关于理性主义，它在西方文化中有几层含义。其中包括一种特定的哲学含义，它出现在与经验主义相对立的语境中。此外还有一般性的含义，正如约翰·科廷厄姆在其著作《理性主义者》中所指出的那样："以笛卡尔、斯宾诺莎和莱布尼茨为首的'理性主义者'，被视为试图纯粹先验地构建其哲学体系。"这一一般性含义正是本课题所关注的。这是因为所有西方思想家的共同点，在于都同意将心智作为立法者（hakim），无论其用于分析和判断的工具为何，即心智是评判事物和事务的依据，而不是宗教。克拉伦斯·克兰·布林顿在其著作《现代心智的形成》中写道："理性主义于是倾向于将上帝和超自然从宇宙中驱逐出去。它只留下了自然，而理性主义者认为自然最终是可以理解的，而且几乎总是通过我们大多数人所知的科学研究方法来理解。"资料库europaeischewerte.info在其出版物《最基本的欧洲价值观定义》中总结道："在启蒙时代，笛卡尔和其他哲学家与科学家都以理性和合理性为思想的基础……理性高于信仰……理性成为决策的最终来源……理性的运用推翻了宗教和专制对自由思想与行为的禁令……'善'被定义为'合乎理性'……评价是基于对情境的理性考量而作出的。"

As for Rationalism, it has several meanings in the Western culture. This includes a particular philosophical meaning that appears in mention that is in contrast to Empiricism. This also includes the general meaning, as alluded to by John Cottingham in his book, The Rationalists when he said, “the 'rationalist', led by Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, were seen as attempting to construct their philosophical systems purely a priori.” This general meaning is what we are concerned about in this subject. This is because the common denominator between all the Western thinkers is the agreement to make mind as the legislator (hakim), regardless of its tools for analysis and judgement i.e. the mind is the reference to judge upon things and matters and not religion. Clarence Crane Brinton in his book, The Shaping of the Modem Mind states “Rationalism tends then to banish God and the supernatural from the universe. It has left only the natural, which the rationalist holds to be ultimately understandable, almost always by what most of us know as the methods of scientific investigation.” The repository europaeischewerte.info summarizes, in its publication, Definition of the most basic European Values that “In the Age of Enlightenment, Descartes and other philosophers and scientists based their thinking on reason and rationality... Reason stands above faith... Reason becomes the ultimate source of decision... The use of reason overrules religious and absolutistic bans on free thought and acts... “Good” is defined as “reasonable”... Evaluation occurs on the basis of a rational consideration of the situation.”.

因此，西方是理性主义的，其含义在于它抛弃了宗教，转而仅依靠理性作为立法者。理性的主导地位在西方体现于西方人所承认的原则、价值和规范之中。这些构成了西方整体思想的基础，作为一种意识形态、文明和文化。对他们而言，价值是指对事物和行为的纯粹理性认知，用以将其描述为善（khair）或恶（sharr）、令人愉悦（hasan）或丑陋（qabeeh）、正确或错误，以及道德或不道德。因此，事物和行为被描述为可取或不可取。对西方而言，已确立并被采纳的价值一方面被视为个人和群体判断何为善（khair）或令人愉悦（hasan）的标准；另一方面，它们又被视为全面的准则，引导和指导个人与社会的行为。

Thus the West is rationalist in the sense that it abandons religion and comes to rely on reason, and reason alone, as a legislator. The dominance of reason appears in the West within what the Westerners acknowledge as principles, values and norms. These constitute the foundations of Western thought as a whole, as an ideology, civilization and culture. For them, values are in the sense of mere comprehended perceptions about things and actions, in terms of describing them as good (khair) or bad (sharr), pleasant (hasan) or ugly (qabeeh), right or wrong and moral or immoral. Consequently, things and actions are described as desirable or undesirable. For the West, the established and adopted values are considered on the one side as criteria of what is good (khair) or pleasant (hasan) to the individuals and groups. On the other side, they are considered as comprehensive criteria that guide and direct the individual and societal behavior.

