Kabla ya kueleza vipengele vya uchumi pepe, nipende kuchora dhana sambamba iliyopo katika mifumo ya kompyuta. Mfano huu husaidia kuelewa upeo na umuhimu wa tatizo.

Before describing the aspects of the virtual economy, let me draw a parallel concept which exists in computer systems. Analogy helps understand the scope and the significance of the problem.

Katika siku za awali za mifumo ya kompyuta, vifaa vya kumbukumbu vilikuwa ghali sana na ukubwa wake ulikuwa mdogo kiasi. Kwa mfano, megabaiti 1 ya kumbukumbu (RAM) iligharimu zaidi ya dola 10,000! Ilikuwa karibu haiwezekani kujenga mfumo wa kompyuta wenye, sema, megabaiti 100 (kumbukumbu ingegharimu zaidi ya dola milioni 1). Wabunifu mahiri wa mifumo ya kompyuta walibuni dhana ya kumbukumbu pepe. Wazo lilikuwa kuunda udanganyifu kwamba kumbukumbu ina ukubwa mkubwa kwa namna ya kawaida (sema, gigabaiti 100). Udanganyifu huu unawezekana kwa kutumia nafasi ya diski ngumu, ambayo ni hifadhi kubwa na ya bei nafuu.

In the earlier days of computer systems, memory devices were very expensive and their sizes were relatively small. For example, 1 megabyte of memory (RAM) cost more than $10,000! It was almost impossible to build a computer system with say 100 megabytes (memory would cost more than $1 million). The smart architects of computer systems invented the notion of virtual memory. The idea was to create the illusion that the memory was virtually large (say 100 gigabytes). The illusion is made possible by using the relatively inexpensive and large storage provided by hard disk space.

Dhana ya kumbukumbu pepe (virtual memory) inafanya kazi kwa msingi kwamba programu za watumiaji hazihitaji kukaa kwenye kumbukumbu halisi (ghali) muda wote. Sehemu ndogo ya programu itakaa kwenye kumbukumbu kuu, wakati sehemu nyingine ya programu na data zake zitakaa kwenye diski, ambayo ni nafuu lakini kubwa. Baada ya muda, vipande vya programu na data vitahamishwa kwenda na kurudi kati ya kumbukumbu na diski. Mtumiaji hatajua kamwe kwamba kumbukumbu ni ndogo mno kuweza kushikilia programu yake. Kwa mtumiaji, kumbukumbu inaonekana kuwa na ukubwa mkubwa kwa namna ya kawaida. Yeye anafurahi na anaweza kuendesha programu kubwa zaidi kwa kutumia kumbukumbu halisi ndogo zaidi; ni udanganyifu, lakini ni udanganyifu mzuri. Bila shaka, mfumo wa kompyuta unaweza kuanguka programu yenye tamaa inapoanza kutumia kumbukumbu halisi zaidi ya ile ambayo mfumo unayo kwa kweli. Jambo hili linajulikana kwa wabunifu wa kompyuta kama thrashing (msongamano wa kubadilishana kumbukumbu), nao wanalifahamu vizuri na wamebuni njia mbalimbali za kukabiliana nalo au kulizuia kabisa. Sasa, uchambuzi huu unapatikana wapi katika mfumo wa kiuchumi?

The concept of virtual memory works under the assumption that user programs do not need to reside in the main (expensive) real memory all the time. A small portion of the program will reside in main memory, while the rest of the program and its data reside on the cheap but large disk space. Over time, pieces of the program and data will be swapped back and forth between the memory and the disk. The user will never know that the memory is too small to hold her program. For the user, the memory has a virtually large size. She is happy and can execute larger programs using much smaller real memory; it is an illusion, but a nice one. Of course the computer system may crash when a greedy program begins to use more real memory than the system actually has. This concept is known for computer architects as thrashing and they are well aware of it and have come up with different ways to cope with it or prevent it altogether. Now, where is the analogy in the economic system?

Mfano rahisi zaidi wa kiuchumi wa kifedha unaolingana na dhana ya kumbukumbu pepe (virtual memory) ni mfumo wa kadi ya mkopo. Chukua mfano wa familia yenye mapato ya dola 3,000 kwa mwezi. Familia hiyo hulipa dola 2,500 kama malipo ya chini kabisa kwenye salio la deni lake, ambalo linaweza kufikia dola 360,000 likijumuisha malipo ya nyumba, magari mawili, na manunuzi ya sikukuu. Utajiri halisi wa familia hiyo ni dola 36,000 kwa mwaka (megabaiti 36 kwa mfano wa kompyuta); kiasi hiki, kikikusanywa kwa miaka kumi, ni dola 360,000 (sawa na megabaiti 360 za hifadhi pepe). Badala ya kutumia utajiri halisi wa dola 36,000 kwa mwaka, familia inatumia utajiri uliopanuliwa (pepe) wa miaka kumi (dola 360,000). Kwa kweli, dola 360,000 hizo hazipo wakati familia inapoanza kutumia pesa hizi kubwa za pepe.

The simplest financial economic analogy to the virtual memory concept is the credit card system. Take the example of a family with a monthly income of $3,000. The family pays $2,500 as a minimum payment on their debt balance, which could be $360,000 including the payments on a house, two cars, and holiday shopping. The actual real wealth of the family is $36,000 a year (36 megabytes in computer analogy); this amounts to $360,000 over ten years (similar to 360 megabytes of virtual storage). Instead of using the real wealth of $36,000 a year, the family uses the extended (virtual) wealth of ten years ($360,000). In reality, the $360,000 does not exist at the time when the family begins to use this large virtual money.

