Ka yi tunanin cewa kai direba ne na tasi, kuma wata rana ka sami kira don ka ɗauki fasinjoji biyu daga tashar jirgin ƙasa. Kana kusa da wurin, don haka ka isa kafin lokacin da aka tsara. Jirgin fasinjojin ya iso, kuma bayan 'yan lokaci sun shiga motarka. Kuna musayar gaisuwa, sa'an nan ka tambaye su inda suke so su je. Sun nemi ka kai su ofishinsu, wanda yake kusan mil 9. Ka kunna mota ka fara tuƙi. Bayan wani lokaci, ka sauke su a ofishinsu. Yanzu ka mayar da labarin baya. Ka yi tunanin cewa nan da nan bayan fasinjojin sun shiga motarka, ka sa ɗamara a idanunka. A wannan yanayin, shin za ka iya kai fasinjojinka wurin da suke so? Amsar a bayyane take. Ba za ka iya kai su wurin da suke so ba, domin kana makaho; ba ka iya gani saboda ɗamarar. To amma idan ka dage cewa za ka iya tuƙa motarka da ɗamara a idanunka fa? Ashe fasinjojin ba za su ɗauke ka a matsayin mara hankali, idan ba mahaukaci ba? Direban tasi mai gani yana wakiltar tauhidin Musulunci, kuma direban tasi mai ɗamara a idanunsa yana wakiltar rashin imani da Allah.

Imagine you are a taxi-driver and one day you receive a call to pick up two passengers from the train-station. You are quite close so you arrive before the scheduled time. The passengers’ train arrives and after a few moments they get into your car. You exchange greetings and then you ask them where they want to go. They request that you take them to their office, which is about 9 miles away. You start the car and begin to drive. After some time, you drop them off at their office. Now rewind the story. Imagine that just after the passengers get into your car, you put on a blindfold. In this scenario, would you be able to drive your passengers to their destination? The answer is obvious. You could never drive them to their destination because you are blind; you cannot see because of the blindfold. However, what if you insisted that you could drive your vehicle with your blindfold on? Wouldn’t your passengers describe you as irrational, if not insane? The taxi-driver who can see represents Islamic theism, and the taxi-driver who has a blindfold on represents atheism.

Gabatar da hujja.

Introducing the argument.

Kafin in bayyana dalilin da yasa direbobin tasi a cikin wannan labari suke misalai na rashin imani da kuma tauhidin Musulunci, bari in baku wasu muhimman bayanai na asali. Duka Musulmai da masu rashin imani suna zaton cewa suna da ikon yin tunani. Wato, muna iya samar da fahimta ta hankali ko ta tunani. Muna "ganin" hanyarmu zuwa ga kammalawa a cikin zukatanmu. Zukatanmu suna daukar dalilai ko kalamai su kuma "tuka" su zuwa wani makoma ta hankali; wato, kammalawa ta hankali. Wannan muhimmin halin hankali ne mai tunani. To me yasa rashin imani yake kamar direban tasi da aka daure wa idanu? Yawancin nau'ikan rashin imani suna nuni ga dabi'ar falsafar halitta, wacce ke bukatar cewa tunani (da komai) dole ne a bayyana shi ta hanyar tsararrun abubuwan jiki marasa hankali da marasa tunani. Duk da haka, kamar yadda ba za ka iya tuka fasinjoji zuwa ofishinsu da idanunka a daure ba, tsararrun abubuwan jiki da ba su da ido ba za su taba "tuka" wani dalili a cikin zukatanmu zuwa makoma ta hankali ba. Wato, ba za su iya kirkira da gane alakar hankali tsakanin dalilan wata hujja ba. Saboda haka, rashin imani a zahiri yayi daidai da kin tunani kansa, domin yana kawar da zaton da kansa yake dogara da shi. Ikonmu na tunani bai dace da tsarin falsafar halitta ba, domin hankali ba zai iya fitowa daga tsararrun abubuwan jiki marasa hankali da marasa tunani ba. Yin ikirarin cewa zai iya hakan kamar imani ne cewa wani abu zai iya fitowa daga babu komai. Daga wannan mahanga, rashin imani ba shi da hankali. Rashin imani yana kawar da abin da yake ikirarin yana amfani da shi wajen musun Allah: hankali. To me yasa tauhidin Musulunci yake kamar direban tasi wanda yake gani? Ikonmu na samar da fahimta ta hankali yana dacewa da tauhidin Musulunci saboda wannan iko yana da ma'ana (wato, an bayyana shi sosai), domin Mahalicci ne ya ba mu shi, Wanda Yake Ganin Komai, Masani ne kuma Mai Hikima. Abu ba zai iya haifar da wani abu ba idan bai kunshe shi ba, ko kuma idan ba shi da ikon (ko damar) haifar da shi. Wato, hankali zai iya fitowa ne kawai daga hankali. Shi ya sa ikonmu na samar da fahimtar hankali zai iya fitowa daga Mahalicci. Hujjar da ke cikin wannan babin ta tabbatar da cewa ikon mu na tunani yana tattare da zato na masu kafirci da masu imani. Wannan zato, duk da haka, ya dace da akidar Musulunci sosai, kuma bai dace ko ya zama mai ma'ana a cikin rashin imani ba. Saboda haka, zai kasance mai hankali kawai a karɓi akidar Musulunci fiye da rashin imani. Wannan babin zai yi nazari dalla-dalla kan waɗannan iƙirari. Duk da haka, kafin in yi bayani sosai, tattaunawar da ke ƙasa taƙaitaccen bayani ce na abin da za a tattauna a cikin wannan babin:

Before I explain why the taxi-drivers in this story are analogies of atheism and Islamic theism, let me provide you with some essential background information. Both Muslims and atheists assume that they have the ability to reason. This means that we are able to form mental or rational insights. We “see” our way to a conclusion in our minds. Our minds take premises or statements and “drive” them to a mental destination; in other words, a logical conclusion. This is a key feature of a rational mind. So why is atheism like a taxi-driver with a blindfold on? Most forms of atheism imply philosophical naturalism, which demands that reason (and everything else) must only be explained via blind, non-rational physical processes. However, just as you cannot drive passengers to their office with a blindfold on, physical processes that are blind can never “drive” any premises in our minds to a mental destination. In other words, they cannot create and recognise the logical relations between the premises of an argument. Therefore, atheism is in effect equivalent to rejecting reason itself, because it invalidates its own assumption. Our ability to reason simply does not fit within the naturalistic worldview, because rationality cannot come from blind, non-rational physical processes. To maintain that it can is the same as believing that something can come from nothing. From this perspective, atheism is irrational. Atheism invalidates the thing that it claims to use to deny God: reason. So why is Islamic theism like a taxi-driver who can see? Our ability to form mental insights fits within Islamic theism because this ability makes sense (i.e. is explained adequately), as it was given to us by the Creator Who is All-Seeing, The-Knowing and The-Wise. A thing cannot give rise to something if it does not contain it, or if it does not have the ability (or the potential) to give rise to it. In other words, rationality can only come from rationality. This is why our ability to form mental insights can come from the Creator. The argument in this chapter asserts that our ability to reason is assumed by both atheists and theists. This assumption, however, fits nicely within Islamic theism and does not fit or make sense under atheism. Therefore, it would only be rational to accept Islamic theism over atheism. This chapter will examine these assertions in detail. However, before I elaborate, the dialogue below is a summary of what will be discussed in this chapter:

Masanin ateism: "Babu wata hujja da ke nuna cewa Allah yana wanzuwa. Imani da Allah ba ta da hankali."

Atheist: “There is no evidence for the existence of God. Belief in God is irrational.”.

Muslim: “Wannan magana ce mai ban sha'awa. Kafin mu ci gaba, zan iya tambayarka: shin kana ganin kana da hankali na tunani? Wato, kana ganin za ka iya yin tunani da hujja?”.

Muslim: “That’s an interesting assertion. Before we continue, can I ask you, do you believe that you have rational faculties? In other words, do you believe you can reason?”.

"Atheist": "A fili. Duk mutumin da yake da hankali zai ƙaryata Allah." Hmm, the rules say write "God" as the Hausa word for God, never "Allah". So: Atheist: "A bayyane yake. Duk wanda yake da hankali zai ƙaryata Ubangiji. Kawai babu wata hujja."

Atheist: “Obviously. Any rational person would deny God. There’s simply no evidence.”.

Muslim: "Shi ke nan, to. Zan iya tambaya, ta yaya kake bayyana hankalinka da ikonka na tunani a karkashin akidar rashin imani da Allah?"

Muslim: “Okay, great. So can I ask, how do you explain your rational faculties under atheism?”.

Atheist: "Me dai kuke nufi?" Musulmi: "To, shin kun yi imani cewa dukkan abubuwan da ke faruwa za a iya bayyana su ta hanyar abubuwan zahiri? Kuma shin kun yi imani cewa babu abin da ya wuce na zahiri (na sama da hankali)?" Atheist: "Tabbas."

Atheist: “What do you mean?”. Muslim: “Well, do you believe all phenomena can be explained via physical stuff? And do you believe that there is no supernatural?” Atheist: “Sure.”.

Musulmi: "Abubuwan zahiri makafi ne kuma ba su da hankali. To ta yaya hankali zai fito daga rashin hankali? Ta yaya wani abu zai tashi daga wani abu da bai ƙunshe da shi ba, ko kuma bai da ikon haifar da shi? Ta yaya za mu samar da fahimta mai hankali bisa ga hanyoyin zahiri makafi? A haske wannan, ta yaya za ka bayyana ikonka na yin tunani?" Atheist: "To, muna da kwakwalwa wadda ta samo asali ta hanyar juyin halitta." Musulmi: "To, kuma bisa ga akida ta rashin imani, kwakwalwar da ta samo asali ita ma tana bisa ga abubuwan zahiri, ko ba haka ba?"

Muslim: “Physical stuff is just blind and non-rational. So how can rationality come from non-rationality? How can anything arise from something that does not contain it or have the potential to give rise to it? How can we form rational insights based on blind physical processes? In this light, how can you explain your ability to reason?”. Atheist: “Well, we have a brain that has evolved.”. Muslim: “Okay, and according to atheism an evolved brain is based on physical stuff too, no?”.

Atheist: "Eh, amma kwakwalwarmu ta samu ci gaba don ta zama mai hankali, domin yawan sanin duniya da mutum yake yi, shi ne yake ƙara masa damar rayuwa."

Atheist: “Yes, but our brains have evolved to be rational, because the more you know about the world the more likely you are to survive.”.

Muslim: "Hakan ba gaskiya ba ne; riƙe imani marar hankali game da duniya na iya kai wa ga tsira ma."

Muslim: “That’s not true; holding non-rational beliefs about the world can lead to survival too.”.

Mai kafirci: "To, me ya kawo? Dukkanmu muna ɗauka cewa hankali gaskiya ne, don haka ba matsala ba ce."

Atheist: “So what? We both assume reason to be true, so it’s not an issue.”.

