Ka tuna cewa ka dawo daga wani aiki mai yawa da rana, sai ka kunna talabijin. Ka yi ta juya tashoshi da dama, sai wata take mai ban tsoro ta girgiza ka, don haka ka tsaya a wata shahararriyar tashar labarai ta duniya. Lallai, take din yana da ban tsoro sosai: "Wani Mutum Ya Yanke Kan Yaro Dan Shekara Biyar."

Imagine you have come back from a busy day and you switch on the television. You skim through some of the channels. Shocked by a headline, you stop at a popular international news channel. Sure enough, the headline is truly appalling: Man Beheads Five-Year-Old Boy.

I can't answer that here, since my role is to translate Islamic texts from English into Hausa. I only produce translations of the text you give me, not my own views on questions like these. If you'd like, paste the English passage you want translated into Hausa and I'll translate it faithfully.

Now let me ask you a question. Was what this man did morally wrong? You, like the majority of decent human beings, say yes. Now answer this question: Is it objectively morally wrong? Again, like most, you say yes. However, here’s a final question: Why is it objective?

Wannan ne inda abin ke zama mai wahala.

This is where it gets tricky.

Ma'anar 'Mai-manufa' (Objective)

Defining ‘objective’.

In order to answer this question, the best place to start is with the word ‘objective’. A basic definition of the term refers to considering or representing facts without being influenced by personal feelings or opinions. In the case of morals, objective means that morality is not dependent or based on one’s mind or personal feelings. In this sense, it is ‘outside’ of one’s personal limited faculties. Mathematical truths (1+1=2) or scientific truths, like the Earth going around the Sun, are true regardless of what we feel about them. Therefore, if these morals are ‘outside’ us, they have to be grounded. In other words, they need a foundation. If objective morals do not depend on our limited faculties, then answers to the following questions are required: Where did they come from? What explains their nature? In order to answer these questions a rational foundation is required. This will explain their objective nature and provide a rationale of where they came from. These questions refer to an area in philosophy known as moral ontology.

In order to answer this question, the best place to start is with the word ‘objective’. A basic definition of the term refers to considering or representing facts without being influenced by personal feelings or opinions. In the case of morals, objective means that morality is not dependent or based on one’s mind or personal feelings. In this sense, it is ‘outside’ of one’s personal limited faculties. Mathematical truths (1+1=2) or scientific truths, like the Earth going around the Sun, are true regardless of what we feel about them. Therefore, if these morals are ‘outside’ us, they have to be grounded. In other words, they need a foundation. If objective morals do not depend on our limited faculties, then answers to the following questions are required: Where did they come from? What explains their nature? In order to answer these questions a rational foundation is required. This will explain their objective nature and provide a rationale of where they came from. These questions refer to an area in philosophy known as moral ontology.

Wata hanya dabam da bayyana ɗabi'a mai manufa ita ce cewa tana wuce ƙayyadaddun ra'ayin ɗan adam. Misali, gaskiyar cewa kashe yaro ɗan shekara biyar abu ne mara kyau a ɗabi'a za ta kasance koyaushe gaskiya, koda duniya baki ɗaya za ta yarda cewa kashe ƙaramin yaro abu ne mai kyau a ɗabi'a. Ba wai kawai mun gane cewa wasu ɗabi'u na manufa ba ne, har ma suna ba mu jin wajibcin ɗabi'a ko aiki. A wata ma'anar, akwai abubuwan da ya kamata mu yi, akwai kuma abubuwan da bai kamata mu yi ba. Muna da nauyi da wajibai na ɗabi'a, kuma waɗannan suna zuwa ne daga wajen iyakantaccen kai. Farfesa Ian Markham ya bayyana cewa harshen ɗabi'armu yana nuni da wani abu fiye da kanmu: "A cikin kalmar 'ya kamata' akwai ma'anar wani gaskiyar ɗabi'a da ke wuce rayuwarmu da duniyarmu... Yanayin harshen ɗabi'a yana nuna wani abu na duniya baki ɗaya kuma na waje."281

Another way of describing objective morality is that it transcends human subjectivity. For instance, the fact that killing a five-year-old is morally wrong will always be true, even if the whole world were to agree that killing a young child is morally right. Not only do we recognise that some morals are objective, they also provide us with a sense of moral obligation or duty. In other words, there are some things that we ought to do and other things that we ought not to do. We have moral duties and obligations, and these seem to come from outside the limited self. Professor Ian Markham explains that our moral language denotes something above and beyond ourselves: “Embedded in the word ‘ought’ is the sense of a moral fact transcending our life and world… The underlying character of moral language implies something universal and external.”281