Benki inayoungwa mkono na Hifadhi ya Shirikisho (Federal Reserve) inaingilia kati na kutenga kiasi kikubwa cha pesa kwa matarajio kwamba pesa hizo zitapatikana hatimaye baada ya muda. Ikiwa kila kitu kitaenda vizuri, familia inaendelea kupata dola 3,000 kila mwezi na inaendelea kulipa malipo yao ya chini kabisa; basi kila kitu kinakwenda vizuri, na tofauti kati ya kile kilicho cha kufikirika na kile kilicho halisi haitajitokeza kusababisha tatizo lolote. Familia inaendelea kuishi kwa furaha ikiwa na udanganyifu wa utajiri wa kufikirika wa dola 360,000.

The bank supported by the Federal Reserve steps in and allocates the large amount of money in anticipation that this money will actually be generated over time. If all goes well, the family continues to earn $3,000 a month and continues to pay their minimum payments; then everything goes smooth and the difference between what is virtual and what is real will not surface to cause any problem. The family continues to happily live with the illusion of $360,000 virtual wealth.

Lakini jambo linapoenda vibaya, kama vile kupoteza kazi kwa mwanafamilia anayefanya kazi, jambo ambalo si la kawaida, au kutokea kwa ugonjwa mkubwa unaogharimu fedha zaidi ya zile ambazo kampuni ya bima inalipa, na hivyo kuzaa deni kubwa la matibabu, au sababu nyingine yoyote, basi kutatokea kuporomoka. Uwezo wa kifedha wa kawaida wa familia hupotea, na mali zilizopatikana kwa uwezo huo wa kifedha nazo zinaweza kutoweka. Kwa kweli, kuporomoka kwa utajiri wa kifedha wa familia kunaweza kuathiri utajiri halisi kabisa wa familia, kama vile ardhi iliyomilikiwa kwa urithi! Aina hii ya hali hutokea kila wakati, na sisi sote tunajua mifano mingi ya maisha halisi. Mfano mmoja mashuhuri, ulioripotiwa katika vyombo vya habari, ni kisa cha bilionea Donald Trump. Yeye huzoea kuendesha miradi yenye thamani ya mabilioni ya dola, na pale anaposhindwa kukidhi madai ya wadai wake, huwasilisha ombi la kufilisika.135

But when something goes wrong, such as a layoff of the working member of the family, which is not uncommon, or a serious health condition occurs and consumes more money than what the insurance company pays resulting on more healthcare debt, or any other reason, then thrashing will take place. The virtual capacity of the family evaporates, and the assets acquired with virtual memory may also vanish. In fact, the collapse of the virtual wealth of the family may affect the absolute real wealth of the family, such as a land owned through inheritance! This type of scenario occurs all the time, and we all know many real-life examples. One outstanding example, which was reported in the media, is the case of the billionaire Donald Trump. He is used to running projects sizing in billions of dollars, and when he fails to meet the demands of the creditors, he files for bankruptcy135.

Kielelezo 22 kinaonyesha ukuaji wa utajiri wa kivitendo (unaolingana na deni), wakati utajiri halisi (unaolingana na mapato) ulibaki karibu bila mabadiliko kwa zaidi ya miaka kumi na tatu. Zingatia kwamba deni linalohusiana na nyumba limeongezeka kutoka dola 120,000 hadi dola 183,000 kwa kila familia, wakati mapato yanayolingana nalo yalibaki vile vile katika kipindi hicho hicho.

Figure 22 shows the growth of the virtual wealth (proportional to the debt), while the real wealth (proportional to income) remained almost steady for more than thirteen years. Note how the home-related debt has increased from $120,000 to $183,000 per family while the corresponding income remained unchanged over the same period.

Katika kiwango kikubwa zaidi cha uchumi, ambapo mashirika, viwanda na aina zote za biashara hushirikiana na kufanya kazi, dhana ya utajiri wa kidijitali (virtual) inafanana na mifano iliyotajwa hapo juu, lakini kwa ukubwa mkubwa zaidi. Kwa miaka mingi, uchumi wa kidijitali chini ya ubepari umekuwa sehemu kuu kabisa ya uchumi, na karibu umefunika kabisa uchumi halisi. Kwa kweli, uchumi wa kidijitali umekuwa na nguvu kiasi kwamba viongozi wa kisiasa wanaonya dhidi ya uwezekano wa kuushusha uchumi kutoka thamani zake za kidijitali kwenda kwenye thamani zake halisi zaidi.

At the larger scale of the economy, where corporations, factories, and all types of enterprises interact and function, the concept of virtual wealth is similar to the examples above but much larger in scale. Over the years, the virtual economy under capitalism became the most dominant part of the economy which has almost totally masked the real economy. In fact, the virtual economy has become so prominent that the political leadership warns against the possibility of pushing the economy down from the virtual values to its more real values.

Katika taarifa aliyoitoa kwa kamati ya Bunge tarehe 3 Aprili 2008, mkuu wa Benki Kuu ya Marekani (Fed), Bernanke, alisema99,

In a statement made to a congressional committee on April 3, 2008, the Fed Reserve chief Bernanke said99,

Ikiwa Bear Stearns ingeruhusiwa kufilisika, ingesababisha kufunguliwa kwa uwekezaji wa Bear Stearns kwa machafuko, uwekezaji ulioshikiliwa na watu binafsi na taasisi nyingine za kifedha. Zaidi ya hayo, athari mbaya ya kushindwa kulipa madeni isingebaki ndani ya mfumo wa kifedha tu, bali ingeonekana kwa upana katika uchumi halisi kupitia athari zake kwa thamani za mali na upatikanaji wa mikopo.

