Bayan ƙarshen mulkin Musulunci a shekara ta 1924, an samar da jihohin Musulmi da yawa na wucin gadi waɗanda suka dogara da kishin ƙasa a matsayin tushen wanzuwarsu. Sai dai waɗannan jihohi sun yi nesa da 'yancin kai da masu kafa su suka yi yaƙi dominsa a kan Daular Usmaniyya (Khilafah ta Usmaniyya). Lallai, alkawuran 'yancin kai da Yammacin Duniya suka yi ƙarya ne tsantsa, kuma a zahiri tarko ne mai muni da Musulmi suka faɗa cikinsa. Manufar gaskiya ta Yammacin Duniya ita ce mulkin mallaka na al'adu a kan duniyar Musulmi, amma sa'ad da Daular Musulunci ta kusanci farcensu, sun gamsu da wani abu ba komai ba face mamayar zahiri ta ƙasar Musulmi. Wannan kuwa sun tabbatar da shi a Mataki na 22 na Ƙungiyar Al'umma (League of Nations) bayan Yaƙin Duniya na Ɗaya, cewa: "Wasu al'ummomi da suka taɓa kasancewa cikin Daular Turkiyya sun kai matakin ci gaba inda za a iya amincewa da wanzuwarsu a matsayin al'ummomi masu zaman kansu na ɗan lokaci, bisa sharaɗin cewa wata hukuma mai ba da amana za ta ba su shawara da taimakon gudanarwa, har sai sun iya tsayuwa da kansu."11

The end of Islamic rule in 1924 created many artificial Muslim states that used nationalism as the basis for their existence. However, these states were far from the ‘independence’ that their creators fought for against the ‘Uthmani Khilafah. Indeed, the promises of independence by the West were outright lies and in reality, it was a vicious trap that the Muslim fell in. The real intent of the West was to colonise the Muslim world culturally, but when the Islamic State came within the reach of their claws, they settled for nothing less than the physical invasion of Muslim Land. This they enshrined in Article 22 of the League of Nations after the 1st World War, “Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of their development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory, until such time as they are able to stand alone.”11

Ba shakka, dole ne sababbin ƙasashen nationalistic da aka kafa su karɓi "shawarar gudanarwa", wadda bisa ga Birtaniya da Faransa ba ta wuce mamayewa ba. Birtaniya ta karɓi Iraƙi, Falasɗinu da Transjordan, yayin da Faransa ta karɓi Siriya da Lebanon. Duk abin da ya rage daga "ƙasar Larabawa mai cin gashin kanta" ta Sharif Hussain, wadda aka sani da Masarautar Hijaz, shi ne aka haɗa shi cikin abin da yanzu ake kira Saudi Arabia a shekarar 1925.

Naturally, the ‘administrative advice’ had to be taken by the newly formed nationalistic states, which according to Britain and France meant nothing short of invasion. Britain took over Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, while France took Syria and Lebanon. All that was left of Sharif Hussain’s ‘independent Arab state’, known as the Kingdom of Hijaz, was absorbed into what is now Saudi Arabia in 1925.

Saboda haka, a bayyane yake cewa duk da kafa jihohi masu kishin ƙasa da yawa a cikin duniyar Musulunci, Musulmi har yanzu suna baya fiye da sauran duniya. Ko da yake ƙasashen Musulmi ba mulkin mallaka ne na Yamma ba, koma baya da muka sha yana da tsanani har ya mai da mu bayi na tattalin arziki ga Yamma, wanda hakan ya fi muni. Tun daga wancan lokaci an yi ƙoƙari don farfado da Musulmi, amma babu wanda ya yi nasara.

It can be seen, therefore, that despite the creation of many nationalistic states in the Muslim world, Muslims still lag behind rest of world. Although Muslim countries are no loner colonies of the West, the stagnation that we have suffered is so severe that we have literally become economic slaves to the West, which is far worse. Attempts have been made since then to revive the Muslims but none of them have succeeded.

Kishin kishin ƙasa ya bar hanyar gazawa a duniyar Musulmi. Ga wasu misalai na yunkurin farfado da Musulmai bisa kishin ƙasa da suka gaza, an gabatar da su a ƙasa.

