在本章中,我将评析一些穆斯林神学家和基督教神学家对伊本·西纳论证的回应。在穆斯林神学家中,我将参考安萨里(al-Ghazālī)、伊本·鲁世德(Ibn Rushd)和伊本·泰米叶(Ibn Taymiyyah)的著作,他们都对伊本·西纳作出了耐人寻味的回应。伊本·西纳论证的许多学术回应都可以用英文读到,但伊本·泰米叶的著作例外。他基于凯拉姆(Kalām)的神存在论证在学界大多未被翻译,也常被忽视。他的贡献尤其有价值,因为他不仅处理论证的理论层面,也处理其牧灵和护教层面的应用。此外,尽管穆尔太齐赖派(Muʿtazilites)积极参与证明神存在的神学领域,但他们所采用的主要论证似乎是“偶性与物体的产生论证”(dalīl al-aʿrāḍ wa ḥudūth al-ajsām),意为“从偶性和物体的开端而来的证明”。这一具体论证超出了本书的范围,需要另行探讨。最后,我将评析伊本·西纳的“Burhān”论证在基督教传统中的一些运用,特别参考托马斯·阿奎那(Thomas Aquinas)和约翰·邓斯·司各脱(John Duns Scotus)。从所有这些思想家那里得出的最重要的延伸要点,是对该论证的重新表述或批评。这些可以被视为加强、完善甚至扩充该论证的方式。尽管这些思想家中的许多人对伊本·西纳论证的某些表述提出了异议,但几乎所有人都趋同于他的结论,即“必然存在”的实在性,它解释了一切其他形式的存在。最后,本节主张,“必然存在”这一结论在跨宗教的知识界中如此普遍,以至于它很可能是哲学神学史上所有一神论者之间最为一致认可的信念。

In this chapter, I will assess the responses of some Muslim and Christian theologians to Ibn Sīnā’s arguments. Among the Muslim theologians, I will refer to the writings of al Ghazālī, Ibn Rushd, and Ibn Taymiyyah, all of whom had intriguing responses to Ibn Sīnā. Many of these scholarly responses to Ibn Sīnā’s arguments can be accessed in English, with the exception of Ibn Taymiyyah. The latter’s Kalām-based arguments for God’s existence are widely untranslated or disregarded within academia. His contribution is particularly valuable, as he deals not only with the theoretical elements of the argument, but also their pastoral and apologetic applications. Moreover, although the Muʿtazilites engaged actively with the theological area of proving God’s existence, it appears that the major argument they employed was dalīl al-aʿrāḍ wa ḥudūth al-ajsām, which translates to ‘the proof from accidents and commencement of bodies’.29 This specific argument goes beyond the remit of this book, and requires a separate treatment altogether. Finally, I will then assess some of the uses of Ibn Sīnā’s Burhān in the Christian tradition, with particular reference to Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus. The most important points of extrapolation from all of these thinkers are reformulations or criticisms of the argument. These can be considered as a means to strengthen the argument, refine it, or even add to it. Despite the objections that many of these thinkers raise with certain formulations of Ibn Sīnā’s argument, practically all of them converge on his conclusion of the reality of a ‘necessary existence’, which explains all other forms of existence. Finally, this section argues that the conclusion of a ‘necessary existence’ is so pervasive within interreligious intellectual circles that it may very well be the most agreed upon belief between all monotheists in the history of theological philosophy.

伊本·西拿的“证明论证”（Burhān）大致如下。存在是存在的。存在分为三种类型：可能的（偶然的）、必然的和不可能的。不可能的存在（如方圆）不可能存在。存在中不可能只有偶然的存在，因为它们需要其他事物使其存在。偶然存在的有限或无限序列也不可能存在，因为这样的序列由许多相互区别且相互依赖的成员组成。在该序列的不同成员中所见的差异性与依赖性表明，这一有限或无限序列本身不可能是必然的，而必须是偶然的。因此，只有必然的存在才能使任何偶然的存在产生，或最终解释它们为何会发生。

Ibn Sīnā’s Burhān argument goes as follows. There is existence. Existence is of three types: possible (contingent), necessary, and impossible. Impossible existences (like squared circles) cannot exist. There cannot be only contingent existences in existence, as they would require something else in order to cause them into existence. There cannot be a finite or infinite series of contingent existences, as such a series would be composed of many differentiated and dependent members. The differentiation and dependent aspects found in the different members of the series indicate that the finite or infinite series itself cannot be necessary. Instead, it must be contingent. Thus, only a necessary existence can cause or ultimately explain why any contingent existences happen to occur