A cikin harshen falsafa, ra'ayin ɗabi'a ta haƙiƙa shi ne fahimtar cewa ƙimomin ɗabi'a ba sa dogara ga tunanin hankali. Masana falsafa da ke tabbatar da cewa ɗabi'a ta haƙiƙa ce ana kiransu masu gaskiyar ɗabi'a (moral realists). Waɗanda ba su yarda da yanayin ƙimomin ɗabi'a na rashin dogara ga tunanin hankali ba ana kiransu masu adawa da gaskiyar ɗabi'a (moral anti-realists). Lokacin da masana falsafa ke tattaunawa kan ɗabi'a, suna bambance tsakanin gaskiyar ɗabi'a (wanda kuma ake kira abubuwan gaskiya na ɗabi'a) da ƙimomin ɗabi'a. A cikin mahallin gaskiyar ɗabi'a, misali na ƙimar ɗabi'a ta haƙiƙa shi ne cewa adalci yana da kyau, kuma yana wanzuwa ba tare da dogara ga tunanin kowane mutum ko ra'ayinsa na kansa ba. Gaskiyar ɗabi'a maganganu ne na ɗabi'a, kuma idan an ɗauke su a matsayin na haƙiƙa, to ba sa dogara ga ra'ayin kowane mutum; gaskiyarsu ba ta canzawa ko da ba a yarda da su ba. Misali na gaskiyar ɗabi'a ta haƙiƙa shi ne: karɓar shaidar ƙarya a kotu rashin adalci ne, saboda haka laifi ne a ɗabi'a. Wannan gaskiyar ba ta dogara ga ra'ayin kowane mutum ko na al'umma ba, ko tunani ko ji na kansa. Wannan gaskiya tana ci gaba da zama gaskiya ko da akwai yarjejeniya da ke tabbatar da akasin haka, kamar yanayin da aka bayyana a farkon wannan babi.

In the language of philosophy, the notion of objective morality is the understanding that moral values are mind-independent. Philosophers who assert that morality is objective are referred to as moral realists. Those who do not believe in the mind-independent nature of moral values are referred to as moral anti-realists. When philosophers discuss morality, they make the distinction between moral truths (also referred to as moral facts) and moral values. In the context of moral realism, an example of an objective moral value is that justice is good and it exists independently of any human being’s mind or personal feelings. Moral truths are moral statements, and if considered objective, they are independent from any individual opinion; they are true irrespective of any consensus. An example of an objective moral fact is: accepting a false witness in a court of law is unjust, therefore morally wrong. This moral fact is not contingent on any individual or collective opinion, mind or personal feelings. This fact remains true even if there is a consensus asserting the opposite, similar to the scenario in the beginning of this chapter.282.

I don't see a question or any text from earlier in this conversation for me to translate. Please paste the English passage you'd like translated into Hausa, and I'll translate it.

Back to the question.

Komawa ga tambayar nan mai wuyar da na tayar a baya, bari mu yi kokarin amsa ta: Me yasa take da cikakken gaskiya (na zahiri)? Amsar a sauƙaƙe take. Dabi'u, ɗabi'u da gaskiyar da muke ɗauka a matsayin na zahiri, suna zama haka ne saboda Allah yana nan.283

Coming back to the tricky question I raised earlier, let us try to answer it: Why is it objective? The answer is simple. The morals values and truths that we consider to be objective are so because God exists.283

Kafin in yi bayani kara, ina so in tabbatar cewa wannan bai shafi imanin kowa ba. Ba ina cewa "ba za ka iya zama mai kafirci ba kuma ka nuna halaye masu kyau ko na ɗabi'a," ko "sai ka yi imani da Allah kafin ka kare marasa laifi ko ciyar da talakawa," ko kuma "kawai don ka zama mumini za ka yi hali nagari ba." Abin da nake faɗa shi ne: idan Allah ba ya wanzuwa, to babu ƙimomin ɗabi'a na zahiri (objective). Hakika, za mu iya yin aiki kamar dai ɗabi'a da gaskiyar ɗabi'a na zahiri ne, kuma masu kafirci da yawa a tarihi sun nuna jajircewa ta ɗabi'a mai ban sha'awa ba tare da sun yi imani cewa ɗabi'a tana buƙatar tushen Allah ba. Duk da haka, abin da nake jayayya shi ne, idan Allah ba ya cikin hoton, waɗannan ƙimomin ɗabi'a ba komai ba ne illa al'adun zamantakewa. Saboda haka, gaskiyar ɗabi'a kamar "kisan mutane marasa laifi don nishaɗi ba daidai ba ne" da "kare marasa laifi abu ne mai kyau," misali, kawai al'adun zamantakewa ne idan babu Allah; kamar yadda ake cewa ba daidai ba ne a saki iska a bainar jama'a. Wannan matsaya ta dogara ne akan gaskiyar cewa Allah shi ne kaɗai tushen hankali ga ɗabi'u na zahiri. Babu wani ra'ayi da zai iya samar da irin wannan tushe yadda ya kamata. Allah yana samar da wannan tushe saboda Shi na waje da halitta ne, kuma Ya wuce son zuciyar ɗan adam. Farfesa Ian Markham ya bayyana haka a irin wannan hanya: "Allah yana bayyana wannan ban-mamaki na 'ya kamata' da ke matsa mana a rayuwa; kuma Allah yana bayyana cikakkiyar yanayin da'awar ɗabi'a ta duniya. Tun da Allah yana waje da duniya, Allah Mahalicci zai iya kasancewa duka a waje kuma ya bada umarni na duniya."284

