这一论证在宗教领域普遍有多种名称，在伊斯兰领域尤其如此。它们都围绕一个核心观点：凡从不存在而成为存在的事物，必有一个使其存在优先于不存在的原因。它们还包括这样一种观点：凡是可能存在的事物，必然依赖于一个创造它的非依赖性原因。122 这个原因就是真主。这一论证的一些名称包括：创造论证、发明论证、第一推动者论证、凯拉姆论证、普遍因果论证、第一因论证、因果论证、宇宙论证、宇宙论（宇宙学）论证，以及其他名称。

This argument has multiple names in the religious space generally, and in the Islamic domain in particular. They all revolve around the central idea that whatever comes into existence after having been non-existent must have a cause that preferred its existence over its non-existence. They also comprise of the idea that whatever is possible is most definitely contingent on a non-contingent cause that created it.122 That cause is Allah . Some of the names for this argument are: the argument from creation, the argument from invention, the prime mover argument, the kalam argument, universal causation, the argument from first cause, the causal argument, the argument from the universe, the cosmological argument, and others.

凡是深思这一论据的人，都会发现它是所有指向真主的迹象中最简明的一种。这也解释了为何此论证在各个文明、文化和民族中广泛流传。其动因是一种出于本能的追问，探寻可观察到、可感知的有始事件的成因。尽管其具体情形和名称各不相同，其根基却在于两个极为清晰的命题：

One who ponders over this proof will find it to be the simplest of all the indicators that are suggestive of Allah . This explains why this argument is widespread across all civilisations, cultures, and nations. The motivation behind it is an instinctive question seeking the cause of observable and perceived temporal events. Though its scenarios and names are varied, its basis lies in two extremely clear propositions:

• 第一命题：时间性的事物存在。时间性的事物，指的是其存在之前有其不存在的事物，或者说任何有开端的事物。

• First proposition: Temporal events exist. A temporal event is that which was preceded by its non-existence, or anything that has a beginning.

• 第二个命题：时间中发生的事件表明存在一个原因。

• Second proposition: Temporal events point to the existence of a cause.

• 结论:存在中的时间性事件必有其因,这个因就是安拉。

• Conclusion: Temporal events in existence must have a cause, which is Allah .

在《启示诸证据方法》(al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij al-Adillah)中阐释这一论证的基础时,伊本·鲁世德(即阿威罗伊)的孙子说:至于创造论证,它涵盖了动物、植物和天体的存在。该方法基于两项原则,这两项原则牢固地存在于所有人的天性之中。第一项是,这些已存在的事物是被创造的。这一点从动物和植物中可以自然而然地得知,正如真主所说:"你们舍真主而祈祷的那些偶像,即使它们都聚集起来,也创造不出一只苍蝇。"我们看到,无生命的物体之中被创造出了生命。我们确知,在此有一个创造者,并赐予它们生命,那就是真主。至于天体,我们从它们永不停歇的运行中得知,它们受命照管世间的万物,并且被驯服以造福于我们。被驯服的事物,必然是被另一者所创造并受其命令的。第二项原则是,每一件被创造的事物都有一个创造者。因此,从这两个命题可以正确地推断出:存在之物必有一个使其出现的行动者。126

Explaining the foundation of this argument in al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij al-Adillah (Revealing the Methodologies of the Arguments), Ibn Rushd (Averroes) the grandson123 said, As for the argument from invention, it captures the existence of fauna, flora, and the heavens. This method is based on two principles that are firmly present in the innate predispositions of all people. The first is that these existing entities are invented. This is something automatically known from fauna and flora, as He  said, “…those idols you invoke besides Allah can never create so much as a fly, even if they all were to come together for that.”124 We see inanimate bodies in which life is created. We definitely know that there is an entity that creates and favours them with life here, which is Allah . As for the heavens, we know from their unfaltering movements that they have been commanded to look after what is here in the world, and that they have been subjugated for our benefit. Something that is subjugated is, by necessity, invented and commanded by something else. As for the second principle, it is that every invented thing has an inventor. Therefore, one can correctly deduce from these two propositions that something in existence125 has a doer that originated it.126

我们可以注意到伊本·路世德所作的一个观察。他区分了动植物与天体在表明其被创生方面的不同：对于前者，他认为这是不言自明的；对于后者，他则认为其被驱使的迹象即是其被创生的迹象。基于此，我们可以说，对真主而言，表明事物为有始的迹象分为两个层次。这取决于有始事物距离被感官与观察所捕捉的程度有多近或多远，以及它们在出现时能被感官观察和感知的可能性。

We can note the observation that Ibn Rushd makes. He differentiated between how fauna and flora are indicative of origination, vesus how heavens are indicative of the same. For the former, he considered it self-evident; for the latter he considered the sign of their subjugation as the sign for their origination. Based on this, we can say the indicators of temporal events for Allah  are of two levels. This is based on how close or remote temporal events are from being capturable by the senses and observation, and the potential of them being observable and perceptible to the senses when emerging:

个体可观察造物的时间性出现。

• The temporal emergence of individually observable creations.

世界的时间性出现（时间性事件这一类）。

• The temporal emergence of the world (the genus of temporal events).

当我们思考启示如何处理这一论证时，会注意到第一个层面更为显著。这是因为它可以通过感官直接感知，是达到目的最快捷的途径，无需冗长的命题、繁复的哲学论证，也无需证明某种并不在场或不可观察的事物。在阐释《古兰经》的论证方法时，并指出可观察的时间性事物无需证据来证明其时间性，伊本·泰米叶说：“《古兰经》所提及的方法，是通过论证人类以及其他存在物的时间性来证明造物主的存在——这些事物的时间性可以通过观察及类似的方式得知。造物者可以通过人的被造来加以论证。人的被造无需通过将其与变化、时间性或时间性事物必然有终结相联系来加以论证。”

When we contemplate the nature of how revelation dealt with this argument, we notice that the first level is more present. This is because it is perceptible by the senses, which is the quickest way to acquiring the aim without the need for lengthy propositions, expansive philosophical argumentation, or proving something that is not present or observable. Explaining the Qur’anic method here, and highlighting that observable temporal events are not in need for evidence to demonstrate their temporality, Ibn Taymiyyah states, ‘The method mentioned in the Qur’an is by reasoning for the temporality of man and other beings – whose temporality is known by observation and similar means – in order to demonstrate the existence of the Creator . The Originator can be argued for by the origination of man. Man’s origination does not need to be reasoned by associating him with change, temporality, or the necessity of temporal events being terminal.

区分"通过他的时效性进行推理"与"为他的时效性进行推理"是显而易见的。《古兰经》中所载的是前者，而非后者。真主说："难道他们是无中生有的吗？还是他们自己就是创造者呢？"此后，动物、植物、金属、雨水、云彩等事物的暂时性出现，是必然可知的；事实上它是可以被亲眼目睹的，无需证明。只有那些不能必然通过感官得知的事物，才需要借助证明来认识。这些存在物的时效性是一种本能的知识，不需要证据。它或是通过感官得知，或是通过本能得知，无论是通过可以提供本能知识的告知，还是通过其他必然知识的途径。人由精液而生，如同果实从树上生出、植物从大地中生长等。通过感官可知，这同一个果实是新生的，是在未曾存在之后才出现的；人与其他事物亦是如此。真主说："人难道不记得，我以前创造他的时候，他一无所有吗？"又说："天使回答说：'事情将是这样的。你的主说：「这对我是易如反掌的，我以前创造你的时候，你一无所有，这也是我所能做的。」'"130

The difference between reasoning through his temporality and reasoning for his temporality is evident. What is in the Qur’an is the first, not the second. Allah  says, “Or were they created by nothing, or are they their own creators?”127 Consequently, the mere temporal emergence of fauna, flora, metals, rain, clouds, and similar is known by necessity; it is in fact witnessed and does not need proof. Only that which is not necessarily known through the senses is to be learned via proof. The temporality of these beings is instinctive knowledge that does not require evidence. It is known either sensorily or instinctively, whether by way of being informed that can offer instinctive knowledge, or by other ways of necessary knowledge. The emergence of man from seminal fluid is like the emergence of fruits from trees and flora from the Earth, etc. It is sensorily known that this same fruit is emergent, coming into existence after having not occurred; the same applies to man and others. Allah  states, “Do such people not remember that We created them before, when they were nothing?”128, and He  says, “An angel replied, ‘So will it be! Your Lord says, “It is easy for Me, just as I created you before, when you were nothing!”129’130

一个微妙之处是伊本·泰米叶所暗示的：人对某一事件的熟悉与否，会影响他是否忽视身边easily可得的迹象。伊本·泰米叶说："这就是为什么创造物的天性（fiṭrah）是这样设定的：每当他们看到新出现的事件，如雷声、闪电和地震，他们就会想起并颂扬安拉。这是因为他们知道，这些现象不会自行重现，而是有一个使其出现的创造者。虽然他们也知道同样的道理适用于所有其他新出现的事件，但他们所习惯的事件已经为他们所熟悉，与之相对，那些很少重现的事件则不然。否则，那些大多只在罕见的新事件出现时才想起并颂扬安拉的人，早就应该见过那些经常出现的、远比罕见事件更伟大的安拉的迹象了。即使安拉只创造了人类，这本身就是最伟大的迹象。每个人都知道，人不是自己创造自己的，也不是他的父母或人类中的其他任何人创造的。每个人都知道，他必定有一个创始者。每个人都知道，他必定有一位创造他的造物主，而这位造物主是临在的、永生的、全知的、全能的、全听的、全见的。创造其他生物的，更配得上生命；赋予其他事物知识的，更配得上知识；使其他事物具有力量的，更配得上力量。人们也知道，其中精妙的设计表明了行事者的知识，而特殊的设计表明了行事者的意志。创造这一过程本身，若没有创造者的能力，也不可能发生。人对自身具体、独特、个别的自我的认识，会使他获得关于这些神圣含义及其他事物的知识，正如安拉所说："……就在你们自己身上。你们难道不看吗？"131132

One subtle point that Ibn Taymiyyah alluded to is the state of familiarity or the lack thereof vis-à-vis observing a particular event, and the impact this state has on a person becoming heedless of the indicators that are easily accessible to him. Ibn Taymiyyah  says, ‘This is why the fiṭrah of the creation is wired so that whenever they see a newly emerging event – such as thunder, lightning, and earthquakes – they remember and glorify Allah. This is because they know that this recurrence did not recur by itself, but rather there was an Originator who caused it to originate. Though they know the same is applicable to all other newly emerging events, the events they are used to are already familiarised to them, as opposed to the rarely recurring ones. Otherwise, those who mostly remember and glorify Allah when newly emerging events that are rare appear would have already seen those oft-recurring signs of Allah that are far greater than the rare event. Had Allah done nothing other than create man, that alone would be the greatest of signs. Everyone knows that man was not created by himself, his parents, or anyone else from humankind. Everyone knows that he must have had an originator. Everyone knows he must have had a Creator that created him, and that He is present, alive, omniscient, omnipotent, all-hearing, and all seeing. One who creates other living things is worthier of being alive; one who grants other things knowledge is worthier of knowledge; one who makes other things powerful is worthier of power. It is also known that the masterful design therein denotes the knowledge of the Doer, and that the special design denotes the will of the Doer. The process of origination per se could not have occurred without the originator’s power. A person’s knowledge of his own specific, personal, and individual self would offer him the knowledge of these godly meanings and other things, as Allah  states, “…as there are within yourselves. Can you not see?”131’132

