在哲学宗教领域中，关于上帝存在的一系列论证，其根源可追溯到前几章所论述的一些中世纪论述。这些论证已进入大众辩论、讨论和文章的范畴。拥有尽可能有力的有神论论证至关重要，因为薄弱或过于复杂的论证在此类对话中说服力较弱。在本章中，我将提出我对上帝存在的论证，这些论证大多从Burhān论证中汲取灵感。这些论证旨在既基础又有效地证明必然存在者的存在。我将提出五项总体证明，然后在此背景下提出两个独立的宇宙论论证，一个基于依赖性，另一个基于因果性。至于本体论论证，我将提出它的三种可能表述：第一种仅涉及依赖性，第二种涉及偶然性与必然性的模态术语，第三种则从因果性出发进行论证。为了确立必然存在者的意志，我将运用前文提到的特化论证。最后，我将提出一个受Burhān启发的精细调整论证。我还将提出三项关于必然存在者独一性的论证，以确立有神论的一神论。所有这些论证都应相互结合来理解，以体会所提出观点的真实性。我会以形式化的方式陈述这些论证，但其写法将力求通俗易懂，便于宗教发言人向普通听众讲解。依照伊本·泰米叶对“部分”与“属性”加以区分、以防止两者混淆的做法，“片段”一词将用来指可以从某物之上移除、添加、断开、撕下或割下的东西。 87 此外,我区分了“因果性”与“依赖性”这两个术语,因为一个对象可以由某物引起,却不必依赖该物而存在(例如孩子与其父母的关系)。然而,后一术语意味着一个对象依赖于某物以维持其持续存在。

A range of arguments for God’s existence that can and have been expressed in the realm of Philosophy of Religion have their roots in some of the medieval renditions covered in the previous chapters. Such arguments have made their way into the domain of popular debates, discussions, and articles. The importance of having the strongest possible theistic argument(s) cannot be overstated, as weak or overcomplicated arguments have less potency in any such conversations. In this chapter, I will present my arguments for God’s existence, which find much of their inspiration from the Burhān argument. The arguments will aim to be both basic and effective in demonstrating the existence of a necessary existence. I will present five overall proofs, and then make two separate cosmological arguments in this context, with one from dependence and the other from causation. As for the ontological argument, I will present three possible formulations of it: the first will exclusively refer to dependence, the second to modal terms of contingency and necessity, while the third will argue from causation. To establish the will of the necessary being, I will use the argument of particularisation mentioned before. Finally, I will present a fine-tuning argument inspired by the Burhān. I will also offer three arguments for the oneness of the necessary existence to establish theistic monotheism. All these arguments should be understood in conjunction with each other to appreciate the veracity of the case being made. I will present the arguments formally. However they will be written in an accessible way intended for use by religious spokespeople to lay audiences. Following Ibn Taymiyyah’s distinction that prevents conflations between ‘parts’ and ‘attributes’, the word ‘piece’ will be used to mean something that ‘can be removed, added, broken off, torn off or cut off from something’.87 Furthermore, I distinguish between the terms ‘causality’ and ‘dependence,’ as an object can be caused by something but not be dependent on it to exist (i.e. a child in relation to his parents). However, the latter term entails that an object relies upon something for its continued existence.

第一部分：

Part I:

命题:不可能存在只有依赖性事物而没有独立事物作为参照的世界,因为依赖性事物无法自行持续存在。存在只能通过独立的存在来解释,因为不可能的存在并不会依据逻辑必然性而存在。此外,依赖性的存在既不能自我产生,也不能自我维持。

Proposition: There cannot be a world with only dependent thing(s) without reference to an independent thing, as dependent thing(s) cannot continue existing on their own. Existence is only explicable with reference to an independent existence, as impossible existences do not exist by logical necessity. Furthermore, dependent existences cannot self-generate or self-maintain.

第二部分:

Part II:

1. 凡由部分组成的事物都是依赖的。

1. Everything made up of pieces is dependent.

2. 宇宙是由许多部分组成的。

2. The universe is made up of pieces.

3. 因此，宇宙是依赖性的。

3. Therefore, the universe is dependent.

请换一种说法：

Put in another way:

1. 凡由部分组成的事物都是依赖的。

1. Everything made up of pieces is dependent.

2. 一个无限的多元宇宙由若干部分构成。

2. An infinite multiverse is made up of pieces.

3. 因此，无限的多重宇宙是依赖性的。用本体论的方式表述，论证如下：

3. Therefore, an infinite multiverse is dependent. Expressed ontologically, the argument runs as follows:

第一部分：

Part I:

