten needles are numbered with lines. Each of them has a number on them, from 1 to 10. Without seeing what happened, we are told that the blind boy was given a bag containing these ten needles, which were placed at random. He had to put his hands into the bag to take each needle out in its correct sequence of numbers by accident, and then throw it at the tablet. The first would fall into the hole; the second would follow it into the same hole; the third into the same hole; the fourth likewise, and so on. All the needles stacked up behind each other into that hole according to their numerical value, and all of this happened by accident. If that argumentative friend of ours then came to prove that the probability of this all being a coincidental accident still exists, and that it is still logically possible, what would we say about this argumentative person?
Ḥayrān: Nina hakika kwamba hangeaminiwa. Uwezekano kwamba hili limetokea kwa bahati ni mdogo sana hadi karibu haiwezekani.
Sheikh: Ḥayrān, linapokuja suala la namba kubwa sana, hizo ni dhahiri kuwa haziwezekani.
Ḥayrān: I am sure that he would not be believed. The possibility of this being coincidental is so remote it is virtually impossible. Sheikh: Ḥayrān, when it comes to very large numbers, they are self evidently impossible.
Ḥayrān: Nilidhani kwamba hiki kitu kinachojidhihirisha chenyewe kilitujia kutokana na uzoefu wetu wa maisha, kwamba marudio ya kubahatisha ni jambo adimu.
Ḥayrān: I thought that this self-evidence came to us from our lived experiences of coincidental repetitions being a rarity.
Sheikh: Hapana, hii kujidhihirisha yenyewe – ndani ya vilindi vya akili zetu fahamu – kunategemea kanuni ya kihisabati isiyoepukika.
Sheikh: No, this self-evidence – within the depths of our subconscious minds – is reliant on an inescapable mathematical rule.
Ḥayrān: Kanuni hii ni ipi, bwana?
Ḥayrān: What is this rule, sir?
Sheikh: Ni kanuni ya uwezekano, inayosema kwamba uwezekano wa tukio fulani la kubahatisha huongezeka na kupungua kwa uwiano wa kinyume na idadi ya uwezekano mwingine shindani. Kila idadi ya mambo shindani inapopungua, nafasi ya mafanikio huongezeka; kila idadi ya chaguo shindani inapoongezeka, nafasi ya mafanikio hupungua. Ikiwa ushindani ni kati ya vitu viwili sawa, nafasi ya mafanikio itakuwa nusu. Ikiwa ni kati ya vitu kumi, nafasi ya mafanikio itakuwa moja ya kumi. Hii ni kwa sababu kila chaguo lina nafasi sawa ya mafanikio, pale ambapo hakuna ubora wa chaguo lolote. Kwa kiwango hiki, nafasi za mafanikio katika ushindani huwa sawa, hata kama ni mia au elfu. Hata hivyo, idadi inapoongezeka kwa kasi ya kiwango cha juu, nafasi za mafanikio hufikia kutokuwepo kabisa, bali kuwa jambo lisilowezekana. Ikiwa mtoto asiyeona atatoa kwa bahati nambari ya 1 mara ya kwanza, tutasema alikuwa na nafasi moja kati ya kumi ya kutoa nambari hiyo. Lakini ikiwa alitoa nambari 1 na 2 mfululizo, hii itakuwa nafasi moja kati ya mia, kwa sababu vyote kumi vingekuwa vinashindana katika kuchora kwa pili, hivyo kuwa ushindani kati ya chaguo mia. Ikiwa mtoto asiyeona atatoa sindano 1, 2 na 3 mfululizo, tutasema hii ni nafasi moja kati ya elfu, na kadhalika. Ikiwa tutadhani kwamba mtoto alitoa sindano zote kumi kwa mpangilio wa nambari, nafasi ya tukio hili kutokea itakuwa moja kati ya bilioni kumi…297
Sheikh: It is the rule of probability, which states that the probability of a certain accident increases and decreases in an inversely proportional manner with the number equal to the other competing possibilities. Whenever the number of competing things decreases, the chance of success increases; whenever the competing choices increase, the chances of success decrease. If the competition is between two equal things, the chance of success would be half. If it is between ten things, the chances of success would be a tenth. This is because each choice has an equal chance of success – when there is, of course, no superiority for any one choice. To this extent, the chances of success between the competition lie in equal stead, even if they are a hundred or a thousand. However, when the numeric value increases exponentially, the chances of success would become non-existence, nay impossible. If a blind child by chance pulls out #1 the first time, we would say that he had a one in ten chance of pulling that number out. But if he pulled out #1 and #2 in succession, this would be a one-in-a-hundred probability, because all ten would be competing in the second draw, thus making it a competition between a hundred choices. If the blind child pulls out needles #1, #2, and #3 in succession, we would say that this is a one-in-a-thousand chance, and so on. If we assume that the child pulled all ten needles in numerical order, the chance of this happening would be one in ten billion…’297
First objection: Mastery is just a projection This is a strange objection. I have come across atheists who reject the manifestations of mastery and greatness in this universe, all to varying degrees and under various pretences. Some are sceptical of whether the universe is masterfully made to begin with, believing that such a claim is just a personal projection on the cosmos. They claim that our reading of the universe offers us this illusion, even though it has no objective meaning in the universe. In other words, the mastery all around us does not necessarily mean that there was a masterful process of construction per se. For example, when we see the sculpture of a human, we would appreciate the nature of construction there. After all, we, looking on at this scene, are humans as well. If it were assumed that some creation never saw a human in its entire life, he might pass by the sculpture without noting any feature of mastery therein; he would probably think this is nothing more than a regular rock, or a rock that has been eroded somewhat, without having been the subject of intervention (i.e., sculpturing) by a willing actor. Similarly, if someone were to see the letters of a language and script that he does not understand, he might think that they were just random scribbles. Therefore, seeing any feature therein would be a projection onto them. I used to think that these sorts of views were confined to statements by philosophers on the peripheries – such as those by the atheist philosopher Baron d’Holbach (d. 1789) – and were not in circulation within modern atheist philosophy. It was not until when I read some of this in contemporary writings, as well as some discussions and encounters I personally experienced, that it dawned on me that such an objection is still in vogue. The fact is that this objection is very odd, for it comprises a gross obstinance and a bizarre error. In fact, the very examples brought here expose the error. The sculpting of a rock by a willing actor, and the set of letters and script belonging to a specific language, reveal mastery as an objective reality in these matters; cognition and knowledge is what leads to the discovery of this reality. So whatever masterful construct exists in the universe there is, it would carry on increasing our experiences and knowledge. This process of discovery will remain so long as experience and knowledge keep on giving. Such a form of thinking undoubtedly leads a person to negate all objective reality. If you are sceptical about whether a complex composition can offer knowledge, and you avoid this sort of conceptualisation under the pretence of the relativity of any such judgement, and that it has no objective reality to it, it will land you into becoming sceptical of everything around you, as it would be possible that everything is also just a projection and devoid of any objective value that is separate from you. This takes away any objective value from human conceptualisation, and instead refers it to mere relative cognition that is subject to doubt, which can lead the bearer of such a philosophy into a type of sophism. The truth is that these sceptics themselves would not behave in this way in their day-to-day lives, as it is diametrically opposed to any sound human fiṭrah, and also because its implications would lead to the destruction of any justification for discovering the world and interacting with it.
Hebu tuangalie nukuu chache zilizochaguliwa kutoka kwenye fasihi kubwa juu ya somo hili. Mwaka 1985, mwanaastronomia Edward Robert Harrison aliandika: “Hii ndiyo hoja ya kikosmolojia ya kuthibitisha kuwepo kwa Mungu – hoja ya usanifu ya Paley – iliyosasishwa na kuboreshwa. Upangaji mzuri wa ulimwengu unatoa ushahidi wa awali wa usanifu wa kimungu. Chagua unachotaka: bahati nasibu isiyo na mpangilio inayohitaji ulimwengu mwingi, au usanifu unaohitaji ulimwengu mmoja tu.” Mwanajenetiki Francis Collins alikuwa mkuu wa Mradi wa Jenomu la Binadamu na kwa wakati huu anaongoza Taasisi za Kitaifa za Afya za Marekani. Katika kitabu chake cha mwaka 2006 kilichouzwa sana, The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief, Collins anatoa tafsiri ifuatayo ya data: “Upangaji sahihi wa konstanti zote za kimwili na sheria zote za kimwili ili kufanya maisha yenye akili yawezekane si jambo la bahati mbaya, bali linaakisi kitendo cha yule aliyeuumba ulimwengu tangu mwanzo.” Daktari Michael Anthony Corey anaandika: “Kiwango cha ajabu cha upangaji mzuri uliokuwepo mara moja kati ya vigezo hivi vya msingi baada ya Mlipuko Mkuu kinaonyesha kiwango cha ajabu cha uhandisi wa kidogo kidogo ambao hauwezekani kufikirika bila ‘Mbunifu’ mwenye uwezo mkubwa wa kukokotoa.” Mwanaastronomia George Greenstein anasema: “Tunapochunguza ushahidi, wazo linajitokeza kwa nguvu kwamba aina fulani ya nguvu ya kiungu – au tuseme Nguvu – inahusika. Je, inawezekana kwamba ghafla, bila kukusudia, tumejikwaa kwenye uthibitisho wa kisayansi wa kuwepo kwa Mungu Mkuu? Je, ilikuwa ni Mungu aliyeingilia na kuuunda ulimwengu kwa hekima kwa manufaa yetu?” Na mwanafizikia wa kinadharia Tony Rothman anaongeza, "Mwanatheolojia wa zama za kati aliyetazama anga la usiku kwa macho ya Aristotle na kuona malaika wakizungusha duara za mbingu kwa upatanifu amegeuka kuwa mwanakosmolojia wa kisasa anayetazama anga hilohilo kwa macho ya Einstein na kuona mkono wa Mungu si katika malaika bali katika vigezo vya maumbile…Anapokabiliwa na mpangilio na uzuri wa ulimwengu na mikutano ya ajabu ya maumbile, ni jaribu kubwa kuruka kutoka sayansi kwenda dini kwa imani. Nina hakika wanafizikia wengi wanataka kufanya hivyo. Natamani tu wakubali hilo."300
Let us look at a few quotations selected from the vast literature on the subject. Back in 1985, astronomer Edward Robert Harrison wrote: “Here is the cosmological proof of the existence of God – the design argument of Paley – updated and refurbished. The fine-tuning of the universe provides prima facie evidence of deistic design. Take your choice: blind chance that requires multitudes of universes, or design that requires only one.” Geneticist Francis Collins was the head of the Human Genome Project and at this writing directs the United States National Institutes of Health. In his 2006 bestseller, The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief, Collins argues for the following interpretation of the data: “The precise tuning of all the physical constants and physical laws to make intelligent life possible is not an accident, but reflects the action of the one who created the universe in the first place.” Physician Michael Anthony Corey writes: “The stupendous degree of fine tuning that instantly existed between these fundamental parameters following the Big Bang reveals a miraculous level of micro engineering that is simply inconceivable in the absence of a ‘supercalculating’ Designer. Astronomer George Greenstein asserts: “As we survey the evidence, the thought insistently arises that some supernatural agency – or rather Agency – must be involved. Is it possible that suddenly, without intending to, we have stumbled upon scientific proof of the existence of a Supreme Being? Was it God who stepped in and so providentially crafted the cosmos for our benefit?” And theoretical physicist Tony Rothman adds, “The medieval theologian who gazed at the night sky through the eyes of Aristotle and saw angels moving the spheres in harmony has become the modern cosmologist who gazes at the same sky through the eyes of Einstein and sees the hand of God not in angels but in the constants of nature…When confronted with the order and beauty of the universe and the strange coincidences of nature, it's very tempting to take the leap of faith from science to religion. I am sure many physicists want to. I only wish they would admit it.”’300
Hizi ni baadhi ya nukuu alizozitaja Stenger. Kuna kauli nyingi nyingine kutoka kwa wanasayansi wa matawi mbalimbali zinazoonyesha jinsi walivyovutiwa na asili iliyopangwa kwa usahihi wa hali ya juu ya ulimwengu. Baadhi zimeshatajwa hapo awali; nyingine zitafuata hivi karibuni.
These are some of the citations that Stenger mentioned. There are many other statements from scientists of various branches that reveal how they are impressed by the finely-tuned nature of the universe. Some have already been mentioned previously; others will soon follow.
Proposal Stenger focuses on a number of data points: He argues over how precise the calculations are vis-à-vis some constants, and that the margin of error is larger than what some researchers claim. However, this should not be a problem. Even if his calculations are right and others are wrong, the argument from fine-tuning would still be intact. If a man said, 'There is a one-in-a-million chance to win the prize', and someone else said, 'Actually, the prize can be won if someone manages to pick out #1 or #2', the possibility of these two options occurring would still be considered highly improbable in light of sheer coincidence. This is of course in relation to some of the calculations he mentioned. It should be noted that what is required here is an alignment between the cosmological constants and the various data points, so that the universe can fulfil the required prerequisites in order to come into existence and support life. The measure of whether the universe exists or not is not down to whether it is connected to one constant or another. In other words, it is not down to whether the scale of probabilities specific to it are broadened further and sufficient to achieve the goal, so to not render the possibility of picking out the required number a coincidence. Rather, what is required is that all the other values are met.
Stenger’s proposal focuses on a number of data points: He argues over how precise the calculations are vis-à-vis some constants, and that the margin of error is larger than what some researchers claim. However, this should not be a problem. Even if his calculations are right and others are wrong, the argument from fine-tuning would still be intact. If a man said, ‘There is a one-in-a-million chance to win the prize’, and someone else said, ‘Actually, the prize can be won if someone manages to pick out #1 or #2’, the possibility of these two options occurring would still be considered highly improbable in light of sheer coincidence. This is of course in relation to some of the calculations he mentioned. It should be noted that what is required here is an alignment between the cosmological constants and the various data points, so that the universe can fulfil the required prerequisites in order to come into existence and support life. The measure of whether the universe exists or not is not down to whether it is connected to one constant or another. In other words, it is not down to whether the scale of probabilities specific to it are broadened further and sufficient to achieve the goal, so to not render the possibility of picking out the required number a coincidence. Rather, what is required is that all the other values are met.
Jambo moja analopendekeza ni kwamba kuporomoka kwa mfumo mzima wa kikosmolojia hakutokei kwa sababu tu kiwango kimoja cha kudumu kimebadilika. Inawezekana kwamba kimoja kikibadilika hakutakuwa na athari mbaya kwa mfumo wote, mradi tu vipimo vingine vya kudumu vimerekebishwa ipasavyo ili kuulinda ulimwengu usianguke. Kwa maneno mengine, inawezekana kwamba kiwango kimoja cha kudumu kina thamani nyingi; hata hivyo, vipimo vingine vya kudumu vingehitaji kupangwa upya ili vilingane na mabadiliko hayo mapya. Seti nzima ya vipimo vya kudumu vinavyowezesha uhai haijafungiwa katika seti moja ya vipimo katika ulimwengu wetu; badala yake, inawezekana kuunda minyororo mingine ya mfuatano inayoweza kuwezesha uhai. Hili linapanua wigo wa uwezekano kwamba mnyororo mmoja utatokea kwa bahati, bila haja ya mchakato wa kurekebisha vizuri (fine-tuning) kutumika.301
One idea he proposes is that the collapse of the entire cosmological system does not occur just because one constant changes. It is possible that one changes and it would not have an adverse impact on the rest of the system, so long as the other constants are properly conditioned to keep the cosmos afloat. In other words, it is possible that one constant possesses numerous values; however, the other constants would need recalibration so that they match up with this new change. The whole set of constants that captures life is not confined to a single set of constants in our universe; rather, it is possible to create other sequences of chains that are able to capture life. This broadens the scope for the chance of a chain coming as an accident, without the need for the process of fine-tuning being applied.301
Mambo yafuatayo yanaweza kuzingatiwa kuhusu wazo hili:
The following observations can be made on this idea:
1. Hata ikiwa hili ni kweli kwa baadhi ya konstanti, si lazima liwe kweli kwa konstanti nyingine za kosmolojia au kwa matukio mahususi. Mojawapo ya vigezo vinavyohitajika kwa kuwepo kwa uhai ni vigezo huru. Inaonekana kwamba hata usumbufu mdogo kabisa katika vigezo hivyo ungeifanya ulimwengu usiwe na uwezo wa kuhimili uhai.
1. Even if this is true for some constants, it is not necessarily true for other cosmological constants or specific events. One of the requisite parameters for the existence of life is independent parameters. It would appear that even the slightest disruption to them would lead to the universe becoming unsuitable for life.
2. Kuunda mfululizo mwingi wa vigezo vya kimaumbile (physical constants) vinavyoweza kukamata na kuhakikishia uhai kwa ulimwengu kunakabiliwa na tatizo: idadi ya mfululizo unaowezekana usioweza kudumisha uhai ni mkubwa zaidi kuliko ile ya mfululizo unaoweza kufanya hivyo. Kwa hakika, hakuna cha kulinganishwa. Pingamizi hili halijibu swali la msingi hapa, ambalo ni: vigezo hivi vya kimaumbile vilipangwaje? Uwezekano wa seti moja ya vigezo vinavyoweza kujumuisha uhai, kwa kuwatenga seti nyingi nyingine zisizoweza, ni mdogo mno. Hii inaibua swali: kwa nini seti hii ya vigezo ilichaguliwa na si nyingine yoyote?
2. Creating numerous series of physical constants that are able to capture and secure life for the cosmos is faced by a problem: The number of possible series unable to sustain life are exceedingly more than those that are able to do so. In fact, there is no comparison. This objection does not answer the fundamental question here, which is this: How were these physical constants determined? The probability of one set of constants that can comprise of life, to the exclusion of the many other sets of constants that do not, is highly unlikely. This begs the question: Why was this set of constants selected and not any other?
3. Uwezekano wa kwamba viwango vyote vya kimaumbile vitanaswa na mfululizo mmoja na kupangika kwa namna inayohitajika kuhimili uhai ni mdogo sana, ikilinganishwa na uwezekano wa kiwango cha kimaumbile kushindwa kuhimili uhai, au kushindwa kwa namna isiyohitaji viwango vingine kubadilika kwa kiwango kinachohitajika ili kudumisha uhai.
3. The probability of all constants being captured by one series and becoming aligned in the manner required to support life is very low, compared to the probabilities of the physical constant falling short to support life, or falling short in a way that does not require the other constants to undergo the required change to maintain life.
Kwa muhtasari, uwezekano wa urekebishaji laini (fine-tuning) na mizani inayohitajika kwa namna hiyo ni mdogo mno ukilinganishwa na uwezekano mbadala – au kwa maneno ya Richard Dawkins: "Lakini, pamoja na njia nyingi za kuwa hai zilizopo, ni hakika kwamba kuna njia nyingi zaidi za kuwa mfu, au badala yake, kutokuwa hai."302
In summary, the probabilities of fine-tuning and the balancing act in the required manner are astronomically small compared to rival possibilities – or in the words of Richard Dawkins: ‘But, however many ways there may be of being alive, it is certain that there are vastly more ways of being dead, or rather not alive.’302
Stenger inatoa ukosoaji wa wazo la kuweka mipaka ya aina za maisha ya viumbe hai kwa aina zinazotegemea kaboni. Anasema kwamba dhana ya fine-tuning ilipendekezwa tu ili kueleza kufaa kwa ulimwengu kuhimili aina za maisha zinazotegemea kaboni. Ni nini kinachozuia uwezekano wa aina nyingine za maisha ambazo hazitegemei kaboni, bali kwa mfano zinategemea silikoni? Ikiwa inawezekana kwamba kuna mifumo ya maisha inayoenda nje ya kanuni ya kaboni, uwezekano wa maisha kama hayo kujitokeza bado ungebaki, hata kama thamani za vipimo vya asili zingebadilika kutoka zilivyo sasa. Kile kinachoweza kusemwa zaidi ni kwamba vipimo vya ulimwengu wetu vinafaa kuhimili maisha yanayotegemea kaboni; vingebadilika, ulimwengu huenda pia ungeweza kuhimili aina nyingine za maisha.
Ili kujibu pingamizi hili, hatuhitaji kuingia katika maelezo ya kama maisha yanayotegemea silikoni yanaweza kujitokeza, wala kwa muda gani tunapaswa kutazama kujitokeza kwa aina zisizo za kaboni za maisha. Pingamizi hili halikubaliki kabisa katika mazingira ambayo ulimwengu umepangwa kwa uangalifu. Kama ilivyotajwa awali, mazingira hayo yamepangwa ili ulimwengu uweze kuendelea kuwepo baada ya kuanza kuwepo, na ili usijibane wenyewe na hatimaye kutoweka. Hili ni pamoja na usawa wa kikosmolojia ambao ulimwengu unao ili kuunda nyota na sayari, ambazo zina nafasi katika kuzalisha elementi kupitia athari za kikemikali. Baadhi ya mifumo ndani ya anga la nje imefikia usawa mzuri sana kiasi kwamba haijaruhusu ulimwengu kuwa supu ya hidrojeni au mchuzi wa heliamu. Fine-tuning inatueleza mambo mengi, moja ikiwa ni kuzaliwa kwa uhai. Anachojaribu kufanya Stenger ni kupunguza uwezekano usio na manufaa kwa ulimwengu, na kuongeza uwezekano unaolingana na manufaa yake. Hata tukikubali kwamba nadharia yake ni sahihi, tofauti kati ya uwezekano wa pande mbili bado itabaki kubwa sana. Hili lingeimarisha uhalali na nafasi ya swali la urekebishaji laini (fine-tuning) na upatanishi (calibration). Fikiria mtu akisema, ‘Uwezekano wa hili kutokea ni moja katika bilioni bilioni bilioni bilioni bilioni’, na mwingine akasema, ‘La, ni mia moja katika bilioni bilioni bilioni bilioni’ – mtu angefikiri kwamba uwezekano wa kutokea kwake katika kesi zote mbili ni mdogo mno. Mojawapo ya majibu bora zaidi kwa Stenger ambayo nimeyaona ni karatasi ya kisayansi yenye kichwa The Fine-Tuning of the Universe for Intelligent Life303 ya Luke A. Barnes, iliyochapishwa katika Publications of the Astronomical Society of Australia. Ni jibu refu kwa sehemu kubwa ya yale yaliyomo katika kitabu cha Stenger. Jibu hilo lilikuwa imara kiasi kwamba Barnes alimshutumu Stenger kwa kufanya makosa mengi ya kisayansi. Kwa hakika, Barnes aligundua makosa mengi. Hili lilimchochea Stenger kuandika jibu la kurasa 12 kwa Barnes lililoitwa Defending The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning304, na Barnes akajibu tena katika blogu ya Letters to Nature.305 Nahitimisha kwamba tasnifu ya Barnes inashinda kwa uamuzi dhidi ya nadharia ya Stenger – kwa sababu zifuatazo:
Stenger critiques the idea of restricting the forms of organic life to carbon forms. He argues that the notion of fine-tuning was only proposed to explain the suitability of the universe to sustain carbon-based forms of life. What prevents the possibility of other life forms that are not carbon-based but are, for example, silicon-based? If it is possible that we have life patterns that fall outside the carbon rule, the probabilities of such life emerging would still be intact, even if the values of the natural constants change from what they are right now. The most that can be said is that the constants of our universe are suitable for supporting carbon based life; were they to change, the universe might also be able to support different forms of life. To answer this objection, we do not need to enter into the detail of whether silicon-based life can emerge, or what timescales we should be looking at for the emergence of non-carbon forms of life. This objection is simply inadmissible in the circumstance that the universe is carefully calibrated. As mentioned before, those sets of circumstances have been calibrated so that the universe could survive after coming into existence, and so that it does not collapse in on itself and ultimately disappear. This is in addition to the cosmological balance the universe possesses in order to create stars and planets, which have a role to play in producing elements through chemical reactions. Some patterns within the cosmos have struck such a fine balance that it has not allowed the universe to become a soup of hydrogen or a stew of helium. Fine-tuning explains numerous issues to us, one of which is the birth of life. The most Stenger is attempting to do is to minimise the possibilities that are not in the interest of the universe, and to maximise the possibilities that are in its interest. However, the problem here is that even if we accept his thesis as accurate, the difference between the possibilities on both sides will still remain vast. This would uphold the legitimacy and standing of the question of fine-tuning and calibration. Imagine a person said, ‘The probability of this occurring is one in a billion billion billion billion billion’, and another says, ‘No, it is a hundred in a billion billion billion billion’ – one would think that the probability of its occurrence in either case is extremely low. One of the best critiques of Stenger that I have seen is the scientific paper titled The Fine-Tuning of the Universe for Intelligent Life303 by Luke A. Barnes, published by the Publications of the Astronomical Society of Australia. It is a lengthy critique of much of what is in Stenger’s book. The critique was so robust that Barnes ended up accusing Stenger of perpetrating many scientific errors. Indeed, Barnes uncovered many errors. This spurred Stenger to pen a 12-page response to Barnes called Defending The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning304, only for Barnes to reply on the Letters to Nature blog.305 I conclude that the dissertation of Barnes is decisively preponderant against Stenger’s thesis – for the following points:
1. Barnes anahusika na kosmolojia (cosmology) na ana idadi ya makala za utafiti zilizochapishwa katika eneo hili. Hili ni somo linaloendana zaidi na mjadala wetu kuliko utaalamu wa Stenger, ambao uko katika fizikia ya chembe (particle physics).
2. Mara nyingi, Stenger hueleza maoni yake binafsi tu. Kwa upande wa msimamo wa kisayansi ambao Barnes anaufuata, unaenea zaidi katika jamii za wanasayansi.