If Bear Stearns had been allowed to fail, it would have led to a chaotic unwinding of Bear Stearns investments held by individuals and other financial institutions. Moreover, the adverse impact of a default would not have been confined to the financial system but would have been felt broadly in the real economy through its effects on asset values and credit availability.

Tambua jinsi Bernanke anavyotaja ulinzi wa uchumi halisi kama lengo lililotajwa la kuokoa Bear Stearns isifilisike.

Note how Bernanke alludes to the protection of the real economy as the objective cited for protecting Bear Stearns from failing.

Katika makala iliyochapishwa katika Newsweek, Oktoba 11, 2008, Daniel Gross anaandika100, "Nyuma mwaka 2002, hisa za Apple zilikuwa zikiuzwa chini sana ya kiwango cha fedha taslimu kilichokuwa kwenye vitabu vyake, zikipa thamani ya sifuri chapa zake na bidhaa zake, ikilinganishwa na mabilioni kadhaa wakati wa kilele cha kipindi cha ukuaji wa uchumi." Angalia jinsi kauli hii inavyorejelea uwepo wa mitazamo miwili ya uchumi: uchumi halisi ambao unaonyeshwa na kiwango cha fedha taslimu kwenye vitabu vya kampuni, na mtazamo uliovimbishwa, uliokuzwa kupita kiasi, unaoonyeshwa na thamani za sasa za hisa sokoni; katika kesi hii, thamani pepe ilionekana kuwa chini ya thamani halisi.

In an article published by the Newsweek, October 11, 2008, Daniel Gross writes100, “Back in 2002, Apple’s stock was trading far below the level of cash on its books, ascribing a value of zero to its brands and products, compared with several billion at the height of the boom.” Note how the statement refers to the existence of two views of the economy: a real economy which is reflected by the level of cache on corporate books and an inflated, exaggerated view which is reflected in the current stock values of the market; in this case the virtual value was observed to be below the real value.

Uchumi pepe (VE) unahusiana kwa karibu na kushindwa kwa mfumo wa kibepari wa kifedha unaoshuhudiwa leo. Uchumi pepe huufanya uchumi uonekane mkubwa zaidi kuliko ukubwa wake halisi. Kama ilivyo kwa kompyuta zenye kumbukumbu pepe, uchumi pepe unategemea dhana kwamba fedha halisi haitaguswa, na hivyo inawezekana kushughulikia thamani pepe iliyodhaniwa kuwa kubwa zaidi ya fedha.

Virtual economy (VE) is strongly related to the failure of the financial capitalist system as being witnessed today. VE allows the economy to appear much larger than its real size. As in the case of virtual memory computers, virtual economy is based on the assumption that the real money will not be tapped into, and therefore, it is possible to deal with an assumed larger (virtual) value for the money.

Kumbuka kwamba mojawapo ya kanuni kuu za ubepari inahusiana na ufafanuzi wa thamani ya bidhaa. Thamani ya bidhaa chini ya ubepari ni kipimo cha manufaa ya jamaa ya bidhaa fulani au thamani yake ya kubadilishana ya jamaa ikilinganishwa na manufaa ya vitu vingine; iwapo thamani ya kubadilishana ni ya jamaa kwa fedha, thamani hiyo hujulikana kama bei. Kwa hiyo, msingi wa ubepari unaruhusu kuwepo kwa thamani ya jamaa ya kivirtual kwa bidhaa badala ya thamani halisi ambayo watu wanaweza kuirejelea wakati wowote. Hivyo, katika uchumi wa soko, inawezekana thamani ya sehemu fulani ya soko, kama mafuta, kubadilikabadilika kati ya ncha mbili ndani ya kipindi kifupi cha muda. Ufafanuzi wa thamani chini ya ubepari unaruhusu mabadiliko haya kutokea kutegemea hali zilizopo. Hali za kiuchumi, kisiasa na kijamii zingefanya kazi kama kichocheo kinachosababisha thamani za bidhaa mbalimbali na sehemu za soko kubadilikabadilika na kuleta msukosuko ambao unaweza kusababisha kuanguka kabisa.

Shughuli za soko la hisa mwanzoni mwa karne ya ishirini ziliunda jambo jipya katika uchumi, ambapo utajiri unaohusiana na thamani za hisa ulikua kwa kasi kubwa zaidi kuliko utajiri unaohusiana na uchumi halisi. Soko la hisa lilipoporomoka jijini New York mnamo Oktoba 1929, wanauchumi walihusisha anguko hilo na tofauti kubwa kati ya thamani zilizopandishwa kupita kiasi za hisa na thamani za mali halisi za uchumi. Ingawa wanauchumi wanaweza wasikubaliane kuhusu chanzo cha anguko la soko la hisa la 1929-1932, wote wanakiri kwamba bei za hisa za huduma zilipanda juu mno.

The stock market activities at the start of the twentieth century created a new phenomenon in the economy, where the wealth associated with stock values grew at much higher rate than the wealth associated with the real economy. When the stock market collapsed in New York in October 1929, the economists attributed the crash to the great difference between the inflated values of stocks and the values of the real assets of the economy. Although economists may not agree on the cause of the 1929-1932 stock market crash, they all admit that the utility stocks prices drove up too high.

