本章将讨论针对已提出的宇宙论与本体论论证各种表述的最常见异议。其中一些与我在上一章所提出的证明和论点并无直接关联,但我仍将积极说明其中缘由。另一些异议则与我对该论证的表述关系更为密切,因此将予以更为系统的处理。除了阐述这些异议之外,我还将说明那些在牧灵与护教语境中应对它们的人,应当如何在技术层面和修辞层面加以处理,因为有时表达方式比内容本身更为重要。首先,肯定或否定上一章提出的初始命题,最终都会导向投降:命题:不可能存在一个只有依赖之物而没有独立之物作为参照的世界,因为依赖之物无法自行持存。存在只能参照独立的存在来解释。这是因为不可能的存在不会由于逻辑必然性而存在,而依赖的存在既不能自我生成,也不能自我维持。对话者可能否认这一陈述,声称存在一个只由依赖之物构成、而这些依赖之物能够持续存在、生成或自我维持的世界。作出这样的主张,对话者实际上就等于肯定这些存在者整体是独立的,这事实上意味着他已经投降。若对话者同意上述命题,则无需再作进一步论证。遗憾的是,对于对话者而言,依赖与独立的二分是穷尽的,这意味着不可能提出第三种选项。若已作出最初的投降,随后的组合论证便可以针对对话者展开。

This chapter will deal with the most common objections to the various articulations of the cosmological and ontological arguments that have been formulated. Some of them are not directly relevant to my proofs and arguments mentioned in the previous chapter, nevertheless I will actively demonstrate why this is the case. Other objections are more relevant to my formulation of the argument, however, and will thus be dealt with more systematically. In addition to outlining these objections, I will outline how they should be dealt with technically and rhetorically by those contending with them in pastoral and apologetic contexts, as delivery can sometimes be of greater importance than content. First, affirming or denying the initial proposition made in the previous chapter ultimately leads to capitulation: Proposition: There cannot be a world with only dependent thing(s) without reference to an independent thing, as a dependent thing(s) cannot continue existing on their own. Existence is only explicable with reference to an independent existence. This is because impossible existences do not exist by logical necessity, and dependent existences cannot self-generate and/or self-maintain. The interlocutor may deny this statement, claiming that there can be a world with only dependent things that can continue to exist, generate, or maintain themselves. With such a claim, the interlocutor will effectively be affirming that such existences collectively are independent, which effectively means that they have in fact capitulated. If the interlocutor agrees with the proposition above, then no further argument is necessary. Unfortunately, for the interlocutor the dependent/independent dichotomy is exhaustive, which means a third option cannot be produced. If the initial capitulation is made, subsequent arguments of composition will then be levelled at the interlocutor.

由于组合谬误意味着从部分到整体做出了错误的概括,因此我们首先有必要梳理mereology(部分-整体学)研究中“部分”的不同类型。部分可以是“附着的”或“分离的”、“认知上或功能上突出的”、“任意划分的”、“自连通的”、“同质的”、“人为拼凑的”、“物质的”或“非物质的”、“有广延的”或“无广延的”,以及“空间的”或“时间的”。 [90] 我在使用“部分”一词时,遵循英语中“piece”一词的通常用法,该用法专门涉及“附着”与“分离”两类部分关系。在他与科普尔斯顿(Copleston)的著名辩论中,伯特兰·罗素(Bertrand Russell)曾有一句名言:“每一个存在的人都有一位母亲,而在我看来,你的论证是:因此人类整体必定有一位母亲。” [91] 将这一推理应用于Kalām宇宙论论证,就会得出类似这样的陈述:“我们在宇宙中看到原因,所以宇宙必定有一个原因。”这好比说,因为鲸鱼的各个部分很小,所以鲸鱼整体也一定很小。当然,情况未必如此,因为部分与整体的区分不必是截然不同的。项链中的每一颗珍珠可能都是白色的,整条项链也可能是白色的。要断言(确定地)某人犯了“组合谬误”(或断言他没有犯),就必须完全了解某一对象的部分与整体,以分析部分与整体之间的对应是否截然不同。这一直是回应此类主张的标准做法。然而,针对前一章中提出的论证,我们还可以采用其他更为有效的方法。

