在本章中，我将批判性地考察哲学宗教领域中一些既有的、以“本体论”方式提出的偶然性论证的文献。我将评估它是否适合用于护教、论辩和牧养的目的。此外，我还将进一步评价宇宙论论证的一些表述形式，以及它们与Burhān的关联，而Burhān本身亦可被视为一种宇宙论论证。通过考察若干论证，我将批判性地评估哪一论证最易陈述且具有超越时代的意义，同时又具有最广的解释范围，并且最不易受到反驳。这四个条件对于这些论证至关重要，尤其是在其用于牧养和护教情境之中时。

In this chapter, I will critically examine some of the pre-existing literature available on the contingency argument made ‘ontologically’ in the field of Philosophy of Religion. I will assess whether it is fit for use in apologetic, polemic, and pastoral purposes. In addition, I will further evaluate some articulations of the cosmological argument and their relevance to the Burhān, which can itself be presented as a cosmological argument. Looking through certain arguments, I will critically assess which of the arguments is most easily stated and timeless, while also having the most explanatory scope and being least susceptible to refutation. These four conditions are of vital importance to the arguments, especially in regard to their use in pastoral and apologetic settings.

在下一章中，我将以"Burhān"（证明）为指导，阐述我自己对这些论证的表述。尽管本章提到的某些论证在上述情境中仍可能有效，但我打算说明这些论证的弱点如何使Burhān在上述条件下成为更好的选择。

In the subsequent chapter, I will present my own rendition of these arguments, while using the Burhān as my guide. Although some of the arguments mentioned in this chapter can still be effective in such settings, I intend to demonstrate how the vulnerabilities of these arguments make the Burhān a better choice considering the conditions mentioned above.

宇宙论论证——尤其是威廉·莱恩·克雷格（William Lane Craig）所提出的卡拉姆论证（Kalām argument）——在当代关于有神论有效性的讨论中占据了核心位置。正如前一章所述，克雷格重申了安萨里（al-Ghazālī）的论证：“凡开始存在的事物都有其原因；宇宙开始存在，因此宇宙有其原因。”65 这一论证引发了大量争议，无论在学术界还是公共辩论圈中皆是如此，这既表明了它的流行程度，也说明了它的有效性。为了使该论证的第二前提得以成立，克雷格提出了一系列为因果性辩护的论证，其中包括静态时间理论、实无限的不可能性，并且提出了反对量子层面上“松弛”（或不存在）因果性的论证。66 例如，在其著作《时间与永恒》（Time and Eternity）中，克雷格就狭义相对论提出了如下论证： 1. 要么爱因斯坦式的相对论解释，要么闵可夫斯基式的时空解释是狭义相对论的正确解释。 2. 如果闵可夫斯基式的时空解释是正确的，那么 3. 静态时间理论是正确的，而爱因斯坦式的相对论解释则不正确。 4. 因此，静态时间理论是正确的。67

Cosmological arguments – most notably the Kalām argument presented by William Lane Craig – have been at the centre of much of the contemporary discourse around the validity of theism. As discussed in the previous chapter, Craig reiterates al Ghazālī’s argument that ‘whatever begins to exist has a cause; the universe began to exist, and therefore the universe has a cause’.65 The fact that the argument has generated much controversy – both within academia and public debate circles – indicates both its popularity and effectiveness. In order for the second premise of the argument to be sustained, Craig has made a series of arguments defending causality, which includes a static theory of time, the impossibility of an actual infinite, as well as posited arguments against quantum notions of a ‘loosened’ (or non-existent) causality.66 For example, in his book Time and Eternity, Craig makes the following argument relating to the special theory of relativity: 1. Either the Einsteinian relativity interpretation or the Minkowskian space-time interpretation of STR is correct. 2. If the Minkowskian space-time interpretation of STR is correct, then 3. a static theory of time is correct and the Einsteinian relativity interpretation of STR is not correct. 4. Therefore, a static theory of time is correct.67