阿勒-加扎利或许是穆斯林世界中对伊本-西那最著名的批判者，他出版了《哲学家的前后矛盾》（Tahāfut al-Falāsifah，直译为《哲学家的不协调》），直接攻击伊本-西那的信念。加扎利的批判如此尖锐，以至于他在书末列出四条理由，宣布开除伊本-西那的教籍，其中与此最相关的是伊本-西那关于宇宙永恒性的观点。下文中，我将阐述伊本-西那与加扎利在论证真主存在时的关键差异。论述将特别聚焦于无限倒退与永恒性问题，以及对流溢论和神圣意志的反驳。尽管加扎利并未直接质疑伊本-西那上述整体论证的任何前提，但他对伊本-西那总体进路的批评同样重要。毕竟，这些批评为有神论的护教者提供了比单纯依赖伊本-西那对Burhān（证明）的表述更多的论证选择。 就无限倒退而言，加扎利提出论断：“任何可以增减的事物都是有限的。”这与约翰·菲洛珀诺斯等人已经采用的证明是一致的。伊本-西那是永恒论者（相信宇宙是前永恒的），也是流溢论者（相信宇宙必然地从真主流溢而出）。换言之，伊本-西那认为真主使宇宙存在，类似于太阳发光。在这个比喻中，光代表宇宙，太阳象征真主。 然而，加扎利认为永恒论与全能的真主不相容，因为这使真主无力阻止事物存在，或无力使事物原本不存在。 32 诚然，al-Ghazālī（以及在他之前的其他Ashʿarite学者）曾运用"特指"（particularisation）的论证，旨在通过宇宙论证明来确立神圣意志。在这一语境中，他们举了一些例子，比如太空中旋转的行星，它们本可以朝相反的方向旋转。33

Al-Ghazālī was perhaps the most famous critic of Ibn Sīnā in the Muslim world, with his publication of Tahāfut al-Falāsifah (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), where he directly attacked Ibn Sīnā’s beliefs. Al-Ghazālī’s criticism was so scathing that it led him to excommunicate Ibn Sīnā for four different reasons outlined at the end of his book, the most relevant of which surrounds Ibn Sīnā’s views on the eternity of the universe. In what will follow I will outline the critical differences found between the approaches of Ibn Sīnā and al-Ghazālī in demonstrating God’s existence. Particular focus will be given to the subjects of infinite regress and eternality, as well as arguments against emanationism and Godly will. Though al-Ghazālī does not directly challenge any of the premises of Ibn Sīnā’s overall argument mentioned above, nevertheless his criticisms of Ibn Sīnā’s general approach are just as important. After all, they give the theistic apologist more argumentative options than would be afforded by just relying on Ibn Sīnā’s articulations of the Burhān alone. As it relates to the infinite regress, al-Ghazālī makes the argument that ‘anything susceptible to greater or lesser is finite’. This is concurrent with the proofs already employed by the likes of John of Philoponus.30 Ibn Sīnā was an eternalist (believing the universe is pre-eternal), as well as an emanationist (believing that the universe emanates from God necessarily). Expressed in another manner, Ibn Sīnā believed that God’s bringing of the universe into existence is analogous to the Sun emitting light. In this simile, the light represents the universe and the Sun symbolises God.31Al-Ghazālī, however, considers eternalism to be inconsistent with an omnipotent God, as it renders him impotent to prevent things from coming into existence, or from not coming into existence in the first place.32 Indeed, al-Ghazālī (alongside other Ashʿarites who preceded him) made arguments from ‘particularisation’ which aim to establish the divine will through cosmological proofs. Within this context, they give examples like those of rotating planets in space that had the potential of rotating the other way.33