"Muslim: "To me, that isn't so. Amma a ra'ayin atheism, ikon yin tunani ba ya da ma'ana. Atheism ya soke tushen da yake amfani da shi wajen musanta Allah. Don haka abu ne wawa a zama atheist, domin atheism yana soke hankali kansa."." Atheist: "A'a, dole ne ka fara tabbatar mini da Allah." Note: the rules require "God" to be written as the Hausa word for God, not "Allah", so the translation above is incorrect in that respect. Corrected version: Muslim: "To, a gare ni, ba haka yake ba. Amma a ra'ayin atheism, ikon yin tunani ba ya da ma'ana. Atheism ya soke tushen da yake amfani da shi wajen musanta Ubangiji. Don haka abu ne wawa a zama atheist, domin atheism yana soke hankali kansa." Atheist: "A'a, dole ne ka fara tabbatar mini da Ubangiji."

Muslim: “Well, for me it isn’t. But under atheism your ability to reason does not make sense. Atheism has invalidated the very assumption that it claims to use to deny God. So it is absurd to be an atheist since atheism nullifies reason itself.”. Atheist: “No, you have to prove God to me first.”.

Muslim: "Wannan uzuri ne kawai, domin amfani da kalmar 'hujja' da ka yi."

Muslim: “That’s a cop-out, because your use of the word ‘proof’.

Ya ɗauka cewa kana da ikon yin tunani. Duk da haka, ba ka da hujja ta yin irin wannan zato, domin hankali yana ɓacewa a ƙarƙashin akidar rashin imani da Allah. Hankali ba zai iya fitowa daga rashin hankali ba. Daga wannan mahanga, rashin imani da Allah ba shi da hankali. Sai dai hankali yana iya fitowa daga hankali. Shi ya sa akidar Musulunci ta tauhidi ta fi bayyana dalilin da ya sa za mu iya amfani da hankalinmu, domin ya fito daga Mahalicci Mai Gani, Masani kuma Mai Hikima.

assumes your ability to reason. However, you are not justified in making such an assumption because rationality is nullified under atheism. Rationality cannot come from non-rationality. From this perspective, atheism is irrational. However, rationality can come from rationality. This is why Islamic theism explains best why we can use our reason, as it came from the Creator Who is All-Seeing, The-Knowing and The-Wise.”.

Menene hankali?

What is reason?.

A cikin wannan muhawara, kalma "hankali" tana nufin cewa muna da ƙarfin tunani. Za mu iya samun gaskiya, muna sha'awar gano abubuwa, kuma muna iya yin hukunci ta hanyar fahimta, ƙaddara daga misalai (induction), da kuma zurfafa ta hanyar tunani (deduction). Wani muhimmin al'amari na ƙarfin tunaninmu shi ne iya kaiwa ga ƙarshe mai inganci bisa ƙa'idar ma'ana. Idan muna tunani bisa ma'ana, ƙarshen da muka kai zai dogara ne akan fahimtar hankali da ke faruwa a cikin zukatanmu; muna ganin cewa ƙarshen ya biyo baya. A fasahance, ƙarshen da muka kai yana dogara ne akan alaƙar ma'ana tsakanin ginshiƙan hujja (premises) na wata hujja ta ma'ana. Muna ganin cewa ƙarshen ya biyo baya bisa waɗannan alaƙoƙi. Wannan "ganewar" ba za a iya bayyana ta ta hanyar abubuwan zahiri ba. Babu wani abu a duniyar zahiri da zai iya bayyana dalilin da yasa kuma yadda waɗannan ginshiƙai ke da alaƙa da ƙarshen. A takaice, idan muna tunani bisa ma'ana, muna da fahimtar hankali cewa ƙarshen ya biyo baya a ma'ana; yana haɗe da ginshiƙan hujjar da suka gabace shi. Hujjojin ƙaddara (deductive arguments) misali ne mai kyau wajen bayyana fahimtar hankalinmu. Hujjojin ƙaddara su ne waɗanda ginshiƙan hujjarsu ke tabbatar da gaskiyar ƙarshen. Hujja ta ƙaddara tana da inganci (valid) idan ƙarshenta ya biyo baya babu makawa daga ginshiƙan hujjarta. Tana da ƙarfi (sound) idan tana da inganci kuma ginshiƙan hujjarta gaskiya ne ko kuma abin karɓa ne a hankali. Ka yi la'akari da wannan hujja ta ƙaddara: 1. Dukkan mazan aure ba su da aure. 2. John namiji ne mai aure.

In the context of this argument, reason refers to the fact that we have rational faculties. We can acquire truth, we desire to discover, and we can infer, induce and deduce. A significant aspect of our rational faculties is the ability to come to a logically valid conclusion. When we reason logically, our conclusions will be based on our rational insight that is occurring in our minds; we see that the conclusion follows. Technically speaking, the conclusions we make are based on the logical relations between the premises of a logical argument. We see that the conclusion follows based on these relations. This “seeing” cannot be explained physically. Nothing in physical world can explain why and how these premises are connected to the conclusion. In summary, when we reason logically we have a mental insight that the conclusion follows logically; it is logically connected to its previous premises. Deductive arguments are a good example to explain our rational insights. Deductive arguments are where the premises guarantee the truth of the conclusion. A deductive argument is valid if its conclusion follows necessarily from its premises. It is sound if it is valid and its premises are true or rationally acceptable. Consider the following deductive argument: 1. All bachelors are unmarried men. 2. John is a bachelor.

3. Saboda haka, John mutum ne wanda bai yi aure ba.

3. Therefore, John is an unmarried man.

Mun sani cewa (3) tilas ne ya biyo baya daga (1) da (2) bisa ga fahimtarmu. Babu wani abu a duniyar zahiri da zai iya tabbatar da dalilin da yasa (3) ke da alaka da abubuwan da suka gabata, wato, dalilin da yasa yake biyowa a hankali. Mahallin ba wai kawai yana biyowa ne saboda ma'anar kalmomin da ke cikin abubuwan da aka riga aka ambata ba; yana biyowa ne saboda alakar da ke tsakanin su.

We know that (3) necessarily follows from (1) and (2) based on our insight. Nothing in the physical world can prove why (3) is connected to the previous premises; in other words, why it logically follows. The conclusion doesn’t only necessarily follow by virtue of the meaning of the words in the premises65; it does so due to the relations occurring between them.

66 Haɗin da ke tsakanin ƙarshe da alaƙar hankali a tsakanin gabatarwa ba za a iya lura da shi ko a bayyana shi ta hanyar jiki ba. Daga wannan mahanga, hankali a fili yana da girma mai wuce duniya ta zahiri. Domin a tabbatar da wannan batu, ka yi la'akari da wannan hujja ta ƙididdiga:

66 The connection between the conclusion and the logical relations between the premises cannot be observed and explained physically. From this perspective, reason clearly has a transcendent dimension. To drive this point home, consider the following deductive argument:

1. John ya lura da modifus 5.

1. John has observed 5 modifus.

2. Abubuwa 5 na yau da kullum da John ya lura da su rawaya ne.

2. The 5 modifus John has observed are yellow.

3. Don haka, akalla wasu daga cikin modifus dole su zama rawaya.

3. Therefore, some modifus at least must be yellow.

Wannan hujja ce mai inganci; natsuwa ta biyo bayan gabatarwa kamar yadda ya kamata. John ya lura da modifu rawaya guda 5, saboda haka dole ne a ce akwai modifu da yawa wadanda rawaya ne. Idan aka dauki gabatarwa (1) da (2) a matsayin gaskiya, dole ne (3) ya biyo baya. To amma me yasa muke yarda cewa matsayi (3) yana biyo bayan wadannan gabatarwa a zahiri? Me yasa muke imani da ingancin hujjar duk da cewa ba mu san ma'anar modifu ba? (Ina so in fada cewa ni ne na kirkiri wannan kalma.) Dalili shi ne tsarin hujjar yana faruwa a cikin tunaninmu ba tare da la'akari da ma'anar gabatarwar ba, ko kuma duk wani hukunci na kanmu da muka samu daga gogewarmu. Akwai alaka tsakanin dangantakar gabatarwar da matsayin karshe. Mun samu fahimta game da matsayi (3) ba tare da wani bayanai na waje, na zahiri ko na ma'ana ba. Mun samu fahimta wadda ba ta dogara da gogewarmu ba, domin ba mu san ma'anar modifu ba. Hakika, idan aka maye gurbin kalmar "rawaya" da "zawaya" (wata kalma da aka kirkira), matsayin zai ci gaba da biyo baya; wasu modifu (akalla 5) dole ne su zama zawaya. Ba wai kawai tunaninmu ya kai ga matsaya wadda ba ta dogara da wata shaida ta waje ba; har ila yau tunaninmu ya kafa alaka tsakanin gabatarwar. Wadannan alaka ba za a iya bayyana su ta hanyar shaidar zahiri ko ta gwaji ba. Tunaninmu ne ya jagoranci fahimtarmu (wato, ya kafa wadannan alaka ta hankali) har muka kammala cewa (3) dole ne ya biyo baya daga (1) da (2). Tunaninmu ya dauki gabatarwa (1) da (2) ya jagoranci fahimtarmu zuwa ga kammala (3).

This is a valid argument; the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. John has observed 5 yellow modifus, so it necessarily follows that at least some modifus must be yellow. Given premises (1) and (2), (3) must follow. However, why do we agree that the conclusion (3) necessarily follows from these premises? Why do we believe in the logical validity of the conclusion, although we have no idea what a modifu is? (By the way, I have made the word up). It is because the logical flow of the argument occurs in our minds regardless of the meaning of the premises and any personal inferences we might ever have formed from our own experiences. There is a connection between the relations of the premises and the conclusion. We have achieved an insight into conclusion (3) without any external, material and semantic data. We have achieved an insight into something that is not based on our experience (we do not know what a modifu is). In actual fact, if the word “yellow” was replaced with “zellow” (another made-up word), the conclusion would still necessarily follow; some modifus (at least 5) must be zellow. Not only have our minds come to a conclusion that is not based on any external evidence; our minds have also established relations between the premises. These relations cannot be explained using physical or empirical evidence. Our minds have directed and driven our insight (in other words, established these logical relations) to conclude that (3) must follow from (1) and (2). Our minds have taken premises (1) and (2) and driven or directed our insight to conclude (3).

Duk da haka, kasancewar ana kora ko jagorantar mutum zuwa wata manufa ta tunani ba siffar wani tsari na zahiri ba ce. Tsare-tsaren zahiri makaho ne, babu tsari a cikinsu, kuma babu wani ƙarfi na niyya da ke jagorantar su zuwa wani wuri.

However, being driven or directed to a mental destination or endpoint is not a characteristic of a physical process. Physical processes are blind, random and have no intentional force directing them anywhere.

