Gwamnatin Burtaniya ta yi alkawarin biyan har zuwa fam biliyan 50 don inganta ma'auni na bankunan da ke cikin matsala, ta hanyar saka jari kai tsaye, ciki har da hannayen jari masu fifiko. Shirin ceto kuɗin kuma ya haɗa da fam biliyan 200 don samar da kuɗin gaggawa ta hanyar faɗaɗa Tsarin Samar da Kuɗi na Musamman, wanda ke ba bankuna damar karɓar bashi don bukatun kuɗi na "gajeren lokaci", da fam biliyan 250 don fitar da bashi wanda gwamnati ke tallafawa.

The UK government committed to pay up to £50 billion to improve the balance sheets of stricken banks, by way of direct investment including preference shares. The bailout package also included £200 billion to provide emergency funding via extension of the Special Liquidity Scheme which enables banks to borrow for “short term” liquidity needs and £250 billion for debt issuance backed by the government.

Allurar gaggawa ta babban birnin kuɗi zuwa Royal Bank of Scotland da Halifax Bank of Scotland ba za a iya ɗaukarta a matsayin saka hannun jari na babban birnin kuɗi ba, saboda gwamnatin Burtaniya ba ta da babban birnin kuɗi da za ta saka. Saboda haka, kuɗin za a ƙara shi cikin bashin da take ci. Idan aka haɗa wannan da mayar da Northern Rock da Bradford and Bingley hannun gwamnati, gwamnatin ta karya ƙa'idarta ta zinariya, wato ta ci bashi kawai don saka hannun jari a tsawon zagayen tattalin arziƙi, ba don biyan buƙatun kashe kuɗin yau da kullum ba.

The emergency injection of capital into the Royal Bank of Scotland and Halifax Bank of Scotland, could not be seen as an investment of capital because the UK government did not have the capital available to invest. Consequently the money will be added to their borrowings. When coupled with the nationalisation of Northern Rock and Bradford and Bingley the government has broken its golden rule of only borrowing to invest over the economic cycle and not for funding day to day spending needs.

A kwatanta da wannan, a ranar 2 ga Oktoba, Amurka ta ware dala biliyan 700 don sayen kadarorin "gurbata" na kamfanonin hada-hadar kudi da suka shiga matsala, domin samar da kudi a hannu har sai farashin kadarorin ya murmure. Daga baya an gyara wannan shiri don hada da cewa gwamnatin Amurka za ta shiga cikin sake karfafa jari na wasu daga cikin cibiyoyin.

In comparison the US on the 2nd of October committed to $700 billion to buy “toxic” assets of stricken financial organisations to provide liquidity until asset prices recover, a plan which was amended later to include the US government taking positions in the recapitalisation of some institutions.

Kalmar "mai guba" tana tuna mana da hotunan wani nau'in bala'in Chernobyl, kuma hakan na iya zama kwatancen da ya dace, amma ba shi kaɗai ne hoto da ke da alaƙa da kalmar "mai guba" ba. Zai yi wuya a sami daraja ko farashi mai kyau ga abu mai guba, sai dai idan ana amfani da shi ne don cutar da wani. Dalilin da ake bayarwa don shirin ceto shi ne cewa ko da yake zuba kuɗin masu biyan haraji a cikin "casino" na Wall Street ba shi da adalci ba, amma larura ce da ba makawa, wadda za ta 'yantar da "kadarorin da ke cikin matsala" tare da samar da ruwan kuɗi a kasuwannin hada-hadar kuɗi, ta haka za ta haifar da sabon zagayen ba da rance, karɓar rance, da kuma ci gaba da ake matuƙar buƙata. Akwai matsaloli da dama game da wannan hanya.

The use of the emotive word “toxic” conjures up images of some form of Chernobyl disaster, and whilst that may be an appropriate analogy, that’s not the only imagery associated with toxic. It would be difficult to find a positive value or price for something toxic, unless one was using it to injure someone. The apparent rationale for the bailout plan is that while the injection of tax payers' money into the Wall Street casino may not be fair, it is a necessary evil that will free up the “troubled assets” and create liquidity in the financial markets, thereby triggering a much-needed new wave of lending, borrowing and the next round of growth. There are several problems with this approach.

1. Rashin samun masu saya wa "kadarorin guba" (wannan magana ce mai karo da kanta) ba matsalar kuɗi ta samu ba ce, matsalar farashi ce. Akwai kasuwa a gare su, amma matsalar ita ce farashin da suke da shi a kasuwa bai dace da bankuna da asusun zuba jari da ke son su tsira ba. Idan kasuwa ta ƙididdige su a matsayin shara, to wace ce gwamnati da za ta ƙididdige su daban? Wannan ya nuna ainihin matsalar amincewa. Matsalar rashin imani da aminci ce, kuma hakan yana faruwa ne saboda yawan shara/kadarori da aka kumbura idan aka kwatanta da kadarori na gaske. Matsalar ƙarancin kuɗi ba ta nufin cewa babu kuɗin da ake samu ba, sai dai waɗanda suke da kuɗin ba za su kashe su ba a lokacin koma-baya mai tsanani da kuma tsadar farashin kadarori. Masu kuɗi ba sa son ba da rancen su ga masu shara, musamman idan ana iya cewa za su faɗi.

