引言
Introduction
所有赞美都归于真主,全世界的主。愿最尊贵的先知和使者、我们的先知穆罕默德ﷺ、他的家人以及他所有的同伴,都蒙受祝福与平安。 我人生中最美好的时刻之一,是把我第一版书稿作为礼物呈给我亲爱的父母。这本新书使我从他们的话语和见解中找到了快乐与喜悦。实际上,我的努力也就是他们的努力,因为孩子不过是父母的延续。我这样说,是为了指出真主对我的恩惠。我的许多学术成果,若没有他们的支持、鼓励和督导,是不会问世的。我祈求真主使我得到他们的喜悦,并使他们的寿命因善功而增长。每写一本书都请他们参与,这一直是我的习惯。 不过也有一个例外。它的主题和书名引起了父母的反对。他们的反对中带着惊讶和某种愤慨。他们的惊讶,源于他们心中燃烧的信仰之火,以及对一种危险的神学偏离模式的斥责。仿佛他们在说:“是什么把我们的儿子引入了这迷宫?”那本书就是《无神论民兵》。 这种情况让我想起一个故事。一位著名的辩证神学(kalām)学者沿着一条小路行走,身后跟着数十名学生。一位年迈的妇人问道:“这是谁?”有人对她说:“您真的不知道吗?这是那位为真主的存在提出了一千个证据的人!”她说:“我的孩子,如果他没有被一千个疑惑所困扰,他就不会需要一千个证据了!”当她的话转告给这位学者时,他说:“主啊,我祈求像这位老妇人那样对你怀有信仰。”1
All praise is for Allah, Lord of the Worlds. May benediction and peace be upon the most honoured of the Prophets and Messengers, our Prophet Muhammad, his family, and all his Companions. One of the loveliest moments in my life was when I presented the first draft of my book as a gift to my beloved parents. With this new book, I found happiness and pleasure in their words and observations. In reality, my efforts are their efforts, as a child is but an extension of its parents. I say this to point out Allah’s favour upon me. Much of my intellectual output would not have happened were it not for their support, encouragement, and supervision. I ask Allah to honour me with their pleasure, and that He increases their age in good deeds. Involving them with every book I have written has been a habit of mine. There was an exception though. Its topic and title evoked a pushback from my parents. It was a pushback that was coloured with surprise and an indignation of sorts. Their surprise was spurred by the fire of faith that burned in them, and the denunciation of a dangerous pattern of theological deviance. It was as if they were saying, ‘What is it that landed our son in this maze?’ That book was The Atheist Militia. This situation reminded me of a story. A leading scholar of dialectic theology (kalām) was walking along a path, followed by dozens of students. An elderly woman asked, ‘Who is this?’ It was put to her, ‘Do you really not know? This is the man who has put forth a thousand proofs for the existence of Allah!’ She said, ‘My son, if he was not afflicted by a thousand doubts, he would not have been in need for a thousand proofs!’ When her words were related back to the scholar, he said, ‘O Allah, I ask for faith in You like that of elderly women.’1
基于上述原因,我一开始就满怀热情地向读者表明:我坚信,认识真主、承认祂的独一性,以及认识到我们对祂的需要,乃是人类深植于本性之中的自然禀赋。正是这种状态最符合人的本性,能带来内心的安宁与满足。若没有它,生命将失去意义,人类许多关于存在的根本问题也将无解,甚至根本找不到任何答案。 看来,这种认知的坚定程度,以及它对灵魂所产生的影响,比我最初所想的还要广泛深远。许多年前,我读到伊本·泰米叶的一段话,当时我觉得这段话十分令人惊讶。他在讨论灵魂对真主存在的天然倾向,以及它与显而易见的理性判断之间的关系时说道:“关于真主的根本知识既是天然的,也是必然的。它在灵魂中的确立程度,远超数学的基本原理,例如‘一是二的一半’,也超过自然知识的基本原理,例如‘一个物体不能同时存在于两个地方’。这是因为,这类知识只是大多数人的天然禀赋可以忽略的命题。至于关于真主的知识,则难以想象有任何天然禀赋能够忽略它。”2
For the aforementioned reasons, right from the outset I am enthused to reveal to the reader that I fervently believe that recognising Allah , acknowledging His oneness, and recognising our need for Him are deeply innate and natural human dispositions. It is this state that is most aligned with the nature of man, leading to inner peace and contentment. Without it, life would be without meaning, and many existential questions on humanity would remain unanswered. In fact, they would have no answer at all. It seems that the firmness of this recognition and the influence it had on