任何包含一个以上成员的集合，都依赖于其成员。

1. Any set with more than one member is dependent on its members.

2. 无限集是指成员数量多于一个的集合。

2. An infinite set is a set with more than one member.

3. 因此，无限集合依赖于其成员。

3. Therefore, an infinite set is dependent on its members.

这一论证的数学成分有助于保护宇宙论论证免受组合谬误的影响。组合谬误认为，对部分为真的，对整体也必然为真。原因在于，它表明部分与整体的区分以及依赖关系，既可以基于宇宙论的理由进行推理，也可以基于先验的理由进行推理。在解释了原因与依赖之间的区别之后，我们接下来可以问：依赖与独立之间的区别，以及偶然与必然之间的区别，二者又是什么关系？简单地说，必然之物不一定是独立的。在所谓的“科学必然性”中，这一点尤为清楚。例如，考虑这样一个命题：“人类不可能在一秒内跑完100米。”这类必然性不必在所有可能世界、宇宙或设想中都成立，尽管它在我们所处的世界中是成立的。有趣的是，奇迹可以被定义为打破科学必然性、却不打破逻辑必然性的事物。尽管如此，借助所谓的“科学必然性”，对“独立性”与“必然性”加以区分的论证变得更加容易。但逻辑必然性又当如何？这里所表达的论点是：必然事实的范畴（如 2 + 2 = 4）预设了存在。这是因为，所能设想的最根本之事是“毫无疑问存在着存在”。存在的范畴比事实的范畴更为基础；事实需要存在，而存在并不依赖于任何东西。因此，可以用如下方式表述这一点：

证明2

Proof 2.

第一部分：

Part I:

1. 存在被预设于一切实在之物之中。

1. Existence is presupposed in everything that is real.

2. 必要的事实是真实的。

2. Necessary facts are real.

3. 因此，必然的事实预设了存在。

3. Therefore, necessary facts presuppose existence.

第二部分:

Part II:

1. 如果必要的事实以存在为前提,那么它们依赖于存在。 2. 必要的事实以存在为前提。

1. If necessary facts presuppose existence, they depend on it. 2. Necessary facts presuppose existence.

3. 因此，必然的事实依赖于存在。

3. Therefore, necessary facts depend on existence.

当我使用“独立”一词时,我指的是自足。也就是说,独立之物不需要其之外的任何东西来解释或使其存在,也不必依赖任何东西而存在。正如我们此前所表明的,并非所有必然之物都是独立的,因为它们依赖于预设的事态才能存在。因此,独立性比必然性更为具体。独立之物必然是必然的,但并非所有必然之物都是独立的。如果这一点成立,那么上述依赖论证就应当引出一种批判性的反思,并最终得出一个独立实体的结论。这是因为世界上的一切事物都有组成部分,而所有本体论上的复合体都依赖其构成成分。因此,要解释任何事物,我们就需要一个独立的实体,其他一切事物都依赖于它,而它自身不依赖任何东西。这个独立的存在根据定义必然是必然的,因为任何“独立”之物都是必然的。如果这一点成立,那么它就不可能以任何其他方式被设想。如果某物不能以任何其他方式被设想,那么它必定在一切时间和地点都是如此,或者说独立于时间和地点。无论哪种情况,它都是永恒的。因此,永恒性并不被理解为一种“积极的品质”,而是描述一种没有开端或终结的状态。这将举证责任转移到了对话者身上。他们必须要么证明永恒性应当按照我所描述的方式来理解,要么证明一个非物质的必然之物有可能具有开端的属性。以模态术语进行论证,我陈述如下:

When I use the term ‘independent’, I mean self-sufficient. That is to say that which is independent does not need anything outside of it to explain or cause it. Nor does it have to depend on anything for its existence. As we have previously shown, not all necessary things are independent, as they rely on presupposed states of affairs in order to exist. Consequently, independence is more specific than necessity. Something which is independent must be necessary, but not all necessary things are independent. If this is true, then the argument of dependence above should bring about a critical reflection which concludes with an independent entity. This is because all things in the world have pieces, and all ontological composites depend on their members. To explain anything, we therefore need an independent entity upon which all other things depend, while it itself depends on nothing. This independent being will be necessary by definition, as anything ‘independent’ is necessary. If this is true, then it cannot be conceived of in any other way. If something cannot be conceived of in any other way, it must be so in all times and places, or independent of time and place. In both events it will be eternal. Eternality is thus not conceived as a ‘positive quality’ insomuch as it describes a lack of beginning or end. This shifts the burden of proof onto the interlocutor. They must either prove that eternality should be conceived in the ways I have described, or that it is possible for something immaterially necessary to possess the quality of beginning. Making the argument using modal terms, I state:

1. 任何在抽象上可以被设想为另外某种样子的事物，都是由其他某物所安排的。

1. Anything that could be conceived of otherwise in abstraction was arranged by something else.

2. 在抽象意义上，宇宙本可以被设想为另一种样子。

2. The universe could be conceived of otherwise in abstraction.

因此,宇宙是由其他某物安排的。

3. Therefore, the universe was arranged by something else.

请换一种说法：

Put in another way:

1. 凡是在抽象中可以被设想为其他样子的事物，都是由别的东西所安排的。

1. Anything that could be conceived otherwise in abstraction was arranged by something else.

2. 无限的多元宇宙在抽象层面也可以有其他的构想方式。

2. An infinite multiverse could be conceived otherwise in abstraction.

3. 因此，无限的多元宇宙是由其他某物安排的。

3. Therefore, an infinite multiverse was arranged by something else.

根据第一个论证，安排偶然之物的那个“某物”，最终必须归结于一个独立的/必然的“某物”。这种独立/必然的存在能够做到这一点，这暗示它具有做出选择的能力。将宇宙/多元宇宙安排成这样而非那样，就表明了一种选择：它选择了它应当是这样而非那样。有人可能会问：独立存在的选择能力或“意志”本身，难道不能在抽象中被设想为另一种样子吗？如果可以，那么关于宇宙或多元宇宙的同样问题，难道不也适用于这个独立存在吗？ 独立存在是必然的，这意味着描述该独立存在的所有方式也都是必然的。也就是说，必然存在者的任何属性，包括“意志”，都是必然的。因此，如果我们确立了关于必然存在者的一切都是必然的，那么我们也就确立了：关于必然存在者，没有任何东西是偶然的，或者可以是偶然的。 为了支持这一观点，可以运用一种以必然与偶然为出发点的“精细调整论证”的变体。

Following Proof 1 mentioned above, the ‘something else’ responsible for arranging the contingent thing must ultimately terminate in an independent/necessary ‘something else’. The fact that an independent/necessary existence is capable of doing this would suggest the capacity to make choices. To arrange the universe/multiverse in one way rather than another indicates a choice; it chose that it should be one way rather than another. A question may be asked: is not the choice making capacity or ‘will’ of the independent existence itself something which can be conceived otherwise in abstraction? If so, would not the same problem with a universe or the multiverse be applicable to the independent existence? The fact that the independent existence is necessary means that all ways of describing the independent existence will also be necessary. That is to say that any attribute of the necessary existence, including ‘will’, is necessary. Therefore, if we establish that everything about the necessary existence is necessary, we also establish that nothing about the necessary existence is or can be contingent. To bolster this opinion, one can make use of a variation of the fine-tuning argument, using necessity and contingency as a starting point.

宇宙为生命而进行的精微调校，是出于必然还是出于偶然。

1. The universe is fine-tuned for life by necessity or contingency.

2. 如果它是因必要性而被微调的，那么一个必然存在者就必须来解释这一微调所具有的必然事实。

2. If it is fine-tuned by necessity, then a necessary existence must account for the necessary fact of fine tuning.

3. 如果它是通过偶然性被微调的，那么一个必然存在者就必须能够说明任何一系列偶然事物。

3. If it is fine-tuned by contingency, then a necessary existence must account for any series of contingencies.

4. 宇宙经过精细的调校，适宜生命存在。

4. The universe is fine-tuned for life.

5. 因此，宇宙为生命而精细调校，其背后是一个必然存在者。

5. Therefore, the universe is fine-tuned for life by a necessary existence.

前提3与最初的论断相联系,后者主张不可能只存在依赖性的存在。依赖之物无法独立持续存在。存在只能参照一个独立的存在来解释,因为不可能的存在并非依据逻辑必然性而存在,而依赖性的存在既不能自行产生,也不能自行维持。既然偶然性与依赖性一样,是可以被产生、被毁灭、并且可以被安排成别的样子的,那么对于一个无穷的"依赖之物"序列所作的同样论断,也同样适用于一个无穷的偶然之物序列。 请注意,这里并未提及此类论证中通常使用的"机遇"或"随机性"这两个术语。这些术语本身需要无神论的对话者加以论证,因为他们必须证明"机遇"或"随机性"确实存在,并且它不仅仅是人们对宇宙运行机制或存在的其他方面缺乏认识的表现。决定论的无神论者实际上无法相信"机遇"或"随机性",因为这类概念暗含着易变性与不可预测性,而这两者在决定论的世界观中都是不可能的。同样,许多相容论的无神论者也会与决定论者一样,认同世界具有可预测的本质。