这些论证对有神论的辩护者而言，或许是不必要的负担。原因在于，该论证要证明宇宙有开端，就必须先驳斥现实世界中实无穷的存在。为此，克雷格必须反驳无穷集合的一种合理数学解释（即康托尔式的解释），或者论证这些解释并不适用于现实世界。[68] 如果论证者对数学及其背后的哲学基础不够熟悉，那么更精通这些学科的无神论对话者，便可能援引相反的解释，最终使其论证失效。对于借助科学证明来确立卡拉姆论证第二前提，即宇宙有开端这一普遍观点，情况同样如此。例如，罗伯特·J·斯皮策在《证明上帝存在的新论证》（*New Proofs for the Existence of God*）一书中，用了相当大的篇幅证明大爆炸的发生、热力学第二定律，以及“为何一个反弹宇宙不可能永远反弹”等相关议题。[69] 科学本身的可修正性，以及我们对物理学理解的剧烈变化，不仅要求辩护者对这些领域有扎实的把握，还可能导致这样的结果：今天所呈现的证据，将被未来的发现所推翻。如此一来，这类论证便达不到有神论论证所必需的超越时代的标准。正如我们在介绍该论证的章节中将看到的，与对话者就无穷问题展开争论或许并无必要。对于卡拉姆论证而言，如果只是提出一个基于复合的论证，同样可以避开这一问题，而这一点前文已有讨论。

Employing these kinds of arguments may be an unnecessary encumbrance for advocates of theism. This is because the argument depends on disproving actual infinities in the real world in order to prove the universe has a beginning. To accomplish this, Craig has to argue against a legitimate mathematical interpretation of infinite sets (namely Cantorian interpretations) or alternatively show how they are not applicable in the real world.68 If one is making the argument and is not well-acquainted with mathematics or the philosophy underpinning mathematics, the atheist interlocutor (who may be more educated on these subjects) may cite opposing interpretations and ultimately derail his opponent’s argument. The same thing may be said of relying on scientific proofs in order to prove the second premise of the Kalām argument, or the general idea that the universe has a beginning. For example, in New Proofs for the Existence of God, Robert J. Spitzer dedicates a considerable portion of his book to proving the occurrence of the Big Bang, the second law of thermodynamics, ‘why a bouncing universe cannot have been bouncing forever’, and similar topics.69 The corrigible nature of science and volatile changes that occur in our understanding of physics not only require apologists to have a strong grasp of these fields, but may even lead to the understanding that the evidence presented today will be contradicted by future discoveries. In this way, such arguments do not fulfil the timeless criterion which is necessary for the continued relevance of theistic arguments. As we will see in our section in which the argument is presented, it may be unnecessary to engage with the interlocutor on the point of infinity. The same can be said for the case of the Kalām argument if one simply makes an argument from composition, a matter which has already been discussed.

许多人对伊斯兰教的宇宙论论证(Kalām)所抱有的疑虑,可以借由莱布尼茨的偶然性论证得到克服。这一论证既可以从宇宙论角度提出,也可以从本体论角度提出。莱布尼茨的论证不仅与Burhān相一致,还通过引入一个普遍的“解释原则”对其有所补充,这一原则被称为充足理由律,缩写为PSR。70 普鲁斯将该论证概括为以下几个步骤:“(1) 每一个偶然事实都有其解释。(2) 存在一个包含所有其他事实的偶然事实。(3) 因此,这一事实有其解释。”71 普鲁斯进一步论证,PSR是“不言自明的”,72

Many of the issues that one may have with the Kalām cosmological argument are overcome with Leibniz’s contingency argument, an argument that can be made both cosmologically and ontologically. Leibniz’s argument is not only consistent with the Burhān but contributes to it by introducing a general ‘explanatory principle’ referred to as the principle of sufficient reason, abbreviated as PSR.70 Pruss summarises the argument in the following steps: ‘(1) Every contingent fact has an explanation. (2) There is a contingent fact that includes all other facts. (3) Therefore, there is an explanation of this fact’.71 Pruss goes on to argue that the PSR is ‘self-evident’,72