the soul is more sweeping than I first thought. Many years ago, I came across what I considered back then to be a surprising statement by Ibn Taymiyyah, where he discussed the existence of this natural predisposition of the soul in recognising the Divine, in conjunction with self-evident and rational positions. He states, ‘The core knowledge of the Divine is both natural and necessary. It is more firmly established in the souls than the fundamentals of mathematics such as “One is half of two”, or the fundamentals of natural knowledge such as “A body cannot simultaneously exist in two places”. This is because such items of knowledge are expressions that the innate predispositions of most people can disregard. As for the knowledge of the Divine, it is unimaginable that any natural predisposition is able to disregard it.’2
当我第一次看到这段文字时,我问自己:对真主的信仰的根深蒂固,是否强过这些例子?我实在无法这样看待!虽然我承认认识真主是我们与生俱来的,但为什么我感觉它不如那些不言自明的例子那样强烈?这个问题的一些复杂之处,在几年后得到了解答。那是在伊本·泰米叶的百科全书式著作《驳斥賈赫米叶派的谬误》(Bayān Talbīs al-Jahmiyyah)全文出版之后,我在书中读到一段极好的论述,他讨论了人们天生理解真主高于其受造物这一信念:"这种认知附着于他们的灵魂,它与灵魂的分离,不亚于人们对可感之物和自然事物的本能认知,例如'一是三的三分之一'以及'一个物体不能同时存在于两个地方'。这是因为后者是人们根本不需要的知识,甚至人可能从未想到过它。至于对真主高于万物的认知,我要说,除了人们需要它之外,人们还需要它所必然带来并蕴含的东西,那就是向真主祈求、请求、谦卑自抑,以及在至高者面前的卑微,即那位被呼求的在上者。"3
When I first saw this passage, I asked myself, ‘Is the entrenchment of belief in the Divine stronger than these examples? I just cannot see it this way! Though I acknowledge that recognising Allah is innate to us, why is it that I do not feel that it is as strong as those self-evident examples?’ Some complexities of this issue were resolved for me a few years later. This was after the full publication of Ibn Taymiyyah’s encyclopaedic book Bayān Talbīs al-Jahmiyyah, in which I came across an excellent passage where he discussed the belief of the innately understood highness of Allah over His creation: ‘This knowledge clings onto their souls. It cannot be separated from it any more than the instinctive knowledge of tangibles and natural matters, such as “One is a third of three”, and “A body cannot simultaneously exist in two places”. This is because the latter is knowledge that they simply do not need; in fact, it may never even occur to a person. As for the knowledge of the highness of Allah, I would say that – in addition to people needing it – people are also in need of what it necessitates and means, which is supplication, asking, self-effacement, and humility unto the Divine – the One Above Who is being invoked.’3
“认识真主”方面的知与行双重结合,正体现了这种理解的力量:相比那些人在忙碌的日常生活中未必时时想起、且不能付诸实践的其他知识,它更为坚实。伊本·타伊米叶在下一页对此作了强调:“至于认识真主,它更加伟大、更加尊贵,因为亚当子孙在知识和意向上都必须转向祂。他们生来就具有这种禀赋。这种天生的本能知识和意向,其固有的存在远比其他知识的存在更加根深蒂固。”4
The knowledge-action duet vis-à-vis recognising the Divine is one aspect that represents the strength of this understanding, compared to those other non actionable pieces of information that man may not always recollect as he grinds on with daily life. This is underscored by Ibn Taymiyyah on the next page: ‘As for knowing the Divine, it is far greater and more honourable, as it is necessary for the children of Adam in terms of both knowledge and intent to turn to Him. They were predisposed for this. The innate existence of this instinctive knowledge and intent is far more entrenched than the existence of other information.’4