关于原则，有些学者将原则与价值区分开来，另一些学者则不加区分。有些人所作的区分并非在含义上，而是在延续性与特殊性上：某些价值是可变的、相对的；而原则则是固定不变的价值，被认为具有普遍的人类性，包括自由、平等和世俗主义。至于规范，据西方的说法，它们是一系列行为准则的集合，这些准则是局部的、具体的，不同于通常由价值派生出的法律。它们与社会上流行的道德和传统相关，用以判定某种行为是可接受的还是应被摒弃的。 这些西方的价值、原则和规范，源于西方对生活的观点，即所谓的意识形态。它们建立在政教分离以及仅凭理性仲裁的基础之上。由此，利益成为界定善与恶、美与丑的依据。这一点体现在西方哲学对事物和行为的规范性表述之中，包括克制与履行两方面，就奖惩所作的判断而言，以及行动过程中所应考虑的意图和价值而言。

As for the principles, some of them differentiate the principles from the values, whilst others do not differentiate amongst them. The differentiation made by some is not in the sense of meaning, but in the sense of continuity and particularity. So, some of the values are subject to change and relativity. However, as for the principles, they are fixed values that do not change. They are considered as humanly universal, including freedom, equality and secularism. As for the norms, they are - according to the West - the collection of rulings of conduct that are partial and specific, apart from the laws that usually emerge from values. They are related to the morals and traditions prevalent amongst the society, that determine whether the behavior is acceptable or rejected. These Western values, principles and norms emerged from the Western viewpoint about life or the so-called ideology. They are based on the separation of religion from life and the arbitration by the mind alone. This makes benefit as a basis to define the meaning of good and bad, as well as pleasant and ugly. This is expressed from the Western philosophy related to things and actions in terms of norms. It includes abstinence and performance, in terms of judgment that include reward and punishment, and in terms of the intent and values to be taken into account during action.

他们依据行为的后果与结果来判定该行为是否善良或令人愉悦。按照他们的说法，这被称为结果主义（后果主义）。结果主义理论所考虑的是快乐、免于痛苦、满足个人的偏好，以及更广泛的“普遍善”概念。 杰里米·边沁在其著作《道德与立法原理导论》中写道：“效用是指任何事物所具有的这样一种属性：它倾向于带来利益、好处、快乐、善或幸福。”因此，功利主义将人的目标界定为追求实现幸福。据称，凡是带来益处的事物都能实现幸福，而凡是带来益处的都是快乐。这种观点在西方盛行，构成了西方人对生活的实际认知。不过，他们又以“福利”的概念重新表述这一观点。行为是否在道德上被接受或拒绝，要依其是令人愉悦还是有害来评判，并视其对个人或群体的福利所达成的程度而定。价值与规范的设立，都只为实现这一目标。

They relied on the consequence and result of an action to establish the action as being good or pleasant. This is called, according to them, Consequentialism. Consequentialist theories consider pleasure, the absence of pain, the satisfaction of one's preferences and broader notions of the “general good.” In his book, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Jeremy Bentham stated, “By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness.” Thus Utilitarianism defines the objective of man to pursue the achieving happiness. It is claimed that happiness is realized by all that benefits, whilst all that benefits is pleasure. This view is prevalent amongst the West, forming the practical Western perception of life. Nevertheless, they express it anew, with the concept of welfare, as they say. The action is evaluated for moral acceptance or rejection, in consideration of its being pleasant or bad, according to what is achieved of the welfare of man as an individual or a group. Values and norms are set only to achieve that notion.

因此，唯一的结果就是由人类心智决定的利益。宗教和真主都不予干涉。因此，理性主义者肯定心智有能力独自理解什么是善，什么是恶。他们主张宗教是多余的。他们引用所谓的“欧绪弗洛困境”，该困境出自柏拉图的对话录《欧绪弗洛》，其中苏格拉底问欧绪弗洛：“虔敬之事是因为它虔敬而被众神所爱，还是因为它被众神所爱而虔敬？”如果有人肯定第一个前提，理性主义者会说，这意味着行为实际上没有任何价值，它只是一种受神的意志支配的法律考量。因此，如果真主没有命令你公正，你就不会是公正的，而公正对所有人类来说都是一个现实，没有它，生活就无法井然有序。如果有人肯定第二个前提，他们会说，如果行为及其标准本质上是善的，那么它就独立于真主之外。人类心智无需真主便能理解它。通过这种方式，西方借助其理性主义，建立起了排斥宗教的理性价值体系。