Premise 3 mentioned above links to the initial postulation, which states that there cannot exist only dependent existences as ‘dependent thing(s) cannot continue existing on their own. Existence is only explicable with reference to an independent existence, as impossible existences do not exist by logical necessity and dependent existences cannot self-generate and or self-maintain’. Since contingency – like dependence – is something which is susceptible to generation, destruction, and could be arranged otherwise, the same thing can be said about an infinite series of ‘dependent things’ can likewise be said of an infinite series of contingent things. Notice the lack of mention of the terms ‘chance’ or ‘randomness’, which are usually employed in such arguments. These terms are themselves in need of justification by the atheist interlocutor, since they must prove that such a thing as ‘chance’ or ‘randomness’ exists, and that it is not merely an expression of one’s ignorance of the mechanics of the universe or any other aspect of existence. Determinist atheists cannot in fact believe in ‘chance’ or ‘randomness,’ as concepts like these imply volatility and unpredictability – both of which are impossible in the deterministic worldview. Likewise, many compatibilist atheists would also agree with determinists on the predictable nature of the world.

对于设计论论证而言，其最大的弱点在于：论证者借助科学数据（例如关于常数的数据）来立论。为规避这一反驳，有人主张，可以把自然界的规则性、稳定性和一致性（这些正是科学工作的前提）作为比常数微调更好的出发点。对此，约翰·霍尔丹（John Haldane）指出：世界与心灵的稳定性、规则性和可理解性，是即便是最有限的科学实在论主张所共同依赖的基本假设。但若追问我们凭什么作出这些假设，一般性的回答不能是：它们是科学探究的结论，因为它们恰恰是科学探究得以可能的条件。88

所采用的论证不必以世界（或宇宙）有开端作为前提之一。这并非因为永恒的宇宙无法被成功驳斥，而只是为了削弱对方的论点。论证可以如下展开：

The arguments one may employ do not need to have the inception of the world (or universe) as one of their premises. This is not because an eternal universe cannot be successfully refuted, but only to undermine the argument of the interlocutor. The argument may run as follows:

1. 凡由部分组成的事物，都是有因的。

1. Anything made up of pieces is caused.

2. 宇宙是由许多部分组成的。

2. The universe is made up of pieces.

3. 因此，宇宙是有原因的。

3. Therefore, the universe is caused.

或者换一种说法:

Or, put in another way:

1. 凡由部分组成的事物，都是有因的。

1. Anything made up of pieces is caused.

2. 一个无限的多元宇宙由若干部分构成。

2. An infinite multiverse is made up of pieces.

3. 因此，便会导致无限的多元宇宙。

3. Therefore, an infinite multiverse is caused.

有了这五个论证，人们便能有力地反驳无神论。此外，还应当在学理上指出，无神论既无法回答最根本的问题，更不能解释"一切存在"。无神论本身既不具备解释的范围，也不具备反驳的范围。在证明必然存在者的存在之后，那些意图确立一神论有效性的人，宜再提出三个论证，以证明这一必然存在者的独一性。这些论证的灵感来自Burhān与Dalīl al Tamanuʿ，并吸收了穆斯林思想家的观点，例如阿尔-安萨里（al-Ghazālī）在其著作《Al-Iqtiṣād fi al ʿItiqād》中的论述。

With these five proofs, one should be able to competently make a case against atheism. In addition, it should be outlined on the field that atheism has no explanatory scope to answer the most fundamental questions, let alone explain ‘all that exists’. Atheism itself lacks any explanatory or refutational scope. After proving that a necessary existence exists, it is befitting for those intending to establish the validity of monotheistic theism to offer three additional arguments for the oneness of such a necessary existence. These arguments take their inspiration from the Burhān and Dalīl al Tamanuʿ, including viewpoints presented by Muslim thinkers like al-Ghazālī in his book Al-Iqtiṣād fi al ʿItiqād.