他在further几页之后更明确地说道:"安拉——愿祂荣耀——使祂的仆人天性倾向于两件事:在认知上,他们的心承认祂;在行为上,他们爱祂,在祂面前谦卑,并在崇拜、敬拜和寻求襄助方面依赖祂。因此,他们天生就倾向于认识祂并为祂而行动。"<br>然而,我仍然困惑于对真主的认识在灵魂中究竟扎根到何种程度。直到我读到伊本·泰米叶答辩中的一段话,才豁然开朗:"众所周知,人们对有争议之知识的吸引力,与对无人反对之知识的吸引力并不相同。对微积分或自然科学中某些概念的知识——例如'一是二的一半'、'一个物体不能同时处于两个地方'等等——的吸引力,并不那么根深蒂固地存于心中,也没有什么强烈的反对。"<br>事实确是如此。那些针对安拉提出的种种疑问——它们可能使人背离或削弱其天生的倾向——远远多于针对其他学科的反驳。因此,人们或许会觉得,这些学科比安拉更为显而易见。然而,如果人们的灵魂是纯净的,并且那些外在的干扰被排除在外,那么毫无疑问,认识安拉必将比认识其他学科更加强烈、更加根深蒂固。
In more explicit terms, he went on to say just a few pages later, ‘Allah, Glory to Him, predisposed His servants to two things: that their hearts affirm Him in terms of knowledge, and that they love Him and are humble in front of Him in terms of practice, worship, and seeking assistance. They are thus predisposed to having knowledge of Him and acting for His sake.5 However, I was still puzzled as to what extent recognition of the Divine was entrenched in the soul. This was until I came across the following passage from Ibn Taymiyyah’s response: ‘It is known that the strength of attraction to disputed knowledge is unlike that attraction to unopposed knowledge. The attraction to knowledge of concepts like calculus or nature – such as “One is half of two”, “A body cannot simultaneously be in two places”, and so on – is not as entrenched in the hearts, nor is there any strong opposition to it.’6 And this is how it is. The various doubts that are raised against Allah – which can potentially cause man to turn away from or weaken his innate predisposition – are far more than objections against other sciences. One therefore might feel that the sciences are more self-evident than Allah. However, if people’s souls were pure and those external distractions were taken out of the equation, it would have most certainly been the case that knowing Allah would be far stronger and entrenched than the sciences.
从序列分析与认知建构的角度来看,对真主的认识应当是一切理性概念中最为显而易见的。若不承认祂,便无从肯定任何天生的知识,也无从对其天然性作出判断,更无从主张它高于宇宙、物质和人类本性之上。确认任何自明真理的门径,首先在于相信真主。没有这一点,就不可能构建一套融贯的哲学观,去肯定本能和天生的观念。基于此,我们便能理解伊本·盖伊姆转述其导师所说的话,愿真主怜悯他们二人。他说:"对于那位本身就是万物之证据的主,你怎能还要求证据呢?"(即伊本·泰米叶)常常引用下面这两句诗:
From the viewpoint of the sequence analysis and cognitive construct, recognition of the Divine must be the most self-evident of all rational concepts. Without acknowledging Him, there would be no scope left to affirm any innate knowledge, to pass judgement on its instinctiveness, or to suggest that it is above and beyond the nature of the universe, matter, and man. The gateway to affirming any self-evident truth is to first believe in Allah . Without this, it is impossible to construct a coherent philosophical outlook that affirms instinctive and innate concepts. Based on this, one can understand what Ibn al-Qayyim reported from his teacher, may Allah have mercy on both of them. He said, ‘“How can you demand proof for someone who Himself is proof for everything?” He (i.e., Ibn Taymiyyah) used to frequently mention this couplet:
“如果一日之中,连人心里的判断都需要证据,那么任何事情在心中都无法成立。”7
“Nothing can be correct in the minds if the day requires proof.”7
诚然,当我们要求证明真主的存在时,就如同在本已明亮的白天里点燃蜡烛。这样的场景难道不会引人发笑吗?然而,当我们被迫置身于必须对此加以阐明的境地时,又该如何是好?读者或许会问:“为何在本书的导言中就急于讨论这一问题?为何不把讨论推迟到更适当的地方,在那里可以恰当地呈现其细节、解释与证据?”这样做的动机,在于强调这样一点:对真主存在的任何研究,以及提出其最重要的证据,都不应被视为一个有争议的问题——哪怕读者只是潜意识地这样认为,或者以为它需要冗长的论述才能证明其真实性。尤其是考虑到人们对此提出了种种反对意见。许多人受骗,以为把一个问题拿出来辩论并加以批驳,就会削弱其确定性,使这一问题沦为合理的争论焦点。试看许多人在面对本能与显而易见的理性问题时的状况:一旦他们接触到认知哲学的各派学说,那些最根本、最显而易见的真理便随之动摇——只因这一问题也变成了如其他问题一样的反复争辩。在我投身于许多此类哲学辩论、深入其中之后,我想分享自己得出的结论:要构造出怀疑显而易见与本能真理的偏差论断,并不困难。如果一个人不坚持所质疑之问题的显而易见性,他必然会陷入那种足以动摇连贯而理性的知识体系根基的怀疑主义之中。