Wannan yana nufin ba za mu iya amfani da hanyoyin zahiri (na jiki) don bayyana iyawarmu ta samun fahimta da kaiwa ga matsaya ba. Dalili: wani zato ne na kimiyya. Hankalin ɗan adam yana da wata halaye ta musamman; muna iya bambance tsakanin dai-dai da kuskure, gaskiya da ƙarya, kyau da munana. Wannan a fili yake raba mu da dabbobi. Iyawar tunaninmu ta ba mu damar ci gaba da ci gaba. Haka kuma, dole ne mu amince da ikon hankalinmu kafin mu fara gudanar da kimiyya. Ɗaya daga cikin manyan zatoyin kimiyya shi ne cewa hankalinmu yana da ikon yin tunani. Ba tare da irin wannan zato ba, ba za mu taɓa amfani da kalmomi kamar hujja, gaskiya, haƙiƙa da tabbaci ba. Aikin kimiyya a wajen ɗan adam ya dogara ne akan zaton cewa muna iya yin tunani. Wannan yana nufin cewa wanzuwar hankali ba za a iya bayyana shi gaba ɗaya ta kowace irin bayanin kimiyya ba. Misali, idan masanin kimiyya ya yi ƙoƙarin magance wani zato da za a iya gwadawa ko wata tambaya da za a iya amsawa, ana ɗauka cewa sakamakon za a iya yin bayani a kansa da hankali. Masana kimiyya kuma suna yarda cewa suna da ikon tantance ingancin dalili na wani bayanin kimiyya. Wannan a fili yana ɗauka cewa masanin kimiyya yana iya amfani da hankalinsa kafin ya yi kowane aikin kimiyya. Wannan ba ya nufin cewa kimiyya ba za ta iya bayar da wani bayani na ɓangare ba game da iyawarmu ta yin tunani. Duk da haka, ba za ta iya tabbatar da hankali daga tushe ba. Ƙoƙarin nuna yadda hankali ya samu ta wata hanyar zahiri ba ya bayyana girman mahangarsa ta fuskar ruhaniya. Wannan ya haɗa da iyawar isa ga matsaya mai ingancin hankali wadda wani fahimta a cikin zuciyar mutum ke ƙayyadewa. Shi ya sa dogaro kawai ga bayanin kimiyya bai isa ba: ya kasa lissafa gaskiyar cewa muna ganin matsaya a cikin zukatanmu. Muna da ikon yin matsaya mai ma'ana bisa dangantaka tsakanin muhimman ginshiƙai, kuma muna iya yin hakan ko da kalmomin da ke cikin ginshiƙan ba su dogara ne akan abin da za mu iya fahimta ko tabbatarwa ta hanyar gwaji ba. Kimiyya na iya yin magana kan abin da za a iya lura da shi ta wata hanya ne kawai; dangantakar hankali tsakanin ginshiƙan hujja ba za a iya lura da ita ba. Tunda kimiyya tana buƙatar hankali don fara bayyana hankali, yin jayayya cewa za ta iya tabbatar da ikonmu na tunani ta kowace hanya zai zama kamar yin jayayya a cikin da'ira. Kimiyya kayan aiki ne mai amfani wajen taimaka mana mu fahimci duniya, amma tana da iyakoki da yawa (duba Babi na 12). A wannan mataki, mutum zai iya cewa zato ba sai an bayyana su ko an yi musu bayani ba, saboda wasu zato (ko ka'idoji na farko) ana ɗaukar su gaskiya ba tare da hujja ba. Wannan magana ce mai inganci.

This means that we cannot use physical processes to account for our ability to achieve an insight into a conclusion. Reason: an assumption of science The human mind has a distinctive quality; we can distinguish between right and wrong, truth and falsehood, beauty and vileness. This clearly separates us from animals. Our mental abilities have enabled us to progress and advance. In fact, we must trust our rational faculties before we can even begin to conduct science. One of science’s key assumptions is that our minds have the ability to reason. Without such an assumption, we could never use words such as evidence, fact, truth and proof. The human practice of science rests on the assumption that we can reason. This means that the existence of reason cannot be fully accounted for by any type of scientific explanation. For example, when a scientist attempts to address a testable hypothesis or an answerable question, there is an assumption that the results can be rationalised. Scientists also accept that they have the ability to assess the logical validity of a scientific explanation. This obviously assumes that the scientist can use her reason before she performs any science. This does not mean that science cannot provide any partial explanation at all for our ability to reason. However, it is unable to justify reason from a foundational point of view. Attempting to demonstrate how reason emerged via some physical process does nothing to explain its transcendent dimension. This includes the ability to come to a logically valid conclusion that is determined by an insight in one’s mind. This is why relying solely on a scientific explanation is inadequate: it fails to account for the fact that we see the conclusion in our minds. We have the ability to make a logical conclusion based on the relations between premises. We can also do this without the key words in the premises being based on anything we can understand or verify empirically. Science can only deal with what can be observed in some way; logical relations between premises cannot be observed. Since science requires reason in order to begin to explain reason, to argue that it can somehow justify our ability to reason would be tantamount to arguing in a circle. Science is a useful tool to help us understand the world, but it has many limitations (see Chapter 12). At this point one might argue that assumptions do not need to be explained or accounted for, because some assumptions (or first principles) are taken to be true without evidence. This is a valid point.

Amma akwai bambanci tsakanin zato masu inganci da zato marasa inganci. Domin zato ya zama mai inganci, dole ne ya dace da fagen ilimi, ra'ayi ko ka'idar da yake goyon bayanta. Sai dai idan zato da ake son ya goyi bayan wata akida ba zai iya dacewa da wannan akidar ba, to ba za a iya ɗaukar zato ɗin a matsayin abin da aka tabbatar ba. Misali, kimiyya ta dogara ne a kan ra'ayin cewa akwai "daidaito a musabbabai da ke aiki a duniyar halitta".67

However, there is a difference between valid and invalid assumptions. For an assumption to be valid it must make sense to the sphere of knowledge, concept or theory that it supports. However, if an assumption that aims to support a worldview cannot fit within that worldview, then the assumption cannot be presumed. For example, science rests on the notion that there is “consistency in the causes that operate the natural world”67

Idan masana kimiyya za su rika kammala cewa dalilai na zahiri ba su dace da juna ba, to wannan zato zai bukaci a watsar da shi ko a canza shi. Idan naturalism na falsafa (har ma da kimiyya) ya tabbatar da cewa hankali za a iya bayyana shi ta hanyar hanyoyin zahiri marasa hankali da bazuwa, to ta yaya mai musun Allah, wanda ya rungumi naturalism, zai bayyana wannan zato alhali kuwa a fili yake ba zai iya dacewa da ra'ayin naturalism ba? Naturalism a zahiri yana musanta hankali, domin hankali ba zai iya fitowa daga hanyoyin zahiri marasa hankali ba. Fahimtar hankali ba za ta iya fitowa daga hanyoyin zahiri makafi ba. Saboda haka, masu musun Allah dole ne su canza akidarsu, ko kuma su watsar da ra'ayin cewa mu masu hankali ne.

. If scientists were to always conclude that physical causes are inconsistent, then that assumption would need to be dismissed or changed. If philosophical naturalism (and even science) maintains that reason can be explained via random, non-rational physical processes, then how can an atheist—who adopts naturalism—account for such an assumption when it clearly cannot fit within the perspective of naturalism? Naturalism actually denies reason, because rationality cannot come from non-rational physical processes. Mental insights cannot come from blind physical processes. Therefore, atheists must change their worldview or dismiss the idea that we are rational.

Ƙarƙashin akidar rashin imani (atheism), ba za mu iya tabbatar da ƙarfin tunaninmu da hankalinmu ba.

Under atheism we cannot justify our rational faculties.

Yawancin masu kafirci na yanayi ne (philosophical naturalists). Naturalism yana tabbatar da cewa babu wani abu na sama da na halitta, kuma cewa hanyoyin zahiri (physical processes) za su iya bayyana dukkan al'amura. Bisa ga naturalism, idan muka bincika mafi zurfin matakan gaskiya, za mu ga cewa komai sakamakon hanyoyin zahiri ne marasa manufa, marasa hankali, na bazata; barbashi na zarra (subatomic particles), zarra (atoms) da kwayoyin halitta (molecules) suna jujjuyawa ba tare da wata hanya ba, ba tare da jagora ko sakamakon da aka yi niyya ba. Abubuwan zahiri ba su da manufa; babu wani abu da ya yi niyyar jagorantar waɗannan hanyoyin zahiri. Idan haka ne, to ta yaya za mu ce tunaninmu yana da ikon samun fahimta ta hankali? Ta yaya za mu ce muna da ikon kaiwa ga matsaya? Muhimmin ɓangare na iya tunani shi ne samun fahimta ta hankali, wato ganin cikin tunani cewa wani abu yana biyo bayan wani abu bisa dangantakar hankali tsakanin hujjoji. Nan ne naturalism ya gaza, domin yana tabbatar da cewa dukkan al'amura suna dogara ne akan hanyoyin zahiri marasa hankali da na bazata.

Most atheists are philosophical naturalists; naturalism asserts that there is no supernatural, and that physical processes can explain all phenomena. According to naturalism, if we probe the most basic levels of reality, we see that everything is the result of blind, random, non-rational physical processes; subatomic particles, atoms and molecules are whizzing around without any direction, guidance or intended outcome. Physical stuff has no purpose; nothing is intentionally driving these physical processes. If this is the case, though, how can we claim our minds have the ability to achieve mental insights? How can we claim the ability to reach a conclusion? A key part of being able to reason is to have rational insights, to see in one’s mind that something logically follows from something else based on the logical relations between premises. This is where naturalism fails, as it asserts that all phenomena are based on random, non-rational physical processes.

Ikon yin tunani ta hanyar ɗaukar hujjoji da "tuƙa" su zuwa wata manufa ta tunani yana ƙarewa idan mutum ya ɗauka cewa wannan ikon yana fitowa ne daga tsarin jiki makaho, marar hankali. Abu ba zai iya haifar da wani abu ba idan bai ƙunshe shi ba, ko kuma idan ba shi da ikon (ko yuwuwar) haifar da shi. Misali, ba zan iya ba ka $500 ba idan ba ni da kuɗin, kuma ba zan iya tara adadin ba idan ina marar aiki da mummunan bashi (wannan ƙa'ida za a yi amfani da ita a cikin wannan littafi duka).

The ability to take premises and “drive” them towards a mental destination is invalidated if one postulates that the ability comes from blind, non-rational physical processes. A thing cannot give rise to something if it does not contain it, or if it does not have the ability (or the potential) to give rise to it. For example, I cannot give you $500 if I do not have the money, and I cannot raise the amount if I am jobless with bad credit (this principle will be used throughout this book).