Thus the only result is benefit decided by the human mind. There is no interference of religion or God. Thus rationalists affirm the ability of the mind to comprehend what is good and bad on its own. They assert the redundancy of religion. They cite the so-called Euthyphro dilemma, which is found in Plato's dialogue Euthyphro, in which Socrates asks Euthyphro, “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” If one asserts the first premise, the Rationalists would say that the meaning of this is that action has in fact no value at all. Instead it is a legal consideration subject to the will of God. Thus if God had not commanded you to be just, you would have not been just, whilst justice is a reality for all human beings, without which life will not be put in order. If one asserts the second premise, they would say that if the action and its criterion are intrinsically good, then it is independent of God. The human mind can comprehend it without the need for God. In this way, the West established its rational system of values, excluding religion by using its Rationalism.

欧绪弗洛悖论是西方理性主义观点（无论是功利主义还是唯心主义）的基础，这一观点就价值与道德整体而言，将其视为一种为排除宗教于生活之外提供正当理由的理性论证。这一悖论不过是一种谬误。原因在于，无论西方人对上帝的误解以及其信仰的败坏如何，该悖论都建立在一个错误的前提之上：即认为行为本身就具有善恶、或美丑之分，因而理智能够认识它们，并判断它们是可取还是不可取。

The Euthyphro dilemma upon which the Western rationalistic view, whether consequentialism or idealism, is built with respect to the subject of values and morals as a whole, considering them as a rational argument that justifies the exclusion of religion from life. This dilemma is nothing but a fallacy. This is because, regardless of their misperception of God and the corruption of their belief, it is established upon the false basis of recognition that actions are intrinsically good and bad, or pleasant and ugly, such that the mind can comprehend them, determining whether they are desirable or undesirable.

至于善与恶，它是从人的角度，依据其对行为所产生的影响，就戒避与履行而言对行为所作的定性。因此，人喜爱那些落在他所能支配的范围之内、或支配他的范围之内的事物；同样，他憎恶这两个范围之内的事物。于是他便试图将这种爱与恨解释为善与恶：他倾向于把自己所喜爱的称为善，把自己所憎恶的称为恶。同样，他也根据对自己有益还是有害，来称某些行为为善，某些行为为恶。

As for what is pertaining to good and bad, it is the characterization of actions in terms of its influence, according to the perspective of man, in terms of abstinence and performance, accordingly. Thus man likes things that fall under the sphere which either he dominates or the sphere that dominates him. Also he hates things within both spheres. So he attempts to interpret this love and hatred, as good and bad. He inclines to call what he loves, as good, and what he hates, as bad. Similarly, he calls some actions to be good, whilst others to be bad on the basis of what benefits him or what harms him.

实际上,人在其支配范围内所发出的行为,本身不能被描述为好或坏。这是因为它们仅仅是行为,其本身并不具有好或坏的属性。相反,好与坏的界定基于行为本质之外的外部因素。因此,杀害一个人的灵魂本身不能被称为好或坏,而只能被称为杀害。好或坏的属性在于该行为之外。于是,杀死参与作战的敌人是好的,而杀死平民、与之有盟约的人或受保护者(musta’min)则是坏的。前者的杀人者将获得报酬,后者的杀人者将受到惩罚,尽管两者所做的行为相同,都是杀害,没有区别。决定好与坏的,是驱使人去做该行为的动机,以及他实施该行为所指向的目的。因此,驱使人去做该行为的动机与他实施该行为的目的,是决定行为好坏的两个因素。无论人喜欢还是憎恶该行为,也无论该行为对他有益还是有害,都不影响这一点。

In reality, actions emanating from man, within his sphere of dominance, cannot be described as good or bad in themselves. This is because they are actions alone, that are not characterized as good or bad in themselves. Instead, the characterization of being good or bad is based on external considerations, outside of the nature of actions. So, killing a human soul cannot be called good or bad. Instead it is only called killing. The characterization of being good or bad is external to that action. Thus, killing the one who wages war is good, whilst killing the citizen, or covenanted person or the one who is under protection (musta’min), is bad. The first killer will be rewarded, whilst the second killer will be punished, although both are undertaking the same action, of killing, without differentiation. What decides the good and bad are the factors that drive man to do that action, as well as the objective for which he carries that action. Thus, the factors that drive man to do the action and the objective for which he carries out that action, are the two things that determine the good and bad in an action. This is irrespective of whether man likes or hates that action and whether the action benefits him or harms him.

