Pia inasemekana: "Hakuna kitu kama ukweli kamili na uongo kamili" (Henry Augustus Rowland), wakati sasa ni jambo la kawaida kusema, "ukweli ni wa kiasi, unatofautiana kutoka mtu mmoja hadi mwingine, kutoka kundi moja hadi jingine, kutoka wakati mmoja hadi mwingine, na hauna viwango vya kiukweli." Basi inawezekanaje kusemwa kwamba mbinu ya kiakili inampa binadamu ukweli kamili usiopingika, ambao sayansi haiwezi kuutoa? Je, si Udogmatiki ndio unaoanzisha Uamuzi wa awali na Ukamilifu katika kuhukumu maoni, mawazo na imani? Zaidi ya hayo, baadhi ya hukumu za mbinu ya kiakili yenyewe si za uhakika, na je, hiyo si sawa na mbinu ya kisayansi? Basi mbinu ya kiakili inawezaje kuwa msingi wa kufikiri, kwa hoja kwamba ni ya uhakika?

And it is also said: “There is no such thing as absolute truth and absolute falsehood” (Henry Augustus Rowland), whilst it is now common place to say, “truth is relative, varying from one individual to another, from one group to another, from one time to another, having no objective standards.” So how can it then be said that the rational method provides the human being decisive absolute truths, which science is not able to provide? Is it not Dogmatism that establishes Determinism and Absolutism in judging opinions, thoughts and convictions? In addition, some of the judgments of the rational method itself are indecisive and so is it not similar to the scientific method? So how can the rational method be a basis of thinking, upon the argument that it is decisive?

Jibu la maswali haya linahusiana na kufafanua hakika ya ukweli, pamoja na hakika ya kuwa hukumu anayoifikia akili ni ya uhakika au ya kutokuwa na uhakika.

The answer to these questions is related to clarifying the reality of truth, as well as the reality of decisiveness and indecisiveness of the judgment arrived at by the mind.

Dhana ya ukweli ni rahisi kwa kila mtu, tofauti na mizunguko ya kifalsafa iliyobuniwa na nadharia za Magharibi za kisasa, kama vile utilitarianism, correlationism, dualism na relativism, iwe ya kiutambuzi, ya kitamaduni au ya kimaadili, pamoja na nyingine ambazo hazina uhusiano wowote na uhalisia. Nadharia hizi ni falsafa tu na dhana za kubuni zilizokataliwa na akili na hisia. Kwa hiyo ukweli si neno linalopaswa kufafanuliwa na watu yeyote kwa kiholela. Ukweli si wazo tu linalofahamishwa na wanafalsafa kwa kiholela, wala si dhana ya kistaarabu iliyochaguliwa na baadhi ya mataifa miongoni mwa mataifa. Badala yake, ukweli ni uhalisia maalum kwa binadamu wote, bila kujali tofauti zao katika kuueleza ukweli. Uhalisia huu ndio asili ya ukweli miongoni mwa binadamu wote, iwe wanaufahamu au hawaufahamu. Ukweli upo pale hukumu au wazo linapolingana na uhalisia unaoliashiria.

The concept of truth is straightforward for any person, unlike the convolutions manufactured by the modern Western theories, such as utilitarianism, correlationism, dualism and relativism, whether cognitive, cultural or moral, as well as others that have nothing to do with reality. These theories are just philosophies and fanciful constructs falsified by reason and sense. Thus truth is not a term to be defined by any people arbitrarily. Truth is not a mere thought comprehended by the philosophers arbitrarily, nor is it a civilizational concept chosen by some nations amongst nations. Instead, truth is a specific reality for all human beings, regardless of their differences in expressing the truth. This reality is the nature of truth amongst all humans, whether they comprehend it or not. It is in truth that the judgment or thought agrees with the reality that it denotes.

Kwa mfano, tukichora umbo la kijiometri lenye mistari minne iliyo sawa na sambamba, lenye pembe nne za kulia, kisha tukamwonyesha Zaid na Thomas ili watoe hukumu kuhusu umbo hilo, kuthibitisha ukweli wa hukumu zao kutafuata mbinu moja kwa binadamu wote. Mbinu hiyo ni kwamba hukumu zao zikubaliane na uhalisia wa umbo lililochorwa. Ikiwa mmoja wao au wote wawili watasema kwamba umbo hilo ni mraba, tutasema kwamba ni kweli. Ikiwa yeyote kati yao atasema kwamba ni pembetatu, tutasema kwamba si kweli, kwa sababu umbo la kijiometri lililochorwa si eneo lililofungwa na mistari mitatu.

For instance, if we were to draw a geometric figure with four equal and parallel lines with four right angles and show it to Zaid and Thomas to make a judgment regarding it. Affirming the truth of their judgments will be according to a single method for all humans. The method is the agreement of their judgments with the reality of the shape drawn. If one or both of them says that the shape is a square, we will say that it is true. If any one of them says it is a triangle, we will say that it is not true. This is because the geometrical shape drawn is not an area defined by three lines.

Vivyo hivyo, ikiwa Ali anasema kwamba mtu fulani yuko nyumbani na Jimmy anasema: mtu huyo hayuko nyumbani, basi ukweli ni makubaliano ya hukumu zao na uhalisia. Ikiwa mtu huyo yuko nyumbani, basi kauli ya Ali ni kweli. Ikiwa hayuko nyumbani, basi kauli ya Jimmy ni kweli. Hii ndiyo dhana ya ukweli. Ukweli ni makubaliano ya fikra na uhalisia unaoonyeshwa na fikra hiyo. Hili linatumika bila kujali fikra yenyewe, iwe fikra hiyo ni ya kimantiki, kisayansi, kimantiki au nyingine yoyote.