The Economist, gazeti maarufu, lilisisitiza tarehe 2 Novemba 1929 kwamba bei za hisa zilikuwa juu mno, likaandika: "Kuna sababu ya kutumaini kwamba kupunguzwa kwa puto lililopanuka kupita kiasi la thamani za hisa za Marekani kutakuwa na manufaa kwa dunia." Kwa maneno mengine, thamani za hisa zilikuwa zimepanda kupita kiasi. Ili kufafanua zaidi suala hili, ilibainika kwamba thamani za hisa katika soko la fedha ziliongezeka kwa asilimia 120 kati ya mwaka 1925 na 1929, wakati ukuaji wa uchumi katika kipindi hicho hicho haukuzidi asilimia 17 (wastani wa asilimia 3.5 kwa mwaka). Mwaka 1932, soko lilipoanguka hatimaye, lilipoteza zaidi ya asilimia 90 ya thamani yake. Soko lilirejea kwenye thamani yake halisi, ambayo bila shaka ilikuwa chini sana kuliko kile soko la hisa lilichoonyesha (101, 134).

The Economist magazine insisted on November 2, 1929, that the stock prices were too high and wrote134, “There is warrant for hoping that the deflation of the exaggerated balloon of American stock values will be for the good of the world.” In other words, the stock values were highly inflated. To elaborate further on this issue, it was found that the stock values in the financial market increased during the period between 1925 and 1929 by 120%, while the economic growth for the same period has not exceeded 17% (an average of 3.5% per year). In 1932, when the market finally collapsed, it lost over 90% of its value. The market returned to its real value which was obviously much lower than what the stock market indicated (101, 134).

Rais Herbert Hoover alikubaliana kwamba bei za soko la hisa zilikuwa juu sana kupita kiasi, na kwamba hazikuwa chochote zaidi ya Bubble ya kubahatisha iliyosababishwa na makosa ya Bodi ya Hifadhi ya Shirikisho. Hoover alieleza, "Mojawapo ya mawingu haya lilikuwa wimbi la matumaini la Marekani, lililozaliwa na maendeleo endelevu katika muongo mzima, ambalo Bodi ya Hifadhi ya Shirikisho ililigeuza kuwa Bubble ya Mississippi ya soko la hisa"102. Hivyo, maoni ya kawaida yalikuwa kwamba bei za hisa zilikuwa juu mno.

Kama mfano, tuchukulie kwamba thamani halisi ya kampuni fulani ni sawa na 10% ya thamani yake yote ya kidijitali; hili si jambo la kawaida katika ulimwengu wa uchumi pepe. Kivitendo, kiasi kinachoweza kugeuzwa kuwa fedha halisi hakiwezi kuzidi 10% ya mtaji wote pepe unaotolewa na thamani ya hisa za kampuni; kilichobaki ni sawa na sifuri. Wamiliki wa hisa za kampuni (au wanahisa) wanapogundua kwamba mwekezaji mkubwa ameanza kuuza mali zake (ili kuzigeuza kuwa fedha halisi), hofu huanza kuenea miongoni mwa wanahisa; wanakimbilia kuuza mali zao wakitumaini kupata fedha halisi kabla hisa zao hazijapoteza thamani. Kisha kuanguka hutokea na kushusha thamani pepe ya kampuni hadi thamani yake ya msingi inayolingana zaidi na uhalisia.

As an example, assume that the real value of some company is equivalent to 10% of its total virtual value; this is not uncommon in the realm of virtual economy world. Practically, the amount that can be turned into real money can be no more than 10% of the total virtual capital given by the stock value of the company; the rest is equal to none. When the owners of the company shares (or stockholders) notice that a major investor begins to sell his possessions (to convert them to real money), a panic among shareholders begin to propagate; they rush to sell their possessions hoping to cache in some real money before their stocks lose value. Then a collapse takes place and brings down the virtual value of the company to its more realistic basic value.

Hebu tufanye mfano huu kwa undani zaidi kwa kutumia uchambuzi rahisi na hesabu, ili wasomaji wasichanganyikiwe (Mchoro 23). Tuchukue kwamba kampuni ina hisa elfu moja. Pia, tuchukue kwamba kila hisa ina thamani ya dola 100. Kwa hiyo thamani ya kubuni ya hisa za kampuni ni dola 100,000. Kwa ajili ya hoja, tuchukue kwamba thamani halisi ya kampuni, kulingana na mali zake na uzalishaji wake, ni dola 10,000. Kwa maneno mengine, thamani halisi ya kampuni ni asilimia 10 ya thamani yake ya kubuni. Sasa tuchukue kwamba mwekezaji mkubwa anauza hisa hamsini kwa dola 100 kila moja, na anapata dola 5,000 taslimu. Ikiwa wanahisa wengine wote wataanza kuuza hisa zao wakitumaini kupata fedha halisi kutoka kwa kampuni, watapata si zaidi ya dola 5,000 kwa jumla, ambacho ndicho kiasi kilichobaki cha thamani halisi ya kampuni. Hii inamaanisha 5,000/950, ambayo ni takriban dola 5.25 kwa kila hisa. Sasa, ikiwa mtu mwingine mmoja aliweza kuchukua hatua haraka kuliko wengine na kuuza hisa hamsini kwa mfano dola 50 na kupata dola 2,500 taslimu, basi kundi lingine lote litalazimika kugawana hisa mia tisa zilizobaki kwa jumla ya si zaidi ya dola 2,500; hiyo ni dola 2.75 kwa hisa ikiwa hisa zote zitauzwa mara moja. Tuseme hisa mia mbili zaidi ziliuzwa kwa dola 10 kwa hisa, ambayo ni sawa na dola 2,000. Kilichobaki cha thamani ya kampuni ni dola 500, zikigawanywa kwa hisa mia saba. Thamani ya hisa za kampuni hii itashuka hadi dola 0.71. Hatimaye, dola 10,000 zote zitakapokwisha, thamani ya hisa itafikia sifuri. Hisa zilizosalia zitapoteza thamani yake kabisa.