Indeed, when we ask for proof of Allah, it is as if we are lighting candles during an already bright day. Such a scene would provoke laughter, would it not? However, what are we supposed to do when we have been forced into a situation to clarify this? A reader may ask, ‘Why the haste in discussing this issue here, in the introduction of the book? Why not defer the discussion to where it can be more appropriately discussed and where the details, explanation, and proofs can be properly presented?’ The motivation for this is to underscore the notion that any research on the existence of Allah and offering up its most important evidence cannot be treated as an issue which a reader may even subconsciously deem to be contentious, or presume that it requires some lengthy discourse to prove its veracity. This is especially given that there are objections raised to it. Many people are duped into believing that offering up an issue for debate and subjecting it to critique weakens its conclusiveness, and that this process renders the issue into a point of legitimate debate. Consider the state of many people vis-à-vis instinctive and self-evident matters of rationality. Look at what became of them when they were exposed to schools of cognitive philosophy, and how the very core and self-evident truths were shaken – all just because this issue became one of to-and-fro, like any other. After barging shoulders and engrossing myself with many of those philosophical debates, I want to share the conclusion I have deduced. It is not difficult to construct deviant assertions that cast doubt on self-evident and instinctive truths. If a person does not hold on to the self-evident nature of the issue being objected to, he will invariably fall into the type of scepticism that can undermine the foundation upon which a coherent and rational knowledge structure rests.
以philosophical idealism(哲学唯心主义)关于外部世界的主张为例。在其极端的边缘立场上,这一哲学断言:“外部世界不存在客观实在;因此,我们的知识并非外部世界的结果或反映,而是知识的起点在于我们的心灵。”这样的断言与我们内心的本能认知相悖。当我们与世界打交道时,我们所面对的,是我们自明地相信其具有真实而客观实在性的事物。因此,我们有一种本能的倾向,认为客观实在具有独立的存在。无论我们是否在场观察,实在都存在。那么,对于否认自明真理的哲学的拥护者,我们应当将他们视为仅仅固执己见之人呢?还是说,实际情况是怀疑曾撼动了他们灵魂的根基,而正是在这根基之上,自明实在的观念才得以存续?
Take, for example, the statements on the external world made by philosophical idealism. At its extreme fringes, this philosophy asserts that ‘there is no objective reality to the external world; therefore, our knowledge is not a result or a reflection of the external world, but rather the starting point of knowledge is in our minds’. Such an assertion flies against what our hearts instinctively know. When we deal with the world, we deal with what we self evidently believe has a real and objective reality. Therefore, we have an instinctive tendency to believe that objective realities have a standalone existence. That reality exists regardless of whether we are there to observe it or not. Would the proponents of a philosophy that denies self-evident truths be considered to be merely obstinate personalities, or is it actually the case that doubts managed to shake the foundations of their souls – foundations upon which the concept of self evident realities can survive?