1. The inability to find buyers for the “toxic assets” (such a contradiction in terms) is not a liquidity problem but a price problem. There is a market for them, but the problem is that the price in the market is unpalatable to banks and investment funds that want to survive. If the market prices them as junk, who is the government to price them otherwise? This betrays the real problem of confidence. The problem is one of a lack of faith and trust, and this is because of too much junk/overblown assets relative to real assets. The liquidity crisis is not that there is no liquidity available, simply that those with it will not spend in a serious downturn and with overblown asset prices. Owners of liquidity are not willing to lend it to owners of junk, particularly if they may fail.

2. Duk da cewa dala biliyan 700 adadi ne mai girma ƙwarai, amma hakan bai isa ba ta kowace hanya. Abu ne kaɗan kawai daga cikin bashin da ba a biya ba da kuma bashin da ake tsammanin za a samu nan gaba. Jaridar Washington Post ta ruwaito a ranar 29 ga Satumba cewa cibiyoyin hada-hadar kuɗi 20 mafi girma a Amurka suna da dala tiriliyan 4.7 a cikin jinginar gidaje da kuma takardun tsaro da aka tallafa wa jinginar gidaje (sannan akwai CDOs da ba a rubuta ba a sama da hakan). Asarar CDS ma ta fara cutar da mutane yanzu, kuma wannan ma ba a tsara shi ba, ba a bayar da rahotonsa ba, kuma yana da girma ƙwarai. Yanzu ana matuƙar shakkar ko gwamnatocin Amurka, Birtaniya da Turai za su taɓa biyan tallafin ceto, lamuni da garantin da suka bayar. Waɗannan adadi, kamar yadda suke a ranar 4 ga Disamba, 2008, sun wuce dala tiriliyan 10.

2. Although $700 billion is a really large number, it is no way large enough. It is only a fraction of the accumulated bad debts and likely debts moving forward. The Washington Post reported on the 29th of September that 20 of the US’s largest financial institutions owned $4.7 trillion in mortgages and mortgage backed securities (with non recorded CDOs on top of that). CDS losses are also now beginning to hurt and this too is unregulated, unreported, and huge. It is now very questionable as to whether the assorted bailout, loans, and guarantees from the US/UK/European governments will ever be paid. Amounts which as of December 4, 2008 were in excess of $10 trillion.

3. Babban dalilin matsalar kumfar gidaje da bashin jinginar gidaje ga masu ƙarancin samu (sub prime) ba a magance shi ba. Saboda haka miliyoyin mutane a Amurka za su rasa gidajensu, kuma za a ƙara tura su cikin talauci. A lokaci guda da gwamnati ke ceton manyan cibiyoyin hada-hadar kuɗi, bayan tallace-tallacen jinginar gidaje masu tsanani da waɗannan cibiyoyi suka yi, akwai miliyoyin mutane da za su rasa komai nasu (gidajensu, dukiyarsu da ayyukansu). Babu wani tanadi a cikin waɗannan ceto-ceto ga waɗanda kumfar gidaje ta shafa, kuma kafafen yaɗa labarai suna saurin zargin su da "yin ɗaukar bashi fiye da ƙarfinsu" ko karɓar jinginar gidaje da ba za su iya biya ba. Amma ba a hukunta manufofin tallace-tallace masu tsanani ba. Me yasa ba a ceto waɗanda abin ya shafa don su iya riƙe rufin kansu? Idan gwamnatoci suka yi haka, to aƙalla za su riƙa mallakar kadarori na gaske (gidaje).

3. The main underlying problem of the housing bubble and sub prime lending is not addressed. Consequently millions in the US will lose their homes and be driven even further into poverty. At the same time that the government is bailing out major financial institutions, following aggressive mortgage selling by those same institutions there are millions who will lose everything (their homes, wealth, and jobs). There is no provision in these bailouts for the victims of the housing bubble and the media is quick to point blame at them for “over-extending” or taking out mortgages they couldn’t afford. Yet the aggressive sales policies are not punished. Why are the victims not being bailed out to enable them to keep a roof over their heads? If the governments did this then they would at least be taking on real assets (houses).

4. Fakitin kara wa tattalin arziki sun zama kawai wani abu mai ban haushi da aka ƙara a kai. Masana'antar motoci ta roƙi a ba ta tallafin dala biliyan 25 saboda yanayin tabarbarewar tattalin arziki gaba ɗaya da koma baya a cikin masana'antar tasu. Tallafin kuɗi zai aika da kuɗi masu yawa (daga masu biyan haraji, ko ta hanyar ƙarin kuɗi da ake fitarwa – buga ƙarin dala) domin rufe asarar masu hasashe masu guba. Wannan kuɗi zai shiga wani rami maras ƙarewa domin rufe asarar bankunan, kuma ba zai taimaka wa masu gidaje ko jama'a gaba ɗaya ba.