以下是这段文字的译文: 与排中律在公理逻辑中的地位相比较。与《证明》(Burhān)一样,该论证以某种东西作结,它能解释存在中的其他一切,而自身无需任何解释。这一论证的简洁性使其适用于护教和牧灵的场合。然而,“解释”一词可能显得不太恰当,尤其是在宇宙论的例子中。此外,使用“可能世界”一词(如 S5 模态逻辑体系中所给出的那样)使该论证容易受到攻击,因为它为“模态虚无主义”打开了大门,这种观点在 W. V. 奎因的著作《信念之网》中有著名的阐述。模态虚无主义(以及其他此类模态怀疑论)可以并且已经被相当轻易地驳倒。对模态范畴(或者实际上对逻辑、数学或任何先验真理)的拒斥,会使奎因失去运用这些工具来反驳它们的能力。[73] 尽管如此,为了规避这一反对意见,我打算至少提出一个不涉及因果性或模态的论证版本。

comparing it to the law of the excluded middle in axiomatic logic. As with the Burhān, the argument terminates with something that explains everything else in existence without requiring an explanation itself. The simplicity of this argument makes it fit for use in apologetic and pastoral settings. However, the term ‘explanation’ may seem inappropriate, especially in cosmological examples. Moreover, the use of the term ‘possible worlds’ (as given in the system of S5 Modal logic) confers vulnerability upon the argument, as it opens the doors to ‘modal nihilism,’ the like of which was famously elaborated upon by W. V. Quine in his work The Web of Belief. Modal nihilism (and other such forms of modal scepticisms) can and have been refuted with considerable ease. A rejection of the modal categories (or indeed logic, mathematics, or any a priori truth) disarms Quine of the ability to use such tools in order to repudiate them.73 Nevertheless, in order to sidestep this objection, I intend to produce at least one version of the argument without making reference to either causality or modality.

本体论证明在公共讨论中的影响相对较小，可以说是如此。阿尔文·普兰亭加本人采用了一种"胜利式"的模态本体论证明，他指出：

Ontological arguments for the existence of God could be said to have had a relatively less impact on public discourse. Alvin Plantinga, who himself employs a ‘victorious’ modal ontological argument, states:

我们对这些重新表述的圣安瑟伦论证所作的判断如下:它们或许不能说是证明或确立了其结论。但是,由于接受其核心前提是合乎理性的,它们确实表明,接受该结论也是合乎理性的。74

Our verdict on these reformulated versions of St. Anselm’s argument must be as follows. They cannot, perhaps, be said to prove or establish their conclusion. But since it is rational to accept their central premise, they do show that it is rational to accept that conclusion.74

使用模态逻辑，普兰丁加（Plantinga）试图重新表述由坎特伯雷的安瑟伦（Anselm of Canterbury）首次著名阐述的"最大完满存在者"本体论证明。安瑟伦的论证大致如下：

Using modal logic, Plantinga attempts to reformulate the ontological argument of a ‘maximally perfect being’, which was first famously elaborated by Anselm of Canterbury. Anselm’s argument runs as follows:

(1) 真主只存在于理解的范畴之中，而不存在于现实之中。

(1) God exists in the realm of understanding but not in reality.

(2) 实际存在的事物，比仅仅存在于心中的事物更为伟大。

(2) Existence in reality is greater than existence in the mind alone.

(3) 真主的存在在现实中是可以想象的。

(3) God’s existence in reality is conceivable.

(4) 如果真主确实存在于现实之中，那么他就会比(1)和(2)中所描述的更加伟大。

(4) If God did exist in reality, then he would be greater than he is in (1) and (2).

（5）可以设想存在一个比（3）和（4）中所述的上帝更伟大的存在。

(5) It is conceivable that there be a being greater than God is in (3) and (4).

(6) 根据“上帝”的定义，可以设想存在一个比任何更伟大者都无法设想的存在者更伟大的存在者。(7) 认为可以设想存在一个比任何更伟大者都无法设想的存在者更伟大的存在者，这是错误的。

(6) It is conceivable that there is a being greater than the being about which nothing greater can be conceived (5), by the definition of ‘God’. (7) It is false that it is conceivable that there is a being greater than the being about which nothing greater can be conceived.

由于(6)与(7)相互矛盾,我们可以得出结论:(8)"上帝存在于理解之中,却不存在于现实之中"这一说法是错误的。

Since (6) and (7) contradict each other, we may conclude that (8) It is false that God exists in the understanding but not in reality.