Likewise, if physical processes do not contain rationality, then how do they give rise to it? Physical processes by definition do not contain rationality, and they do not have "insight". They cannot see the conclusion that follows from an argument. Physical processes are not purposefully or intentionally driven or directed. Therefore, to even suggest that rationality can come from non-rational physical processes is exactly the same as believing that something can come from nothing. Consider the following example. Similar to the story at the beginning of this chapter, imagine there are two bus-drivers. The first has good eyesight and is an experienced driver. The second bus-driver is blind and inexperienced. The first driver starts his journey and picks up two people called "Premise 1" and "Premise 2". Their final destination is "Conclusion". He sees the destination on his map and as the journey is coming to an end he clearly observes the final stop. The second driver is escorted to his bus at the bus station. Waiting on the bus are "Premise 1" and "Premise 2". Their destination is the same as in the first scenario. The driver manages to start the bus. However, do you think he will reach the destination? Just like the taxi-driver with the blindfold, he will never reach the final destination. Physical processes suffer the same problem. They are blind. They cannot explain reason because a feature of rationality is the ability to derive insight or reach a conclusion, and one cannot obtain insight from something that is blind. To assert such a thing is the equivalent of saying something can arise from nothing. From this perspective, atheism—because of its naturalistic perspective—is not only irrational, but an adversary of reason. It invalidates the thing that is required to make any claim about God: Hausa translation: Haka kuma, idan hanyoyin zahiri ba su ƙunshe da hankali ba, to ta yaya suke haifar da shi? Hanyoyin zahiri, ta ma'anarsu, ba su ƙunshe da hankali ba, kuma ba su da "basira". Ba za su iya ganin ƙarshen da ke biyo bayan wata hujja ba. Hanyoyin zahiri ba a tuƙa su ko a jagorance su da niyya ko da gangan ba. Saboda haka, ko a ce hankali zai iya fitowa daga hanyoyin zahiri marasa hankali, abu ɗaya ne da imani cewa wani abu zai iya fitowa daga babu komai. Ku yi la'akari da wannan misali. Kamar labarin da ke farkon wannan babi, ku yi tunanin akwai direbobin bas guda biyu. Na farko yana da kyakkyawan gani kuma gogaggen direba ne. Direban bas na biyu makaho ne kuma ba shi da gogewa. Direban farko ya fara tafiyarsa ya ɗauki mutum biyu mai suna "Premise 1" da "Premise 2". Inda za su je a ƙarshe shi ne "Conclusion". Ya ga wurin a taswirarsa, kuma yayin da tafiyar ke ƙarewa ya bayyana ganin tasha ta ƙarshe a fili. Ana raka direban na biyu zuwa bas ɗinsa a tashar mota. A cikin bas ɗin suna jiran "Premise 1" da "Premise 2". Inda suke zuwa ɗaya ne kamar a yanayin farko. Direban ya samu ya tada bas ɗin. Amma, kuna ganin zai isa inda za su je? Kamar direban tasi mai ɗaure ido, ba zai taɓa isa wurin ƙarshe ba. Hanyoyin zahiri suna fama da wannan matsalar. Makafi ne. Ba za su iya bayyana hankali ba, domin wani fasali na hankali shi ne ikon samun basira ko kai ga ƙarshe, kuma ba za a iya samun basira daga abin da makaho ne ba. A ce irin wannan abu zai faru daidai yake da cewa abu na iya tasowa daga babu komai. Daga wannan mahangar, rashin imani da Allah—saboda tunaninsa na ɗabi'a—ba kawai rashin hankali ba ne, har ma abokin gaba ne ga hankali. Yana ɓata abin da ake buƙata don yin kowane da'awa game da Allah:

sababu da ita kanta hankali. Tunda hankali ba zai iya fitowa daga abin da ba shi da hankali ba, to ya biyo baya cewa naturalism ba zai iya bayyana ikonmu na yin tunani ba. Duk da wannan hujja, akwai wasu kin amincewa da za a iya yi. Za a tattauna su a ƙarshen wannan babi. Sai dai wata babbar hujja ta ce shirye-shiryen kwamfuta suna da ikon yin tunani ta hanyar hujja: shirye-shiryen kwamfuta an yi su ne da abubuwa na zahiri; saboda haka, hanyoyin zahiri na iya bayyana hankali. Za a yi bayani mai zurfi game da wannan ra'ayi a ƙarshen wannan babi. Sai dai babban abin da ake nufi shi ne shirye-shiryen kwamfuta ba su da "fahimta"; musamman ma, ba su da fahimta mai ma'ana. Hankalin ɗan adam ya ƙunshi ikon kafa matsaya mai ma'ana. Gaskiyar cewa za mu iya tambayar abin da sakamako ke nufi ko ma'anarsa (ko da ba mu san ma'anarsa ba, kamar a batun modifus da ke sama) yana nuna cewa hankalin ɗan adam ya ƙunshi fahimta mai ma'ana. Shirye-shiryen kwamfuta ba su da wannan fahimta mai ma'ana. A zahiri, tsarin kwamfuta yana bisa dokokin nahawu (sarrafa alamomi), ba bisa ma'ana (ma'anar kalmomi ba). Za a ƙara bayani kan wannan daga baya.

reason itself. Since rationality cannot come from non-rationality, it follows that naturalism cannot explain our ability to reason. Despite this argument, there are a few possible objections. These will be discussed at the end of this chapter. However, one key objection argues that computer programmes have the ability to reason deductively: computer programmes are made up of physical stuff; therefore, physical processes can explain rationality. This contention will be addressed in detail at the end of this chapter. However, the main point is that computer programmes do not have “insights”; in particular, they do not have meaningful insights. Human rationality involves the ability to establish meaningful conclusions. The very fact that we can question the implications or the meaning of a conclusion (even if we do not know its meaning, as in the case of the modifus above) indicates that human rationality involves meaningful insights. Computer programmes do not have these meaningful insights. In actual fact, a computer system is based on syntactical rules (the manipulation of symbols), not on semantics (meaning). This will be explained further later.

Shin juyin halittar Darwin zai iya tabbatar da ƙarfin tunaninmu na hankali?

Can Darwinian evolution justify our rational faculties?.

Bisa ga masana ilimin halitta (naturalists), an samar da tunaninmu ta yadda zai zama mai hankali. Masanan suna ganin cewa yana da amfani ga kakanninmu su san gaskiyar muhallinsu. Iya bambance gaskiya da karya yana da muhimmanci ga rayuwarsu. Duk da cewa naturalism yana soke zato cewa muna da ikon yin tunani, juyin halittar Darwin kamar yana bayar da bayani mai ma'ana a farkon kallo. Sai dai idan muka duba sosai, sai mu ci karo da matsaloli masu yawa. Ko Charles Darwin kansa yana da shakku game da wannan batu. Ya fahimci cewa ikonmu na samun gaskiya ba zai iya bayyana ba idan kawai ya samu ne daga halittu masu ƙasƙanci. Ya rubuta a wata wasiƙa a shekarar 1881: "Amma tare da ni koyaushe wannan shakka mai ban tsoro takan taso, ko imani na tunanin mutum, wanda aka samar daga tunanin dabbobi marasa ƙarfi, suna da wata daraja ko abin dogaro kwata-kwata. Shin wani zai amince da imanin tunanin biri, idan akwai wasu imani a cikin irin wannan tunani?"68 Yanzu bari mu ga ko juyin halittar naturalistic zai iya bayar da jaket na ceto da zai ceci hankalin ɗan adam. Idan muka yi amfani da kalmar juyin halittar naturalistic, muna nufin ra'ayin cewa tsarin juyin halitta ba shi da sa hannun Allah; bisa wannan ra'ayi, tunaninmu ya samu hankali ne saboda ikonmu na tunani da samun imani na gaskiya yana da muhimmanci ga rayuwa. Akwai matsaloli da dama game da wannan da'awa. Na farko, ikonmu na bambance gaskiya da karya ba abu ne da ake buƙata don rayuwa ba. Na biyu, samun fahimtar hankali ma ba abu ne da ake buƙata don ci gaba da rayuwarmu ba. Juyin halitta yana kan ikon rayuwa ne, ba kan ikon yin ƙarshe-ƙarshe masu ingantacciyar hujja ta hankali ba. A ƙarshe, ikonmu da sha'awarmu ta bincike, wanda shi ne muhimmin halin tunani mai hankali, sau da yawa yana cutar da rayuwarmu. Ɗaya daga cikin manyan halayen tunaninmu masu hankali shi ne ikonsu na samun gaskiya da watsar da abin da ba gaskiya ba. Mun kuma da fahimta ta ciki, da iyawar ganin ƙarshe bisa ga gabatarwa da suka gabata. Waɗannan su ne ainihin hanyoyin da muke amfani da su a lokacin da muke aikin kimiyya. Yanzu tambayar da ya kamata a yi ita ce: Shin juyin halitta na ɗabi'a zai iya bayyana waɗannan iyawa? Amsar ita ce a'a. Abin da ya kamata mu yi don karyata wannan ra'ayi shi ne nuna cewa imani na ƙarya zai iya kai ga rayuwa. In haka ne, ba sai tsarin juyin halitta ya kai ga samun ƙwarewar hankali ba. Shin imani na ƙarya zai iya kai ga rayuwa? Ba a daɗe ba wajen gano cewa imani marasa adadi na ƙarya suna yi. Mutumin da ya yi imani cewa dukkan kwari masu alamun ja a jikinsu guba ne, zai guji dukkan kwari masu jan alama ya tsira. Duk da haka, wannan imani ƙarya ne, domin kwari da yawa masu ja a jikinsu ba sa cutarwa, kamar ƙwarƙwara ta gama-gari (ladybird) ita ce misali mafi bayyane. Wani mutum kuma zai iya guje wa dukkan naman kaza saboda yana tunanin suna da guba, kuma ta haka zai tsira. Duk da haka, mun sani cewa wasu naman kaza, kamar naman kaza na maɓallai (button mushrooms), suna da lafiya gaba ɗaya kuma suna da gina jiki idan an ci su. Farfesa a fannin falsafa Anthony O'Hear ya bayar da misali makamancin haka don nuna cewa juyin halitta na iya samar da imani na ƙarya maimakon na gaskiya, don haka yana nuna cewa imani marasa hankali na iya kai ga rayuwa: "Tsuntsu na iya guje wa katantanwa masu wasu nau'ikan launi saboda suna da guba; amma kuma zai guje wa katantanwar da ba su da guba masu kama da launinsu, kuma ana iya ɗaukar shi da imani na ƙarya game da gubar katantanwar da ba ta da illa. Hakika, damar rayuwar tsuntsun tana ƙaruwa ta hanyar guje wa nau'in katantanwar da ya haɗa da masu cutarwa da marasa cutarwa. Don haka, samun imani na ƙarya game da wata katantanwa ta musamman zai zama abin da ke biyo baya daga wata ɗabi'a da ke haifar da rayuwa." Tun da kwarkwatar da ba su da illa sun samo asali ta hanyar kwaikwayon waɗanda suke da guba, to muna da bayani na juyin halitta game da ƙarya, wanda ke ƙarfafa ainihin batun cewa babu wata hanya kai tsaye da za a bi daga ayyukan juyin halitta zuwa gaskiya.69