Nationalism has left a trail of failure in the Muslim world. Some examples of failed attempts to revive the Muslims based on nationalism are presented below.

Misira Gamal Abdul Nasser na Misira misali ne na wannan gazawa. Nasser ya hau mulki a shekarar 1954, ya fara yada hangen nesansa game da Misira. A cikin littafinsa The Philosophy of Revolution, ya bayyana manyan ayyuka uku na Misira: zama shugaban duniyar Larabawa, duniyar Musulunci, da kasashen Afirka baki masu gwagwarmayar neman 'yanci.

Egypt Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt is a classical example of such failure. Nasser came to power in 1954 and began to propagate his vision for Egypt. In his book The Philosophy of Revolution he outlines the three main roles of Egypt as the leader of the Arab world, the Muslim world and of the black African nations struggling for independence.

Burin Nasser na haɗa kan Larabawa ya dogara ne da farko ga kishin kishin Larabawa. Ya yi tunanin cewa Larabawa za su haɗu kawai saboda suna da harshe, suturar jiki da tarihi ɗaya. Duk da haka, Nasser ya samu ya tada kishin kishin Larabawa zuwa matakin da ba a taɓa gani ba. Kwace Canal na Suez a shekarar 1956 da haɗewar Masar da Siriya a shekarar 1958 domin kafa Jamhuriyyar Larabawa ta Hadaddiya, wanda ya haɗa ƙasashe biyu mafi muhimmanci a dabarun yaƙi a Gabas ta Tsakiya, ya ƙara ɗaga kiransa na 'Larabci'.

Nasser’s hope of uniting the Arabs primarily hinged around Arab nationalism. He imagined that the Arabs would unite simply because they had a common language, dress and history. However, Nasser did manage to arouse Arab nationalism to the extent never seen before. The nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956 and the merger between Egypt and Syria in 1958 to create the United Arab Republic, bringing together two of the most strategic countries in the Middle East, further boosted his call of ‘Arabism’.

Amma kiran da ake yi na 'Larabawa' ya kasance tare da manufofin tattalin arziki na gurguzu marasa tunani waɗanda suka durkusar da ƙasar. Haka kuma, kamar yadda Ummah ta koya daga baya, Nasser bai wuce ɗan amshin shata ba a cikin gwagwarmayar da ake yi tsakanin Birtaniya da Amurka a Gabas ta Tsakiya.

The call for ‘Arabism’, however, was also accompanied by reckless socialist economic policies that crippled the country. Also, as the Ummah learnt later, Nasser was nothing more than a pawn in the struggle between Britain and America in the Middle East.

Duk da cewa an ga Nasser yana samun goyon bayan Tarayyar Soviet a fili, a zahiri shi wakili ne na Amurka12.

Although Nasser was seen to be publicly backed by the former Soviet Union, in reality he was an agent of America12.

Rushewar Hadaddiyar Larabawa (United Arab Republic) a shekarar 1961, da nasarar Isra'ila a shekarar 1967

The breakup of the United Arab Republic in 1961, and the triumph of Israel in the 1967

yaƙin 1967, lokacin da ya kwace Sinai daga Masar, da tsaunukan Golan daga Siriya, da Gabar Yamma daga Jordan, ya kawo ƙarshen "Larabci-kishin-ƙasa" na Nasser. Wannan babban gwaji na kishin ƙasa ya gaza, kuma har yau duniyar Larabawa tana rabe zuwa ƙasashe da yawa.

war, when it captured Sinai from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria and the West Bank from Jordan, put an end to Nasser’s ‘Arabism’. This great nationalistic experiment had failed and to this day the Arab world is still divided into many states.

Turkiyya Turkiyya, wadda ita ce cibiyar Khalifancin 'Uthmaniyya, na daga cikin kasashen da kishin kasa ya shafa sosai. Hangen nesa na Mustapha Kamal na gina al'umma bisa kishin kasa ya tabbata, amma bai ci gaba ta kowace hanya mai muhimmanci ba. Manufofin kishin kasa na Jam'iyyar Jama'ar Jamhuriyya ta Kamal a baya, ko na Jam'iyyar Uwar Kasa mai akidar boye addini da kuma Jam'iyyar Dimokuradiyya ta Gurguzu da ke yanzu, ba za su taba mayar da Turkiyya ga daukakarta ta da ba. Maimakon haka, Turkiyya tana kara zamewa zuwa rikicin cikin gida yayin da kishin kasar Kurdawa ke kara tushe.

