Akwai marubuta da yawa da suka yi hasashen ƙarshen tsarin da muka sani. Haka ma a yanzu, mai yiwuwa marubuta da dama suna aika rubuce-rubucensu zuwa ga masu buga littattafai, suna neman su kasance na farko wajen sanya take “Ƙarshen Jari-hujja” don yin gogayya da rubutun Fukuyama mai shahara (kuma yanzu ya zama mara amfani) kan Ƙarshen Tarihi a shekarar 1989. To amma shin wannan lamari zai zama hakika ƙarshen Jari-hujja? Ba mai yiwuwa ba ne. Amma shin wannan ne farkon ƙarshen jari-hujja? Mai yiwuwa ne sosai, kuma babu shakka cewa Jari-hujja a yanzu tana buƙatar kulawa mai tsanani, kuma tana fuskantar babbar matsalarta.

There has been no shortage of writers predicting an end to the system as we know it. Indeed as we speak many authors are probably sending manuscripts to publishers trying to be first with the title “The End of Capitalism” to rival Fukuyama’s infamous (and now defunct) essay on the End of History in 1989. But will this event really be the end for Capitalism? Unlikely. But, is this the beginning of the end of capitalism? Quite probably, and it is without doubt that Capitalism currently needs intensive care and is facing its greatest crisis.

Abubuwan da suka faru a watan Satumba na 2008 za su zama ɗaya daga cikin lokuta mafi duhu a tarihin Jari-hujja. Alan Greenspan, tsohon Shugaban Babban Bankin Tarayyar Amurka (US Federal Reserve), ya bayyana cewa abubuwan da ke faruwa a yanzu ba kasafai ake ganin irinsu ba, suna faruwa ne sau ɗaya a kowace shekara hamsin ko ɗari. Ga Amurka musamman, rikicin yanzu yana kama da harin Pearl Harbour da harin 9-11 a haɗe, wata babbar girgiza ga tsarin tattalin arziki wadda za a ji tasirinta shekaru masu yawa, idan ba shekaru da dama ba. Ba wai kawai mun ga ƙarshen tsarin bankunan zuba jari masu zaman kansu ba, wanda shi ne ginshiƙin jari-hujjar kuɗi ta zamani, har ma mun ga akidar tattalin arziki ta kasuwa mai 'yanci (laissez faire) an watsar da ita, yayin da gwamnatoci ke ta ruɗani don ceton wata cibiyar kuɗi da ke gaba.

The events of September 2008 will go down in history as one of the darkest times in the history of Capitalism. Alan Greenspan former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve stated that the current events were rare, once every fifty or hundred years. For the US, in particular the current crisis constitutes the economic equivalent of Pearl Harbour and 9-11 combined a profound shock to the system which will be felt for years if not decades ahead. Not only have we witnessed the end of the stand alone investment banking model which was the cornerstone of modern financial capitalism, we have also seen the dogma of laissez faire free market economics trashed as Governments scramble around to bail out the next financial institution.

Greenspan ya yi kuskure game da abin da ya faru sau ɗaya a cikin karni, domin shekara takwas kawai ta wuce tun faɗuwar kamfanonin intanet (dot com), wadda ta goge kusan dala tiriliyan 7 daga darajar kasuwannin hannun jari. To ta yaya muka shiga wannan matsala? Ta yaya Amurka, babbar ƙasa mai tattalin arziƙi na dala tiriliyan 14, za ta zama abin dariya a yanzu? Ta yaya bankunan zuba jari waɗanda darajarsu kwanan nan ta kai biliyoyin daloli, kuma suka tsira daga yaƙe-yaƙen duniya guda biyu da babban koma-bayan tattalin arziƙi, za a shafe su cikin sauƙi haka? Ta yaya gwamnatocin yammacin duniya, waɗanda a dā suke wa ƙasashe masu tasowa wa'azin fasahar ƙwarewar tattalin arziƙi cikin girman kai, yanzu ba su fi ƙasashen ayyukan banza ba?

Greenspan is wrong about a once a century occurrence, it has only been eight years since the dot com fiasco which wiped off almost 7 trillion dollars off stock market valuations. So how did we get into this mess, how could the United States, a superpower with a $14 trillion economy now become a laughing stock. How could investment banks valued only recently at tens of billions of dollars and who were able to survive two world wars and the great depression be wiped out so easily. How could western governments who used to smugly preach to the developing world the art of economic competence act no better than glorified banana republics?.

