关于以"天性"（fiṭrah）证明安拉存在的论证，并不局限于灵魂中那种要求人肯定有一位造物主的因素。相反，天性可能以多种方式、在不同层面上揭示这一实质性的事实。

The argument from fiṭrah for Allah  is not limited to the element that exists in the soul, which requires a person to affirm that there is a Creator. Rather, it is possible that the fiṭrah reveals this substantial fact in a number of ways and at various levels.

在人能够自动把握的事物中，有一些自然的、理性的事实，被称为直觉知识或自明真理。它们是天生被知晓的，灵魂无需任何分析或推理便可获得。这与被称为理论知识的那一类知识形成对比，理论知识只能通过分析和推理才能获得。

Of the issues a person can automatically grasp are certain natural and rational facts, referred to as intuitive knowledge or self-evident truths. These are innately known and are acquired by the soul without any analysis or reasoning. This is in contrast to the type of knowledge that is known as theoretical knowledge, which can be acquired only via analysis and reasoning.

两者之间的区别应当是清楚的,事实上,这种区别应当是不言自明的,使每个人都能立即辨认出来,而不像理论知识那样容易引起怀疑和反驳。这些反驳可以通过分析和推理加以驳斥。直觉知识的本性在于它不依赖证明;相反,直觉知识本身被用作证据。理论知识则要回溯到直觉知识以获得验证。伊本·哈兹姆对此解释说:“凡是能够通过逻辑或感官直接获得的事实,根本不需要证据。相反,正是这类事实,每个人都应当用作证据和反驳的依据,之后他的理论推理才能被判定为正确或错误。”42

The difference between the two should be clear; in fact, it should be self evident such that every person must instantly recognise it, as opposed to theoretical knowledge that can be prone to doubt and objection. Such objections may be repelled through analysis and reasoning. It is in the nature of intuitive knowledge that it is not dependent on proof; rather, intuitive knowledge itself is used as evidence. Theoretical knowledge is referred back to intuitive knowledge for verification. Explaining this, Ibn Ḥazm says, ‘Whatever that can be acquired immediately through logic or the senses is not in need of evidence at all. Rather, it is these types of facts that everyone ought to use as evidence and refutation, after which his theoretical reasoning can be deemed to be correct or incorrect.’42

Muʿallimī说道："至于直觉性和自明性的知识，逻辑学家一致认为，它们是逻辑的通货。另一方面，从分析性知识中推导出信息，只有在它以前者为基础并归于前者时，才有可能实现。" 推理若没有直觉性信息的存在便无法成立。没有它，就会出现循环论证和无穷倒退，从而导致整个推理体系的崩溃。伊本·泰米叶对此解释道："通过分析论证所获得的知识，必须回溯到直觉性命题。任何非直觉性的知识，都必须回溯到直觉性知识。如果理论性命题总是由同类命题来证明，就会出现循环论证或因果关系的无穷倒退。依据必然性以及逻辑学家的共识，这两者在多个方面都是不恰当的。"

Muʿallimī said, ‘As for instinctive and self-evident information, the logicians agree that it is the currency of logic. On the other hand, deriving information from analytical knowledge can only be aspired when it is based on, and attributed to, the former.’43 Reasoning cannot work without the existence of intuitive information. Without it, circular reasoning and infinite regress would come as a result, causing the collapse of the entire system of reasoning. Explaining this, Ibn Taymiyyah said, ‘Knowledge that is acquired by analysing proof must refer back to intuitive propositions. Any piece of knowledge that is not intuitive must refer back to intuitive knowledge. If theoretical propositions are constantly proven by their like, circular reasoning or infinite regress of causality would ensue. By necessity and the agreement of logicians, both are improper from a number of angles.

获得的理论知识是从已知的命题中得来的、无需分析的知识。如果这些命题也是理论性的,那么它们又会依赖于其他命题,如此一来,人的内心就会有无穷无尽的理论命题。人是有始的——他是在不存在之后才出现的。人心中的知识也是有始的。如果他心中的知识不是在先前没有任何知识的情况下获得的,那就意味着他的心从一开始就是没有知识的。因此,必定有一些基本的、不证自明的信息,是真主置于人心之中的。任何证明的目的,都是回溯到这类不证自明的信息。此外,不证自明的信息有时也会受到怀疑和低语的侵扰,就像诡辩者的怀疑那样,他们攻击那些可感知的、不证自明的信息。例如,拉齐在其《Al-Muḥaṣṣal》开头提出的怀疑即是如此,我们已在别处讨论过。

Acquired theoretical knowledge is that which is gained from known propositions that do not require analysis. Had those propositions been theoretical as well, they would have in turn been contingent on other propositions, leading to an infinity of theoretical propositions inside man. Man is temporal – he came into existence after having been non-existent. The knowledge in his heart is temporal. If the knowledge in his heart was not acquired without knowledge prior to it, it would mean that his heart would be without knowledge right from the start. Therefore, it is necessary that there are basic self-evident pieces of information that Allah places within a person’s heart. The aim of any proof is to refer back to this type of self-evident information. Furthermore, self-evident information is sometimes subject to doubts and whispers, like the doubts of sophists who cast aspersions on tangible and self-evident information. These include, for example, the doubts cast by Rāzī in the beginning of his al Muḥaṣṣal, which we have discussed elsewhere:

不能用证据去驳斥那些损害这类知识的怀疑，因为证据的作用在于回归到那些直觉性的知识。因此，一旦怀疑滋生，通向分析和研究的道路便被堵塞。这正是为什么不必与那些否认可感知和本能知识的人辩论的原因。事实上，如果此人固执己见，就应当对其加以惩戒，直到他承认真理。如果他因感官或理智受到败坏而产生错误，或者他根本无法理解这些知识，或者出于其他任何原因，就应当对他进行治疗，使他具备获取知识的前提条件，并能够消除阻碍知识的种种因素。如果他仍因性情败坏而无法领会，就应当用对症的药物为他治疗，或者通过祈祷、鲁格耶以及特别的关注等方式为他医治。否则，就应当放任不管。44

Doubts that are injurious to that information cannot be repelled with proof. This is because the aim of proof is that it refers back to that intuitive information. Therefore, when doubt creeps in, the path to analysis and research is closed off. This is why those who deny tangible and instinctive information are not to be debated. In fact, if such a person is being obstinate, he should be disciplined until he admits the truth. If he is mistaken due to corruption afflicting his senses or his mind, is simply unable to understand that information, or for any other reason, he should be treated so that he can gain the prerequisites of acquiring knowledge and be able to dispel those things that block it. If he is still unable to comprehend because of corruption in his temperament, he should be treated with medicament that deals with this, or with supplication, ruqyah, special attention, etc. Otherwise, he should be left alone.44

任何试图通过推理来证明自明真理之真实性的做法都极为困难。事实上，这可能是不可能的，而且可能使人对它们产生怀疑，从而陷入诡辩的诸多类型之一。无论如何，这样的过程无异于折磨灵魂，且毫无益处。伊本·泰米叶在阐述这一点时，举了一个精妙的例子来说明这一问题的本质：

Any attempt to demonstrate the veracity of self-evident truths through reasoning is very hard. In fact, it can be impossible and may lead a person to doubt them, thus falling into one of the many types of sophism. In any case, such a process would be tantamount to torturing the soul without any benefit whatsoever. Expounding on this, Ibn Taymiyyah offered a fine example to demonstrate the nature of this problem:

当本能可以直接理解的事情，却要借助非本能的方式去推理时，人只会徒然折磨自己的灵魂。这就如同一个人被吩咐把一笔钱平均分给若干人，而这件事本应毫不费力地完成。有人却对他说：“等等，你若不知道除法的定义，若不区分除法与乘法，你就无法分钱。除法与乘法互为相反。乘法是把一个数的单位与另一个数的单位相合而成，而除法则是把一个数的单位分割为另一个数的单位。因此，当商与除数相乘时，得到的是被除数；而当乘积被乘数之一除时，得到的是另一个乘数……”“我刚才所说的乘法定义并不完全成立，因为它只适用于整数的乘法，而不适用于分数。一个包罗万象的定义应当是：乘积与所乘数之一的关系，等同于数字一与另一个所乘数的关系……”“二分之一乘以四分之一得到八分之一。八分之一与四分之一的关系，等同于二分之一与一的关系。”这些陈述本身都是正确的，但显然，一个有钱、想把钱平均分给若干人的人，如果他在分钱之前强迫自己理解这一切，那他只会徒劳地煎熬。他甚至可能根本无法理解这些问题，反而觉得它们棘手难解。45

When instinctively comprehended matters are reasoned through non instinctive means, one will be tormenting the soul in vain. This is similar to a man who is told to divide a certain sum of money into equal portions among a number of individuals – a task that should be performed without difficulty. Someone may say to him, “Wait, you cannot divide it without knowing the definition of division and without drawing a distinction between division and multiplication. Division is the opposite of multiplication. The latter is carried out by compounding the units of one number by the units of the other, whereas the former is achieved by dividing the units of one number by the units of the other. This is why when the quotient is multiplied by the divisor, the result is the dividend, and when the number resulting from multiplication is divided by one of the two numbers multiplied, the result is the other number… “What I have said about the definition of multiplication is not valid because it applies to the multiplication of integers, not fractional numbers. An all-inclusive definition would be: Multiplication is the sum total whose relation to one of the numbers multiplied is the same as the relation of figure one to the other number… “The multiplication of one-half by one quarter results in one-eighth. The relation of one-eighth to one quarter is the same as the relation of one-half to the figure one.” Although these are all valid statements, it is clear that the person who has money and wishes to distribute it equally among a number of individuals would agonise in vain if he were to force himself to understand all this before he divided the money. He may not even understand these matters and may find them problematic.’45