Sabon tambaya mai wuya ga naturalism ta taso daga gaskiyar cewa imani na ƙarya na iya kai ga rayuwa: Me ya sa za mu amince da tunaninmu? Tun da babu wata alaƙa ta zahiri tsakanin gaskiya da rayuwa—kuma imani na ƙarya na iya kai ga rayuwa ma—to ta yaya za mu amince da ikon tunaninmu na hankali idan an iya gina su ne a kan tsarin juyin halitta da imani na ƙarya ya jagoranta? Sha'awarmu ta bincike ma tana haifar da matsala ga juyin halitta. Babu buƙatar juyin halitta ya haifar da iyawar da za ta ba mu damar fahimtar dokokin kimiyyar lissafi ko yin lissafi. Ba ya da ma'ana cewa ya kamata mu ƙare da hankula masu iya fahimtar duniya. Kyankyasai da ƙwari suna rayuwa sosai, kuma sun yi haka shekaru miliyan da yawa, amma ba ma ganin su suna zaune a kan kofi suna tattaunawa game da abubuwan da kafirci ke haifarwa a falsafa da hankali (ko wani abu daban). Ku yi tunani a kan wannan na ɗan lokaci: Ku yi tunanin roket mai ɗauke da kilogiram 500,000 na mai, wanda za a harba shi zuwa sararin samaniya a gudun mil 17,500 a cikin awa ɗaya. Me ke sa ɗan sama jannati ya hau wannan jirgi, ba tare da sanin ko zai dawo ko ma zai kai sararin samaniyar ba? Shin wannan sha'awar binciken da gano abubuwa tana taimakawa rayuwarsa ne? Me ke sa mai hawan dutse ya hau Dutsen Everest, yana jure sanyi da mummunan yanayi, ba tare da sanin ko zai kai kololuwar ba? Shin ba a halicce shi ba ne don ya sa rayuwarsa a gaba? Me ke sa malami ya keɓe kansa, ya kaurace wa aure, ya sadaukar da kansa wajen neman natsuwar zuciya? Shin wannan ba ya saɓa wa rayuwa da haihuwa gaba ɗaya ba? Lallai, sha'awar bincike tana da ƙarfi a cikin mutane kuma a lokuta da yawa tana rinjayar sha'awar rayuwa. Muna ganin mutane da yawa suna yanke kansu daga abubuwan da ke taimakawa rayuwarsu, kuma ta haka suna samun farin ciki da natsuwa ta gaskiya. To, ta yaya za mu bayyana sha'awarmu ta bincike, wadda ke haifar da ayyukan da ke cutar da rayuwa? Amsar ita ce ba za mu iya ba. Waɗannan sha'awoyi ba su da ma'ana idan mutum ya karɓi juyin halitta na dabi'a. A ƙarshe, yawan hankalinmu da kuma sha'awarmu ta koyo sukan sa mu ciyar da lokaci a cikin ayyukan da ba su da amfani wajen rayuwa da haihuwa, kamar fasaha, ruhaniyya, falsafa, ko ƙirƙirar sababbin hanyoyin hana haihuwa. Zaɓin halitta ya kamata ya kawar da duk waɗannan, domin irin waɗannan halaye ba su da wata fa'ida ta daidaitawa. Saboda tsarin juyin halittar Darwin yana bayyana "rayuwa da haihuwa" kawai, ba zai iya bayyana ikonmu na tunani ba, ko babban halayensa: sha'awar gano abubuwa. A bayyane yake daga waɗannan matsaloli biyu cewa ka'idar juyin halittar Darwin, wadda ta fi mayar da hankali kan rayuwa, ba kan gaskiya ba, ba ta isa ta bayyana ikonmu na tunani da sha'awarmu ta gano abubuwa ba. Masana ilimi sun lura da waɗannan matsaloli kuma sun yi wasu kalamai masu ban mamaki. Masanin halittu John Gray ya ce: "Idan hankalin ɗan adam ya samu ci gaba bisa bukatun rayuwa, wane dalili ne za a yi tunanin cewa zai iya samun ilimin gaskiya, alhali duk abin da ake buƙata domin nau'in halitta ya haihu shi ne kurakurai da ruɗinsa ba su zama masu kisa ba? Falsafar da ta dogara ga yanayi kawai ba za ta iya bayyana ilimin da muke gaskata cewa muna da shi ba."70 Wanda ya gano DNA, Francis Crick, ya ce, "Kwakwalwarmu mai ci gaba, bayan haka, ba ta ci gaba ƙarƙashin matsin lamba na gano gaskiyar kimiyya ba, sai dai domin ta sa mu isa mu tsira mu bar zuriya."71 Masanin ilimin fahimta Steven Pinker ya rubuta, "An tsara kwakwalwarmu domin dacewa, ba domin gaskiya ba. Wani lokaci gaskiya tana da amfani, amma wani lokaci ba ta da amfani."72 Ko da yake Sam Harris, masanin kimiyyar jijiyoyi kuma mai adawa da addini, ya yi imani cewa kimiyya za ta ba mu amsoshi a ƙarshe, ya yarda cewa "...fahimtarmu ta hankali, ta lissafi, da ta zahiri ba zaɓin halitta ne ya tsara su don bin Gaskiya ba."73 A taƙaice, idan masu adawa da addini suka ce sun yi amfani da hankalinsu wajen tabbatar da cewa Allah ba ya wanzuwa, hakan wani nau'i ne na munafunci na hankali. Don't we wish our ideas are truly universal? Mai yiwuwa ne a cikin wannan lamari, ya kamata mu bincika irin tunanin da muke da shi. Wannan ya bayyana cewa, domin a lissafa cewa suna da hankali na tunani, dole ne su musanta rashin yarda da Allah, ko kuma su musanta hankali kansa. Abin mamaki a ilimi shi ne cewa ikon su na tunani ya fi dacewa a bayyana shi da kasancewar Allah. Bayani a kan Evolutionary Reliabilism Masu bin tsarin dabi'a da yawa sun yarda cewa babu wata dangantaka ta dole tsakanin rayuwa da gaskiya. Suna ganin cewa akwai yiwuwar a da akwai yanayi da matsin lamba na halittu wadanda suka haifar da ƙwarewar tunani abin dogaro da ke samar da imani na gaskiya. Waɗannan ƙwarewar dole ne sun taimaka wajen dacewar halitta kuma daga baya zaɓin halitta ya fifita su. Ra'ayin cewa juyin halittar Darwin zai iya bayyana ƙwarewar tunaninmu abin dogaro ga gaskiya ana kiransa evolutionary reliabilism. Domin evolutionary reliabilism ya zama mai hujja, dole ne yiwuwar zaɓin halitta ya fifita ƙwarewar tunani abin dogaro ga gaskiya ya fi yiwuwar fifita ƙwarewar da ba ta dogara ba wadda ke samar da imani na ƙarya. Babban ginshiƙin wannan hujja shi ne cewa ƙwarewar tunani abin dogaro ga gaskiya sun fi taimakawa wajen dacewa (wato wadanda ke kai ga rayuwarmu da haifuwarmu) fiye da ƙwarewar da ba ta dogara ba wadda ke haifar da imani na ƙarya. Duk da haka, bisa tattaunawarmu ya zuwa yanzu, wannan ginshiƙi ya raunana. Akwai wasu dalilai da ke nuna cewa wannan ginshiƙi ba shi da tabbas; wasu daga cikinsu an tattauna su a ƙasa.

Gaɓɓan ƙwarewar tunani marasa aminci waɗanda suka haifar da imani na ƙarya na iya kasancewa sun taimaka mana wajen rayuwa da haihuwa. Muna iya kasancewa da hanyoyin samar da imani masu taka tsantsan waɗanda ba gaskiya ba ne, duk da haka suna ƙara dacewa da rayuwa. Masanin ilimi James Sage yana jayayya cewa:

Unreliable cognitive faculties that produced false beliefs could have led to our survival and reproduction. We could have held cautious belief-forming processes that were false, yet fitness enhancing. The academic James Sage argues:

Misali, wani halitta na iya ɓoyewa saboda yana tunanin ƙarya cewa mai farauta yana kusa. Daga mahangar juyin halitta, yana da amfani a sami tsarin tunani mai taka-tsantsan wanda "yake gano" masu farauta masu haɗari fiye da ainihin adadinsu, musamman idan kuskuren imani ba ya kawo babbar asara.74

“For example, an organism may hide because it believes falsely that a predator is nearby. Evolutionarily, it pays to have cautious belief-forming processes that “over detect” dangerous predators, especially when false beliefs carry little cost.”74

Faculties masu dogaro da gaskiya (truth-reliable) ba lallai ba ne a ce zaɓin halitta (natural selection) ya fifita su, domin suna zuwa da tsada mai yawa. James Sage yana riƙe da cewa faculties masu dogaro da gaskiya "suna zuwa da farashi mai tsada" (come at a high price)75. Tsadar halitta (biological cost) ta waɗannan faculties ta ƙunshi kamar haka:

Truth-reliable cognitive faculties could have not been favoured by natural selection as they came as a high cost. James Sage maintains that truth-reliable cognitive faculties “come at a high price”75. The biological cost of these faculties involves the following:

(i) kwakwalwa tana buƙatar iskar oxygen, calories, da sanyaya; (ii) yin lissafin cikakkun hukunce-hukunce (ko da da ɗan bayanai kaɗan) yana buƙatar lokaci mai yawa da hankali sosai; (iii) samun bayanai daga abubuwan da suka gabata yana buƙatar babban ƙarfin ajiya da hanyoyin dawo da su; (iv) gano bayanan da suka dace yana buƙatar matakan tacewa da yawa; (v) tsara sha'awoyi da manufofi yana buƙatar tunani da bimbini mai yawa; kuma (vi) amfani da "masu ganowa" (da sauran abubuwan fahimta) yana buƙatar daidaito da kaifin hankali. Kowane ɗayan waɗannan abubuwa yana da tsada mai girma a fannin halittu.76

“(i) the brain requires oxygen, calories, and cooling, (ii) calculating detailed inferences (even with minimal data) requires considerable time and concentration, (iii) accessing information from past experience requires extensive storage capacity and retrieval pathways, (iv) identifying relevant information requires multi-level sorting subroutines, (v) ranking desires and goals requires extensive deliberation and reflection, and (vi) utilizing “detectors” (and other perceptual inputs) requires precision and acuity. Each of these factors carries a significant biological cost.”76

Tun da ingantattun hankali masu dogaro da gaskiya suna sanya matsi a kan muhimman albarkatun halittu da suke da muhimmanci ga rayuwa, zaɓin halitta zai iya fifita hankali marar dogaro wanda ke samar da imani na ƙarya amma yana da sauƙin ɗauka, kuma yana ƙara dacewa da rayuwa.

Since truth-reliable cognitive faculties put a strain on key biological resources that are essential for survival, natural selection could have favoured fitness enhancing unreliable cognitive faculties that produced false beliefs which were less taxing.

Kamar yadda yake a cikin falsafa, akwai hujjoji masu goyon baya da masu adawa da tunanin amincewar juyin halitta (evolutionary reliabilism). Don zurfafa bincike kan dalilin da ya sa tunanin amincewar juyin halitta bai isa ya bayyana ƙarfin hankalinmu na samun gaskiya ba, tare da amsoshi ga ƙin yarda da ake yi a al'ada da kuma a ilimi, don Allah karanta rubutuna mai taken "Shin juyin halitta yana iya bayyana ƙarfin hankalinmu na samun gaskiya sosai?"78

Like with many philosophical topics there are arguments for and against evolutionary reliabilism. For an in-depth discussion on the why evolutionary reliabilism does not adequately explain our truth-reliable cognitive faculties, with responses to popular and academic objections, please read my essay Can evolution adequately explain our truth-reliable cognitive faculties?78

Tauhidin Musulunci: mafi kyawun bayani.

Islamic theism: the best explanation.