至于人身上发生的行为，或施加于他身上的行为，只要是发生在支配他的范围之内，人便依据自己对它们的喜爱或厌恶，依据自己从中获益或受损，来判定它们是好还是坏。然而，这种判定并不意味着这些事物在实际上确实具有相应的性质。人可能认为某件事是好的，而实际上它是坏的；人也可能认为某件事是坏的，而实际上它是好的。安拉（SWT）说：

As for the actions that occur from a person or against him in the sphere that dominates him, man describes them to be good or bad based on his love or hatred towards them and based on his benefit or harm from them. However, this characterization does not mean that they are characterized by their reality. Man may see something as good, whilst it is in fact bad. Man may see something as bad, whilst it is in fact good. Allah (swt) said,

“或许你们厌恶某件事，而它对你们却是好的；或许你们喜爱某件事，而它对你们却是坏的。真主知道，你们不知道。”{《古兰经》2:216}

“But perhaps you hate a thing and it is good for you; and perhaps you love a thing and it is bad for you. And Allah Knows, while you know not.” [TMQ Surah Al-Baqarah 2: 216],

关于善与恶的问题。至于美好（hasan）与丑恶（qabeeh）的问题，行为的性质是由人的判断以及对其所作的赏罚来确定的。人的行为就其本身的内在属性而言，在其一切情况与考量之下，仅仅是物质性的。物质性的本质本身并不决定行为是美好的还是丑恶的。相反，行为是由行为之外的外部情况与考量来描述的。正是这另一方面，解释了行为为何是美好的或丑恶的。这不可能是理智，因为理智会受到差异、分歧与矛盾的影响。理智对美好与丑恶的判断会受到人所生活的环境的影响。理智会随着时间的推移而出现差异与分歧。如果任由理智来决定美好与丑恶，那么对某一群人而言是丑恶的事物，对另一群人而言就可能是美好的。同一件事物在某一时期可能是美好的，而在其他时期却可能是丑恶的。一个行为被描述为美好或丑恶，必须适用于所有人、在所有时代都成立。因此，行为本质上被定性为美好或丑恶，必定来自超越理智的力量，那便是真主（SWT）。

This is in relation to good and bad. As for the subject of pleasant/pretty (hasan) and ugly (qabeeh), actions are characterized by the judgment of man, by the reward and punishment of them. Actions of man are materialistic alone, with respect to their intrinsic nature, for all of their circumstances and considerations. The nature of being materialistic does not characterize itself as being either pleasant or ugly. Instead, the actions are described by their external circumstances and considerations external to the actions. This other matter is what explains the nature of action as being either hasan or qabeeh. This cannot be the mind because the mind is subject to disparity, difference and contradiction. The mind’s estimations of hasan and qabeeh are influenced by the environment in which a person lives. Minds are subject to disparity and difference over the passage of time. If the mind is left to determine hasan and qabeeh, then the thing that is qabeeh to one group of people will be hasan to another group. The same thing may be hasan at one time, whilst qabeeh at other times. The description of an action to be hasan or qabeeh must be applicable to all human beings, at all times. Accordingly, the characterization of actions being either hasan or qabeeh, by their nature, must come from a power that is beyond mind, which is Allah (swt).

人凭借类比事物，赋予自己判定行为为善（hasan）或恶（qabeeh）的权威。由于人发现自己能够判定苦的东西为丑（qabeeh），甜的东西为美（hasan），丑陋的外形为丑（qabeeh），美丽的外形为美（hasan），他便以为自己也能判定真实为善，虚假为恶，履行承诺为善，背信为恶。于是他就赋予自己判定行为善恶的权威。依据自己的判断，他为丑恶的行为规定了惩罚，为美善的行为规定了奖赏。他这样做，尽管行为不能与事物相提并论。原因在于，事物的苦、甜、丑、美可以被感知，因此可以对其作出判断；而行为之中，人没有能够感知的任何东西，使他得以判断它们是恶还是善。因此，行为本身不能被绝对地判定为恶或善。

Man gives himself the authority to judge actions to be either hasan or qabeeh by making analogies upon things. Since man finds that he is able to judge the bitter thing as ugly (qabeeh), the sweet thing as pleasant (hasan), the hideous form as ugly (qabeeh) and the beautiful form as pleasant (hasan), he thinks that he can judge truth as hasan, false as qabeeh, fulfilling the promise as hasan and treachery as qabeeh. So he gave himself the authority of judging actions as hasan or qabeeh. Based on his judgment, he determined penalty for the ugly action and reward for the pleasant action. He did so even though actions cannot be compared with things. This is because things can be sensed for their bitterness, sweetness, hideousness and beauty and so judgment can be passed upon them. In contrast, nothing can be found within actions that can be sensed by man, so that he can judge upon them, as to whether they are qabeeh or hasan. Thus, actions themselves cannot be judged as qabeeh or hasan absolutely.