在解释自明真理的推理过程可能导致的结果时，他补充道：“大量信息是必然的，也是本能的。如果一个人想要强迫自己为此提供论证，那对他来说会很困难。他会使自己陷入怀疑，原因或是因为这会导致冗长的命题，或是因为这些命题难以厘清，或是两者兼而有之。”46

Explaining what the process of reasoning for self-evident truth can lead to, he adds: ‘A lot of information is necessary and instinctive. If a person wants to force himself to offer reasoning for that, it would be difficult for him. He would land himself into doubt, whether because it would lead to lengthy propositions, because they are difficult to unlock, or both.46

如果说自明的事实确实需要通过推理来论证,那恰恰说明它们是内在的、出于本能的,而不是为了证明其正确性。揭示某事物的本质,与为其真实性提供证据,这两者有所不同:前者好比提醒那些疏忽和健忘的人。因此,伊本·泰米叶在论述证明安拉存在的迹象时说:"当他看到那些必然指向安拉存在的迹象时,这些迹象会在那一范畴中使他醒悟,正如安拉所说:'当恶魔向敬畏安拉的人耳语时,他们便想起了自己的主,于是他们开始看清事物。'这也是提醒人们在健忘和疏忽降临时记念安拉。因此,它是驱散人可能遭遇的无知的醒悟,也是消除疏忽的提醒。尽管如此,对安拉存在的根本认识,是灵魂中本就具备的本能,无需任何外在的途径。"48

If there is ever a case that self-evident facts need to be reasoned, then that would actually be to demonstrate that they are indeed innate and instinctive, not to prove they are correct. There is a difference between revealing the nature of something and the attempt to offer evidence for its veracity – the former is akin to reminding the heedless and forgetful. This is why when discussing the evidence that proves the existence of Allah , Ibn Taymiyyah said, So when he sees the signs that necessitate His existence, they would be an eye-opener from that spectrum, just as He  said, “Indeed, when Satan whispers to those mindful of Allah, they remember their Lord then they start to see things clearly.”47 It would also be a reminder to remember Allah when forgetfulness and heedlessness overcome. Therefore, it is an eye-opener to dispel the ignorance one may experience, and a reminder to remove one’s heedlessness. This is despite the fact that the core recognition of Allah’s existence is instinctively found in the soul without any external means whatsoever.48

这就引出了两个合理的问题：

This brings about two valid questions:

灵魂是在哪里获得直觉知识的?

1. Where did the soul gain intuitive knowledge?.

2. 直觉知识的普遍性和绝对客观性从何而来?

2. From where does intuitive knowledge acquire its universal and absolute objectivity?.

根据前面的讨论,已经清楚的是,直觉性的认知本已存在于心中。它不是通过教育过程获得的,也不是从任何外部来源获取的信息。因此,自然会提出这样一个问题:是谁或什么把这些本能的观念放入心中?合乎逻辑的答案是安拉。为了回避这个问题,无神论的论述竭力质疑这种认知的本能性质,声称这类信息源于人通过感官所接受的教育,经由归纳法(istiqrā’)的过程而形成。他们提出如下例子:如果一个人把一个苹果加到另一个苹果上,就会得到两个苹果;如果他把一个橙子加到另一个橙子上,就会得到两个橙子。这是一条普遍规律:1+1=2。他们还补充说,因果律是人通过感官感知到的因果过程形成的。简言之,他们主张这种知识源于经验,而非源于任何先于感官的本能知识。这种哲学立场——以感官知识来解释理性信息,并忽视任何先天倾向——会导致一系列认知上的问题。它为怀疑这些概念实际上所具有的本能性与恒常性真理打开了大门。涵盖人类一切经验的"尝试与检验"方法是无法完全实现的。因此,一个人仍有可能对这条普遍规律心存疑虑,因为它可能在他有限的"尝试与检验"实验之外的某处被打破。例如,他无从知道宇宙中某处是否发生过一个没有任何外部原因引发的事件。

From the previous discussion, it was made clear that intuitive information is already present in the heart. It is not acquired through the process of education. It is not information accessed from any external source. Therefore, it is perfectly natural to ask the following question: What or who placed these instinctive ideas in the heart? The logical answer is Allah. In order to sidestep this question, atheist discourse has strived to cast doubt on the instinctive nature of this cognition, claiming that such information is borne out of the education received by the senses via the process of induction (istiqrā’). They propose the following: If a man adds an apple to another, it would be two apples; if he adds an orange to another, it would be two oranges. This is a universal rule: 1+1=2. They add that the rule of causality is borne out of the cause-effect process that man perceives through his senses. In a nutshell, they claim that this knowledge is borne out of this experience, not because of any instinctive knowledge in this regard that precludes the senses. This philosophical outlook – interpreting rational information by referring them back to sensory knowledge and disregarding any innate predisposition – leads to a number of cognitive problems. It opens up the door of doubting the instinctive and recurring truths that these concepts actually are. The ‘try-and-test’ method that covers every human experience is impossible to achieve. Therefore, it is possible that a man can still have doubts about this universal law, as it might be broken somewhere outside of his limited ‘try-and-test’ experiment. For example, he would not know that there is an event, somewhere in the universe, that came to pass without any external cause triggering it.

这一难题促使一些无神论者提出一种观点:承认这些理性概念在实践中普遍存在,但不试图从哲学或理论的角度对其加以解释。这些哲学家承认宇宙中存在一种实用主义的互惠安排:人在日常生活中相信这些是天生的、不言自明的真理,而实际上,它们的自明性、天赋性和本能性无法被证明,也无法通过推理加以论证。当某些无神论者真的对自明和必然的概念采取怀疑态度时,这一问题便更加严重:他们认为,从这些概念中不可能获得任何理论知识,也不应将其视为不证自明的事实。

This problem led some atheists to propose a view that acknowledges the universal recurrence of these rational concepts in practice, without attempting to explain them from a philosophical or theoretical viewpoint. These philosophers acknowledge a pragmatic quid pro quo arrangement in the universe: Man engages with his daily life believing these are innate and self-evident truths, while in reality, their self-evidentiary, innate, and instinctive nature is something that cannot be demonstrated or reasoned with proof. The problem is compounded when some atheists actually adopt a sceptical approach to self-evident and necessary concepts: that there cannot be any theoretical knowledge that could be gained from them, nor should they be accepted as self-evident facts.

著名无神论者劳伦斯·克劳斯曾多次表示,人类的心智是原始的,并且在达尔文主义的意义上不断进化,以便安全地应对稀树草原上的危险;然而,这些心智未必能够理解宇宙的本质或存在的实在。因此,他主张,必须通过世界本身来理解世界——借助观察与经验主义,而不依赖任何被称为理性概念的东西,更不能将其视为真理的裁决者。他认为,真理只是那些可以按照科学方法通过观察和感官获得的东西,无论它看起来多么奇怪,甚至与我们的直觉相矛盾。克劳斯在其著作《从无到有的宇宙:为何存在的是某物而非虚无》中提到了这一点,该书基于这样一种观点:尽管宇宙源于虚无,但它能够依据物理定律由自身创造出自身。这一论断及其所包含的细节问题极大,因为它会导致多种极其危险的认知问题。克劳斯与哈姆扎·佐尔齐斯在辩论《伊斯兰教还是无神论:哪一个更合乎情理?》中,暴露了其中一些认知上的混乱。在这场辩论中,克劳斯自相矛盾、困惑的立场被揭示出来,他被证明无法构建任何站得住脚的认知观点。其问题首先在于,它抛弃了基本的理性概念。抛弃它们不仅导致对观察工具的信任丧失,也导致对科学方法本身的信任丧失。按照极端科学主义的观点,科学方法是通往知识的唯一途径。然而,科学方法所依据的种种论断,其证据本身无法通过科学方法来证明;否则就会陷入循环论证。 这种认为知识只能建立在自然和科学信息之上的立场是自相矛盾的，无法被视为理性上可以接受的。然而，如果这类反驳针对的是那些否认基本理性概念的人，而正如你所见，这种反驳本身正是建立在这些概念之上，我们又该怎么办呢？对于那些不觉得接受“宇宙自己创造了自己”有任何问题的人来说，这样的反驳又怎能令他们信服呢？如果他们愿意接受这一类说法，那么 27