3. Stenger anafuata seti ya mapendekezo ya ajabu. Chukua, kwa mfano, anachosema anapojadili tatizo la urekebishaji sahihi kati ya uzito wa elektroni na uzito wa protoni: 'Zaidi ya hayo, tunaweza kubishana kwamba uzito wa elektroni utakuwa mdogo zaidi kuliko uzito wa protoni katika ulimwengu wowote unaofanana hata kidogo na wetu.' 306 Anachojaribu kusema ni kwamba udogo wa elektroni ikilinganishwa na uzito wa protoni ni jambo la kawaida na hauhitaji urekebishaji wowote. Lakini cha kuvutia ni jinsi alivyomaliza sentensi hii, akionyesha jinsi alivyoelewa vibaya jambo la fine tuning (urekebishaji laini), ambalo ndilo lengo kuu la mjadala huu. Ni wazi kwamba haishangazi kuwa ulimwengu kama wetu una sifa kama zetu, ikiwa ni pamoja na udogo wa elektroni ikilinganishwa na protoni. Swali linalojadiliwa hapa ni: 'Kwa nini iko hivi?' Swali hili halihusu ulinganisho mdogo tu na ulimwengu unaofanana na wetu, bali na idadi isiyo na mwisho ya uwezekano, kama inavyowakilishwa katika ulimwengu usiofanana nao. Hili ndilo fumbo, ambalo suluhisho lake Stenger kwa bahati mbaya anaamini ni rahisi kupitia maarifa yaliyopo ya fizikia, bila kutoa dhana za aina ya multiverse (ulimwengu mwingi), ambazo zitajadiliwa baadaye pamoja na mambo mengine. Msimamo wa Stenger kwa kweli unarahisisha kupita kiasi upeo wa tatizo pale anapoombwa maelezo ya asili na ya kimaada kulihusu.
1. Barnes deals with cosmology and has a number of published research papers on this area. This is a subject that is more aligned to our discussion than Stenger’s speciality, which is in particle physics. 2. On many occasions, Stenger expresses only his personal views. As for the scientific position that Barnes operates from, it is more widespread across scientific circles. 3. Stenger operates from a strange set of propositions. Take, for example, what he says when discussing the problem of precise calibration between electron and proton mass: ‘What is more, we can argue that the electron mass is going to be much smaller than the proton mass in any universe even remotely like ours.’306 What he is trying to say is that the small size of electrons compared to the mass of protons is natural and does not require any calibration. What is interesting is how he ended this sentence, revealing how badly he misunderstood the phenomenon of fine tuning, which is the entire point of the discussion. Obviously, it is not surprising that universes like ours have characteristics like ours, including the small size of electrons compared to that of protons. What is the point of discussion here is the question: ‘Why is it like this?’, which is not a limited comparison with universes similar to ours, but rather with the endless number of probabilities, as represented in dissimilar universes. This is the mystery, the solution to which Stenger unfortunately believes is simple through extant knowledge of physics, without offering assumptions from the genus of the multiverse (which will be discussed later alongside other things). Stenger’s position really does oversimplify the scope of the problem when asked for a natural and materialistic explanation for it.
4. Stenger anachukua maoni ya kifalsafa yenye matatizo makubwa. Misimamo yake ya kisayansi haiendani wala haiambatani na maoni hayo. Hili linaweza kuleta mshtuko mkubwa na shaka kwa yeyote anayemfuata kuhusu asili halisi ya utafiti wake, na kuhusu iwapo unatiririka kutokana na dhana za kiitikadi alizonazo tangu awali. Chukua kwa mfano mjadala wake kuhusu kanuni ya sababu: ‘Tuchukulie kanuni (1). Je, imejengwa juu ya ukweli wa kiuzoefu? Je, ni kweli kwamba kila kinachoanza kina sababu? Ni wazi kwamba hatujaona mwanzo wa kila kitu, kwa hiyo hatuwezi kusema kwamba kila kinachoanza kina sababu. Kama mwanafalsafa mkubwa wa Scotland David Hume (d. 1776) alivyoonyesha katika An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, hata tunapoona tukio moja likifuatiwa na jingine, hatuwezi kuhitimisha kwamba kuna uhusiano wa sababu kati ya hayo mawili.’307 Msimamo kama huu unapaswa kumfanya yeyote anayeukubali aachane na kila kitu kinachohusiana na sayansi. Kutoendesha mambo kwa kuzingatia kanuni hii, na badala yake kuipinga, ni kwenda kinyume na hitaji la kisayansi la kutafuta sababu za asili za matukio. Kwa kweli, aligusia suala la makosa yanayoweza kutokea katika hisi zetu; kama mfano, anasema: ‘Mwezi huenda ni halisi.’308 Pia anataja kwamba nafasi na wakati ni vipimo vya kiasi tu vilivyobuniwa na wanafizikia, ambavyo havihitaji kuwepo kwa uhalisia wowote.309 Kinachoonyesha pia upendeleo wake kwa mtazamo wake wa kimaada ni kwamba anasema wazo la kwamba ulimwengu ulianza kwa mikono ya viumbe wa kigeni ni la kimantiki zaidi kuliko wazo la Muumba.310 Katika mjadala wake kuhusu vigezo vya kikosmolojia, anasema: ‘Hesabu yoyote inayotofautiana na data kwa mizani ya 50 au 120 ya mpangilio wa ukubwa ni makosa tu na haifai kuzingatiwa kwa uzito. Tunapaswa tu kusubiri hesabu sahihi.’311 Kifungu hiki kinaonyesha msimamo wa kimsingi ambao yeye anaegemea, unaopingana na dhana ya urekebishaji sahihi wa vigezo (fine-tuning). Kinachosemwa kwa kweli ni kwamba hesabu lazima ziwe si sahihi. Kwa nini? Kwa sababu, ikiwa sivyo, ingemaanisha kwamba kiwango cha kosmolojia kimeamuliwa kweli. Katika makala yake, Barnes alionyesha upungufu katika uelewa wa Stenger kuhusu suala hili, na kwamba hakuna mgongano halisi kati ya data na hesabu za kihisabati hapa.
4. Stenger adopts philosophical views that are very problematic. His scientific positions are not consistent or aligned with such views. This can cause a lot of consternation and doubt in anyone following him with regard to the true nature of his research and whether it drips of ideological preconceptions on his part. Take, for example, his discussion on the principle of causality: ‘Let’s consider premise (1). Is it based on empirical fact? Is it a fact that everything that begins has a cause? Obviously we haven’t observed the beginning of everything, so we can’t say that everything that begins has a cause. As the great Scottish philosopher David Hume (d. 1776) pointed out in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, even when we observe one event following another, we cannot conclude that a causal relation between the two exist.’307 Such a position should make anyone who adopts it abandon anything to do with science. To not operate from this axiom, and to instead dispute it, is to go against the scientific requirement of seeking out the natural causes of phenomena. In fact, he touched upon the issue of the possible mistakes that our senses fall into – he offers as an example: ‘The Moon is probably real.’308 He also mentions that space and time are only quantitative measures concocted by physicists that do not need any real existence.309 What also exposes his partiality to his materialistic view is that he states that the idea of the inception of the universe from aliens is more rational than the notion of a Creator.310 On his discussion on the cosmological constants, he says, ‘Any calculation that disagrees with the data by 50 or 120 orders of magnitude is simply wrong and should not be taken seriously. We just have to await the correct calculation.’311 This passage reveals the position of principle he is biased towards, which goes against the notion of fine-tuning. What it is really saying is that the calculations must be wrong. Why? Because if they are not, it would mean that the cosmological constant really is determined. In his paper, Barnes highlighted the deficiency in Stenger’s understanding of the issue, and that there is no real contradiction between the data and the mathematical calculations here.
5. Katika sehemu ya 13 ya kitabu chake, Stenger alipinga dhana ya fine-tuning. Alifanya hivyo kwa kutumia programu ya kompyuta aliyoitengeneza miongo miwili iliyopita, ambayo aliipa jina ‘MonkeyGod’. Programu hii inapatikana kwenye tovuti yake binafsi. Wazo lililo nyuma yake ni kutoa aina fulani ya simulizi kuhusu ulimwengu kwa kucheza na konstanti nne za kifizikia, ambapo ingewezekana kuunda ulimwengu tofauti wa kidijitali wenye sifa tofauti kwa kubadilisha tu konstanti hizo. Stenger aliipanga programu hiyo kwa seti ya data ambayo aliamini ni muhimu kwa kuwepo kwa uhai. Programu hutoa matokeo yanayoonyesha ni ulimwengu gani wa kidijitali unaoweza kuhimili uhai, na ni ule usioweza. Barnes alikosoa kwa kina matokeo ya programu hii, akisema: ‘Tunahitimisha kwamba MonkeyGod ina kasoro kubwa sana hadi matokeo yake hayana maana.’312 Ukosoaji mmoja aliouwasilisha ni kwamba dhana ambazo Stenger alizitegemea kuhusu uwezekano wa uhai hazikuchukuliwa kutoka kwenye data sahihi, na kwamba kati ya vigezo nane vya kuruhusu uhai alivyovitegemea, ‘vitatu si sahihi, viwili havihusiani, na kimoja hakitoshi. Mengine mengi hayapo. Muhimu zaidi, dhana mbalimbali zilizochaguliwa kwa upendeleo zimejificha nyuma ya pazia, na zoezi zima linaonyesha kosa la cheap-binoculars. Tutaanza na zisizohusiana. Urefu wa siku na mwaka si vigezo vya kuruhusu uhai. Sijui makala yoyote ya fine-tuning katika fasihi ya kisayansi inayotetea kikomo kama hicho, na kwa sababu nzuri – asili na uendelevu wa aina za awali za uhai pengine hazingeathiriwa na siku au mwaka mfupi zaidi. Inawezekana kwamba viumbe wakubwa na mifumo ikolojia pekee ndiyo ingeathiriwa…’313
5. In section 13 of his book, Stenger objected to fine-tuning. He did so by resorting to the computer programme he had made two decades prior, which he had named ‘MonkeyGod’. This programme can be found on his personal website. The idea behind it is to offer a type of narrative for the universe by playing around with four physical constants, in which it would be possible to create different virtual worlds with different characteristics just by retuning those constants. Stenger programmed it with a set of data that he believed to be necessary for the existence of life. The programme offers results on which virtual worlds can support life, versus the ones that cannot. Barnes thoroughly critiqued the results of this programme, stating, ‘We conclude that MonkeyGod is so deeply flawed that its results are meaningless.’312 One critique he presented was that the assumptions Stenger based life sustainability on were not taken from precise data, and that of the eight life-permitting criteria he relied upon, ‘three are incorrect, two are irrelevant, and one is insufficient. Plenty more are missing. Most importantly, all manner of cherry-picked assumptions are lurking out of sight, and the whole exercise exemplifies the cheap-binoculars fallacy. We’ll begin with the irrelevant. The length of a day and a year are not life-permitting criteria. I know of no fine-tuning article in the scientific literature defends such a limit, and for good reason – the origin and survival of primitive forms of life probably wouldn’t be affected by a shorter day or year. Plausibly, only larger organisms and ecosystems would be influenced…’313
Ninaamini kwamba haya yanatosha kutoa picha ya baadhi ya matatizo katika pingamizi la Victor Stenger. Kwa maelezo zaidi kuhusu hili, rejea mzozo kati ya wanaume hawa wawili ambao nilioutaja katika kurasa zilizotangulia. Pia kuna tasnifu ya kitaaluma ya kuchambua kwa kina iliyoandikwa na Robin Collins yenye kichwa "Stenger's Fallacies".
I believe this is sufficient to give a picture of some of the problems in Victor Stenger’s objection. For more on this, refer to the dispute between the two men that I alluded to in the previous pages. There is also a critical dissertation by Robin Collins entitled as Stenger’s Fallacies.
There are two points that ought to be noted when answering this objection. Firstly, this way of presenting the objection is misleading. The idea of fine-tuning means that the universe we are in has life, even in spite of the probabilities of the existence of many other universes that are unsuitable for life, even if as small as a microscopic speck in a house. This is an extremely unique position to be in – by the very admission of physicists themselves, given the examples they offer. It is a position worthy of being recognised as such, the cause of which ought to be investigated. Consequently, the question here is not why there is a huge vacuum in the universe, but rather why life can be found in the universe in spite of the massive probability of it being unattainable. As thus, the fact that this level of fine-tuning exists – even if it is meagre compared to the rest of the universe – is sufficient to establish the required indication for the existence of God, even if this level of fine-tuning is not present in other places. It would be like a man ordering his children to organise and tidy up an extremely messy house and leaves. When he returns, he finds that a tiny part of the house has been tidied. Would it be possible to deny that this small part was not tidied by anyone, just because the rest of the house was still a disorganised mess?
Pili, kutojua hekima iliyo nyuma ya ulimwengu mkubwa usio na mipaka si sababu ya kutosha ya kuacha maarifa yetu kuhusu taarifa za uwepo wa uhai katika sehemu ndogo ya ulimwengu huu na kuyapuuza. Kwa kweli, baadhi ya wanafizikia wanataja kwamba data fulani muhimu kwa uwepo wa uhai zinaonyesha kuwa kuna haja ya upana huu mkubwa. Kwa mfano, katika kipindi cha podikasti ‘Conversations from the Pale Blue Dot’ kinachoitwa 11 Responses to Fine-Tuning315, Luke Barnes anataja kwamba ili ulimwengu uweze kuhifadhi uhai katika maeneo mapana zaidi, wingi wake lazima uongezeke huko pia; kama hilo likifikiwa, mvuto ungelazimika kuongezeka; na mvuto ukiongezeka, ingemaanisha kwamba mgandamizo uliofuata mara baada ya Mlipuko Mkuu ungeharakishwa. Suala hilo kwa hiyo linahitaji uchunguzi wa sababu zilizo nyuma ya upanuzi huu mkubwa, na kama una athari chanya ya jumla kwa uwepo wa uhai katika ulimwengu wetu. Suala hilo halihitaji kupuuza ugumu wa vigezo mbalimbali tunavyohitaji kwa ajili ya kuumbwa kwa ulimwengu unaoweza kudumisha uhai. Zaidi ya hayo, thamani ya vitu haipimwi kwa vipimo vya kimaada. Ingawa tunakubali kwamba ukubwa wa mwanadamu ukilinganishwa na ulimwengu huu wa ajabu ni mdogo sana, ni kipengele chake cha kiroho cha kusudi na maana kinachomfanya awe bora. Heshima na utukufu ambao Allah amempa haizuii ulimwengu huu, pamoja na yote yaliyomo ndani yake, kuumbwa kwa ajili yake. Mshairi wa Kiarabu alisema:
Secondly, the fact that we do not know the wisdom behind the expansive universe is not a sufficient justification to relinquish our knowledge of the information on the existence of life in a minute part of this universe and overlooking it. In fact, some physicists mention that some important data for the existence of life mean there is a need for this wide expanse. For example, in a ‘Conversations from the Pale Blue Dot’ podcast episode titled 11 Responses to Fine-Tuning315, Luke Barnes mentions that for the universe to accommodate life in wider regions, its mass must increase there as well; if that was achieved, gravity would have to increase; if gravity increased, it would have meant that the crunch right after the Big Bang would have been accelerated. The issue therefore requires an investigation of the causes that are behind this huge expanse, and whether it has a net positive influence on the existence of life in our universe. The issue does not need to marginalise the complexity of the various parameters we need for the creation of a universe that can sustain life. Furthermore, the value of things is not measured in material dimensions. Though we acknowledge that the size of man compared to this awesome cosmos is insignificant, it is man’s spiritual element of purpose and meaning that makes him superior. The esteem and honour that Allah has given him does not prevent this universe, with all that is in it, from being created for his sake. The Arab poet said:
Unafikiri wewe ni mwili mdogo, lakini ulimwengu mkubwa zaidi umo ndani yako.
You think you are of a small body Yet the largest world is represented in you.
Ni dhahiri kwamba wanaoamini kuwa hakuna Mungu huona mwanadamu kwa namna ya kudharau, kana kwamba si chochote zaidi ya ajali ya kibaiolojia. Wao huona makazi yake ya mwisho kuwa ni ya spishi inayoelekea bila shaka kwenye maangamizi. Alitoka kwenye maangamizi (kutokuwepo) na mwisho wake ni maangamizi (kifo), wakati wote huo bila kuwa na thamani yoyote ya lengo au kusudi la kuishi.
It is obvious that atheists see man in this derogatory fashion, as if he is nothing more than a biological accident. They view his ultimate abode as being that of a species that is inevitably heading to annihilation. He came from annihilation (non existence) and his destination is annihilation (death), all the while without possessing any objective value or purpose to live.
kuzuia, fanya iwe nukta ya bluu. Sasa rudia utaratibu huo kiholela mara nyingi upendavyo mpaka karatasi ijae nukta. Matokeo yake ni bahari ya bluu yenye nukta chache tu za nyekundu. Hiyo ndiyo maana ni jambo lisilowezekana kabisa kwamba Ulimwengu uwe unaoruhusu uhai. Kwa hakika, katika eneo letu la karibu la ulimwengu zinazowezekana, kuna ulimwengu mwingi zaidi unaozuia uhai kuliko ulimwengu unaoruhusu uhai.317
prohibiting, make it a blue dot. Now repeat the procedure arbitrarily many times until the sheet is filled with dots. What one winds up with is a sea of blue with only a few pinpoints of red. That is the sense in which it is overwhelmingly improbable that the Universe should be life-permitting. There are simply vastly more life-prohibiting universes in our local area of possible universes than there are life permitting universes.317
Kwa kweli, ni dhahiri kwamba uwezekano wa kuona ubora wa usanifu hautegemei kwa lazima kama inawezekana kulinganisha jambo hilo na machafuko, ili tujue kama kile kilicho mbele yetu kimebuniwa kwa ustadi au la. Ubora ni hali inayoweza kutambuliwa katika visa vingi bila kujua jinsi kinyume chake kingeonekana. Kwa ujumla, mtazamo wa aina hii hufunga mlango wa utafiti wa kisayansi kuhusu chanzo cha mara kwa mara hizi za kimaumbile zilivyo. Mtu mwenye mtazamo kama huo angesema, ‘Ni vile tu ilivyo, na ndivyo hivyo.’ Kwa kweli, aina hii ya kufikiri hufunga pia uwezekano wowote wa kumshawishi upande mwingine juu ya kuwepo kwa Allah ﷻ, kwani inaweza kuibua wazo kwamba jambo hili lipo katika ulimwengu wetu tu, na kwamba hatuwezi kufika katika ulimwengu mwingine ili kuthibitisha jinsi ulimwengu wetu ulivyo wa pekee au wa kipekee. Kwa mfano, tukigundua kwamba msimbo wa jeni wa binadamu una alama ya ‘Imeumbwa na Allah’ ndani yake, ni uwezekano kwamba mpinzani huyu atapinga hata hivyo. Hakutakuwa na njia ya kujua kama jambo hili ni la kipekee lililoweza kutoka tu kwa Mtendaji Mwenye Uwezo Wote na Mwenye Mapenzi, au kama ni la kawaida kwa ulimwengu tunamoishi.
In fact, it is self-evident that the possibility of observing mastery is not necessarily dependent on whether or not a comparison can be conducted between it and chaos, just in order for us to learn whether what is in front of us is masterfully designed or not. Mastery is a state that can be recognised in most instances without knowing what the opposite of it would look like. Generally speaking, such a train of thought shuts down the door to scientific research on the cause behind these constants in the way they are. A person of such a mentality would say, ‘It is as it is and that’s it.’ In fact, this type of thought process shuts down any possibility to convince the other side of the existence of Allah , as it might invoke the notion that this matter is extant in our universe, and we cannot come across other universes to verify how exceptional or unique our universe is. For instance, if we discover that the human genetic code has ‘Made by Allah’ imprinted onto it, it would be probable that this opponent will even dispute that is the case. There would be no way to know whether this is an exceptional matter that could have only come from an Omnipotent and Willing Doer, or whether it is natural for the universe that we are living in.
Closely linked to this objection is the weak anthropic principle, which in itself is the oddest and flimsiest of all atheist theses, even though it is quite widespread. As mentioned before, the anthropic principle is the notion that a degree of calibration in this cosmos is necessary for the emergence of man, without which we would not have existed. The question on the back of this would be: So what caused our universe to be as it is? As for the weak anthropic principle, it is confined to a small part of the principle without entering into the maze of questions that would ensue as a result. It says this: Had the universe not been calibrated in the precise manner it has been, we would not have come into existence to speak about it. In other words: Because we exist, the universe must have been finely-tuned for us to exist. Consequently, the probability of our existence in a universe that allows us to live is actually 100%, and it is therefore not surprising or questionable at all why we came into existence. John Leslie highlights the problem of this objection through this example: Imagine a man was presented for execution. When he was brought to the gallows, and before his eyes closed, he saw a hundred expert snipers in front of him, all of whom had trained their rifles on him. He shut his eyes, and then heard the sound of fire as the rifles were shot. He held his breath as he thought he was about to die, but he felt nothing. He felt his body, and noticed he had not been impacted by even one bullet. Is it possible that this could have occurred by accident? Note that the snipers were experts, and it is highly unlikely they could have all missed. He started to think: 'Perhaps they conspired not to kill me, or perhaps someone bribed them all to miss, or perhaps there was some other reason.' The blindfold was removed from him. It turned out he was among a hundred other people, and the number of people to be executed was 101. Bila shaka, katika hali hii, mtu bado angekuwa hai.318
Closely linked to this objection is the weak anthropic principle, which in itself is the oddest and flimsiest of all atheist theses, even though it is quite widespread. As mentioned before, the anthropic principle is the notion that a degree of calibration in this cosmos is necessary for the emergence of man, without which we would not have existed. The question on the back of this would be: So what caused our universe to be as it is? As for the weak anthropic principle, it is confined to a small part of the principle without entering into the maze of questions that would ensue as a result. It says this: Had the universe not been calibrated in the precise manner it has been, we would not have come into existence to speak about it. In other words: Because we exist, the universe must have been finely-tuned for us to exist. Consequently, the probability of our existence in a universe that allows us to live is actually 100%, and it is therefore not surprising or questionable at all why we came into existence. John Leslie highlights the problem of this objection through this example: Imagine a man was presented for execution. When he was brought to the gallows, and before his eyes closed, he saw a hundred expert snipers in front of him, all of whom had trained their rifles on him. He shut his eyes, and then heard the sound of fire as the rifles were shot. He held his breath as he thought he was about to die, but he felt nothing. He felt his body, and noticed he had not been impacted by even one bullet. Is it possible that this could have occurred by accident? Note that the snipers were experts, and it is highly unlikely they could have all missed. He started to think: ‘Perhaps they conspired not to kill me, or perhaps someone bribed them all to miss, or perhaps there was some other reason.’ The blindfold was removed from him. It turned out he was among a hundred other people, and the number of people to be executed was 101. Of course, in this case, one would still be alive.318
Njia ya busara katika jambo hili ni kutafuta sababu iliyofanya yeye asiuawe. Hata hivyo, kwa mujibu wa pingamizi za wenye shaka, hakuna haja ya kushangazwa kwamba bado yuko hai na kwamba risasi zote zilimkosa, kwa sababu angekuwa amekufa lau angepigwa. Hii ndiyo hoja yenye tatizo ya mtazamo huu uliorahisishwa kupita kiasi: Hatupaswi kushangazwa na idadi hiyo kubwa ya uwezekano mbele ya upangaji sahihi wa ulimwengu, kwa sababu wewe upo hapa kuuona. Ingekuwa kama mtu aliyeshinda kamari mara elfu moja mfululizo. Tukiuliza ameshindaje pesa hizi zote kwa namna hii, je, ingekuwa jibu la kushawishi kusema, ‘Alishinda pesa hizi kwa sababu alishinda mchezo kila mara alipocheza – lau asingeshinda mchezo, asingeshinda pesa hizi’?
The rational position on this would be to find out the cause of why he was not killed. However, as per the objection of the sceptics, there is no need to be surprised that he is still alive and that all bullets missed him, because he would have been dead had he been hit. This is the problematic point of this overly simplistic train of thought: We must not be surprised at that huge number of probabilities in the face of the precise calibration of the cosmos, because you are there to see it. It would be just like a man who won at gambling a thousand times in a row – if we ask how he won all this money in this manner, would it be convincing to say, ‘He won this money because he won the game every time he played it – had he not won the game, he would not have won it’?
Ukweli ni kwamba aina hii ya pingamizi inakwepa swali lenye uhalali mkubwa la kwa nini uwezekano huu dhaifu wa ulimwengu kuwa na usawa mzuri kama ulivyo ulipatikana, ikilinganishwa na uwezekano usio na kikomo wa ulimwengu usio na usawa. Martin Rees alisema, ‘Jibu moja la kiakili ni kwamba tusingeweza kuwepo kama sheria zingekuwa na matokeo ya kuchosha. Sisi kwa hakika tupo hapa, kwa hiyo hakuna cha kushangaza.’ Lakini, ‘Kwa bahati mbaya jibu hili linaniacha sijaridhika. Ninavutiwa na mfano maarufu uliotolewa na mwanafalsafa John Leslie...’319
The fact is that this type of objection is evading the quite legitimate question of why this weak possibility for the finely balanced universe being the way it is was found, in comparison to the infinite probabilities of imbalanced universes. Martin Rees said, ‘One hardheaded response is that we couldn’t exist if the laws had boring consequences. We manifestly are here, so there is nothing to be surprised about. I’m afraid this leaves me unsatisfied. I’m impressed by a well known analogy given by the philosopher John Leslie...’319
Hizi ndizo pingamizi zenye nguvu zaidi dhidi ya dhana kwamba ulimwengu umepangwa kwa usahihi wa hali ya juu (fine-tuned). Ningetarajia watu wengi wasingepinga hili. Hisia zetu za asili na ukweli wa kisayansi vyote vinaelekeza kwake. Lau ulimwengu wetu ungekuwa hauna athari yoyote ya upangaji huo wa usahihi, ungekuwa tofauti sana na ulivyo. Kwa kweli, pengine tusingekuwepo hata sisi kujadili tofauti hiyo.
These are the most salient objections to the concept of the universe being finely-tuned. I would think most people would not dispute this. Both sensory instinctiveness and scientific facts suggest it. Had our universe been devoid of any effect of fine-tuning, it would have been substantially different from what it is. In fact, we would not have been here to discuss this difference to begin with.