需要指出的是，大多数揭示事物具有时间性（有始）的古兰经经文，其目的在于阐明一个更为宏大的道理，而并非仅仅为了证明造物主的存在。例如伊本·泰米叶在其前文结尾所引用的两节经文即是如此。这些经文的语境表明，它们被降示的目的，是为真主的全能提供论证，并说明祂有能力使复活实现。换言之，能够从无中创造万物的，更有能力使之重新造化。如前所述，这一推论隐含却又显而易见地表明全能者的存在，而且被造物从无中出现本身，即暗示了祂的存在。承载这一理性论证的最著名经文，是真主的话语：“他们是无因而生的呢？还是他们自己就是创造者呢？”133

It should be noted that most Qur’anic passages that reveal the temporal nature of events were brought to demonstrate a wider point, not to merely prove the existence of the Creator, like the two verses Ibn Taymiyyah concluded his previous statement with. The context in these verses show that they were revealed to offer reasoning for the perfect power of Allah , and that He is able to bring about the Resurrection. In other words, one who created things out of nothing is a fortiori able to refashion them. This amount, as mentioned before, implicitly yet self-evidently suggests that the Omnipotent exists, and that His existence is suggested by the mere emergence of the creation out of nothing. The most famous verse that carries this rational argument is Allah’s statement: ‘Or were they created by nothing, or are they their own creators?’133

对于我们这里讨论的问题，这节令人敬畏的经文是《古兰经》中最持久的证据。该经文首先提出这一重大的神学事实，将讨论聚焦于各种可能性，随后论证为何所有选项都不可能成立，唯一真实的选项是：人有一位创造他的造物主。该经文向有理智的人提出一个问题：“他们是否无缘无故地被造出来的？还是他们自己创造了自己？”事实都不是，因为创造他们并赋予他们生命的是安拉，而他们之前什么也不是，不值一提。134

For the issue we are dealing with here, this awe-inspiring verse is the most enduring proof in the Qur’an. The verse starts off by setting out the great theological reality by focusing the discussion to what are the possibilities, after which it proceeds to demonstrate why all the options are impossible save for the only true option: Man has a Creator Who created him. The verse poses a question to rational people: ‘Were they brought into existence without anyone causing it? Or did they bring themselves into existence? It is neither, for it is Allah Who created them and gave them life, having previously been nothing worth mentioning.’134

在阐述这一论证时,伊本·盖伊姆说:请思考"被造"一词的重复出现,以及其中所包含的、以最简洁而最有说服力的方式建立证据的限定。安拉实际上是在说:"这些受造物原先并不存在,它们怎么可能不经过造物主而被造出来?"任何有理智、有悟性的人都会认为这是不可能的:世上竟会有无制造者的被造之物,或无创造者的被创造之物。如果一个人经过一片没有任何建筑的荒原,之后又再次经过,却看到了坚固的建筑和城堡,他绝不会怀疑这些建筑有其建造者。随后安拉说:"难道他们是无中生有的吗?还是他们自己就是创造者呢?"同样,这表明仆人自己发明并创造自己是不可能的。一个人怎能从无中生出自己?他甚至不能延长自己的生命哪怕一个小时,尽管他拥有生命所需的一切条件;他甚至不能伸出自己的手指、指甲,或哪怕一根头发。既然这两种可能都不成立,剩下的唯一可能就是:他们有一位创造他们的创造主,有一位塑造他们的造化者。他是真正的神明,唯有他值得他们崇拜和感谢。既然他是唯一创造他们的存在,他们又怎能去感谢他以外的神明呢?如果有人问:安拉的经文"难道他们创造了天地吗?其实他们并不坚信真主"在这一论证中处于什么位置?那么回答是:位置极佳。前面几个部分说明了他们有创造者和造化者,并且他们是被造的;第三个部分说明他们无力创造,因为他们自己也是被造并被带入存在的。他们没有创造自己,也没有创造天地。 那位独一、全能者，即被描述为“除他之外，别无真主，也别无主宰”的那位，创造了他们。他创造了天与地。他创造了上界与下界及其中的一切，唯独他是创造居所与居住者的那一位。”137

Detailing this argument, Ibn al-Qayyim says, Contemplate the phrasal repetition of the creation term, and the restriction that comprises of establishing evidence in the simplest and most eloquent manner. Allah  is essentially saying, “How could have these creations – having not been in existence – been created without a Creator? This would be considered impossible by anyone with understanding and rationality, that there can be something made without a maker, or something created without a creator.” If a person passes by a wasteland without any building, then he passed by it again and saw solid buildings and castles, he would have no doubt that these had a maker. Then Allah said, “Or were they created by nothing, or are they their own creators?”135 This, likewise, shows that it is impossible that a servant invents and creates himself. How can someone be able to create himself out of non-existence? He cannot even increase his own life, not even by an hour, even though he has all the facilities of life. He cannot even extend his finger, fingernail, or even one strand of his hair. Given that both options are false, the only option that remains is that they have a Creator Who created them, and a Fashioner Who fashioned them. He is the True Divine Who is worthy of their worship and thanks. How can they thank a god other than Him when He is the one and only being that created them? If it is said, “What is the place of Allah’s statement ‘Or did they create the heavens and the Earth? In fact, they have no firm belief in Allah’136 in this evidence?”, it would be said in response: “The best place. Through the first couple of segments, He explained that they have a Creator and Fashioner, and that they are created. With the third segment, He explained that they are unable to create, having been created themselves and brought into existence. They did not create themselves. They did not create the heavens or the Earth. It was the One, the Omnipotent, the One described as ‘There is neither any god nor lord besides Him’ Who created them. He created the heavens and the Earth. By creating the upper and lower dominions and everything therein, He alone is the one Who created both residence and resident.”’137

Jubayr ibn Muṭʿim 有一段优美的圣训，揭示了这节古兰经文的伟大。他说：“我听到先知在昏礼中诵读《Ṭūr》篇。当他读到这节经文：‘难道他们是无中生有的吗？还是他们是自己的创造者呢？’时，我的心几乎要飞出来了。”思考先知们如何与否认安拉的主宰性、并自认为拥有主宰权的人辩论的人，会注意到先知们正是以这种理性的方法教导他们，论证安拉的主宰性，以及祂独享崇拜的应得之权。

Jubayr ibn Muṭʿim  has a beautiful narration revealing the greatness of this Qur’anic verse. He said, ‘I heard the Prophet  read al-Ṭūrin the Maghrib prayer. When he reached this verse: “Or were they created by nothing, or are they their own creators?”138, my heart almost flew out.’139 The one contemplating the method of the Prophets in debating those who denied the lordship of Allah  and claimed it for themselves will note that the Prophets instructed them with this rational method to argue for the lordship of Allah , and subsequently His worthiness to be worshipped alone.

历史上否认安拉的主宰性最臭名昭著的人是法老。他说："我是你们的主，至高无上的！"140 因此，穆萨与他的辩论中，有一部分是以安拉大能的迹象来作为反驳他的证据。安拉说："法老说：'众世界的主是什么？'"141

The most infamous person who denied the lordship of Allah  was Pharaoh. He said, ‘I am your lord, the most high!’140 As thus, part of the discussion Mūsā had with him was to use the effects of the power of Allah  as an evidence against him. Allah  says, ‘Pharaoh asked, “And what is ‘the Lord of all worlds’?”’141

穆萨提出了多种回答和证据。他提醒法老注意人与生俱来的本能,即真主的存在远比任何定义更为显而易见,无需多作解释。他解释说,真主的全部创造物在本质上都依赖于祂:天空、大地以及两者之间的一切,在被创造、获得给养和得到帮助方面,都需要真主。他说的“东方和西方的主”142是补充的信息,也是强调:一切事物都依赖于祂。你上面和下面的一切,东方和西方的一切,以及在你面前和身后的两者之间的一切,都依赖于祂。

Mūsā  offered a variety of answers and proofs. He reminded Pharaoh of the innate instinct, that Allah is far more recognisable than the need for some definition. He explained that all of Allah’s creation is existentially dependent on Him – all the heavens, the Earth, and everything in between is in need of Allah  for creation, sustenance, and assistance. His statement ‘Lord of the east and west’142 is additional information and emphasis that all events are dependent on Him, . Everything above and beneath you, everything in the east and the west, and everything in between that is in front of you and behind you is dependent on Him .

伊本·泰米叶分析了穆萨与法老之间的辩论：

Ibn Taymiyyah analysed the debate between Mūsā and Pharaoh:

法老把他的否认和拒绝包装成了一个反问句。他并不是在询问一位他已经承认的主的属性，因为他否认并拒绝了这位主。所以在辩论接近尾声时，他说："如果你取我以外的任何神为神，我必定让你下狱。"143

Pharaoh shrouded his denial and rejection in the form of a rhetorical question. He was not asking about the attributes of a Lord he had already acknowledged, as he was in denial of Him and rejected Him. This is why towards the end of the discussion, he said, “If you take any other god besides me, I will certainly have you imprisoned.”143