Similarly, if Ali says such a person is at home and Jimmy says: such a person is not at home, then the truth is the agreement of their judgments with the reality. If such a person is at home, then the statement of Ali is true. If he is not at home, then the statement of Jimmy is true. This is the concept of truth. Truth is the agreement of the thought to the reality denoted by the thought. This is regardless of the thinking itself, whether the thinking is rational or scientific or logical or any other.

Kuhusu suala la kigezo cha kubainisha uhakika na usahihi wa ukweli, kuufikia, kuufikiria na kuutofautisha na ule usio na uhakika, mambo haya yote yanatawaliwa na kuangalia nyanja zile zile za utafiti wa kiakili. Kwa hiyo, fikra za kiakili ni uhamishaji wa uhalisia ndani ya ubongo kupitia hisia, ukiunganishwa na taarifa zilizotangulia, ambazo kwazo uhalisia huo hufasiriwa. Hukumu juu ya vitu na mambo hutolewa kwa kuzingatia kuwepo kwake, kiini chake na sifa zake.

As for the issue of a criteria to determine the decisiveness and certainty of truths, arriving at them, thinking about them and distinguishing them from indecisiveness, all of this is governed by looking at the same fields of rational study. Accordingly, rational thinking is the transference of reality to the brain through sensations, linked with previous information, by which the reality is interpreted. The judgments upon things and matters are in terms of their existence, essence and characteristics.

Ikiwa hukumu ya kiakili inahusiana na kuwepo kwa kitu, basi hakuna shaka kwamba hukumu hiyo ni ya hakika na yenye uhakika. Hii ni kwa sababu hukumu kuhusu kuwepo hupatikana kupitia hisia ya uhalisia fulani. Hisi hazikosei kuhusu kuwepo kwa uhalisia. Kwa hiyo,

If rational judgment is related to the existence of an object, then there is no doubt that it is definite and certain. This is because the judgment about the existence comes through sensation of a reality. The senses are not mistaken regarding the existence of a reality. So,

hukumu inayotolewa kwa njia ya mawazo ya kiakili kuhusu kuwepo kwa uhalisia ni ya kuamua.

judgment issued by the rational method of thinking about the existence of a reality is decisive.

Kuhusu hukumu inayohusu kiini (muundo) au tabia (sifa na sifa za kipekee) ya kitu, hukumu hiyo ni ya kutilia shaka, yaani inaweza kukosea. Hii ni kwa sababu hukumu juu ya kiini au tabia hutokana na taarifa kuhusu kitu hicho au kwa kuchambua hali halisi inayotambulika, kwa kuzingatia taarifa zilizotangulia. Kosa linaweza kuingia katika mchakato huu. Kwa hiyo, hukumu hii huwa na tofauti na mitazamo mbalimbali kutokana na tofauti za uwezo wa binadamu katika kuchambua, katika kiasi cha taarifa kuhusu jambo hilo, na katika namna taarifa hizo zinavyochambuliwa. Kwa mfano, tukisikia sauti ya mwendo, tunaweza kuhukumu kwa uhakika kwamba mwendo upo. Hata hivyo, hatuwezi kuwa na uhakika kuhusu kiini chake au tabia yake. Mwendo huo unaweza kuwa wa mtu au wa kitu fulani. Basi, hukumu yetu hapa iko ndani ya kutokuwa na uhakika. Hata hivyo, kukubali kuwepo kwa kutokuwa na uhakika katika baadhi ya hukumu hakumaanishi kwamba hakuna ukweli kamili usiotiliwa shaka. Hii ni kwa sababu hukumu yetu inapolingana na hali halisi yake, basi tunakitambua ukweli wake. Zaidi ya hayo, tukihukumu kuhusu kitu kinachosogea, kama katika mfano uliotajwa, kwamba ni mtu au mnyama kutokana na mwendo tunaouhisi, na hukumu yetu ikalingana na hali halisi tuliyoihisi, basi tutakuwa tumelitambua jambo la kweli. Kwa hiyo, uwepo wa uwezekano wa kutokuwa na uhakika katika baadhi ya hukumu na mawazo hauondoi uwepo wa ukweli usiotiliwa shaka, ambao akili inalazimika kuukubali.

As for the judgment related to the essence (composition) or characterization (properties and qualities) of an object, the judgment is indecisive, that is, susceptible to error. This is because the judgment upon the essence or characterization comes through information about the object or through the analysis of the perceived reality, according to previous information. Error can seep into this. Therefore, this judgment is liable to disparity and differences because of disparity in human abilities in terms of analysis, in the amount of information about the thing and in how the information is analyzed. For instance, if we hear the sound of a movement, we can decisively judge the existence of the movement. However, we cannot be certain about its essence or characterization. The movement could be from a man or from an object. So, our judgment here falls within indecisiveness. Nevertheless, acknowledging the occurrence of indecisiveness in some judgments does not mean that there is no, decisive absolute truth. This is because when our judgment agrees with its reality, we perceive its truth. Moreover, if we judged upon the moving object, as in the aforementioned example, that it is a man or an animal from its sensed movement, and our judgment agreed with the sensed reality, then we would have perceived the truth. Therefore, the existence of the possibility of indecisiveness, in some judgments and thoughts, does not negate the existence of decisive truth, which the mind is compelled to submit to.