The famous atheist Lawrence Krauss has stated on multiple occasions that the human mind is primitive and evolving – in Darwinist terms – to safely interact with the dangers in the savannah; however, they are minds that are not necessarily able to understand the nature of this universe or existential reality. Therefore, he claims, it is necessary that the world is understood through the world itself – via observation and empiricism, without relying on anything known as rational concepts, let alone referring to them as arbiters of truth. Truth, he claims, is only that which we can access via observation and the senses according to the scientific method, no matter how strange it may appear – or contradictory even – to our instinctive minds. Krauss mentioned this in his book A Universe from Nothing: Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing, which is based on the idea that even though the universe came from nothing, it can create itself from itself as per the laws of physics. This assertion with the detail it entails is extremely problematic, as it leads to multiple cognitive problems that are extremely dangerous. Some of this cognitive disorder became apparent in Krauss’s debate with Hamza Tzortzis, Islam or Atheism: Which Makes More Sense? In this debate, the self-conflicting and confused position of Krauss was exposed, as it was revealed that he was unable to construct any sound cognitive viewpoint. Its problems begin in that it discards basic rational concepts. Discarding them leads to the abandonment of not only trust in the tools of observation, but also a loss of trust in the scientific method itself. The scientific method is the sole path to knowledge, as per the view purported by extreme scientism. The scientific method is based on assertions whose evidence cannot be demonstrated through the scientific method itself; otherwise, it will lead to circularity. The position that knowledge can only be based on natural and scientific information is a self-contradictory one that cannot be deemed rationally acceptable. However, what are we to do if this type of objection is directed at those who deny basic rational concepts, when – as you can see – the objection is based on them? How can it be convincing to those who do not see any problem in accepting that the universe created itself? If they are willing to accept this type of 27

如果按照这种观点，又有什么能阻止人们宣称"科学方法之所以正确，是因为……科学方法本身"呢？毫无疑问，提出这样一种概念化的说法必然导向诡辩。事实上，一些无神论者已经陷入了这种思维方式。

view, then what is stopping them from claiming that ‘the scientific method is correct because of…the scientific method’? There is little doubt that the proposal of such a conceptualisation leads to sophistry. Indeed, some atheists have fallen victim to this type of mentality.

有一次,我与一些受无神论思想困扰的青年进行讨论。讨论把我们引向了西式的辩论话题,于是我觉得有必要把讨论拉回到双方都能接受的共同基础上。我便开始谈论人类获取信息的来源。我说,概括而言,这些来源有三种。

On one occasion, I was in a discussion with some youth who were afflicted by atheist ideas. The discussion led us to Western-style polemics on the subject, so I saw that it was necessary for the discussion to be brought back to a common ground. I started to speak on the human sources of information. I said that, broadly speaking, these sources are three:

感官。

1. The senses.

逻辑学。

2. Logic.

3. 传述的信息

3. Transmitted information.

当我得知,按照他们的说法,获取知识的来源仅限于感官,而不包括理性层面的问题(无论是理论性的还是本能性的),我是多么惊讶啊!我想确定这个问题在他们的思想中确实存在。于是我向他们提出了一系列问题,以弄清他们在这个问题上的信念,以及他们为何会提出这样一条关键原则。我当时说的话如下:"一个基本的理性概念是'部分小于整体'。设想我们面前有一个橙子,我们把它切成四份。那其中的一份会比整个橙子小、相等,还是更大?"他们的回答让我大为震惊:"在我们亲眼看到这个橙子并亲手切开之前,我们无从得知。"我又对他们说:"我家里有一本书,名为《伊本·泰米叶文集》(Majmūʿ Fatāwā Ibn Taymiyyah),共37卷。第一卷比整套书小、相等,还是更大?"他们说:"在我们去你家亲眼看到之前,我们也不会知道。"我们面前放着一把咖啡壶。我对其中一人说:"把壶提起来。"他提起后,我又说:"既然你知道自己能提起较重的东西,那么你能否根据这一认知,去提起较轻的咖啡杯呢?"他伸手去拿杯子,我对他说:"我不想让你去做实验。"他回答说:"在我实验之前,我不会知道答案。"我最后问其中一人:"你存在还是不存在?"他说:"我存在。"我又问:"未来的科学是否有可能证明你实际上并不存在?"他说:"有可能。"讨论就此结束。

Imagine how surprised I was when I learned that the source of gaining information according to them was sensory only, not rational issues (whether theoretical or instinctive)! I wanted to be certain that this problem actually existed in their mindset. I asked them a number of questions to ascertain their convictions on the topic, and why they would propose such a key principle. What I said was the following: ‘One basic rational concept is that “part < whole”. Imagine we have an orange in front of us and we split it into quarters. Would that one quarter be smaller than, equal to, or larger than the whole orange?’ I was shocked when they replied: ‘We cannot know until we see this orange and cut it ourselves.’ I told them, ‘At home, I have a book titled as Majmūʿ Fatāwā Ibn Taymiyyah in 37 volumes. Is the first volume smaller than, equal to, or larger than the whole collection?’ They said, ‘We would not know until we visited you at your home and saw it.’ There was a coffee pot in front of us. I said to one of them, ‘Lift the pot up.’ When he raised it, I said, ‘Will you be able to raise the coffee cup – which is lighter – based on your knowledge that you can lift something heavier?’ He reached out to the cup – I said to him, ‘I do not want you to experiment.’ He said, ‘I would not know the answer until I experiment.’ I finished my line of questioning by asking one of them, ‘Do you exist or not?’ He said, ‘I exist.’ I said, ‘Is it possible that science in the future will be able to prove that you are in fact non-existent?’ He said, ‘It is possible.’ The discussion ended at this.

公允地说,他们之中也有人不赞同同伴对基本理性概念的否认,认为这类理论化和奠基性的做法足以终结讨论。然而,他的朋友们反对这一观点。事实上,他们的一些主张未必源于固执或傲慢,而是基于一些数据,其中部分可追溯到这样一条原则:知识不能脱离感官作为中介而凭直觉确立。他们还依赖一些科学论断,尤其是量子物理学领域的论断,这些论断使他们误以为理性论断与科学论断之间无法调和。

To be fair, there were some among them who did not agree with their fellows’ denial of basic rational concepts, and were of the view that this type of theorising and foundational basis would end the discussion. However, his friends were opposed to this. The truth is that some of their proposals did not necessarily arise from obstinacy or haughtiness. Rather, they based this on data, some of which goes back to the rule that knowledge cannot be instinctively established without the intermediary of the senses. They also rely on scientific assertions – especially in the field of quantum physics – that duped them into believing that there is no way to marry rational and scientific assertions.

任何读过量子物理学的人都会知道它有多么含混，人类的心智要理清它的诸多层面又有多么复杂。约翰·惠勒（John Wheeler）说：“如果你对量子力学不感到完全困惑，那你就是没有理解它。”49 罗杰·彭罗斯（Roger Penrose）说：“量子力学绝对说不通。”50 理查德·费曼（Richard Feynman）说：“我可以很有把握地说，没有人理解量子力学。”51

Whoever has read quantum physics will know how ambiguous it is, and how complex it is for a human mind to navigate its many aspects. John Wheeler said, ‘If you are not completely confused by quantum mechanics, you do not understand it.’49 Roger Penrose said, ‘Quantum mechanics makes absolutely no sense.’50 Richard Feynman said, ‘I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics.’51

我认为,一个人不应当为了自然知识而抛弃自明知识及其客观价值,这是不恰当的。应当做到的是让自然知识受自明知识的支配:凡是来自前者而含糊不清或与后者相矛盾的内容,都应当摒弃。我们必须相信自己对实在是无知的;如果这种无知得以消除,那么感官所得与可感之物必然会与理性相一致。若不采取这种态度,我们将什么知识都没有,无论是可感的知识还是理性的知识。由此可以确凿地证明,许多无神论者确实面临一个真实的问题,他们在调和二者方面存在一定程度的无能,从而导致极其危险的结论。

I believe that it is not proper for a person to discard self-evident knowledge and their objective value just for natural knowledge. What is incumbent is to have natural knowledge governed by self-evident knowledge – whatever from the former is ambiguous or contradicts the latter should be cast aside. We must believe that we are ignorant of reality; if that ignorance is dispelled, then most certainly the sensory and tangible would be in alignment with the rational. Without this approach, we will be left without any knowledge, whether tangible or rational. It has thus been conclusively proven that there is a real problem facing many atheists, and that there is a degree of inability on their part to reconcile the two, leading to extremely dangerous conclusions.

在与伦纳德·蒙洛迪诺（Leonard Mlodinow）合著的《大设计》一书中，斯蒂芬·霍金说：“的确，与当今科学中的许多观念一样，它似乎违背常识。但常识建立在日常经验之上，而非建立在通过种种技术奇迹所揭示的宇宙之上，那些技术使我们得以窥探原子深处，或回溯到宇宙的早期。”52 这段话的问题在于“常识”一词的含义模糊。它是指基本的理性概念应当被否定，还是仅仅指自然律意义上的不可能？

In his book The Grand Design, which was co-authored with Leonard Mlodinow, Stephen Hawking said, ‘Indeed, like many notions in today’s science, it appears to violate common sense. But common sense is based upon everyday experience, not upon the universe as it is revealed through the marvels of technologies, such as those that allow us to gaze deep into the atom or back to the early universe.’52 The problem with this passage is the ambiguity surrounding the idea of ‘common sense’. Does it mean that basic rational concepts are to be denied, or does it simply mean nomological impossibilities?

