Nilipofika kwa mara ya kwanza katika nchi ya taifa kubwa zaidi la kibepari duniani, nilishangazwa na nguvu ya tija ya kibepari nchini Marekani ya Amerika. Nikiwa kijana mdogo, chini ya miaka kumi na sita, niliona matrekta makubwa na mashine za kuvuna zikilima ekari mia kadhaa na kuzalisha tani nyingi za mahindi na nafaka za soya, zote zikiendeshwa na familia moja. Niliona mikono ya mkulima iliyokakamaa kwa ardhi aliyoilima, na iliyolainishwa na fedha ambazo ardhi yake iliziingiza. Sikuona wakati huo mikono isiyoonekana ya mabenki yaliyofadhili uendeshaji wote huo. Sikuweza kuona dalili zozote za kushindwa wakati huo.

When I arrived for the first time to the land of the largest capitalist nation in the world, I was amazed by the power of capitalist productivity in the United States of America. As a young teenager, less than sixteen years old, I saw huge tractors and combines cultivating hundreds of acres and producing tons of corn and soybean grain, all operated by a single family. I saw the hands of a farmer hardened by the land he cultivated and softened by the money his land generated. I did not see then the invisible hands of the banks financing all that operation. I could not see any signs of failure then.

Mwaka mmoja baadaye, hatima yangu ya kielimu ilinipeleka upande mwingine kabisa. Nilifika katika nchi kubwa zaidi ya kisoshalisti duniani ili kutumia miaka sita iliyofuata nikisoma huku nikiangalia ujamaa katika Umoja wa Jamhuri za Kisoshalisti za Kisovieti (USSR). Nakumbuka mara nyingi nilivyolazimika kusimama kwenye foleni ili kununua bidhaa ya chakula, na kisha kukatishwa tamaa saa moja baadaye kwa sababu bidhaa niliyokuwa nikiisubiri haikuwepo tena. Silika yangu ilinambia kwamba mfumo huo haungedumu. Nakumbuka pia kwamba ilinilazimu kununua gazeti la kikomunisti kama sharti la kununua kitabu cha hisabati au sayansi ya kompyuta. Nilihisi kwamba mfumo huo haungedumu kwa muda mrefu.

A year later, my education fate flew me to the other extreme. I arrived at the land of the largest socialist nation in the to spend the next six years studying while observing socialism in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). I recall how often I had to stand in line to buy a grocery product, only to be disappointed an hour later because the item I waited for is no longer available. That system would not last, my instincts told me. I recall having to buy a communist publication as a condition for buying a book of math or computer science. That system would not last for long, I felt it.

Ninakumbuka nilivyolazimika kuruka juu ya watu waliolala wamelewa njiani asubuhi nilipokwenda shuleni na mchana nilipokuwa nikirudi. Ninakumbuka wanafunzi wengi wakihitimu shule za udaktari, sheria na uhandisi bila hata kuhudhuria madarasa; walikuwa wanaharakati wa kisiasa au wanafunzi tajiri wa kigeni. Ninakumbuka watu wakilazimika kufanyiwa upasuaji ili tu kutimiza mgawo wa daktari bingwa katika hospitali fulani. Ninakumbuka kifaa cha zamani cha kusikiliza redio kilichowekwa ukutani kwenye chumba changu cha bweni, ambacho pengine kilikuwa redio ya mawasiliano ya pande mbili. Kila nilipokizima, mafundi wangefika chumbani kwangu kukitengeneza; sikuwahi kuomba huduma hiyo. Nilijua kwamba mfumo huo hautadumu kwa muda mrefu. Hisia zangu, silika yangu na uchambuzi wangu rahisi vilithibitika kuwa kweli miaka kumi tu baada ya kuhitimu na kuondoka Umoja wa Kisovieti. Ujamaa uliporomoka na Umoja wa Kisovieti ukavunjwa kufikia mwaka 1991.