人依据感官所作的关于善与恶、以及“哈桑”与“卡比赫”的判断，彼此各异甚至相互矛盾。这是因为这些判断出自有限的心智，并建立在相互矛盾且不确定的感觉之上。将善恶、哈桑与卡比赫的衡量交给人来决定是不正确的，因为令人愉悦和令人厌恶之物会因时间不同、群体不同而有所差异。这与思想体系具有普遍性的事实相抵触，因为思想体系要为全人类、为一切时代对行为作出界定。因此，这种界定必须来自超越心智的力量，以向人说明何为善、何为恶，何为哈桑、何为卡比赫，从而为人确定何者带来利益、何者防止伤害。这一力量便是人类的创造者安拉（SWT）。安拉（SWT）说：

The analogies made by man for good and bad, and for hasan and qabeeh, are varying and contradicting analogies. This is because they emanate from a limited mind, based upon sensations that are contradictory and not definite. It is not correct to leave the measuring of good and bad, or hasan and qabeeh, to man. This is because pleasant and ugly will be different from one time to another, from one group to another. This contradicts the reality of ideology being universal, through its characterization of actions for the whole of humankind, for all ages. Therefore, the characterization must be from a power that is beyond the mind, to explain to man what is good and bad and what is hasan and qabeeh, thereby determining for him what brings him benefit and what prevents harm. This power is the Creator of Man who is Allah (swt). Allah (swt) said,

“难道创造者不知道吗？而祂是微妙的，是洞察一切的。”[《古兰经》第67章 Al-Mulk 67:14]

“Does He who created not know, while He is the Subtle, the Acquainted?” [TMQ Surah Al-Mulk 67:14],

不应当在此说，差异和分歧不一定是负面的，它们也可能是积极的，表明演变、发展与进步。因此，西方法律的演变是由于社会与人民的演变。这种说法不能成立，因为这些处理办法，从根源上讲，是为满足人类而设的有组织的裁决，着眼于人的机体需要和本能，同时将其视为人。该制度的实质在于，它并不是逐个个体地、或考虑其所处的地点与时代来处理人的问题。相反，该制度是把人当作人来对待，无论男女、阿拉伯人或非阿拉伯人、白人或黑人，也无论他是古代的人、当代的人还是未来的人。该制度把他当作人来对待，不因时间和地点而有所不同。当代人与古代人之间没有区别。当代人的问题就是古代人的问题，因为两者都会感到饥饿、口渴、恐惧和情欲。这是因为机体需要和本能对每个人都是相同的，它们不会因个体而异，也不会因时代而变化。所看到的人类生活的变化，是就实际境况而言的，而不是就人类本身的本质而言的。变化只发生在生活方式的形式上。因此，古人住在洞穴里、骑马，而当代人住在摩天大楼里、乘坐飞机。如果我们仔细审视，就会发现古人住在洞穴、骑马的动机，与当代人住在楼房、乘坐飞机的动机是相同的。 因此,适用于一切时代和地方的制度,是那种能够为所有人类提供解决方案的制度,无论其肤色、性别、种族、地域或时代如何。