Turkey Turkey, being the seat of the ‘Uthmani Khilafah, is one of the countries that was deeply affected by nationalism. The vision of Mustapha Kamal to forge a nation based on nationalism did materialise but it failed to progress in any substantial way. Neither the nationalistic policies of Kamal’s Republican People’s Party in the past, nor those of the secular Motherland Party or the Socialist Democratic Populist Party now, are ever going to return Turkey to its former glory. Instead, Turkey is gradually slipping towards civil strife as Kurdish nationalism takes root.

Ƙoƙarin farfado da ƙasar da Kamal ya yi bisa kishin ƙasar Turkiyya ya bar Turkiyya cikin sanyi.

Kamal’s attempted revival based on Turkish nationalism has left Turkey in the cold.

Yankin da aka taɓa girmamawa a matsayin babban birnin ƙasa mafi jagoranci a duniya, Daular Musulunci, yanzu ya zama ƙasa mai ciwo, da aka bari babu inda za ta, ba a karɓe ta ba, ba ta Turawan Yamma ba, ba kuma ta Gabas ta Tsakiya. Kishin ƙasa bai kawo wa Turkiyya kome ba sai wulakanci, duk da haka gwamnatin Turkiyya tana ci gaba da riƙe kishin ƙasar Turkiyya.

The area which was once honoured as the capital of the leading state of the world, the Islamic State, has now become the diseased state, left for nowhere; it is not accepted by the Europeans nor by the Middle East. Nationalism has brought nothing but humiliation for Turkey, yet despite this, the Turkish government still persists with Turkish nationalism.

Saudiyya da ƙasashen Gulf Saudiyya da ƙasashen daban-daban na Gulf suna nuna wani misali na al'ada na kishin ƙasa wanda Yammacin duniya, musamman Birtaniya, ta renon su. Manyan kabilu daga waɗannan yankuna an tara su don yaƙar Khilafar 'Uthmaniyya ta hanyar yarjejeniyoyin kuɗi da alkawuran kafa ƙasashe masu zaman kansu.

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States Saudi Arabia and the various states in the Gulf reflect a classical case of nationalism that was nurtured by the West, especially Britain. The powerful tribes were mobilised from these areas against the ‘Uthmani Khilafah through financial deals and promises of independent states.

Da farko Birtaniya ta yi amfani da Sharif Hussain da 'ya'yansa Faisal da 'Adbullah wajen tayar da boren kan Khilafah. Wadannan tawaye sun samu kwarin gwiwa ne ta hannun shahararren wakilin Birtaniya T. E. Lawrence, wanda ya yi kokarin hargitsa rundunonin Daular Musulunci da katse hanyoyin sadarwarsu a gefen dama na rundunar Janar Allenby, wacce ta taso daga Masar a shekarar 1917. Sai dai daga baya, da Sharif ya fadi a idon Birtaniya, sai suka maye gurbinsa da 'Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud, wanda shi ma Birtaniya ke ba da kudi a gwagwarmayarsa ta samun iko.

The British first used Sharif Hussain and his sons Faisal and ‘Adbullah to revolt against the Khilafah. These revolts were instigated through the assistance of the famous British agent T. E. Lawrence13, who was trying to harass the Islamic State’s forces and disrupt their communications on the right flank of General Allenby’s army advancing from Egypt during 1917. However, when Sharif later fell out of favour with the British, they replaced him with ‘Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud, who was also being financed by the British in his struggle to gain control.

Zuwa ƙarshen shekarar 1927, dangin Al Sa'ud sun samu damar mallakar mafi yawan yankin tsibirin Larabawa, kuma a cikin wannan shekarar aka sanya hannu kan yarjejeniya da Birtaniya, wadda ta ba dangin cikakken iko a madadin amincewar Al Sa'ud da ikon mulkin Birtaniya a kan sarakunan Gulf na Qatar, Bahrain, Hadaddiyar Daular Larabawa da Oman. A shekarar 1932, aka sanya wa tsibirin Larabawa suna Masarautar Saudiyya.