他还说:"……尽管我确信他(穆萨)是个骗子。"144 他这番提问,实际上是为了表达他的否认和拒绝。他的意思是:"世界上并没有派你来的主。这到底是谁?"这是作为一种否认的态度。穆萨解释说,他和朝廷中在场的人都认识这位主,祂的迹象明显、清楚,无可否认。他指出,他们用舌头否认的,正是他们内心本已知道是真实的事情。《古兰经》在另一处也记载,穆萨对法老说:"你很清楚,除了天地的主,没有谁降下这些作为明证的迹象。"145 安拉说:"他们的心里虽然确信这些迹象是真的,却因不义和傲慢而否认它们。那么请看,作恶者的下场如何!"146 法老没有说"谁(Arabic = man)是众世界的主?"因为man用于询问一个特定的实体,是在其一般身份已知的前提下,对某个确切而具体的存在提出疑问。就像问一个传信人:"谁(man)派你来的?"而mā则用于询问事物的性质或描述。法老的意思是:"这是什么?你所称的'众世界的主'又是什么?"他这样说,是出于对祂的否认和拒绝。当他以轻蔑的态度这样发问时,穆萨回答说,祂远比任何人能够否认的更为显而易见,祂的存在远比任何人能够怀疑的更为明白。他说:"祂是天地及其间万物的主,如果你们有确信的信念的话。"147 他没有说"……如果你们对某某事物有确信",而是保持了开放的表述。实质上,如果你对任何事物有确定的认知,那么排在确定之首的,应当是对这位主的信念——正如众使者对他们的民族所说:"关于安拉还有什么可怀疑的吗?"148 如果你说:"我们对任何事情都没有确定的把握。" "事实上，所有知识都已从我们这里被夺走"，这是一种普遍性的诡辩主张。其提出者显然在撒谎，因为知识是每个人固有的一部分。每个有理性的人都必定有一些知识。这正是为什么在理性的定义中已经说明，理性是一种本能的知识，没有哪个有理性的人能够摆脱它。因此，当法老说"你们那位被派来的使者一定是疯子"时，这是对使者的诬陷。他们已经背弃了他们所称道的传统，于是把众使者归为疯癫。他们也表现出对造物主的否认或怀疑。这就是他们普通民众的状况，也是他们的宗教状况。在他们看来，这是一种好的宗教，而他们所顺从的神就是法老："你们那位被派来的使者一定是疯子。"于是穆萨向他解释，真正失去有益理性的是他自己，他更配得上这种指控。他说："他是东方和西方的主，以及两者之间的一切之主，如果你们有理智的话。"理性需要本能的、确定的知识，而在天性（fiṭrah）中最伟大的知识，就是承认造物主。随后他进一步说明，肯定造物主是理性的必然结论。 然而，有益的知识只有当拥有它的人依其行动时才值得称赞。如果他不依其行动，就会被说成失去了理性。也会被说成：不遵循自己表面上确信之事的人，实际上并不拥有确信。确信也可以指扎根于心中的知识，也可以指依照这一知识而行动。因此，"信士"（即有确信的人）这一称谓，只适用于知识与行动都已在其心中安定的人。法老的民众在明知真相时却不遵从，因此他们既没有理性，也没有确信。 穆萨的这番话表明了两层意思：如果你们有确信，就会认识祂；如果你们有理智，也会认识祂。如果你声称自己既没有确信，也没有理智，那么你的族人同样如此。这样一来，你就等于承认自己已经失去了人性。凡是这样的人，都不配自称拥有神性。你虽然这样说是虚假的，但你内心仍然相信祂。正如安拉所说："他们虽然内心确信这些迹象是真实的，却因不义和傲慢而否认它们。"你们拥有能够认识祂的理智，然而你们的私欲阻碍你们遵循理智所指引的道路。你们想在大地上自夸，并且行为败坏。因此，从这个角度来看，你们是没有理智的。153

He also said, “…although I am sure he (Mūsā) is a liar.”144 His question was actually to convey his denial and rejection. He was basically saying, “The world does not have a lord who sent you. Who is this?” – as a point of denial. Mūsā explained that He is known to both him and those who were present in court, and that His signs were apparent, clear, and undeniable. He stated that they were denying with their tongues what they instinctively knew to be true. As related in another place in the Qur’an, Mūsā said to Pharaoh, “You know well that none has sent these signs down except the Lord of the heavens and the Earth as insights.”145 Allah  said, “And, although their hearts were convinced the signs were true, they still denied them wrongfully and arrogantly. See then what was the end of the corruptors!”146 Pharaoh did not say “Who (Arabic = man) is the Lord of the Worlds?”, as man is a question about a specific being. It is used in questions in which an exact and specific entity is being questioned, with its generic identity already known. It is like when a conduit is asked when he comes from someone, “Who (man) sent you?” ‘As for mā, that would be used in a question for description. Pharaoh was saying, “What is this? And what is this that you have called ‘Lord of the Worlds’?” He said this out of denial and rejection of Him. When he asked this in a dismissive fashion, Mūsā answered that He is far more recognisable than to ever be denied, and that He is far more obvious than to be ever doubted. He said, “He is the Lord of the heavens and the Earth and everything in between, if only you had sure faith.”147 He did not say, “…if only you had sure faith in such and such” – he kept it open ended. In essence, if you had certainty for anything, the first on the list of certainties should be conviction in this Lord – just as when the Messengers said to their people, “Is there any doubt about Allah?”148 If you say, “We have no certainty in anything. In fact, all knowledge has been seized from us”, then this is a general claim to sophism. Its claimant is obviously lying, as knowledge is part and parcel of every human. Every rational human must have some knowledge. This is why it has been stated in the definition of rationality that it is the instinctive knowledge, which no rational person is free of. So when Pharaoh said, “Your messenger, who has been sent to you, must be insane”149, it was a lie on the Messenger. They had left their praiseworthy traditions, and thus they ascribed the Messengers to insanity. They also showcased a denial or doubting in the Creator. This was the state of their common people and their religion. This was a good religion in their eyes, and the god they obeyed was Pharaoh: “Your messenger, who has been sent to you, must be insane.”150 So Mūsā explained to him that he is the one who has been left bereft of beneficial logic, and he is worthier of this ascription. He said, “He is the Lord of the east and west, and everything in between, if only you had any sense.”151 Logic requires instinctive and certain knowledge, the greatest of which in the fiṭrah is acknowledging the Creator. He then went on to explain that affirming Him is a logical implication. However, beneficial knowledge is praiseworthy when a person endowed with it acts upon it. If he does not act upon it, it would be said that he is bereft of logic. It would also be said that the one who does not follow what he is seemingly certain of actually does not possess certainty. Certainty can also mean knowledge that is settled in the heart; it can also mean acting upon this knowledge. Therefore, the term believer (one who is certain) would only be said for those in whose hearts both knowledge and action have settled. The people of Pharaoh did not follow when they knew. They therefore possessed neither logic nor certainty. The statement of Mūsā denotes both points: If you have certainty, you will know Him, and if you have logic, you will know Him. If you claim that you have no certainty or logic, then likewise your people. This therefore would be an acknowledgement on your part that your humanity has been taken away from you. Whoever is like this is unfit to claim divinity. Even though this is false on your part, you still believe Him. It is as Allah  said, “And, although their hearts were convinced the signs were true, they still denied them wrongfully and arrogantly.”152 You have logic by which you can recognise Him. However, your predilections prevent you from following what logic dictates. You want to boast in the land and be corrupt. Therefore, from this angle, you have no logic.’153

易卜拉欣与奈穆鲁德（尼姆罗德）之间的争论，与穆萨与法老的争论相似。安拉说：“难道你没有看见那与易卜拉欣争论他的主的人吗？因为安拉把国权赐予了他。当时易卜拉欣说：‘我的主是使人生又使人死的主。’他说：‘我也能使人生，也能使人死。’易卜拉欣说：‘安拉使太阳从东方升起，你就使它从西方升起吧！’那个不信道的人便哑口无言了。安拉不引导不义的民众。” 伊本·凯西尔解释这场辩论的各个环节以及奈穆鲁德的处境时说：这是因为他否认除他之外还有神，就像法老对他的人民所说的：“众官员啊！我不知道你们还有别的神，只有我。”这只是由于他的傲慢和长期的统治，使他走向暴虐、极端的不信和严重的顽固。因此安拉说：“因为安拉把国权赐予了他。”他仿佛是在要求易卜拉欣拿出证据，证明他所呼吁崇拜的主确实存在。易卜拉欣说：“我的主是使人生又使人死的主。”他的意思是：“证明祂存在的证据，就是这些可以观察到的事物先前不存在，然后出现；之后又归于不存在。这自然证明了创造者和有意志的主宰的存在，因为这些事物不可能自行产生。因此，必然有一个使它们存在的实体。那就是我所崇拜的主，祂是独一的，没有伙伴。”就在那时，辩论的对手奈穆鲁德说：“我也能使人生，也能使人死。” 卡塔德、穆罕默德·伊本·伊斯哈格、苏迪等人说：“看哪，我现在把两个人带来，他们都是死囚。我下令处死其中一个，赦免另一个。” 这就是赐予生命与致死的含义。”看来——真主至知——纳木鲁德所指的并非此意，因为这并不是对易卜拉欣问题的直接回答，也与他的问题无关，因为它并不排除造物主的存在。相反，他的意思是出于顽固与傲慢，为自己宣称这一地位。他假装通过这样做，自己就是颁布生死的那一位。法老也效仿他说：“众长老啊！我不知道你们还有别的神，除了我之外。”这就是为什么当他夸耀这种虚妄时，易卜拉欣对他说：“真主使太阳从东方升起，你就让它从西方升起吧。”其意是：“如果你声称自己赐予生命与致死，那么施行这一切的，是那位通过创造祂所拣选的万物、并使星辰及其运行服从于祂，从而在存在中贯彻祂旨意的主。这太阳每天从东方升起——如果你如你所说是赐予生死的神，那就把它从西方升起吧。”当他知道自己无能为力，无法作答时，他意识到在此情境下已无法再自夸，于是哑口无言。真主说：“真主不引导不义的民众。”这意味着祂不会启发他们去寻找任何证据或证明。相反，在他们主的眼中，他们的证据是徒劳无益的。他们将承受震怒，并遭受严厉的惩罚。按照这一含义来理解启示，远比大多数逻辑学家所提出的说法更为妥当，即认为易卜拉欣从第一个问题转到第二个问题，是从一个证据转向另一个更加明确的证据。一些逻辑学家用一种不雅的说法来描述这种转换。然而，实际情况并非他们所说的那样。相反，第一个问题就如同第二个问题的前提，并且它揭示了纳木鲁德在第一个和第二个问题中所宣称之事的虚妄。全部赞美与感谢唯独归于真主。162

