关于真主存在的逻辑论证
Argument From Logic For The Existece Of Allah
在上一章中,已经指出,对主的认知存在于人的本性(fiṭrah)之中,它先于分析与推理。烙印在灵魂中的这份认知要求人去承认祂,只要人的感官健全、没有障碍。若有人陷入怀疑或疏忽,逻辑便起到作用,通过提醒灵魂来巩固基于本性的认知。伊本·泰米叶说:"本能的自明之知与支持它的证据之间,并无相互冲突。"107
In the previous chapter, it was highlighted that the cognition of the Lord within the fiṭrah precedes analysis and reasoning. The imprint on the soul requires a man to acknowledge Him, , so long as his senses are of sound nature and the impediments are absent. In the event where a person falls prey to doubt or heedlessness, logic has a role in shoring up fiṭrah-based cognition by reminding the soul. Ibn Taymiyyah said, ‘There is no mutual conflict between instinctive self-evident knowledge and possession of evidence that supports it.’107
启示指出了这一问题及其他问题中的主要理性论据。若我们思考启示如何处理这一问题,便会注意到若干要点:
Revelation points out the main rational arguments in this issue and others. If we contemplate how revelation deals with this issue, we observe a number of points:
1. 《古兰经》和先知圣训中基于逻辑推理的工具明显简明清晰。它们易于理解,并与天性(fiṭrah)完全一致。
1. The tools of logic-based reasoning in the Qur’an and the prophetic tradition are distinctly simple and clear. They are easy to digest and are in absolute alignment with fiṭrah.
这些工具是理性论证中最有益的一类,并且与大多数人的灵魂相契合。"容易领会和消化、且对理智显而易见的理性论证,更容易被人信服。"108 伊本·鲁世德(Ibn Rushd)指出了启示中论证的简明性,以及它们如何高效地引导人达到目标。他说:"考察宗教的方法时,会发现其中大多数具有两个特征:它们是确凿的,并且简单而非复合的,即其前提数量很少。因此,其结论会与其前提紧密相符。"109
These tools are the most beneficial of rational proofs and are congruent with most souls. ‘Rational proof that is easy to grasp and digest, and is apparent to the mind, is more likely to be trusted.’108 Ibn Rushd reveals the simplicity of the proofs in revelation, and how they efficiently lead a person to the goal. He said, ‘When the religious methods are contemplated, most are found to comprise of two characteristics: they are conclusive, and they are simple and not compounds, i.e., they are few in terms of their propositions. Therefore, their conclusions would be closely aligned to their propositions.’109.
2. 丰饶与多样
2. Abundance and variety.
这是真主赐予祂的仆人的一种便利。伊本·泰米叶说:"人们越是需要了解某件事,真主就越为他们提供认识它的证据,例如认识真主本体的证据、先知使命的证据、真主大能与全知的证据等等。这类证据数量众多,且确凿无疑。"110
This is a facilitation granted by Allah to His servants. Ibn Taymiyyah said, ‘The more people are in need of knowing something, Allah facilitates for them the evidence for its knowledge, such as the proofs for knowing Who He is, the proofs of His Messenger’s prophethood, the proofs of His power and knowledge, etc. Such proofs are numerous and conclusive.’110
一种从逻辑论证真主存在的观点认为:结果能够指示原因。启示降临,正是以各种措辞、在多种语境中提醒我们这一论证。有鉴于此,便可以通过祂的全部创造来证明祂,因为它们都是祂的结果。结果指示原因,这一原则是众多子论证的总纲,子论证的数量与创造物中所见的多样性相当。正如伊本·鲁世德在评论以创造为据论证造物主存在的论证时所说:"这一类中的指示物,其数量与被创造之物的数量相同。"111 事实上,"没有任何受造物不是自身就指向其造物主的迹象,而这种指向排除了任何与祂并列的同伴"。112
One aspect of the argument from logic for the existence of God is that the effect is indicative of the cause, and revelation came to remind us of this argument with various wordings and in multiple contexts. With this in mind, it is then possible to prove Him through His entire creation, as they are all one of His effects, . The effect being indicative of the cause is an umbrella argument for numerous sub-arguments, which number the amount of variety found in the creation. It is as Ibn Rushd said as he commented on the argument from invention for the existence of the Creator: ‘And in this type are many indicators as per the number of invented things.’111 In fact, ‘there is no creation that is not in itself a sign pointing to its Creator, in a manner which disallows any partnership associated unto Him’.112
诗人阿布·阿塔希叶说:
The poet Abū al-ʿAtāhiyyah said:
“看哪,我们都将变得过时。”
‘Lo, we are all going to become obsolete.