By the end of 1927, the Saud family had managed to secure control of most of the Arabian peninsular, and in the same year, a treaty was signed with the British who gave the family complete authority in return for the Saud’s recognition of British suzerainty over the Gulf Sheikhdoms of Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates and Oman. In 1932, Arabian peninsular was named Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Tun daga wannan lokaci gidan Sa'ud ya ci gaba da riƙe iko mai ƙarfi a yankin, yana kafa mulkinsa a kan tsarin kabilanci. Dukkan gwamnati tana hannun 'yan gidan Sa'ud, waɗanda yanzu adadinsu ya haura dubu biyar.

Since then the Saud family has kept a very tight control of the area, establishing the authority on a tribalistic structure. The entire government is run by the members of the Saud family, which is currently in excess of five thousand.

Game da Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Daular Larabawa ta Hadaddiyar Daular (UAE) da Oman, Birtaniya ta riga ta kafa wakilanta a matsayin sarakuna tun kafin rushewar Daular Musulunci a 1924. Iyalan Al-Said sun sanya hannu kan yarjejeniya da Birtaniya a 1891, Al-Sabah na Kuwait sun sanya hannu a 1899, iyalan Al-Thani kuma suka bi sahu a 1915, sannan wasu sarakunan yankin Daular Larabawa ta Hadaddiyar Daular suma suka bi irin wannan tsari.

As for Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates and Oman, Britain had installed its agents as rulers even before the demise of the Islamic State in 1924. Al-Said family signed treaties with Britain in 1891, al-Sabah of Kuwait signed in 1899, al-Thani family followed suit in 1915 and various local rulers of United Arab Emirates also followed the same pattern.

Shigar waɗannan iyalai a matsayin masu mulki da Birtaniya ta yi ya mayar da tsibirin Larabawa zuwa zamanin kafin Musulunci, lokacin da kabilu daban-daban ke mulkin yankin. Wannan tsarin mulki bai farfado da Musulmi a wannan yanki ba. Haka kuma, raba yankin bisa layukan kishin ƙasa ya kashe duk wata fata ta ci gaba, domin masu mulki duk sun shagaltu da neman tabbatar da matsayinsu. Duk da cewa tsibirin Larabawa yana samun kuɗi daga man fetur wanda ya zarce ma ƙasashen Yamma, hakan bai haifar da wani irin ci gaba ba.Ban da man fetur, babu wata masana'anta, kuma babu wani shiri na kafa ɗaya. Kuɗin da man fetur ya kawo tun shekarun 1940 an karkatar da su zuwa asusun bankunan Switzerland da kamfanonin zuba jari na ƙasashen Yamma. Kishin ƙasa bai ɗaukaka waɗannan jihohi ba; a maimakon haka, ya sanya su ƙarƙashin ikon kafirai fiye da kowane lokaci a baya.

The installation of these families as rulers by the British returned the Arabian peninsular to the pre-Islamic days when various tribes were ruling the region. This form of governmental structure has not revived the Muslims of this region. Indeed, dividing the area on nationalistic lines has obliterated any hope of progress because the rulers are all too busy trying to secure their positions. Despite the fact that the Arabian peninsular has income from oil that far exceeds even the Western countries has not resulted in any form of progress. Except the oil, there is no industry or any plans to establish one. The money that oil has brought since the 1940’s has been siphoned off to the Swiss banks accounts and Investment Houses of the Western nations. Nationalism has not elevated these states, rather, it has subjected them to the control of the Kuffar more than ever before.

Iran Tashin kishin kishin Iran ya samo asali ne tun karni na 19, a lokacin da harkar mishan ta shiga cikin Daular Musulunci. Tun daga wannan lokaci Iran ta sha fama da tsoma baki, mamayewa da hadin kai na kasashen waje. Duk da haka, lokacin da ya kamata a jaddada shi ne tun bayan barkewar abin da ake kira 'Juyin Juya Halin Musulunci' a shekarar 1979, wanda ya canza dukkan yanayin al'umma.