I remember discussing this once with some youth who had been influenced by atheism. One of them raised an objection that was so brazenly inspired by the above argument. After a lengthy discussion, he admitted that coincidence is not suitable as an explanation for the manifestations of complexity, composition, and mastery in our existence. He said to me, ‘The complexity we see today in the universe and living beings could not have really come into existence simply in one go out of coincidence. However, what if all of this in the beginning was simple, but then with the passing of time, evolved until it became what we now see to be complex compositions? It would be impossible that man, for example, just left the water in one go because of random chemical reactions; however, that a cell left by chance would be more plausible, which then started to gradually evolve until various living beings – including man – emerged.’ Away from debating the details of whether there ever was a simple cell, how plausible it was for existence to appear as an accident, or that it was the beginning of all life, the basic idea of evolution is very clear. The ‘Dangerous Idea’ (as expressed by Daniel Dennett in the title of his book) of Charles Darwin’s theory is that complex systems can gradually emerge over a lengthy period of time – it is not necessary that they come into existence in one go.
Hii si mahali pa majadiliano ya kina kuhusu nadharia ya Darwin au pingamizi zinazoweza kutolewa dhidi ya baadhi ya maelezo yake. Hilo lingehitaji utafiti tofauti kabisa, kama mtu yeyote mwenye shauku ya suala hili anavyoweza kutambua. Ninachotaka kulenga ni kuchunguza uhusiano kati ya nadharia hii na dhana ya kuwepo kwa Allah. Kwa maneno mengine, je, nadharia hii kweli ni pingamizi la maana dhidi ya wazo kwamba ubora na usafi usio na dosari ni dalili ya kuwepo kwa Allah? Pengine ninaweza kufupisha suala hili katika mambo yafuatayo:
This is not the place for a detailed discussion on Darwin’s theory or the objections that can be laid at some of its details. This would require an entirely separate piece of research, as can be appreciated by anyone who has some interest in this issue. What I want to focus on is to scrutinise the connection between this theory and the concept of Allah’s existence. In other words, does this theory really comprise of a reasonable objection against the notion that mastery and immaculateness are indicative of the existence of Allah ? Perhaps I can summarise this issue into the following points:
1. Je, kuna uhusiano wa asili kati ya Udarwini na kutokuamini Mungu? Hili ni suala lenye mjadala mkubwa katika mazungumzo ya Magharibi. Nimeona filamu ndefu kuhusu jambo hili, pamoja na mdahalo kati ya Kenneth Miller na Ursula Goodenough uliopewa kichwa Does Evolution Imply Atheism?, na vitabu kadhaa. Richard Dawkins anasisitiza kwamba kuna uhusiano kati ya nadharia ya mageuzi na kutokuamini Mungu. Hata anadai kwamba safari yake ya kutokuamini Mungu ilianza kupitia nadharia hiyo. Hata hivyo, je, uhusiano huo ni wa kweli kiasi hicho? Inaonekana kwamba hakuna uhusiano wa lazima kati ya hayo mawili. Tunaona kwamba wapo wengi wanaoamini Mungu ambao pia wanaamini katika mageuzi. Zaidi ya hayo, Darwin mwenyewe hakuwa asiye na imani alipoandika kazi yake muhimu ya biolojia ya mageuzi, On the Origin of Species. Kwa hiyo nadharia yenyewe haikuwa sababu ya yeye kukataa Mwenyezi Mungu; badala yake, kutokuamini kwake kulikuja baadaye maishani mwake, wakati mmoja wa binti zake alipofariki, jambo lililomfanya ashikwe na tatizo la uovu na haki ya Mungu. Swali linapaswa kuulizwa upya: Je, hili ni ushahidi wa kutosha kuonyesha kwamba hakuna uhusiano halisi kati ya nadharia ya mageuzi na kutokuamini Mungu? Kwa maneno mengine, je, wanaoamini Mungu na pia mageuzi wanakabiliwa na mkinzano wa kisayansi? Au uwepo wa wanamageuzi wanaoamini Mungu unatosha kuonyesha kwamba hakuna kiungo kati ya hayo mawili? Kwangu, inaonekana kwamba hakuna kiungo, si kwa sababu watu hao wapo, wala hata kwa kiwango cha nadharia, bali kwa sababu hakuna kizuizi cha kimantiki kinachomzuia mtu kumwamini Allah na pia kuamini nadharia ya mageuzi. Hili litafafanuliwa zaidi katika nukta inayofuata.
1. Is there an inherent correlation between Darwinism and atheism? This is a point of contention in Western discourse. I have seen a lengthy documentary on this, as well as a discussion between Kenneth Miller and Ursula Goodenough titled Does Evolution Imply Atheism?, and a number of books. Richard Dawkins insists there is a link between the theory of evolution and atheism. In fact, he asserts that his journey of atheism began through the theory. However, is that correlation really so? It would appear that there is no necessary link between the two. We see that there are many theists who also believe in evolution. In fact, Darwin himself was not an atheist when he wrote his seminal work on evolutionary biology, On the Origin of Species. As thus, the theory per se was not a cause for him denying Allah; rather, his atheism came about later in his life when one of his daughters died, through which he became gripped by the problem of evil and divine justice. The question must be restated: Is this sufficient evidence to demonstrate that there is no actual correlation between the theory of evolution and atheism? In other words, are evolutionary theists prey to scientific contradiction? Or is the presence of theist evolutionists sufficient to show that there is no link between the two? It would seem to me that there is no link, though not because such people exist or even at a theoretical level, but rather because there is no rational block which prevents someone from believing in Allah and also believing in the theory of evolution. This can be clarified further in the next point.
2. Nadharia ya Darwin inalenga mifumo ya kibaiolojia. Ingawa mifumo hii ni dhihirisho la umahiri, au kama Dawkins anavyosema katika kitabu chake The Blind Watchmaker: 'Biolojia ni utafiti wa mambo tata yanayoonekana kana kwamba yalibuniwa kwa kusudi fulani.' 170
2. Darwinism focuses on biological systems. Though these systems are manifestations of mastery, or as Dawkins puts it in his book The Blind Watchmaker: ‘Biology is the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a 170
Jambo la mjadala hapa si muundo wenyewe kama ulivyo, bali ni swali hili: je, muundo unatoa tu hisia ya kuwa na kusudi, au je, kweli ulibuniwa kwa kusudi fulani? Vyovyote iwavyo, ishara za ustadi, ubora, usafi usio na dosari, na ukuu zinaenda mbali zaidi ya uwanja wa biolojia. Nadharia ya Darwin haina uhusiano wowote na nyanja hizo nyingine, ingawa baadhi ya watu, kwa maneno yao ya kuvutia, wanaweza kupenda kuiingiza nadharia hiyo katika nyanja hizo pia. Kwa mfano, vigezo vya ulimwengu, sheria za fizikia zinazoupanga, hali za mwanzo kabisa wa kuwepo kwake, kiasi cha maada, na mambo mengine yanayoundwa ndani yake havihusiani kabisa na nadharia ya mageuzi. Nadharia ya Darwin haiwezi kutoa maelezo kuhusu masuala haya. Kinachoweza kusemwa kwa kiwango cha juu, hata kama kingekuwa kweli, ni kwamba nadharia ya Darwin inatoa maelezo ya eneo dogo tu katika sayansi, si ukamilifu wa kuwepo. Licha ya hayo, nadharia ya Darwin haikanushi nafasi ya Mwenyezi Mungu, hata katika uwanja wa biolojia, kama tutakavyojadili hivi punde. Ndiyo maana ilikuwa ni chuki kubwa kwa upande wa Richard Dawkins kuipa kitabu chake The Blind Watchmaker kichwa kidogo: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe Without Design.
purpose’320, design per se is not the point of dispute here. What is the point of dispute here is whether design merely gives the impression of purpose, or whether it was indeed designed for a purpose? Whatever the case, the signs of mastery, brilliance, immaculateness, and magnificence go well beyond the field of biology. Darwinism has nothing to do with those other fields, even though some – with clever rhetoric – may like to interpolate Darwinism into those subject areas as well. For example, the universe constants, the laws of physics that organise it, the circumstances of its very first moments, the quantities of matter, and other things that are formed in it have no bearing on the theory of evolution at all. Darwinism is unable to offer an explanation for these issues. The most that can be said, even if it were true, is that Darwinism offers an explanation of a limited space in science, not the entirety of existence. In spite of this, Darwinism does not negate the role of God, even in the biological space, as will be discussed momentarily. This is why it was quite the exaggeration on Richard Dawkins’s part to subtitle his book The Blind Watchmaker with: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe Without Design.
3. Inawezekana kiakili kwamba nadharia hii ni sehemu ya mbinu ya Allah katika mchakato wa uumbaji, na kwamba Yeye alitumia mageuzi (evolution) kuumba jenasi na spishi mbalimbali. Ingawa uumbaji wa Adam ﷺ umeamuliwa na maandiko kwa mujibu wa Uislamu, bado inawezekana kiakili kwamba viumbe hai wengine – katika ufalme wa wanyama na ufalme wa mimea – waliumbwa kwa njia hii. Sioni chochote katika dini kinachozuia dhana ya mageuzi kwa falme hizi mbili. Hata hivyo, inapaswa kusisitizwa kwamba kitu kuwa kinawezekana haimaanishi kwamba kilitokea kweli, kwa kuwa hilo lingehitaji ushahidi na hoja ili kuthibitisha uhakika wake na matumizi yake katika uhalisia – ushahidi ambao sioni ukija. Kinyume chake, ninachoona ni kwamba nadharia ya mageuzi ina mapungufu mengi, na iko katika mkwamo mkubwa. Narudia kujiepusha na kuingia katika maelezo na pingamizi hizi, kwa kuwa hilo lingekuwa refu mno kwa majadiliano; mada kama hiyo inapaswa kushughulikiwa katika kitabu cha pekee. Hata hivyo, ninapaswa kutaja kwa ufupi baadhi ya pingamizi kuu zaidi.
3. It is rationally possible that this theory is part of the method of Allah in the process of creating, and that He used evolution to create various genera and species. Though the creation of Adam has been decided by scripture insofar as Islam is concerned, it remains rationally possible that other living beings – in both the animal and the plant kingdoms – were created in this manner. I cannot see anything in the religion that would prevent the notion of evolution for these two kingdoms. However, it should be pointed out that just because something is possible, it does not mean it actually occurred, for that would require evidence and reasoning in order to demonstrate its veracity and real-life applications – evidence I do not see forthcoming. To the contrary, what I do see is that the theory of evolution has many holes in it, and is in a serious quandary. I once again excuse myself from delving into these details and objections, as that would be too lengthy for a discussion; such a topic should be dealt with in a standalone book. However, I should quickly mention some of the more salient objections.
Pingamizi moja la kuchekesha ni lile alilolitaja mtu asiyejua kama Mungu yupo, David Berlinski:
One humorous objection is what the agnostic David Berlinski mentioned:
Hoja ya kuvutia kuhusu nyangumi, ambaye ni mamalia baada ya yote — yuko katika kundi moja la viumbe kama mbwa, binadamu, sokwe, au chui — hoja ya kuvutia kuhusu nyangumi ni kwamba, ikiwa asili yake ilikuwa nchi kavu hapo awali, basi tuna njia fulani ya kupima kwa kiasi — si kwa ubora — ukubwa wa mradi wa mabadiliko. Mradi huo ni rahisi sana — hebu tuuweke kwa maneno yanayoonekana wazi. Una ng'ombe. Unataka kumfundisha aishi maisha yake yote katika bahari kuu, huku akiendelea kuwa na sifa zake za kupumua hewa. Ni nini unachopaswa kufanya kwa mtazamo wa uhandisi ili kumgeuza ng'ombe kuwa nyangumi? Hili ni la kawaida tu, lakini linakupa wazo muhimu.
Sasa, ikiwa swali hilo hilo lingeulizwa kuhusu gari, na ungeuliza itachukua nini kubadilisha gari kuwa manowari, tungeelewa mara moja kwamba itachukua mabadiliko mengi; mradi huo ni mradi mkubwa wa uhandisi wa kubuni upya na kuzoea. Vivyo hivyo swali hilo linajitokeza kuhusu yule ng'ombe maarufu. Karibu kila sifa ya ng'ombe inapaswa kubadilishwa, kuzoewa. Lakini kwa kuwa tunajua kwamba maisha duniani na maisha majini ni shughuli tofauti kabisa, tuna wazo la idadi ya mabadiliko hayo. Kila wakati sayansi inapokwepa kukabiliana na namba, huingia kwa namna fulani katika ukungu ambao, ingawa hauepukiki, kwa hakika si wa kuvutia. Hapa kuna fursa ya kweli ya kuweka namba katika mahesabu. Hatuzungumzii jenetiki — tunazungumzia namba rahisi. Ngozi inapaswa kubadilika kabisa — ni lazima iwe isiyopitisha maji. Hilo ni badiliko moja. Mfumo wa kupumua unapaswa kubadilika. Mfumo wa kupiga mbizi unapaswa kuwekwa. Mifumo ya kunyonyesha inapaswa kubuniwa. Macho yanapaswa kulindwa. Kusikia kunapaswa kubadilishwa. Viungo vya mate vinapaswa kubadilishwa. Mifumo ya ulaji inapaswa kubadilishwa. Baada ya yote, ng'ombe hula nyasi; nyangumi hali. Kama nilivyosema, nimejaribu kufanya baadhi ya hesabu hizi. Hesabu zenyewe si ngumu. Lakini zinavutia kwa sababu nilisimama kwenye 50,000, yaani mabadiliko ya kimofolojia. Na tusisahau kwamba mabadiliko haya hayajitegemei; yote yameunganishwa. Ukibadilisha mfumo wa kuona wa kiumbe, lazima ubadilishe sehemu nyingi za cerebellum yake, cerebrum yake, na mfumo wake wa neva. Mabadiliko haya yote yanaratibiwa pamoja. Kwa hiyo tunapozungumzia mfuatano wa mageuzi kama huu, jambo la kuvutia kuhusu mpito wa ng'ombe-kwenda-nyangumi, na ninatumia tu hili kama wazo rahisi kulielewa, ni kwamba mazingira tofauti yanaweka vikwazo vikali vya muundo juu ya mfuatano wowote unaowezekana wa mageuzi. Vikwazo hivi vinatimizwaje ikiwa ni takriban 50,000? Ikiwa ni vikwazo milioni mbili, vinatimizwaje? Na hili linaashiria nini kuhusu tunachopaswa kuona katika rekodi ya visukuku? Kwa mtazamo wangu, ikiwa dhana za Darwin ni sahihi, hili linapaswa kuashiria wingi mkubwa wa wanyama wa kati kati ya, sema, Ambulocetus na hatua inayofuata. Hilo halitatatua matatizo yote; mtu angependa kujua nini kinaongoza mabadiliko haya, kama kuna chochote. Lakini angalau litaiweka katika kiwango cha makadirio ya kiasi, jambo ambalo karibu halifanywi kamwe.321
The interesting argument about the whale, which is a mammal after all – it belongs to the same group of organisms as a dog, a human being, a chimpanzee, or a tiger – the interesting argument about a whale is that if its origins were land-based originally, then we have some crude way of assessing quantitatively – not qualitatively – but quantitatively the scope of the project of transformation. The project is very simple – let’s put it in vividly accessible terms. You’ve got a cow. You want to teach it how to live all of its life in the open ocean, still retaining its air-breathing characteristics. What do you have to do from an engineering point of view to change the cow into a whale? This is crude, but it gives you the essential idea. Now if the same question were raised with respect to a car and you asked what it would take to change a car into a submarine, we would understand immediately it would take a great many changes, the project is a massive engineering project of redesign and adaptation. Well the same question occurs with respect to that proverbial cow. Virtually every feature of the cow has to be changed, has to be adapted. But since we know that life on Earth and life in the water are fundamentally different enterprises, we have some sense of the number of changes. You know, anytime a science avoids coming to grips with numbers, it’s somehow immersing itself in perhaps an unavoidable but certainly an unattractive miasma. Here’s a chance actually to put some numbers on calculations. We’re not talking about genetics – we’re talking about simple numbers. The skin has to change completely – it has to become impermeable to water. That’s one change. Breathing apparatus has to change. A diving apparatus has to be put in place. Lactation systems have to be designed. The eyes have to be protected. The hearing has to be altered. Salivary organs have to be changed. Feeding mechanisms have to be changed. After all, a cow eats grass; a whale doesn’t. As I say, I’ve tried to do some of these calculations. The calculations are certainly not hard. But they’re interesting because I stopped at 50,000 – that is morphological changes. And don’t forget these changes are not independent – they’re all linked: if you change an organism’s visual system, you have to change a great many parts of its cerebellum, its cerebrum, its nervous system. All of these changes are coordinated. So when we’re talking about an evolutionary sequence such as this, what’s interesting about the cow-to-whale transition – and I’m just using this as an easily accessible idea – what’s interesting about the cow-to-whale transition is that we can see a different environment is going to impose severe design constraints on a possible evolutionary sequence. How are these constraints met if they’re roughly 50,000? If they’re two million constraints, how are those meant? And what does this suggest about what we should see in the fossil record? To my way of thinking, if Darwinian hypotheses are correct, it should suggest an enormous plethora of intermediary animals between say ambulocetus and the next step. That won’t solve all problems – one wants to know what’s directing this change, if anything. But at least it will put it in the ballpark of a quantitative estimate, which is hardly ever done.’321
Tatizo hapa ni kwamba rekodi za visukuku (fossils) hazisaidii kuunganisha viungo vinavyokosekana kati ya kile nadharia ya mageuzi inachokieleza kuwa maumbo ya awali na maumbo yaliyobadilika. Hii ni kasoro kubwa katika nadharia ya Darwin. Bila shaka, wanadarwinia wataonyesha baadhi ya viungo vya kati na kudai wamepata kumi kati yake. Hata hivyo, idadi hii ni ndogo sana ikilinganishwa na kile ambacho kingepaswa kugunduliwa kwa swali muhimu kama hili. Viungo vingine vya kati viko wapi?
Ni sawa na mtu anayempiga picha mtoto wake kila siku kwa miaka kadhaa, kisha akazikusanya kuwa video ya mwendo wa haraka ili mabadiliko ya taratibu ya uso na mwili wa mtoto yaonekane. Isingekuwa tatizo kama baadhi ya picha hapa na pale zingekosekana, kwa sababu hali ya taratibu ya mabadiliko bado ingeonekana katika albamu ya video ya mwisho. Hili ndilo lilipaswa kutokea kwa nadharia ya mageuzi. Rekodi za visukuku ni sawa na mfululizo wa picha zinazoonyesha mchakato wa taratibu wa mageuzi. Tatizo ni kwamba idadi ya "picha" zilizohifadhiwa ni ndogo sana kuliko idadi ya picha ambazo zimetambuliwa, hivyo viungo vilivyopotea vinakuwa ndivyo vya kawaida, si ubaguzi wa kanuni.
Tatizo hili lilimfanya mwanamageuzi maarufu Stephen Jay Gould na mwanapaleontolojia Niles Eldredge kupendekeza mfano wa mageuzi unaotegemea dhana ya vipindi vya kuruka ghafla, ambavyo waliviita 'punctuated equilibrium' (usawa uliokatizwa). Mfano huu unasema kwamba mageuzi hayatokei kwa mfululizo katika kipindi kirefu kama inavyoeleweka sana, bali katika mfululizo wa 'kuruka' katika vipindi vifupi vya muda, ambavyo kisha hukatizwa na vipindi virefu vya utulivu – au kukwama (stasis) – kwa spishi. Wao wanasema kwamba rekodi za visukuku hazijarekodi mabadiliko ya taratibu kwa sababu ya mzunguko huu wa 'kukwama kwa muda mrefu na mageuzi ya haraka'. Katika mfano huu, mageuzi yangeweza kutokea kutoka hatua A hadi hatua Z kwa mfululizo wa kuruka, huku dirisha la mageuzi halisi likiwa finyu sana, tofauti na mtazamo wa kawaida kuhusu mageuzi. Ingawa suluhisho hili linajibu swali moja, linafungua mlango wa matatizo mengine makubwa zaidi, na hilo ndilo linaloeleza kwa nini mfano huu wa mageuzi haujapata kukubalika sana. Zaidi ya hayo, Gould mwenyewe alibadili mtazamo wake kuelekea mwisho wa maisha yake.
The problem here is that fossil records are not helpful in putting together the missing links in between what the evolution theory describes as first forms and evolved forms. This is a major flaw in Darwinist theory. Of course, Darwinists will show some intermediary links and claim – for example – they have found ten of them. However, this is an extremely meagre number compared to what should have actually been discovered for what is such a critical question. Where are the rest of the intermediary links? It is like someone who takes a daily photograph of their child for several years, and then makes them into a motion video so the gradual changes in the child’s face and body can be seen as a time lapse. It would not be problematic if some pictures here and there were missing, as the gradual nature of change would still be reflected in the final video album. This is exactly what should have happened with the theory of evolution. Fossil records are tantamount to a series of images that showcase the gradual evolutionary process. The problem here is that the quantity of preserved ‘images’ is far less than the number of images that have been identified, thus rendering the lost links to be the rule, not the exception to the rule. This problem led the famous evolutionist Stephen Jay Gould and the palaeontologist Niles Eldredge to propose an evolutionary model that is based on the notion of sudden jump phases, which they named ‘punctuated equilibrium’. It states that evolution does not continuously occur over a long period as is widely understood, but rather in a series of ‘jumps’ over short periods of time which are then punctuated by lengthy periods of stability – or stasis – of the species. They argue that fossil records have not recorded a gradual change because of this ‘lengthy stasis and rapid evolution’ cycle. In this model, it would be possible for evolution to take place from point A to point Z in a series of leaps, with the window of actual evolution being extremely narrow, as opposed to the conventional view of evolution. Though this solution answers one question, it opens up a can of worms and introduces greater problems, all of which explains why this model of evolution has not gained wider acceptance. In fact, Gould himself retracted his view towards the end of his life.
Tatizo jingine linahusiana na mageuzi makubwa (macroevolution), yaani mageuzi ya taksa zilizo juu ya ngazi ya spishi (kama jenasi, familia, oda, n.k.). Mageuzi yanamaanisha mabadiliko katika kipindi fulani cha muda, na yanaweza kutokea ndani ya spishi moja. Kwa mfano, mbwa wanaweza kubadilika na kuzoea ukubwa, urefu, umbo, rangi na sifa nyingine zao. Hii inaweza pia kujumuisha mbwa kubadilika kutoka kwa canids wa kale, na hivyo kutofautiana na spishi ya mbwa mwitu. Aina hii ya mageuzi inaitwa microevolution (mageuzi madogo), na inaweza kuonekana. Hii si tatizo kubwa, kwa sababu masharti na zana zinazosababisha aina hii ya mageuzi zinajulikana.
Tatizo ni mageuzi yanayopendekeza mfuatano wa 'majini → nusu-majini → reptilia → mamalia → ndege'. Katika mtazamo wa Darwin, binadamu anasemekana kuwa alitokana na viumbe vya majini. Tatizo hapa liko katika dhana kwamba binadamu anashiriki babu mmoja na nzi, mimea, na hata bakteria, kwa kuwa wote ni sehemu ya mti wa mageuzi unaotawanyika. Nadharia hii inadai kwamba mageuzi makubwa kama hayo yalitokana na mabadiliko madogo madogo kwa mamilioni ya miaka. Uwezekano wa mageuzi haya ulikuwa kiasi gani? Ni masharti gani yaliyosukuma kundi fulani la viumbe hai kutoka jenasi moja kuingia katika jenasi nyingine? Hili ni jambo ambalo Darwinism haijalimudu vizuri, kwa sababu tatizo liko katika kama mfuatano kama huo wa mabadiliko uliwahi kutokea kwa viumbe vyote hai.
Mwanasayansi wa mageuzi Gerald A. Kerkut anatofautisha kati ya kile anachokiita 'Nadharia ya Jumla ya Mageuzi' (General Theory of Evolution) na 'Nadharia Mahsusi ya Mageuzi' (Specific Theory of Evolution). Ya mwisho inahusu phyla mpya; ya kwanza inahusu jinsi phyla tofauti zinavyorudi kwenye mzizi mmoja wa pamoja. Akisema kwamba 'Nadharia ya Jumla ya Mageuzi' ni dhana tu, anasema, "Nadharia hii inaweza kuitwa 'Nadharia ya Jumla ya Mageuzi' na ushahidi unaoiunga mkono si imara vya kutosha kuturuhusu kuichukulia kuwa zaidi ya dhana ya kufanyia kazi." Haijulikani wazi kama mabadiliko yanayosababisha kutokea kwa spishi mpya ni ya aina moja na yale yaliyosababisha kuibuka kwa phyla mpya [mgawanyiko mkuu wa viumbe hai, ambao ni takriban 80, ikiwa ni pamoja na vijidudu]. Jibu litapatikana katika kazi ya majaribio ya baadaye, na si kwa madai ya kidogma kwamba Nadharia ya Jumla ya Mageuzi lazima iwe sahihi kwa sababu hakuna nyingine itakayoweza kuchukua nafasi yake kwa kuridhisha.'322
Another problem is in relation to macroevolution, which is evolution of taxa above the species level (like genera, families, orders, etc.). Evolution denotes change over a specific period of time, which can occur in one species. For example, dogs can change and adapt their size, length, shape, colour, and other features. This may also potentially include dogs evolving out of ancient canids, thus diverging from the wolf species. Such evolution is referred to as microevolution, which can be observed. This is not as problematic, and the conditions and tools to bring about this type of evolution are known. What is problematic is the evolution that suggests the ‘aquatics → semiaquatics → reptiles → mammals → birds’ evolution model. In the Darwinist model, humans are said to have evolved from aquatic forms. The problem here lies in the notion that humans share a common ancestor with flies, plants, and even bacteria, as they are all part of the evolutionary tree that is branching out. The theory postulates that such large-scale evolution was a result of slight changes over millions of years. What was the probability of this evolution? What were the conditions that pushed a class of living beings out from one genus into another? This is something that Darwinism has not coped well with, as the problem lies in whether such a series of changes ever occurred for all living creatures. The evolutionist Gerald A. Kerkut makes a distinction between what he calls the ‘General Theory of Evolution’ and ‘Specific Theory of Evolution’. The latter is in relation to new phyla; the former is about how different phyla go back to a common root. Asserting that the ‘General Theory of Evolution’ is just a hypothesis, he says, This theory can be called the “General Theory of Evolution” and the evidence that supports it is not sufficiently strong to allow us to consider it as anything more than a working hypothesis. It is not clear whether the changes that bring about speciation are of the same nature as those that brought about the development of new phyla [major divisions of living things, of which there are about 80, including microbes]. The answer will be found in future experimental work and not by the dogmatic assertions that the General Theory of Evolution must be correct because there is nothing else that will satisfactorily take its place.’322
Kwa hiyo tuanze kuelewa jinsi jambo hili lingekuwa gumu: kuundwa kwa spishi mpya kabisa hakuhitaji kurekebisha upya taarifa zilizomo kwenye msimbo wa jeni, wala kuchochea mabadiliko ya kubahatisha ndani yake, ambayo mara nyingi yangekuwa na madhara. Safari ya kimaendeleo tu kutoka kwa vijidudu hadi binadamu inahitaji kuundwa kwa mifumo mipya na tata ya taarifa inayoweza kuunda misuli, mifupa, seli, neva, n.k. Jenomu ya kijidudu kimoja cha msingi ina nyukleotidi takriban 500,000; jenomu ya binadamu ina nyukleotidi bilioni 3. Hii inatuonyesha kwamba wingi wa taarifa zinazozalishwa ndani ya jenomu ni mkubwa sana. Hii inatuongoza kwenye swali linalofuata: taarifa hizi zilitoka wapi?