亚当的子孙中,谁能永生不死?
Who from the children of Adam can remain forever?.
他们的来源是他们的主。
Their origin is from their Lord.
每个人都将回归他的主。
And everyone shall return unto his Lord.
唉,怎么能违抗真主呢?
Alas, how can the Divine be disobeyed?.
那么,祂怎么可能被否认呢?
And how can He be denied?.
真主在每一个动态之中。
Allah has in every motion.
每一个静止的时刻,都是一份证据。
And in every stationary moment a testament.
在万物之中,都有他的一个迹象。
And in everything He has a sign.
指出祂是独一的。
Pointing out that He is the One.’.
由此可见,“安拉通往祂的途径与被造物所呼吸的气息数目一样多”这一说法,离真理并不遥远。113。
It is clear, therefore, that the statement ‘Allah has ways unto Him to the tune of all the breaths taken by the creation’ is not far off from the truth.113.
3. 《古兰经》处理这一问题时,大多是通过暗示和“举轻以明重”(argumentum a fortiori)的方式进行的。
3. The Qur’an mostly deals with this issue by way of implication and argumentum a fortiori.
大多数在《古兰经》中为证明真主存在而提出的证据,其实是为了证明更广泛的论点,例如真主在主宰性与神性上的独一。这些经文通过必然蕴含的方式指明真主的存在。既然这些经文是为证明真主的独一而提出,并叙述了真主的一些完美属性,那么它们也就隐含地为真主的存在提供了证据。这种论证方法显然属于“以更有力者论证”(argumentum a fortiori)。举例来说,真主说:“你说:‘难道我要以真主以外的主作为主宰,而他是万物的主宰吗?’”因此,真主是万物的主宰,这意味着他具有至高主权、创造和安排万事的属性。由此可见,《古兰经》所关注的,不仅仅是证明真主的存在,更在于让受造物认识其造物主,揭示他的完美属性,并阐明他所应得的敬畏、颂扬以及纯一的崇拜。至于受造物仅仅认识到有一位创造他们的主宰,并且他们需要这位主宰的存在,这种认知早已铭刻在他们的天性(fiṭrah)之中。
Most proofs in the Qur’an mentioned to demonstrate His existence are presented to prove a wider point, such as His oneness, in lordship and divinity. Such verses point out Allah’s existence by necessary implication. Since these verses are presented to prove the oneness of Allah and relate some of His perfect attributes, then they are also offering proof for His existence by implication. This method of evidence is argumentum a fortiori, as is evident. To highlight an example, Allah says, ‘Say, O Prophet, “Should I seek a lord other than Allah while He is the Lord of everything?”’114 So, for Allah to be the Lord of everything denotes that He is associated with the attributes of ultimate dominion, creation, and planning. This reveals that the Qur’an’s concern was spent not solely on proving Allah’s existence, but rather to introduce the creation to its Creator, reveal His perfect attributes, and explain the reverence, glorification, and monotheistic worship that He deserves. As for the mere cognition of the creation that they have a Lord that created and that they are in need of His existence, then that is already imprinted onto their fiṭrah.