Iran The rise of Iranian nationalism can be traced back to the 19th Century during the infiltration of the missionary movement in the Islamic State. Since then Iran also had its share of foreign intervention, occupations and collaborations. However, the key period that need to be highlighted is the period since the eruption of the so-called ‘Islamic Revolution’ in 1979, which transformed the entire shape of the society.

"Juyin Juya Halin Musulunci" ya kawar da mulkin sarki na Iran, Shah, ya maye gurbinsa da abin da ake ikirarin cewa tsarin Musulunci ne. Amma idan aka duba Iran sosai, ana ganin har yanzu tana nesa da tsarin da Musulunci ya yi kira zuwa gare shi. Ko da yake jilbab da khimar sun zama ruwan dare, haka kuma gemu da sautin adhani, dokokin da ake aiwatarwa har yanzu suna nuna abubuwan da ba na Musulunci ba. Haka kuma, kundin tsarin mulkin Iran ya tanadi cewa shugaban kasa zai iya zama dan Iran kawai. Wannan a fili yake sabawa Musulunci, domin kabila, kabilanci ko launin fata ba sharadi ba ne ga matsayin shugaban kasa. Don haka juyin juya halin Iran bai kawar da kishin kasa ba, sai dai ya kara karfafa shi.

The ‘Islamic Revolution’ eradicated the Iranian monarchy of the Shah and replace it with what is claimed to an Islamic system. Close examination of Iran shows that it is still very far from the system that Islam calls for. Although jilbab and khimar are common, as well as the beards and the sound of adhan, the laws that are applied still reflect non-Islam. Also, the constitution of Iran stipulates that the head of the state can only be an Iranian. This clearly contradicts Islam because tribe, race or colour are not conditions for the post of the head of the state. So the revolution in Iran has not uprooted nationalism, instead, it has further strengthen it.

Pakistan Pakistan ta samu kafuwa a shekara ta 1947 a matsayin wata kasa ga Musulmai a yankin Indiya.

Pakistan Pakistan was created in 1947 be to an entity for the Muslims in the Indian subcontinent.

Ko da yake hangen nesa da aka bai wa jama'a shi ne cewa Pakistan za ta zama Ƙasar Musulunci, a zahiri an raba Pakistan a matsayin ƙasa mai ƙin addini da kishin ƙasa. A ranar 11 ga Agusta, 1947, majalisar kundin tsarin mulki ta Pakistan ta taru a Karachi a karon farko, kuma Mohammed Ali Jinnah, wanda aka zaɓa ya jagoranci taron, ya ce, "Ina ganin ya kamata mu riƙe manufofinmu a gaban idanunmu, za ku ga cewa a cikin lokaci Hindu za su daina zama Hindu, Musulmi kuma za su daina zama Musulmi, ba a ma'anar addini ba, domin hakan imanin kowane mutum ne, amma a ma'anar siyasa a matsayinsu na 'yan ƙasa..."14

Although the vision given to the masses was that Pakistan would be an Islamic State, in reality, Pakistan was carved-up as a secular nationalistic state. On August 11, 1947, Pakistan’s constituent assembly met in Karachi for the first time and Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who was elected to preside over the meeting, said, “I think we should keep in front of us our ideals and you will find that in the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State...”14

Idan Musulmi ya daina zama Musulmi a fagen siyasa, yana nufin Musulunci ba zai taka wata rawa wajen tafiyar da gwamnati ba, amma zai ci gaba da yin ibadunsa na al'ada, zai zama mutum mai ɗaukar tsarin boko (secular), tun da tsarin boko shi ne raba addini da gwamnati. Saboda haka hangen nesa na Jinnah game da Pakistan shi ne na al'umma mai tsarin boko. Haka kuma, an ƙarfafa Musulmi su haɗu a kan wani taken kishin ƙasa, 'Pakistan Zindabad' (Pakistan ta daɗe), wanda har yau ana jin sa a Pakistan da ma wajenta.

When a Muslim ceases to be a Muslims in the political sense, it means that Islam will not play any part in running the state, but he keeps his rituals of worships, he becomes a secular person since secularism is to divorce the deen from the state. So Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan was that of a secular nation. Furthermore, the Muslims were encouraged to rally behind a nationalistic slogan, ‘Pakistan Zindabad’ (Long live Pakistan), which is heard even to this day in Pakistan and outside.