“……以理性为依据,否则你直到今天都还会相信它。那么,或许在理性之上还有另一位裁判,如果他出现,就会证明理性是虚妄的,正如理性曾经驳倒了我们一样。若这样的第三位仲裁者尚未显现,也不能因此断定它不存在。” “对于这一论证,我沉默了许久,无以作答;从睡眠现象中引出的一个思考,使我的怀疑更加深重。‘你难道没有看到吗?’我想,‘你在睡着时,总是把梦境当作无可置疑的实在。一旦醒来,你便认识到它们不过是毫无根据的幻影。那么,谁又能保证你醒时从感官和理性中得到的观念是可靠的呢?相对于你当前的状态,它们或许是真实的;但你也有可能进入另一种存在状态,它与你当前状态的关系,恰如你睡眠时的状态与清醒时的关系。在那个新境界里,你会认识到理性的结论也只是幻影。’” “这种可能的状态,或许就是苏菲派所称的‘出神’(ḥāl),也就是说,照他们的看法,在这种状态中,人沉浸于自身,感官知觉停止作用,他们能看到超出理智所能企及的景象。死亡或许也是这样一种状态,正如众先知之首(ﷺ)的那句话所说:‘人们都在沉睡,死后才会醒来。’我们现今的生活相对于来世,或许也只是一场梦;人死之后,将看到与今日眼前所见完全相反的事物,那时他才会明白《古兰经》中的那句话:‘今天我们已为你揭去了你眼上的遮蔽,你的视力就敏锐了。’{我们已经为你揭开了覆盖你眼睛的遮蔽,今天你的视力是敏锐的。}” “这些想法几乎要动摇我的理性,我竭力想找到摆脱它们的出路。但如何才能做到呢?要解开这个难题的死结,就需要一个证明。然而,证明必须建立在第一原则之上,而恰恰是这些第一原则,正是我所怀疑的。” 这种不幸的状态持续了大约两个月,在此期间,我虽然并非明言或以此为业,但在道德与本质上,确实是一个彻底的怀疑论者。 上帝终于垂怜,治愈了我这一心理上的疾病;我的心智恢复了清明与平衡:理性的基本前提也随之恢复了全部的严谨与力量。我的解脱并非归功于一连串的证明与论证,而是归功于上帝使之照入我心中的光——那照亮一切知识门槛的光。若认为确定性只能建立在形式化的论证之上,便是限制了上帝无边的慈悲。 有人曾向先知请教《天经》中这段经文的含义:“上帝为他所拣选引导的人,敞开心扉接受伊斯兰。”先知回答道:“这说的是上帝投射在心中的光。”有人问:“人怎样才能认出那光?”先知答道:“通过他对这虚幻世界的超脱,以及内心对永恒世界的秘密牵引。” 另一次,他说:“上帝在黑暗中创造了祂的受造物,然后将祂的光照耀在他们身上。”追求真理必须借助这光而进行。由于祂的慈悲,这光不时降临人间,我们必须不断地留心等待它。使徒的另一句话也印证了这一点:“上帝会在某些时刻向你们吹送祂的恩典之息,你们当预备好迎接。” 我叙述这些,目的是让他人明白,我们应当何等恳切地寻求真理,因为它会带来我们从未梦想过的结果。基本前提无需刻意去寻找,因为它们始终存在于我们心中;若我们去刻意追寻,反而会发现它们总是从我们的掌握中滑脱。但那些将探究推进到寻常界限之外的人,不会被怀疑在探求触手可及之事时有所疏忽。 10 人们可以从本段的结尾中领悟到许多教训与智慧。
of reason, otherwise you would have continued to believe it to this day. Well, perhaps, there is above reason another judge who, if he appeared, would convict reason of falsehood, just as reason has confuted us. And if such a third arbiter is not yet apparent, it does not follow that it does not exist.” ‘To this argument I remained some time without a reply; a reflection drawn from the phenomena of sleep deepened my doubt. “Do you not see”, I reflected, “that while asleep you assume your dreams to be indisputably real? Once awake, you recognise them for what they are: baseless chimeras. Who can assure you, then, of the reliability of notions which, when awake, you derive from the senses and from reason? In relation to your present state they may be real; but it is also possible that you may enter upon another state of being which will bear the same relation to your present state as this does to your condition when asleep. In that new sphere you will recognise that the conclusions of reason are only chimeras.” ‘This possible condition is perhaps that which the Sufis call “ecstasy” (ḥāl), that is to say, according to them, a state in which absorbed in themselves and in the suspension of sense-perceptions, they have visions beyond the reach of intellect. Perhaps Death is also that state, according to that saying of the prince of prophets: “Men are asleep; when they die, they wake up.” Our present life in relation to the future is perhaps only a dream, and man, once dead, will see things in direct opposition to those now before his eyes; he will then understand that word of the Qur’an, “Today we have removed the veil from thine eyes and thy sight is keen.”9 ‘Such thoughts as these threatened to shake my reason, and I sought to find an escape from them. But how? In order to disentangle the knot of this difficulty, a proof was necessary. Now, a proof must be based on primary assumptions, and it was precisely these of which I was in doubt. This unhappy state lasted about two months, during which I was, not, it is true, explicitly or by profession, but morally and essentially, a thorough-going sceptic.’ ‘God at last deigned to heal me of this mental malady; my mind recovered sanity and equilibrium: the primary assumptions of reason recovered with me all their stringency and force. I owed my deliverance not to a concatenation of proofs and arguments, but to the light which God caused to penetrate into my heart – the light which illuminates the threshold of all knowledge. To suppose that certitude can be only based upon formal arguments is to limit the boundless mercy of God. Someone asked the Prophet the explanation of this passage in the Divine Book: “God opens to Islam the heart of him whom He chooses to direct.” “That is spoken”, replied the Prophet, “of the light which God sheds in the heart.” “And how can man recognise that light?” he was asked. “By his detachment from this world of illusion and by a secret drawing toward the eternal world”, the Prophet replied. ‘On another occasion, he said: “God has created His creatures in darkness, and then has shed upon them his light.” It is by the help of this light that the search for truth must be carried on. As by His mercy this light descends from time to time among men, we must ceaselessly be on the watch for it. This is also corroborated by another saying of the Apostle: “God sends upon you, at certain times, breathings of His grace; be prepared for them.” ‘My object in this account is to make others understand with what earnestness we should search for truth, since it leads to results we never dreamed of. Primary assumptions need not be sought for, since they are always present in our minds; if we engage in such a search, we only find them persistently elude our grasp. But those who push their investigation beyond ordinary limits are safe from the suspicion of negligence in pursuing what is within their reach.’10 One may find a number of lessons and wisdoms in the conclusion of this passage.