Since the fallacy of composition suggests that a false generalisation has been made from part to whole, it is perhaps important for us to start by outlining different types of ‘parts’ in the study of mereology. Parts may be ‘attached’, ‘detached’, ‘cognitively or functionally salient’, ‘arbitrarily demarcated’, ‘self-connected’, ‘homogenous’, ‘gerrymandered’, ‘material’, ‘immaterial’, ‘extended’ or ‘un-extended’, or ‘spatial’ or ‘temporal’.90 When I use the term ‘part’ I do so in compliance with the common usage of the term ‘piece’ in the English language, which specifically deals with ‘attached’ and ‘detached’ categories of parthood. In his famous debate with Copleston, Bertrand Russell famously stated that ‘every man who exists has a mother, and it seems to me your argument is that therefore the human race must have a mother’.91 Applying this reasoning to the Kalām cosmological argument, this would translate to a statement like, ‘We see causes in the universe, so there must be a cause of the universe.’ This is analogous to stating that since the parts of a whale are small, the whale itself must be small. Naturally, this is not necessarily the case, as the part/whole distinction does not need to be disparate. Both the individual pearls in the pearl necklace may be white, as well as the entire necklace. To claim (with certainty) that one is committing a ‘fallacy of composition’ (or that one is not), one must have complete knowledge of both the parts and whole of an object to analyse whether the correspondence between the parts and the whole is disparate or not. This has been the standard way of responding to this kind of contention. However, there are other more effective methods regarding the arguments made in the previous chapter that we can employ instead.

如前所述，依赖性的论证既可以从本体论上（基于先验的数学理由）提出，也可以从宇宙论上提出。认为由部分构成的事物依赖于这些部分而存在，这并非从部分到整体的推广，而是对整体的一个直接定义性主张。有部分构成的整体就是其各部分之和，而且如果没有这些部分，整体就不会是现在的样子。如果一条古驰珍珠项链由10颗珍珠组成，而我用塑料珍珠替换其中3颗，它就不再是古驰珍珠项链，而只是对它的仿制品。如果我把兰博基尼Murcielago的轮子和发动机换成别的，我就无权再称这辆车为兰博基尼Murcielago。当然，在日常例子中，人们可以谈论社会上可接受的增减，例如我拆掉兰博基尼上的一颗螺栓，它仍然保持兰博基尼的身份。但从严格的物质层面看，如果不重新定义兰博基尼是什么，就不可能断言它仍是原来那辆车。因此，我们对这辆车的定义取决于我们对使它成为它自身之所以然的理解。 将这一思路应用于宇宙：如果我们假设宇宙在膨胀，那么每过一秒，我们面对的都是一种新的宇宙。即便我们假设宇宙是永恒的或静止的，并设想从中逐一移除宇宙的所有组成部分，直至宇宙不复存在，那么我们便已证明宇宙是偶然的、依赖性的。如果我能毁坏你的手机，或使其状态变化到无法与之前区分的程度，那么我便证明了你的手机并非必然存在。有人可能会问：如果情况确实如此，而人是由其身体各部分构成的，那么假设他所有的身体细胞都被替换，我们谈论的是否就成了另一个人了？ 在严格的唯物主义立场上，答案是肯定的；实际上，只有宗教和哲学的论述才鼓励人们以非物质的灵魂来定义人类。

布尔汉论证表明，无限回溯并非必然存在。它不是通过论证无限在数学上或实际上不可能来做到这一点，而是通过组合（tarkīb）来实现。即便假定无限多重宇宙的有效性，这也完全不影响该论证，因为多重宇宙a）依赖于其各个组成部分，b）能够在抽象中以另一种方式被构想。因此，这一反驳虽然与某些形式的宇宙论论证相关，但与布尔汉毫无干系。

The Burhān argument shows how an infinite regress is not a necessary existence. It does so by not arguing that infinity is mathematically or actually impossible, but through composition (tarkīb) instead. Even if one assumed the validity of an infinite multiverse, it would not affect the argument at all, since a multiverse is a) dependent on its pieces, and b) able to be conceived of in another way in abstraction. Therefore, this objection, though relevant to some forms of the cosmological argument, has no bearing at all to the Burhān.