It must not be said here that the difference and disparity do not necessarily have to be in a negative sense, as they may be in a positive sense indicating evolution, development and progress. Accordingly, the evolution of Western laws is because of the evolution of societies and people. This must not be said because the treatments, in origin, are the organized rulings to satisfy a human, with respect to his organic needs and instincts, whilst considering him as a human. The reality of the system is that it does not treat the problems of humans, by considering them on an individual basis, or considering the place and time in which they live. Instead, the system would address the problems of Man by considering him as a human, whether male or female, Arabs or non-Arab, white or black, as well as whether he is an ancient Man, contemporary Man or future Man. The system would treat him as a human, without differing over time and place. There is no difference between a current Man and ancient Man. The issue of the contemporary Man is the issue of ancient Man, as both would feel hunger, thirst, fear and lust. This is because the organic needs and instincts are the same for every human. They do not differ from one individual to another, nor do they vary from one time to another. What is seen as a change in human living is in terms of practical realities and not in terms of the nature of humans themselves. The change occurs only in the forms of lifestyle. So the ancient man lived in caves and rode on horses, whilst the contemporary man lives in skyscrapers and flies in airplanes. If we scrutinize closely, we will find that the motive for ancient Man to live in caves and ride on horses, is the same as the motive for contemporary man to live in buildings and fly over airplanes. Accordingly, the system that is good for all times and places, is the system that provides treatments for the problems applicable to all the human beings regardless of their color, sex, race, place and time.

关于价值的问题，西方思想在研究中于四个方面出现了偏差：

As for the values, Western thought erred in its research in four aspects:.

首先,关于西方思想家所讨论的那些价值观,如自由、尊严、正义、平等、慈悲、诚信、宽容、责任以及其他,它们只是一些概念,若不与感知相联系,即与所公认的来源及其实际落实的方式相联系,其含义便无从理解。因此我们看到,人们在接受这些概念时并无分歧,真正的分歧在于所公认的来源及其具体的实践方式。由此可见,若说平等是一种普世价值和人类的普遍需求,这种说法是一种欺骗,因为众所周知,在西方人那里“平等”的含义,与在穆斯林那里的含义并不相同;在资本主义中所指的平等,也与伊斯兰教中所指的平等有所不同。

Firstly, regarding the values discussed by Western thinkers such as freedom, dignity, justice, equality, mercy, integrity, tolerance, liability and others. These are mere concepts whose meanings are not understood, unless they are connected with sensations, i.e. with the accepted sources and implemented treatments. Accordingly, we see that people do not differ over their adoption as mere concepts. Instead, they differ over the accepted sources and their practical implementations. Accordingly, it is fraudulent to say, for instance, that equality is a universal value and human requirement, knowing what it is means for a Westerner, is other than what it means for a Muslim. It is meant in Capitalism in a manner other than what is meant in Islam.

其次,西方人所倡导、并努力在其社会中强调的那些价值观,是无法实现的。原因在于,这些价值观与西方的观点或意识形态相矛盾,而后者是从功利的角度,即从利益的角度来描绘生活的。因此,如果这些价值观与西方关于生活的观点不一致,它们便只是观念,无法转化为目标和实践。西方一些思想家自己也认识到了这一现实,于是他们复兴了所谓的义务论伦理学(以义务为基础的伦理学)理论。这意味着他们设想西方人可以在不考虑后果与利益的情况下,对价值观做出承诺。于是他们认为,西方人不会撒谎,因为撒谎本身就是丑陋的(qabeeh),而诚实则因其本质而是善的(hasan)。这是一种理想主义的幻想,在西方任何群体中都无法实现,因为其中并没有实施这些价值观的动机。仅仅因为一个人知道诚实是好的,并不意味着他就会自动坚持诚实。必须存在一种有约束力的动机,并伴随着赞扬或谴责。那么,对于一个信仰将此世与前世、来世割裂开来、以自我为宇宙中心、把生命描绘为唯一的今世生活的人来说,他会尽可能地贪享今世的快乐。这样的人只会在诚实对自己有利的范围内才重视诚实,而不会在其他方面予以关注。在此不能说,具有惩罚权威的法律可以起到威慑和激励遵守的作用。之所以不能这样说,是因为法律并不能在任何时间、任何地点控制人的行为。相反,法律对行为的约束是有缺陷的,效果也是有限的。当人忽视法律时,他还需要另一种推动力。