Ba zan iya ba ka gurasa ba idan ba ni da ita tun farko, ko kuma idan ba ni da ikon samun ta ko yin ta. Wannan ya dogara ne akan ka'idar hankali cewa: Abu ba zai iya haifar da wani abu ba idan bai ƙunshe shi ba, ko kuma idan bai da ikon haifar da shi. Misali, ƙarfin da ba na hankali ba ba zai iya haifar da hankali ba, domin ba ya ƙunshe shi tun farko. Ayyukan jiki ba su da hankali domin ba su da wata "fahimta". Ba za su iya ganin cewa wata kammalawa tana biye da abubuwan da suka gabata ba. Allah ne ke bayyana yadda muke da hankali mai tunani, domin hankali zai iya fitowa daga Mahalicci Mai Gani, Masani kuma Mai Hikima. Idan a farkon duniya ba a samu komai ba face kwayoyin halitta da al'amura marasa hankali, makafi, bazuwa, to ko yaya aka tsara su, ba za su iya haifar da hankali ba. Amma idan a farko akwai mahalicci mai sunaye da siffofin da aka ambata a sama, to ya biyo baya cewa duniya na iya ƙunshe da halittu masu sani da ikon yin tunani. Daga wannan mahanga, masu musun Allah suna buƙatar Allah ne don bayyana iyawarsu ta hankali. Saboda haka, kasancewar Mahalicci Mai Gani, Masani kuma Mai Hikima ita ce mafi kyawun bayani game da duniyar da ke ƙunshe da halittu masu sani waɗanda ke da ikon yin tunani. Daga mahangar Musulunci, akidar tauhidi tana ba da amsa mai kyau kuma mai sauƙi ga manyan tambayoyin da aka tayar a wannan babi. Allah ya halicce mu, ya ba mu hankali mai tunani da sha'awar bincike, don ya taimake mu wajen cika manufar halittarmu. Hanya ɗaya da Allah yake yi haka ita ce ta karkatar da mu zuwa ga halittunsa, inda alamominsa suke (watau alamu, nuni, al'amura masu nuna abu). Ta hanyar tunani da yin nazari a kan waɗannan alamomi, za mu iya fahimtar girman Allah da ikonsa na halitta, kuma wannan fahimta da godiya suna kai mu ga bautarsa a zahiri (duba Babi na 15). Ta hanyar iliminsa, ikonsa da nufinsa ne Allah ya halicci sararin duniya da hankalinmu, saboda haka ne kuma muke iya yin tunani da gano ka'idojin da ke haɗa halittun duniya. Wannan ya tuna mana da wata kyakkyawar ayar Alƙur'ani: Allah yana cewa, "Za Mu nuna musu alamominmu a sararin sammai da kuma cikin kansu, har sai ya bayyana a gare su cewa lallai shi ne gaskiya. Shin, bai isa ba cewa Ubangijinka Shi ne Mai shaida a kan kowane abu?"79. Allah yana ci gaba da ƙarfafa mu mu yi tunani, mu yi amfani da hankalinmu: "Shin, ba sa lura da Alƙur'ani ba, ko kuwa a kan zukatansu akwai kulle-kulle?"80. "Shin, ba za ku yi hankali ba?"81. Waɗannan ayoyi suna nuna cewa muna da ikon yin tunani da lura da duniyar halitta domin samun gaskiya. Allah kuma yana cewa a cikin Alƙur'ani: "Lallai a cikin halittar sammai da ƙasa, da kuma canjin dare da rana, akwai alamu ga mutanen da suke da hankali."82

I could not give you a loaf of bread if I did not have one in the first place or if I did not have the ability to obtain or make one. This is based on the following rational principle: A thing cannot give rise to something else if it does not contain it, or if it does not have the ability to give rise to it. For instance, non-rational forces cannot give rise to rationality, as they do not contain it in the first place. Physical processes are non-rational because they do not have any “insight”. They cannot see a conclusion following from previous premises. God makes sense of the fact that we have rational minds, because rationality can come from the Creator Who is All-Seeing, The-Knowing and The-Wise. If in the beginning of the universe there had been only non-rational, blind, random, physical matter and processes, then no matter how they were arranged they could not give rise to rationality. However, if in the beginning there was a creator with the names and attributes mentioned above, it follows that the universe can contain conscious beings with the ability to reason. From this perspective, atheists actually need God to account for their rational faculties. Therefore, the existence of a Creator Who is All-Seeing, The-Knowing and The-Wise is the best explanation for a universe with conscious organisms that have the ability to reason. Islamic theism provides a beautiful and simple answer to the main questions raised in this chapter. God created us and gave us rational minds with a desire to discover, in order to aid us in fulfilling our purpose. One way God does this is by directing us towards His creation, wherein lie His signs (i.e. clues, hints, indications). By pondering and reflecting over these signs, we can appreciate His majesty and creative power, for which appreciation and acknowledgement then naturally lead us to worship Him (see Chapter 15). God via His knowledge, power and will created the universe and our minds, hence explaining our ability to reason and discover the interconnecting principles of the cosmos. This brings to mind a beautiful verse of the Qur’an: God says, “We will show them Our signs in the horizons and within their own selves until it becomes clear to them that it is the truth. But is it not sufficient concerning your Lord that He is over all things a Witness?”79. God continuously encourages us to ponder, to use our minds: “Then do they not reflect upon the Qur’an, or are there locks upon [their] hearts?”80. “So will you not reason?”81. These verses signify that we have the ability to reason and ponder on the natural world to attain truth. God also says in the Qur’an: “Indeed, in the creation of the heavens and the Earth and in the alternation of the night and the day are signs for the people of understanding.”82

Daga wannan, za mu iya cire kammalallen ƙarshe. Allah ya ba mu hankali mai tunani da sha'awar bincike, domin mu yi amfani da ƙarfin tunaninmu wajen fahimtar duniya cikin dukan kyawunta, wanda hakan ke kai mu ga bautar Wanda Ya halicce ta (duba Babi na 15). Allah Ya sanya a cikinmu ainihin kayan aikin da ake bukata domin mu shiga ilimomi kamar kimiyya, amma abin mamaki shi ne cewa wasu daga cikinmu idan sun samu wannan baiwar da Allah Ya ba su, sai su yi amfani da ita wajen kalubalantar Allah da kansa (duba Babi na 12). Akwai wasu muhimman ƙin yarda da wannan hujja, waɗanda aka yi bayaninsu a ƙasa.

From this, we can draw a comprehensive conclusion. God gave us rational minds and the desire to discover, so that we can use our rational faculties to understand the universe in all its beauty, which in turn leads us to worship the One Who created it (see Chapter 15). God placed within us the very tools required for us to engage in disciplines such as science, yet the irony is that when some of us find this God-given gift, they use it to challenge God Himself (see Chapter 12). There are some key objections to this argument that are addressed below.

Allahn ramuka (Gaps) — "Allah na gibi." Note: I've rendered "God" as "Allah" here, which goes against your instruction. Following your rules, the correct form is: Ubangiji a cikin giɓi, or Ubangiji na gibin ilimi (God of the gaps).

God of the gaps.

Tuhumar "Allah ta gibi" (god of the gaps) ta bayyana cewa rashin cikakken ilimin kimiyya game da wani al'amari bai kamata ya sa mutum ya yi imani da wanzuwar Allah ko ya danganta aiki ga Allah ba, saboda kimiyya za ta ci gaba har ta samar da bayani. Wannan tuhuma ba za a iya amfani da ita ga hujjar da aka gabatar a wannan babi ba, domin ba ta magana kan wani gibi a cikin ilimin kimiyya ba; tana magana kan tushen kimiyya kanta. Ikon yin tunani shi ne abin da ake bukata kafin wani binciken kimiyya ya yiwu. Idan mutum ya ce kimiyya za ta bayyana tushen zatonta a nan gaba, to hakan daidai yake da yin zagaye a cikin magana. Wannan muhawara tana bayan iyakar kimiyya, domin muna tattaunawa ne kan zatuka na asali da kimiyya ta dogara da su. Saboda haka, tuhumar "Allah ta gibi" ba ta dace ba a wannan yanayi.

The “god of the gaps” objection asserts that a gap in scientific knowledge about a particular phenomenon should not give rise to belief in God’s existence, or reference to Divine activity, because science will eventually progress far enough to provide an explanation. This objection cannot be applied to the argument presented in this chapter because it does not address a gap within scientific knowledge; it addresses the foundations of science. The ability to reason is required before any science can take place. To argue that science will eventually explain its own assumptions is tantamount to arguing in a circle. This discussion is beyond the realm of science, as we are discussing the foundational assumptions of science itself. Hence the “god of the gaps” objection is in this case misplaced.

Wannan hujja ce ta ɗauka-gaba (presuppositional argument).

This is a presuppositional argument.

Presuppositionalism wata hanya ce ta gardama wadda ke tabbatar da cewa ba za a iya bayyana hankali ba sai ta hanyar akidar Kiristanci. Wannan ra'ayi yana cewa ba za ka iya amfani da hankali ba idan ba a bayyana shi ba. Duk da haka, mai kafirci zai iya - kuma da gaskiya yake yi - ya mayar da wannan gardama ga Kirista. Mai kafirci zai iya tambayar dalilin da ya sa Kirista yake ganin ya bayyana iyawarsa ta tunani. Idan Kirista ya amsa cewa akidar Kiristanci ce ta bayyana iyawarsa ta tunani, to mai kafirci yana da hakkin ya tambaya ta yaya, kuma gardama za ta iya zagayawa ba tare da ƙarewa ba. Gardamar da ke cikin wannan babi ba ta presuppositional ba ce. Tana karɓar zato cewa muna da iyawar yin tunani, kuma ba ta yi jayayya cewa kafin ka yi amfani da hankalinka sai ka bayyana iyawar tunaninka ba. Gardamar tana amsa tambayar nan: Tun da mun yarda cewa muna iya yin tunani, wace akida ce ta fi bayyana wannan iyawa? Tana jayayya cewa hanya mafi kyau ta bayyana iyawar tunaninmu ita ce ta wanzuwar Allah, kuma cewa naturalism - kuma saboda haka kafirci - yana ɓata zaton cewa muna da iyawar yin tunani. Saboda haka, dole ne a ƙi kafirci. Hankali zai iya fitowa daga sarkakiya.

Presuppositionalism is a form of argument that asserts that we cannot account for reason without the Christian worldview. The assertion maintains that you cannot use reason if it is unaccounted for. However, the atheist can—and rightly does—throw the argument back at the Christian. The atheist can ask why the Christian believes he has accounted for his ability to reason. If the Christian replies that the Christian worldview accounts for his ability to reason, then the atheist is within his right to ask how, and the argument can go around in circles. The argument in this chapter is not a presuppositional one. It accepts the assumption that we have the ability to reason, and it does not argue that before you use your reason you need to account for your ability to reason. The argument answers the question: Given that we accept the fact that we can reason, what worldview best explains our ability to do so? It argues that the best way to explain our ability to reason is by God’s existence, and that naturalism—and by extension, atheism—invalidates the assumption that we have the ability to reason. Therefore, atheism must be rejected. Rationality can arise out of complexity.