There was a confrontation between Ibrāhīm  and Namrūd (Nimrod) similar to that of Mūsā  and Pharaoh. Allah  says, ‘Are you O Prophet not aware of the one who argued with Abraham about his Lord because Allah had granted him kingship? Remember when Abraham said, “My Lord is the One Who has power to give life and cause death.” He argued, “I too have the power to give life and cause death.” Abraham challenged him, “Allah causes the Sun to rise from the east. So make it rise from the west.” And so the disbeliever was dumbstruck. And Allah does not guide the wrongdoing people.’154 Explaining the segments of this debate and the state of Namrūd, Ibn Kathīr  said, That is because he denied that there is a god other than him, like Pharaoh said to his people, “O chiefs! I know of no other god for you but myself.”155 It was only his arrogance and prolonged rule that led him to his tyranny, gross disbelief, and severe obstinance. This is why Allah said, “…because Allah had granted him kingship?”156 It is like he demanded evidence from Ibrāhīm for the existence of the Lord he was calling to. Ibrāhīm said, “My Lord is the One Who has power to give life and cause death.”157 By this he meant: “The evidence for His existence is the appearance of these observable things after they were previously in non-existence, and their non existence after they had been in existence. This is automatically proof for the existence of the Doer and the Chooser, as they would not have occurred by themselves. Therefore, it is necessary for there to be an entity who brought them into existence. That would be the Lord to Whose worship that I call, for He is alone and without partner.” At that moment, the interlocutor – Namrūd – said, “I too have the power to give life and cause death.”158 Qatādah, Muhammad ibn Isḥāq, Suddī, and others said, “Look – I now have two people brought to me. They are on death row. I hereby order that one is killed and the other pardoned. This is the meaning of giving life and death.” It appears – and Allah knows best – that this is not what Namrūd meant, as this is not a direct answer to Ibrāhīm, nor is it related to his question, as it does not preclude the existence of a Maker. Rather, what he meant was to proclaim this station for himself out of stubbornness and arrogance. He pretended that by doing this, he was the one who issued life and death. Pharaoh followed him on this: “O chiefs! I know of no other god for you but myself.”159 This is why when he claimed this puffery, Ibrāhīm told him, “Allah causes the Sun to rise from the east. So make it rise from the west.”160 By this he meant: “If you are claiming that you give life and death, then the One Who does this is the One Who enforces His will in existence by creating His chosen entities, and by subjugating the planets and their movements. This Sun appears every day from the east – if you are a god who gives life and death as you claim, then bring it from the west.” When he knew he was unable and could not offer a response, he realised that he could no longer boast in this situation, and was left dumbstruck. Allah  said, “And Allah does not guide the wrongdoing people.”161 This means He does not inspire them to any evidence or proof. Rather, their evidence is futile in the eyes of their Lord. Upon them is wrath, and they will suffer a severe punishment. Revelation according to this meaning is far better than what most logicians mention, namely that Ibrāhīm’s switch from the first issue to the second was a switch from one evidence to another that was more clear-cut. Some logicians refer to this switch with an unsavoury expression. However, it is not like they have stated. Rather, the first issue is like the proposition to the second and highlights the falsehood of what Namrūd claimed in both the first and second issues. And to Allah belongs all praise and thanks.162

• 第一个前提：时间中的事件存在。

• First proposition: Temporal events exist.

• 第二个命题：每一个有时间起始的事件，都有其造成者。

• Second proposition: Every temporal event has someone who caused it.

• 结论:安拉是世间(有始)事件的因。

• Conclusion: Allah  is the cause of temporal events.

需要为这两个命题提供证据，以及说明它们如何导出前述结论。

Evidence for these two propositions, and how they lead to the aforementioned conclusion, is required.

这一命题的证明依据是感官与观察，正如安萨里、伊本·鲁世德、伊本·taymiyyah等人就可感知的有时间性的事件所指出的那样。关于宇宙（及其中的一切）的有时间性，其存在与不存在都可以被设想，因此其存在并不被视为必然，而只是或然的。或然的事物必然是有时间性的，因为它们需要一个非或然的存在者才能够存在。宇宙的时间性将在下一节中更详细地讨论，蒙安拉允许。

The proof of this proposition is the senses and observation, which is what Ghazālī, Ibn Rushd, Ibn Taymiyyah, and others pointed out in relation to perceptible temporal events. On the temporality of the universe (and everything within it), both its existence and non-existence can be envisaged, and thus its existence is not considered necessary – it is only contingent. Contingent entities are most certainly temporal, as they require the existence of a non-contingent being for them to come into existence. The temporality of the universe will be discussed in more detail in the next section, by the permission of Allah.

感官是认知的传递者,而非认知的裁决者。人对周围所见所感的新生事物的认识是必要的。伊本·泰米叶说:"以可观察到其有始性的事物来举证的方法存在于《古兰经》之中,古代的学者和伊玛目们对此也都予以认同,但须与本能和感官相结合。有了这一点,就无需再为那些新生之物的有始性提供证据。怀疑那些其新生可以被观察到的事物的有始性,会导致诡辩,从而封闭了任何知识的可能性。它的结果是使神志正常的人与疯子等同起来。"

The senses are cognitive transmitters, not cognitive arbiters. A man’s recognition of the emerging things he witnesses and senses around him is necessary. Ibn Taymiyyah  said, The method of bringing evidence by using that whose temporality is observable is in the Qur’an, and the ancient scholars and Imams have agreed to it, though in conjunction with instinct and the senses. With this, there is no need to offer evidence for the temporality of specific Doubting the temporality of those things whose emergence can be observed leads to sophism, which shuts down the possibility of any knowledge. It results in the equalisation of a sane person and a madman.

这一论证的依据是理性本能,体现于因果原则之中。这是一个自明且出于本能的问题,其反面情形无法设想:不可能想象一个有时间性的事物在没有其出现之因的情况下存在。伊本·泰米叶说:"知道一个被造之物必有造物主,是天生且出于本能的知识。"164 因此,这一问题并不需要通过基于证据的推理过程来证明,而是应当被当作事实接受,因为它是基础知识,理论知识正是建立在它之上。理性的必然性可以用作其他事物的证据,它们本身并不需要被证明,其决定性来自于它们的天生性。若不肯定其本能性,知识的基础就会陷入无穷递归,从而导致一切知识的可能性崩溃。因此,必定存在一些基本事实,即本能的认知概念,基于证据的推理过程正是以之为根基。因果原则便是这些本能认知概念之一。

The proof for this is rational instinctiveness, as represented in the principle of causality. It is a self-evident and instinctive issue whose opposite scenario cannot be envisaged: It is not possible to imagine the existence of a temporal matter without knowing there was a cause that brought about its emergence. Ibn Taymiyyah said, ‘Knowing that an originated entity must have an originator is innate and instinctive knowledge.’164 Therefore, this is an issue that does not require a process of evidence-based reasoning. Rather, it would be accepted as fact, for it is basic knowledge, upon which theoretical knowledge is based. Rational necessities are to be used as evidence for other things. They are not there to be proven. They acquire their decisiveness from their innateness. Without affirming their instinctiveness, the basis of knowledge would become an infinite series, causing the collapse of the possibility of gaining any knowledge. Therefore, there must be some basic facts – or cognitive concepts – upon which the process of evidence-based reasoning is founded. One of these instinctive cognitive concepts is the principle of causality.

有趣的是，基于证据的推理过程要求承认理性的必然性。证据与其所指之物之间的联系受此规则支配，因为证据是获得关于其所指之物知识的原因。对手试图否定因果原则的行为，本身就是对该原则的一种默认承认。 关于这一原则对人类理性构成的深刻影响，伊本·泰米叶说：“众所周知，依据fiṭrah（真主以清晰的逻辑赋予其仆人的本性）可知，新生事件不会无缘无故地发生，必有其起因；而没有起因的时间性事件的产生，可以直接判定为虚假。这一认知根植于所有亚当的后代之中，甚至包括幼童。若一个孩子被打了，并问：‘是谁打我？’有人回答：‘没有人’，他的心智是不会接受这一击是在无人施加的情况下发生的。因此，如果有人主张书写、建造、栽植或类似之事可以在无人从事的情况下发生，有理智的人会认为他要么是疯子，要么是诡辩者，正如否认自明之理和本能知识的人一样。”165

It is interesting that the process of evidence-based reasoning requires that rational necessity is acknowledged. The connection between evidence and what it points to is governed by this rule, for evidence is the cause of gaining knowledge about what it points to. The opponent’s mere attempt to disprove the principle of causality is a tacit acknowledgement on his part in favour of it. On the deep influence of this principle on the make-up of human rationality, Ibn Taymiyyah said, It is known by fiṭrah – upon which Allah predisposed his slaves with clear logic – that an emerging event does not occur without something originating it, and that the emergence of a temporal event without an originator can be automatically ruled out as false. This is entrenched in all children of Adam, even small children. If a child were struck and said, “Who hit me?”, and he was told, “Nobody”, his mind would not accept that the strike occurred without someone perpetrating it. This is why if someone posited that writing, construction, implantation, or similar can occur without someone doing these, rational people would consider him to be either a madman or a sophist, just like someone who denied self-evidence and instinctive knowledge.’165

这一证明被称为"时间性论证"、"凯拉姆论证"、"宇宙论证"或"宇宙论论证"。该证明的前提与结论，与我们刚刚讨论的第一层级的内容相似。

This proof is known as the argument from temporality, the kalam argument, the argument from the universe, or the cosmological argument. The propositions and conclusion of this proof are similar to those of the first level that we just dealt with:

• 第一个命题：任何有开端的事物都必有其因。

• First proposition: Anything with a beginning must have a cause.

• 第二个命题：宇宙有一个开端。

• Second proposition: The universe has a beginning.

• 结论:因此,宇宙必定有一个原因。

• Conclusion: Therefore, the universe must have a cause.

使其存在胜过不存在的那个原因，是安拉。

The cause that preferred its existence over its non-existence is Allah .

实际上,这种推理方法在哲学和凯拉姆(Kalam)领域并不新鲜。事实上,它是凯拉姆探讨安拉存在问题时最著名的切入点。正因如此,即便是一些在当代西方学术领域运用这一推理的人——例如著名的基督教辩论家威廉·莱恩·克雷格(William Lane Craig)——也称之为"凯拉姆宇宙论证",他还为此出版了同名著作。在该书开篇,他作出了以下重要的承认:"在宇宙论证的历史中,或许没有哪一章像阿拉伯神学家和哲学家的那一章那样重要,却又那样被普遍忽视。尽管我们可以在他们那里找到两种最重要的宇宙论证版本的起源与发展,即时间回溯论证和偶然性论证,但这些伊斯兰思想家的贡献在西方的相关文集和著作中却几乎被完全忽略。"168

In actuality, this method of reasoning is not new in the philosophy or kalam space. In fact, it is the most famous entry point of kalam into the issue of the existence of Allah . This is why even some of those who have used this reasoning within the contemporary Western arena – such as the famous Christian debater William Lane Craig – have called it the ‘kalam cosmological argument’; he also has a book with the same name. In the beginning of this book, he makes the following important acknowledgement: ‘Probably no chapter in the history of the cosmological argument is as significant – or as universally ignored – as that of the Arabic theologians and philosophers. Although we find in them the origin and development of two of the most important versions of the cosmological argument, namely the argument from temporal regress and the argument from contingency, the contribution of these Islamic thinkers is virtually ignored in western anthologies and books on the subject.’168