罗素可能就像在说“宇宙就是宇宙”或“宇宙存在”。这让我想起我责备三岁的女儿、问她为什么做错事的情形。在这种时候，她只会回答“因为”，却毫无解释。这使人不禁要问：为什么罗素不把同样的推理用于存在中的其他事物，反而把宇宙单独当作特殊的存在？理查德·斯温伯恩（Richard Swinburne）对这一推理路线作了令人相当满意的驳斥，他指出：“这一反驳未能在宇宙与其他事物之间作出任何关键的区分；因此，它未能在一开始就阻止对宇宙是否有其自身之外的起源这一问题进行理性探究。”92

Bertrand Russell may as well have said ‘the universe is the universe’ or ‘the universe exists’. It reminds me of when I reprimand my three-year old daughter and ask her why she has misbehaved. In such cases, she simply replies ‘because’, while offering no explanation whatsoever. This causes one to wonder why Russell does not apply the same reasoning to other things in existence, instead of simply peculiarising the universe in this way. Richard Swinburne (in a more than satisfactory refutation of this line of reasoning) states: The objection fails to make any crucial distinction between the universe and other objects; and so it fails in its attempt to prevent at the outset a rational inquiry into the issue of whether the universe has some origin outside itself.92

因果关系的通俗词典定义是：产生某种结果的事物。更正式的定义如下：“当且仅当C与E都是实际存在的，并且在其他条件相同的情况下，C对E而言是充分的，则C是E的原因。”93 原因不一定是单向的，也不必然受时间约束；只有某些关于因果关系的构想是这样的。约翰·麦基（John Mackie）把这种特定类型的因果性称为“因果优先性”。94 关于方向性问题，约翰·麦基指出：“可以设想存在反向因果的证据，即A在因果上先于P，而P在时间上先于A。”95 这些关于逆向因果的构想需要额外的证据。正如卡尔·波普尔（Karl Popper）所说：“如果一块石头掉进水池，石头的落入将解释向外扩散的圆形波纹。这就要求大量遥远的、相干的波源——而要使其相干性可以得到解释，就必须表明它们是从同一个中心发挥作用的。”96 这一命题是否成立（或是否不成立），取决于人们对时间方向的理解。威廉·克雷格（William Craig）花费了大量论证精力来反驳静态时间理论。由于前一章中关于因果关系的论证并不包含时间要素，因此逆向因果的问题与此处所阐述的分析无关。还必须记住，任何基于因果的反驳只与前一章提到的五个证明中的最后一个相关，因为前四个并不依赖因果关系。尽管因果怀疑论（甚至因果虚无论）并不对我们的论证构成威胁，但人们也必须指出，如果在没有合理的形而上学替代方案的情况下认真对待这一反驳，将会产生怎样的影响。因为那样一来，人们就必须严肃质疑科学方法本身，因为“这类知识在科学中不可或缺，这一点几乎无可否认”。 第97条 与规律性一样，因果性是科学所预设的，而非科学所能发现的。从牧养的角度来看，若与无神论者讨论这一问题，对方很可能相信达尔文式的进化论。进化论等科学理论需要因果性作为前提，因此，一个坚信进化论的无神论者不可能是因果怀疑论者。

A vernacular dictionary definition of causation is something which produces an effect. A more formal definition runs as follows: ‘C is a cause of E if, and only if, C and E are actual and C, cetereis paribus, is sufficient for E’.93 A cause does not need to be one directional, or indeed bound by time at all; only some conceptions of causation are envisioned like this. John Mackie refers to this specific type of causality as ‘causal priority’.94 On the issue of directionality, John Mackie states that ‘it is conceivable that there should be evidence for backwards causation, with A being causally prior to P and P temporally prior to A’.95 These conceptions of retro causality require additional evidence. As Karl Popper states, ‘If a stone dropped into a pool, the entry of the stone will explain the expanding circular waves. This would demand a vast number of distant coherent generators of waves – the coherence of which, to be explicable, would have to be shown as operating from one centre’.96The possibility of this proposition (or the lack thereof) depends on one’s conception of the direction of time. William Craig dedicates much of his argumentative effort into arguing against a static theory of time. Since the arguments presented in the previous chapter relating to causation did not have a time element, the issues of backward causation are irrelevant for the analysis articulated here. It must be also remembered that any cause based objection will only be relevant to the last of the five proofs mentioned in the previous chapter, as the first four do not rely on causation. Though causal scepticism (or even causal nihilism) does not pose a threat to our arguments, one must also highlight the implications of taking this objection seriously without a reasonable metaphysical substitute. For one then must call into serious question the scientific method itself, as it ‘can hardly be denied that such knowledge is indispensable in science’.97 Like regularity, causality is presupposed by science, not discoverable by it. Pastorally, if one is discussing the issue with an atheist, it is likely that they believe in Darwinian evolution. Scientific theories like evolution require causality, and so an atheist who is committed to evolutionary theory cannot be a causal sceptic.