4. 启示通过其各种表述,旨在激发并提醒人对fiṭrah(天性)这一要素的觉察。
4. Through its various wordings, revelation seeks to stimulate and remind man of the element of fiṭrah.
《古兰经》唤起灵魂的渴望,促使人在面对各种处境时采取相应的方法,以达成所期望的结果。例如,安拉说:“不信后世的人,有恶劣的品性;安拉有至高无上的属性。他是万能的,是至睿的。”115 它也提醒仆人在安拉面前应有的地位,以及灾难降临时他对主的需要:“他使你们能在陆地和海洋中旅行。你们乘船,船借着顺风航行,乘客为之欢喜。忽然狂风骤起,波浪从四面八方袭来,船上的人以为自己已陷入绝境,便一心诚意地只向安拉祈祷:‘如果你救我们脱离此难,我们必定感恩。’”116 《古兰经》还说:“人遭受苦难时,无论躺着、坐着还是站着,都向我祈求。但当我解除他的苦难后,他又恢复旧的样子,仿佛从未为解除苦难而向我祈求过一样!过分的人,他们的恶行就是这样被美化给他们的。”117
The Qur’an evokes the soul’s desire to adopt means in the various situations man faces in order to achieve a desired outcome. For example, Allah says, ‘To those who disbelieve in the Hereafter belong all evil qualities, whereas to Allah belong the finest attributes. And He is the Almighty, All-Wise.’115 It also reminds the servant of his rightful place in front of his Lord and his need for Him when calamity befalls: ‘He is the One Who enables you to travel through land and sea. And it so happens that you are on ships, sailing with a favourable wind, to the passengers’ delight. Suddenly, the ships are overcome by a gale wind and those on board are overwhelmed by waves from every side, and they assume they are doomed. They cry out to Allah alone in sincere devotion, “If You save us from this, we will certainly be grateful.”’116 The Qur’an also says, ‘Whenever someone is touched by hardship, they cry out to Us, whether lying on their side, sitting, or standing. But when We relieve their hardship, they return to their old ways as if they had never cried to Us to remove any hardship! This is how the misdeeds of the transgressors have been made appealing to them.’117
逻辑论证的组成部分:
Components of the argument from logic:
如果我们分析指向安拉存在的理性证据的本质,就会发现它由两个关键部分构成:
If we analyse the nature of the rational proof that points to the existence of Allah , we will observe that it is made up of two key components:
1. 本能性的先天观念。
1. Instinctive innate concepts.
2. 观察与感官
2. Observation and the senses.
第一部分:天生且必然的概念
First component: Concepts that are innate and necessary
这些证明真主存在的论证,是人天生具有的本能认知,例如:没有原因的优先选择是不合理的、结果需要原因、因果律。其他证明也都源于这些论证。因此,某物在原本不存在之后得以存在,便引出关于因果与优先选择的问题:究竟是什么使这个实体的存在优先于其不存在?是什么原因把它从虚无带入存在的世界?同样,世界构造中精妙的设计也是一个需要原因的结果,依此类推。由于这一天生的成分存在,此类论证极为普遍,也易于理解。它使贝都因人说出了那句著名的话:"骆驼的粪便指示骆驼,足迹表明有人走过。那么,布满星辰的天空与沟壑纵横的大地,又怎么会不指向至高无上、全知一切的主呢?"
These arguments that prove Allah’s existence are instinctive realities that are innate to man, like the impropriety of preponderance without a cause for preponderance, an effect’s need for a cause, and the principle of causality. Other proofs stem from these arguments. Thus, the existence of something after having been non-existent leads to the question on causality and preponderance: What exactly gave preponderance for the existence of this entity over its non-existence? What was the cause to take it out from nothingness into the world of existence? Likewise, the immaculate design in the construct of the world is an effect that requires a cause, and so on. The presence of this innate component makes this type of argument extremely widespread and easy to understand. It led the Bedouin to utter his famous phrase: ‘Camel dung points to camels. Footprints indicate travel. So the sky with its constellations and the Earth with its valleys – why do they not point to the Sublime, the Omniscient?’