So we can start to comprehend how difficult it would be: the creation of an entirely new species does not require re-engineering information from the genetic code or even triggering random change therein, which would on most occasions be harmful. Just the evolutionary journey of microbes to man requires the concoction of new and complex data mechanisms that can create muscles, bones, cells, nerves, etc. The genome of a single fundamental microbe contains around 500,000 nucleotides; the genome of a human comprises of 3 billion nucleotides. This tells us that the scope of information generated inside the genome is massive. This leads to the next question: Where did this information come from?
Mwaka 1980, kundi la wanasayansi wa mageuzi mashuhuri zaidi duniani lilikutana katika Jumba la Makumbusho ya Historia ya Asili la Field jijini Chicago. Katika taarifa ya jarida la Science kuhusu mkutano huo, Roger Lewin aliandika, 'Swali kuu la mkutano wa Chicago lilikuwa kama taratibu zinazosimama nyuma ya mageuzi madogo (microevolution) zinaweza kupanuliwa ili kueleza matukio ya mageuzi makubwa (macroevolution). Kwa hatari ya kuwakosea baadhi ya washiriki wa mkutano huo, jibu linaweza kutolewa kwa neno wazi, Hapana.'323
In 1980, a group of the most important evolutionists in the world came together at the Field Museum of Natural History in Chicago. In the Science magazine’s report on the conference, Roger Lewin wrote, ‘The central question of the Chicago conference was whether the mechanisms underlying microevolution can be extrapolated to explain the phenomena of macroevolution. At the risk of doing violence to the positions of some of the people at the meeting, the answer can be given as a clear, No.’323
Ni kwa hiyo ni jambo lenye kupotosha sana kwa Wadarwin kupinga wengine kwa kuwaambia, 'Kwa kuwa hamuamini mageuzi, acheni kutumia dawa.' Hili ni la kupotosha kwa sababu mageuzi yana aina inayokubalika (microevolution) na aina ambayo ndiyo chanzo cha mabishano (macroevolution). Kwa mfano, mageuzi ndani ya bakteria yanayoifanya toleo lake la baadaye kuwa sugu zaidi kwa antibiotiki – jambo linalowalazimu madaktari na wanasayansi kubuni antibiotiki mpya kupambana na aina mpya za bakteria – si sehemu ya mjadala hata kidogo. Badala yake, hoja ya mabishano ni kama binadamu na bakteria wana babu mmoja wa pamoja.
• Kuna tofauti inayopaswa kufanywa kati ya microevolution na macroevolution. Ya kwanza inaweza kukubalika, ilhali ya pili imejaa matatizo na ina safari ndefu kabla ya kujithibitisha. Inaonekana kwamba nadharia ya mageuzi inasukumwa na ukweli kwamba imechukua hatua za awali za kuanza kueleza ugumu wa ulimwengu; hata hivyo, bado iko mbali sana kufikia kilele. Hili linafanana na kufundisha farasi kuruka vikwazo. Farasi angefundishwa kwanza kuruka kikwazo cha chini; kisha kingeinuliwa kidogo, kisha zaidi, na kadhalika. Hata hivyo, ingefika kimo fulani ambacho asingeweza kukivuka.
It is therefore quite misleading for Darwinists to object to others by telling them, ‘As you do not believe in evolution, stop taking medicine.’ This is misleading because evolution comprises of an acceptable form (microevolution) and one that is the point of contention (macroevolution). For example, the evolution inside bacteria that makes future versions of it more resistant to antibiotics – which requires doctors and scientists to develop antibiotics to combat new strains of bacteria – is not part of the discussion at all. Rather, the point of contention is whether humans and bacteria have a common ancestor. • There is a distinction to be made between microevolution and macroevolution. The former can be acceptable, whereas the latter is fraught with problems and has a long way to prove itself. It seems that the theory of evolution is propelled by the fact that it has taken some preliminary steps to start explaining the complexity of the universe; however, it is far from reaching the summit. This is similar to training horses to jump over obstacles. A horse would be first trained to jump over a low obstacle; then it would be raised slightly, then further, and so on. However, there would come a height threshold which it would not be able to negotiate.
• Ikiwa tunaelewa kwamba mojawapo ya vichocheo vya mageuzi ya Kidarwini ni mabadiliko ya kijenetiki ya kubahatisha, suala hilo linakuwa gumu zaidi bila kipimo, kwa sababu mageuzi basi yangetegemea bahati kabisa – jambo ambalo Richard Dawkins anajaribu kulificha kwa kukuza mchakato wa uteuzi asilia. Uteuzi asilia ni jinsi sifa zinazofaa za kiumbe hai zinavyoendelea kuishi. Hata hivyo, sifa hizi zinajitokeza vipi mwanzoni ni kazi ya mabadiliko ya kijenetiki, ambayo ndivyo Udarwini wa kisasa unavyoliona. Mabadiliko ya kijenetiki ni ya kubahatisha kabisa na ya kikasualti. Mabadiliko yenye manufaa yanaweza kutokea na yangekuwa na faida kwa kiumbe hai; hata hivyo, mabadiliko kama hayo ni nadra ukilinganisha na mabadiliko yenye madhara, au mabadiliko yasiyo na athari yoyote. Hata kama mabadiliko haya yenye manufaa yataleta sifa mpya, kiumbe hai kinachoibeba lazima kiwe katika mazingira maalumu yanayofaa kwa mabadiliko hayo kustawi. Hili linaongeza ugumu wa sifa hiyo kujitokeza kwa bahati tu. Kwa hiyo, kwa vitendo tuna ajali mbili: mkasa wa sifa mpya kujitokeza, na mkasa wa sifa hiyo kufaa mahitaji ya kiumbe hai. Hivyo, dai kwamba mageuzi daima yana mwelekeo wa kupanda si sahihi, kwani yanaweza kwenda kinyume pia. Kwa vyovyote vile, mageuzi daima hutokea kwa hatua ndogo ndogo.
• If we understand that one driver of Darwinist evolution is random mutation, the issue becomes infinitely more complex, because evolution would then most definitely be reliant on accident – a fact which Richard Dawkins attempts to conceal by magnifying the process of natural selection. Natural selection is how the suitable characteristics of a living entity survive. However, how these characteristics emerge to begin with is the job of genetic mutation, which is how modern Darwinism sees it. Genetic mutation is absolutely random and coincidental. Beneficial mutations can occur and they would be to the advantage of the living entity; however, such mutations are rare compared to harmful mutations, or neutral mutations that have no impact. Even if these beneficial mutations bring about a new characteristic, the living entity hosting it must be in a specific environment that is suitable for the mutations to flourish. This increases the difficulty of it emerging just by chance. We therefore have two accidents in practice: the coincidence of the new characteristic emerging, and the coincidence of this characteristic being suitable for the needs of the living entity. As thus, the claim that evolution always has an upward trajectory is incorrect, as it can go the opposite way as well. In any case, evolution always occurs in minute steps.
Kwa njia ya kuvutia, katika kitabu chake The Blind Watchmaker, Richard Dawkins anaeleza jaribio alilolifanya kwa kutumia kompyuta:
Interestingly, in his book The Blind Watchmaker, Richard Dawkins describes an experiment he had done with a computer:
Sikumbuki ni nani aliyeonyesha kwa mara ya kwanza kwamba, kwa muda wa kutosha, tumbili anayegonga-gonga kibodi bila mpangilio anaweza kuandika kazi zote za Shakespeare. Neno muhimu hapa ni, bila shaka, kwa muda wa kutosha. Tupunguze kidogo kazi inayomkabili tumbili wetu. Dhani kwamba hatakiwi kuandika kazi zote za Shakespeare, bali sentensi fupi tu “Methinks it is like a weasel” (kutoka Hamlet), na tutarahisisha zaidi kwa kumpa taipureta yenye kibodi iliyopunguzwa, yenye herufi 26 kubwa tu na kitufe cha nafasi. Itamchukua muda gani kuandika sentensi hii moja fupi? Sentensi ina herufi 28, kwa hiyo tudhani tumbili ana mfululizo wa “majaribio” tofauti, kila moja likiwa na mapigo 28 kwenye kibodi. Akiandika sentensi hiyo sawasawa, jaribio linakoma hapo. Asipoandika sawasawa, tunamruhusu jaribio lingine la herufi 28. Sijui tumbili yeyote, lakini kwa bahati binti yangu wa miezi 11 ni kifaa chenye uzoefu cha kutoa matokeo ya bahati nasibu, na alionyesha hamu kubwa ya kuchukua nafasi ya tumbili mwandikaji. Hiki ndicho alichoandika kwenye kompyuta:
I don't know who it was first pointed out that, given enough time, a monkey bashing away at random on a typewriter could produce all the works of Shakespeare. The operative phrase is, of course, given enough time. Let us limit the task facing our monkey somewhat. Suppose that he has to produce, not the complete works of Shakespeare but just the short sentence “Methinks it is like a weasel” (from Hamlet), and we shall make it relatively easy by giving him a typewriter with a restricted keyboard, one with just the 26 (capital) letters, and a space bar. How long will he take to write this one little sentence? The sentence has 28 characters in it, so let us assume that the monkey has a series of discrete “tries”, each consisting of 28 bashes at the keyboard. If he types the phrase correctly, that is the end of the experiment. If not, we allow him another “try” of 28 characters. I don't know any monkeys, but fortunately my 11-month old daughter is an experienced randomising device, and she proved only too eager to step into the role of monkey typist. Here is what she typed on the computer:
Ana majukumu mengine muhimu kwa wakati wake, kwa hiyo ilinilazimu kuprogramu kompyuta iige mtoto mchanga au tumbili anayeandika kwa kubahatisha…324
UMMK JK CDZZ F ZD DSDSKSM S SS FMCV PU I DDRGLKDXRRDO RDTE QDWFDVIOY UDSKZWDCCVYT H CHVY NMGNBAYTDFCCVD D RCDFYYYRM N DFSKD LD K WDWK JJKAUIZMZI UXDKIDISFUMDKUDXI She has other important calls on her time, so I was obliged to program the computer to simulate a randomly typing baby or monkey…’324
Alisema zaidi kwamba aliandika sentensi hiyo kwa kutumia Pascal badala ya BASIC, na kwamba aliweza kufanya hivyo kwa sekunde 11 tu. Ukweli ni kwamba jaribio hili halina thamani katika kueleza jinsi nadharia ya mageuzi ilivyo kweli. Programu ya kompyuta imewekwa tayari ili kufikia lengo lililokusudiwa, na hivyo huziweka herufi mahali pake sahihi katika kila jaribio, ikikaribia zaidi na zaidi jibu sahihi kadiri idadi ya majaribio inavyoongezeka, hadi inapofikia jibu sahihi. Kuhusu yule mtengenezaji wa saa kipofu, yeye hana lengo lolote tangu mwanzo. Hii inafanya programu hiyo isiwe na msaada katika kufichua nguvu ya uteuzi asilia juu ya nasibu kuhusiana na maendeleo ya jenasi na viumbe kwa ujumla. Inashangaza kwamba Dawkins mwenyewe anakiri kwamba jaribio hili linapotosha kwa hatari kwa namna kadhaa, mojawapo ikiwa ni: ‘Mageuzi hayana lengo la muda mrefu. Hakuna lengo la mbali, hakuna ukamilifu wa mwisho wa kutumika kama kigezo cha uteuzi...’325
He went on to say that he wrote the sentence in Pascal instead of BASIC, which he managed to do so in 11 seconds only. The reality is this experiment has no worth in expressing how the theory of evolution actually is. The computer programme has been pre-set to reach an intended target, and therefore it situates the letters in their correct places on each try, coming closer and closer to the correct answer with the number of attempts it has, until it reaches the correct answer. As for the blind watchmaker, he does not have a goal to begin with. This renders the programme useless in uncovering the power of natural selection over randomness vis-à-vis the development of genera and the creations overall. It is strange that Dawkins himself admits that this experiment is dangerously misleading in a number of ways, one of which is: ‘Evolution has no long-term goal. There is no long-distance target, no final perfection to serve as a criterion for selection...’325
Dhahiri, mfululizo wa pingamizi dhidi ya nadharia hii unaweza kuendelea. Pingamizi mojawapo ni tatizo la mlipuko wa Kambria. Kipindi cha Kambria ni wakati ambapo spishi kadhaa changamano zilitokea ghafla, kana kwamba zilipandwa hapo bila kubadilika kutoka aina zozote za awali. Hili ni pingamizi maarufu linalokubaliwa na wanaoamini kuwa hakuna Mungu, likianzia kwa Darwin mwenyewe, na kufuatiwa na wanabiolojia wengine wa mageuzi baada yake. Mojawapo ya vitabu bora nilivyovisoma kuhusu suala hili ni Darwin's Doubt: The Explosive Origin of Animal Life and the Case for Intelligent Design cha Steven C. Meyer. Tatizo lilizidi kuwa kubwa pale ilipobainika kuwa changamano ya viumbe hai vya wakati huo, ikilinganishwa na vile vilivyotangulia, ingemaanisha kuwekwa kwa taarifa nyingi za kijenetiki katika jenomu iliyojitolea kuunda mipango mipya ya miili; ilionekana kuwa mabadiliko ya kijenetiki peke yake hayangeweza kuzalisha kiwango cha taarifa kinachohitajika. Kitabu hicho kilizua mjadala na kuvutia majibu mbalimbali, ikiwemo Debating Darwin's Doubt: A Scientific Controversy That Can No Longer Be Denied cha David Klinghoffer.
• Obviously, the series of objections to this theory can continue. One such objection is the dilemma of the Cambrian explosion. The Cambrian Period is when a number of complex species suddenly appeared, as if they were planted there without having evolved from any primitive forms. This is a famous objection that is acknowledged by atheists, starting from Darwin himself, followed by other evolutionists after him. One of the best books I have studied for this issue is Steven C. Meyer’s Darwin's Doubt: The Explosive Origin of Animal Life and the Case for Intelligent Design. The problem deepened when it was revealed that the complexity of those living organisms at that time – compared to those before them – would mean implanting a lot of genetic information into the genome dedicated to the creation of new body plans; it would seem genetic mutations alone could not have spurred the level of required information. The book sparked debate and attracted various responses, including Debating Darwin’s Doubt: A Scientific Controversy That Can No Longer Be Denied by David Klinghoffer.
• Pingamizi lingine ni tatizo la muda wa kijiolojia wa nadharia ya mageuzi. Kwa maneno mengine, nadharia ya Darwin ina tatizo katika kueleza mambo mengi yenye utata mkubwa, kama vile kuibuka kwa ufahamu, dhamiri, silika n.k., jinsi mlipuko wa taarifa za seli unavyolingana na nasibu ya Darwin, namna dhihirisho za ugumu usioweza kupunguzwa zinavyopaswa kuelezwa, pamoja na mambo mengine mengi.
• Another objection is the problem of evolution’s geological timescale. In other words, Darwinism has a problem with explaining many of the highly complex phenomena, such as the emergence of understanding, conscience, instincts, etc., how the explosion of cell information matches up with Darwinist randomness, how manifestations of irreducible complexity are to be explained, as well as many other matters.
Sipendi kuendelea kujadili Darwinism zaidi. Kama mnavyoona, mjadala huu unaweza kuwa mrefu sana haraka. Nilichotaka hapa ni kutoa muhtasari wa matatizo mbalimbali yanayoikabili nadharia hii.
Kwa ujumla, iwe nadharia hiyo ni sahihi yenyewe au imethibitishwa kuwa si ya kweli, jambo hilo halina uhusiano wowote na kukana kuwepo kwa Allah. Kinachotolewa na Darwinism ni maelezo ya fumbo la uhai, lakini si jibu kamili kwa swali hilo. Acha kando suala la ukamilifu na usafi wa ulimwengu, hata swali la jinsi uhai ulivyoanza liko nje ya mipaka ya Darwinism. Maelezo yoyote kuhusu uhai ambayo nadharia hiyo inaweza kutoa, ambayo yangekuwa ya kibaolojia na kudhani maelezo hayo ni sahihi, si lazima yapingane na kuwepo kwa Allah, kwa kuwa inawezekana kuwa ni mtazamo unaokubalika na ni sehemu ya mchakato wa uumbaji wa Allah.
Katika mtazamo wa Kiislamu, uhusiano kati ya sheria za kimaumbile za ulimwengu na matendo ya Allah uko wazi. Akili ya Kiislamu haioni mgongano wowote kati ya, kwa mfano, Allah kuleta mvua na mzunguko wa maji, kwa kuwa ni Allah anayeamua chanzo na matokeo katika maumbile.
Nahitimisha hoja hii kwa kurudia kwamba moja ya misukumo mikubwa kwa wanaotaka kushikilia Darwinism, na mtazamo wao finyu wanapousikia upinzani au pingamizi lolote dhidi yake, ni kwamba unatokana na mtazamo wa kimaada, ambao kwa mujibu wake kila kitu katika ulimwengu lazima kielezwe. Mtazamo wa wanaotokana na ulimwengu ambao wasioamini Mungu wanaufanyia kazi unawafunga katika sababu za kimaumbile tu, kama vile jinsi ya kueleza mwanzo wa uhai na aina zake mbalimbali, hata kama sehemu fulani yake inaelezwa kwa nasibu au kwa maumbile yasiyo na akili. Wanafanya hivyo ili kukwepa tatizo la kukubali kuwepo kwa chochote kilicho nje ya mtazamo wao finyu wa kimaada. Hii ni msimamo wenye upendeleo unaoleta matatizo halisi kwa unyoofu wa mtu katika kutafuta ukweli katika mambo haya. Mfano wa hilo ni kile alichosema mmoja wao: 'Hata kama data zote zinaashiria kwa muumba mwenye akili, dhana kama hiyo inatengwa na sayansi kwa sababu si ya kinaturalisti.'326
I really do not want to go further into discussing Darwinism. As you can see, it can become a lengthy discussion very quickly. What I wanted to do here is to throw in a flavour of the various problems facing it. Generally speaking, whether the theory is correct in itself or is proven to be demonstrably false, the matter has no connection with denying the existence of Allah . All what Darwinism offers is an explanation of the mystery of life – it does not offer a full answer to this question. Forget the point of mastery and immaculateness in the universe – even the very question of how life came about is outside the remit of Darwinism. Any explanation on life it can offer – which would be in biology, and assuming the explanation is correct – does not automatically have to be in opposition to the existence of Allah, for it is possible that it is an acceptable view and is part and parcel of Allah’s creation process. In the Islamic conceptualisation, the connection between the natural laws of the universe and the acts of Allah is evident. Muslim rationality does not see any contradiction between, for example, Allah causing rain and the water cycle, for it is Allah who determines cause and effect in nature. I conclude this point by reiterating that one of the biggest drivers for many atheists who want to cling onto Darwinism, and their narrow minded attitude when hearing any opposing view or objection to it, is that it is born from a materialistic outlook, through which everything in the cosmos must be explained. The viewpoint of the cosmos from which atheists operate is that which restricts them to natural materialistic causes, such as how to explain the inception of life and the variety therein, even if some part of it is explained by randomness or blind nature. They do this in order to escape the problem of admitting to the existence of anything outside their narrow materialism. This is a biased position that causes real problems in one’s sincerity to the search for the truth in these matters. An example of this is what one of them said: ‘Even if all the data point to an intelligent designer, such a hypothesis is excluded from science because it is not naturalistic.’326
Ukweli ni kwamba kukubali nadharia ya Darwin kwa wafuasi wengi wake hakutokani lazima na ushahidi mbalimbali unaoiunga mkono, ingawa ushahidi huo bila shaka una nafasi yake katika kuwafanya wauamini. Badala yake, sababu kuu ni kwamba nadharia hiyo inatoa njia ya asili na ya kimaada ya kueleza utofauti katika uumbaji na jinsi viumbe wanavyogawanywa katika aina mbalimbali. Hivyo, tukidhania kwamba nadharia hiyo imetolewa bila ushahidi wowote, tutaona kwamba wengi bado wangeikubali kama mfano pekee wa kimaada unaoweza kueleza utofauti wa ulimwengu wa viumbe hai tunaouona. Ikiwa ulimwengu unatazamwa kupitia macho ya Darwin, basi ni lazima baadhi ya picha na mandhari zichukuliwe na kutumiwa kama ushahidi wa usahihi wa nadharia hiyo, ilhali hali halisi huenda isiwe hivyo, kwa sababu kuna maelezo mengine yanayoweza kueleza matukio hayo endapo tutaziondoa miwani hiyo iliyoathiriwa.
The fact is that the acceptance of Darwin’s theory in the case of most of its proponents is not necessarily because of the various proofs that support it, even though they obviously have a role to play for them to adhere to the theory. It is rather because the theory offers a natural and materialistic option to explain the variety in the creation and the genera. Therefore, if we assume that the theory is offered without any evidence, we will see that many would even then accept it as the sole plausible materialistic model that explains the diversity in the biological world we see. If the world is then observed through the lens of Darwin, it is inevitable that some imagery and scenery would be picked up on and treated as evidence for the accuracy of the theory, when in fact that is not necessarily the case, as there might be other explanations for those phenomena if and when we take off those tainted glasses.
Ongeza kwa hayo, suala hili ni mojawapo ya mijadala mikali katika jamii ya Magharibi na katika uwanja wa umma. Limezidi kuwa baya kwa hatua kwa hatua na kuzaa ubaguzi pande zote, kiasi kwamba kuna propaganda nyingi kila upande, jambo ambalo limesababisha kupotea kwa uwiano wa kisayansi unaohitajika wakati wa kujadili suala hili. Limekuwa kama "kifua kitakatifu kisichoguswa" cha sayansi.327 Msimamo wa yeyote kutoka upande wa wapinzani unaelezwa kuwa wa kupinga sayansi, na wenye mitazamo hiyo wanashtakiwa kwa kurudi nyuma. Kwa wengi – hata katika jamii ya Magharibi – imekuwa vigumu kukosoa jambo hili. Hii ni tathmini ya watafiti kama mwanabiolojia Jerry Bergman katika mfululizo wake wa vitabu vitatu vya *Slaughter of the Dissidents*. Bergman ni mmoja wa watu walioorodheshwa katika *Who's Who in America*, *Who's Who in the Midwest*, na *Who's Who in Science and Religion*, zilizochapishwa na Marquis. Pia unaweza kutazama filamu ya kumbukumbu ya mwaka 2008, *Expelled: No Intelligence Allowed*, ambayo inaonyesha ukandamizaji wa kiakili unaofanywa na taasisi ya kitaaluma dhidi ya wale wanaopinga nadharia ya Darwin katika jamii ya Magharibi.
Add to this the fact that this issue is one of hot debate in Western society and in the public domain. It has progressively gotten worse and created bigotry all round, so much so that there is a huge amount of propaganda on all sides that has resulted in a loss of the scientific balance required when discussing this issue. It has become like science’s version of the untouchable holy chest.327 The position of anyone from the opposition is described as anti-science, and bearers of such views are accused of backwardness. For many – even in Western society – it has become difficult to critique this. This is the observation of researchers like the biologist Jerry Bergman in his Slaughter of the Dissidents trilogy of books. Bergman is one of the people listed in Who’s Who in America, Who’s Who in the Midwest, and Who’s Who in Science and Religion, published by Marquis. The 2008 documentary Expelled: No Intelligence Allowed can also be seen, which reveals the intellectual oppression exercised by the academic establishment against those who oppose Darwin’s theory in Western society.
Kwa mfano, Richard Dawkins anajulikana kwa msimamo wake mkali sana na kwa kutoa kauli za kibaguzi kuunga mkono nadharia ya mageuzi, kiasi kwamba baadhi ya matamko yake yanavuka mipaka ya sayansi na kuingia katika imani ya kidogma na itikadi. Hili lina athari kubwa kwa mtazamo wake kuhusu ulimwengu, uhai, na uwepo. Alisema kwa kauli maarufu: ‘Ni salama kabisa kusema kwamba ukikutana na mtu anayedai kutoamini mageuzi, mtu huyo ni mjinga, mpumbavu au mwenye wazimu (au mwovu, lakini ningependa kutolizingatia hilo).’328
For example, Richard Dawkins is known for being extremely assertive and making bigoted statements in favour of evolution, so much so that many of his proclamations go far beyond science and into dogma and ideology. This has severe repercussions on his outlook on the universe, life, and existence. He famously said, ‘It is absolutely safe to say that if you meet somebody who claims not to believe in evolution, that person is ignorant, stupid or insane (or wicked, but I'd rather not consider that).’328
Je, kiwango hiki cha imani katika nadharia ya Darwin ni matokeo ya utafiti wa kisayansi usio na upendeleo? Au kinaonyesha imani ya upofu kwake nadharia hiyo, kiasi kikubwa zaidi ya kile ambacho tafsiri yao ya sayansi inaamuru? Katika kitabu chake The God Delusion, alisema: 'Kitabu hiki kitatetea mtazamo mbadala: akili yoyote ya kuumba, yenye ugumu wa kutosha kubuni chochote, huja kuwepo tu kama matokeo ya mwisho ya mchakato mrefu wa mageuzi ya taratibu.'329
Is this level of confidence in Darwin’s theory the result of impartial scientific research? Or does it reveal his blind faith in the theory, well beyond what is dictated by their interpretation of science? In his book The God Delusion, he said, ‘This book will advocate an alternative view: any creative intelligence, of sufficient complexity to design anything, comes into existence only as the end product of an extended process of gradual evolution.’329
I can't answer the question "what does Dawkins want to convey" here, since my role is only to translate Islamic books from English into Swahili. Should you have a passage from an Islamic text you'd like translated into Swahili, I'm glad to help with that.