I recall having to step over people lying drunk in my morning journey to school and on my way back. I recall scores of students graduating from medical, law, and engineering schools without even attending classes; they were political activists or rich foreign students. I recall people having to go through surgery only to fulfill the quota plan for the surgeon at a given hospital. I recall the primitive radio monitor fixed on the wall of my dorm room, which must have been a two-way radio. Every time I disabled the radio, technicians would show up at my room to fix it; I never asked for the service. I knew that system could not last for long. My gut feelings, my instincts, and simple analysis turned out to be true only ten years after I graduated and left the Soviet Union. Socialism collapsed and the Soviet Union was dismantled by 1991.

Miaka sita niliyotumia katika Umoja wa Kisovieti ilikuwa uzoefu wa maisha yangu yote. Kwanza kabisa, singeweza kuishi maisha chini ya ujamaa leo hata nikitaka. Muhimu zaidi, nilijifunza kanuni za uchumi, uchumi wa kisiasa, na muundo wa kijamii wa ujamaa na ubepari. Mafundisho ya Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin na Friedrich Engels yalikuwa sehemu muhimu ya mtaala kama masomo ya hesabu, fizikia na uhandisi. Nadharia ya uyakinifu wa kihistoria iliyoanzishwa na Marx na baadaye kuboreshwa na Lenin ilidokeza kwamba ubepari ungetoweka na kutoa nafasi kwa ujamaa. Mtazamo huo ulishindwa kabisa katika ulimwengu halisi wakati ujamaa ulipoanguka kwanza. Nadharia ya Marx ya "thamani ya ziada" ilikuwa sahihi tu kwa maana kwamba chini ya ubepari utajiri huelekea kukusanywa mikononi mwa wachache. Lakini sehemu nyingine ya nadharia hiyo, kwamba tabaka maskini la wafanyakazi na wakulima lingeasi kudai haki zao za umiliki zilizoibiwa, halikuwahi kutokea.

The six years I spent in the Soviet Union gave me an experience of a lifetime. For one thing, I could not experience the life under socialism today even if I wanted to. Most importantly, I learned the principles of economy, political economy, and social structure of both socialism and capitalism. The teachings of Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, and Friedrich Engels were as important part of the curriculum as the subjects of math, physics, and engineering. The theory of historic materialism developed by Marx and later refined by Lenin suggested that capitalism would fade away only to give rise to socialism. That view was dead beaten in real world when socialism fell first. Marx’s theory of the “surplus value” was correct only in the sense that under capitalism the wealth tends to accumulate in the hands of the few. But the other part of the theory that the poorer classes of workers and farmers would revolt for their stolen rights of ownerships never materialized.

Nilipowasili katika nchi ya ubepari kwa mara ya pili, lakini kwa muda mrefu zaidi, niliona yale ambayo nisingeweza kuyaona wakati wa safari yangu ya kwanza nilipokuwa mvulana mdogo. Shamba nilimoishi wakati wa safari yangu ya kwanza halikuwa tena lilivyokuwa. Lilichukuliwa na benki ambayo, miaka michache iliyopita, ilikuwa imefadhili uzalishaji wake, kama malipo ya madeni ambayo familia mwenyeji wangu ilishindwa kuyalipa. Mkulima mchapakazi alipoteza ardhi yake pamoja na kampuni ya mbegu aliyomiliki pamoja na ndugu zake. Mfumo huu haungedumu, silika yangu iliniambia.

When I arrived at the land of capitalism for the second but longer period of time, I observed what I could not have observed during my first trip when I was a young boy. The farm I lived in during my first trip was no longer the same. It was confiscated by the bank which, few years earlier had financed its production, in exchange for the debts which my host family failed to pay. The hardworking farmer lost his land and the seed company he co-owned with his brothers. This system would not last, my instincts told me.