在讨论这一类论证时——即从受造物推证造物主的论证——必须注意：它实际上是在肯定某一特定受造物或若干受造物的有始性，所用的推理工具所得出的结论，与目击观察所给出的结论相同。这是因为宗教的一般观念，尤其是伊斯兰的观念，相信在我们称之为宇宙的这个特定世界之外，还存在其他世界。伊本·泰米叶与哲学家和凯拉姆学者关于世界有始还是前永恒之争，以及他关于事件无穷倒退和其类别前永恒的主张，使这一问题更加复杂。在他看来，整体的受造物没有开端，也没有终结，尽管每一个别受造的存在都有开端。因此，依照伊本·泰米叶所推论的这一观点，试图证明整体受造物有开端，并没有多大益处，因为这一观点主张整体并无开端。只要真主被赋予完全的权能和意志，并且祂随意而造，那么心智所能设想的每一个有开端的特定受造物，都可能先于另一个受造物而存在，原因正在于真主的权能与意志是完满的。当一个人判定这一链条必须中断，必定存在第一个受造物，并且它不可能先于另一个受造物时，就会出现将不可能性归于主的问题，此行为的不可能性也将适用于真主。而祂绝不能以此来描述，因为祂从前永恒到后永恒，都以受造、权能和意志来被描述。事实上，这一问题使心智困惑，并被归入哲学辩论的深水区。 这显然不是讨论这一问题的场合。我只是想指出这一点，以便把这类论证放在它应有的位置上。因此，不宜热衷地推广它。人们只应在其有益作用的范围内涉及这一论证：即促使各方迅速承认，我们所处的宇宙是有始的，凡在我们感官范围之内的事物都是有始的，而宇宙中凡不在我们面前的事物也同样是有始的。当今大多数无神论者承认宇宙是有始的，并承认其中的一切都是有始的，而这种承认在前现代的无神论中通常是找不到的。直到最近，他们还相信宇宙是前永恒的；事实上，他们把这视为公认的事实，并宣称证明宇宙有始的举证责任在于那些主张宇宙有始的人。著名的英国数学家和哲学家伯特兰·罗素曾声称“宇宙就在那里，仅此而已”——依他之见，它无需任何解释；它是前永恒的，没有任何东西使它开始。169

在宇宙学历史的早期阶段，人们对宇宙本质的两个基本概念达成了某种程度的共识：

During the early stages of the history of cosmology, there was an agreement of sorts on two fundamental notions related to the nature of the universe:

1. 宇宙是均匀的，具有相同的特征——其所有组成部分都是相同的。

1. The universe is homogeneous with the same characteristics – it is the same across all its constituent parts.

2. 宇宙遵循着固定而恒定的规律运行。

2. The universe is in a fixed and constant pattern.

当爱因斯坦提出相对论时，这两个假设似乎与他最初提出的相对论定律相矛盾。为了解决这一问题，他提出了一个称为宇宙学常数的恒定系数，用以抵消引力的作用。这样一来，他所提出的新宇宙理论便能保持平衡，而该理论认为宇宙是静止的。这在当时大多数科学界中是被普遍接受的宇宙观：宇宙被描述为静止且恒定不变的。

When Einstein came and introduced relativity, these two assumptions appeared to contradict the first iteration of the law of relativity that he theorised. To deal with this problem, he proposed a constant coefficient he called the cosmological constant in order to counterbalance the effect of gravity. That way, there would be balance in the new theory of the universe that he had proposed, which was that the universe is static. This was the generally accepted view on the universe in most scientific circles back then: The universe was characterised as being static and constant.

随后,比利时天主教神父兼物理学家乔治·勒梅特(Georges Lemaître)和俄罗斯科学家亚历山大·弗里德曼(Alexander Friedmann)登上了舞台。他们提出了关于宇宙的一种新理论:宇宙正在膨胀,并且起源于一种极其致密、高度压缩的状态。 宇宙膨胀理论的关键支持来自埃德温·哈勃(Edwin Hubble)。1929年,他取得了一项重要发现:我们周围的星系正在以一种与它们和我们之间距离相对应的速度远离我们;距离越远,它们的速度越快。膨胀现象是通过这些星系的光谱探测到的——它们看起来呈红色,这表明它们正在远离我们;相反,当某物向观察者靠近时,在观察者看来它会带有蓝色的光晕。 1946年,乔治·伽莫夫(George Gamow)提出理论:伴随着宇宙的膨胀和温度的下降,光子成功地从物质中脱离出来。这一过程以一道他假设存在的光线来表示,并且这道光线持续穿越宇宙。阿诺·彭齐亚斯(Arno Penzias)和罗伯特·威尔逊(Robert Wilson)偶然发现了这一现象。这一现象后来被命名为宇宙微波背景辐射,是大爆炸理论最有力的证据之一。这种辐射揭示了星系之间存在异常高的温度,也表明空间的温度并非绝对零度。相反,空间温度约为3开尔文——这种辐射是大爆炸遗留的热余晖。 由于这一发现,这两位研究者于1978年获得了诺贝尔物理学奖。这一时刻标志着科学界的一个转变:从对大爆炸的排斥转变为普遍接受。值得注意的是,他们的这一发现是偶然的。他们说:"要么我们看到了宇宙的诞生,要么(正如一则天体物理学的民间故事所说)我们看到了一堆81"

Thereafter, the Belgian Catholic priest and physicist Georges Lemaître and the Russian scientist Alexander Friedmann came onto the scene. They offered a new theory for the universe: The universe is expanding, and it began from an extremely dense and compact state. Key support for the expansionist theory of the universe came from Edwin Hubble. In 1929, he made an important discovery: The galaxies around us are moving farther out from us with a speed that corresponds to the distance between them and us; their speed increases as the distance widens. Expansionism was detected through the light spectrum of those galaxies – they appear to be reddish, which suggests that they are moving farther away, as opposed to when something is moving closer, in which case it appears to the observer to have a blue haze. In 1946, George Gamow theorised that, alongside the expansion of the universe and the falling of temperature, photons successfully detached from matter. This was represented in the form of a light ray that Gamow assumed existed, and that it continued to beam across the universe. This was accidentally discovered by Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson. This phenomenon was later named as cosmic microwave background radiation, representing one of the strongest proofs for the Big Bang theory. This radiation uncovered the existence of abnormally high levels of temperature in between the galaxies, and that space does not have a temperature of absolute zero. Rather, space temperature sits at around 3 Kelvin – this radiation is the heat remnant of the Big Bang. As a result of this discovery, the two researchers won the Nobel Peace Prize in Physics in 1978. This point marked a shift in the science community: Rejection of the Big Bang turned to general acceptance. It is interesting to note that this discovery on their part was an accident. They said, ‘Either we’ve seen the birth of the universe, or (as one astrophysical folk tale would have it) we’ve seen a pile of 81

在九十年代中期，科学家们试图找出一条能够解释宇宙中一切不可逆过程的定律。正是这些努力促成了热力学第二定律的发现。实现这一发现的第一步，是注意到热量总是从温度较高的物体传向温度较低的物体，并且热量会持续传递，直到所有相连的物体达到热平衡。事实上，热传递只是众多例子之一，这些例子可以被描述为平衡概念，或称自然界的平衡。气体扩散以达到平衡、电的流动以及其他情况，也都可以看到同样的现象。如果自然界中不存在这些现象，生命将无从存在。正是由于这一现象，空气（例如）不会分离开来，使得氧气只聚集在房间的一侧，而氮气聚集在另一侧。这一定律形成过程中的一个重要进展，是它与熵的概念相联系。熵是一个专业术语，用来表示混乱的程度。每当一个系统内的无序程度增加时，其中各部分熵的总和随之增大；同样，当无序程度降低时，熵的总和也随之减小。这就是为什么热力学定律中包含一项规定：系统倾向于从低熵转向高熵，换句话说，它们从有序转向无序。在这里我们关心的，是这一定律与宇宙的联系。宇宙是一个封闭系统，因此热力学第二定律适用于它。作为封闭系统，宇宙在多个领域中都力求达到平衡。热量扩散直至达到平衡，能量、熵等的分布也同样如此。

In the mid-90s, scientists attempted to uncover a rule that explains all irreversible processes in the universe. As a result of those efforts, the second law of thermodynamics was discovered. The first step to realising this was to note that heat always transfers from a more heated body to a less heated one, and heat keeps on transferring until all connected bodies reach thermal equilibrium. The fact of the matter is that the thermal transfer is just one example of many, which can be described as the equilibrium concept or the balance of nature. The same can be seen vis-à-vis the spread of gases to achieve equilibrium, electricity, and other cases as well. Had these phenomena not occurred in nature, life would have been impossible. By this phenomenon, the air – for example – does not separate out so that oxygen gathers only on one side of the room and nitrogen on the other side. One significant development in the shaping of this law is its connection with the concept of entropy. It is a technical term used to denote the amount of chaos. Anytime there is an increase in the scale of disorder within a system, the sum of the entropies rises therein; likewise, when there is a disorder scale decrease, the sum of the entropies decreases. This is why the law of thermodynamics has within it a provision that states that systems are inclined to switch from low entropy to higher entropy. In other words, they switch from order to disorder. What concerns us here is the connection of this law to the universe. The universe is a closed system. This is why the second law of thermodynamics is applicable to it. As a closed system, the universe strives to achieve equilibrium in multiple fields. Heat spreads until it reaches equilibrium, and likewise the same occurs in the distribution of energy, entropy, and others as well.

因此,如果宇宙是前永恒的,它早已达到热平衡,因为它将有无限的时间去达到这一状态。而一旦达到这一状态,宇宙中所有物体的热量将被均匀分布,我们今天所看到的各种系统将不复存在,其各个角落的无序程度将完全相同,能量之源将被耗尽,一切运动都将停止。事实上,每一个自然和化学过程都将停止。然而,宇宙的实际状态恰恰相反。宇宙依然具有秩序,尚未达到热寂的阶段。综上所述,宇宙向我们揭示了一个重要事实:它并非前永恒的,而是当我们回溯其历史时,它有一个确定的年龄,它是有起点的。

As such, had the universe been pre-eternal, it would have already reached equilibrium, as it would have had an infinite amount of time to have reached this state. And had it reached this state, heat would have been equally distributed across all bodies inside the universe, the systems as we see them today would not have existed, disorder would have been equal across all its corners, the fountain of energy would have been depleted, and all movement would have stopped. In fact, every natural and chemical process would have stopped. Yet, the state of the universe is the exact opposite. The universe still has a system to it. It has not yet reached the stage of heat death. In light of what has preceded, the universe reveals to us an important fact: It is not pre-eternal, but rather has a fixed age when we look back into its history, and it had a start to it.

一个否认真主存在的人，不会接受这一论证所自然指向的结论，而会对其提出一系列疑问。这些疑问要么回到该论证的第一前提，要么回到第二前提，或是回到结论。在此，我将提及已被列出的最重要的疑问与反驳。

One who denies the existence of Allah  would not accept the instinctive indication of this argument, and would instead cast a set of doubts on it. These doubts either go back to the argument’s first proposition, second proposition, or conclusion. Here, I shall mention the most important doubts and objections that have been listed.