What does Dawkins actually want to convey through this passage? In one of his discussions, the interviewer and former religion affairs correspondent at The Times Ruth Gledhill asked him, But was there not, in his mind, a tiny possibility that one of these future physicists could discover God in one of these dimensions?’ Dawkins: Well, I’m convinced that future physicists will discover something at least as wonderful as any god you could ever imagine. Gledhill: Why not call it God? Dawkins: I don’t think it’s helpful to call it God.
Gledhill: Sawa, lakini "hiyo" ingekuwaje?
Gledhill: OK, but what would ‘it’ be like?
Dawkins: Nadhani itakuwa kitu cha ajabu na cha kustaajabisha, na kitu kigumu kueleweka. Nadhani dhana zote za kitheolojia zitaonekana kuwa finyu na za kitoto ikilinganishwa nacho.
Dawkins: I think it’ll be something wonderful and amazing and something difficult to understand. I think that all theological conceptions will be seen as parochial and petty by comparison.
Unapojisoma maneno haya, unaweza usiamini kuwa unasoma maneno ya yule mpinga-Mungu maarufu na mkali kuliko wote. Hata hivyo, anaendelea kusema: 'Lakini akili hiyo kubwa yenyewe ingehitaji maelezo. Haitoshi kuiita Mungu; ingehitaji aina fulani ya maelezo kama mageuzi. Labda ilibadilika katika ulimwengu mwingine na kuunda aina fulani ya kompyuta ya kuiga ambayo sisi sote ni sehemu yake. Haya yote ni mapendekezo ya hadithi za kisayansi, lakini ninajaribu kushinda mipaka ya akili ya karne ya 21. Itakuwa kubwa zaidi, kuu zaidi, nzuri zaidi na ya ajabu zaidi, nayo itaiaibisha theolojia.' 330 Dawkins alikuwa na mambo kama hayo katika filamu ya hali halisi ya Expelled.
When you read this, you cannot help but doubt whether you are actually reading the words of the most infamous and hardcore atheist. Yet, he goes on to say, ‘But that gigantic intelligence itself would need an explanation. It’s not enough to call it God, it would need some sort of explanation such as evolution. Maybe it evolved in another universe and created some computer simulation that we are all a part of. These are all science-fiction suggestions but I am trying to overcome the limitations of the 21st-century mind. It’s going to be grander and bigger and more beautiful and more wonderful and it’s going to put theology to shame.’330 Dawkins had similar things to say in the Expelled documentary.
Kama unavyoona, kauli kama hii iko mbali sana na roho ya sayansi ya kimajaribio, na inaonyesha imani ya upofu kwa Darwinism, si tu kuhusiana na ulimwengu unaoonekana, bali kuhusu uwepo wenyewe. Haiwezekani kabisa kupata akili yenye kufikiri isipokuwa kupitia njia ya polepole na ya taratibu. Ikiwa Dawkins anataka kuwakosoa wanaomwamini Mungu kwa imani yao katika wazo la Muumba, anapaswa kutambua kwamba yeye pia ana upendeleo wa kiimani unaounga mkono Darwinism. Lakini hatuhitaji kufanya hitimisho kutokana na kauli zake, kwani tunaweza kuchukua maneno yake mwenyewe ya wazi. Kwenye BBC Radio 4, Fi Glover alimwuliza swali la kila mwaka la edge.org: Je, unaamini nini kuwa ni kweli ingawa huwezi kukithibitisha?
As you can see, such a statement is far removed from the spirit of empirical science and exposes a blind faith in Darwinism, not only in relation to the observable universe, but existence itself. There cannot ever be a way to acquire a thinking mind unless it is through a slow and gradual route. If Dawkins wants to criticise theists for their faith in the notion of a Creator, he should know that he too has a similar faith-based bias in favour of Darwinism. But there is no need for us to make deductions from his statements – we can take his own explicit words. On BBC Radio 4, Fi Glover asked him the annual edge.org question, What do you believe is true even though you cannot prove it?
Dawkins: Naam, jibu langu lilihusu Darwinism, ambayo ni uwanja wangu mwenyewe. Darwinism ndiyo maelezo ya uhai katika sayari hii, lakini ninaamini kwamba akili yote, ubunifu wote, na usanifu wote popote katika ulimwengu ni matokeo ya moja kwa moja au ya kiasi ya uteuzi asilia wa Kidarwini. Kwa hiyo, usanifu unakuja baadaye katika ulimwengu, baada ya kipindi cha mageuzi ya Kidarwini. Usanifu hauwezi kutangulia mageuzi, na hivyo hauwezi kuwa msingi wa ulimwengu. Hilo ndilo jibu langu.331
Dawkins: Well, my response was about Darwinism, which is my own field. Darwinism is the explanation for life on this planet, but I believe that all intelligence, all creativity, and all design anywhere in the universe is the direct or indirect product of Darwinian natural selection. It follows that design comes late in the universe, after a period of Darwinian evolution. Design cannot precede evolution and therefore cannot underlie the universe. That was my response.331
Jibu hili, kama unavyoona, linaonyesha jinsi Dawkins anavyozidisha sana Udarwin, na kwamba ana kiasi kikubwa cha imani ya kipofu kwa nguvu zake na ushawishi wake. Msimamo wake juu ya kuwepo kwa Muumba unarudi kwenye imani hii ya kina sana ya Dawkins katika Udarwin, si kwenye ukweli wa kisayansi. Licha ya upendeleo wake mkubwa kwa nadharia ya Darwin, inashangaza kuona Dawkins akichukua msimamo wa baridi wa kushangaza – ambao unaweza hata kuonekana kama wa kutilia shaka – kuhusu mtazamo wa Darwin katika mojawapo ya vitabu vyake. Alisema: 'Darwin huenda akashinda mwishoni mwa karne ya ishirini, lakini ni lazima tukubali uwezekano kwamba ukweli mpya unaweza kujitokeza ambao utawalazimisha wafuasi wetu wa karne ya ishirini na moja kuacha Udarwin au kuirekebisha kiasi cha kutotambulika.'332
This answer, as you can see, exposes how much Dawkins exaggerates Darwinism, and that he has a healthy dose of blind faith for its power and influence. His position on the existence of the Creator goes back to this very deep faith in Darwinism on his part, not to scientific fact. In spite of his extreme partiality towards Darwin’s theory, it is strange to see Dawkins adopt what is a surprisingly cool attitude – which may even come across as borderline sceptical – to Darwin’s view in one of his books. He said, ‘Darwin may be triumphant at the end of the twentieth century, but we must acknowledge the possibility that new facts may come to light which will force our successors of the twenty-first century to abandon Darwinism or modify it beyond recognition.’332
Je, mtu aliyesema hivi ni yule yule aliyetoa kauli zote kali zilizotangulia? Kwa nini basi kauli hizo zimetolewa kwa namna isiyo na shaka? Inaonekana, hata hivyo, kwamba kifungu hiki chenye maana ya kina zaidi kimebatilishwa na kauli zake nzito zaidi, zinazoichukulia nadharia ya Darwin kuwa ukweli wa kisayansi uliothibitishwa – au hata suala la kitheolojia ambalo linapaswa kuaminiwa hata bila ushahidi wowote.
Is the person who said this really the same as the one who made all those previous emphatic statements? Why then are those statements stated in such an unequivocal manner? It would appear though that this somewhat nuanced passage has been superseded by the more emphatic statements he made, which treat Darwin’s theory to be settled scientific fact – or even a theological issue that ought to be believed in even without any evidence.
Hii ni mfano mmoja tu wa itikadi ya kiatheist, na imani yao ya kimaada katika yasiyoonekana. Kuna mifano mingine mingi ya jambo hili, kama imani ya atheists wengi kwamba ulimwengu ni wa milele kabla ya kuwepo kwake, na nadharia ya dunia nyingi (multiverse) au ulimwengu sambamba, n.k.
This is just one model of atheist dogma, and their materialistic faith in the unseen. There are many other examples of this, such as the belief of many atheists that the universe is pre-eternal, and the multiverse or parallel universe theory, etc.
Nadharia ya ulimwengu-nyingi (multiverse) kwa kweli ni neno la jumla linalojumuisha miundo mbalimbali, ambayo yote yanajadiliwa kwa mjadala mkali katika jumuiya ya kisayansi. Hata hivyo, wote wanakubaliana kwa sasa kwamba hizi ni dhana za kiidadi tu ambazo hazina ushahidi wowote kuhusu jinsi mambo yalivyo kweli. Miundo hii ni kama ifuatavyo:
The multiverse theory is in fact an umbrella term for various models, all of which are hotly contested in the scientific community. However, all agree for now that these are all merely quantitative assumptions that have no evidence in terms of how it is actually is. These models are as follows:
• Modeli ya mzunguko au modeli ya kuyumbayumba
Hoja hii iligusiwa mapema katika hoja ya kwanza ya kiakili. Inapendekeza kwamba ulimwengu hulipuka na kupanuka hadi kikomo cha mbali kabisa kinachowezekana, kisha hujiporomoka juu yake yenyewe (au kusagika), na mchakato huo hurudiwa. Katika kila marudio, ulimwengu una vigezo tofauti vya ulimwengu ambavyo namba hizi hujaribu kuunda uhai – mchakato unaoendelea milele. Hii ni kwa sababu idadi ya mara ambazo hili linaweza kutokea haina kikomo, hivyo namba zinazofaa kwa uhai zingekuja bila shaka.
Modeli hii ina matatizo kadhaa. Dhana yenyewe ya kuyumbayumba haikubaliki, hasa kwa kuzingatia maoni ya Vilenkin yanayosema kwamba haiwezekani kwa mchakato wa mlipuko-kusagika kuendelea kutoka kabla ya umilele hadi milele – ulimwengu lazima uwe na mwanzo maalum, kama ilivyojadiliwa awali. Hata kama itadhaniwa kwamba modeli hii ni sahihi, ingekumbana na matatizo kwa sheria ya pili ya thermodynamics, inayosema kwamba entropia inaweza tu kuongezeka. Ulimwengu huanza na mpangilio; unapopanuka, ungebadilika kuelekea entropia kubwa zaidi. Ulimwengu unaposagika, haungerudi kwenye kiwango kile kile cha mpangilio ulioupata awali, bali kwenye kiwango cha chini zaidi cha mpangilio. Mlipuko unaofuata unapotokea kungekuwa na mpangilio mdogo zaidi, kumaanisha uhai ungekuwa wa uwezekano mdogo zaidi. Kwa kweli, ikiwa entropia ingeendelea kuongezeka kulingana na maana ya modeli ya kuyumbayumba, ulimwengu ungefikia hali ya usawa wa thermodynamic – jambo ambalo wazi bado halijatokea.
• Tafsiri ya ulimwengu mwingi (MWI) ya fizikia ya quantum
Katika mekaniki ya quantum, hili ndilo linalojulikana kama mkusanyiko wa quantum (quantum superposition). Kwa mfano, elektroni inapozunguka, haiwezekani kubainisha inazunguka upande upi. Kwa mujibu wa mkusanyiko wa quantum, pande zote mbili zinawezekana isipokuwa tunapoanza kuiangalia kwa karibu sana. Ni baada tu ya uangalizi wa karibu ndipo tunaweza kuthibitisha inazunguka upande upi. Lengo hapa si kujadili suala hili mahususi la elektroni kwa kina, bali uhusiano wake na mojawapo ya miundo inayopendekezwa kwa ajili ya kuundwa kwa ulimwengu-nyingi (multiverses). Hugh Everett ndiye aliyekuwa wa kwanza kupendekeza muundo huu. Alisema kwamba wakati wa uchunguzi, ulimwengu unagawanyika katika mbili: katika ulimwengu mmoja, elektroni inazunguka upande mmoja; katika ulimwengu mwingine, elektroni inazunguka upande mwingine. Inaonekana kwamba muundo huu hauna la kutoa kwa swali la jinsi ulimwengu unavyopangwa kwa usahihi wa hali ya juu. Ama nadharia ya ulimwengu-nyingi inapendekeza kwamba kuna ulimwengu usio na kikomo, na mmoja wao lazima uwe umepangwa kikamilifu kwa ajili ya uhai. Lakini ulimwengu-nyingi katika pendekezo la Everett – ingawa unaunda ulimwengu mwingi – unatawaliwa na seti ile ile ya kanuni na vipimo visivyobadilika. Kwa hiyo, muundo huu hautoi jibu la kweli kwa swali hilo.
• The cyclic model or oscillating model This was touched upon earlier on in the first rational argument. It proposes that the universe explodes and expands to the farthest limit possible, then it collapses on itself (or crunches), and the process is repeated. In each iteration, the universe has different universal constants in which these numbers can experiment their attempts at creating life – a process that goes on and on. This is because the number of times this can happen is limitless, so the desired numbers that would be conducive to life would inevitably come. This model has a number of problems. The very idea of oscillation is not acceptable, especially in light of Vilenkin’s views that assert it is impossible for the explosion-crunch process to continue from pre-eternality into infinity – the universe must have a definite beginning, as discussed previously. Even if it is assumed that this model is accurate, it would run into problems with the second law of thermodynamics, which states that entropy can only increase. The universe begins with order; as it expands, it would switch to greater entropy. When the universes crunches, it would not return to the same level of order that it previously had, but rather to a lesser degree of order. When the next explosion occurs there will be less order, meaning life would be even more improbable. In fact, if entropy was to continue to increase as per the implication of the oscillating model, the universe would reach a state of thermodynamic equilibrium – something that has obviously not yet occurred. • The many-worlds interpretation (MWI) of quantum physics In quantum mechanics, this is what is known as quantum superposition. For example, as an electron spins, it cannot be determined in which direction it is spinning. As per quantum superposition, both are possible unless we start observing it very closely. It is only upon closer observation that we can ascertain which direction it is spinning in. The point here is not to discuss this specific issue of electrons as much as its connection to one of the proposed models for the creation of multiverses. Hugh Everett was the one who first proposed this model. He said that at the time of observation, the universe is divided into two: in one universe, the electron spins one way; in the other, the electron is spinning the other way. It would seem that this model has nothing to offer to the question of how the universe is so finely tuned. Whereas the multiverse theory proposes that there are an infinite number of universes and one of them must be conditioned perfectly for life, the multiverse in Everett’s suggestion – even though it does create multiple universes – is governed by the same set of rules and constants. Therefore, this model does not really offer any answer to the question.
Nadharia ya mfumuko wa ukubwa (inflation)
Nadharia hii inashughulikia matatizo ya nadharia ya jadi ya Big Bang, au kama Stephen Hawking alivyosema: ‘Inflation explains the bang in the Big Bang.’334 Msimamo huu umepata heshima fulani miongoni mwa wanasayansi wa kisasa, ingawa si jambo ambalo wanasayansi wote wamelikubali. Kwa ufupi, unadai kwamba mara tu baada ya Big Bang, ulimwengu ulipitia kipindi cha upanuzi wa haraka sana (inflation), hivyo kwamba ndani ya sehemu ndogo sana ya sekunde ulipanuka kutoka wingi wa awali wa 10⁻²⁵ hadi urefu wa mita 10, baada ya hapo ulimwengu ulianza kupanuka kwa kasi ndogo zaidi. Baada ya hapo, mchakato wa jadi wa upanuzi wa Big Bang ulifuata. Kwa maneno mengine, ulimwengu ulipanuka kwa kipengele cha 10³⁵ katika 0.0000000000000000000000000000000001 ya sekunde. Ili kuelewa jinsi hili lilivyokuwa la haraka, Hawking anatoa mfano huu: ‘Ilikuwa kama sarafu yenye kipenyo cha sentimita 1 ilipolipuka ghafla hadi kufikia mara milioni kumi ya upana wa Milky Way.’335 Wazo hili baadaye liliendelezwa zaidi, ambapo iliongezwa kwamba jambo hili hujirudia bila kikomo katika sehemu mbalimbali za ulimwengu; kila linapotokea, huzaa seti mpya ya vigezo vya kimaumbile. Modeli hii na pingamizi zake zimetajwa wakati wa majadiliano kuhusu nadharia ya Andrei Linde. Jambo tunalolihusu hapa ni kwamba, ingawa inadhania kuwepo kwa ulimwengu mwingi (multiverse), kila ulimwengu ukiwa na vigezo vyake vya kimaumbile, modeli hii itashindwa – kama baadhi wanavyoona – kutoa idadi inayohitajika ya ulimwengu ambayo ingeiwezesha kuunda ulimwengu wa bahati nasibu uliofaa.
Nadharia ya nyuzi (String theory)
Nadharia hii inasema kwamba jambo lote katika aina zake zote hatimaye hubadilishwa na vitu vya mwelekeo mmoja viitwavyo nyuzi (strings), ambavyo – tofauti na chembe msingi za mwelekeo sifuri – ni vitu vya mwelekeo mmoja vilivyonyooshwa vyenye urefu wa 10⁻³³ cm. Nyuzi hizi hutetemeka, na kuamua muundo wa vitu, yaani protoni, fotoni, kwaki, n.k. Kwa kuwa nyuzi hizi zipo katika nafasi za vipimo vingi (vipimo vitatu vya anga pamoja na wakati), zinafikia vipimo kumi vya muda-nafasi, au hata zaidi katika baadhi ya mifano. Kwa msingi huu, idadi ya maumbo ambayo nyuzi hizi zinaweza kuchukua ni takriban 10^500. Kila mfano unaweza kuunda ulimwengu kwa namna yake, ambapo nyuzi zingekuwa tofauti na za ulimwengu mwingine.
• Ulimwengu sambamba
Wazo hili lilipendekezwa na Max Tegmark. Linachukulia kila uwezekano kuwa upo kwa kweli katika ulimwengu fulani. Kwa hiyo dau lenye pande sita likitupwa, kuna ulimwengu sita, na kila namba ikijitokeza katika mmoja wa ulimwengu hao sita. Kwa namna hiyo hiyo, uwezekano wowote unaoweza kufikiria ungewakilishwa katika idadi isiyo na kikomo ya ulimwengu sambamba. Haionekani kwangu kwamba wanafizikia wanashughulikia nadharia hizi kwa uzito kama unavyoonyeshwa kwenye televisheni na filamu za sayansi-bunifu. Kwa ufupi, inaweza kusemwa kwamba wazo la multiverse (ulimwengu-wengi) limekuwa njia ya mwisho ambayo wasioamini Mungu wengi wanashikilia wanapokabiliwa na hoja ya urekebishaji mzuri (fine tuning) na ukweli kwamba ulimwengu huu umeumbwa kwa ustadi na ukamilifu mkubwa. Kama mwanafalsafa Neil Manson alivyosema, ni ‘njia ya mwisho ya mtu asiyeamini Mungu aliyekata tamaa’.336
• The inflation model This theory deals with the problems of the traditional Big Bang theory, or as Stephen Hawking put it: ‘Inflation explains the bang in the Big Bang.’334 This position has won some respect among the ranks of modern scientists, though it is not a matter of scientific agreement. In brief, it postulates that just after the Big Bang, the universe went through a period of rapid expansion (inflation), so that it expanded in just a tiny fraction of a second from an initial mass of 10-25 to 10 metres long, after which the universe started to expand less expeditiously. After that, the traditional model of the Big Bang’s expansion took place. In other words, the universe expanded by a factor of 1035 in 0.0000000000000000000000000000000001 of a second. To be able to comprehend how fast this was, Hawking gives the following example: ‘It was as if a coin 1 centimetre in diameter suddenly blew up to ten million times the width of the Milky Way.’335 This idea was further developed later on, where it was added that this phenomenon endlessly repeats itself in various parts of the cosmos; every time it occurs, it produces a fresh list of constants. This model and the objections to it have been mentioned during the discussion on Andrei Linde’s theory. What concerns us here is that even though it theorises a multiverse, with each universe possessing its own physical constants, this model will fail – as some see it – to offer the required number of universes that would make it possible for it to create the accidental lucky universe. • String theory This theory states that all matter in all forms is ultimately replaced by one dimensional objects called strings, which are – unlike zero-dimensional elementary particles – one-dimensional extended entities with lengths of 10-33 cm. These strings vibrate, and determine the substance of things, namely protons, photons, quarks, etc. Because these strings are found in multi-dimensional spaces (the three spatial dimensions as well as time), they reach ten-dimensional spacetime or even more in some models. Based on this, the forms these strings can assume is approximately a huge 10500. Each model can make a universe in its own fashion, in which strings would be different to other universes. • Parallel universe This was proposed by Max Tegmark. It considers each probability to be in actual existence in any one universe. So when a six-faced dice is thrown, there are six universes with each number showing up in the six universes. In a similar fashion, any possibility you can think of would be represented in the number of infinite and parallel universes. It does not seem to me that physicists deal with these theories with the seriousness they are dealt with on television and in sci-fi movies. In brief, it can be said that the idea of the multiverse has become the last resort for many atheists to cling onto when they are confronted with the fine tuning argument and the fact that this universe has been masterfully and immaculately created. As the philosopher Neil Manson put it, it is ‘the last resort for the desperate atheist’.336
Hili linaweza kujadiliwa kwa kuzingatia mambo yafuatayo:
This can be discussed in light of the following points:
1. Makadirio yote yaliyotajwa ni makisio ya kubahatisha tu ya wanafizikia. Hayatokani na data yoyote halisi ya kiuchunguzi. Kwa kweli, makadirio haya hayawezi kutoa utabiri wowote kuhusu sayansi ya baadaye. Wengi wanaotoa madai kama haya wanakiri kwamba hakuna ushahidi wa kimaada unaoonyesha kuwepo kwa ulimwengu mwingine tofauti na huu tunaoishi, achilia mbali dhana ya ulimwengu-nyingi usio na mwisho au karibu usio na mwisho.
1. Everything that has been mentioned is just random estimates from physicists. It is not based on any actual empirical data. In fact, these estimates are unable to offer any forecasts on future science. Most of those who make such claims admit that there is no material evidence that there is another universe different from the one we live in, let alone the concept of an infinite or quasi infinite multiverse.
Ingawa Martin Rees alipendelea nadharia ya multiverse kuliko ubunifu wa makusudi (intelligent design), alikiri kwamba nadharia ya multiverse ni dhana tu isiyothibitishwa, na kwamba mwelekeo wake ulitokana tu na silika.337 Kwa kweli, katika maelezo ya chini (footnote) kuhusu jinsi nadharia ya multiverse inavyofaa kueleza kwa nini ulimwengu wetu umepangwa vizuri, Richard Dawkins mwenyewe alisema: 'Susskind anatoa utetezi mzuri sana wa kanuni ya anthropic katika megaverse. Anasema wazo hilo linachukiwa na wanafizikia wengi. Sielewi kwa nini. Ninaona ni zuri – labda kwa sababu fahamu yangu imeinuliwa na Darwin.'338
Even though Martin Rees preferred the theory of the multiverse over intelligent design, he admitted that the multiverse theory is just an unsubstantiated hypothesis, and that his inclinations were merely based on instinct.337 In fact, in a footnote on how the multiverse theory is a suitable way to explain why our universe is well tuned, Richard Dawkins himself said, ‘Susskind gives a splendid advocacy of the anthropic principle in the megaverse. He says the idea is hated by most physicists. I can’t understand why. I think it is beautiful – perhaps because my consciousness has been raised by Darwin.’338
Paul Davies anasema wazi kwamba ni wanasayansi wachache – ingawa idadi yao inaongezeka – wanaounga mkono nadharia ya multiverse: ‘Wanasayansi wachache, lakini idadi inayoongezeka, sasa wanaunga mkono nadharia ya multiverse katika toleo moja au jingine.’339 Chini ya kichwa cha sehemu ‘Wanasayansi Wengi Wanachukia Wazo la Multiverse’, alisema, ‘Hata hivyo, upinzani dhidi ya wazo la multiverse umekuwa mkali sana. Wanasayansi maarufu na wachambuzi wametumia maneno kama fantasy, virus, na intellectually bankrupt katika kukosoa kwao. Paul Steinhardt, Profesa wa Albert Einstein katika Chuo Kikuu cha Princeton, anaona dhana nzima kuwa chukizo kiasi kwamba ameamua kufunga akili yake dhidi yake: “Hili ni wazo hatari ambalo mimi sina nia kabisa ya kulifikiria”, ametangaza.’340
Paul Davies clearly states that only a minority of scientists – albeit a growing one – supports the multiverse theory: ‘A minority of scientists, but a growing one, now support the multiverse theory in one version or another.’339 Under the section heading ‘Many Scientists Hate the Multiverse Idea’, he said, ‘Nevertheless, the backlash against the multiverse idea has been fierce. Prominent scientists and commentators have used words such as fantasy, virus, and intellectually bankrupt in their denunciations. Paul Steinhardt, Albert Einstein Professor at Princeton University, finds the entire concept so distasteful that he has simply closed his mind to it: “This is a dangerous idea that I am simply unwilling to contemplate”, he has declared.’340
Kikao cha majadiliano chenye kuchochea fikra kinachoitwa Multiverse: Ulimwengu Mmoja au Mingi?
A thought-provoking panel session titled Multiverse: One Universe or Many?