Riba ni sababu ya pili kuu ya kuundwa kwa utajiri wa kivituo (virtual), ambao huifanya uchumi uonekane mkubwa zaidi kuliko thamani yake halisi. Riba inafafanuliwa katika kamusi ya Merriam-Webster kama “ukopeshaji wa fedha kwa malipo ya riba kwa matumizi yake”; neno hili linatokana na neno la Kilatini cha Zama za Kati usuria, lenye maana ya riba. Maana ya riba ilirekebishwa ili kuonyesha kiwango cha riba kinachotozwa juu ya kiwango kilichowekwa awali. Marekebisho haya yalifanywa ili kuhalalisha utozaji wa riba juu ya fedha. Katika utamaduni na dini ya Kiislamu, neno usury linalingana na neno riba. Riba linatokana na neno ongezeko. Likitumika katika dhana ya usury, linamaanisha ongezeko la fedha kwa gharama ya fedha za watu wengine. Ufafanuzi huu unatokana na aya ya Qur'an isemayo:

Usury is the second major cause for the creation of virtual wealth which causes the economy to appear much larger in size than its real value. Usury is defined in Merriam-Webster dictionary as “the lending of money with an interest charge for its use”; this comes from the Medieval Latin usuria, which means interest. A modification was made to the meaning of usury to indicate the interest rate charged above a predetermined rate. This modification was made in order to legitimize the charging of interest on money. In the Islamic culture and religion, the word usury is mapped to the word riba. Riba comes from the word increase. When applied to the concept of usury, it means the increase of money at the expense of the money of other people. This definition is based on the Quranic verse:

Riba ambayo mnaitoa ili iongezeke kupitia mali ya watu wengine haitazidi kwa Mwenyezi Mungu. (Quran 30:39)

That [usury-riba] which you lay out for increase through the money of other people will have no increase with Allah. (Quran 30:39)

Riba, ambayo mara nyingi hujulikana kama kiwango cha riba, ni msingi mkuu wa sera za kifedha chini ya ubepari. Hutumiwa na Benki Kuu ya Marekani (Federal Reserve) kurekebisha mabadiliko ya soko na uchumi. Wakati wa mdororo wa uchumi, Benki Kuu ya Marekani hupunguza kiwango cha riba (thamani ya riba) ili kuhimiza ukopaji na kuongeza mahitaji ya bidhaa na huduma. Kinyume chake, huongeza thamani ya riba ili kudhibiti mfumuko wa bei wakati wa ukuaji mkubwa wa uchumi. Lengo hapa ni kuelewa kwamba riba katika uchumi wa kisiasa wa kibepari ni mojawapo ya zana muhimu zaidi zinazotumika kudhibiti kupanda na kushuka kwa uchumi. Huenda sifa ya kipekee zaidi ya uchumi wa kibepari ni matumizi mapana ya taasisi za kifedha zinazotoa mikopo kwa watu binafsi, kampuni, taasisi, na hata kwa serikali zenyewe.

Usury, or the interest rate as most frequently referred to, is a cornerstone of the financial policies under capitalism. It is used by the Federal Reserve to adjust market and economy fluctuations. During a recession, the Federal Reserve Bank reduces the interest rate (usury value) in order to encourage borrowing and increase the demands on goods and services. Conversely, it increases the value of usury to curb inflation during excessive economic growth. The point here is to understand that usury in the capitalist political economy is one of the most important tools used for the control of the ups and downs of the economy. Perhaps the single most unique characteristic of capitalist economy is the widespread use of financial institutions that offer loans to individuals, companies, institutions, and even governments themselves.

Kiasi na kasi ya fedha inayotiririka kuelekea kwa wawekezaji na wateja kwa hakika kitakuwa kidogo kuliko kiasi na kasi ya fedha inayotiririka kuelekea kwa benki. Baada ya muda, benki hukusanya utajiri zaidi kuliko jumla ya utajiri unaokusanywa na soko, iwe kupitia mikopo ya benki au kupitia uzalishaji wa bidhaa na huduma. Tofauti kati ya utajiri uliokusanywa na benki na utajiri unaodumishwa na soko inatoa sababu nyingine ya mitazamo miwili kuhusu uchumi: ule wa kweli na ule wa kivirtuali. Ili kufafanua zaidi jambo hili, zingatia kesi mbili zifuatazo.

The amount and rate of money which flows in the direction of investors and customers will certainly be less than the amount and rate of money which flows in the direction of the banks. Over time, the banks accumulate more wealth than the total wealth collected by the market either through loans from the banks or through production of goods and services. The difference between the wealth accumulated by the banks and the wealth sustained by the market provides another reason for the dual views of the economy: the real and the virtual. To further illustrate this phenomenon, consider the following two cases.