4. The economic stimulus packages are only an inconvenient “add-on”. The auto industry pleaded for a $25 billion bail out due to the overall economic malaise and decline in their own industry. The financial bailout will send good money (from the taxpayers, or via inflated money supply – printing of more dollars) to cover the toxic losses of the speculators. That money will fall into a black hole to cover their (bank’s) losses and will not help homeowners or the general public.

Damuwa game da almubazzaranci da manufofin ceto na gwamnatin Amurka ta ƙaru sosai. Jaridar NY Times ta ruwaito a ranar 27 ga Nuwamba cewa, bayan da Babban Bankin Tarayya (Federal Reserve) da Ma'aikatar Kuɗi (Treasury) suka sanar a ranar Talata 25 ga wata da sabbin shirye-shiryen bayar da rance na dala biliyan 800, suna aika saƙon cewa za su buga kuɗi kamar yadda ake buƙata don farfado da tsarin bankunan ƙasar da ya lalace.

Concerns about the profligacy of the US government’s spendthrift bailout policies have accelerated. The NY Times reported on the 27th of November that with the Federal Reserve and the Treasury announcing a new $800 billion in lending programs on Tuesday the 25th, that they were sending a message that they would print as much money as needed to revive the nation’s crippled banking system.

"A cikin shekara ɗaya da ta wuce, gwamnati ta ɗauki nauyin kuɗi kusan dala tiriliyan 7.8 na wajibai kai tsaye da na kaikaice. Wannan ya yi daidai da kusan rabin girman tattalin arzikin ƙasar baki ɗaya, kuma ya zarce da nisa dala biliyan 700 da Majalisa ta amince da su don shirin ceto na Ma'aikatar Kuɗi."

“In the last year, the government has assumed about $7.8 trillion in direct and indirect financial obligations. That is equal to about half the size of the nation’s entire economy and far eclipses the $700 billion that Congress authorized for the Treasury’s financial rescue plan.” 1

Baya ga tallafin gwamnati, masu ba da bashi da suka shiga matsala suna duba dakatar da ka'idojin lissafin "mark to market" a matsayin hanyar ceto. Waɗannan ka'idoji sun buƙaci cibiyoyi su kimanta kadarorin jinginarsu bisa farashin da aka fi kwanan nan ciniki da shi. Duk da haka, sauye-sauyen da Hukumar Ka'idojin Lissafin Kuɗi ta Amurka (FASB) ta aiwatar kwanan nan, a ƙarƙashin matsin lamba daga manyan bankuna, don ba da damar kimantawa mafi fa'ida bisa tsarin ƙira, yanzu sun fara aiki. Masu ba da bashi yanzu suna iya yin kamar asarar ba ta wanzu, ko kuma su jinkirta yin lissafin ta, wanda hakan ke cire bayyananniyar gaskiya da masu zuba jari ke matuƙar buƙata cikin haɗari.

In addition to the government bailouts, distressed lenders are looking to the suspension of "mark to market" accounting rules as a means of salvation. These rules required institutions to value their mortgage assets according to the most recently traded price. However, changes recently implemented by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) under pressure from the large banks to allow more advantageous model based valuations have now been brought in. Lenders are now able to pretend that the losses do not exist, or defer accounting for them, thereby dangerously removing the transparency that investors so desperately need.

Yana ba kamfanoni damar amfani da kimantawa da hukuncinsu da yawa a lokuta da dama idan suka ga kasuwa tana "rikici" ko kuma ta shiga matsalar rashin kuɗi (liquidity) 2.

“It gives companies more leeway to employ estimates and their own judgment in many cases when they deem the market to be "disorderly" or seized by liquidity problems” 2.

Saboda haka bankuna yanzu za su iya gabatar da ƙimar da aka ƙara wa kadarorin jinginarsu, kuma takardun kuɗaɗensu su nuna cewa suna da isasshen jari. Ba za su buƙaci tara ƙarin jari ba don ba da sabbin lamuni. Sai dai, kamar yadda mutumin da ba ya jin zafi yake fuskantar haɗarin mummunar rauni, wannan mataki yana ƙarfafa waɗannan cibiyoyin kuɗi su ɗauki ƙarin haɗari. A ƙarshe hakan zai iya haifar da ƙarin asara, wanda zai ba su damar yin caca don fita daga matsalar ba tare da bayyana ainihin halin tattalin arzikinsu ba.

As a result the banks can now present inflated values for their mortgage assets, and that their balance sheets are well capitalized. They would not need to raise more capital in order to fund new loans. However, like the person with no sensitivity to pain runs the risk of serious injury, this move encourages the same financial institutions to take greater risks. In the end this will likely lead to more losses, allowing them to try to gamble their way out of the problem without reporting their true economic position.