有人可能会错误地以为某件在规律上不可能的事情在理性上也不可能,后来才发现它并非理性上不可能。然而,存在一套基本的本能概念,它们似乎高于人类本身的存在。这类本能的信息并非仅靠人类经验获得。因此,否认逻辑上的不可能是一种错误;逻辑上的不可能,实际上是那些导致矛盾的情形,例如方的圆、运动着的静止物体、既不存在又不不存在的事物等等。这类图像不属于规律上不可能的范畴——我们对规律上不可能之事的理解,并非仅仅源于人类经验。相反,这些是逻辑上的不可能,它们根本不可能在外部世界中被设想出来。

A person might mistakenly assume that something nomologically impossible is also rationally impossible, only to later find out that it is not rationally impossible. However, there is a package of basic instinctive concepts that appear to be higher than the very existence of man. Such instinctive information is not gained by mere human experience. This is why it is an error to deny logical impossibilities, which in reality are those scenarios that lead to a contradiction, such as a squared circle, a moving motionless body, something that is neither in existence nor in non-existence, etc. These sorts of images are not from the family of nomological impossibilities – such that our understanding of nomological impossibilities goes back solely to our human experience. Rather, these are logical impossibilities that cannot ever be envisaged in the external world at all.

霍金的这段论述存在的问题，在他同一本书中的另一句话中得到了进一步的说明：“量子物理学似乎可能动摇自然受法则支配的观念，但事实并非如此。”53 如果表面看来确实如此，那么实际上为什么又不是这样呢？原因在于，那些看似矛盾的说法应当回归到其他概念和断言中去加以考察，如此矛盾的问题便得以解决。其中一类概念便是本能的理性概念。

The problem with Hawking’s passage is further clarified with what he mentions in the same book: ‘Quantum physics might seem to undermine the idea that nature is governed by laws, but that is not the case.’53 If this appears to be the case, then why is it not like that then in actual truth? The reason for that is what appears to be contradictory would be referred back to other concepts and assertions, so that the problem of contradiction is solved. One of these concepts are the instinctive rational concepts.

事实上，量子物理学以其全部科学与理性的内涵，是一门重要的研究领域。要澄清物理学中各种论断的真实性，并回应这些论断所提出的概念，需要众多专家的协作。

The truth is that quantum physics, with all its scientific and rational implications, is an important field of study. It requires the convergence of many specialists to clarify the reality of assertions made in physics in order to offer answers to concepts brought up by those assertions.

无神论者在基本理性原则方面所面临的问题，很大程度上可以追溯到他们对我们存在的唯物主义和达尔文主义观点。如果我们能够化解这样一个僵局：即认为物质能够产生逻辑，而达尔文式的进化能够创造出这一产物，那么达尔文主义在我们理性能力问题上提出的一个问题便是：自然是为我们进化并发展出能够抵达客观实在的心智，还是为了让我们能够生存和存活而进化并发展出它们，而不管它们能否揭示事物的真实本性？我们的心智是否有可能告诉我们某些东西，并把它说成对我们的生存和存活是必要的，而实际上这可能只是一种幻想？

The problem faced by atheists vis-à-vis basic rational principles goes back, for the large part, to their materialistic and Darwinist outlook on our existence. If we could negotiate the deadlock caused by the notion that matter is able to produce logic, and that Darwinist evolution is able to create this product, then one question that Darwinism poses vis-à-vis our rational capabilities is this: Did nature evolve and develop minds for us that are able to reach objective realities, or did it evolve and develop them for us to live and survive, regardless of the possibilities in revealing the actual true nature of things? Is it possible that our minds tell us something and make it out as if it is necessary for us so that we can live and survive, even though this might just be a fantasy?

这是达尔文主义的一个深层问题。它在无神论的整体论述中引发了许多广泛的问题，涉及诸多议题，例如信仰上帝的先天性、对宗教的渴望、道德感、自由意志的倾向等。原因在于，所有这些都是通过达尔文主义的视角来解释的，而这种视角要么基于a)生命体的生存优势，要么基于b)在这些优势并非主要目的或被视为无关紧要的情况下，它们的存在原因，即这些只是自然选择过程以及人类生存的副产品。逻辑学家并非首个这样思考的人。按照达尔文主义的观点，自然进化出我们的心智，是为了让我们得以生存。至于这些心智能够认识现实这一事实，那不过是其副产品（如果确实存在的话）；否则，完全可以假设，我们的心智只是为了生存而欺骗了我们。达尔文本人也承认这一深层问题。他对此表达了困惑，说道：“但对我来说，那令人恐惧的怀疑总是出现：由低等动物的心智发展而来的人类心智所形成的信念，是否有任何价值，或者根本是否值得信赖。”54 《大设计》，第93页。

This is one of the deep problems with Darwinism. It leads to wide problems in general atheist discourse across a number of issues, such as the innateness of faith in God, the desire for religion, the sense of morality, the tendency of free will, etc. This is because all of these are explained through the Darwinist lens, that is based on either a) the advantages of living for living beings or b) the causes of their existence if those advantages are not primarily intended or are considered inconsequential, but are rather just a by-product of the natural selection process for life and the survival of humankind. Logic is not the first to think this. Nature – as per the Darwinist view – evolved our minds so we can survive. As for the fact that these minds are able to learn about reality, then that is a by-product if it exists; otherwise, it is quite possible to assume that our minds have duped us, simply so that we may survive. This deep problem was something acknowledged by Darwin himself. He expressed his confusion on the issue, saying, ‘But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy.’54 The 53 The Grand Design, p. 93.

54 达尔文通信计划，致威廉·格雷厄姆的信，1881年7月3日，https://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/DCP-LETT-13230.xml 30

54 Darwin Correspondence Project, Letter to William Graham, 3 July 1881, https://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/DCP-LETT-13230.xml 30

对这些理性且必然之真理的排斥与轻视——无论这些真理是有时极其显而易见的，还是本质上较为隐微却无可否认的——已在哲学与理性理论上引发了强烈的反弹，无论其是否受宗教思维所支配。

rejection and downplaying of these rational and necessary truths – whether they are those truths that are sometimes incredibly self-evident, or those undeniable truths that are somewhat reserved by nature – has created a severe pushback against philosophy and rational theory, whether that is governed by the religious mindset or not.

正因如此,许多人在各种场合宣称哲学已死,毫无益处。史蒂芬·霍金在《大设计》开篇引用的一句名言便是例证:"传统上,这些问题属于哲学的范畴,但哲学已经死了。哲学没有跟上现代科学,尤其是物理学的发展步伐。在我们探求知识的征程中,科学家已成为发现之火的传递者。"55 PZ·梅尔斯说:"很多哲学都能毁掉你。"56 劳斯说:"哲学是一个令人遗憾的领域,它让我想起伍迪·艾伦那个老笑话:'会做的人去做,不会做的人去教,不会教的人去教体育。'哲学中最糟糕的部分是科学哲学。据我所知,读科学哲学著作的人,只有其他科学哲学家。它对物理学毫无影响,而我怀疑其他哲学家也不读它,因为它相当专业、技术性很强。所以真的很难理解它有什么依据。我认为,这种紧张关系之所以出现,是因为哲学界的人感到受到了威胁,而他们确实有理由感到受到威胁,因为科学在进步,哲学却没有。"57

This is why many people, in various contexts, have declared that philosophy is dead and offers no benefit. One famous quotation is by Hawking in the beginning of The Great Design: ‘Traditionally these are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics. Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge.’55 PZ Myers said, ‘A lot of philosophy can destroy you.’56 Krauss said, Philosophy is a field that, unfortunately, reminds me of that old Woody Allen joke, “those that can’t do, teach, and those that can’t teach, teach gym.” And the worst part of philosophy is the philosophy of science; the only people, as far as I can tell, that read work by philosophers of science are other philosophers of science. It has no impact on physics what so ever, and I doubt that other philosophers read it because it’s fairly technical. And so it’s really hard to understand what justifies it. And so I’d say that this tension occurs because people in philosophy feel threatened, and they have every right to feel threatened, because science progresses and philosophy doesn’t.57

这种否认理性空间的做法，连同其直觉式与理论式的断言，若顺着其蕴含的意义推下去，便会导向诡辩，前文已有解释。在它的阴影之下，任何获取认知与知识的可能性都会瓦解。自然，它也会摧毁自然科学与经验科学所赖以建立的根本原则。

This denial of the space for rationality, along with its instinctive and theoretical assertions, when taken with its implications, leads to sophistry, as has been explained before. In its dark shadow, any possibility to access cognition and knowledge would fall apart. Naturally, it would destroy the rule upon which the natural and empirical sciences are founded.

奇怪的是，尽管他们极力抬高和夸大经验科学的重要性，他们却在不知不觉中依据一套无法通过经验科学证明的先入之见行事。例如，他们的出发点是：宇宙拥有独立于我们感知之外的实在，它可以被研究，它服从一套特定的法则，而且这些法则是固定不变的。因此，今天被视为自然法则的东西，明天就会成为公认的实在。以先入的框架行事，既不奇怪，也不难理解。更值得玩味的是，他们即便声称否认，却无法摆脱那些本能的理性真理。仅仅运用基于证据的推理过程，就表明他们接受因果性的概念，接受证据与其所指向之物之间存在联系，因为证据确实是认识其所指向之物的原因。

It is strange that even though they magnify and exaggerate the importance of empirical science, they unknowingly operate from a set of preconceived notions that cannot be proven by empirical science. An example of this is the initial starting point that the universe has a reality that is separate from our perception, that it can be studied, that it is subjected to a particular set of laws, and that these laws are fixed. So, whatever is considered to be from the natural laws today will become an accepted reality tomorrow. Operating from a preconceived framework is neither strange nor hard to envisage. What is more amusing is that they cannot divorce themselves from instinctive rational truths, even though they claim to deny them. Merely exercising the process of evidence-based reasoning speaks to the fact that they accept the concept of causality, and that there is a link between evidence and that which it points to, because evidence really is a cause of knowing that which the evidence points towards.