Fikiria kesi ya mkopo, ambapo benki inatoa mkopo kwa mwekezaji. Tuchukulie kwamba benki imetoa mkopo wa dola milioni 100 wenye riba ya 5% kwa mwaka mmoja. Tuchukulie pia kwamba mfumuko wa bei katika kipindi hicho ulikuwa 2%; thamani halisi ya kiwango cha riba inakuwa 3% baada ya marekebisho ya mfumuko wa bei. Tuchukulie zaidi kwamba mwekezaji aliyekopa fedha hizo aliweza kuzitumia kuzalisha bidhaa na huduma na kupata faida ya 2% mwishoni mwa kipindi cha mkopo. Sasa jumla ya fedha atakayolipa benki ni dola milioni 103, wakati fedha halisi zilizopatikana kutokana na mkopo, uwekezaji na faida ni dola milioni 102. Hii inamaanisha kuwa kuna dola milioni 1 katika akaunti ya benki ambayo hailingani na thamani yoyote halisi ardhini. Ziada hii ndiyo riba-usury; inawakilisha ukuaji safi wa fedha ambao haulingani na ukuaji wowote wa uchumi. Uchumi ulikua kwa dola milioni 2; fedha zilikua kwa dola milioni 3. Ni dola milioni 2 tu za ukuaji wa fedha ndizo zinazolingana na ukuaji halisi wa utajiri wa kiuchumi. Hii ndiyo Qur'ani inayoielezea kama ukuaji wa fedha kwa gharama ya fedha za watu wengine: "Na kile mnachotoa kwa riba ili kiongezeke katika mali za watu, hakiongezeki kwa Mwenyezi Mungu" (Qur'ani 30:39).

Consider the loan case, where the bank provides a loan for an investor. Let’s assume that the bank provided a loan of $100 million with 5% usury for one year. Let’s assume also that the inflation during this period was 2%; the actual value of the interest rate becomes 3% after inflation adjustment. Assume further that the investor who borrowed the money was able to use the borrowed money to produce goods and services and generate 2% profit at the end of the loan period. Now the total amount of money to be paid back to the bank is $103 million, while the real available money due to the loan, investment, and profit is $102 million. This means that there is $1million in the bank account which does not correspond to any real value on the ground. This surplus is the usury; it represents the pure growth of money which does not correspond to any growth in the economy. The economy grew by $2 million; the money grew by $3 million. Only $2 million of the money growth corresponds to economic real wealth growth. This is what the Quran refers to as money growth at the expense of other people’s money: “That [usury-riba] which you lay out for increase through the money of other people will have no increase with Allah” (Quran 30:39).

Kielelezo 25 kinaonyesha jinsi Benki Kuu ya Marekani (Federal Reserve Bank) inavyoingiza fedha kwenye akaunti yake yenyewe bila kuzingatia ukuaji wa uchumi halisi107. Takwimu zinaonyesha kwamba akiba ya fedha iliongezeka mara zaidi ya nne kati ya mwaka 1994 na 2008; jumla ya fedha taslimu na akiba iliongezeka mara mbili ndani ya chini ya miezi minne baada ya kuporomoka kwa Benki ya Lehman Brothers. Akiba ya fedha iliongezeka kutoka dola bilioni 850 tarehe 10 Septemba 2008 hadi dola bilioni 1,702 tarehe 31 Desemba 2008. Haina haja ya kusema kwamba katika kipindi hiki (siku 112), uchumi haungeweza kukua kwa asilimia 200.

Figure 25 shows how the Federal Reserve Bank pumps money into its own account without consideration to the economic growth on the ground107. The data shows how the money reserves multiplied more than four times between 1994 and 2008; the total cache currency and reserves doubled in less than four months after the collapse of the Lehman Brothers Bank. The currency reserves rose from $850 billion on September 10, 2008, to $1,702 billion on December 31, 2008. It is needless to say that during this period (112 days), the economy could not have grown 200%.

Mazoezi ya Hifadhi ya Shirikisho (Federal Reserve) yanachangia kulipuka kwa utajiri pepe badala ya kufanya kazi ya kuudhibiti. Badala ya kudhibiti ukuaji wa utajiri pepe kwa gharama ya ukuaji wa uchumi halisi, Hifadhi ya Shirikisho inauzidisha zaidi.

The practice of the Federal Reserve contributes to the explosion of virtual wealth instead of working to control it. Instead of containing the phenomenon of virtual wealth growth at the expense of real economy growth, the Fed aggravates it.

Kwa upande wa dunia nzima, deni la serikali na nchi zinazotoza riba ni la kushtua. Jumla ya madeni ya nchi sitini ilizidi dola trilioni 65 mwishoni mwa mwaka 2008112. Riba inayolipwa kwa deni hili inazidi dola trilioni 3 kwa mwaka; riba hii peke yake ni zaidi ya kiasi cha pesa kinachohitajika kuiondoa dunia katika mdororo mkubwa wa kiuchumi iliyoingia.

Worldwide, the interest baring debt of states and governments is shocking. The total amount of debts for sixty countries exceeded $65 trillion at the end of 2008112. The interest paid on this debt exceeds $3 trillion a year; this interest alone is more than the amount of money required to pull the world out of the deep recession it plunged in.

Katika ngazi ya dunia, Shirika la Fedha la Kimataifa (IMF) na Benki ya Dunia (WB) hufanya kazi sawa na ile inayofanywa na Benki Kuu ya Marekani (Federal Reserve). IMF na WB hutoa mikopo yenye riba kwa karibu kila nchi duniani; IMF na WB huweka masharti kwa wengi wa wapokeaji wa mikopo yao, masharti ambayo huathiri ukuaji halisi wa uchumi wa kila nchi pamoja na akiba ya fedha za kigeni na thamani ya sarafu. Deni la nje kwa IMF la nchi ishirini na tano maskini zaidi lilifikia dola bilioni 129.3 mwishoni mwa mwaka 2008.