第二个组成部分:观察与感官
Second component: Observation and the senses
这些内容捕捉的是世界上可观察、可感知的景象与现象。人们在这些观察之上运用逻辑,从而得出结论,这便是基于证据的推理过程的成果。懂得感官指向真主的受造物,知道自己是祂的造化之一。从这一观点看,阿拉伯语中每一类受造物都被称为"ʿālam"(字面意为"世界")。伊本·泰米叶讨论了为何称其为"ʿālam":"ʿĀlam是那能给予知识的东西,正如khātam是用来封印的东西……每一类受造物都被称为ʿālam,因为它是造物主的迹象和证据——与ʿālim(知者)相对,后者是知道的人,正如khātim(封印者)是封印的人。祂说:'……但他是真主的使者,也是众先知的封印。'"118
These pick up the observable and perceptible imagery and phenomena of the world. Logic is applied on these observations, enabling a person to derive conclusions – this is the fruit of the evidence-based reasoning process. Creations who understand that the senses point to Allah know that they are one of His effects. From this viewpoint, each type of creation in Arabic is called ʿālam (literally: world). Ibn Taymiyyah discusses why ʿālam is called ʿālam: ‘ʿĀlam is that which gives knowledge, like khātam is that which is used to seal…Each category of creation is called ʿālam as it is a sign and proof for the Creator – as opposed to ʿālim, who is one who knows, just like khātim, who is the one who seals. He said, “…but is the Messenger of Allah and the seal of the prophets”118
“因为他是他们的封印。”虽然一切受造物都指向祂,但它们指向的程度各不相同。无生命之物虽指向真主,但其指向远不及有生命的受造物。小石子对真主的指向,与人对真主的指向,存在明显差别。指向程度的差异,部分源于事物本身的性质(即推理的对象领域),部分源于观察者的性质(即进行推理的人)。
because he was the seal to them.’ Though all creations are indicative of Him , they vary in their level of indication. Though inanimate objects are indicative of Allah , their indication is less than that of living creations. There is a difference between the indication to Allah by a pebble and that of a human. Part of the varying levels of indication goes back to the nature of matter (the subject area for reasoning) and the nature of the observer (the reasoner).
为论证安拉存在的理性证明奠定基础
Setting the basis for the possibility of rationally proving the existence of Allah
虽然有神论者关于真主的认知是天生的这一观点十分明确,并且可以借助理性证明来提醒人们注意这一天生的本性,从而使其在这方面获得安宁,但哲学界的争论焦点在于:是否可能为真主的存在提供理性论证?
Though the theist viewpoint on the cognition of Allah being innate is clear, and that it is possible to leverage rational proofs to remind man of that innate predisposition and to gain contentment in that regard, the arena of argument in circles of philosophy is this: Is it possible to offer rational reasoning for Allah’s existence or not?
人们对此大致持三种立场:认为可能;持反对态度;以及介于两者之间的中间立场,这些立场或是混乱不清,或是犹豫不决、难以倾向任何一方。例如,不可知论者对神的存在没有立场——既不接受,也不否定其存在。其中一些人持此观点,是因为他们觉得支持与反对的证据相互抵消;另一些人则声称,他们的不可知论源于人类的认知无法就此问题得出任何确定的结论。他们主张,我们的认知工具无法回答神是否存在的问题。这一立场否定了关于神存在的问题能够得到解答的可能性。在我们深入探讨那些表明神存在的证据细节之前,应当先简要讨论通过理性证明认识神的可能范围。我们能否运用认知能力来得出这方面的答案?尽管信神的人并非通过经验或直接的感官途径信神,这并不妨碍他们对神抱有信仰。他们的信仰基于:a)fiṭrah(天性)的要求,以及b)各种理性论证。此外还有先知和使者所带来的证据,这些证据不仅指向神的存在,也指向其完美的属性。为了说明真主可以通过理性被认识,需要指出,存在中的一切事物都属于两种类型之一:
One finds three positions on this: possible; against; and middle positions that are either confused or hesitant to incline either way. Agnostics, for example, do not have a position on the existence of the Divine – they neither accept nor reject His existence. Though some of them are of this view because they feel the evidence on both sides cancel each other out, others of this view state that their agnosticism is because it is impossible for human cognition to arrive at any firm conclusion in this matter. They claim that our cognitive tools are unable to offer any answer to the question of God’s existence. This position negates the possibility that the question of God’s existence can be answered. Before we delve into discussing the details of the proofs that are indicative of His existence, we should quickly deal with the issue of the scope of possibility of knowing God through rational proofs. Can we use our cognitive powers to arrive at an answer in this regard? Though humans who believe in God do not do so by way of empirical or direct sensory means, that has not prevented them from having faith in Him. They believe on the basis of a) the requirement of the fiṭrah, and b) various rational arguments. This is in addition to the evidence brought by the Prophets and Messengers that point not only to His existence but His perfect attributes. To clarify that Allah can be recognised rationally, it should be noted that everything in existence is one of two types:
可通过感官感知。
• Perceptible through the senses.