在弗兰克·图雷克于威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校的一场演讲中，有一段与一位无神论者（迈克尔）的有趣讨论，该无神论者明确质疑了本能理性概念的存在：

In an interesting discussion between Frank Turek and an atheist (Michael) found in one of Turek’s lectures at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the atheist explicitly doubted the existence of instinctive rational concepts:

Michael:我认为,如果那样的话,逻辑定律其实就不存在了。

Michael: I would argue that the laws of logic really don’t exist then.

Frank: 所以你的意思是，它们确实存在。

Frank: So you’re saying that they do really exist.

迈克尔:不。

Michael: No.

Frank: 是的，你是在说他们确实如此。

Frank: Yes, you’re saying they do.

Michael: 我这样说，他们是怎么做的？

Michael: How am I saying they do?.

Frank:因为你现在正在运用矛盾律来说我是错的。

Frank: Because you’re using the law of non-contradiction right now to say that I’m wrong.

“不矛盾律”指的是：相互对立的两个观点不可能在同一时间、同一意义上both为真，它是逻辑的基本定律之一。尽管迈克尔在运用这一定律以及其他逻辑定律，但他仍然坚称逻辑定律并不真实存在。听他的意思，似乎是说逻辑定律只是人类的约定俗成：我们人类只是在脑中发明了这些定律，它们在人的思维之外并不真实存在。包括斯坦博士在内，有几位无神论者都持这一立场。我问迈克尔是不是这个意思，他回答说：“是的。”于是我接着问他：“在地球上有人类之前，‘地球上没有人类’这句话是真的吗？”迈克尔沉默了很久，给出了一个含糊其辞的回答。经过我一再追问，他勉强承认这句话“很可能”是真的（但他仍然固执地坚持认为逻辑定律只是人类的约定）。当然，这句话显然是真的。既然那时没有人类的思维去构想它，那么逻辑定律就不可能只是人类的约定。此外，还有其他几个理由可以说明，逻辑定律不是人类的约定，而是独立于人类思维而存在的。58

The law of non-contradiction – which says that opposite ideas cannot both be true at the same time and in the same sense – is one of the fundamental laws of logic. Despite using that law and others, Michael continued to assert that the laws of logic don’t really exist. It sounded like he was saying that the laws of logic are just a human convention; that we human beings simply invent these laws in our minds but they don’t really exist outside of our minds. Several atheists have held this position, including Dr. Stein. When I asked Michael if that was his position, he said “Yes.” So I then asked him, “Before there were any humans on the Earth, was the statement, ‘There are no human beings on the Earth’, true?” Following a long pause, Michael gave a meandering response. After some prompting, he reluctantly admitted that the statement “likely” would be true (yet he continued to cling to the idea that the laws of logic were mere human conventions). Well, of course the statement would be true. And since there were no human minds to conceptualize it, the laws of logic cannot be a mere human convention. In addition, there are several other reasons to believe that the laws of logic are not human conventions that they exist independently of human minds.58

这场讨论揭示了无神论者在确定天赋观念本身性质时所面临的困境:它们是客观且绝对的,还是基于人的感官而相对的?结合前面的论述,许多无神论者表示,没有必要遵循这些本能性的观念。事实上,他们明确表示反对这些观念,理由来自量子物理等领域的自然科学思想。他们主张,实在可能是,或者确实是,与天赋的、本能的知识相冲突的。这类论断的含义是众多且危险的,即基本的理性观念仅仅是我们心智运作的结果,与任何外在的客观真理都无关。以人与人之间的交流来说明信念的形成,其本质是试图在共同的认知基础之上,让每一个人都获得信念。而作为这种认知基础的规则,必须是自然的、普遍的,而不能相对于某个特定的人。依靠这一规则,双方的认知同一性才能得以搭建,从而促成信念的确立。若没有这一规则,每个人都将被局限于自己的认知领域之中,无法与他人进行富有成效的互动,因为那些超越双方、使他们能够在某种共性上彼此交往的意义将不复存在。

This discussion reveals the atheistic dilemma in determining the nature of innate concepts in and of themselves. So are they objective and absolute, or are they relative based on a person’s senses? In light of previous statements, many atheists state it is not necessary to follow these instinctive concepts. In fact, they explicitly mention they are opposed to them because of ideas from natural science related to quantum physics and other fields. They set out that reality might be, or indeed is, in conflict with innate and instinctive knowledge. The implications of this sort of assertion – that basic rational concepts are merely a result of the workings of our minds, with no external objective truth associated with them – are numerous and dangerous. Having human interaction to bring about conviction is at its essence an attempt to bring about conviction to every person on the basis of a common cognitive playing field. The rule upon which this cognition is built must be natural and universal, not relative to x person. With this rule, it is possible to bridge the cognitive identity between the two sides to bring about conviction. Without this, each person would remain confined to their own cognitive realm, unable to fruitfully interact with the next person, as those meanings that transcend both of them – by which they would have been able to forge interaction with a degree of commonality – would be absent.

如果那些本能概念仅仅是人类心智的建构，那么每一个人类观念也都将是我们心智的建构，知识又会重新沦为相对的。在这种情况下，我们将失去对几乎任何事物获得确信的能力与信心。这将是一个灾难性的问题。没有作为理论知识根基的必然真理，就不可能形成一种连贯的哲学视野，而基于证据的推理或运用证明也就无从进行。这种视野的后果是，人会采取一种诡辩式的态度，放弃对一切人类知识的信任。这样的主张恰恰为那种错误的论断提供了可以赢得信服的土壤。它断言一切知识都是相对的，没有通往确定、结论性认知信息的途径，也没有人拥有客观实在。这一断言是自相矛盾的，因为它假定自己应当成为自身的裁决者，这正暴露了它的虚妄与错误。否定本能的理性概念及其客观性，实际上就是否定：a）人心的一切运作，b）人与人之间交往的可能，c）彼此说服的能力，d）自然经验科学。所有这些概念，唯有承认本能概念并肯定其超越人类存在的更高价值的原则，才能得以存续。事实上，这类主张正是采纳无神论观点的自然流露。若不肯定这个宇宙有一位造物主，一位以绝对完美来描述的造物主，那么肯定绝对真理就不可能成立。 如果我们无法肯定绝对真理，那么也就没有办法证明绝对的、本能的知识的存在，因为本能知识的本质就是绝对的，不受时间、地点、环境和人的限制。这样的知识确实超越于人的存在之上。无论人是否存在，矛盾律都是必然的，并且普遍为真。因果原则在人类出现之前就已是绝对真理。“部分小于整体”等命题也是如此。若不肯定绝对存在，即安拉，就无从肯定这些绝对命题。

Had those instinctive concepts been merely the construct of the human mind, every human idea would also be the construct of our minds, leading knowledge to become relative again. In that case, we would lose both the power and the confidence of ever possibly gaining conviction in virtually anything. This would be a catastrophic problem. Without necessary truths upon which theoretical knowledge can be built, there would be no pathway to offer a coherent philosophical outlook through which the process of evidence-based reasoning or employing proofs would be feasible. The consequences of such an outlook are that one would end up adopting a sophist approach that discards trust in all human knowledge. Such an assertion is the exact environment in which that false claim can gain credence. It asserts that all knowledge is relative, that there is no pathway to gain definitive and conclusive cognitive information, and that nobody possesses objective reality. Such an assertion is self-contradictory, for it assumes that it should be the arbiter unto itself, which exposes its falsehood and error. Disregarding the instinctive rational concepts and their objective nature is in reality to disregard a) every engagement of the human mind, b) the possibility of human interaction, c) the ability to convince one another, and d) the natural empirical sciences. All of these concepts can only survive with the rule that acknowledges instinctive concepts and affirms their higher value that transcends human existence. The truth is that these types of assertions are a natural overflow from adopting the atheist viewpoint. Without affirming a Maker for this universe – a Maker that would be described with absolute perfection – the possibility of affirming absolute truths would not be possible. And if we are unable to affirm absolute truths, there is no chance for proving the existence of absolute and instinctive knowledge, as it is in the nature of instinctive knowledge to be absolute and agnostic of time, place, environment, and persons. Such knowledge is indeed above and beyond the existence of humans. The law of non-contradiction is both necessary and universally true, whether man exists or not. The principle of causality was an absolute truth before man ever came into existence. The same applies to the notion that ‘part < whole’, etc. There is no pathway to affirm these absolutes without affirming an absolute existence, which is Allah .