1. 如果“必然存在”是指不可能以其他方式存在的存在，那么它不可能有多于一个。

1. If a necessary existence is an existence that cannot be any other way, there cannot be more than one.

2. 必然存在者不可能是其他样子。

2. A necessary existence cannot be any other way.

3. 因此，必然存在者不可能有一个以上。

3. Therefore, there cannot be more than one necessary existence.

如果有任何东西能够区分“必然存在者1”与“必然存在者2”，那么这种区分的属性按定义就会使“必然存在者2”失去必然性。因为这将被认为“必然存在者2”可以是“另一种样子”，因此在这种情况下，“必然存在者2”根本不是必然的，而应被视为偶然的。例如，若假设真主1在一切方面都是必然的，而真主2与真主1不同，那么使真主2有别于真主1的东西，将表明至少其中一位“真主”，甚至两位，都是偶然的。若权能是真主1的必然属性——真主1必然是全能的——而“真主2”并非必然地展现权能，那么这意味着真主2不符合作为“必然存在”所要求的必然性标准。

If there was anything to demarcate ‘necessary existence 1’ from ‘necessary existence 2,’ that property of demarcation would disqualify ‘necessary existence 2’ from being necessary, by definition. This is because it would be conceived that ‘necessary existence 2’ could be ‘another way’ and therefore ‘necessary existence 2’ would not be necessary at all in this case. Instead, it would be considered contingent. For instance, if one supposes God 1 is necessary in all aspects and God 2 is different from God 1, that which differentiates God 2 from God 1 will indicate contingency in at least one of the ‘Gods’, or even both. If power is a necessary attribute of God 1 – and God 1 is necessarily powerful – but ‘God 2’ does not exhibit power by necessity, then this means that God 2 does not meet the criterion of necessity required to be the ‘necessary existence’.

第一部分。

Part I.

1. 如果必然存在者是存在中其他一切事物的原因，那么必然存在者便对存在中的一切事物拥有能力。

1. If the necessary existence is responsible for all other things in existence, then the necessary existence has capacity over all things in existence.

必然存在者是存在中其他一切事物的根源。

2. The necessary existence is responsible for all other things in existence.

3. 因此，必然存在者对于一切存在之物都具有能力。

3. Therefore, the necessary existence has capacity over all things in existence.

第二部分

Part II.

如果必然存在者对存在之物拥有绝对的能力,那么除必然存在者之外,就不可能有任何事物对一切事物都具有能力。

1. If the necessary existence has ultimate capacity over all things in existence, nothing other than the necessary existence is over all things capable.

2. 必然存在者对一切存在之物都具有能力。

2. The necessary existence has capacity over all things in existence.

3. 因此，必然存在者对一切事物都有能力。

3. Therefore, the necessary existence is over all things capable.

为使自然界保持稳定、统一和规律，世界的安排只能由一个外在的主宰者来完成。

1. For nature to be stable, uniform, and regular, there must only be one external agent arranging the world.

2. 自然是稳定、统一且有规律的。

2. Nature is stable, uniform, and regular.

3. 因此，必定只有一个外在的主体在安排世界 有人可能会主张，是一群“心灵”合作，使自然得以稳定、统一而有规律。然而，如果全能者是这些心灵存在的根源，那么他也必定是这些心灵所产生之物的根源。

3. Therefore, there must be only one external agent arranging the world It could be argued that a collection of ‘minds’ cooperated together to allow nature to be stable, uniform and regular. However, if the one who is all capable is responsible for the existence of such minds, then they will also be responsible for whatever such minds produce.

上文所提供的诸多证明与论证，确立了必然存在者的必然性、抉择能力、绝对能力、独立性与独一性。正如前文所说，必然存在者必须存在，才能解释世界的持续存在。此外，必然存在者必须存在，才能解释任何存在，因为“依赖性的存在”既不能产生自身，也不能维持自身。要使这些论证在牧养和护教的场合中行之有效，可以先提出一些根本而发人深思的问题，例如：“为什么有某物存在，而不是虚无？”这个问题虽然简单，却足够深刻，能够引发深入的思考，触动受众的存在层面的感受，从而以一种比单纯辩论更有价值的方式，引导对话者走向有神论。 在打比方和使用隐喻方面，乔舒亚·拉斯穆森（Joshua Rasmussen）为普通读者撰写过一本专门的著作，他举了一个例子：地面上堆放的一叠砖块，砖块代表依赖性的事物，而地面则代表独立的实体。89 也可以运用海床与大海的例子：人们即便不去设想海床，也会认为海水的停留是依赖于海床的。这让人清楚地看到，独立性的论证是多么明晰。对于年轻人（他们可能对智能手机十分熟悉），可以举手机依赖电量、而电量依赖某种发电厂的例子。无一例外，这一过程终将止于一个自足的独立实体。同样，谈到因果关系时，可以论证：凡由部件组合而成的事物，都是因果上偶然的。我由身体各部分组成，这一事实表明，我是由某个外在于我的存在拼合而成的。宇宙由许多部分组成，这同样表明，有某个外在于它的存在将它拼合起来。 在这些论证中，如果要在普通人面前产生说服力，形象化的表达十分重要；提问，并把举证责任放在无神论对话者身上，同样重要。值得提出的问题包括：存在能否用不存在来解释？什么是不存在？如果不借助存在，不存在是否还能被构想？如果不参照自然数和负数，零是否还能被理解？能否存在这样一种情形：只有依赖之物依赖于依赖之物，无限延续下去？你如何从宇宙论或先天的角度为这种情形辩护？这类问题有助于显示有神论立场的力量，以及反对观点的彻底无力。