Secondly, the values discussed by the Westerners, seeking to emphasize them in their societies, are not achievable. This is because they contradict the Western viewpoint or ideology that depicts life from the utilitarian angle of benefits. Thus, if the values are not concordant to the Western viewpoint about life, then they are mere ideas that do not transform into purpose and practice. This reality is known by a group of the Western thinkers themselves. It prompted them to revive the so-called theory of deontological ethics (duty-based ethics). This means that they perceive the possibility of Western commitment to values, without considering their consequences and benefits. So they perceive that Westerners will not lie because lying is ugly (qabeeh) in itself and to be truthful because truth, by its nature, is good (hasan). This is a view of idealistic fantasy that is not achievable in any group of individuals in the West, as there is no motive for the implementation. Just because a Man knows that truthfulness is good, it does not automatically follow that he will adhere to it. There must be a binding motive, accompanied by praise or condemnation. So for a man whose creed separates this world from what is before and what is after, makes his individuality the center of the universe, depicts for him a single life which is the worldly life, he would devour the pleasures of this world as much as possible. This person will not pay any attention to truthfulness, except to the extent that it benefits him. It cannot be said here that the laws with their punitive authority could be a deterrent and stimulus for abiding. This cannot be said because the laws do not control human behavior at any time and place. Instead, their control over the behavior is deficient and has limited effect. The individual needs another stimulus, when neglecting the laws.

第三，价值的界定并非人类可以凭理性去评判的问题。原因在于，人可能只专注于某些观念和价值并加以认可，而忽略其他价值，这取决于他对人生的看法。例如，“荣誉”这一概念在西方没有意义，而它却是穆斯林的基本观念之一。西方的价值体系中没有精神价值，尽管数以百万计的人信奉宗教。然而，西方却忽视它，因为西方是世俗的，不关心宗教层面的事物。另外，人可以在价值之间进行比较，以选择其中最好的，即使这些价值之间并不存在可比性或对等性。然而，他不会因此感到满足，他仍然会去比较和衡量这些价值。不过，这种比较和衡量并非基于价值本身的优越性，而是基于该价值对他自身的影响。因此，人类在价值之间进行比较和衡量时，依据的是这些价值给他带来的益处或害处。于是，他把自己作为标准，或者把这些价值对他的影响作为标准。这实际上是在比较这些价值对自身的影响，而非比较价值本身。由于人的禀性不同，他们对价值影响的感受也不同，因此他们在价值之间的比较也各不相同。那些被物质倾向支配、受欲望驱使的人，会忽视物质以外的价值，只偏好物质价值，并努力去追求它们，这正是人们在西方所看到的现实。

Thirdly, characterizing values is not a rational issue for Man to evaluate. This is because Man could simply focus on some concepts and values to validate them, whilst neglecting others, based on the viewpoint about life. For instance, the concept of honor has no meaning within the West, whilst it is amongst the basic concepts of Muslims. Spiritual value is not present in the Western system of values although millions of people are religious. Yet, the West ignores it because the West is secular and does not care about religious aspects. Also, it is up to a man to compare between values in order to choose the best of them, even if the values do not have comparison or equality. However, he would not be satisfied with that. He would still compare and equate between the values. However, the comparison and equation are not based on the virtue of the value itself, but based on how the value affects him. Accordingly, humankind builds comparison and equation between values, with respect to what the value bring of benefit or harm to him. Accordingly, he makes himself the criterion, or makes the effect of these values upon him, as the criterion. This is, in fact, the comparison between the effects of these values on himself, as opposed to between the values themselves. Since the constitutions of human beings differ with respect to the effects of values, they differ in their comparison between the values. Individuals who are dominated by materialistic inclinations, driven by lusts, would neglect values other than materialistic ones. They would prefer materialistic values and go out to achieve them, as is the reality perceived in the West.

第四，西方的价值体系从其根基上就是无效的。原因在于，所有西方思想家，无论其流派与倾向如何不同，在考察行为的规范时，都没有区分指导行为的概念与这些概念的目的（qasd）。他们的研究全部集中于行为规范者相关的价值，而非其目的。因此，他们所讨论的价值，数以百计，例如诚信、爱、专注、同理心、纪律、谦卑、理解、宽容、自由、民主、勇气、平等、真诚、诚实等等，都是包含在个人层面以及个人之间关系，换言之，即社会中群体相关的规范性概念之内的价值。西方的价值包含的是个人道德品质中所涵盖的内容，而这些内容与行为的价值毫无关联。这是因为人作为人，其行为是为了满足他的本能和生理需要，依据某种特定的概念来确定该行为的可行与否，或应当避免与否。然而，人在行动时，并非仅仅考虑这些规范性概念。事实上，他还会考虑其所实施行为的目的是否得以实现。否则，这一行为便是徒劳的。行为的目的（qasd），即他为了什么目的而实施该行为，被称为行为的价值。