一个否认自身存在的人,无法证明任何绝对真理的存在。即便他以在某些知识和科学领域主张"相对绝对主义"来作出让步,这一结论也完全站不住脚,因为它并不具备认知得以建立的根本依据。然而,实际上,这种结论在很大程度上与无神论的概念相吻合,按照这种观点,在哲学上无法阐明任何理性和本能的知识。这是因为,此类断言的认知结构及其通过证明所作的论证,若不以信仰安拉的存在为前提,便不可能成立。基于此,我们可以理解学者们那句深刻而动人的话:"认识安拉是认识一切的根本。"我曾在追寻真理的实质、维度和丰富内涵的过程中,反复思索这句话所表达的见解,以及认识安拉与其他一切知识之间的联系。在领会这些事实之后,我逐渐明白,问题的关键在于:所有这些知识,实际上都是认识安拉的一个分支。凡是不理解安拉之存在的人,都无法在哲学或理性上建立起任何连贯的认知理论,来解释这些知识为何存在,以及如何获得。对此,伊本·泰米叶说:"认识祂(安拉)是一切知识中最崇高的。它是一切知识的目标、终点、归宿和根本,尽管对祂之外事物的认识可能先于认识祂,或成为认识祂的前提。认识祂,除了更为崇高、更加完善、更有益处之外,还是一种必要的需求。仆人若没有祂,便无法达到正道;若没有祂,便没有真正的幸福。祂是一切知识得以真正实现的根源,这些知识唯有通过祂,才配称为知识。"59

A person in denial of his own existence is unable to prove the existence of any absolute truth. Even though he offers a compromise by claiming ‘relative absolutism’ in some aspects of knowledge and science, this conclusion is totally false, as it does not possess the rule upon which cognition can be based in the first place. However, in reality, it is a conclusion that is largely in line with atheist conceptualisations, through which it is impossible to philosophically set out any rational and instinctive knowledge. This is because the cognitive structure for these types of assertions and the demonstration of them through proof is not possible without having faith in the existence of Allah. Based on this, we can understand the deep and poignant statement of the scholars: ‘Knowing Allah is fundamental to knowing anything.’ I used to ponder quite a bit over this expression in my pursuit of understanding the reality, dimensions, and wealth of meaning behind the outlook expressed in this statement, and the connection between knowing Allah  and all other knowledge. After grasping these facts, it became apparent to me that the point here is this: All this knowledge is actually a branch of knowing Allah . Whosoever does not comprehend His existence is unable to philosophically or rationally establish any coherent cognitive theory that explains to us why this knowledge exists and how it can be acquired. In this regard, Ibn Taymiyyah said, Knowing Him (Allah) is the highest of all knowledge. It is the goal, the end, the culmination, and the root of all knowledge, even though knowledge of other than Him might come first, or might be a precursor to, knowing Him. Knowing Him – in addition to being loftier, more wholesome, and more beneficial – is a necessary need. A servant cannot achieve righteousness without Him. There is no felicity without Him. He is the root to the realisation of all knowledge that – through Him – deserves to be labelled as such.’59

他的学生伊本·盖伊姆说:你当思考整个世界,思考其上界与下界的每一个部分。你会发现它是造物主、创造者和君王的明证。在心智与天性中否认其造物主并拒绝祂,无异于否认和拒绝知识本身,二者并无区别。依照纯净、明澈、崇高的理智和健全的天性,创造者对被造物、行动者对行动、设计者对被设计之物的指示,比相反的观点更为明显。有学识和远见的人以安拉作为祂的作为与设计的证据,而普通人则以祂的设计和作为来指向祂。毫无疑问,这两种方法都是正确的,各自都是真实的。《古兰经》兼具这两者。至于以设计为证据,其例不胜枚举;至于以造物主为证据,也有明确的例证。这正是众使者在对他们的民众说"关于安拉,难道还有疑问吗?"时所指向的,即:难道我们应当怀疑安拉的存在,直到有证据呈现出来吗?哪一种证据比这本身更恰当、更显明呢?一件更隐晦的事物,怎能被用来证明更显明的事物?接着,使者们又提醒人们注意这一证据,补充说:"……天地的创造者吗?"我听伊斯兰学者谢赫·泰卡·丁·伊本·泰米叶说:"你既然以之为一切证据的事物本身就是证据,怎能再要求对它提供证明呢?"他还常以这两句诗为例:"当白昼还需要证据时,心智中便不存在任何可以被认为正确的事物。"众所周知,主的存在对心智与天性而言,比白昼的存在更为显明。凡不能在自己的心智与天性中见到这一点的人,应当对其自身产生怀疑。62

His student Ibn al-Qayyim  said, Ponder over the whole world, in all its parts across its higher and lower dominions. You will find it to be a testament to the Maker, the Creator, and the King. Denying its Maker and rejecting Him in the minds and the innate predispositions is tantamount to denial and rejection of knowledge itself. There is no difference between the two. According to pure, enlightened, and lofty minds and the sound fiṭrah, the indication of the Creator to the creation, the Doer to the action, and the Designer to the fashioned is more obvious than the opposite view. Those with knowledge and foresight use Allah as evidence for His actions and design, whereas common people use His design and actions to point to Him. No doubt, both are correct methods and each is true. The Qur’an comprises of both. As for the evidence from design, it is plentiful. As for the evidence from the Maker, that has a case in point as well. It is what the Messengers pointed to when they told their nations, “Is there any doubt about Allah…?”60, i.e., should we doubt in Allah until evidence for His existence is presented? Which evidence is more proper and apparent than this itself? How can something that is more obscure be used in evidence to prove something that is more obvious? Then the Messengers alerted people to the evidence by adding: “…the Originator of the heavens and the Earth?”61 I heard Shaykh al-Islām Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyyah  say, “How can you demand proof for something that in itself is proof for everything?” He also used to say the following couplet as an example: “Nothing can be deemed to be correct in the minds when day requires evidence.” It is known that the existence of the Lord  is more apparent to the minds and the fiṭrah than the existence of day. Whosoever cannot see this in his mind and fiṭrah should view them with suspicion.62

简而言之,首位的老师是真主。祂以教育的形式赐恩于祂的受造物,无论是无需中介的方式——例如人们天生的本能与直觉倾向,祂赋予他们分析和推理的潜能与工具——还是通过祂的先知和使者。祂说:"你应当奉你的创造主的名义而诵读。"[63]因此,伊斯兰关于认知的概念宣称,一切知识的显现都源自真主,若不肯定这一事实,无论从理性还是哲学的角度,都无法建立一套连贯的知识理论。所以,这种本能知识的存在指向祂的存在,因为人们能直觉地感受到它们。如果反对的一方承认它们作为客观真理的存在,他们就不得不肯定真主的存在,因为这些真理若无祂便绝不可能成立。然而,如果反对的一方否认它们,这种否认的代价将非常高昂,因为它会断然关闭获取任何知识的大门;实际上,情况还会更糟,堪比诡辩。请看以下例子——尼克·波拉德与理查德·道金斯之间的一场讨论:

Suffice it to say that it is Allah  Who is the First Teacher. He is the one Who bestowed His favour upon His creation in the form of education – whether without an intermediary, such as people’s innate and instinctive predispositions, Him giving the potential and the tools to allow them to analyse and reason, or via His Prophets and Messengers. He  said, ‘Read, O Prophet, in the Name of your Lord Who created.’63 Thus, the Islamic conceptualisation of cognition declares that the manifestations of all knowledge originate from Allah , and that there is no way – whether rationally or philosophically – to establish a coherent theory of knowledge without affirming this fact. So, the existence of this instinctive knowledge points to His existence , as they are intuitively felt. If the opposing side accepts their existence as objective truths, they would be compelled to affirm the existence of Allah, as these truths cannot possibly be established without Him. However, if the opposing side denies it, the price of such a denial would be very high, as it would categorically shut off the door to any knowledge acquisition; in fact, it would be worse than that, on par with sophism. Consider the following example – a discussion between Nick Pollard and Richard Dawkins:

Pollard:"Susan Blackmore 最近在《怀疑论者》(The Skeptic) 上说:"我认为我们存在这一观念是一种幻觉……认为有一个'自我'在那里决定事情、行动并承担责任……这是一个巨大的幻觉。我们所构建的自我只是幻觉,因为实际上只有大脑和化学物质,这个'自我'并不存在——它从来就不存在,也没有人会死去。"你是否同意这种还原论式的解释,来说明你的妻子是谁、你自己是谁?"

Pollard: ‘Susan Blackmore said recently in The Skeptic: “I think the idea we exist is an illusion...The idea that there is a self in there that decides things, acts and is responsible...is a whopping great illusion. The self we construct is just an illusion because actually there’s only brains and chemicals and this ‘self’ doesn’t exist – it never did and there’s nobody to die.” Would you agree with that kind of reductionist explanation of who your wife is, who you are?’.

Dawkins: "Yes. Susan is staking out a position on what a self is, and it is one I am inclined to think is probably right; but I don't think we are yet in a position to substantiate it. What makes it seem plausible to me is various things. One is that brains came into the world through a gradual process of evolution, and we have a continuum from ourselves through all the other animals, to animals with very simple brains, to animals with no brains at all, to plants. Certainly, the prediction that we do not survive death seems to me overwhelmingly probable. That would be a good operational test – not that we can actually carry it out, but in principle: if a self is something other than brain matter, then it should survive when the brain rots – and I would place a very heavy bet (which I realize I could never actually win) that when my brain rots, myself will not in any sense exist."