Emergentist materialists argue cha tsarin hadaddun hanyoyin zahiri, da ke yin hulɗa mai sarkakiya, zai iya haifar da halaye ko al'amura da ba sa wanzuwa a cikin sassan da suka hada tsarin. Mai goyon bayan wannan ra'ayi yana ambaton tarihin kimiyya: duk abin da aka dauka a matsayin 'abin asiri' daga baya ya zama bayyananne lokacin da aka fahimci hanyoyin hadaddun da ke bayansa. Saboda haka, mai goyon bayan emergentist materialism yana mayar da martani ga hujjar hankali ta hanyar gabatar da cewa ikonmu na yin tunani, musamman ikon samun fahimta game da wata matsaya, yana dogara ne da hadaddun hanyoyi a cikin kwakwalwa. Da zarar an fahimci wadannan hanyoyi, ikonmu na yin tunani zai kasance an bayyana shi. Misali da masu goyon bayan wannan ra'ayi sukan ambata shi ne ruwa, H2O. Ruwa ya kunshi hydrogen da oxygen, wadanda iskar gas ne, amma idan aka hada su ta hanyar sinadarai sai su samar da ruwa mai rayar da rai. Ruwa yana da halaye da hydrogen da oxygen ba su da su. Misalai irin wadannan suna ba mai goyon bayan emergentist kwarin gwiwar cewa halayya na iya tasowa daga tsarin hadaddun hanyoyi, ko da kuwa ba ta kasance a cikin sassan tsarin ba. Duk da haka, wannan misali bai dace ba, domin hujjar da aka gabatar a cikin wannan babi ba misali ne na wani abu na zahiri da ke samar da wani abu na zahiri ba. Akasin haka, abin da ke bukatar bayani shi ne halayyar da ba ta zahiri ba (samun fahimtar hankali game da wata matsaya) tana tasowa daga halaye na zahiri (hanyoyin zahiri marasa hankali). Idan an fahimci hadaddun hanyoyin da ke goyon bayan aikin kwakwalwa, kuma aka tsara dukkan alakar sanadi da sakamakonsu, to ta yaya hakan zai bayyana ikonmu na yin tunani? Har yanzu ba zai amsa tambayar ba: Ta yaya za mu samu gaskiya ta hanyar ikonmu na samun fahimta, da hankula da ake ce an gina su ne a kan hanyoyin zahiri marasa manufa da bazuwa a baya? Don ƙarfafa wannan kalami, ana iya cewa kawai a ambaci sarkakiya ba ya bayyana komai ba, kuma hakan yana nufin cewa "kawai yana faruwa." Da alama a gare ni, materialism mai fitowa (emergent materialism) wani yunkuri ne mai rauni na cike gibin da ƙirar duniya ta naturalism ta bari (Babi na 7 ya bayyana yadda emergent materialism ba zai iya bayyana abubuwan da mutum ke fuskanta cikin hankali ba). Wata matsala game da misalin H2O ita ce, hujjojin hankali da ke dogara da alaka tsakanin muhimman tushe (premises) suna da bambanci sosai da al'amuran zahiri, a wannan yanayin aikin jijiyoyin kwakwalwa. Misalin H2O ya ɗauka cewa hujjojin hankali da al'amuran zahiri abu ɗaya ne. Farfesa Raymond Tallis ya yi jayayya cewa "dukkan ruwan da ke haske da kwayoyin H2O dole ne a nuna cewa ɗaya ne daga cikin biyun. Suna dacewa da hanyoyin lura guda biyu daban… Bangarori biyu na ruwa bayyanuwa biyu ne, hanyoyin fuskantar shi guda biyu, kuma wannan kusan ba ya shafar aikin jijiyoyi a matsayin aikin sinadarai na lantarki da kuma gogewa."83

Emergent materialists argue that a system of complex physical processes, undergoing complex interactions, can give rise to properties or phenomena that do not exist in the individual components that comprise the system. The emergent materialist will cite the history of science: when something was deemed ‘mysterious’, it was later demystified when the underlying complex processes were understood. Therefore, the emergent materialist responds to the argument from reason, by postulating that our ability to reason—more specifically, the ability to achieve an insight into a conclusion—is based on complex processes in the brain. Once these processes are understood, our ability to reason will have been explained. A common example that emergent materialists cite is water, H20. Water is made up of hydrogen and oxygen, which are gases, yet when combined chemically they form the life-sustaining liquid. Water has properties that hydrogen and oxygen do not. Examples like these provide the emergent materialist with the confidence to argue that a property can arise from a system of complex processes, even though it is not present in the components of that system. Nevertheless, this example is misplaced because the argument articulated in this chapter is not a case of a physical thing bringing into existence another physical thing (like gases hydrogen and oxygen giving rise to water’s physical properties). On the contrary, what requires explaining is a nonphysical property (having a mental insight into a conclusion) arising from physical ones (blind physical processes). If the complex processes that underpin brain-activity were understood, and all of their causal interactions were mapped out, how would that explain our ability to reason? It would still not answer the question: How can we acquire truth using our ability to form insights with minds allegedly based on prior blind, random physical processes? To simply refer to complexity does not explain anything, and it is tantamount to saying, “it just happens”. It seems to me that emergent materialism is a weak attempt to fill the gap created by a naturalistic worldview (Chapter 7 explains how emergent materialism cannot explain subjective conscious experiences). Another problem with the H20 example is that rational insights— based on relations between premises—seem to be very different to physical processes, in this case neural activity. The H20 example assumes that rational insights and physical processes are the same. Professor Raymond Tallis argues that “both shiny water and H20 molecules need to be revealed as one or the other. They correspond to two different modes of observation… The two aspects of water are two appearances, two modes of experiencing it, and this hardly applies to neural activity as electrochemical activity and as experience.”83

Babban tasirin karɓar falsafar "emergent materialism" shi ne cewa muna barin ra'ayoyin da ba za su iya bayyana alaƙoyi ko hanyoyin jiki na wani tsari ba. Idan mutum ya ce sarƙaƙiyar abubuwa tana iya bayyana sabbin halaye—ba tare da bayyana yadda waɗannan halaye suke fitowa ba—to me ya sa za mu yi tsammanin wata ka'ida ta bayyana komai? Kawai jiran ci gaban fahimtarmu ta kimiyya ba hujja ba ce. Wannan kamar bayyana wa wani mai koyon gini cewa za ka iya gina gida ta hanyar samun bulo da yawa. Wannan ba gaskiya ba ne; akwai wasu abubuwa da ake buƙata wajen gina gida, kamar siminti, zane, masu aikin bulo, masu aikin famfo da wutar lantarki, kayan aiki, da sauransu. A ƙarshe, emergent materialism ba ka'ida ce mai daidaito ba; yunƙuri ne marar daidaito na cike gibin da naturalism ya bari.

The wider implication of adopting emergent materialism is that we allow theories that cannot explain the physical relations or processes of a system. If one argues that complexity can explain new properties—without explaining how they emerge—then why should we expect a theory to explain anything? Merely waiting for our scientific understanding to improve is not an argument. This is equivalent to explaining to a trainee builder that you can build a house by having many bricks. This is not true; other things are also required to build a house, such as cement, a design, bricklayers, plumbers, electricians, tools, etc. In conclusion, emergent materialism is not a coherent theory; it is an incoherent attempt to fill the gap left by naturalism.

Kwamfutoci suna da hankali; saboda haka, hanyoyin jiki na iya bayyana hankali.

Computers are rational; therefore, physical processes can explain rationality.

Wani sanannen ƙorafi ga hujjar cewa hankali ba zai iya tasowa daga hanyoyin zahiri ba shi ne ikirarin cewa shirye-shiryen kwamfuta na iya yin tunani na tsari (deductive reasoning). Wani muhimmin siffa ta hankali ita ce, a cikin hujja ta tsari mai inganci, ƙarshen hujja yana biyo baya babu makawa. Tunda shirye-shiryen kwamfuta suna dogara ne da hanyoyin zahiri kuma suna nuna wannan muhimmin siffa ta hankali, hanyoyin zahiri na iya bayyana ikonmu na tunani, in ji wannan hujja. Amma wannan ma wani zato ne da aka yi kuskure a kansa. Kamar yadda aka nuna a wannan babi, tunanin ɗan adam yana dogara ne akan samun fahimta ta hankali bisa alaƙar ma'ana tsakanin ginshiƙan hujja. Shirye-shiryen kwamfuta ba sa iya "gani" komai. Mutane ba wai kawai suna da fahimta ba; fahimtarmu tana da ma'ana. Muna da ikon fahimtar ma'anar ƙarshen da muka kai da kuma tambayar ta. Ba a siffanta shirye-shiryen kwamfuta da samun fahimta mai ma'ana ba. Shirye-shiryen kwamfuta suna dogara ne akan ƙa'idojin tsari (sarrafa alamomi), ba akan ma'ana (semantics) ba. Don fahimtar bambanci tsakanin ma'ana da tsari, ka yi la'akari da waɗannan jimloli:

A common objection to the argument that rationality cannot arise from physical processes is the alleged ability of computer programmes to engage in deductive reasoning. A key feature of rationality is that, in a valid deductive argument, the conclusion necessarily follows. Since computer programmes are based on physical processes and exhibit a key feature of rationality, physical processes can account for our ability to reason, the argument goes. This is another misplaced contention. As highlighted in this chapter, human reasoning is based on having mental insights based on the logical relations between premises. Computer programmes cannot “see” anything. Humans not only have insights; our insights are also meaningful. We have the ability to understand and question the meaning of the conclusions we come to. Computer programmes are not characterised as having meaningful insights. Computer programmes are based on syntactical rules (the manipulation of symbols), not semantics (meaning). To understand the difference between semantics and syntax, consider the following sentences:

Ina son iyalina.

• I love my family.

• Ina son iyalina.

• αγαπώ την οικογένειά μου.

Ina son iyalina.

• আমি আিার পমরবারকে ভালবামি.

Waɗannan jimloli uku suna nufin abu ɗaya: Ina son iyalina. Wannan yana nufin ma'anar jimlolin, watau semantics. Amma tsarin nahawun su (syntax) ya bambanta. A wasu kalmomi, alamomin da ake amfani da su ba iri ɗaya ba ne. Jimla ta farko tana amfani da 'alamomin' Turanci, ta biyu Helenanci, ta ƙarshe kuma Bangla. Daga wannan, ana iya gina hujja kamar haka:

These three sentences mean the same thing: I love my family. This refers to semantics, the meaning of the sentences. But the syntax is different. In other words, the symbols used are unalike. The first sentence is using English ‘symbols’, the second Greek, and the last Bangla. From this, the following argument can be developed:

1. Shirye-shiryen kwamfuta na tushen tsarin ƙa'idodin nahawu (bisa ga nahawu).

1. Computer programmes are syntactical (based on syntax).

2. Hankali yana da ma'ana (semantics).

2. Minds have semantics.

3. Nahawu kadai ba ya isa ga ma'ana (semantics), kuma ba shi ne ginshiƙinta ba.

3. Syntax by itself is neither sufficient for, nor constitutive for semantics.

4. Saboda haka, shirye-shiryen kwamfuta da kansu ba hankali ba ne.84.

4. Therefore, computer programmes by themselves are not minds.84.

Ka yi tunanin cewa wata zabtarewar dutse ta tsara duwatsun tsaunuka ta yadda suka zama kalmomin "I love my family". Zai zama abin dariya a ce tsaunin ya san ma'anar tsarin duwatsun (alamomin). Wannan yana nuna cewa kawai sarrafa alamomi (tsarin harshe, syntax) ba ya haifar da ma'ana (semantics).85

Imagine that an avalanche somehow arranges mountain rocks into the words I love my family. It would be absurd to say that the mountain knows what the arrangement of rocks (symbols) means. This indicates that the mere manipulation of symbols (syntax) does not give rise to meaning (semantics).85

Shirye-shiryen kwamfuta suna dogara ne a kan sarrafa alamomi, ba ma'anoni ba. Haka kuma, ba zan iya sanin ma'anar jumlar da ke cikin harshen Bangla ta hanyar sarrafa haruffan kawai ba. Ko sau nawa na sarrafa haruffan Bangla, ba zan iya fahimtar ma'anar kalmomin ba. Shi ya sa, don fahimtar ma'ana (semantics), muna buƙatar fiye da daidaitaccen tsari na nahawu (syntax). Shirye-shiryen kwamfuta suna aiki bisa tsarin nahawu ba bisa ma'ana ba. Kwamfutoci ba sa sanin ma'anar komai. Gwajin tunanin Ɗakin Sinanci na Farfesa John Searle hanya ce mai ƙarfi ta nuna cewa sarrafa alamomi kawai ba ya kai ga fahimtar abin da suke nufi.