主要用来质疑这一命题的方法，是声称某物可以无缘无故地存在，并且一个偶有的实体可以在没有选择者的情况下被选定存在，而不是不存在。基于此，宇宙可能无缘无故地自行产生，因此它不需要一个使其存在得以优先的原因。这样一来，对一个独立创造者的需要也就变得无关紧要了。最著名的怀疑论论证力图否定人的本能性要素。这种本能指的是因果性原则。前文已经指出，该原则是一种本能的、不言自明的理性概念，不需要外部的证实。这一原则最著名的怀疑者是英国哲学家大卫·休谟。他是经验主义学派的先驱，该学派宣称只有感官才是人类知识的来源。他说：

The main way of casting doubt to this proposition is through the claim that something can come into existence without any cause, and that it is possible for a contingent entity to be chosen for existence – versus non-existence – without a chooser. Based on this, it is possible that the universe just came into existence without cause; therefore, it is not in need for a cause that preferred it to exist. As thus, this claim would make the need for an independent creator irrelevant. The most famous sceptic argument strives to negate man’s instinctive element. That instinct denotes the principle of causality. It has been previously highlighted that this principle is an instinctive and self-evident rational concept that does not require external veracity. The most famous sceptic of this principle is the English philosopher David Hume. He is a pioneer of the empiricist school, that declares that only the senses can be the source for human knowledge. He states.

要想充分理解力量或必然联系的观念，那么就让我们考察它的印象。为了更确切地找到这一印象，就让我们在所有可能由之衍生的来源中去寻找它。当我们环顾外部事物，考察原因的作用时，我们在任何单独的例子中都无法发现任何力量或必然联系；也就是说，找不到任何能把结果与原因紧密相连、使一者必然成为另一者无误结果的性质。我们只发现，一者确实在事实上跟随另一者。一个台球撞击另一个台球，第二个球随之运动。这就是外部感官所能觉察到的全部。心灵对于这一系列事物并不感受到任何情感或内在印象；因此，在任何单独、特定的因果实例中，都不存在能够唤起力量或必然联系观念的东西。176

To be fully acquainted, therefore, with the idea of power or necessary connexion, let us examine its impression; and in order to find the impression with greater certainty, let us search for it in all the sources, from which it may possibly be derived. When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects: consequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, anything which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion.176

他还说:"一般人在解释自然界那些较为常见、熟悉的现象时,从不觉得困难——比如重物的下落、植物的生长、动物的繁衍,或食物对身体的滋养。但假设在所有这些情形中,他们确实察觉到了那连接原因与结果的力量或能量,并且它在运作上永远准确无误。通过长期的习惯,他们会形成这样一种思维倾向:一旦原因出现,他们便会确信地预期其通常伴随的结果,而几乎无法想象除此之外还会有别的结果从中产生。"177

He also said, The generality of mankind never find any difficulty in accounting for the more common and familiar operations of nature – such as the descent of heavy bodies, the growth of plants, the generation of animals, or the nourishment of bodies by food: but suppose that, in all these cases, they perceive the very force or energy of the cause, by which it is connected with its effect, and is for ever infallible in its operation. They acquire, by long habit, such a turn of mind, that, upon the appearance of the cause, they immediately expect with assurance its usual attendant, and hardly conceive it possible that any other event could result from it.’177

最重要的异议在于，有人试图提出另一些观点，用以取代传统的大爆炸理论。这种异议首先主张，宇宙是前永恒的，如同静态模型所描述的那样；或者把大爆炸看作宇宙的一个演化起点，即相对于我们的宇宙是开端，但并非绝对的开端。看来，提出此类替代理论的努力，是出于对大爆炸理论所蕴含的理论意义的排斥，带有意识形态的动机。有一位物理学家对这一理论表现出强烈的反感，仿佛它是一场由宗教驱动的阴谋。他说："这种潜在动机当然是要把上帝引为创造者。自十七世纪科学开始把宗教从理性之人的头脑中驱逐出去以来，基督教神学一直在等待的，似乎正是这样一个机会。"184 大爆炸的观念起初令爱因斯坦感到不安，因为它意味着我们今天所见的宇宙有一个开端。他说："这种情况（即宇宙在膨胀）令我烦恼。"罗伯特·贾斯特罗（Robert Jastrow）指出："爱因斯坦从来不喜欢大爆炸的观念，因为它暗示了一个开端和一次创造，而创造则暗示了一位创造者。"他引用爱丁顿的话说："作为一名科学家，我根本不相信现今的这一秩序是以一声爆炸开始的。"贾斯特罗补充道："是的，那里的比喻是：我们现在知道宇宙有一个开端，宇宙中存在的一切事物——生命、行星、恒星——都可以追溯到那个开端，而从科学中得出这样一个结果，是一件颇为奇特的神学性结论。我写这段文字时心中的画面是：一群科学家和天文学家攀登一列山峰，他们抵达最高的山巅，而就在峰顶，他们遇见了一群神学家，这些神学家已经在那里坐等了几个世纪。"185

The most significant objection here is the attempt to offer alternative viewpoints that would replace the traditional theory of the Big Bang. The objection firstly entails – and maintains – the notion that the universe is pre-eternal, like the static model, or that it assigns an evolutionary angle to the Big Bang in the sense that it was the beginning relative to our universe, but not the absolute beginning. It would appear that the attempt to propose such alternative theories is ideologically driven by the rejection of the theoretical implications of the Big Bang. We have one physicist express deep resentment of this theory, as if it were a religiously driven conspiracy. He said, ‘The underlying motive is, of course, to bring in God as creator. It seems like the opportunity Christian theology has been waiting for ever since science began to depose religion from the minds of rational men in the seventeenth century.’184 The idea of the Big Bang made Einstein initially uncomfortable, as its implication was that the universe – as we see it today – has a beginning. He said, ‘This circumstance (i.e., of an expanding universe) irritates me.’ Robert Jastrow notes: Einstein never liked the idea of a big bang because it suggested a beginning and a creation, and a creation suggested a Creator.’ He quoted Eddington by saying, ‘As a scientist I simply do not believe that the present order of things started off with a bang.’ Jastrow adds: ‘Oh yes, the metaphor there was that we know now that the universe had a beginning, and that all things that exist in this universe – life, planets, stars – can be traced back to that beginning, and it’s a curiously theological result to come out of science. The image that I had in my mind as I wrote about this was a group of scientists and astronomers who are climbing up a range of mountain peaks and they come to the highest peak and the very top, and there they meet a band of theologians who have been sitting for centuries waiting for them.185

讽刺的是，正是著名天文学家弗雷德·霍伊尔为这一理论创造了“大爆炸”（Big Bang）这个术语。他在BBC的一次讨论中带着嘲讽的口吻说出了这个词，结果这个说法流传开来，这一理论也因此被人们以此称呼。

The irony here is that it was the famous astronomer, Fred Hoyle, who coined the term ‘Big Bang’ for this theory, which he mockingly said in one of his discussions on the BBC. As a result, the theory became known by this term.

振荡宇宙模型基于这样一种观点：宇宙先膨胀一段时间，然后坍缩收缩，接着再次膨胀，如此循环往复，类似于一种“坍缩与反弹”。这一观点认为，宇宙本质上是前永恒的，没有确定的开端，但它始终处于膨胀与收缩的持续波动之中。该模型存在若干问题。此外，它承载着一种普遍存在却未经证实的观念，即宇宙是前永恒的。这一点可以从约翰·格里宾（John Gribbin）的言论中看出：

The oscillating universe model is based on the idea that the universe expands for a period, then collapses and contracts, and then expands again. The process repeats itself, resembling a ‘crunch and bounce’. This view states that the universe at its core is pre-eternal without any definitive beginning, but it is in a constant state of volatility of expansion and contraction. This model has a number of problems. In addition, it carries the pervading yet unsubstantiated mentality of the pre-eternality of the universe. One can detect this in what John Gribbin said:

宇宙起源的大爆炸理论最大的问题是哲学上的——甚至可能是神学上的——大爆炸之前是什么？仅这一个问题，就足以给稳恒态理论带来巨大的最初推动力；但由于该理论现在与观测结果相冲突，遗憾的是，绕过这一最初困难的最佳方式，是一种模型：宇宙从一个奇点膨胀，然后又坍缩回去，并无限重复这一循环。190

The biggest problem with the Big Bang theory of the origin of the Universe is philosophical – perhaps even theological – what was there before the bang? This problem alone was sufficient to give a great initial impetus to the Steady State theory; but with that theory now sadly in conflict with the observations, the best way round this initial difficulty is provided by a model in which the universe expands from a singularity, collapses back again, and repeats the cycle indefinitely.190

一种对振荡宇宙理论的反对意见是，宇宙收缩这一概念在科学界存在很大争议。Alan Guth 与 Marc Sher 撰写了一篇题为《反弹宇宙的不可能性》（‘The Impossibility of a Bouncing Universe’）的科学论文，其中提到即便假定宇宙会收缩，它也无法再次经历一次大爆炸。

One objection to the oscillating universe theory is that the notion of contraction is an area of great debate in the scientific community. Alan Guth and Marc Sher wrote a scientific paper titled ‘The Impossibility of a Bouncing Universe’, in which they mentioned that even if it is assumed that the universes contracts, it would be unable to repeat another bang.

许多宇宙学家认为，宇宙将无限期地持续膨胀，而且宇宙的质量不足以引发"大坍缩"，因为要抵消膨胀的力量，需要一种足以与之抗衡的引力。科学家们曾估计，宇宙的膨胀会因引力作用而逐渐减速，但事实恰恰相反——两个因此获得诺贝尔奖的科学家团队发现，宇宙正以越来越快的速度膨胀，其原因是一种被称为暗物质的离心力，它比引力更强。这种力与引力的作用相反，推动宇宙不断向外扩张。这种离心力代表了宇宙学常数，其数值极其精确，令科学家们震惊不已。该数值平衡得如此精细，以至于哪怕只改变10^120分之一，都会给宇宙带来灾难性的后果。如果它稍微大一点点，宇宙膨胀就会更快，从而无法让恒星和星系形成；如果它稍微小一点点，宇宙就会在大爆炸之后不久迅速坍缩于自身之上。

Many cosmologists believe that the universe will continue to expand indefinitely and that the universe’s mass is not sufficient to cause a ‘Big Crunch’, as it requires a gravitational force that is capable of countering the force of expansion. Scientists estimated that the universe’s expansion was slowing down as a result of gravity, but it turned out – thanks to two teams of scientists who went on to win the Nobel Prize – that it is in fact completely the opposite: The universe is expanding at an ever-increasing rate of speed as a result of a centrifugal force – known as dark matter – that is greater than gravity. It has a power that is the opposite to gravity and pushes the universe to expand further and further out. This centrifugal power represents the cosmological constant, the extremely precise value which left scientists stunned. The value is so fine balanced that even the change of a fraction of 10120 would be cataclysmic for the universe. Had it been even a fraction more, the universe would expand quicker so to not allow stars and galaxies to form; were it a fraction less, the universe would have rapidly collapsed on itself, soon after the Big Bang.