这是本书的核心思想。我希望它能达成其目标,而不陷入那种与当今无神论实际表现方式脱节的论战。本书的目的不在于呈现或讨论过去用以证明真主存在的古老神学或哲学论证,例如身体的有始性论证、组合论证、特殊设计论证,以及围绕这些论证的种种讨论。相反,本书旨在展开一场与当今正在进行的讨论相契合的对话。这正是我与一些受无神论话语影响的当代青年所进行的交流,也是对当代无神论者提出的诸多疑惑与反对意见的研究。我也不应对读者隐瞒,就我个人而言,我非常热衷于捍卫逊尼派的辩证神学,并以逊尼派学者在这一领域的著述与辩论为依据,尤其是伊斯兰教长伊本·泰米叶的著作。不过,我会尽力克制自己对逊尼派的强烈倾向,力求提供清晰易懂、耳目一新、并对广大社会有益的内容与观点。最后,我谨向我挚爱的妻子和女儿们——Munā、Fāṭimah、Shaykah和Balsam——致敬,感谢她们为使我完成这项研究所做出的巨大牺牲与耐心。愿真主代我赐予她们最好的回报。我感谢Ibrāhīm al-Rammāḥ博士审阅出版前的草稿,并给予了出色的反馈,愿真主赐他善报与回馈。我祈求真主使我们所有人都有行善的能力,并让真理从我们的心中与舌上涌现。祂是最值得祈求的。
So this is the central idea of the book. I hope it will achieve its aims without delving into the type of polemic that is detached from how atheism actually manifests itself today. The purpose is not to present or discuss the old theological or philosophical arguments used to establish Allah’s existence, such as the argument from the temporality of bodies, argument from composition, argument from special design, or the discussions surrounding these. Rather, the aim is to have a discussion that is aligned to the discourse occurring today. They are the types of discussions I have been having with some of today’s youth who have been impacted by atheist discourse. It is also the study of many of the doubts and objections raised by contemporary atheists. I should not hide from the readership that, personally speaking, I am highly enthusiastic about defending Sunni dialectic theology, and by what is recorded in the Sunni books and debates by Sunni scholars on this subject, especially the writings of Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah . However, I will try to curb my strong views in favour of Sunnism to offer material and ideas that I hope will be clear, easy to understand, refreshing, and beneficial to wider society. I end this introduction by paying homage to my beloved wife and my beloved daughters – Munā, Fāṭimah, Shaykah, and Balsam – for their great sacrifices and patience that have allowed me to complete this research. May Allah grant them the best of rewards on my behalf. I thank Dr. Ibrāhīm al-Rammāḥ for reviewing the pre-publication draft, and for his excellent feedback – may Allah decree reward and recompense for him. I ask Allah to grant us all the ability for good, and that He allow the truth to emanate from our hearts and tongues. He is the best requestee.