"无物可以被定义为某物的缺失。新无神论者劳伦斯·克劳斯（Lawrence Krauss）写过一本题为《从无到有的宇宙》（A Universe from Nothing）的书。在这部著作中，他把“无”（nothing）与“空空间”（empty space）当作可以互换的术语来使用。在书中一段重要的论述里，他写道："

Nothing can be defined as the absence of something. New Atheist Lawrence Krauss wrote a book entitled A Universe from Nothing. In this work, he uses the term ‘nothing’ as interchangeable with ‘empty space’. In an important passage of his work, he states:

总结来说,对宇宙呈平坦性以及今天局部牛顿引力能本质上为零的观测,强有力地表明我们的宇宙是通过暴胀过程产生的:在这一过程中,空虚空间(虚无)的能量转化为某种存在的能量,而这段时间里宇宙被不断推向在所有可观测尺度上本质上几乎完全平坦的状态。98

To summarize then: the observation that the universe is flat and that the local Newtonian gravitational energy is essentially zero today strongly suggests that our universe arose through a process of inflation, a process whereby the energy of empty space (nothing) gets converted into energy of something, during a time when the universe is driven closer and closer to being essentially exactly flat on all observable scales.98

在接下来的页面中,克劳斯实际上否定了他自己先前的评论,他写道:虽然暴胀说明了充满能量的空空间如何能够有效地产生我们所见的一切,以及一个难以置信地庞大且平坦的宇宙,但如果说驱动暴胀的、充满能量的空空间真的什么都不是,那就未免有失诚实了。在这一图景中,人们必须假定空间存在并且能够储存能量……因此,如果我们止步于此,人们或许有理由宣称,现代科学距离真正解答如何从无中生有,还有很长的路要走。然而,这只是第一步。随着我们拓展认识,我们接下来将看到,暴胀可能仅仅是一座宇宙冰山的一角,而这冰山由虚无构成。99

In the following pages, Krauss essentially refutes his own earlier comment by stating: While inflation demonstrates how empty space endowed with energy can effectively create everything we see, along with an unbelievably large and flat universe, it would be disingenuous to suggest that empty space endowed with energy, which drives inflation, is really nothing. In this picture, one must assume that space exists and can store energy…so if we stop here, one might be justified in claiming that modern science is a long way from really addressing how to get something from nothing. This is just the first step, however. As we expand our understanding, we will next see that inflation can represent simply the tip of a cosmic iceberg of nothingness.99

这一论断本身实际上是自相矛盾的。在2012年Krauss与Hamza Tzortzis的一场著名辩论中（观看次数超过四百万），Krauss被问及为何将其著作《Nothing is Something》的第九章取名如此。对此，Krauss的回答是："我喜欢朗朗上口的短语，而当我说'无即是有'时，那只是一个章节标题。"100 正如我们所见，最有力的"无"论证都是以模态语言提出的，并且涉及可设想性。这正是David Hume的论点。同样的模态语言，也能够确立"肯定性"或"必然性"高于"不存在"和"否定性"（参见上一章对Gödel本体论论证的讨论）。既然前者在某些可能世界中的存在凌驾于后者的不存在之上，那么可以推知后者的存在已经得到确立。

This assertion is essentially self-refuting. In a famous debate between Krauss and Hamza Tzortzis in 2012 which garnered over four million views, Krauss was asked why he named chapter 9 of his book ‘Nothing is Something’. To this question Krauss responded with the following answer: ‘I like catchy phrases, and when I said nothing is something, it’s a chapter title’.100 As we have seen, the strongest types of ‘nothing’ arguments have been delivered in a modal language and refer to conceivability. This was in fact the argument of David Hume. It is the very same modal language that can establish ‘positivity’ or ‘necessity’ over ‘non-existence’ and ‘negativity’ (refer to the discussion of Gödel’s ontological argument in the previous chapter). Since the existence of the former in some possible worlds overrides the non-existence of the latter, it follows that the existence of the latter is established.