The collection of proofs and arguments I have provided above establishes the necessity, choice making capability, ultimate capacity, independence, and oneness of the necessary existence. As initially stated, a necessary existence must exist to account for the continued existence of the world. Furthermore, a necessary existence must exist to account for any existence whatsoever, as ‘dependent existences’ could neither generate nor maintain themselves. To make these arguments effective in pastoral and apologetic settings, one should start by asking fundamental thought-provoking questions, such as, ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ This question – despite its simplicity – is profound enough to engender deep thoughts and strike existential chords within the recipient, drawing the interlocutor towards theism in a manner more valuable than argumentation. In terms of analogies and metaphors, Joshua Rasmussen (who authored a book specifically for lay audiences) gives the example of a stack of bricks on the ground, in which the stack of bricks represents dependent things, and the floor represents the independent entity.89 One may also use the example of the sea floor and the sea, and how one assumes the dependence of the water’s settlement without visualising the sea floor. This brings to mind just how clear the case for independence is. To young people (who may be familiar with their smartphones), one may give the example of the mobile phone depending on charge, with the charge depending on some sort of power plant. Without any exception, this process terminates with a self-sufficient independent entity. Likewise, when referencing causation, one can argue that anything which is composed of pieces is causally contingent. I am made up of my body parts, a fact which indicates that I was pieced together by something external to me. The universe is made up of many pieces, which denotes that something external to it pieced it together as well. Imagery is important in these arguments if they are to be effective before laypeople, as is questioning and placing the burden of proof on the atheist interlocutor. Worthwhile questions in this regard include: Can existence be explained by non-existence? What is nonexistence, and is it even conceivable without reference to existence? Is zero ever intelligible without reference to natural and negative numbers? Can there be a state of affairs where only dependent things depend upon dependent things ad infinitum? How do you justify such a state of affairs cosmologically or on a priori grounds? Questions like these are important to show power of the theistic position, as well as the utterly impotent nature of the opposing view.

许多新无神论者对宗教的批判,都依赖于一些暗示宗教"已经过时"的观念。理查德和贝蒂似乎都受到这类论述的影响。受过教育的科学家和其他知识分子选择成为无神论者,这一事实本身就可能使人难以积极地接触有神论。例如,理查德和贝蒂都对伯特兰·罗素十分着迷,他们在批驳有神论时甚至会直接引用他的话。从严格的逻辑角度看,这显然无关紧要,属于一种"诉诸权威"的谬误。理查德和贝蒂都足够聪明,知道这一点。然而从心理层面看,正如多项研究(尤其是米尔格拉姆的电击实验)所显示的,我们无法确定理查德和贝蒂是否没有受到罗素等无神论者的知识地位所影响。因此,一个简单却有力的提醒或许是:列举历史上那些不仅信仰有神论、而且一直为有神论辩护的众多知识贡献者。

Much of the New Atheist polemic against religion depends on notions which imply that religion is ‘outdated’. Both Richard and Betty seem affected by this kind of discourse. The simple fact that educated scientists and other kinds of intellectuals choose to be atheists can be influential in keeping someone from positively engaging with theism. Richard and Betty are both fascinated with Bertrand Russell for example. They may even quote him directly when making a case against theism. On strictly logical terms, this is obviously inconsequential and an ‘appeal to authority’. Both Richard and Betty are clever enough to know that. Psychologically, as shown in multiple studies (most notably Milgram’s Shock Experiment), one cannot be sure that Richard and Betty are not immune influenced by the intellectual status of some atheists like Russell. It may be a simple, yet powerful, point of reminder therefore to simply outline the sheer number of intellectual contributors who not only were theists, but argued for theism throughout the years.