探讨阿什尔里派的特殊化论证十分重要，因为在宗教哲学的讨论中，它作为关于神意志的论证几乎完全被忽视，尽管这一论证具有很高的理论涵盖面。遗憾的是，可以说阿什尔里派并不善于应对可能的决定论异议（这将在关于异议的章节中讨论）。原因在于，包括安萨里在内的许多主要思想家都倾向于偶因论，从而预先提出了与大卫·休谟相似的观点，即因果之间的联系并非必然。他们常常以火使棉花燃烧为例，而实际上认为因果关系直接来自神。[34] 当然，偶因论削弱了安萨里自身论证的第一前提，该前提称：“凡开始存在者必有其因，宇宙开始存在，故宇宙有其因。”[35] 这是因为，如果安萨里在其他著作中实际论证了原因直接来自神，那么“凡开始存在者必有其因”这一前提就无法通过归纳法确立。若他所指的正是这些原因，则安萨里可能被指责为预设结论。针对这一观点，罕百里学派学者伊本·泰米叶论证说，次级因果并不危及神的独立性，即…… [31] Leaman, O. (2000). A brief introduction to Islamic philosophy. Polity Press, p. 41.

伊本·鲁世德对上文所述伊本·西纳论证的批评，与论证的推进过程关系并不大。其要点主要在于伊本·西纳界定模态范畴的方式，尤其是“可能存在”（mumkin al-wujūd，即可能或偶然的存在）这一范畴。在他那段著名的引用亚里士多德的论述中，伊本·鲁世德提到：“任何科学都不可能证明其自身主题的存在。”41 在其《指南》（Pointers）一书中，伊本·西纳将可能（偶然）的存在定义为“既非不可能、也非必然”之物。42 此外，他还指出，如果这样的偶然存在并不实际存在，也不会产生任何逻辑上的荒谬。伊本·鲁世德主张，要使伊本·西纳的“burhān”论证得以恰当成立，就必须采用适当的“可能存在”或mumkin al-wujūd定义，即“被生成或被毁灭者”。这应当作为分析的起点，因为它是经验所证实的。43 若不以此类定义为起点，就有将偶然者与被因者混为一谈的危险。事实上，伊本·鲁世德指责伊本·西纳在原因与偶然之间混淆不清；在这一批判性讨论中，他指出偶然之物的范围比原因更为广泛。44 重要的是，伊本·鲁世德还指责伊本·西纳主张偶然之物都是有原因的，并认为在他看来，这一区分“并非考察‘作为存在者’的划分”。45

Ibn Rushd’s critique of Ibn Sīnā’s argument presented above does not relate much to the flow of the argument. Instead, it largely lies in the way Ibn Sīnā defines the modal categories, especially the category of mumkin al-wujūd (possible or contingent existences). In his famous invocation of Aristotle, Ibn Rushd mentions that ‘it is impossible for any science to demonstrate the existence of its own subject matter’.41 In his Pointers, Ibn Sīnā defines possible (contingent) existence as something which is ‘not impossible and not necessary’.42 In addition, he indicates that if such a contingent existence is not in existence no logical absurdities would occur. Ibn Rushd claims that in order for Ibn Sīnā’s Burhān argument to be properly made, an appropriate definition of possible existence or mumkin al-wujūd must be adopted, namely ‘what is generated or destroyed’. This must be the analytical starting point, for it is empirically attested.43 If one does not start with this kind of definition, one will be at risk of equivocating between that which is contingent and that which is caused. In fact, Ibn Rushd accuses Ibn Sīnā of equivocating between causes and contingencies; within this critical discussion he states that contingent things are broader than causes.44 Importantly, Ibn Rushd accuses Ibn Sīnā of claiming that contingent things are caused and that in his view this distinction ‘is not a division that considers the qua existent’.45

鉴于伊本·路世德的批评，在我自己的论证陈述中，我会确保区分原因、依赖之物和偶然之物。 托马斯·阿奎那与第三条路 伊本·西纳的《证明》（Burhān）对后世影响深远，以至于在托马斯·阿奎那的著作中仍可见其踪迹。[46] 除伊本·路世德外，阿奎那的思路也与他同时代的罕百里学派学者伊本·泰米叶相当。后者在其《阿斯巴哈尼信条注释》（Sharḥ al ʿAqīdah al Aṣfahāniyyah）中，倾向于用一种宇宙论推理来论证神的存在。[47] 阐述自己的观点时，阿奎那写道： 第三条路基于"可以不存在之物"与"必然存在之物"，其论证如下。我们所遇见的某些事物可以存在，但并非必然存在，因为我们发现它们有生有灭，时而存在，时而不存在。然而，并非一切事物都能如此，因为一个可以不存在的事物，曾经是不存在的；如果一切事物都可以不存在，那么曾经必定什么都没有。但若果真如此，现在也将什么都没有，因为不存在的事物只能通过已经存在的事物而开始存在。若曾经没有任何存在之物，那就不可能有任何事物开始存在，现在也就不会有任何存在之物，而这显然是错误的。因此，并非一切事物都是可以不存在的；必然有些事物是必然存在的，而这些事物的必然性可能源于他物，也可能不源于他物。但正如我们已经证明，动力因的序列不可能无限延续，同样，那些必然存在且其必然性源于他物的事物序列也不可能无限延续。因此，我们被迫假定有某种本身必然存在的事物，它的必然性不源于其自身之外的任何事物，而它本身就是其他事物必然存在的原因。这便是众人所称的神。48