Monster hiyo hiyo, benki, ilimeza kiwanda cha mashine kilichomilikiwa na rafiki yangu mmoja katika jiji la Milwaukee, jimbo la Wisconsin. Ninakumbuka jinsi rafiki yangu alivyosafiri hadi nchi yangu ya asili akitaka kuanzisha kiwanda cha kusaidia kuendeleza viwanda katika nchi inayoendelea. Ninakumbuka jinsi mmiliki (rafiki yangu) alivyokuwa na shauku ya kuwasaidia watu kupata ajira, kuunga mkono elimu, na jinsi alivyochukia sana kuwaondoa watu kazini. Kama ilivyo kwa kila biashara nyingine chini ya ubepari, yake pia ilimilikiwa na benki. Kwa kawaida, biashara katika nchi za kibepari zina madeni kwa benki moja au zaidi. Bado nakumbuka maneno ya mwakilishi wa benki ya uwekezaji kwa mmiliki wa kampuni ndogo ya teknolojia: "Huwezi kuwa katika biashara bila kuwa na deni." Rafiki yangu, mmiliki wa kiwanda cha mashine, alipoteza duka lake la mashine, lile lililokuwa likitengeneza bidhaa halisi hapa hapa katika nchi ya ubepari. Lilikuwa likitengeneza bidhaa na kuzalisha faida pale lilipotaifishwa na benki. Kwa muda, benki zilikuwa zikiifuata bima ya maisha ya rafiki yangu kama dhamana ya mali yao inayodaiwa kupotea! Nilijua wakati ule kwamba mfumo huu haungedumu.

The same monster, the bank, swallowed the machine factory owned by one of my friends in the city of Milwaukee in Wisconsin. I recall how my friend traveled to my home country in attempt to set up a factory to help industrialize a developing country. I recall how the owner (my friend) was enthusiastic about helping people get jobs, supporting education, and how much he detested laying people off their jobs. Just like every other business under capitalism, his was also owned by the bank. Typically, businesses in capitalist countries are indebted to one or more banks. I still recall the words of an investing bank representative to the owner of a small technology company: “You cannot be in businesses without being in debt.” My machine factory owner friend lost his machine shop, the one that produces real products right here in the land of capitalism. It was making products and generating profit when it was confiscated by the bank. The banks for some time were going after the life insurance policy of my friend as a guarantee for their supposedly lost wealth! I knew then that this system would not last.

Wakati wa utumishi wangu katika mojawapo ya kampuni kubwa zaidi duniani (zilizokuwa na wafanyakazi zaidi ya 160,000 wakati huo), nilishuhudia jinsi wahandisi na mafundi wengi bora walivyoongozwa kutoka nje ya jengo chini ya kisingizio cha kupunguzwa kwa kazi. Awamu ya kwanza ya kupunguza kazi, iliyoondoa zaidi ya ajira 50,000, ilifanyika wakati kampuni hiyo ikipata faida na kutengeneza fedha nyingi. Kupunguzwa huko kulikuwa muhimu ili kuongeza bei za hisa za kampuni, ambazo zilipanda kwa kiwango kikubwa.

During my tenure at one of the largest corporations in the world (more than 160,000 employees at the time), I witnessed how scores of the best engineers and technicians were escorted out of the building under the auspices of layoff. The first round of layoffs which eliminated more than fifty thousand jobs was done at a time when the company was profitable and making lots of money. The layoffs were necessary to boost the stock prices of the company which have soared over the roof.

Nakubali kwamba hizi ni hadithi tu, hisia za silika na hisia za utumbo. Basi alama za kushindwa ziko wapi, kama zipo? Baada ya yote, ubepari umepitia mizunguko kadhaa ya mdororo, mgogoro mkubwa, kushuka kwa uchumi, tija ndogo, na kushindwa kwa makampuni huko nyuma. Daima umeibuka ukiwa imara, au hata imara zaidi. Kwa nini wakati huu ni tofauti?

I admit that these are just stories, instincts, and guts feelings. So where are the signs of failure if there are any? After all, capitalism has gone through several rounds of recessions, depressions, downturns, low productivity, and corporate failures in the past. It has always emerged as strong or even stronger. Why is it different this time?