Abubuwan da suka faru a cikin watan da ya wuce sun samo asali ne daga bangaren subprime, lokacin da dillalai masu samun kudin kwamishan mai yawa suka sayar da jinginar gidaje a manyan adadi ga miliyoyin masu karbar bashi. Wannan manufa ta karfafa mallakar gida a fadin kasa wadda gwamnatoci da suka biyo baya suka bi, saboda sun yi imani cewa mallakar gida wani bangare ne na mafarkin Amurka. Ga mutane da yawa masu karbar bashi, wadanda sha'awar samun kudi cikin sauri ta motsa su kuma saukin samun bashi ya ba su kwarin gwiwa, samun jinginar gida karamin farashi ne da za a biya domin samun riba mai yawa yayin da farashin gidaje ke tashi cikin sauri. Dillalai, bayan sun ajiye kwamishansu, sun yanke shawarar sayar da jinginar gidajen nasu ga wasu, kuma nan da nan sai aka hada su waje guda suka zama jinginar gidaje masu goyon bayan tsaro (MBS), wadanda bankuna a fadin duniya ke sayarwa da sake sayarwa. A lokacin da ribar riba ta yi kasa, bankuna a duniya, wadanda masu hannun jari da manazarta, masu shangwaba ga jari-hujjar kamfanoni, suka tura su, an kalubalance su su nemi samun riba mafi girma da girma. Saboda haka MBS sun zama kamar aljanna daga sama, kuma yayin da farashin gidaje ke tashi, bukatar irin wadannan kayayyaki da sauran kayayyakin hadari ta ci gaba da kasancewa mai yawa.

The events of the past month were rooted in the sub prime sector when brokers incentivised by fat commissions sold mortgages in their truck loads to millions of borrowers. This policy of encouraging widespread home ownership had been followed by successive administrations who believed that owning one’s house was part of the American dream. For many borrowers motivated by a quick buck and cushioned by easy credit, getting a mortgage was a small price to pay in exchange for a huge profit as house prices rose exponentially. Brokers having banked their commissions decided to sell their mortgages on and soon these would be parcelled up and form mortgage backed securities (MBS) sold and resold by banks throughout the world. At a time of low interest rates, banks throughout the world egged on by shareholders and analysts, the cheerleaders of corporate capitalism, were challenged to seek to gain higher and higher returns. MBSs therefore were like nirvana from heaven and while house prices rose, demand for such instruments and other alternative instruments remained high.

A lokacin, wannan sabon tsarin sayar da kayayyaki a kan irin wadannan kayan aiki ya samu yabo daga masu kula da kasuwanni da masu sharhi, domin sun yi imanin cewa wadannan kayayyaki suna watsa hadari da kuma tabbatar da cewa babu wani kamfani guda daya da zai fuskanci hadari fiye da kima. Bayan shekaru na karuwar farashin gidaje, kowa yana farin ciki, har sai da durkushewar da ba makawa ta faru. A lokacin, nesa da amfanin watsa hadari, tsoro mai tsanani ya mamaye kasuwanni yayin da bankuna suka gano cewa ba su san inda hadarin yake ba. Wannan ya haifar da asarar amincewa mai tsanani da daskarewar lamunin tsakanin bankuna. Bankuna ba sa amincewa da juna, suna tunanin cewa wasu bankuna na iya rike da asara mai yawa yayin da wadannan MBSs ke rasa daraja, ko kuma, a kalmar fasaha, sun zama "masu guba". Wannan daskarewa zai sa wasu bankuna su fada cikin fatarar kudi, wasu kuma su durkushe saboda rashin kudin ruwa bayan caca mai tsanani da aka yi a kan kayayyakin kudi na derivatives. Hakan zai kuma sa lamuni ya yi tsada, ya haifar da rashin tsaro ga ajiyar kudi a ko'ina, ya kara farashin kayayyakin masarufi, ya kuma raunana kudaden kasashe, wanda ke sa farashi ya tashi. Ga manyan al'amuran da suka faru a duniya tun farkon wannan rikici.