Bearing Ibn Rushd’s criticism in mind, in my own presentation of arguments I will make sure that I differentiate between causes, dependent things, and contingent things. Thomas Aquinas and the Third Way Ibn Sīnā’s Burhān was influential to the degree that it appears in the works of Thomas Aquinas.46 In addition to Ibn Rushd, the approach of Aquinas is commensurate with that of his Ḥanbalite contemporary Ibn Taymiyyah, who, in his Sharḥ al ʿAqīdah al Aṣfahāniyyah (Explanation of the Creed of Aṣfahān) prefers a form of cosmological reasoning to demonstrate God’s existence.47 When presenting his viewpoint, Aquinas states: The third way is based on what need not be and on what must be, and runs as follows. Some of the things we come across can be but need not be, for we find them being generated and destroyed, thus sometimes in being and sometimes not. Now everything cannot be like this, for a thing that need not be was once not; and if everything need not be, once upon a time there was nothing. But if that were true there would be nothing even now, because something that does not exist can only begin to exist through something that already exists. If nothing was in being nothing could begin to be, and nothing would be in being now, which is clearly false. Not everything then is the sort of thing that need not be; some things must be and these may or may not owe this necessity to something else. But just as we proved that a series of agent [efficient] causes can’t go on forever, so also a series of things which must be and owe this to other things. So we are forced to postulate something which of itself must be, owing this to nothing outside itself, but being itself the cause that other things must be. And this is what everyone calls God.48

伊本·泰米叶主张以宇宙论的方式论证，他明确区分了“部分”与“属性”。在伊本·泰米叶看来，“部分”是从某个基体中被物质性地增加或移除的东西，就像整艘船所依赖的木板。凡是由这类物质部分构成的事物，都必定是复合的或被产生的。既然宇宙或多元宇宙符合这一描述，那么宇宙或多元宇宙也就会是复合的或被产生的。伊本·泰米叶进一步论证，真主的属性是“必然的”（talāzumī），以至于它们不能被想象为另一种样子。①尽管伊本·泰米叶本人并未在本体论意义上认同这一观点，但他使复合论证以类似于前一章所探讨的伊本·西纳集合论式表述的方式成为可能。这些中世纪的讨论早已是无神论者与有神论者之间争论的重要内容，尤其是近年来不可知论兴起之后。颇具讽刺意味的是，正是安东尼·肯尼本人，以主持人的身份，用这一思路向理查德·道金斯发难。当时道金斯与时任坎特伯雷大主教的罗温·威廉斯辩论，议题是道金斯关于“复杂的上帝”的论证，辩论中援引了电动剃须刀与直刃剃刀的例子。肯尼说道：“直刃剃刀在设计上更简单，却具有比电动剃须刀更复杂的功能。”此后道金斯除了表示自己不知情外别无回应，这恰恰说明了这一推理方式的有效性。②由此可见，作出这类部分与整体的区分（正如前文所探讨的那些）是构建复合论证的一个essential part，即不可或缺的组成部分。 如果把“部分”的定义包括“属性”，那么护教事业可能会停留在自然神论的立场上，因为通过启示所知的神圣属性之确证会变得多余且累赘。许多关于神存在的论证对由普通信众组成的听众而言可能相当复杂。在牧灵的场合中，这些论证可能令人反感，因为普通信众只想消除无神论的疑虑。在伊斯兰黄金时代，传统主义者伊本·泰米叶最反对在面向普通信众时使用过于复杂的论证。他认为，这些论证应当局限于具有分析性背景的听众。他有趣地指出，对于“某些人来说，证明越是阐释得详细、逻辑前提越多，对他们就越有用……对于这类人，应当使用详细的卡拉姆方法或其他他们习惯的分析方法”。57 在另一部题为《世界有始论》（Mas’alah Ḥudūth al-ʿĀlam，即“世界的开端问题”）的著作中，他指出，使普通人相信神的最佳方式是运用尽可能基础的推理。在评注《古兰经》中那一段众多修辞性问句之一“难道他们是无中生有的，还是他们自己就是创造者？”（《古兰经》52:35）时，伊本·泰米叶说： 这种分类是人们以最少的内省来推论创造者存在的最简单、最清楚的方式。这是因为仆人知道自己曾经不存在，之后才有了存在……他也知道自己并非自我创造，也非自己使自己存在，而这是一种确凿无疑的知识……他还知道，他的被造不可能没有创造者，任何原因都不可能没有结果……如果他知道这些，他就会知道如何推论天地的存在。58