Katika World Science Festival ya mwaka 2013 walikutana wanasayansi kadhaa, akiwemo Andrei Linde, Alan Guth, Neil Turok, na Andreas Albrecht. Katika mjadala huu, Turok alisema, ‘Multiverse hakika iko akilini mwetu. Kama iko katika uhalisia ni swali lenye utata mkubwa kwangu. Ninachoweza kusema ni kwamba ushahidi kutoka mwaka uliopita kutoka Large Hadron Collider, kwa kugundua Higgs boson, unapingana vikali na multiverse. Badala yake, wananadharia wengi walitarajia kuwepo kwa Higgs boson zaidi ya moja, chembe nyingi nyingine, na mambo mengi tata. Badala yake, Large Hadron Collider iligundua Higgs boson moja tu yenye sifa rahisi za ajabu – sifa zinazoonyesha kwamba labda tunaweza kufuatilia kilichotokea kwenye uwanja wa Higgs hadi kwenye singularity yenyewe, na zinaashiria urahisi wa ajabu katika singularity hiyo. Vivyo hivyo, satelaiti ya Planck inatuonyesha mpangilio rahisi zaidi kuliko ule ambao miundo ya inflation kwa ujumla ilikuwa ikitabiri. Inflation kwa kweli si nadharia. Ni mkusanyiko mkubwa wa miundo. Na miundo mingi kati ya hiyo imekataliwa na data. Kwa hiyo ningesema ulimwengu unatupa mwanga wa urahisi na uzuri wa ajabu katika muundo wake. Tunachohitaji sasa ni mfululizo wa kanuni na hisabati zitakazoeleza urahisi tunaouona. Multiverse inaenda upande usio sahihi kabisa.’341 Vivyo hivyo, katika mkutano wa Richard Dawkins na Steven Weinberg, Weinberg alisema mara kadhaa kwamba nadharia ya multiverse ni makadirio tu, na hata hayo ni ya kiwango cha juu zaidi.
at the World Science Festival in 2013 brought together a number of scientists, including Andrei Linde, Alan Guth, Neil Turok, and Andreas Albrecht. In this discussion, Turok said, ‘The multiverse is certainly in our minds. Whether it is in reality is for me a very open question. What I would say is that the evidence from last year from the Large Hadron Collider in discovering the Higgs boson goes strongly against the multiverse. Instead, most theorists were expecting more than one Higgs boson, lots of other particles, and lots of complications. Instead, the Large Hadron Collider found just one Higgs boson with amazingly simple properties – properties which indicate that perhaps we can trace what happened to the Higgs field all the way back to the singularity itself, and they point to extraordinary simplicity in that singularity. Likewise, the Planck satellite is showing us a far simpler pattern than what the inflationary models in general were predicting. Inflation isn’t really a theory. It is a vast collection of models. And the vast majority of those models have ruled out by the data. So I would say the universe is giving us a glimpse of extraordinary simplicity and beauty in its structure. What we need now are series of principles and mathematics which explain the simplicity we see. The multiverse is all going in the wrong direction.’341 Likewise, in Richard Dawkins’s meeting with Steven Weinberg, Weinberg said on multiple occasions that the multiverse theory is just an estimate at best.
Tatizo hili linazidi kuwa gumu kwa kuwa wanafizikia wengi wanakiri kwamba hawana njia yoyote ya kuthibitisha kwa majaribio kwamba ulimwengu hizo zilikuwepo wakati wa mwanzo, hata kama zipo sasa. Wanaongeza kwamba kile ambacho fizikia ya kinadharia inaweza kutoa katika eneo hili ni miundo ya kihisabati tu, bila ushahidi wa kimaada. Hili linaonyesha wazi kwamba, wanapoulizwa moja kwa moja kuhusu ushahidi wa kiasili na wa kimajaribio wa kuwepo kwa multiverse, wasioamini Mungu hushindwa kabisa kujibu.
Paul Davies anatoa maoni kuhusu suala hili, akifichua upande wa "imani" wa mtazamo huu: "Bila shaka, mtu anaweza kuona ni rahisi zaidi kuamini safu isiyo na mwisho ya ulimwengu kuliko Mungu asiye na mwisho, lakini imani kama hiyo lazima itegemee imani badala ya uchunguzi."342
The issue is further complicated given that many physicists admit they do not have any way of empirically verifying that those universes existed at inception, even if they indeed do exist now. They add that the most that theoretical physics can offer in this space are mathematical theoretical models only, without any material evidence. This clearly reveals that, when atheists are asked point blank about the natural and empirical evidence for the existence of the multiverse, they fall completely flat and are unable to answer. Paul Davies makes a note on this issue, as he reveals the ‘faith’ aspect of this view: ‘Of course, one might find it easier to believe in an infinite array of universes than in an infinite Deity, but such a belief must rest on faith rather than observation.’342
2. Ikiwa tutaangalia kwa makini chaguo zinazotolewa na wanafizikia wanaodai kuwepo kwa idadi isiyo na kikomo ya ulimwengu ili kukabiliana na tatizo la urekebishaji laini (fine tuning), tutaona kwamba zimejengwa juu ya dhana zilizokwisha kuwa akilini, pamoja na makisio yanayojengwa juu ya makisio mengine. Wazo la mfumuko (inflation) si jambo ambalo wanasayansi wamekubaliana nalo. Katika jopo la majadiliano lililoitwa Multiverse: One Universe or Many?, ambalo lilihusisha mwanzilishi wa nadharia Alan Guth na msanidi wa nadharia ya ulimwengu-nyingi Andrei Linde, kulikuwa na kukiri kwamba nadharia hiyo ina matatizo mengi, na kwamba haiwezi kutoa ugunduzi wowote wa kisayansi siku zijazo. Kwa kweli, kulikuwa na tofauti za maoni kuhusu kama nadharia ya ulimwengu-nyingi ni sahihi hata mwanzoni. Unaweza kuona kiwango cha tofauti hiyo miongoni mwa washiriki wa jopo kupitia sura zao za uso. Sawa na nadharia ya ulimwengu-nyingi ni suala la nyuzi (strings), ambalo ni makisio tu na jaribio la kutengeneza muundo wa hisabati wa ulimwengu bila ushahidi halisi unaoliunga mkono kwa vitendo. Ndiyo sababu kuna mgawanyiko mkubwa katika jumuiya ya wanafizikia kuhusu nadharia hii: baadhi wanaikubali; wengine wanaikataa; wengine bado hawajaamua kwa namna yoyote. Suala hili lilishughulikiwa katika jopo la majadiliano, ambapo Neil Turok alisema, ‘Ningejibu kwa kusema kwamba dai hili kwamba nadharia ya nyuzi inatabiri ulimwengu-nyingi wa 10500 au zaidi ya ulimwengu tofauti unaowezekana linategemea makadirio yenye nguvu sana. Halijathibitishwa kabisa. Hakuna hata moja ya ulimwengu huu uliojengwa – na zimejengwa kwa sehemu tu – ambalo lina uthibitisho wa kihisabati kwamba lina maana…Nadhani ni vigumu sana kupinga hilo. Lakini hakuna hata moja kati yake ni ulimwengu wa kidinamiki. Kila mmoja wao angalau una singularity mbaya kama singularity ya Big Bang tunayoizungumzia siku zote. Na hakuna hata mmoja wa wanaosoma ulimwengu hizi aliyeitatua singularity hiyo. Kwa hiyo hakuna hata mmoja wao unaleta maana ya kihisabati.’ Albrecht alijibu kwa kusema, ‘Nitachukua hoja hiyo. Una vitu 10500, lakini kila moja kati ya hivi vitu inazalisha multiverse yake yenyewe katika picha hii, na kuna matatizo makubwa hata kwa multiverse moja tu kati ya hizo. Kuwa na 10500 au zaidi hakurekebishi chochote. Na matatizo ni haya: unaweza kuwa na pocket universes zisizo na kikomo... huwezi hata kuzihesabu, kwa hiyo huwezi kujua unachotabiri ni kipi kinachotokea mara nyingi zaidi kuliko kingine. Hasa, nadhani swali la kitaalamu ni jinsi gani hata unafanya hesabu za uwezekano. Mtu alitaja kamari ya Las Vegas mapema jioni hii... Njia ambazo watu wanatumia uwezekano kukabiliana na universes nyingi zinazopanuka milele - huwezi kuendesha kasino kwa msingi huo; si matumizi imara ya uwezekano. Kila mtu bado anajaribu, anahangaika, akitafuta kuufanya ufanye kazi, kwa ajili ya nini? Kuwa na 10500 kunachanganya zaidi.
Guth alikiri kuwepo kwa kile alichokieleza kama 'tatizo la kipimo': 'Msingi wa tatizo ni kwamba kila kitu kinachoweza kutokea kitatokea mara nyingi zisizo na kikomo, jambo ambalo linamaanisha kwamba ukitaka kusema aina fulani ya tukio ni ya kawaida zaidi kuliko nyingine, ni vigumu kuzilinganisha ikiwa kila moja inatokea mara nyingi zisizo na kikomo. Kwa hiyo hilo ni tatizo ambalo ninapaswa kukubali...'343
2. If we look carefully at the choices offered by physicists that postulate an infinite number of universes to deal with the fine tuning problem, we will find that they are based on preconceived notions, as well as guesswork built on other guesswork. The idea of inflation is not a point of scientific consensus. In the panel discussion Multiverse: One Universe or Many?, in which theory pioneer Alan Guth and multiverse theory developer Andrei Linde participated, there was an admission that there are many problems with the theory, and that it is unable to offer any future discoveries in science. In fact, there was a difference of opinion on whether the multiverse theory is accurate to begin with. You could detect the scope of the difference among the panellists in their facial expressions. Similar to the theory of the multiverse is the issue of strings, which is just guesswork and an attempt at a mathematical model for the universe without any real evidence backing it up in actuality. This is why there is a wide divide in the physics community over this theory: some accept it; others reject it; others have still not decided either way. This issue was dealt with in the panel discussion, in which Neil Turok said, ‘I would answer it by saying that this claim that string theory predicts a multiverse 10500 or more different possible universes is based on very strong approximation. It’s very unproved. None of these universes that have been constructed – and they’ve only been partially constructed – there’s no mathematical proof they make sense…I think that’s very hard to disagree with. But none of them is a dynamical universe. Each one of them at the very least has a singularity as bad as the Big Bang singularity we’ve always talked about. And none of these who study these universes have resolved that singularity. So none of them make mathematical sense.’ Albrecht reacted by saying, ‘I’ll pick up on that. You have 10500 of something, but each one of these somethings is generating the multiverse on its own in this picture, and there are serious problems just with the one of those multiverses. Having 10500 or more doesn’t fix anything. And the problems are that you can have infinitely many pocket universes…you can’t even count them up, so you can’t tell what you are predicting which is more common than something else. And in particular, I feel the technical question is how you even do probabilities, so someone mentioned Las Vegas betting somewhere earlier in the evening…The way people use probabilities to cope with these multiple eternally inflating universes – you couldn’t run a casino on that, they’re not solid use of probabilities. Everyone’s still ripping, scrambling away, trying to get it to work, just for what? Having 10500 is even more confusing.’ Guth admitted there was what he described as a ‘measure problem’: ‘The basic issue is that everything that can happen will happen an infinite number of times, which means that if you want to say that type of event is more common than another type of event, it’s hard to compare them if they’re each happening an infinite number of times. So that is a problem which I have to agree…’343
Kitabu kimoja cha kuvutia kinachokosoa nadharia ya nyuzi (string theory) ni kile cha Peter Woit kiitwacho *Not Even Wrong*, kilichopewa jina hilo kwa sababu kinaakisi chuki ambayo nadharia hii inakabiliana nayo. Kitabu kingine ni *The Trouble With Physics* cha Lee Smolin. David Berlinski ana ukosoaji mkali wa nadharia hii katika kitabu chake *The Devil's Delusion*.
One interesting work that critiques string theory is the book by Peter Woit called Not Even Wrong, which is named as such since it represents the resentment this notion faces. Another book is The Trouble With Physics by Lee Smolin. David Berlinski has a sharp critique of the theory in his book The Devil’s Delusion.
Wakati tovuti ya edge.org ilipotoa swali lake la kila mwaka la kuchekesha: 'Ni wazo gani la kisayansi liko tayari kustaafu?', Frank Tipler alijibu: 'Kama ilivyokuwa mwanzoni mwa sayansi ya kisasa, ndivyo inavyopaswa kuwa sasa. Tunapaswa kubakiza sharti la msingi kwamba uthibitisho wa kimajaribio ndio alama ya sayansi ya kweli. Kwa kuwa wataalamu wa nadharia ya kamba (string theory) wameshindwa kupendekeza njia yoyote ya kuithibitisha nadharia ya kamba kimajaribio, nadharia ya kamba inapaswa kustaafishwa, leo, sasa hivi.'345
When the edge.org website put its annual humorous question: ‘What Scientific Idea is Ready For Retirement?’, Frank Tipler replied, ‘As it was in the beginning of modern science, so it should be now. We should keep the fundamental requirement that experimental confirmation is the hallmark of true science. Since string theorists have failed to propose any way to confirm string theory experimentally, string theory should be retired, today, now.’345
Kwa kweli, mwanasayansi maarufu asiyeamini kuwepo kwa Mungu, Lawrence Krauss, ni mmoja wa watu wanaokataa dhana hii. Ametoa ukosoaji mkali wa nadharia ya multiverse mara kadhaa. Pia amefanya mjadala na mwanafizikia maarufu Brian Greene kuhusu somo hili.
Tatizo pana la nadharia hii ni kwamba mara nyingi inawasilishwa kama ukweli wa kisayansi uliothibitishwa, na imekubalika katika duru za kisayansi. Mtu akisoma kile kilichoandikwa katika sayansi maarufu kuhusu mada hii, au taarifa anazopokea kupitia filamu za kielimu au mihadhara ya hadharani, ataona lugha isiyo na shaka inayotumika, ambayo haiendani na tahadhari ya kisayansi inayohitajika. Wanawasilisha mambo wanayotaka kuyasambaza kama ukweli usiopingika, si kama nadharia, dhana, au makisio tu, ingawa jambo hilo bado halijathibitishwa kama hivyo ndani ya sayansi yenyewe.
Wakati wa mijadala, wanasayansi wasioamini Mungu hutumia hali hii kuwasilisha nadharia zao kama ukweli wa kisayansi, kana kwamba zimekubaliwa na wanasayansi wote. Ukweli ni kwamba wameshikilia makadirio haya kwa sababu tu ya upendeleo wa kiitikadi unaowasukuma kukataa kukubali uwepo wa Muumba asiye wa kimaumbile, na kuacha mtazamo wao finyu wa kimaada kuhusu uwepo.
Clifford Longley alisema: '[Hoja ya muundo wa kianthropiki] na kile inachoelekeza kina kiwango cha uhakika ambacho, katika uwanja mwingine wowote wa sayansi, kingechukuliwa kuwa kimethibitishwa. Kusisitiza vinginevyo ni sawa na kusisitiza kwamba Shakespeare hakuandika Shakespeare kwa sababu huenda liliandikwa na nyani bilioni moja wakiwa kwenye kibodi bilioni moja kwa miaka bilioni moja. Huenda ikawa hivyo. Lakini kuona wanasayansi wasioamini Mungu wakishikilia majani ya mwisho ya kukata tamaa kama hayo kumewapa wanaoamini Mungu hamasa mpya.'346
In fact, the famous atheist Lawrence Krauss is one personality that rejects this assumption. He has offered a stinging critique of the multiverse theory on a number of occasions. He has a discussion with the famous physicist Brian Greene on this subject. The wider problem with this hypothesis is that it is presented oftentimes as conclusive scientific fact and has become accepted in scientific circles. If one reads what has been written in popular science on the topic, or information that is received via documentaries or public lectures, they will notice the unequivocal language employed that defies the required scientific nuance. They present the issues they seek to disseminate to be the gospel truth, not just theories, assumptions, or mere guesswork, even though they have not been settled as such in science itself. During debates, atheist scientists leverage this to present their theories as scientific facts, as if they have been agreed upon in science. The fact is they have clung onto these estimates only because of preconceived ideological biases that push them to refuse both accepting a supermaterial creator and leaving their narrow materialistic outlook on existence. Clifford Longley said, ‘The [anthropic-design argument] and what it points to is of such an order of certainty that in any other sphere of science, it would be regarded as settled. To insist otherwise is like insisting that Shakespeare was not written by Shakespeare because it might have been written by a billion monkeys sitting at a billion keyboards typing for a billion years. So it might. But the sight of scientific atheists clutching at such desperate straws has put new spring in the step of theists.’346
3. Tatizo moja ambalo nadharia ya ulimwengu-nyingi (multiverse) huibua ni kwamba uumbaji wa ulimwengu-nyingi unahitaji marekebisho sahihi (fine-tuning). Hili mara moja huleta swali: Ni nani aliyerekebisha ulimwengu mama, ambao ulimwengu-nyingi ulizaliwa kutoka kwake? Paul Davies anaandika:
3. One problem that the multiverse theory triggers is that the creation of the multiverse requires some fine-tuning. This immediately leads to the question: Who tuned the mother universe, from which the multiverse was born? Paul Davies writes:
Nadharia ya ulimwengu-nyingi (multiverse) hakika inaondoa msingi chini ya nadharia ya muundo wa makusudi (intelligent design), lakini haitoshi kutoa maelezo kamili ya kuwepo kwa vitu. Kwanza kabisa, lazima kuwepo na utaratibu wa kimwili unaozalisha ulimwengu wote huo na kuupa kila mmoja sheria zake. Utaratibu huu unahitaji sheria zake yenyewe, au sheria za kiwango cha juu zaidi (meta-laws). Sheria hizo zinatoka wapi? Tatizo limehamishwa tu kutoka kwenye sheria za ulimwengu hadi kwenye sheria za kiwango cha juu za ulimwengu-nyingi. Chanzo cha ugumu wote huu kinaweza kufuatiliwa hadi ukweli kwamba dini na sayansi zote mbili zinategemea wakala aliye nje ya ulimwengu ili kueleza mpangilio wake unaofuata sheria. Kumtupia tatizo mbunifu aliyekuwepo tangu awali si maelezo yoyote, kwa sababu inaacha swali kuwa ni nani aliyemuumba mbunifu huyo. Lakini kutegemea kundi la ulimwengu usioonekana na seti ya sheria za kiwango cha juu zisizoelezwa sio bora zaidi.347
The multiverse theory certainly cuts the ground from beneath intelligent design, but it falls short of a complete explanation of existence. For a start, there has to be a physical mechanism to make all those universes and allocate bylaws to them. This process demands its own laws, or meta-laws. Where do they come from? The problem has simply been shifted up a level from the laws of the universe to the meta-laws of the multiverse. The root cause of all the difficulty can be traced to the fact that both religion and science appeal to some agency outside the universe to explain its lawlike order. Dumping the problem in the lap of a pre-existing designer is no explanation at all, as it merely begs the question of who designed the designer. But appealing to a host of unseen universes and a set of unexplained meta-laws is scarcely any better.347
Mwanafalsafa Robin Collins anasema: "Katika mapendekezo yote yaliyofanyiwa kazi hadi sasa kuhusu kile ambacho jenereta hii ya ulimwengu inaweza kuwa – kama vile mfano wa mlipuko mkubwa unaojirudia-rudia na mifano ya mabadiliko ya utupu… – 'jenereta' yenyewe inatawaliwa na seti tata ya sheria zinazoiwezesha kuzalisha ulimwengu. Kwa hiyo ni busara kudhani kwamba kama sheria hizi zingekuwa tofauti kidogo, jenereta hiyo kwa uwezekano mkubwa isingeweza kuzalisha ulimwengu wowote unaoweza kuendeleza uhai."348
The philosopher Robin Collins says, ‘In all currently worked out proposals for what this universe generator could be – such as the oscillating big bang and the vacuum fluctuation models… – the “generator” itself is governed by a complex set of laws that allow it to produce universes. It stands to reason, therefore, that if these laws were slightly different the generator probably would not be able to produce any universes that could sustain life.’348
Kuhusu nadharia ya mfumuko wa ukubwa wa ulimwengu (inflation), ambayo imependekezwa kama maelezo ya multiverse, Stephen Hawking alisema, 'Tatizo ni kwamba, ili modeli zetu za kinadharia za mfumuko wa ukubwa ziweze kufanya kazi, hali ya awali ya ulimwengu ilipaswa kuwekwa kwa namna maalum sana na yenye uwezekano mdogo sana. Kwa hiyo nadharia ya jadi ya mfumuko wa ukubwa hutatua seti moja ya matatizo lakini huunda jingine...'349
Regarding inflation theory, which has been proposed as an explanation for the multiverse, Stephen Hawking said, ‘The problem is, for our theoretical models of inflation to work, the initial state of the universe had to be set up in a very special and highly improbable way. Thus traditional inflation theory resolves one set of issues but creates another...’349
4. Tatizo linalohusishwa na mtazamo huu wa multiverse ni kwamba huuandaa akili kukimbilia jibu hilo kila wakati tatizo lisiloelezeka linapotokea. Hali hii ni dhahiri zaidi katika baadhi ya duru za fizikia zinazoliona kwa upendeleo wazo la multiverse, kwa kukubali mfano wa ulimwengu unaogawanyika bila kikomo uliopendekezwa na Max Tegmark na wengine, jambo ambalo hatimaye hufanya uwezekano wowote kuwa unatokea kwa kweli.
4. The problem associated with this multiverse thought pattern is that it conditions the mind to resort to that answer whenever an inexplicable problem transpires. This is especially the case in some physics circles that have a favourable view of the multiverse by accepting the infinitely splitting universe model as proposed by Max Tegmark and others, which ultimately renders any possibility to be occurring in actuality.
Fikiria mtu mmoja ana dau na mtu mwingine. Anachagua namba kwenye kete, kisha anairusha, na kete inatua ikiwa na namba aliyoichagua. Kulikuwa na uwezekano wa moja kati ya sita kwamba hilo litokee. Alichagua namba ileile na matokeo yaleyale yakajitokeza alipoirusha kete. Wakakubali kwamba matokeo hayo ni ya kawaida, kwa kuwa yametokea kwa bahati tena. Sasa fikiria mchakato huu umerudiwa mara mia moja, na kila mara kete imetua kwenye namba ileile. Je, hoja ya bahati bado ingefanya kazi?
Kwa mujibu wa nadharia ya ulimwengu-mwingi (multiverse), jambo hilo lingewezekana kabisa na lisingeshangaza hata kidogo. Ikiwa mtu huyo atamshutumu mrusha kete kwa udanganyifu, mrusha kete anaweza kujibu kwamba hakudanganya hata kidogo. Anaweza kusema: "Ni kwamba tumo katika ulimwengu ambamo jambo hili lilipaswa kutokea." Mchakato huu wa kufikiri unatupeleka tena – ingawa kwa njia ndefu zaidi – kwenye nguvu kuu za bahati. Bila kujali jinsi uwezekano wa jambo ulivyo mdogo, lingehitaji kutokea katika ulimwengu mmoja ndani ya ulimwengu-mwingi. Hakuna kinachozuia ulimwengu huo kuwa ulimwengu wetu.
Kwa msingi huu, kila tunapokuwa hatuko vizuri na wazo kwamba jambo limetokea kwa bahati, hata kama tunaamini kihisabati kuwa ni hivyo, na hata kama tunajua uwezekano wake ni mdogo mno, bado jambo hilo linapaswa kuchukuliwa kuwa linawezekana, kwa msingi kwamba ulimwengu wetu ulikusudiwa kuwa mwenyeji wa tukio hilo lisilowezekana. Hii ndiyo hasa dhana inayopendekezwa na wafuasi wa nadharia ya ulimwengu-mwingi, ambao wanautumia kueleza tukio lolote lisilowezekana katika ulimwengu wetu, ambalo bila hilo, kwa mujibu wao, uhai usingewezekana. Mtazamo unaokubali wazo hili la kimetafizikia unazifunga njia zote za kuonyesha kwa uwazi uwepo wa Allah (SWT), kwa sababu uthibitisho wowote wa usanifu kamili unaowasilishwa kwao unaweza kukataliwa kwa kutumia fimbo ya ulimwengu-mwingi usio na mwisho. Basi, je, kuna faida gani kuwahi kuchunguza matukio yasiyowezekana katika ulimwengu wetu, au kufanya hitimisho kutokana nayo? Kwa kuonyesha kwamba tatizo hili ni la kweli, na kwamba lina athari kwa mjadala mzima kuhusu kuwepo kwa Mungu, angalia sehemu hii kutoka kwenye mdahalo kati ya Dan Barker (mtu asiyeamini Mungu) na Trent Horn, unaoitwa God: Supreme Being or Imaginary Friend?:
Imagine a person has a bet with someone. He chooses a number on a dice, throws it, and it lands to match the number. There was a one-sixth probability of that occurring. The same number was chosen and the same result appeared when he threw the dice. They assumed the outcome is reasonable, as it happened by chance again. Now imagine that this process was repeated a hundred times and on every occasion, the dice landed on the same number – would the coincidence argument work anymore? In light of the multiverse theory, this should be perfectly possible and not surprising at all. If the person accuses the thrower of cheating, he can simply turn around and say he did not cheat at all. He could say, ‘It just so happens that we are in the universe where this was supposed to occur.’ This thought process leads us yet again – just in a more long-winded way – to the high powers of chance. No matter how remote the probability of something is, it would need to occur in one universe within the multiverse. There is nothing to stop that universe being our universe. Based on this, whenever we are uncomfortable with the idea that something occurred by accident, even if we believe it to be so mathematically, and even if we know of the incredibly low probability of it ever occurring by chance, it should still be considered feasibe and possible according to the notion that our universe was meant to host that improbable event. This is exactly the idea proposed by the pro-multiverse theorists, who use this theory to explain any improbable occurrence in our universe, without which life – according to them – would not have been possible. The mindset that accepts this metaphysical idea shuts down all routes to the possible demonstration of the existence of Allah , because whichever proof vis-à-vis immaculate design is presented to them, it can be batted away using the stick of the infinite multiverse. As thus, what is the point in ever investigating improbable events in our universe, or making deductions from them? Highlighting that this problem is a real issue, and that it has an impact on the entire discussion on the existence of the Divine, look at this segment from the debate between Dan Barker (atheist) and Trent Horn, titled God: Supreme Being or Imaginary Friend?:
Horn: Unaweza kutupa mfano wa kidhahania wa kitu ambacho kingeupinga kauli ya 'Ushahidi wa Mungu usiofuata mtindo huu, hatujui maelezo ya x, kwa hiyo Mungu yupo', kwa sababu ulisema nimependekeza hoja za 'Mungu wa mapengo'? Ninatamani kujua ni aina gani ya ushahidi hauendani na mtindo huu. 'Hatujui maelezo ya kile tulichoona x, kwa hiyo Mungu.' Je, unaweza kutupa mfano usiolingana na hilo?
Horn: Can you give us a hypothetical example of something that would falsify the statement ‘An evidence for God that does not conform to this pattern, we don’t know the explanation for x, therefore God exists’, because you said I just proposed ‘God of the gaps’ arguments. I’m curious what kind of evidence doesn’t conform to this pattern. ‘We don’t know the explanation for what we observed x, therefore God.’ Could you give us an example that does not correspond with that?