Kiwango cha dhahabu au fedha kinarejelea mfumo wa fedha ambamo sarafu ya taifa inaungwa mkono na madini ya thamani kama dhahabu na/au fedha. Sarafu kama dola inapoungwa mkono na dhahabu au fedha, itakuwa karibu haiwezekani kukuza fedha za nchi hadi viwango vya juu kiasi hicho bila nchi kuhatarisha kupungua kwa akiba zake za dhahabu au fedha. Uchumi pepe, unaostawi katika ulimwengu wa ubepari leo, usingeweza kuwa halisi kama sarafu kuu (k.m. dola ya Marekani) ingeendelea kuunganishwa na kiwango cha dhahabu.

Gold/silver standard refers to the monetary system where the currency of a nation is backed by a precious metal such as the gold and/or silver. When the currency such as the dollar is backed by gold or silver, it would be almost impossible to grow the finances of the country to such high limits where the country risks the depletion of its gold or silver reserves. The virtual economy, which thrives in the world of capitalism today, could not have become a reality, if main currency (e.g. US dollar) remained linked to the gold standard.

Hadi Vita Kuu ya Dunia, dhahabu ilitumika kama kiwango cha fedha cha nchi zote kuu za biashara duniani. Kila nchi ilifunga sarafu yake kwa dhahabu kwa kiwango kisichobadilika na kisichoweza kubadilishwa. Chini ya kiwango cha dhahabu, mifumo ya fedha ya kimataifa ilifurahia kipindi cha utulivu na ustawi usio na kifani. Kwa msingi wake, kiwango cha dhahabu kilileta nidhamu ya kifedha. Kiasi cha sarafu ambacho nchi ingeweza kuchapisha kilikuwa kimepunguzwa na kiasi cha dhahabu katika akiba zake, kwa sababu nchi zingeweza kukabiliwa na lazima ya kubadilisha fedha zao kuwa dhahabu. Viwango vya ubadilishaji wa sarafu kati ya mataifa tofauti vilibaki karibu kisichobadilika katika mfumo wa kawaida wa dhahabu.

Until World War I, gold ruled as the monetary standard of all the major trading countries in the world. Each country pegged its currency to gold at a constant and unchanging rate. Under the gold standard, the international monetary systems enjoyed a period of unprecedented stability and prosperity. In essence, the gold standard provided monetary discipline. The amount of currency a country could print was limited by the amount of gold in their reserves, because countries could have faced the requirement to convert their money to gold. Exchange rates between currencies of different nations remain fairly constant in the classical gold system.

Era ya kiwango cha dhahabu ilikatizwa ghafla katika Vita vya Kwanza vya Dunia. Nchi zilizokuwa vitani ziliamua kuchapisha fedha bila kuiunga mkono kwa dhahabu, ili kugharamia gharama kubwa mno za vita. Kiasi kikubwa sana cha fedha kilimwagwa sokoni bila msingi imara wa kuiunga mkono, jambo lililozaa mfumuko mkubwa wa bei. Hali hii iliendelea katika kipindi chote cha vita na baada yake. Ujerumani ilipaswa kulipa, chini ya mpango wa fidia, alama bilioni 132 na ililazimika kuunga kiasi hiki kwa dhahabu. Ni dhahiri kwamba Ujerumani haingeweza kutimiza sharti hili; Ujerumani haikuweza kutumia dhahabu yake kulipia uhalifu wa vita. Washirika wa Ulaya walikuwa wamekopa fedha nyingi mno kutoka Marekani, ambayo ilidai mikopo yake ilipwe. Kushindwa kwa Ujerumani kutii mpango wa fidia baada ya vita na kushindwa kwa nchi washirika kutimiza wajibu wao wa mikopo kwa Marekani kulitoa kisingizio cha Vita vya Pili vya Dunia.

Uchaguzi ulikuwa mikononi mwa watunga sera za fedha za Marekani kati ya aina mbili za uchumi. Ya kwanza ni uchumi halisi unaoungwa mkono na sarafu zenye msingi wa dhahabu, ambao hukua polepole lakini kwa uhakika. Ya pili ni uchumi pepe unaoonyeshwa na sarafu za karatasi tupu (na baadaye za kidijitali) zisizo na msaada wowote wa madini yoyote ya thamani, dhahabu wala fedha. Chaguo la uchumi pepe liliruhusu upatikanaji wa fedha taslimu kwa wingi karibu usio na kikomo, liliruhusu ukuaji wa utajiri usio na kifani, liliruhusu ubora usio na mfano juu ya kambi ya Wasovieti wa Kijamaa, na liliruhusu kuhifadhiwa kwa akiba ya dhahabu ya Marekani. Ingawa chaguo hili lingeweza kuvutia kiasi gani, lilikuja kuwa jiwe la kwanza katika kaburi la uchumi wa kibepari.

The choice was in the hands of US financial policy makers between two forms of economy. A real economy backed by gold-based currencies, which grows slowly but surely. Or a virtual economy characterized by pure-paper (and later digital) currencies without any backup from any precious metal, gold or silver. The virtual economy option allows for a virtually large liquidity, allows for an unprecedented wealth growth, allows unparalleled superiority over the Soviet Socialists camp, and allows the preservation of the US gold reserves. As attractive as this option could be, it became the first brick in the grave of the capitalist economy.

Vita baridi na mapambano makali dhidi ya ujamaa wa Kisovieti vilitoa mazingira yanayofaa kwa chaguo hili kustawi, na vilitoa ngao iliyowazuia watunga sera kutathmini kwa makini hatari za chaguo kama hilo. Tamaa ya taasisi za kifedha zilizohusika na kutoa ukwasi, hasa Muungano wa Hifadhi ya Shirikisho la Marekani, ilisukuma chaguo hili mbele kwa shauku kubwa na hamu kali. Hivyo njia ikatengenezwa kwa ajili ya kufutwa kwa Sheria ya Bretton Woods.