这个模型是大爆炸理论的一个演进版本。它肯定我们的宇宙有一个起点，但补充说，这并不意味着这就是所有物质和能量的绝对起点。这一观点认为，物质和能量是前永恒的。具体来说，该理论提出，宇宙的组成部分以不同的速率膨胀和收缩。可以将这些部分视为各种宇宙，或称多重宇宙。尽管我们的宇宙可能有一个起点，但这并不意味着所有宇宙都是如此。 科学家们注意到，该理论也存在一些问题。因此，宇宙学家安德烈·林德试图通过提出一个改进版本来解决这一模型面临的问题，称为新暴胀理论。然而，他自己也指出了其中的缺陷，这促使他提出了他最著名的模型，称为混沌暴胀。简而言之，该模型提出存在一个“母宇宙”，从中衍生出许多新的宇宙，而这些新宇宙又诞生出其他宇宙，如同气泡一般。这一过程将永远持续下去。该理论认为，尽管新的宇宙有起点，但主宇宙并没有起点。 关于宇宙整体的前永恒性，他说道：“这一问题最困难的方面不是奇点本身的存在，而是奇点之前是什么的问题……这个问题位于物理学与形而上学的边界上。”由于这一问题，也由于缺乏超越物理学领域去肯定任何事物的动力，林德采用了一个否定时间有起点和终点的模型。正如主宇宙是前永恒的，他认为新的宇宙将会无休止地不断产生。如此一来，他便可以回避奇点的概念以及随之而来的先验性问题。 换句话说,他通过让宇宙在某种程度上具有前永恒性,回避了探寻宇宙出现原因的问题。当我们分析这一模型以及此前的所有模型时,可以看到它们都不是建立在科学之上的。它们充其量只是假设。事实上,它们不过是为了回避宇宙存在绝对开端这一问题而设计的假说。这就是为什么许多物理学家认为,要通过证据来证明——更不用说检验——这些理论的有效性是不可能的。

This model is an evolved version of the Big Bang theory. It affirms that our universe has an origin, but it adds that this does not mean that this is the absolute beginning of all matter and energy. This view states that matter and energy are pre-eternal. To clarify, this theory proposes that the constituent parts of the universe expand and contract at varying rates. It is possible to treat these parts as various universes, or the multiverse. Though it could be the case that our universe has an origin point, this does not mean that all universes are like this. Scientists have noted that this theory has also been beset by a number of problems. This is why the cosmologist Andrei Linde attempted to solve the problem facing this model by offering a refined version of it, called new inflation. However, he himself noted that there are faults in this, which led him to propose his most famous model called chaotic inflation. In brief, it proposes that there is a ‘mother universe’ from which many new universes are spawned, and from them other universes are born – like bubbles. This process would continue forever. This theory suggests that though the new universes have a beginning, the principal universe does not. Speaking on the overall pre-eternality of the universe, he said, ‘The most difficult aspect of this problem is not the existence of the singularity itself, but the question of what was before the singularity…This problem lies somewhere at the boundary between physics and metaphysics.’194 Because of this problem, and because of the lack of impetus to affirm anything beyond the realm of physics, Linde assumed a model that negated a beginning and end for time. Just as the principal universe is pre-eternal, he argued that new universes would endlessly continue to be made. As thus, he could escape the notion of singularity and the a priori questions that come with it. In other words, he evaded searching for a cause for the emergence of the universe by making it (somewhat) pre-eternal. When we analyse this model – and all previous models – we can see that none of them are based on science. They are at best assumptions. In fact, they are just hypotheses that are designed to avoid the problem of an absolute beginning for the universe. This is why many physicists believe it is impossible to demonstrate – let alone test – the validity of these theories through evidence.

背景是这样的：即使假设世界的出现背后有一个原因，凭什么就自动认定这个原因是安拉？这是无神论者最著名的反驳之一。奇怪的是，理查德·道金斯在其臭名昭著的著作《上帝的妄想》中讨论时间性论证（关于上帝存在的论证）时，只提出了这一反驳。

The background to this objection is this: Even if it is assumed that there is a cause behind the emergence of the world, how is Allah then automatically assumed to be that cause? This is one of the most famous objections of atheists. What is strange is that when Richard Dawkins discussed the argument from temporality for the existence of God in his infamous book The God Delusion, he offered only this objection:

即便我们姑且奢侈地、随意地设想出一个终结无限回溯的第一因，并仅仅因为需要而给它起个名字，也绝没有任何理由赋予这个终极因以通常归于上帝的那些属性：全能、全知、仁慈、设计上的创造性，更不用说倾听祷告、赦免罪过、洞察内心所思等人类式的属性了。199

Even if we allow the dubious luxury of arbitrarily conjuring up a terminator to an infinite regress and giving it a name, simply because we need one, there is absolutely no reason to endow that terminator with any of the properties normally ascribed to God: omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, creativity of design, to say nothing of such human attributes as listening to prayers, forgiving sins and reading innermost thoughts.199

接着他又专注于真主的属性，以及这些属性如何可能是祂的属性。经过进一步分析，他这一策略——以及一般无神论者的做法——是对所讨论要点的一种策略性回避，把议题引向了一个完全不同的问题。任何将其作为证据的人，其用意都是为了证明非偶然存在者的存在，而非其属性。从论证的核心要点跳到论证支持者并未涉及的问题，要么反映出缺乏公正，要么是对辩论和哲学讨论规则的肆意无知。请看以下内容：

Then he focuses on the attributes of Allah , and how it is possible for these to be His attributes. Upon further analysis, this strategy on his part – and by atheists in general – is a strategic evasion of the point under discussion, landing it onto a completely separate issue. Whoever uses this in evidence would be doing so to prove the existence of the non-contingent being, not its attributes. Jumping from the central point of the argument to an issue not tackled by its proponents reflects either a lack of impartiality or wanton ignorance of the rules of debate and philosophical discussion. Consider the following:

无神论与有神论之间最重大的分歧之一，在于无神论者对物质的信仰，以及他们认为物质背后没有任何原因。有神论的论证则暗示，存在一个超越物质的原因，使世界得以存在。这正是证据的一部分——它是理性证明真主存在的一块基石，即真主不同于其全部受造物以及宇宙的本质。

• One of the most significant areas of difference between atheism and theism is the belief of atheists in matter, and that there is no cause behind matter. The theist argument implies that there is a super-material cause that allowed the world to come into existence. This is part of the evidence – it is a brick within the construct of the rational indicator for Allah’s existence , namely that Allah  is different from His entire creation and the nature of the universe.

该论证阐明了关于这一原因之本质的若干问题,这使它成为证明安拉存在以及证明祂某些属性的适当论据。如果宇宙是从虚无中产生的,那么它的原因必定是一位造物主,宇宙正是通过祂而被创造的。祂必定是前永恒的,因为因果序列必须止于祂,以免出现无限因果的序列。也就是说,祂不能是另一个原因的结果,因为宇宙需要一个超越时间的原因。此外,宇宙的出现具有独特的特征,这使它成为一个出于意志而产生的存在;这指向一位通过自身意志实施此行为的行动者。这位凭自身意志行事的创造者必定是有生命的,因为有生命的行动者与无生命的行动者之间是有区别的。它还表明具有伟大的能力,这一事件正是凭借此能力而发生的;没有能力,这样的行为就不可能发生。因此,宇宙的创造行为本身就昭示了安拉的某些完美属性(SWT)。

这是一个众所周知的反驳。无神论者说："有神论者对‘世界出现的原因是什么？’这一问题的回答是‘安拉’，这是对因果关系的无知。仿佛有神论者是在用这种答案填补自己无知的空白。有神论者通过诉诸无知来强调他们的这一立场，因此把对手无法推翻它当作证据——仅此而已。他们没有为其陈述的证据效力提供任何证明。"这种说法是无神论者的又一个错误。我们对造物主存在的肯定，并不是基于我们无法解释宇宙的终极原因，也不是仅仅出于一种盲目的信仰飞跃，把神的概念硬塞进来解决一个我们没有答案的问题。相反，我们的信仰是一套理性和本能命题得出的结论。我们相信安拉是宇宙存在的原因，这是基于知识，而非无知。正如前面已经证明的，宇宙是有始的。因此它要么是有始的且背后有一个原因，要么没有原因；后者是不可能的，因为有始的事物必定有原因。原因要么是该有始事物自身，要么是别的东西；前者是不可能的，因为它在出现之前是不存在的，而不具有自身存在的事物不能将存在赋予他物。因此，既然它是从另一个原因出现的，那个原因本身必定是有始的或无始的；如果是有始的，这一系列必须终止于一个无始的原因，因为无穷的因果链是不可能的。由此可见，我们的立场不仅仅是想要填补无知留下的空白，而是一个经过深思、依据自明命题的理性答案。

This is a well-known objection. Atheists say, ‘The theists’ answer to the question “What is the cause for the emergence of the world?” with Allah is ignorance of causality. It is as if theists are filling in the gaps of their ignorance with such an answer. Theists emphasise this ignorant stance of theirs by appealing to ignorance, and thus use as evidence the opponent’s inability to dismantle it – nothing more. They fail to offer any proof for the evidentiary veracity of their statement.’ This rhetoric is another error on the part of atheists. Our affirmation of the existence of the Creator is not based on our inability to explain the ultimate cause of the universe, nor is it merely a blind leap of faith in which we shoved in the concept of God to solve a problem for which we have no answer. Rather, our belief is a result of a set of rational and instinctive propositions that offers this conclusion. Our belief of Allah being the cause for the existence of the universe is based on knowledge, not ignorance. As proven earlier, the universe is temporal. It is therefore either temporal with a cause behind it, or without a cause; the latter is impossible as temporal entities must have a cause. A cause would be either the temporal entity itself or something different; the former is impossible as it would have been non-existent before emergence – something that does not possess existence for itself cannot confer existence onto something else. Therefore, as it emerged from a separate cause, that cause must in itself be temporal or atemporal; if the former, this series must end at an atemporal cause, as infinite causality is impossible. Therefore, it becomes clear that our position is not merely the desire to fill in the gap left by ignorance, but is rather a considered and rational answer that relies on self-evident propositions.