Kama ilivyoelezwa hapo awali, kasoro au hitilafu za msingi si lazima zizalishe makosa. Na makosa si lazima yasababishe kushindwa. Kasoro huzalisha kosa pale tu masharti fulani yanapotokea na kuchochea kasoro hiyo. Ndipo tu kosa linapotokea. Kosa ni upotovu kutoka kwenye mwenendo wa kawaida wa mfumo. Ikiwa kosa litaonekana, kugunduliwa, kutengwa, na kudhibitiwa ipasavyo, basi kushindwa kunaweza kuepukwa. Kama ilivyo katika mfumo wowote wa kimwili, kurejea kutoka kwenye kosa au upotovu kutoka kwenye mwenendo wa kawaida wa mfumo si jambo la kujiendesha lenyewe; utambuzi sahihi na kutenganisha matatizo kwa usahihi, pamoja na udhibiti sahihi, ni jambo la lazima kabisa ili kurejesha mfumo na kuzuia kushindwa.

As explained earlier, faults or defects do not necessarily generate errors. And errors do not necessarily lead to failure. A fault generates an error only when certain conditions occur and trigger that fault. Only then an error occurs. An error is a deviation from the normal behavior of the system. If the error is observed, detected, isolated, and contained properly, then failure could be avoided. Just like in any physical system, the recovery from an error or a deviation from the normal behavior of the system is not automatic; a correct identification and isolation of the problems and a correct containment is absolute necessity to restore the system and to prevent failure.

Mdororo mkubwa wa uchumi wa mwaka 1929 ulikuwa ni mwenendo potofu wa uchumi na soko kwa ujumla. Soko la hisa lilianguka; watu wengi walipoteza ardhi zao, mashamba yao, nyumba zao na kampuni zao. Ilichukua miaka kadhaa ya kujenga upya uchumi, pamoja na vita kubwa (Vita vya Pili vya Dunia), ili kudhibiti mwenendo potofu wa soko na kurejesha mfumo kufanya kazi kwa hali ya kawaida. Hali zilizosababisha mdororo huo (yaani, mwenendo potofu wa uchumi) zilihusiana na thamani zilizopandishwa kupita kiasi za hisa, kama alivyoripoti jarida la The Economist tarehe 2 Novemba 1929: “Kuna sababu ya kutumaini kwamba kushuka kwa puto lililopanuliwa kupita kiasi la thamani za hisa za Marekani kutakuwa kwa manufaa ya dunia”134. Iliripotiwa kwamba bei za soko la fedha ziliongezeka katika kipindi cha kati ya mwaka 1925 na 1929 kwa asilimia 120, wakati ukuaji wa uchumi katika kipindi hicho hicho haukuzidi asilimia 17. Soko lilipoanguka, lilipoteza zaidi ya asilimia 93 ya thamani yake, jambo linalomaanisha kwamba soko lilirejea kwenye thamani yake halisi ya kawaida, ambayo dhahiri ilikuwa chini sana kuliko kile ambacho soko la hisa lilikuwa likionyesha.

The great depression of the 1929 was an erroneous behavior of the economy and the market at large. The stock market collapsed; many people lost their lands, farms, homes, and companies. It took several years of rebuilding the economy and a great war (World War II) to contain the erroneous behavior of the market and to resume a normal functioning of the system. The conditions which led to the depression (i.e., the erroneous behavior of the economy) were related to inflated stock values as reported by the Economist magazine on November 2, 1929: “There is warrant for hoping that the deflation of the exaggerated balloon of American stock values will be for the good of the world”134. It was reported that the prices of financial market increased during the period between 1925 and 1929 by 120%, while economic growth for the same period has not exceeded 17%. And when the market has collapsed, it lost over 93% of its value, which means that the market returned to its real normal value which was obviously much lower than what the stock market had indicated.