Barker: Yeah. Injili inasema wazi kwamba mambo yote mtakayoomba katika sala kwa imani, mtapokea. Biblia inasema hivyo, na imani yenu imejengwa juu ya kitabu hicho. Hiyo ni wazi kabisa – yote maana yake ni yote. Kwa hiyo ushahidi kwangu ungekuwa ikiwa ungemwomba Mungu kitu ambacho hatuwezi hata kukijua. Mfano wa ajabu: ukimwomba Mungu, kisha ukaniambia kwamba Mungu amekuambia kwamba kesho saa 12:43:16, kimondo kutoka kusini-kusini-magharibi kwa pembe ya digrii 83 kitapiga nyumba yako… Horn: Naona unakoelekea. Unachosema ni kwamba hatujui jinsi ulivyotabiri kimondo kile kitakavyotua hapo, kwa hiyo ni Mungu. Barker: Sisemi 'kwa hiyo ni Mungu'; ninasema una ushahidi mzuri.
Barker: Yeah. The Bible is very clear that all things whatsoever you shall ask for in prayer believing, you shall receive. The Bible says that, and you faith is based on that book. That’s pretty clear – all means all. So evidence for me would be if you were to ask God for something we couldn’t possibly know. Here’s a wild example. If you were to pray to God and you told me that God told you that tomorrow at 12:43:16, an asteroid from the south-south-west at an 83° angle would strike your house… Horn: I see where you’re going. What you’re saying is that we don’t know how you predicted how that asteroid landed there, therefore God. Barker: I wouldn’t say ‘therefore God’; I would say you have some good evidence.
Pembe: Kwa ajili ya nini?
Horn: For what?
Barker: Kwa huyu Mungu unayemwamini.
Barker: For this God you believe in.
Pembe: Lakini utajuaje kwamba si kitu cha kawaida ambacho bado hatujakigundua?
Horn: But how would you know it isn’t something natural we haven’t discovered yet?
Barker: Kwa sababu ungeielezaje? Horn: Ungeielezaje!? Sijui! Ungeielezaje!?
Barker: Because how would you explain it? Horn: How would you explain it!? I don’t know! How would you explain it!?
Barker: Ikiwa unauliza ushahidi, utahitaji kitu kama hicho… (Baada ya dakika chache)
Barker: If you’re asking for evidence, you would need something like that… (A few moments later)
Horn: Nadhani nimepata jambo la kuvutia kuhusu ulimwengu wa aina nyingi (multiverse). Ulisema kwamba unaweza kuwa usio na mwisho.
Horn: I guess I have something interesting with the multiverse. You said it could be infinite.
Barker: Hapana. Tunajua kwamba kuna angalau moja. Hiyo ndiyo tu tunayojua kwa sasa.
Horn: Sawa, kwa sababu unahitaji ulimwengu mwingi, sivyo? Haiwezi kuwa bilioni tu kwa sababu hilo halitatoa namba kubwa. Lakini kama zingekuwa zisizo na mwisho, hapa ndipo tatizo lilipo. Katika multiverse isiyo na mwisho, je, kutakuwepo na ulimwengu mmoja ambapo unatabiri kwa kawaida kuanguka kwa kimondo?
Barker: No. We know that it is at least one. That is all we know right now. Horn: Alright, because you need a lot of universes right? It can’t just be a billion because that won’t give you huge numbers. But if it was infinite, here’s the problem. In infinite multiverse, will there be one universe where you naturally predict a meteor strike?
Barker: Kungekuwa na ulimwengu ambamo mtu angepigwa, ndiyo hivyo.
Barker: There would be a universe in which someone would get struck, that’s right.
Horn: Kwa hiyo hakungekuwa na njia ya kujua kama ni Mungu, au kama uko tu katika ulimwengu wa multiverse?
Horn: So there would be no way to know if it was God or if you’re just in the multiverse?
Barker: Lakini ningekubali hilo kama ushahidi katika ulimwengu huo.
Barker: But I would accept it as evidence in that universe.
Horn: Lakini unajuaje kuwa ni Mungu, na kwamba hauko katika ulimwengu wa aina nyingi usio na mwisho?
Horn: But how do you know it’s God and you’re not in the infinite multiverse?
Barker: Katika hali hiyo, ningesema tu kwamba ningekubali hilo kama ushahidi wa uwepo wa Mungu; huenda likawa si sahihi, si kama uthibitisho, lakini ningelikubali kama ushahidi katika ulimwengu huo.350
Barker: In that case, I would just say I would accept that as an evidence for God, it might be wrong – not as proof – but I would accept it as evidence in that universe.350
Fikiria kama mmoja wa hawa wanaoamini hali ya kuwa na ulimwengu usio na mwisho, yaani multiverse, na kwamba kila uwezekano unaoweza kufikiriwa unawakilishwa katika multiverse hiyo, akishuhudia muujiza wa Mwenyezi Mungu uliotokea mkononi mwa mmoja wa Manabii Wake. Papo hapo angejibu, ‘Sijui. Huenda ulitokea kwa bahati tu kwa sababu nilikuwa katika ulimwengu ambamo tukio hilo la bahati lilitokea.’
Jambo la ajabu sana lilikuwa kwamba Barker alikiri – licha ya shinikizo la ukweli dhahiri na la yale ambayo fiṭrah yake mwenyewe ingekuwa ikimwambia – kwamba aliyoyataja yanatosha kumshawishi nafsi yake. Hili lipo licha ya ukweli kwamba, kwa makadirio yangu, uwezekano wake wa kihesabu ni mkubwa zaidi kuliko uwezekano wa kwamba viwango na vigezo hivyo vya ulimwengu vimewekwa na kiumbe cha nje. Akiukosoa nadharia ya multiverse, David Berlinski alisema, ‘Kuna ulimwengu ambamo elektroni huendelea kufuata sheria fulani, na zile ambazo hazifuati. Katika Landscape ambamo chochote kinawezekana, hakuna kitu kinachokuwa cha lazima. Katika ulimwengu ambamo hakuna kitu cha lazima, chochote kinawezekana.’351
This discussion reveals the scale of the problem. Imagine if one of these atheists who believe in the infinite multiverse and that all possibilities one can envisage are represented in the multiverse, and he witnessed a miracle of God that occurred at the hand of one of His Prophets. In response, he would immediately retort, ‘I don’t know. Perhaps it occurred as an accident because I was in the universe where this accident occurred.’ What was quite remarkable was that Barker admitted – in spite of pressure from self-evident truths and what his own fiṭrah would have been telling him – that what he mentioned was enough to convince himself. This is notwithstanding the fact that his probabilities – in my estimation – are numerically far more than the probabilities of those universe standards and constants being set in place by an external entity. In critiquing the multiverse theory, David Berlinski said, ‘There are universes in which the electron continues to follow some law, and those in which it does not. In a Landscape in which anything is possible, nothing is necessary. In a universe in which nothing is necessary, anything is possible.’351
5. Kwa muda mrefu dai madai yao yanategemea makisio, basi mchakato wa kutofautisha ulimwengu-nyingi ungeishia wapi? Kwa nini tujizuie kwa mfano kwenye tofauti za vipimo vyao vya kudumu? Kwa nini isiwepo tofauti katika sheria za fizikia pia? Kwa nini tofauti hii isiwe ndani ya chembechembe za ulimwengu hizo? Zaidi ya hayo, kwa nini mchakato huu usifanywe kuwa wa kanuni kwa kila kitu, na wigo mzima wa uwezekano kuhusu tofauti ukafunguliwa kwa mjadala? Hili limependekezwa kwa mfano katika modeli ya Max Tegmark, yaani kwamba kuna nakala za sisi wenyewe katika kila ulimwengu ambamo tunaweza kuwepo, pamoja na ulimwengu mwingi kulingana na kila uwezekano katika maisha yetu na kila chaguo tunaloweza kufanya. Hii ina maana kwamba mwanamapinduzi kabisa wa kutoamini Mungu katika ulimwengu huu angekuwa Mwislamu muumini katika ulimwengu mwingine, Mkristo katika mwingine, mwasi wa Uislamu katika mwingine, mdai wa uungu katika mwingine, mwendawazimu katika mwingine, na kadhalika. Hali hii inafanana zaidi na filamu ya kisayansi-kubuni kuliko uhalisia; kwa kweli, ni hiyo hasa. Alan Guth, Profesa wa Fizikia katika Taasisi ya Teknolojia ya Massachusetts na mwanzilishi wa nadharia ya mfumuko wa kikosmolojia, alisema, ‘Kimsingi chochote kinachoweza kutokea hutokea katika moja ya njia mbadala, jambo linalomaanisha kwamba juu ya Ulimwengu tunaoujua kuna ulimwengu mbadala ambamo Al Gore ni Rais na Elvis Presley bado yu hai.’352
5. So long as their claim is based on guesswork, where then would the processing of the differences between the multiverse stop at? Why should we limit ourselves to, for example, the differences between their constants? Why can there not be variation in the laws of physics as well? Why can this difference not be inside the particles of those universes? In fact, why is the process not regularised across the board and the entire raft of probabilities vis-à-vis difference is opened up for debate? This has actually been proposed in, for example, the model offered by Max Tegmark, namely that there are repetitions of ourselves in each universe we can possibly be in, as well as multiple universes in accordance with each possibility in our lives and each choice we can make. This means that the most belligerent of atheists in this universe would be a Muslim theist in another universe, a Christian in another, an apostate from Islam in another, a claimant of divinity in another, a crazed madman in another, and so on. This situation resembles a sci-fi movie more than it does reality; in fact, it is exactly that. Alan Guth, Professor of Physics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and pioneer of cosmic inflation theory, said, ‘Essentially anything that can happen does happen in one of the alternatives which means that superimposed on top of the Universe that we know of is an alternative universe where Al Gore is President and Elvis Presley is still alive.’352
Mahali pengine, alisema, ‘Katika ulimwengu mmoja pekee, ng'ombe wanaozaliwa na vichwa viwili ni wachache kuliko wanaozaliwa na kichwa kimoja’. Lakini katika ulimwengu-nyingi unaogawanyika bila kikomo, ‘kuna ng'ombe wasio na kikomo wenye kichwa kimoja na ng'ombe wasio na kikomo wenye vichwa viwili. Je, uwiano unakuwaje?’353
Elsewhere, he said, ‘In a single universe, cows born with two heads are rarer than cows born with one head’. But in an infinitely branching multiverse, ‘there are an infinite number of one-headed cows and an infinite number of two-headed cows. What happens to the ratio?’353
Akiwa amekasirishwa na wazo hili, Paul Davies alisema, "Lakini hata kama huna haja ya kuogopa kukutana na nakala yako mwenyewe, wazo tu kwamba kunaweza kuwepo si nakala moja tu, bali nakala zisizo na kikomo zinazofanana nawe, zikiishi maisha yanayofanana (na zisizo na kikomo nyingine zikiishi maisha yanayofanana lakini si yanayofanana kabisa) ni jambo linalosumbua sana. Hata Tegmark anakiri kwamba silika yake ya kwanza ni kuona wazo hilo kuwa la "ajabu na lisilo la kweli.""354
Vexed by this idea, Paul Davies said, ‘But even if you need not fear an encounter with a duplicate you, the very notion that there could be not just one, but an infinity of identical copies of you, leading identical lives (and infinitely many others leading similar but not identical lives) is deeply unsettling. Even Tegmark admits that his gut reaction is to find the idea “strange and implausible.”’354
Kinachoonyesha wazi jinsi watu wanavyojiingiza katika aina hii ya 'fizikia ya dhana' ni kwamba baadhi ya wanasayansi wameanza kufikiri kwa uzito kuhusu swali lifuatalo: Je, sisi tumeunganishwa kwa akili zetu na chombo cha mawasiliano cha ulimwengu wote kinachotuwezesha kuishi katika ulimwengu wa kivirtual kupitia fahamu zetu? Au tunaingiliana na uhalisia halisi wa lengo? Je, hali yetu inafanana na ile inayoelezwa katika filamu maarufu ya Kimarekani ya The Matrix? Paul Davies alitaja kwamba mojawapo ya matokeo ya kukubali multiverse isiyo na mwisho ni kwamba mtu angelazimika kukubali ulimwengu wa kubuni unaotoa udanganyifu kwamba ni ulimwengu halisi. Hili bila shaka linaleta tatizo la jinsi ilivyo na uwezekano kwetu kuthibitisha kwamba ulimwengu tunaoishi ni halisi na si wa kubuni au wa kivirtual.
Zaidi ya hapo, tunaweza kuipeleka mbali zaidi dhana ya ulimwengu wa kivirtual, kwani baadhi ya watu wanasema kwamba sisi wenyewe ni viumbe vya kivirtual tu, kwamba hatuna uwepo halisi bali ni matokeo ya mpangaji aliyetuprogramu kwenye kompyuta yake, na kutuweka katika ulimwengu huu wa kivirtual kupitia kompyuta yake. Alitupanga kwa namna ambayo tunahisi kuwepo bila kamwe kujua kwamba kilicho karibu nasi si halisi. "Msimamo" huu ungefanya uwepo wetu kuwa kama toleo lililobadilika la mchezo wa kompyuta wa The Sims ambao vijana hucheza, ambapo ustaarabu wa hali ya juu hujengwa kwenye kompyuta kutoka faraja ya vyumba vyao vya kulala. Kwa hiyo inashangaza kuona kwamba Wanaatheisti Wapya wanaamini ndoto za aina hizi kuwa za kimantiki zaidi kuliko kuamini Bwana Muumba. Ingawa Wanaatheisti Wapya hawasemi wazi kwamba tunaishi katika ulimwengu kama wa The Sims, hawawezi kuukanusha, na kwa kweli wanaona uzoefu huu wa kimchezo kuwa unaendana na maarifa ya kisayansi. Mlango kwao uko wazi kwa dhana za aina hii. Hili linaonyesha hatari kubwa ya kujiingiza katika kila wazo la ajabu au ndoto yoyote ambayo akili inaweza kuibuni. Pia inaonyesha bei kubwa sana ambayo mwanadamu hulipa – utu wake wenyewe – anapojihusisha na aina hizi za mawazo. Mawazo kama haya yanaweza kumpeleka mtu kwenye shimo lisilo na mwisho na kumlazimisha kukumbatia hoja potofu zisizo na mwisho kwa gharama ya uelewa halisi na maarifa. Kwa kweli, huigeuza maisha yake yote kuwa fujo isiyo na maana ya kutokuamini kuwa kuna maana, kutokuwa na mantiki na machafuko. Hakuna upande wowote wa maisha yake ungekuwa huru kutokana na kukosa maana kama hiyo. Kwa mfano, maadili hayangekuwa na maana yoyote katika ulimwengu wa kivirtual – je, maisha ya kivirtual yangekuwa na thamani yoyote ya kweli ambayo ingemzuia mtu kuvunja maadili?356
Ni pendekezo la ajabu kweli. Jambo la kusumbua ni kwamba wasioamini Mungu wengi, katika masuala haya, wako tayari kuruka na kujiunga na kundi la waumini, yote ili kujiepusha kumkiri Bwana wao na Muumba wao. Mwanadamu asiposhikilia kwa uthabiti yale anayoyajua kutokana na silika yake ya kiakili, na hisia zake za asili na za lazima, bila shaka ataanguka katika mashaka na ndoto hizi. Ndiyo sababu ninaona ni wajibu kwa mtu kushikamana na alama za kisilika na za asili zilizo katika nafsi yake, na kuzifanya kuwa mwongozo ambao kwa huo anaishi. Mtu akipuuza mwongozo huo au kuuraruara, gharama ya kitendo hicho itakuwa kubwa mno – itamgharimu kila kitu kihalisi.
Kuhusu hoja za upotoshaji, sababu, na uhusiano wake na ukweli na ushahidi wake, Ibn Taymiyyah anatoa kifungu hiki kifupi lakini chenye busara: "Fahamu kwamba hakuna ukweli wala ushahidi usioweza kuwekewa shaka za upotoshaji. Upotoshaji hutokana ama na akili iliyoharibika au ukaidi wa kukataa kukubali ukweli. Hakuna kanuni inayoweza kuyabana hayo; badala yake, daima ni ndoto potofu na ukaidi wa kukataa ukweli ndizo zinazoingia nafsini."357 Alisema kweli kabisa, .
What shines a light on these people getting carried away with this sort of ‘hypothetical physics’ behaviour is that some scientists have started to think seriously about the following question: Are we connected with our minds to a universal communication tool that allows us to live in a virtual world though our consciousness? Or are we interacting with actual objective reality? Is our state like the one described in the famous American movie The Matrix? Paul Davies mentioned that one implication of accepting the infinite multiverse is one would accept fictitious universes that give the illusion that they are actual universes. This obviously leads to the problem of how probable it is for us to ascertain that the universe that we live in is real and not fictitious or virtual.355 In fact, we can take the idea of the virtual world further, because some actually do say that we ourselves are simply virtual beings, and that we do not have any real actual existence but are rather the result of a programmer who programmed us on his/its computer, and placed us in this virtual world through his/its computer. He/It programmed us in such a way that we feel we exist without ever knowing that what is around is not real. This ‘position’ would make our existence like an evolved version of the PC game The Sims that adolescents play, where advanced civilisations are built on computers from the comfort of their bedrooms. It is therefore quite surprising to see that New Atheists believe these sorts of fantasies to be more rational than believing in a Lord Who created. Even though New Atheists do not explicitly state that we are living in a Sims like world, they nonetheless cannot falsify it and in fact consider this game-like experience to be congruent with scientific knowledge. The door for them is open to these sorts of ideas. This uncovers the great danger of getting carried away with any and every wild idea or fantasy that the mind can conjure up. It also highlights the very high price man pays – his humanity itself – when dabbling with these sorts of thoughts. Such thoughts can take a person down a rabbit hole and force him to adopt endless sophistry at the price of actual cognition and knowledge. In fact, it renders his entire life into a pointless mess of nihilism, irrationality, and chaos. No aspect of his life would ever be free from such meaninglessness. For example, ethics would have no point in a virtual world – would a virtual life possess any real value that would stop a person from violating ethics?356 It is indeed a strange proposition. What is disconcerting is that many atheists are, on these issues, prepared to jump into the believers’ category, all to save themselves from acknowledging their Lord and Creator. When man does not hold fast onto what he knows from his own rational self-instincts, and his innate and necessary feelings, he would no doubt slip up at these doubts and fantasies. This is why I consider it incumbent for a person to adhere to the instinctive and innate imprints on one’s soul, and to make that the blueprint by which one lives. If someone ignores that blueprint or tears it up, the price for such a deed would be extremely high – it will quite literally cost him everything. On the sophistic questions, causes, and their link with the truth and its evidence, Ibn Taymiyyah offers this brief yet graceful passage: ‘Realise that there is no truth or evidence that cannot be subject to sophistic doubts. Sophism is either about a corrupted mind or obstinance from accepting the truth. Neither have a rule to pin them down; rather, it would always be down to the corrupt fantasies and stubborn denials of the truth that come into the souls.’357 He spoke the truth indeed, .
6. Wazo hili linatoa suluhisho lenye ugumu usio wa lazima katika kueleza chanzo cha muundo na utata wa ulimwengu wetu. Hili linapingana na Wembe wa Occam, dhana maarufu ya kisayansi ya kutatua matatizo, ambayo inamaanisha kwamba vitu havipaswi kuongezwa zaidi ya kiwango kinachohitajika, au kwamba maelezo rahisi zaidi kwa kawaida ndiyo bora zaidi. Kwa hiyo itaonekana kuwa ni upuuzi kudai idadi kubwa au isiyo na kikomo ya ulimwengu ili kueleza ulimwengu mmoja.
Cha kuvutia ni kwamba katika kitabu *The God Delusion*, Richard Dawkins anasema: ‘Ulimwengu-anuwai (multiverse) unaweza kuonekana wa kupindukia kwa wingi wa ulimwengu. Lakini kila mojawapo ya ulimwengu huo ukiwa rahisi katika sheria zake za msingi, bado hatuwekei dhana ya jambo lisilowezekana sana.’358 Ikiwa kila ulimwengu ni rahisi kweli kama anavyosema, na kwa kuwa ulimwengu wetu ni sehemu ya ulimwengu-anuwai huo kwa wazi, basi kulikuwa na haja gani ya kudai ulimwengu-anuwai ili tu kueleza ulimwengu wetu rahisi? Hii ni kwa sababu kila ulimwengu katika mfululizo usio na mwisho wa ulimwengu usingekuwa rahisi, bali ungekuwa wa kiutata. Kila mmoja ungehitaji maelezo yake yenyewe. Kwa hiyo, kutoa ulimwengu-anuwai kama maelezo ya ulimwengu wetu ni jambo lisilo na maana kabisa. Hasa ukizingatia msisitizo wa Dawkins kwamba hayana utata kwa namna ile iliyowafanya Paul Davies na wengine kutafuta ufafanuzi juu ya asili ya mchakato unaozaa ulimwengu nyingi, ambao nao pia ungehitaji kiwango fulani cha urekebishaji makini (fine-tuning).
Zaidi ya hayo, tuchukulie kwamba kila ulimwengu wenyewe ni rahisi – je, ingekuwa sahihi basi kusema kwamba ulimwengu-anuwai kwa jumla hauna utata? Fikiria kuna mashine kubwa. Kila sehemu yake ndogo ni rahisi. Sehemu hizi zinapounganishwa pamoja kuunda mashine, je, ingefaa kudai kwamba kwa sababu sehemu hizo ni rahisi, mashine nayo ni rahisi? Fikiria mtu akidai kwamba mwanadamu mwenye viungo vyake vyote vilivyo hai ni rahisi, kwa sababu tukimpunguza hadi vipengele vyake vya msingi, tunaweza kusema kwamba sehemu hizi za msingi ni rahisi, na kwa hiyo mwanadamu ni rahisi. Ni wazi kwamba kuna kosa la msingi hapa. Bila shaka, kauli yake kwamba 'ikiwa kila moja ya ulimwengu hiyo ni rahisi katika sheria zake za msingi, bado hatuwekei dhana yoyote isiyowezekana sana' haina maana kubwa. Ni upeo gani hasa wa uwezekano unaolinganishwa hapa? Anawezaje kujua ni kwa kiasi gani nadharia ya ulimwengu mwingi usio na mwisho ina uwezekano ikilinganishwa na ulimwengu mmoja? Hizi ni baadhi ya pingamizi dhidi ya nadharia ya ulimwengu mwingi (multiverse) na kufaa kwake katika kueleza jambo la umahiri na ujenzi kamili wa ulimwengu. Wapenzi wa suala hili wanapaswa kujisaidia kwa vitabu vifuatavyo ili kujifunza pingamizi zaidi: The Goldilocks Enigma, Big Bang, Big God: A Universe Fit for Life?, The Devil's Delusion, God's Undertaker, God and Design, Science and Evidence for Design in the Universe, na vingine.
6. This idea offers an overly difficult solution in interpreting the cause of composition and complexity in our universe. This contradicts Occam’s Razor, the famous scientific problem solving concept, which means that entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity, or that the simplest explanation is usually the best one. It would therefore seem to be absurd to claim a huge or infinite number of universes to explain one universe. What is interesting is that in The God Delusion, Richard Dawkins says, ‘The multiverse may seem extravagant in sheer number of universes. But if each one of those universes is simple in its fundamental laws, we are still not postulating anything highly improbable.’358 If each universe is really simple as he says, and given that our universe is obviously part of that multiverse, then what was the need to claim the multiverse just to explain our simple universe? This is because each universe in the infinite series of universes would not be simple, but rather complex. Each would require its own explanation. Therefore, to offer the multiverse as an explanation for our universe is absolutely pointless. This is especially given Dawkins’s insistence that they are not complex in the way that led Paul Davies and others to seek a clarification on the nature of the operation that results in the creation of multiple universes, which would also be in need of some degree of fine-tuning. In addition, let us assume that each universe in its own right is simple – would it then be correct to say that the multiverse in toto is not complex? Imagine there is a large machine. Each constituent part of the machine is simple. When these parts are put together to form the machine, would it be proper to claim that because these parts are simple, the machine is also simple? Imagine if a person claimed that man with all his living limbs is simple, because if we reduce him to his basic elements, we can say that these basic parts are simple, and therefore man is simple. It is clear that there is a fundamental error here. Obviously, his statement, ‘if each one of those universes is simple in its fundamental laws, we are still not postulating anything highly improbable’ does not make much sense. What exactly is the scope of probability being compared to here? How can he know how probable the infinite multiverse theory is compared to the single universe? These are some of the objections to the multiverse theory and its suitability in explaining the phenomenon of mastery and consummate construction of the universe. Enthusiasts of this issue should avail themselves of the following books in order to learn further objections: The Goldilocks Enigma, Big Bang, Big God: A Universe Fit for Life?, The Devil’s Delusion, God’s Undertaker, God and Design, Science and Evidence for Design in the Universe, and others.
Though this objection is relatively ancient, the one who systemised it is David Hume via his typical scepticism vis-à-vis the principle of causality. This scepticism has been imbibed by atheist thought to a large degree, giving rise to a plethora of problems. Hume commented extensively on this objection, especially in his book Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. The presence of this objection among atheists has become increasingly conspicuous, especially when they debate proponents of intelligent design or creationists. They claim that masterful construction in itself does not necessarily mean that a selective maker exists. This delusion that we sense in ourselves comes from observing the masterful makings of man, so it appeared to our minds that the will of a doer is the cause of mastery. This is a non sequitur. This is why we find one angle of objection made on Paley’s famous watchmaker argument to be that it is improper to analogise mastery in the universe to mastery in a watch. Though the construct of a watch is from a willing maker, this does not have to be the case for the universe. The most that can be said is that some manifestations of mastery can be ascribed to a doer – with the condition that it be as a result of observation and induction. Our judgement that watches have a maker is based on seeing the first watch being made, the second watch being made, and so on. As for the universe, we cannot see or comprehend that it has a maker, let alone comprehend that the maker may have made a second or third universe. Therefore, it is not proper to jump to this sort of conclusion – i.e., that the universe has a maker – based on the fact that both the universe and watches are masterfully constructed. This objection surfaced during the debate between Dr. ʿAmr Sharīf and Bassām al-Baghdādī on the Misr 25 satellite channel, moderated by Eng. Fāḍil Sulaymān over three episodes. Eng. Fāḍil picked up a glass in his hand and asked Bassām, There is this glass in front of you. Is its existence not evidence for the existence of a maker who made this glass?’ Bassām: We know that this cup exists and we know the factory that manufactured it. Have you seen what made the universe that we are in? Have you seen other universes to compare this one to them?