Dawkins: ‘Yes. I mean, Susan is sticking her neck out for one particular view of what a self is, and it’s one that I am inclined to think is probably right; but I don’t think we are yet in a position to substantiate that. What makes it seem plausible to me is various things. One is that brains have come into the world by a gradual process of evolution and we have a continuum from ourselves through all the other animals to animals that have very simple brains, to animals that have no brains at all, to plants. Certainly, the prediction that we don’t survive death seems to me to be overwhelmingly probable. That would be a good operational test – not that we can actually test it, but in principle: if a self is something other than brain stuff, then it should survive when the brain rots – and I’d place a very heavy bet (which I realize I could never actually win) that when my brain rots myself will not in any sense exist.’.

Pollard：“你是否相信我存在这一想法是一种错觉？”

Pollard: ‘Do you believe that the idea that I exist is an illusion?’.

道金斯："嗯，我当然很高兴我们是大脑的产物，而且当我们的大脑死亡时，我们就消失了。把我们称为一种幻象，或许是一种表达它的好方式。但我不愿承认我们的自我感是一种幻象。这要看你怎么理解。我确实觉得有一个'我'存在。"64.

Dawkins: ‘Well, I’m certainly happy that we are a product of brains and that when our brains die, we disappear. To call us an illusion is possibly a good way to express it. But I wouldn’t wish to commit myself to saying that our sense of self is an illusion. It depends what you mean. I certainly feel that there’s a me.’64.

所以，道金斯完全愿意接受这样一种观点：个体的良知本身、使他区别于他人的个人身份感，以及他对“我”的理解，都只是幻觉。尽管道金斯试图显得温和得体，以淡化他的回答给读者带来的问题，但他的话已足以清楚地表明他所持的思想类型。确实，在这场讨论的最后时刻，道金斯试图把自己塑造成一个理性的人。然而事实上，他是在回避这个话题，并没有提出任何能够反驳他所作断言的东西。仅仅感受到“我”的概念并意识到它，根本不是讨论的主题，因为那是每个人都会自己发现并相信的显而易见的事情。所提出的问题其实是这样的：有没有什么东西可以解释这种倾向？换言之：是否存在某种真实存在的事物，可以被正确地归类为“我”，并解释我们对自身存在的感受？还是说，“自我”、“我”或“独特的个人身份”的概念仅仅是一种没有任何外在实在性的幻觉？

So Dawkins was quite prepared to accept that the conscience of an individual per se, his sense of personal identity that distinguishes him from others, and his understanding of the ‘me’ concept are all merely illusions. Though Dawkins attempted to come across as diplomatic to downplay the problematic nature of his answer to the reader, his words are sufficient in clearly conveying the type of ideas he espouses. Indeed, Dawkins attempted to portray himself as a rational person during the last moments of this discussion. However, in reality, he tried to sidestep the topic and did not offer anything that would contradict the assertion he made. Merely sensing the concept of ‘me’ and being conscious of it was not the topic of discussion at all, for that is an obvious matter that every person finds and believes for themselves. The posed question actually was the following: Is there anything that explains this tendency? In other words: Is there anything that is real and in existence, which can be correctly classed as ‘me’, that explains how we feel about our existence? Or is the concept of ‘self’, ‘me’, or ‘distinct personal identity’ merely an illusion without any external reality?

从人内心所具有的fiṭrah（天性）要素中，有一种根深蒂固的道德本能。凭借它，人不仅能够分辨什么是善的品德、什么是恶的品德，而且还会本能地感觉到，这些道德价值在本质上是客观的。正是客观性赋予了这些道德以真正的价值，并使其摆脱了相对性。这些是超越人类存在、乃至超越一切物质存在的客观实在。无论人和宇宙是否存在，这些道德价值都依然保持其客观性。

From the fiṭrah-driven elements that man finds in himself is the deeply entrenched moral instinct. With this, one can grasp not only what are good and bad morals, but one also instinctively feels that these moral values are objective by nature. Being objective is what gives these morals their true value and removes relativity from them. These are objective realities that transcend not only human existence, but all material existence. Whether man and the universe exist or not, these moral values retain their objectivity.

理解力包含两个方面：分辨善与恶的能力，以及领会善恶价值中所蕴含之客观性的能力。这一双重理解力可以运用于本议题之中。我们试图借此说明，在我们自身之内存在着先天的禀赋，而这些禀赋指向上帝的存在。因为若不肯定神圣者的存在，这种道德倾向便无法得到解释。正如理性的概念要求我们追问："谁把它们置于灵魂之中？"同样，道德倾向也要求我们追问："谁把它置于那里？"还有一个更深层的问题：是什么解释了我们内心的这种本能感受，即公正是一种客观的价值，使其普遍地成为善，而不公正则是我们必然认为客观上为恶的品质？因此，在不承认上帝存在的观点之下，是否可能提出一种在哲学上自洽的道德观？换言之，若没有上帝的存在，是否可能有任何客观的善？再换一种说法：若没有上帝的存在，一个人是否可能是善良和正直的？

Comprehension is twofold: the ability to distinguish good from evil, and the ability to comprehend the objectivity found in the values of good and evil. This duet of comprehension can be deployed in this subject, in which we are attempting to demonstrate the existence of innate predispositions in our own selves that point to the existence of God. This is because this moral inclination cannot be explained without affirming the existence of the Divine. Just as the rational concepts require that we ask the question ‘Who placed them in the soul?’, then likewise the moral inclination requires us to ask: ‘Who placed it there?’ There is another question that is deeper: What explains this instinctive feeling in ourselves that justice is an objective value that makes it universally good, as opposed to injustice, which we necessarily consider to be an objectively evil trait? Consequently, is it possible to offer a philosophically coherent moral outlook in light of the view that does not acknowledge the existence of God? In other words, is it possible that there is any objective good without the existence of God? Put in another way: Is it possible that a person can be good and righteous without the existence of God?

许多无神论者在这里操之过急：他们认为，大多数无神论者在道德上是正直的，或者他们的日常行为具有可以称为道德良善的特质。因此他们得出结论，人不信仰真主也可以是善良的。然而，这个问题的重点并非“人在不信仰真主的情况下能否行善”。这个问题真正要追问的是：在没有真主存在的情况下，人能否行善？换言之，客观的道德价值能否在没有真主存在的情况下存在？如果不能，那么我们是善是恶这一问题也就无关紧要，因为那些价值本身根本不会存在。这一问题揭示了无神论意识形态的一个深层难题。这一难题不仅仅关乎善与恶的区别，也不仅仅关乎借以分辨善恶的途径，实际上，它延伸到一个更根本的问题：是否存在超越人类存在的普遍道德价值？例如，诚实与公正是否无论人是否存在都是普遍的善，不ities 或者不公与越界是否是普遍的恶，而不相对于某个特定的社会或时代？

Many atheists jump the gun here, believing that most atheists are morally upright, or that they carry what can only be described as morally good actions in their daily lives. They therefore conclude that it is possible to be good without having any faith in God. However, the question was not whether it is possible to be good without faith in God. What the question is actually demanding is whether it is possible to be good without the existence of God. In other words, can objective moral values exist without the existence of God? If not, then the question of whether we are good or bad becomes irrelevant, as those values would not exist to begin with. This issue reveals one of the deep problems of atheist ideology. It is a problem that goes deeper than merely the difference between good and bad values, or the difference between the means by which good values can be discerned from bad ones. In fact, it is a problem that extends to the question of whether universal moral values that transcend human existence exist, e.g., whether honesty and justice are universally good values, regardless of whether man exists or not, or whether injustice and transgression are universally evil values and not relative to a particular society or era.

当我开始步入阅读的世界时，最早读的书之一是沙维基·阿布·哈利勒（Shawkiy Abu Khalil）所著的《本能还是天命？》（Gharīzah am Taqdīr Ilāhī?）。这本书描绘了动物世界中精彩的场景：动物本能地做出那些符合其生存利益的特定行为，从未受过教育、训练或培养。

When I embarked the world of reading, one of the first books I read was by Shawkiy Abu Khalil titled Gharīzah am Taqdīr Ilāhī? (Instinct or Divine Decree?). This book adopts wonderful scenes from the animal world, in which animals instinctively carry out specific actions that are in their survival interests, without ever being educated, trained, or brought up to do so.