Fourthly: The Western value system is invalid from its basis. This is because all the Western thinkers, irrespective of their different schools of thoughts and tendencies, when looking at the regulation of behavior, did not differentiate between the concepts that guide the behavior and the aim (qasd) of those concepts. Their research was all about the values related to the regulators of behavior and not their aim. Thus, the values which they discuss, which number in their hundreds such as integrity, love, focus, empathy, discipline, humility, understanding, tolerance, freedom, democracy, courage, equality, sincerity, honesty and others, are the values that include what falls within the concepts of regulation related to individuals, as well as relationships between the individuals, in other words, the regulatory concepts related to groups in a society. The Western values include what falls within the individual moral traits, which do not have any relation to the values of actions. This is because man as a human performs actions to satiate his instincts and organic needs, according to a specific concept that determines for him the permissibility of performing the action, or abstaining from the action. However, he does not perform actions with the regulatory concepts in mind alone. In fact, he also takes into account the realization of the aim of the action which he performs. Otherwise, the action would be in vain. The aim (qasd) of the action i.e. for what purpose he performs the action, is called the value of action.

西方文明的基础建立在将宗教与生活相分离之上，否认宗教对生活的影响，将生活定义为利益，并以功利主义作为行为的标准。因此，它除了形式上的存在之外，并不拥有道德、精神或人性的价值。事实上，西方文明所拥有的只是功利的、物质的价值。这种功利主义的物质观正是给人类带来苦难的根源。法国哲学家埃米尔·布雷埃在其著作《当代哲学主题》（法文：Les themes actuels de la philosophie）中哀叹，物质科学导致了一种深陷于物质主义的工业文明，抹杀了人的人性，使他失去其内在本性，将他变成一件物品或一台机器。至于作为道德概念的行为调节观念，西方也称之为价值，西方思想家开始讨论它们，是因为他们看到了其必要性以及社会对它们的需要。然而，这些只是资本主义意识形态失败、其对人类的灾难性影响变得明显之后所作的修补。尽管如此，那些非物质的价值本身并不因其自身而具有效力，它们只是为了利益，为了防止苦难而存在。威尔·杜兰特在《文明的故事》第9卷《伏尔泰的时代》中写道：“伏尔泰看到了很多。他认为，人类智能的发展表明宇宙之中或其背后存在一种智能。最后，他回到了他著名的命题：‘如果上帝不存在，就必须发明一位上帝’（法文：Si Dieu n'existait pas, il faudrait I'inventer）；没有对至高存在、对其智慧和公义的信仰，充满奥秘与苦难的生活将不堪忍受。他与霍尔巴赫一同蔑视迷信，但他为宗教辩护，将其视为对神明的单纯崇拜。” 所以，道德本身对于西方思想实现利益或好处而言是必要的。

The Western civilization is based on the basis of separating religion from life, denying the impact of religion on life, characterizing life as benefit and making utilitarianism the criterion for actions. Consequently, it does not possess moral or spiritual or human values, except by way of formality. In fact, the Western civilization possesses only utilitarian, materialistic values alone. This utilitarian materialistic view is what brings misery to human beings. The French philosopher, Emile Brehier, in his book, Contemporary Themes in Philosophy (French: Les themes actuels de la philosophie), laments as how material science has led to an industrial civilization that indulged deeply in materialism and eradicated the humanity of man, making him lose his intrinsic nature, turning him into an object or a machine. As for the regulatory concepts of behavior that are moral concepts, which the West also calls values, the Western thinkers began to discuss them as they see their necessity and the society’s need for them. However, they are only amendments to the capitalist ideology after its failure and catastrophic impact on humanity became obvious. Nevertheless, those values other than materialistic are not intended in themselves for their validity. Instead, they are only for the benefit, to prevent misery. Will Durant wrote in The Story of Civilization Volume 9, The Age of Voltaire, that, “Voltaire sees much. He argues that the development of intelligence in man indicates an intelligence in or behind the universe. Finally, he returns to his famous proposition that ‘if God did not exist it would be necessary to invent him (French: Si Dieu n'existait pas, il faudrait I'inventer)’; that without belief in a Supreme Being, in his intelligence and his justice, life with its mysteries and miseries would be unbearable. He joins d'Holbach in scorning superstition, but he defends religion as the simple adoration of a deity.” So, morality itself is necessary for the Western thought to achieve the interest or benefi