At the time, this new model of selling on such instruments was considered ingenious by regulators and commentators alike as they believed these products diversified risk and ensured that no one entity would be disproportionately exposed. After years of house price growth, everyone was happy until the inevitable crash. At the time, far from the benefits of diversified risk, deep panic set in as banks discovered that they actually didn’t know where the risk was, thereby leading to a chronic loss of confidence and the freezing of inter bank lending. Banks simply didn’t trust each other believing that other banks could be potentially sitting on huge losses as these MBSs lost value or to use the technical term became “toxic”. This freeze would make certain banks insolvent and others would go to the wall due to a lack of liquidity following highly leveraged derivative bets. It would also make credit more expensive, lead to mass insecurity around savings, increase commodity prices and weaken currencies, so making prices higher. The following are the key events that have hit the world since the crisis began.

Abubuwan da suka faru sun kasance cikin rashin kwanciyar hankali da ba a taɓa gani ba. Tun lokacin Babban Koma-bayan Tattalin Arziki ba mu ga irin waɗannan abubuwa ba, kuma ba mu taɓa ganin irin rauni da tsarin kuɗi ya nuna ba. Shawarar gwamnatin Amurka ta sayen kadarori masu guba har dala biliyan 700 daga bankunan Amurka da farko an ki amincewa da ita a Majalisar Wakilai da ƙuri'a 228-205, inda mutane da yawa suka ambaci yadda jama'a ba su yarda da wannan shiri ba. Mutane sun yi nuni da gaskiya cewa Wall Street ta yi farin ciki sosai wajen ajiye ribar dala biliyan a ɓoye a lokacin arziki, amma yanzu tana son a "mayar da asarar ta ta gwamnati", wanda masu biyan haraji na Amurka za su biya lokacin da abubuwa suka tsananta. Yayin da mutane ke ci gaba da wahala saboda tsadar abinci, makamashi da kiwon lafiya, albashin ma'aikatan banki na Wall Street na ci gaba da biyan kuɗi, kuma tsoffin ma'aikatan Lehman na kan hanyar samun manyan kyautukan kuɗi na dala biliyoyi daga sabbin kamfanoninsu a 2009. Ba abin mamaki ba ne mutane sun rasa amincewa da Wall Street da abokan huldarsu a Washington. Bugu da ƙari, wasu suna tambaya yaya Amurka, wadda ke cikin bashin tiriliyoyin dala, za ta iya ɗaukar nauyin irin wannan babban taimako, kuma ta yaya za ta ci gaba da samar da daruruwan biliyoyin dala na kuɗi ga kasuwannin Amurka da na duniya. Ga Ben Bernanke, shugaban Babban Bankin Tarayya na yanzu, da sandar sihirinsa! A wani jawabi da ya yi shekaru shida da suka wuce, Bernanke ya bayyana manyan makamansa sa'ad da ya ce kamar haka.

The events have been of unprecedented volatility. Not since the Great Depression have we witnessed such events and seen such fragility in the financial system. The US government’s proposal to buy toxic assets up to $700 billion from the US banking system was initially defeated by 228-205 in the House of Representatives, with many citing the sheer unpopularity of the package with the American people. People have rightly pointed to the fact that Wall Street was more than happy to keep their billion dollar profits private in the good times and yet want to ‘nationalise’ their losses, to be paid for by the American taxpayer when the going got tough. While people continue to suffer from higher food, energy and healthcare costs, Wall Street bankers’ compensation packages continue to be paid with ex Lehman’s staff on course for huge multi billion dollar bonuses from their new employers in 2009. No wonder people are so disillusioned with Wall Street and their cohorts in Washington. In addition some ask how the US, already trillions in debt can afford such huge bailouts and how they can continue to be able to provide hundreds of billions of dollars in liquidity to the US and world markets. Step forward Ben Bernanke the current Chairman of the Federal Reserve and his magic wand! In a speech given six years ago Bernanke revealed his secret weapons when he stated the following.

Kamar zinari, dalar Amurka tana da daraja ne kawai in dai yawanta an takaita shi sosai. Amma gwamnatin Amurka tana da wata fasaha, wadda ake kira injin buga takardu (ko kuma abokin aikinsa na lantarki a yau), wadda ke ba ta damar samar da dalolin Amurka yadda take so ba tare da kusan wani kuɗi ba.