Ibn Taymiyyah –who prefers the argument to be made cosmologically – makes a clear distinction between a ‘part’ and an ‘attribute’. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, a part is something that is materially added or removed from a substratum, like planks of wood that a whole [ship] depends upon for its existence.54 Anything that is constituted by material parts like these must be composed or generated. Considering that the universe – or a multiverse – would fit this description, it would follow that a universe or multiverse would be composed or generated. Ibn Taymiyyah goes on to argue that the attributes of God are talāzumī (necessary) such that they cannot be imagined in another way.55 Although Ibn Taymiyyah himself does not endorse it in ontological terms, nevertheless he renders the composition argument possible in terms similar to Ibn Sīnā’s set theory type formulations explored in the previous chapter. These medieval discussions have already been a staple part of the atheist versus theist discourse, especially with the rise of agnosticism in recent years. Ironically, it was Anthony Kenny himself – who was acting in his capacity as a moderator – challenged Richard Dawkins with this line of thinking. This was during the latter’s debate with Rowan Williams – the Archbishop of Canterbury at that time – regarding Dawkins’ argument of a complex God, where the example of an electric razor and a cutthroat razor was invoked. On this point, Kenny stated that ‘the cutthroat razor is simpler in design but has more complex powers than the electric razor’, after which Dawkins had no response but to plead ignorance, thereby demonstrating the effectiveness of this line of reasoning.56 One can see how making mereological distinctions – like those hitherto explored – is an essential part of making the argument from composition. If one defines a ‘part’ in a way that includes ‘attributes’, the apologetic mission may halt at a point of deism, as the affirmation of Godly attributes that are known through revelation becomes both redundant and superfluous. Many arguments for God’s existence can be quite complicated for an audience consisting of laypeople. They can be off-putting in pastoral settings, where the common folk just want to resolve atheistic doubts. In the Islamic golden age, the traditionalist Ibn Taymiyyah was most disapproving of employing overly complicated arguments when addressing lay people. He argued that they should be limited to an audience with an analytic background, interestingly pointing out that for ‘some people, every time the proof is more explicated and detailed, with more logical premises, it was more useful to them…and with this kind of person, one should use a detailed Kalām approach or other such analytic approach which they would be used to’.57 In another work entitled as Mas’alah Ḥudūth al-ʿĀlam (The Issue of the Beginning of the World), he states that the best way to convince a layperson of God is to use the most basic reasoning possible. Commenting on one of the Qur’an’s many rhetorical questions, ‘Or were they created from nothing or are they their own creators?’ (Qur’an, 52:35), Ibn Taymiyyah states: This categorisation is the easiest and clearest way that one can reason the existence of a creator with the most minimal amount of introspection. This is because the slave knows that he once did not exist, and that he came into existence after he did not exist…He also knows that he did not create himself or bring himself into existence, and this is known as a matter of critical certainty… He also knows that his creation could not be without a creator, and that there is no cause without effect… If he knows this, then he will know how to reason the existence of the heavens and the Earth.58

邓斯·司各脱开始他的论证的方式与安萨里和伊本·泰米叶相似。然而，他随后阐述了两类论证（一类是宇宙论的，另一类是本体论的），以得出无可回避的结论。雷加·伍德以如下方式概括了司各脱的论证：(1) 某物可以被产生。

Duns Scotus begins his argument in a similar manner to al-Ghazālī and Ibn Tamiyyah. However, he then explicates two types of arguments (with one being cosmological, and the other being ontological) in order to produce an inescapable conclusion. Rega Wood summarises Scotus’ argument in the following way: (1) Something can be produced.