Kosa jingine la soko lilitokea mwaka 1987 wakati soko lilipoanguka tena. Wachunguzi walibaini kwamba bei za soko la fedha zilikuwa zimepanda kwa kiwango kikubwa ikilinganishwa na ukubwa halisi wa uchumi, ambapo tofauti kati ya thamani zilizopanda na zile halisi ilikuwa zaidi ya asilimia 200. Ilihitajika vita nyingine kubwa ili kudhibiti athari za tabia hii potofu. Vita vya Ghuba vilivyoongozwa na George Bush, baba, vilisaidia kudhibiti tatizo hilo na kurudisha uchumi katika tabia yake ya kawaida.

Another market error occurred in 1987 when the market collapsed again. Observers noted that the prices of financial market had inflated significantly compared with the real size of the economy, where the difference between the inflated values and the real ones was more than 200%. It took another war of large magnitude to contain the effects of this erroneous behavior. The Gulf War led by George Bush, the father, helped contain the problem and bring the economy back to its normal behavior.

Mnamo mwaka wa 1999, uchumi ulizalisha kosa jingine pale kile kinachoitwa "Bubble la Mtandao" (Internet bubble) kilipopasuka, na soko likapoteza mabilioni mengi ya dola za kidijitali. Uchumi ulikuwa ukielekea kwenye anguko kubwa. Utaratibu wa kudhibiti tatizo ulitumika tena: vita virefu! Safari hii vita havikufanikiwa kudhibiti kosa wala kukomesha mgogoro. Kinyume chake, vita vilivyoanzishwa kwa jina la kupambana na ugaidi dhidi ya Afghanistan na Iraq viliuchochea mgogoro na kuongeza kina cha matatizo ya kifedha. Kufikia mwaka wa 2008, mgogoro ulikuwa umefikia kilele chake kibaya. Uingiliaji mkubwa wa serikali wenye zaidi ya dola trilioni 1.5 nchini Marekani pekee ulikimbizwa kuisaidia uchumi uliokuwa ukiporomoka. Wasomi wengi walikimbilia kutangaza mwisho wa zama, zama za ubepari huria (liberal capitalism).

In 1999, the economy generated another error when the so called “Internet bubble” was deflated and the market lost hundreds of billions of virtual dollars. The economy was heading to a steep dive. The containment procedure was invoked again: a lengthy war! This time the war did not succeed in containing the error or ending the crisis. On the contrary, the wars launched in the name of fighting terrorism against Afghanistan and Iraq fueled up the crisis and deepened the financial problems. By the time the year 2008 arrived, the crisis had reached a serious peak. A massive government intervention with more than $1.5 trillion in the United States alone was rushed to the aid of a failing economy. Scores of scholars rushed to declare an end of an era, the era of liberal capitalism.

Ingawa sababu kuu za mgogoro wa sasa si tofauti sana na zile za migogoro iliyotangulia, hali zilizopelekea mgogoro wa sasa na mazingira ambamo ulifanya kazi, pamoja na taratibu za kuudhibiti, ni tofauti sana. Mambo makuu mawili yalijitokeza kama dalili kuu za mgogoro wa kifedha wa hivi karibuni, ambayo yana uwezo wa kuporomosha uchumi wa kisiasa wa ubepari. La kwanza ni kuundwa kwa uchumi pepe sambamba na uchumi halisi. La pili ni ununuzi mkubwa wa benki binafsi, kampuni za bima, sekta ya magari, mali isiyohamishika na nyinginezo na serikali. Mambo haya mawili yatajadiliwa katika vipengele vidogo vijavyo.

Although the root causes of the current crisis are not significantly different from the previous ones, the conditions which led to the current crisis and the environment in which it functioned, as well as the containment procedures, are significantly different. Two major phenomena emerged as prominent signs of the most recent financial crisis, which have the capacity of collapsing the political economy of capitalism. The first is the creation of virtual economy parallel to the real economy. The second one is a massive government buyout of private banks, insurance companies, auto industry, real estate, and more. These two phenomena will be discussed in the next subsections.