这一点说过之后，库尔特·哥德尔的本体论证明解决了这里的许多问题。哥德尔的论证依赖两条公理：第一条规定，如果一个性质是正面的，那么非A（∼A）就不是正面的。第二条是，如果A是正面的，且A蕴含B，那么B也是正面的。83 哥德尔所说的“正面”（positive）究竟是什么意思，一直是学术界争论的主题。一些学者倾向于从“道德/审美”的意义上解释正面性，并以此批判该论证，尽管他们也承认，这一概念可能仅仅意味着“属性归属”。这种解释使得古斯塔夫森（他在S5系统中引用了上述两条公理）断言：“具有神性似乎是正面的，而具有魔性似乎是负面的。”85 但是，如果像拉斯穆森和普鲁斯所主张的那样，假定“必然存在”是正面的，并且“可能引起某事”是可能的，那么本体论证明就完全可以成立。拉斯穆森和普鲁斯以归谬法的形式对该论证作了如下阐述：

Having said this, Kurt Gödel’s ontological proof resolves many of the issues here. Gödel’s argument depends on two axioms: the first, stipulating that if a property is positive, then not a (∼ A) is not positive. The second is that if A is positive, and A entails B, then B is positive.83 What Godel means by ‘positive’ has been a subject of scholarly contention, with some84 preferring to critique the argument by interpreting positivity in the ‘moral/aesthetic’ sense, despite admitting that it may simply mean ‘attribution’. Such an interpretation leads Gustafsson (who references the two axioms stated above in S5) to state that ‘being God-like seems positive and being Devil-like seems negative’.85 But if one assumes – as Rasmussen and Pruss contend – that ‘existing necessarily’ is positive and possibly causing something is possible, then the ontological argument is certainly sustainable. Rasmussen and Pruss make the argument in a reductio format in the following way:

为了证明这一点，我们进行归谬法：假设 A & B 是不可能的。那么没有任何事物能同时具有 A 和 B，因此必然地，凡具有 A 的事物都不具有 B。于是，A 蕴含 ∼ B。由于 A 是积极的，根据 (2)，∼ B 是积极的。再根据 (1)，B 不能是积极的——这就产生了矛盾。由 (3)、(4) 和 (5) 可知，N & C 是可能被例示的。86.

To see this, for a reductio suppose A & B is impossible. Then nothing can have both A and B, and so necessarily anything that has A lacks B. Thus, A entails ∼ B. Hence ∼ B is positive by (2) since A is positive. By (1), B cannot be positive – and we have a contradiction. It follows from (3), (4), and (5) that N & C is possibly instantiated.86.

(2) mentioned above is, in effect, the assumption of modus ponens; (1) is Gödel's assumption that if A is positive, then not-A is not positive. (3) is the assumption that existing necessarily is positive, and (4) assumes that possibly causing something is positive. Although Gödel's argument is definitely valid in modal logic, assumptions such as those articulated by Pruss and Rasmussen are almost certainly open to attack. Furthermore, when delivered in this form, the argument is virtually inaccessible to lay audiences. That Kurt Gödel even attempted such an argument, and succeeded in securing its validity, is in itself worthy of mention, as it dispels the common New Atheist notion of irrational or unprovable faith. Yet using such a long-winded argument, one that requires prior knowledge of modal logic, is not practical in pastoral or mainstream apologetic settings.

如果了解理查德,你会发现他可能会反对这样一种观点:宇宙需要任何形式的解释。他可能会认为,追问"宇宙的解释是什么?"是一个多余的问题。然而,我们知道,理查德在存在的其他任何事物上都不会运用这种逻辑。如果他生活中发生了任何影响到自己的事情,他都会要求某种解释。向理查德指出这一点很重要,因为理查德在日常生活中遵循一套标准,而在处理生命的终极问题时却采用另一套标准。

Knowing Richard, he may reject the idea that the universe requires any sort of explanation at all. He may suggest that asking ‘what is the explanation for the universe?’ is an unnecessary question. We know however, that Richard doesn’t apply this kind of logic to anything else in existence. If anything happens to Richard in his life which impacts it, he will demand some kind of an explanation. It is important to outline this to Richard, as Richard has one set of criteria in day-to-day living, but another set when dealing with the ultimate questions of life.