(2) 凡被产生的事物，要么是自己产生自己，要么是由虚无产生，要么是由其他原因产生。

(2) Everything that is produced is produced either by itself, nothing, or some other cause.

（3）无中不能生有。

(3) Nothing can be produced from nothing.

(4) 没有任何事物能够自己产生自己。(5) 因此,某物是由另一个原因产生的,我们称之为 a。(6) a 要么是无因之因,要么不是。(7) 如果 a 是无因之因,这便足以作为证明。(8) 如果 a 不是无因之因,那么依据第(2)至(4)步,它必定由另一个原因产生,我们称之为 b。(9) 但原因相互先后相继的无穷系列是不可能存在的。(10) 因此,这一因果进程必定终止于某个无因之因。60

(4) Nothing can produce itself. (5) Therefore, something is produced by another cause, which we will call a. (6) Either a is an uncaused cause or it is not. (7) If a is an uncaused cause, this suffices as proof. (8) If a is not an uncaused cause, then given steps (2-4), it must be produced by another cause, which we call b. (9) But it is impossible to have an infinite series of causes preceding each other. (10) Therefore, the procession must halt at some uncaused cause.60

关键在于，司各脱区分了偶然有序的因果与本质有序的因果。在偶然有序的因果中，若其中一个停止存在，另一个并不会因此不再存在。在本质有序的因果中，情况则并非如此。例如，父亲可能有一个儿子，而这个儿子又可能有另一个儿子。祖父可能去世，而儿子和孙子仍然继续存在。如此看来，父亲的儿子与他自己的儿子，即便先行的原因已经不复存在，仍可以继续存在。61 与亚里士多德和伊本·西纳一样，司各脱强烈反对本质有序的因果无限倒溯的可能性。62 司各脱的论证也有如下的表述方式：(1) 若一个独立的实体（称之为 a）可以不存在，那么与它不相容的某物（称之为 b）就可以存在，因为两个互相矛盾的命题中必有一个为真。

Crucially, Scotus differentiates between accidentally ordered causes and essentially ordered causes. In the case of accidentally ordered causes, if one stops the other will not cease to exist. In the case of essentially ordered causes this is not the case. For example, a father may have a son, and the son may have another son. The grandfather may die, while both the son and the grandson will continue to exist. In this way, the son of the father and his own son can continue to exist despite the antecedent cause ceasing to exist.61 Like Aristotle and Ibn Sīnā, Scotus argues strongly against the possibility of an infinite regress of essentially ordered causes.62 Scotus’s argument has also been presented in the following manner: (1) If an independent entity (call it a) can fail to exist, then something incompatible with it (call it b) can exist, for one of two contradictories is always true.

贝蒂可能并不相信宇宙是偶然存在的。借助阿奎那的论证思路，可以向贝蒂提出这样的看法：宇宙是偶然的，因为它处于不断的变化之中。凡处于不断变化中的事物都具有潜能，不可能是纯粹的现实。凡具有潜能的事物都需要一个外在的原因。贝蒂曾遭受的一些创伤来自她自己的家人，因此她可能会对宗教权威人物感到畏惧或不信任。也可能是，宗教代表着一种她所鄙视的更高权威。当然，也可能是贝蒂确实不被这些论证说服，或者她根本不想被任何导向宗教生活的论证说服。贝蒂的意图和心理状态是无法评估的。与贝蒂交流时，我发现最好的方式是尽可能真诚，以便与贝蒂建立积极的关系。

Betty may not be convinced that the universe is contingent. Using Aquinas’s lines of argumentation, one may be able to suggest to Betty that the universe is contingent because it is in constant change. Anything in constant change is potential and cannot be purely actual. Anything which is potential requires an outside cause. Some of the trauma Betty had suffered had been at the hands of her own family members. It may be that Betty may feel intimidated or distrustful of religious authority figures. It may also be that religion represents a greater authority that Betty disdains. Of course, it may be that Betty is genuinely not convinced with the arguments or that she doesn’t want to be convinced by any argument that leads to religious living. It is impossible to assess Betty’s intentions and psychoanalytic state. When interacting with Betty, I have found that the best way to be is as authentic as possible. To create a positive relationship with Betty.