我在本章讨论的反对意见，是我在实践中遇到的最常见的几种。我只列出了前五种，是为了简洁起见，并非因为其他更精妙的论证（或我提出的论点）不存在。话虽如此，根据我的经验，对话者使用这五种反对意见之一（或其中几种的组合）的可能性很高。 关于因果逆转（retro-causality）问题，Richard 可能会借助量子力学，对因果关系的过程与作用提出质疑。他也可能借用祖父悖论来论证：未来的原因可以产生先前的结果。祖父悖论是说，如果一个孙子回到过去杀死了自己的祖父，那么他自己的存在就变得不可能。把这一点应用到宇宙上，Richard 可能会主张宇宙可以导致它自身的产生。人们可以从逻辑上论证，这类事情是不可能的，正如一位母亲生下她自己那样不可能。然而，因果逆转与逆向依赖（retro-contingency）或逆向依存（retro-dependence）并不相同。后两者意味着宇宙永久地依赖于它自身。如果 Richard 提出这一点，人们便会同意宇宙是独立且自足的，而这是一种站不住脚的立场，正如本书所提出的论证所表明的那样。 Betty 可能会表面接受这些论证，并提出存在一个必然存在者。"那神的其他宗教属性呢？"她可能会问，"爱、慈悲与宽恕呢？"对此可以回答说，神的属性细节是通过宗教经典来理解的，神在经典中向世界启示了祂是谁。当然，Betty 需要被说服，相信这些经典是受神启示的，但这已超出本书的范围。从第一人称的主观经验出发与 Betty 交流，或许是有益的。 爱，例如，对大多数人来说是难以解释的，但它从何而来？宗教叙述表明，爱的源头就是必然存在本身。这是因为，一个缺乏某种东西的实体，通常不能使另一个实体拥有它自身所不具备的属性。例如，若有人主张生命可以从无生命中产生，就必须给出解释。

The kind of objections I tackle in this chapter are the most common ones I have encountered in the field. I have mentioned the top-5 for the sake of brevity and conciseness not because other more sophisticated renditions of the Burhan (or arguments I have presented) do not exist. Having said this, based on my experience in the field, the likelihood that an interlocutor will use one of the five objections (or a combination of more than one of them) is high. On the point of retro-causality, Richard may use quantum mechanics to cast aspersions on the process and function of causation. He may argue, using the grandfather paradox for example, that future causes can create prior effects. The grandfather paradox states that if a grandson goes back in time and kills his grandfather, this should make his own existence impossible. Applying this to the universe, Richard may want to argue that the universe may have caused itself. One can argue that this kind of thing is impossible on logical grounds just as in the case of a mother giving birth to herself. Retro-causation, however, is not the same as retro-contingency or retro-dependence. The latter imply a perpetual reliance of the universe on itself. If Richard makes this point, one agrees that the universe is independent and self-sufficient, which is an untenable position as per the arguments presented in this book. Betty may accept the arguments on face value and suggest that there is a necessary existence. ‘What about the other religious attributes of God?’ she may ask. ‘What about love, mercy and forgiveness?’. It could be said that details of the divine attributes are understood through a religious text wherein God has revealed who he is to the world. Of course, Betty needs to be convinced that such text is inspired by God, but this goes beyond the scope of this book. It may be useful to engage Betty experientially, drawing upon her first-person subjective experiences. Love, for example, is inexplicable to most people but from whence did it come? Religious narratives would indicate that the source of love is the necessary existence itself. This is because an entity which is deplete of something cannot usually cause another entity to have a quality that it doesn’t have. An explanation must be given, for example, for someone who wants to suggest that life can emerge from lifelessness.