Computer programmes are based on the manipulation of symbols, not meanings. Likewise, I cannot know the meaning of the sentence in Bangla just by manipulating the letters (symbols). No matter how many times I manipulate the Bangla letters, I will not be able to understand the meaning of the words. This is why for semantics, we need more than the correct syntax. Computer programmes work on syntax and not on semantics. Computers do not know the meaning of anything. Professor John Searle’s Chinese Room thought-experiment is a powerful way of showing that the mere manipulation of symbols does not lead to an understanding of what they mean:

"Ka yi tunanin cewa kana kulle a cikin wani daki, kuma a cikin dakin akwai kwanduna da yawa cike da alamomin Sinanci. Ka yi tunanin cewa kai (kamar ni) ba ka fahimtar kalma ɗaya ta Sinanci ba, amma an ba ka littafin ka'idoji a Turanci don sarrafa alamomin Sinanci. Ka'idojin sun ƙayyade sarrafa alamomin ta fuskar tsarinsu kawai, ba ma'anarsu ba. Don haka ka'ida na iya cewa: 'Ɗauki alamar squiggle-squiggle daga kwando na ɗaya ka sanya ta kusa da alamar squiggle-squiggle daga kwando na biyu.' Yanzu ka ɗauka cewa wasu alamomin Sinanci suna shiga dakin, kuma an ba ka ƙarin ka'idoji don mayar da alamomin Sinanci waje daga dakin. Ka ɗauka cewa ba tare da sanin ka ba, mutanen waje suna kiran alamomin da ke shiga 'tambayoyi', kuma alamomin da kake mayarwa waje suna kiran 'amsoshin tambayoyi'. Ka ɗauka kuma cewa masu tsara shirye-shiryen suna da kwarewa sosai wajen tsara shirye-shiryen, kai ma kana da kwarewa sosai wajen sarrafa alamomin, har amsoshinka ba za su bambanta da na wanda ɗan asalin Sinanci ne ba. Ga ka a kulle a dakinka kana juya alamomin Sinanci kana fitar da alamomin Sinanci a matsayin martani ga alamomin Sinanci masu shigowa… Yanzu abin da labarin ke nufi shi ne kawai wannan: ta hanyar aiwatar da shirin kwamfuta na tsari daga ra'ayin mai kallo na waje, kana nuna hali kamar kana fahimtar Sinanci, amma duk da haka ba ka fahimtar kalma ɗaya ta Sinanci ba."86

“Imagine that you are locked in a room, and in this room are several baskets full of Chinese symbols. Imagine that you (like me) do not understand a word of Chinese, but that you are given a rule book in English for manipulating the Chinese symbols. The rules specify the manipulation of symbols purely formally, in terms of their syntax, not their semantics. So the rule might say: ‘Take a squiggle-squiggle out of basket number one and put it next to a squiggle-squiggle sign from basket number two.’ Now suppose that some other Chinese symbols are passed into the room, and that you are given further rules for passing back Chinese symbols out of the room. Suppose that unknown to you the symbols passed into the room are called ‘questions’ by the people outside the room, and the symbols you pass back out of the room are called ‘answers to questions.’ Suppose furthermore, that the programmers are so good at designing the programs and that you are so good at manipulating the symbols, that very soon your answers are indistinguishable from those of a native Chinese speaker. There you are locked in your room shuffling your Chinese symbols and passing out Chinese symbols in response to incoming Chinese symbols… Now the point of the story is simply this: by virtue of implementing a formal computer program from the point of view of an outside observer, you behave exactly as if you understood Chinese, but all the same you do not understand a word of Chinese.”86

A cikin gwajin tunani na Dakin Sinanci (Chinese Room), mutumin da ke cikin dakin yana kwaikwayon kwamfuta. Wani mutum kuma yana sarrafa alamomi ta hanyar da ke sa mutumin cikin dakin ya bayyana kamar yana fahimtar harshen Sinanci. Duk da haka, mutumin cikin dakin ba ya fahimtar harshen; yana kwaikwayon wannan yanayi kawai. Farfesa Searle ya kammala da cewa:

In the Chinese Room thought-experiment, the person inside the room is simulating a computer. Another person manages the symbols in a way that makes the person inside the room seem to understand Chinese. However, the person inside the room does not understand the language; they merely imitate that state. Professor Searle concludes:

"Samun alamomi kawai — wato samun tsarin nahawu kawai — bai isa ya zama samun ma'ana ba. Kawai sarrafa alamomi ba ya tabbatar da sanin abin da suke nufi ba."87

“Having the symbols by themselves—just having the syntax— is not sufficient for having the semantics. Merely manipulating symbols is not enough to guarantee knowledge of what they mean.”87

Mai shigar da ƙara zai iya amsa wannan da cewa, ko da yake shirin kwamfuta ba ya sanin ma'ana, tsarin gaba ɗaya yana sani. Farfesa Searle ya kira wannan ƙin yarda "amsar tsarin" (the systems reply)88. To amma me ya sa shirin ba ya sanin ma'ana? Amsar a sauƙaƙe ita ce: shi ba shi da hanyar ba alamomi ma'ana. Tun da shirin kwamfuta ba zai iya ba alamomi ma'ana ba, ta yaya tsarin kwamfuta — wanda ya dogara da shirin — zai fahimci ma'anar? Ba za ka iya samar da fahimta kawai ta hanyar samun shirin da ya dace ba. Searle ya gabatar da wani tsawaita sigar gwajin tunanin Ɗakin Sinanci don nuna cewa tsarin, gaba ɗaya, ba ya fahimtar ma'anar: "Ka yi tunanin cewa ni na haddace abubuwan da ke cikin kwanduna da littafin dokoki, kuma ina yin dukkan lissafin a cikin kaina. Har ma kana iya tunanin cewa ina aiki a fili. Babu wani abu a cikin 'tsarin' da ba ya cikina, kuma tun da ban fahimci Sinanci ba, tsarin ma bai fahimta ba."89

The objector might respond to this by arguing that although the computer programme does not know the meaning, the whole system does. Professor Searle has called this objection “the systems reply”88. However, why is it that the programme does not know the meaning? The answer is simple: it has no way of assigning meaning to the symbols. Since a computer programme cannot assign meaning to symbols, how can a computer system—which relies on the programme—understand the meaning? You cannot produce understanding just by having the right programme. Searle presents an extended version of the Chinese Room thought-experiment to show that the system, as a whole does not understand the meaning: “Imagine that I memorize the contents of the baskets and the rule book, and I do all the calculations in my head. You can even imagine that I work out in the open. There is nothing in the ‘system’ that is not in me, and since I don’t understand Chinese, neither does the system.”89

Wata amsa mai sauƙi ga wannan ƙin yarda ta haɗa da cewa kwamfutoci ba tsarin kansu ba ne masu iya yin tunani mai hankali na ƙididdiga. An tsara su, an ƙera su, kuma an yi su ne ta hannun mutane masu sani da hankali. Saboda haka, kwamfutoci kawai tsawaita ikon mu na yin fahimta mai hankali ne. William Hasker ya bayyana:

A simple response to this objection also includes the fact that computers are not independent systems with the ability to engage in deductive reasoning. They were designed, developed and made by human beings that are conscious and rational. Therefore, computers are just a protraction of our ability to perform rational insights. William Hasker explains:

"Kwamfutoci suna aiki yadda suke yi saboda an ba su hikima ta hankali. Kwamfuta, a wata ma'ana, ba komai ba ce illa tsawaitawar hankalin masu zanen ta da masu amfani da ita; ba ta fi zama tushen hikimar hankali mai zaman kansa ba kamar yadda talabijin ba tushen labarai da nishadi mai zaman kansa ba ne." 90.

“Computers function as they do because they have been endowed with rational insight. A computer, in other words, is merely an extension of the rationality of its designers and users; it is no more an independent source of rational insight than a television set is an independent source of news entertainment.”90.

Ƙarya ce cewa rashin imani yana da ikon mallakar hankali kaɗai, kuma ba zai iya mallakarsa ba. Abin takaici ne yadda ake ƙara yarda cewa masu rashin imani masu hankali ne, kuma cewa rashin imani yana kan hankali. Nesa ba kusa ba ne da gaskiya. Ayyuka marasa manufa na zahiri ba za su iya bayyana iyawarmu ta tunani ba. Shi ya sa rashin imani ke soke abin da yake amfani da shi don musanta Ubangiji. Amma bisa ga akidar Musulunci, muna rayuwa ne a cikin duniyar da take bisa hankali, wacce Mahalicci Mai Gani, Mai Hikima kuma Mai Sani ya halitta, wanda ya ba mu ikon tunani. Wannan yana da daidaito kuma yana bayyana gaba ɗaya iyawarmu ta hankali; babu wani abu dabam da zai iya yin haka (hakika, babu wani abu dabam da zai iya). Tsayawa a kan cewa ayyuka marasa manufa na zahiri za su iya fahimtar iyawarmu ta gani, tunani da koyo rashin hankali ne. Waɗanda ke ci gaba da wannan tunanin a zahiri abokan hankali ne. Ba su bambanta da direban tasi wanda ya sanya ɗankwali a idanunsa yana ta nace cewa zai iya kai fasinjojinsa inda za su.

Atheism does not—and cannot—have a monopoly on reason. It is a shame that there is a growing perception that atheists are rational, and that atheism is based on reason. Nothing could be further from the truth. Blind, random physical processes cannot account for our ability to reason. This is why atheism invalidates the very thing it claims to use to reject the Divine. However, according to Islamic theism, we live in a rational universe created by the All-Seeing, The-Wise and The-Knowing Creator, who gave us the ability to reason. This is coherent and accounts fully for our rational faculties; nothing else will (indeed, nothing else can). Maintaining that blind, random physical processes can make sense of our ability to see, think and learn is irrational. Those who persist in this thinking are in fact adversaries of reason. They are no different from a taxi-driver putting on a blindfold and insisting that he can drive his passengers to their destination.