这个故事通常被归于拉齐(Rāzī)名下,但我无法可靠地查证其来源。我提及它只是为了其中所包含的教训,并指出它颇有几分真实性:它提醒人们,认识安拉是与生俱来的本性,无需特定的证据,尤其是对那些fiṭrah(天性)未受玷污的人而言。在伊本·哈哲尔(Ibn Ḥajar)的《舌之衡》(Lisān al-Mīzān,6/319)中,关于拉齐的条目写道:"他虽然深谙宗教的根本原理,却常说:'谁坚守老妇人的信仰,谁就会成功。'"老妇人的宗教,只有对那些可以通过fiṭrah获得信仰的人而言,才是值得称赞的品质。 在《湿润之枝的芬芳》(Nafkh al-Ṭīb min Ghuṣn al-Andalus al-Raṭīb,5/263)中写道:法拉比(Fārābī,即Alpharabius)时常念叨"我的主啊,我向你诉苦",频繁到在他的许多言谈中都能见到,而这些场合往往并不完全适宜,以至于不熟悉他说话风格的人感到惊讶。他说:"我听说,拉齐(Fakhr)曾经路过一位苏菲长老。有人对长老说:'此人能为造物主提供一千个证明,你想去见他吗?'长老说:'凭他的尊严发誓,如果他真正认识祂,就根本不会去试图证明祂。'这话传到了伊玛目(即Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī)耳中,他说:'我们是隔着帷幕认识祂的;他们(即苏菲)则是毫无帷幕地见到祂。'" 我注意到这里的概括存在一些问题。与此故事类似的,还有达希比(Dhahabī)在《杰出人物传》(Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalā',22/112)中关于纳吉姆·丁·库布拉(Najm al-Dīn al-Kubrā)的传记中所提到的内容:"多产的作者法赫鲁丁·拉齐去拜访他。一位教法学家与他就安拉的认识和独一性进行了长时间的辩论。之后两人向长老请教认识论的学问,他说:'这是一种不可逆的知识,它只是自然地显现于灵魂之中。'" 法赫尔·丁问他:“人该如何才能达到这一境界并获得它?”他说:“放下你目前所处的领导地位和好运。”他说:“这一点我做不到。至于它的替代之物——这些我是可以做到的——便是苦修、独居,以及追随一位导师。” 真主的基本认知无需努力,便烙印在灵魂之中,因为这正是真主创造祂的仆人时所依据的本性(fiṭrah)。
1 This story is commonly attributed to Rāzī, though I have been unable to reliably source it. I have mentioned it only for the lesson it offers, and to point out that it bears a considerable amount of truth: it reminds people of the innate nature of knowing Allah and the fact that it is not in need of specific evidence, especially for those whose fiṭrah remains unblemished. On Rāzī’s entry in Ibn Ḥajar’s Lisān al-Mīzān (6/319), it reads: ‘Though he was deeply proficient in the religious fundamentals, he used to say, “Whoever adheres to the faith of old women, he would be successful.”’ The religion of old women would be a praiseworthy trait only for those whose acquisition of faith can be achieved by way of fiṭrah. In Nafkh al-Ṭīb min Ghuṣn al-Andalus al-Raṭīb (5/263), it says, ‘Fārābī (Alpharabius) used to frequently utter “O my Lord, to You I complain” so frequently that this could be found in many instances of his speech that were not exactly suited to it, thus leaving those unfamiliar with his style of speaking surprised. He said, “I have been told that Fakhr (Rāzī) passed by a sufi shaykh. The shaykh was told, ‘This man can provide a thousand proofs for the Maker. Do you want to go over to him?’ He said, ‘By His honour, had he truly known Him, he would never have attempted to prove Him in the first place.’ This news reached the Imam (Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī) – he said, ‘We know Him from behind the veil; they (i.e., sufis) see Him without any veil.’” I do note some problems with the generalisations made here. Similar to this story is what Dhahabī mentioned in his Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalā’ (22/112), in the biography of Najm al-Dīn al-Kubrā: ‘The prolific author Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī went to him. A jurist debated him at length on the cognition and monotheism of Allah. Then the two asked the shaykh on the science of cognition – he said, “This is irreversible knowledge that simply appears to souls.” Fakhr al-Dīn asked him, “How does one reach the station to attain it?” He said, “By abandoning the leadership and good fortune you are currently in.” He said, “This I cannot do. As for its substitutes – which I can – they are asceticism, seclusion, and the companionship of a shaykh.”’ The basic knowledge of Allah is imprinted onto the soul without exertion, as this is the fiṭrah upon which Allah created His servants.