谁引导幼儿去吮吸母亲的乳头?谁在母亲心中植入了母性本能,使她照料自己的孩子?谁教会飞鸟在特定的地点之间迁徙?谁在一切生物中注入了求生的本能?谁在灵魂中烙下了对美的热爱?所有这些现象,like其前身一样,天生存在于有生命的人类与动物之中,引出了一个问题:这些本能是如何产生的?谁在灵魂中创造了它们? 去问无神论者吧。他会大谈达尔文主义,说这些本能是进化过程的一部分,目的是保障生物的生存。然而,问题依然存在:这些本能最初从何而来?换句话说,按照达尔文的进化论,这种本能是如何产生的?它在进化的某个时刻并不存在,却突然以如此深刻的方式嵌入生物的灵魂之中?这些本能究竟何时首次出现?它们是如何形成的?又是如何代代相传的?无神论者对这些问题没有答案。他们所能做的,要么是表达自己的彻底困惑,要么是把讨论拉回到那个驱使生物不惜一切代价求生的自私基因上。正如理查德·道金斯的名言所说,我们只能随它的节拍起舞。 请你想一想母亲的本能。告诉我——你见过比它更纯洁的东西吗?我指真主起誓,世间没有任何东西能与母亲的心相比——它是真爱与完美慈悲的象征。我请你指着真主,提醒自己母亲与孩子们的故事——那些无穷无尽的奇迹,语言无法描述。在我写下这些文字时,脑海中涌现出数十个这样的故事。

Who guided a child to take the breast of its mother? Who planted the instinct of motherhood in a mother’s heart, so that she looks after her children? Who taught birds to migrate between specific places? Who instilled the survival instinct in all living things? Who imprinted the love of beauty in the soul? All these phenomena, like their predecessors that are innately found in living humans and creatures, beg the question: How did these instincts come about? Who created them in the soul? Ask the atheist about them. He will go on about Darwinism and how these instincts were part and parcel of the evolution process for the purpose of survival of living creatures. However, the question remains: Where did these instincts come from in the first place? In other words, in light of Darwinist evolution, how did this instinct come about, which at a point of time during evolution did not exist, only to appear all of a sudden in such a deeply embedded manner within creature’s souls? When exactly did these instincts first appear? How did they form? And how are they generationally passed down? Atheists have no answer to these questions. The only thing they have is either to express their utter confoundment or to bring this discussion back to the selfish gene85 that pushes a living being to survive at any cost. We can only dance to its tune, which is how Richard Dawkins famously puts it. Ponder over a mother’s instinct. Pray tell me – have you seen anything purer than that? I swear by Allah, there is nothing in existence like a mother’s heart – a symbol of true love and perfect compassion. I ask you by Allah to remind yourself of the stories of mothers with their children – they are endless wonders that words are unable to describe. As I write these words, I am confronted by dozens of stories:

人身上另一项内在的本能，是他深层的情感性目的感，即目的论倾向。正是这种感觉促使他追问那些根本性的问题："我是谁？我从哪里来？我为何在此？我将归向何处？"这些深刻的问题正是人与动物的区别所在。动物依循原始本能而行动，而推动人前行的，是他内在的倾向：去探寻自身存在与生命的目的。因此，最真实的名字是Ḥārith（耕作者）和Hammām（勤奋的劳作者），正如先知ﷺ所言，因为它们体现了人的两个核心特质，代表了他的渴望与追求。这两种特质若没有可被渴望和追求之物的存在，便无从实现。可以被追求的终极目标，便是安拉。

Another innate tendency present in man is his deep emotional sense of purpose, or teleological tendency. It is this feeling that makes him ask the big questions: ‘Who am I? Where did I come from? Why am I here? Where will I end up?’ These deep questions are what distinguish humans from animals. If animals desire to move on their primal instincts, what moves man is his innate tendency to seek out the purpose of his existence and life. This is why the truest of names are Ḥārith (ploughman) and Hammām (energetic worker), as stated by the Prophet 95, as they comprise of two central features of man that represent his desire to wish and to seek. These two traits are not possible without the existence of something that can be wished and sought after. The ultimate aim that can be sought is Allah .

正如伊本·泰米叶所说："灵魂不可能没有感受和渴求。事实上，灵魂中不可能存在这种空虚。感受和渴求是灵魂本质的组成部分。没有感受和渴求的灵魂是无法想象的。说灵魂可以与造物主无关——既不感受到祂的存在或不存在，也不感受到对祂的爱或缺乏爱——是不正确的。说承认祂和爱祂不是灵魂存在的必要组成部分，即使没有受到反对，也是不正确的。事实上，这是错误的，因为灵魂承载着它所渴望的东西，这是其fiṭrah（本性）的必要组成部分。由于灵魂作为其本质的必然功能总是在渴求，因此无法想象一个人的灵魂会没有渴求某物。 "这就是为什么先知ﷺ说：'最真实的名字是Ḥārith和Hammām。'灵魂毕竟是一种有生命的存在，每一种有生命的存在都是出于自身意愿而运动的。因此，灵魂必定有它自己所意愿的运动。于是，每一个'有所愿望的实体'都必定有它所希望的东西。所希望的东西，要么本身就是为了自身，要么是作为达到其他目的的手段；作为达到其他目的之手段而被希望的东西，必然导向最初的愿望。因此，一个人的所有愿望都只是达到其他目的的手段，这是不可能的，因为那将导致终极因的序列无限的谬误，这是不可能的，就像动力因的序列无限一样，甚至更加不可能。鉴于人必定有所渴求，那么归根结底，他的心所向往的是安拉。因此，每一个仆人必定有一个所崇拜的神。由此可知，仆人天生倾向于爱他的神。"96

It is as Ibn Taymiyyah  said: ‘The soul cannot be vacant of feeling and want. In fact, such vacantness is impossible in the soul. Feeling and want are part and parcel of its reality. A soul cannot be envisaged without feeling and wanting. It is not correct to say that the soul can be vacant of the Creator  – vacant of feeling either His existence or non-existence, or of His love or lack thereof. It is not correct to say that acknowledging Him and His love is not a necessary part of the soul’s existence, even if unopposed. Rather, this is false, because the soul carries what it desires as a necessary part of its fiṭrah. Because the soul always wants as a necessary function of its essence, it cannot be envisaged that a person’s soul can ever be vacant of wanting something. ‘This is why the Prophet  said, “The truest of names are Ḥārith and Hammām.” The soul after all is a living creature – every living creature moves of its own volition. Therefore, the soul must have movement that it wills for itself. Thus, every “wishing entity” must have something it wishes for. Whatever is wished is either for itself per se, or it is as a means to something else; something wished as a means to something else must inevitably lead to the primary wish. Therefore, it is impossible that all of a person’s wishes are a means to something else, as that would lead to the fallacy of serial infinity of final causes, which is impossible, just like – or even more so than – the serial infinity of efficient causes. Given that man must have something he wants, it is ultimately Allah that his heart yearns for. Therefore, every servant must have a god. It is thus learned that the servant is predispositioned to love his god.96

人类有一个特点:他们能够从内心本能地分辨人的自主选择与那些不由自主地从他身上发生的行为。当一个人端起杯子喝水、提起包、或坐进汽车时,他能本能地将这些与他心跳、血液在血管中流动以及身体感到的阵阵寒颤区分开来。一个人可以凭意愿暂时停止呼吸,但他无法持续这样做,因为身体不由自主的反应要求他呼吸。人们本能地感受到自己拥有自由意志,这种与生俱来的倾向需要解释。事实上,这种倾向的存在本身就需要一个解释。

A feature of humans is that they instinctively feel within themselves the differentiation between man’s choices and those acts that emanate involuntarily from him. When a person raises a glass of water to his mouth, picks up his bag, or gets in his car, he can instinctively differentiate between those and his heart pulsing, the blood running in his veins, and the cold shivers his body feels. A person can stop breathing for a while by choice, but he is unable to continue to do so, as the involuntary bodily reaction requires him to breath. This innate tendency – that people have free will, which they can instinctively feel – requires an explanation. In fact, the existence of this tendency requires an explanation.

看来，无神论基于唯物主义的存在观，难以为自由意志这一现象提供令人信服的解释。如果我们的自主行为仅仅且完全是身体神经肌肉系统中生化作用和电脉冲的结果，而这一切又都受固定规律支配，那么自由意志又如何可能存在呢？这使得许多无神论者转向了极端的决定论哲学。在这种观点中，自由意志是一种幻觉，人实际上是被编程去做他所做的事情的，尽管他可能以为自己拥有自由意志。在古典阿拉伯文献中，一位决定论者将此表述为："人被编程成了一个拥有自由意志的形象。"

It would seem that atheism, in light of its materialistic outlook on existence, is unable to offer a plausible explanation for the phenomenon of free will. If our voluntary actions are merely and exclusively the result of biochemical interactions and electric pulses in the body’s neuromuscular system, and that is all governed by fixed laws, how is it possible for there to be any free will? This has led many atheists to adopt an extreme determinist philosophy. In this conceptualisation, free will is an illusion and man is actually programmed to do what he does, even though he might think he has free will. In classical Arabic literature, one determinist expressed this as ‘Man is programmed with an image of one with free will’.

在他的著作《自由意志》中，山姆·哈里斯写道：“我的选择确实重要，人也可以走向做出更明智选择的道路，但我无法选择我所选择的东西。即使有时看似我能够选择，比如在两个选项之间反复犹豫之后，我也并非选择去选择我所选择的东西。这里存在一种回溯，它总是以黑暗告终。”[99] 这一观点受到了无神论大众的欢迎，甚至也获得了那些持唯物主义世界观、但对无神论心存保留的人的认可。要了解哈里斯的立场，书的开篇所说的话已经足够：“自由意志是一种幻觉。”[100] 他接着说：“自由意志实际上不仅仅是一种幻觉（或者更少），因为它在概念上无法自洽。”[101]102

In his book Free Will, Sam Harris says, ‘My choices matter – and there are paths towards making wiser ones – but I cannot choose what I choose. And if it ever appears that I do – for instance, after going back between two options – I do not choose to choose what I choose. There is a regress here that always ends in darkness.’99 This position was well received by the atheist rank and file, and even by those with a materialistic outlook on the world who have reservations on atheism. What Harris said in the beginning of the book suffices in learning about his position: ‘Free will is an illusion.’100 He goes on to say, ‘Free will is actually more than an illusion (or less)101, in that it cannot be made conceptually coherent.’102