An samar da Pakistan an yi nufin haɗa kan Musulmi da farfado da su. Duk da haka, wannan gwaji ya kasance da lahani tun daga farko, domin bambance-bambance sun fito tsakanin Gabashin Pakistan da Yammacin Pakistan. Duk da cewa fiye da rabin Musulmin da ke cikin Pakistan haɗaɗɗiya suna magana da harshen Bengali, shugabannin masu mulki a Yammacin Pakistan sun karɓi Urdu a matsayin harshen gwamnati, Urdu kuwa shi ne harshen da ake magana da shi a Yammacin Pakistan. Baya ga wannan, an ɗauki mutanen Bengali a matsayin ƙabila mai daraja ƙasa, saboda haka nauyin mulki ya kasance ne kawai a hannun Yammacin Pakistan. Yawancin ci gaban masana'antu ma an yi shi a ɓangaren Yamma, kuma mutanen Bengali sun ji an ware su sosai. Waɗannan abubuwa, tare da yunƙurin Indiya na lalata haɗin kan Musulmi, sun haifar da gwagwarmayar iko tsakanin Gabashin Pakistan da Yammacin Pakistan. A lokacin da wannan gwagwarmaya ta kai kololuwarta, ta zama gwagwarmayar ƙabilu biyu, wato 'Pakistanawa' da 'Bengalawa'.

The creation of Pakistan was meant to unify and revive the Muslims. However, this experiment was flawed right from the start as differences emerged between East and West Pakistan. Despite the fact that more than half of the Muslims in united Pakistan spoke Bengali, the ruling elites in West Pakistan adopted Urdu as the state language, Urdu being the language spoken in West Pakistan. Added to this was the fact that Bengali people were seen as an inferior race, and responsibility of governance was thus exclusively in the hands of West Pakistan. Most of the industrial development was also carried out in the Western wing and the Bengali people became very alienated. These factors, and the campaign by India to destroy the unity of the Muslims, led to a power struggle between East and West Pakistan. At its zenith, this power struggle became the struggle of two races, namely, the ‘Pakistanis’ and the ‘Bengalis’.

Kishin ƙasa ya kai kololuwarsa a shekarar 1971 lokacin da Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto ya ƙi miƙa mulki bayan Mujibur Rahman, daga Gabashin Pakistan, ya lashe zaɓen gama-gari da ƙaramin rinjaye. Mujibur Rahman ya ci gaba da kafa wata ƙasar Bengali mai suna Bangladesh, ta haka ya kammala lalata Pakistan wadda take haɗe.

Nationalism reached climax in 1971 when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto refused to relinquish power after Mujibur Rahman, from East Pakistan, won the General Elections with a slim majority. Mujibur Rahman went on to create a Bengali state called Bangladesh, thus completing the destruction of united Pakistan.

Raba Pakistan zuwa ƙasashe bisa tsarin kishin ƙasa bai warware wata matsala ga Musulmi ba. Rarrabuwar kai ta sa Musulmi sun raunana ta fannin soja da tattalin arziki, musamman Bangladesh, wacce har yau ke ci gaba da fama da talauci mai yaɗuwa da ke durƙusar da al'umma da cin hanci da rashawa.

Carving-up united Pakistan on nationalistic lines did not solve any problems for the Muslims. Disunity has made the Muslims weak militarily and economically, especially Bangladesh which continues to suffer from wide-spread crippling poverty and corruption even to this day.

A takaice, za mu iya kammala cewa kishin ƙasa bai taɓa aiki ga Musulmi ba. Bai kawo haɗin kai ba, bai kawo ci gaba ba, bai kuma kawo zaman lafiya ba, sai dai ya haifar da rarrabuwar kai, rashin kwanciyar hankali, da dogaro ga ƙasashen waje da ƙungiyoyi irin su Majalisar Ɗinkin Duniya (UN) da Asusun Lamuni na Duniya (IMF).

In summary, we can conclude that nationalism has never worked for the Muslims. It did not provide unity, progress nor harmony but created disunity, instability and dependence on foreign nations and organisations like the UN and the IMF.