Fāḍil: Hapana – hujanielewa swali langu. Ninakuuliza wewe, Bassām, kwamba ikiwa hujui kiwanda ambamo kioo hicho kilitengenezwa, je, kuwepo tu kwa kioo hicho hakutakuwa bado ushahidi kwamba kina mtengenezaji?
Eng. Fāḍil: No – you have not understood my question. I am asking you, Bassām, that if you do not know the factory in which it was manufactured, would the mere existence of the glass still not be evidence that it has a maker?
Kambi hii inaonyesha pengo kubwa kati ya wasioamini Mungu na waumini katika elimu ya nadharia ya theolojia (epistemology of theology). Sababu ya tofauti hii ni kwamba waumini wanategemea dhana ya sababu-na-matokeo (causality) iliyo wazi yenyewe na inayotokana na fiṭrah, ilhali wasioamini Mungu wanakataa kanuni hii na kuifanya kuwa suala la hoja ya kiingizi (inductive reasoning). Tatizo ni kwamba kanuni hii ni sehemu ya mchakato wa hoja ya kiingizi ambao wakati mwingine haufanyi kazi; kwa hakika, katika falsafa ya wasioamini Mungu, kitu kinaweza kutokana na kisichokuwepo kabisa. Kwa hiyo, hata katika mfano wa saa, mtu anaweza kutumia hoja hiyo hiyo na kusema: "Ukweli kwamba saa X ina mtengenezaji, saa Y ina mtengenezaji, na saa Z ina mtengenezaji, haimaanishi kwamba saa A, B na C nazo zina mtengenezaji." Hii ndiyo hasa ambayo wasioamini Mungu wengi walihitimisha kutoka kwa maneno ya David Hume, wakailikubali nadharia yake, ingawa kiutendaji wanalazimika kufuata kile fiṭrah yao inachowaamuru. Sitarudia yale ambayo tayari yameshasemwa kuhusu hatari ambayo kukataa kanuni ya sababu-na-matokeo kunaleta kwa utambuzi wa binadamu, pamoja na matatizo mengi ya kielimu yanayotokana nayo, yanayomwacha hata mtu asiyeamini Mungu asiweze kuyakwepa. Kwa kweli, wasioamini Mungu hawawezi kushikilia msimamo wao kiutendaji. Ni jambo la kiholela kabisa kuachana na kanuni hii kwa kisingizio kwamba uzoefu wa hisia na hoja ya kiingizi peke yake vinatosha. Hii kwa kweli ingekuwa mlango wa kuelekea shaka kubwa kabisa, si katika suala hili pekee, bali katika maarifa yote. Ni kosa la kimbinu kudhani hapa kwamba msimamo wa waumini ulifikiwa kwa njia ya kulinganisha vitu vinavyofanana (analogy). Ukweli ni kwamba huu haukuwa mlinganisho tangu mwanzo, bali ni matumizi ya jumla ya dhana ya kiasili na ya kiakili inayoamuru kwamba kuona umbo lililobuniwa kwa ustadi tu kunaonyesha kwamba nyuma yake yupo Mtendaji mwenye mapenzi na ujuzi wa yote. Hili ni kweli hata kama tukichukulia kwamba hatujui hasa hali halisi ya Mtendaji huyo wala sifa alizonazo.
This reveals the yawning chasm between atheists and theists in the epistemology of theology. The cause of this difference is that theists rely on the self-evident, fiṭrah-driven concept of causality, whereas the atheists deny this principle and make it an issue of inductive reasoning. The problem is that it is part and parcel of an inductive reasoning process that can sometimes not work; in fact, in atheist philosophy, something can come out of nothing; therefore, even in the watch example, a man can use the same polemic and say, ‘The fact that watch X has a maker, watch Y has a maker, and watch Z has a maker does not mean that watches A, B, and C also have a maker.’ This is exactly what many atheists inferred from David Hume’s words and took ownership of its theory, even though in practice they are compelled to adhere to what their own fiṭrah dictates to them. I will not repeat what has been already reiterated about the danger the denial of the principle of causality has on human cognition and the multiple epistemic problems it leads to, leaving even the atheist unable to escape them. In fact, atheists are unable to adhere to their view in practice. It is utterly arbitrary to dispense with this principle on the excuse that sense experience and induction alone will suffice. This would truly be the gateway to ultimate scepticism, not only in this issue, but in all knowledge. It is methodologically incorrect here to be duped into thinking that the view of theists was negotiated by some form of like for-like analogy. The fact is this was not an analogy to start with, but rather the general application of the instinctive and rational concept that dictates that merely noting something’s masterful construct would denote that there is a willing and omniscient Doer behind it. This is the case even if it is assumed that we do not know the exact nature of this Doer and the attributes He possesses.
Hapa kuna taarifa zaidi zinazohusiana na asili ya pingamizi hili:
Here is some further information relevant to the nature of this objection:
1. Fikiria tunakutana na kitu kilichotengenezwa, na tunajua kwamba mwanadamu ametengeneza kitu kama hicho au kitu kinachofanana nacho. Je, tunaweza kuamini kwamba kitu hiki kilichotengenezwa nacho pia kinatokana na kazi ya mwanadamu? Je, haiwezekani kwamba kitu hiki mahsusi kingeweza kutengenezwa na kiumbe mwingine? Ikiwa jibu ni ndiyo, basi je, kutojua kwetu asili ya kitu hiki kunatufanya tuwe sahihi kukataa kwamba kilitengenezwa? Je, tuna uwezo wa kuelewa kwamba lazima kuwepo na mbunifu wa kitu hiki, hata kama hatujui kwa hakika asili ya mbunifu huyo? Ningeamini kwamba mtu asiyeamini Mungu angeshikilia msimamo ule ule aliokuwa nao Bassām, yaani kukataa kinadharia suala hili. Hili ni tatizo kubwa sana. Fikiria tumeona saa kwenye sayari nyingine. Je, tutasema kwamba saa hiyo inaonyesha kwamba mwanadamu amefika kwenye sayari hiyo? Je, tutasema angalau kwamba mtengenezaji mwenye kuchagua amefika kwenye sayari hiyo? Au tutasema kwamba hatujui mwanadamu yeyote aliyefika kwenye sayari hii? Kwa msingi huu, je, hatuwezi kudai kwamba saa hii ina mbunifu? Ningetarajia jibu la mtu asiyeamini Mungu kuwa la ajabu sana likipimwa kwa kutumia uelewa wetu wa kiakili na wa kiasili.
1. Imagine we come across something that is constructed, and we know that man has made something like it or something similar to it. Can we believe that this constructed item too is from the makings of man? Would it not be possible that this specific item could have been made by another entity? If the answer is in the affirmative, then does our lack of knowledge of the nature of this item make it proper for us to reject that this was made? Do we have the power to comprehend that there must have been a designer for this item, even if we do not know the precise nature of this designer? I would believe that an atheist would stick to the line that Bassām held, which is the theoretical denial of this issue. This is extremely problematic. Imagine we found a watch on another planet – will we say that this watch denotes that man has reached that planet? Shall we say at the very least that a choosing maker reached that planet? Or do we say that we do not know of any man who has reached this planet? Based on this, can we not claim that this watch has a designer? I would expect an atheist’s answer to be strange indeed when assessed by our cognitive and innate understandings.
2. Ukweli ni kwamba wanaoamini kuwa hakuna Mungu (wasioamini) hawafuati kivitendo dhana zao za kinadharia ambazo wanazitoa wanapotoa pingamizi dhidi ya kuwepo kwa Allah. Tatizo hili linazidi kuthibitishwa na ukweli kwamba wanasayansi wanazitumia kanuni za muundo wa ustadi katika nyanja nyingi za kiakili kama chombo kinachofichua kuwepo kwa mtendaji mwenye kuchagua. Mradi wa NASA wa SETI (ambao sasa haupo tena) ulianzishwa hasa juu ya wazo hili, ambalo lilikuwa ni kutafuta ishara za viumbe wenye akili kutoka sayari nyingine. Mradi huo unadhani kwamba tunaweza kuchuja ishara zilizonaswa, na kwamba tunaweza kutofautisha kile kisicho na mpangilio na kile kinachoamuliwa, na kile kinachotokana na mtendaji mwenye kuchagua. Fikiria kama tungenasa ishara halisi na ya kipekee: je, tungeweza kudai kwamba ilikuwa ya kubahatisha au ya ajali kwa sababu ni kitu ambacho hatukijui? Je, kweli tungeweza kutoa udhuru kwamba ishara hii kwa namna yoyote haidhihirishi kuwepo kwa yule aliyetuma ishara hizo? Ukweli kwamba ishara hizi zinafanana tu na zile zinazotengenezwa na binadamu haupaswi kutufanya tuamini kwamba wageni kutoka anga za juu ndio waliozituma. Hatujaona viumbe hai angani ambao wangetuma aina hii ya ishara ili tuweze kutoa hukumu. Naamini hii ndiyo msimamo wa kisayansi wa kuchukua, ingawa naamini pia kwamba mbinu ya wasioamini ya kukataa hoja ya kiteleolojia kwa ajili ya kumtambua Muumba inafanya kazi kwa namna hiyo hiyo.
2. The fact is that atheists do not – in practice – adhere to their own theoretical assumptions that they aver in the context of casting objections against the existence of Allah. What further underscores this problem is that scientists adhere to the foundation of masterful construct in multiple cognitive fields as a tool that reveals the existence of a choosing doer. NASA’s (now defunct) project SETI was founded precisely on this idea, which was the search for signals of intelligent extraterrestrial life. The project assumes that we can filter out intercepted signals, and that we can understand what is random and deterministic versus what came from a choosing doer. Imagine if we picked up a real and unique signal – could we then claim that this was random or accidental because it is something we are unaware of? Could we really have given the excuse that this signal does not in any way reveal the existence of the one who sent those signals? The fact that these merely resemble man-made signals should not validate for us the belief that aliens sent those signals. We have not seen any life beings in space that would have sent these sorts of signals for us to pass judgement. I believe this is the scientific stance to adopt, though I do believe that the atheist methodology of denying the teleological argument in favour of the Creator operates in the same way.
1. Ni wazi kwamba Dawkins anafanya kazi kwa msingi wa dhana ya kimwili kuhusu Mungu, ambapo anadhani kwamba Muumba anapaswa kuwa wa jinsi moja na ulimwengu huu ulioumbwa. Ndiyo sababu yuko tayari kumweleza Mungu kwa maneno yenye utata kama 'mchanganyiko' na 'changamano', ilhali kwa hakika Mungu yuko juu zaidi ya uwepo huu wa kimwili. Hakuna ulinganifu kabisa kati ya dhati Yake na viumbe vyake vingine, kama Allah asemavyo kuhusu Nafsi Yake: {Hakuna chochote kinachofanana Naye, na Yeye ndiye Mwenye kusikia, Mwenye kuona}.361
1. It is clear that Dawkins operates from a corporealist conceptualisation of God, in which he assumes that the Creator should be of the same genus of this created world. This is why he is prepared to depict God with ambiguous phrases such as ‘composite’ and ‘complex’, when in fact God is far above this material existence. There is absolutely no comparison between His essence and the rest of His creation, as Allah says of Himself: ‘There is nothing like Him, for He alone is the All-Hearing, All Seeing.’361
2. Dawkins anafanya kosa la kuchekesha ambapo anadhani kwamba kuleta Mungu kama jibu la swali la mpangilio wa kimfumo wa ulimwengu na utengenezaji wake wa kiufundi ni jibu lililounganishwa na tata. Hili si kweli hata kidogo; kwa kweli, ni jibu lililo dhahiri zaidi na rahisi kuliko yote. Inaonekana kwamba Dawkins amechanganya masuala mawili.
2. Dawkins commits a comical error where he thinks that introducing God as an answer to the question of the systematic nature of the universe and its masterful making is a composite and complex answer. This is not the case at all; in fact, it is the most obvious and simplest of all answers. It appears that Dawkins has conflated two issues:
a. Lile linalohusu nafsi na uhalisia wa Mungu.
a. That which is in relation to the essence and entity of God.
b. Hicho ambacho ni maelezo yanayokubalika kwa jambo linalojadiliwa.
b. That which is a plausible explanation for the phenomenon under discussion.
Huenda kiini kinachoelezwa chenyewe kikawa changamano. Hata hivyo, licha ya hilo, bado ni maelezo bora zaidi kwa jambo lililopo. Chukua mfano huu: Mtu anaingia pangoni na kukuta maandishi au michoro iliyochorwa kwenye kuta zake. Akili yake mara moja inadhani kwamba lazima kuna mtu aliyewahi kuishi pangoni hapo na kuandika maandishi hayo na kuchora michoro hiyo. Je, hii si jibu la kimantiki lisilo na changamoto yoyote? Tunaweza bado kukubali kwamba mtu halisi aliyechora maandishi au michoro hiyo ni mgumu zaidi kumtambua na kumbainisha kuliko pendekezo kwamba michoro hiyo imetoka kwa binadamu.
3. Suala lililotangulia linaonyesha kwamba watu wengi wanaamini katika kuwepo kwa Mungu. Hii inadokeza kwamba kwa uumbaji wa ulimwengu wenye ustadi mkubwa, Mungu ndiye jibu lililo dhahiri zaidi, rahisi zaidi, na linalokubalika zaidi kwa binadamu wengi, tofauti na dhana inayoungwa mkono na Dawkins, ambaye anadai kwamba jibu hili huleta changamoto zaidi. Kama ingekuwa hivyo, wanadamu wengi wasingefikia hitimisho la kiteísta. Ni jibu hili, kwa urahisi wake na kwa kuwa limo ndani ya asili ya binadamu, ndilo lililoenea kwa kiwango kikubwa.
It might be the case that the entity that is being explained is complex in and of itself. However, in spite of that, it is still the best possible explanation for the phenomenon. Take this as an example: A man goes into a cave and finds writings or inscriptions etched into its walls. His mind immediately thinks that there must have been someone who lived in this cave and wrote those writings and sketched those drawings. Is this not a rational answer that does not comprise of any complexity? We can still accept that the actual person who etched those writings or drawings is more complex to pinpoint and identify than the suggestion that these etchings are from a person. 3. The previous issue underscores that most people believe in the existence of God. This suggests that for the universe’s masterful making God is the most obvious, easiest, and acceptable answer according to most humans, as opposed to the concept supported by Dawkins, who claims that this answer brings about further complexity. Had that been the case, most of humankind would not have reached the theist conclusion. It is this answer, with its simplicity and innateness to humans, that led to its spread on a mass scale.
4. Hii inaonyesha kwamba kila wakati jibu linalofaa linapopatikana kwa swali, si lazima watu waliache kwa sababu tu wamekutana na pingamizi jipya. Katika mfano uliotangulia, fikiria mtu anayekataa kwamba kulikuwa na mtu aliyechora maandishi hayo kwenye ukuta wa pango kwa sababu tu hajui jina lake, alitoka kabila gani, aliishi lini, alikuwa pangoni lini, na kadhalika. Je, mtazamo kama huo ungekubalika?
4. This underscores that whenever a suitable answer is found to a question, it is not necessary that people abandon it just because they were confronted by a new objection. In the previous example, imagine that a person rejected that there was a person who etched those writings in the wall of the cave just because he does not know his name, which tribe he came from, when he was alive, when he was in the cave, and so on. Would such an attitude be acceptable?
5. Mtazamo ambao Dawkins ameuchukua kushughulikia tatizo hili kwa kweli ni mgumu zaidi kuliko jibu ambalo wanaoamini Mungu wanalitoa kushughulikia swali la kuumbwa kwa ulimwengu kwa ubunifu wa hali ya juu. Dawkins anapendekeza ulimwengu-wengi (multiverse) kama jibu la swali hilo. Hakuna shaka kwamba kutegemea kiumbe kimoja kujibu swali ni bora kuliko kudhania idadi kubwa, huenda isiyo na kikomo, ya viumbe. Inashangaza kwamba Dawkins anaamini kwamba chaguo lake la jibu katika kutatua swali ndilo chaguo rahisi zaidi na lenye mantiki zaidi. Kwa tathmini yangu, hii ni ukaidi mtupu upande wake – anasukumwa wazi na mtazamo wa kimaada unaoongozwa na upendeleo wake wa awali. Anaamini kwamba ni jambo lenye mantiki zaidi kwamba kijana fulani mwenye umri mdogo anayeishi katika ustaarabu wa juu zaidi wa kibinadamu alituumba kupitia programu ya kompyuta yenye nguvu na kuziunda dunia hizi pepe kwa ajili yetu, jambo ambalo lina maana kwamba sisi ni viumbe pepe tu bila uwepo halisi. Kwa hiyo, si ajabu hata kidogo kwamba ana upendeleo huu dhidi ya wazo la imani katika kuwepo kwa Mungu, ambalo linaendana zaidi na asili ya binadamu, mwelekeo wa kibinadamu, maarifa ya kibinadamu, na mwelekeo wa kibinadamu kwa dini. Kukataa misingi hii kunaleta uharibifu kamili wa misingi ambayo elimu, sayansi, na falsafa ya maadili yenye mshikamano zimejengwa juu yake. Kwa kweli, bila kuthibitisha kuwepo Kwake, hakuna njia nyingine yenye kuaminika kwetu ya kukubali kwamba sisi kama binadamu tupo kwa uhakika na tuna uwepo.
5. The view adopted by Dawkins to deal with the problem is in reality far more complex than the answer offered by theists to deal with the question of the universe’s masterful making. Dawkins proposes the multiverse as an answer to the question. There is no doubt that to suffice on one entity to answer the question is superior to the assumption of a huge, possibly infinite, number of entities. It is interesting that Dawkins believes that his choice of answer in solving the question is the simpler option and more plausible. In my estimation, this is sheer obstinance on his part – he is clearly motivated by a materialistic outlook that is propelled by his preconceived bias. He believes that it is more plausible that some adolescent teen living in a higher human civilisation made us through an advanced computer programme and created these virtual worlds for us, which means that we are mere virtual beings without any real existence. Therefore, it is not surprising at all that he has these biases against the idea of faith in the existence of God, which happens to be far more congruent with human nature, human predisposition, human knowledge, and human partiality to religiosity. Denying these bases leads to the complete destabilisation of the fundamentals upon which knowledge, science, and a coherent moral philosophy are founded. In fact, without affirming His existence, there is no credible alternative for us to acknowledge that we as human beings are objectively present and are in existence.
Na kwa pingamizi hili la mwisho, tunamaliza sehemu hii na kufika kwenye hitimisho la kitabu.
And with this final objection, we end this section and come to the conclusion of the book.
256 Ndoto za Nadharia ya Mwisho: Utafutaji wa Sheria za Msingi za Maumbile, uk. 250.
256 Dreams of a Final Theory: The Search for the Fundamental Laws of Nature, p. 250.
257 Science and Evidence for Design in the Universe, uk. 57.
257 Science and Evidence for Design in the Universe, p. 57.
258 https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20227123-000-gravity-mysteries-why-is-gravity-fine-tuned/
259 Wanaastronomia wanakadiria kwamba Jua lina umri wa miaka bilioni 4.6, na kwamba lina hidrojeni ya kutosha kuendelea kuwepo kwa miaka mingine bilioni 5 +.
260 Kuna Mungu, uk. 113.
258 https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20227123-000-gravity-mysteries-why-is-gravity-fine-tuned/ 259 Astrophysicists estimate that the Sun is 4.6 billion years old, and that it has enough hydrogen to remain alive for a further 5 billion + years. 260 There is a God, p. 113.
269 Karibu karibu kila mara, wasioamini kuwepo kwa Mungu huchanganya dhana kwamba Allah ndiye sababu ya mwisho ambayo matukio yote hurejea Kwake, na dhana kwamba Allah aliumba kwa ajili ya ulimwengu seti ya sheria zilizopangwa kwa utaratibu. Katika mtazamo wa Kiislamu, hakuna mgongano kati ya Allah kwa mfano kuteremsha mvua na jambo la kiasili linaloitwa mzunguko wa maji.
270 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U2IisaNC4bE
271 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kNpiX8XQhJM
272 Answering Atheism, uk. 153.
269 On almost every occasion, atheists conflate the notion that Allah is the ultimate cause to Whom all phenomena go back, and the notion that Allah created a systemised set of laws for the universe. In the Islamic view, there is no contradiction between Allah, for example, sending down rain and the natural phenomenon that is the water cycle. 270 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U2IisaNC4bE 271 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kNpiX8XQhJM 272 Answering Atheism, p. 153.
286 https://www.economist.com/letters/2006/01/19/on-devan-nair-american-poverty-the-death-penalty evolution-deutsche-bank-gay-marriage 287 Science and Evidence for Design in the Universe, p. 67.
286 https://www.economist.com/letters/2006/01/19/on-devan-nair-american-poverty-the-death-penalty evolution-deutsche-bank-gay-marriage 287 Science and Evidence for Design in the Universe, p. 67.
293 The Comprehensive Guide to Science and Faith: Exploring the Ultimate Questions About Life and the Cosmos, p. 281. 294 Evolution: A Theory in Crisis, p. 271.
293 The Comprehensive Guide to Science and Faith: Exploring the Ultimate Questions About Life and the Cosmos, p. 281. 294 Evolution: A Theory in Crisis, p. 271.
295 Al-Iʿtiqād wa al-Hidāyah ilā Sabīl al-Rashād ʿalā Madhhab al-Salaf wa-Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth, p. 39.
Al-Kahf, 54.
296 Al-Kahf, 54.
Qiṣṣah al-Īmān, uk. 292.
297 Qiṣṣah al-Īmān, p. 292.
298 Uongo wa Kurekebishwa Vizuri (Fine-Tuning), uk. 37.
298 The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning, p. 37.
299 https://letterstonature.wordpress.com/2014/08/17/carrolls-five-replies-to-the-fine-tuning-argument number-1/ 300 The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning, p. 18.
299 https://letterstonature.wordpress.com/2014/08/17/carrolls-five-replies-to-the-fine-tuning-argument number-1/ 300 The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning, p. 18.
301 Udanganyifu wa Urekebishaji Mzuri (Fine-Tuning), uk. 70.
303 https://arxiv.org/pdf/1112.4647v1.pdf 304 https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1202/1202.4359.pdf 305 https://letterstonature.wordpress.com/2012/05/02/in-defence-of-the-fine-tuning-of-the-universe-for intelligent-life/ 306 The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning, p. 164.
303 https://arxiv.org/pdf/1112.4647v1.pdf 304 https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1202/1202.4359.pdf 305 https://letterstonature.wordpress.com/2012/05/02/in-defence-of-the-fine-tuning-of-the-universe-for intelligent-life/ 306 The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning, p. 164.
307 Udanganyifu wa Urekebishaji Sahihi (Fine-Tuning), uk. 116.
307 The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning, p. 116.
308 Uongo wa Urekebishaji Mzuri (Fine-Tuning), uk. 53.
308 The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning, p. 53.
309 Udanganyifu wa Urekebishaji Mzuri (Fine-Tuning), uk. 51.
Visigino vya Kisigino vya Mageuzi (Evolution’s Achilles’ Heels), uk. 9.
326 Evolution’s Achilles’ Heels, p. 9.
327 Dokezo la mtafsiri: Hili linahusu kisa cha Ṭālūt katika Qur'ani; pia kimetajwa katika maandiko ya Biblia. Mfano mwingine ungeweza kuwa ndama wa dhahabu.
327 Translator’s note: This is in reference to the story of Ṭālūt in the Qur’an; it also has been mentioned in the biblical scriptures. Another analogy could have been the golden calf.
328 https://secularhumanism.org/2001/07/ignorance-is-no-crime/ 329 The God Delusion, p. 31.
328 https://secularhumanism.org/2001/07/ignorance-is-no-crime/ 329 The God Delusion, p. 31.
330 https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/god-in-other-words-wvkzwdjwxxz 331 https://www.edge.org/edgenews/question/2005 332 The Devil's Chaplain, uk. 81.
330 https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/god-in-other-words-wvkzwdjwxxz 331 https://www.edge.org/edgenews/question/2005 332 The Devil’s Chaplain, p. 81.
The user's message is a citation label: "337 Big Bang, Big God: A Universe Fit for Life?, p. 133." Translating it faithfully:
337 Big Bang, Big God: Je, Ulimwengu Unafaa kwa Uhai?, uk. 133.
337 Big Bang, Big God: A Universe Fit for Life?, p. 133.
350 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_nC99sCxFbE 351 The Devil’s Delusion, p. 133.
350 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_nC99sCxFbE 351 The Devil’s Delusion, p. 133.
352 https://www.bbc.co.uk/science/horizon/2001/parallelunitrans.shtml 353 https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-multiverses-measure-problem-20141103/ 354 The Goldilocks Enigma, p. 202.
352 https://www.bbc.co.uk/science/horizon/2001/parallelunitrans.shtml 353 https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-multiverses-measure-problem-20141103/ 354 The Goldilocks Enigma, p. 202.
355 The Goldilocks Enigma, uk. 203.
355 The Goldilocks Enigma, p. 203.
356 Dokezo la mtafsiri: Ukosefu wa maadili na tabia njema katika ulimwengu wa kidijitali unaashiriwa katika filamu kama Minority Report. 357 Sharḥ al-ʿAqīdah al-Aṣbahāniyyah, uk. 60.
356 Translator’s note: The lack of ethics and morality in the virtual world is alluded to in movies such as Minority Report. 357 Sharḥ al-ʿAqīdah al-Aṣbahāniyyah, p. 60.
359 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aiGY3xj-_rY&t=660s Dokezo la mtafsiri: Kituo hiki kilifungwa wakati Abdel Fattah el-Sisi alipochukua udhibiti wa Misri.
359 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aiGY3xj-_rY&t=660s Translator’s note: This channel was shut down when Abdel Fattah el-Sisi took control of Egypt.