• 不可察觉之物。
• Imperceptibles.
关于前者的知识可以通过感官获得。至于不可感知之物,其中一些的知识可以获得,另一些则不能。因此,通过逻辑推理,有可能获得某些不可感知之物存在的知识。
Knowledge of the former can be acquired through the senses. As for the imperceptibles, the knowledge of some can be acquired; some may not. Therefore, it is possible to acquire the knowledge of the existence of some imperceptibles via logic.
107 《Bayān Talbīs al-Jahmiyyah》,第572页。108 《Al-Qā’id ilā Taṣḥīḥ al-ʿAqā’id》,第29页。
107 Bayān Talbīs al-Jahmiyyah, p. 572. 108 Al-Qā’id ilā Taṣḥīḥ al-ʿAqā’id, p. 29.
《Al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij al-Adillah》,第116页。
109 Al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij al-Adillah, p. 116.
《درء تعارض العقل والنقل》,10/129。
110 Dar’ Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wa al-Naql, 10/129.
《Al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij al-Adillah》,第119页。
111 Al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij al-Adillah, p. 119.
112 《Bayān Talbīs al-Jahmiyyah》,第583页。
112 Bayān Talbīs al-Jahmiyyah, p. 583.
参见伊本·泰米叶在《Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā》(《法特瓦集》)第10卷第454页中对此的详细论述。
113 See Ibn Taymiyyah’s detail on this in Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, 10/454.
《古兰经》6:164
114 Al-Anʿām, 164.
115 Al-Naḥl, 60.
115 Al-Naḥl, 60.
116 Yūnus, 22.
116 Yūnus, 22.
117 Yūnus, 12.
117 Yūnus, 12.
33:40 艾哈@zāb章,第40节。 Wait, let me correct the transliteration to match the original text: "Al-Aḥzāb" is the name of the surah, so it should be written as 《艾哈@zāb》 with proper transliteration. Corrected translation: 第33章 艾哈zāb(部落联军),第40节。
118 Al-Aḥzāb, 40.
《Miʿyār al-ʿIlm fī Fann al-Manṭiq》,第56页。
119 Miʿyār al-ʿIlm fī Fann al-Manṭiq, p. 56.
《درء تعارض العقل والنقل》,10/246。
120 Dar’ Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wa al-Naql, 10/246.
一个对这一问题很有帮助的参考资料,是我从中受益的 Suʿūd al-ʿArīfī 所著《al-Adillah al-ʿAqliyyah al-Naqliyyah》。121 Mawqif al-ʿAql wa al-ʿIlm wa al-ʿĀlam min Rabb al-ʿĀlamīn wa-ʿIbādih al-Mursalīn, 3/
A good reference point for this issue which I benefited from is Suʿūd al-ʿArīfī’s al-Adillah al-ʿAqliyyah al Naqliyyah. 121 Mawqif al-ʿAql wa al-ʿIlm wa al-ʿĀlam min Rabb al-ʿĀlamīn wa-ʿIbādih al-Mursalīn, 3/