The cold war and the fierce struggle with the Soviet socialism provided the suitable environment for this option to flourish and provided the shield which prevented policy makers from carefully evaluating the dangers of such option. The greed of the financial institutions which were responsible for providing the liquidity, in particular the US Federal Reserve Consortium pushed this option forward with great avidity and eagerness. The path was thus paved for the revocation of Bretton Woods Act.

Mgogoro wa ubadilishaji wa dola kuwa dhahabu ulidhihirika kutokana na kiasi cha dola zilizoshikiliwa katika benki kuu za Ulaya. Kufikia mwaka 1966, Ulaya ilikuwa imeshikilia katika benki zake kuu zaidi ya dola bilioni 14. Marekani ilikuwa na akiba ya dhahabu ya dola bilioni 13.2 tu, ambayo dola bilioni 10 zilihitajika kusaidia mahitaji ya soko lake la ndani. Iwapo serikali na benki kuu za kigeni zingejaribu kubadilisha hata robo ya akiba zao kwa wakati mmoja, Marekani isingeweza kutimiza wajibu wake. Bei ya dhahabu iliyokuwa ndogo kiasi, dola 35 kwa wakia kama ilivyopangwa na Makubaliano ya Bretton Woods, iliwavutia wanaofanya ubashiri, wafanyabiashara wa dhahabu na taasisi tajiri kununua na kuhifadhi dhahabu, na hivyo kuongeza kasi ya upungufu wa dhahabu katika masoko ya dunia.

Kwa mara ya kwanza katika historia, dhahabu ikawa rasmi bidhaa tu, ambayo bei yake iko chini ya kanuni na sheria za soko. Kielelezo cha 26 kinaonyesha kupanda kwa bei za dhahabu na mabadiliko yake kulingana na Bei ya Dhahabu ya Spot ya London117. Bei za dhahabu zilibaki karibu thabiti hadi mwaka 1972, wakati Marekani ilipoachana na kiwango cha dhahabu. Baada ya mdororo wa kifedha wa mwaka 2008, bei ya dhahabu ilipanda zaidi ya dola 1,200 kwa aunsi.

For the first time in history, the gold officially became just a commodity, whose price is subject to market rules and regulations. Figure 26 shows the rise of gold prices and their fluctuation based on the London Spot Gold Prices117. The gold prices remained almost stable until 1972 when the United States relinquished the gold standard. After the financial crisis in 2008, the price of gold exceeded $1,200 per ounce.

Tangu kuvunjika kwa mfumo wa Bretton Woods mwaka 1971 na kumalizika kwa kiwango cha dhahabu, dola imekuwa sarafu kuu ya akiba ya kimataifa. Katika miaka ishirini kabla ya 1970, akiba ya dola za kimataifa iliongezeka kwa takriban 55% tu, kwa kasi ya 2.7% kwa mwaka. Kati ya 1971 na 2001, pamoja na kupitishwa kwa dola badala ya kiwango cha dhahabu, akiba iliongezeka zaidi ya 2,000%, kwa kasi ya zaidi ya 66% kwa mwaka118. Mchoro 27 unaonyesha ukuaji wa utajiri wa dunia tangu 1972. Ukuaji wa namna hiyo usingewezekana chini ya kiwango cha dhahabu. Lakini Marekani ilipogeuka dhidi ya Makubaliano ya Bretton Woods na kuvunja uhusiano kati ya dola na dhahabu, iliikomboa dola kutoka katika udhibiti wa dhahabu na kufungua uwezo wake wa ukuaji wa kidijitali.

Since the breakdown of Bretton Woods in 1971 and the end of the gold standard, the dollar has become the default international reserve currency. The twenty years prior to 1970, international dollar reserves increased only about 55%, at a rate of 2.7% a year. Between 1971 and 2001, with the adoption of the dollar instead of gold standard, reserves have increased over 2,000%, at a rate of more than 66% a year118. Figure 27 shows the growth of the world wealth since 1972. Such growth could not have been possible under the gold standard. But when United States turned against Bretton Woods Agreement and broke the link between the dollar and the gold, it freed the dollar from the rein of the gold and unleashed its potential for virtual growth.

Baada ya kufa kwa Makubaliano ya Bretton Woods, dhahabu haikuweza tena kuweka mipaka ya kasi ya ukuaji wa uchumi unaotegemea dola; hata hivyo, kulikuwa na kamba nyingine iliyoshikilia dola, ambayo iliizuia kupanda kwa kasi ya kiwango cha kielelezo kama inavyoonyeshwa katika Kielelezo 27. Kamba hiyo ilikuwa seti ya kanuni na vizuizi vilivyowekwa dhidi ya taasisi za kifedha baada ya Unyogovu Mkubwa wa 1929. Vizuizi hivyo vilianzishwa katika miaka ya 1930 na viongozi wa kisiasa ili kuzuia unyogovu mwingine siku zijazo. Kimsingi, vizuizi hivyo vilipunguza uwezo wa taasisi za kifedha kukuza utajiri wao kwa kutoa mikopo zaidi na zaidi na kuzalisha riba zaidi na zaidi kutokana na mikopo hiyo. Kwa mujibu wa kanuni hizo, wakopaji walilazimika kuweka kiasi kikubwa cha fedha mapema wanapokopa ili kufadhili ununuzi wa nyumba. Hali hiyo iliacha sehemu ya mkopo inayozaa riba ikiwa ndogo kiasi.