无神论者长期利用这一异议，是对古代人类在解释许多自然现象时急于归因于神的直接干预的一种反应。这些解释没有认识到，真主在其创造中的几乎所有行为，都是通过一套支配宇宙体系的法则与规律来实现的，而这些法则与规律是真主自己预先设定的。无神论者不公正地将这种错误的判断，推广到所有信仰真主的人所运用的推理过程之上。真主在其宇宙中行事，并且存在着各种因果，这在伊斯兰话语中并不奇怪；事实上，这一点在《古兰经》中有明确的提及，经中提到了自然现象中的许多原因。伊本·盖伊姆说：“如果我们列举《古兰经》和先知圣训中肯定因果的经文与段落的总数，它们将超过一万处，这并不夸张。”200

The atheists’ protracted leveraging of this objection is a reaction to old-age human haste in explaining many of the natural phenomena through direct divine intervention. These explanations did not realise that almost all of Allah’s actions in His creation are through a set of laws and rules governing the system of the universe, as predetermined by Allah Himself. Atheists unjustly generalise this errant judgement across all reasoning processes used by believers of Allah . That Allah acts in His universe and is the existence of causes is not strange to Islamic discourse; in fact, it is a point that is explicitly mentioned in the Qur’an through the mention of many causes within natural phenomena. Ibn al-Qayyim  said, ‘Were we to list the total number of places from the Qur’an and the prophetic tradition that affirm causes, they would surpass 10,000 places without exaggeration.’200

这一反驳实际上结合了两方面的错误：一方面是对科学定义的严重限制，另一方面则是对它的夸大。无神论者的存在主义哲学源于纯粹的唯物主义观点：他们只相信经验科学所规定的东西，只接受自然的、物质性的解释来说明各种现象。因此，任何超自然或形而上的解释都没有容身之地。请看无神论者斯科特·托德（Scott Todd）的说法，他明确地表述了这一立场的含义：“即使所有数据都指向一个有智慧的设计者，这一假设也会因为不是自然主义的而被排除在科学之外。”202

This objection is actually a combination of a gross restriction of the definition of science on the one hand, and an exaggeration of it on the other. Atheists draw their existential philosophy from a purely material view: They have faith in only what the empirical sciences dictate, and they accept only natural material explanations for phenomena. As thus, there is no room for any supernatural or metaphysical explanation. Check what the atheist Scott Todd said – he stated in clear terms what this outlook meant: ‘Even if all the data point to an intelligent designer, such a hypothesis is excluded from science because it is not naturalistic.’202

达尔文主义者兼无神论者理查德·列万廷（Richard Lewontin）说：“我们愿意接受那些违背常识的科学主张，这正是理解科学与超自然之间真正斗争的关键。我们站在科学一边，尽管它的某些构想显然荒谬，尽管它未能兑现许多关于健康与生命的夸大承诺，尽管科学界容忍那些未经证实的‘just-so故事’，因为我们有一个先行的承诺，即对唯物主义的承诺。并非科学的方法和制度以某种方式迫使我们接受对现象世界的物质性解释，相反，正是由于我们先验地坚持物质原因，我们才被迫去构建一套调查装置和一组概念，以产生物质性的解释，无论它们多么违反直觉，无论对外行人来说多么令人费解。而且，唯物主义是绝对的，因为我们不能让‘神圣的一只脚’踏进门来。”203

The Darwinist and atheist Richard Lewontin said, Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common sense is the key to an understanding of the real struggle between science and the supernatural. We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfil many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door.203

这种对实证自然科学能力的夸大看法，明显偏向于狭隘的唯物主义，在科学界和哲学界有一个专门的名称：科学主义（scientism）。该词由“science”（科学）与后缀“-ism”（主义）组合而成。它代表的是一种对实证科学的夸大观念，将知识仅限于实证科学。这一思潮的根源其实十分古老。奥古斯特·孔德（Auguste Comte）制定了实证主义哲学，从而引导了这一思想的方向，并催生了多个哲学流派。随着时间的推移，对唯物主义的夸大愈演愈烈。这种夸大的部分理由可以追溯到依靠科学方法所取得的巨大科技成就，这一点并非隐秘。这些成就在各个层面都成为人类的转折点，其影响是此前难以想象的。然而，问题在于，这种观念轻视了获取知识的其他途径，并试图将知识的获取限定在它自身的方法、细节、复杂性和独特方式之中。这是一个方法论上的问题，并由此导致大量显而易见的科学问题。科学主义所依托的经验主义之准确性，其成立方式要么通过经验主义自身的方法，要么通过外部方法。如果我们对经验主义准确性的理解是以经验主义本身为依据，那便是错误的，因为这会变成循环论证；这同样是自相矛盾的，因为以某一主张作为该主张自身的证据是不恰当的。然而，如果经验主义作为一种方法是由外部来源加以验证的，那么我们的目标便已达成：即用经验主义之外的另一种知识获取来源来验证经验主义。 事实上，每个知识领域都有其自身的工具和认知来源；因此，若强行将经验主义套用于每一个知识领域，并认为它独自足以回答一切问题，便会成为方法论和认识上的问题，进而引发多重科学难题。科学与知识领域本身就揭示了这类问题。以历史学为例，它有自己的史料来源；数学亦然；其他各门学科也莫不如此。认为经验性的科学方法是获取知识的唯一工具，这一观点与各学科中所固有的多元知识来源相矛盾。在威廉·莱恩·克雷格与无神论者彼得·阿特金斯的辩论中，无神论者根深蒂固的混乱暴露无遗，事实证明他们无法运用科学解释一切，而这恰恰正是阿特金斯在辩论中所主张的。

这一观点近来在无神论者圈子中广为流传,并已成为反驳“创造与发明论证”的一个关键异议。这一异议声称,宇宙是自足的,不依赖于一位创造者;或者说,宇宙具有自我创造的能力;又或者说,宇宙有可能从虚无中涌现。这一主张由伯特兰·罗素在其著作《我为何不是基督徒》中提出,并在著名理论物理学家斯蒂芬·霍金与伦纳德·蒙洛迪诺合著的《大设计》中得到广泛阐述。著名无神论者劳伦斯·克劳斯在其著作《从虚无到宇宙》中也提出了同样的主张,他认为依据现代物理学,宇宙可以从虚无中涌现,而无需某个外部实体来解释这一涌现过程;换言之,宇宙的出现就是从无到有。在《大设计》的开篇,作者讨论了本书试图回答的问题类型,以及用以得出这些答案的信息来源。

This idea has spread across atheist circles recently. It has become a key objection to the argument from creation and invention. This objection claims the universe to be self-sufficient and not dependent on a founder, or that it has the power to make itself, or that it is possible it emerged from nothing. This notion was proposed by Bertrand Russell in his book Why I Am Not a Christian, and is covered extensively in The Grand Design, co-authored by the famous theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow. It is the same claim made by the famous atheist Lawrence Krauss in his book A Universe From Nothing, in which he claims that the universe – in light of modern physics – can emerge from nothing without the need for an external entity that would explain this emergence; rather, the emergence of the universe is from nothing. In the beginning of The Grand Design, there is a discussion on the type of questions that the book seeks to offer an answer to, and the source of information that feeds into these answers:

我们每个人存在的时间都只是短暂的一瞬,在这短暂的时间里,我们所探索的只是整个宇宙的一小部分。然而,人类是一个充满好奇心的物种。我们会惊叹,会追寻答案。我们生活在这个广阔的世界上,它时而仁慈,时而残酷;我们仰望头顶浩瀚的天空,人们一直以来都在提出许多问题:我们如何才能理解自己所处的这个世界?宇宙是如何运行的?实在的本质是什么?这一切从何而来?宇宙是否需要一位造物主?我们大多数人并不会把大部分时间用来思考这些问题,但几乎每个人都会在某些时候为此忧虑。传统上,这些问题属于哲学的范畴,然而哲学已经死亡。哲学没有跟上现代科学,尤其是物理学的发展。在我们探求知识的道路上,科学家已成为发现之火的传递者。本书的目的,是给出近期发现与理论进展所提示的答案。它们引导我们形成一幅关于宇宙以及我们在其中位置的新图景,这幅图景与传统图景大不相同,甚至与十年或二十年前我们可能描绘的图景也有所不同。209

We each exist for but a short period of time, and in that time explore but a small part of the whole universe. But humans are a curious species. We wonder, we seek answers. Living in this vast world that is by turns kind and cruel, and gazing at the immense heavens above, people have always asked a multitude of questions: How can we understand the world in which we find ourselves? How does the universe behave? What is the nature of reality? Where did all this come from? Did the universe need a creator? Most of us do not spend most of our time worrying about these questions, but almost all of us worry about them some of the time. Traditionally these are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics. Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge. The purpose of this book is to give the answers that are suggested by recent discoveries and theoretical advances. They lead us to a new picture of the universe and our place in it that is very different from the traditional one, and different even from the picture we might have painted just a decade or two ago.209

这是无神论者针对信徒最著名的反驳之一,也是无神论话语中反对有神论的一个关键理性疑问。仔细思考之后,它不过是争辩式的修辞而已,别无其他。他们的整个信仰体系建立在真主没有创造世界这一观念之上。因此,他们提出的“那谁创造了真主?”这一反驳,在信徒的经验中是很典型的。在大多数语境中,这些只不过是用于无益争执和反驳的工具。

This is one of the most famous atheist objections against believers. It is a key rational doubt against theism in atheist discourse. Upon contemplation, it is just sparring rhetoric – nothing more. Their entire belief system rests upon the notion that Allah did not create the world. Therefore, their objection ‘So who created Allah?’ would be typical of believers’ experiences. In most contexts, these are simply tools for unfruitful quarrel and objection.

在研究以往众多无神论人物时，我们不难发现他们中有多少人持有这一异议，这个问题如何占据主导并施压于许多人的思想。它是促使许多人倾向无神论的最重要的疑问之一。约翰·斯图尔特·穆勒、伯特兰·罗素、大卫·休谟和斯蒂芬·霍金都曾表示，这个问题代表了有神论的一个难题，并最终使他们采纳无神论，或被无神论所说服。据注意，这也是《上帝的妄念》一书的核心问题。几乎在每一个例子中，这个问题都大量出现于新无神论的论述之中，并处于其最前沿，这可以通过研究其著作、文章、辩论及其他材料而察觉。由这个问题带来的困惑，可以通过以下几点加以消除：

When studying the many atheist personalities that have gone by, we can easily uncover how many had this objection, and how this question took control and pressurised many minds. It is one of the most important doubts that introduced the inclination to atheism in many people. John Stuart Mill, Bertrand Russell, David Hume, and Stephen Hawking have all stated that this question represents a problem in theism, which ultimately led them to adopt, or become convinced by, atheism. It is noted that this is also the central question in the book The God Delusion. In almost every instance, this question is heavily present in, and at the forefront of, New Atheism discourse, which one can detect by studying its writings, articles, debates, and other materials. The problems brought about by this question can be dispelled by the following points:

1. 这显然不是一个新问题。事实上，这是人们很自然会去思考的问题。它归根结底是撒旦的邪恶暗示，并且建立在一个极其错误的前提之上。 2. 这个问题源于无神论话语所造成的一种误解。它严重误解了有神论者所提出的信仰理性证据的确切性质。该问题所持有的关于以创造和发明来论证安拉存在的论证，是如下的概念化：

1. This is obviously not a new question. In fact, it is quite a natural question for people to think about. It is ultimately one of satan’s evil suggestions, and is founded on a hugely erroreous proposition. 2. This question is based on an error perpetrated by atheist discourse. It is a gross misunderstanding of the precise nature of the rational evidence for faith offered by theists. The question carries the following conceptualisation of the argument from creation and invention to support the existence of Allah :

• 存在的每一件事物都必定有其原因。

• Everything in existence must have a cause.

宇宙存在，因此它必定有一个原因。

• The universe exists, and therefore it must have a cause.