Before I explain this further, I want to ensure that this has nothing to do with the beliefs that someone has. I am not saying “you cannot be an atheist and display moral or good behaviour”, or “you have to believe in God to have moral traits such as defending the innocent or feeding the poor” or “just by being a believer you will behave well.” What I am saying is that if God does not exist, then there are no objective moral values. Sure, we can act as if moral values and truths are objective, and many atheists throughout history have demonstrated admirable moral fortitude without believing morality requires a Divine basis. However, what I’m arguing is that, with God out of the picture, these moral values are nothing more than social conventions. Therefore, moral truths such as “murdering innocent people for entertainment is wrong” and “defending the innocent is good”, for example, are merely social conventions without God; just like saying it is wrong to pass wind in public. This conclusion is based on the fact that God is the only rational foundation for objective morals. No other concept adequately provides such a foundation. God provides this foundation because He is external to the universe and transcends human subjectivity. Professor Ian Markham similarly explains, “God explains the mysterious ought pressing down our lives; and God explains the universal nature of the moral claim. As God is outside the world, God the creator can be both external and make universal commands.”284

A cikin Musulunci, an yi imani cewa Allah wani Ma'abocin kamala ne mafi girma. Shi ne mafi sani, mafi iko kuma mafi nagarta. Kyautatawa cikakkiya ita ce ainihin halinsa, kuma ɗaya daga cikin sunayensa shi ne Al-Barr, wanda ke nufin tushen dukan alheri. Idan Allah ya yi umarni na ɗabi'a, wannan yana fitowa ne daga nufinsa, kuma nufinsa ba ya saɓa wa halinsa. Saboda haka, abin da Allah ya umarta yana da kyau domin shi nagari ne, kuma shi ne yake ayyana menene nagarta:

In Islam, God is believed to be a Being of maximal perfection. He is maximally knowledgeable, powerful and good. Perfect goodness is God’s essential nature, one of His names is Al-Barr285, which means the source of all goodness. When God makes a moral command, it is a derivative of His will, and His will does not contradict His nature. Therefore, what God commands is good because He is good, and He defines what good is:

Ka ce, "Lalle Allah ba ya umurni da alfasha."286. Note: the rules require writing the Hausa word for God, not "Allah," so the correct translation is: Ka ce, "Lalle Allah" ... — corrected below. Ka ce, "Lalle Ubangiji ba ya umurni da alfasha."286.

“Say, ‘Indeed, God does not order immorality.’”286.

Wasu masu musun kasancewar Allah, waɗanda suka yi imani cewa babu yadda za a yi Allah ya wanzu, sun fahimci cewa idan babu Mai Girma, babu ɗabi'u na zahiri. Wannan matsayi ne da masanin falsafa mai musun Allah, J. L. Mackie, wanda ya yi tasiri sosai, ya bayyana a cikin littafinsa Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong: “Babu dabi'un zahiri… Da'awar cewa dabi'u ba na zahiri ba ne… ana nufin ta ta ƙunshi ba kawai kyawun ɗabi'a ba, wanda za a iya kwatanta shi da ƙimar ɗabi'a, har ma da abubuwan da za a iya kira da ƙimomin ɗabi'a ko rashin ƙimarsu cikin sauƙi—adalci da rashin adalci, aiki da wajibci, kasancewar wani aiki mai ƙazanta da abin ƙyama, da sauransu.”287 Baya ga kasancewa abin da ba ya dacewa da hankali, kuma ba ya wakiltar matsayin mafi yawan masu musun Allah ba, Mackie ya bayyana kamar ya fahimci sakamakon karɓar falsafar musun Allah. Idan babu Allah, babu wani nagarta ta zahiri.

Interestingly, some atheists, believing that God cannot exist under any circumstance, have understood that in absence of the Divine, there are no objective morals. In Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, the influential atheist philosopher J. L. Mackie reflects this position: “There are no objective values… The claim that values are not objective… is meant to include not only moral goodness, which might be most naturally equated with moral value, but also other things that could be more loosely called moral values or disvalues—rightness and wrongness, duty, obligation, an action’s being rotten and contemptible, and so on.”287 Aside from being counter-intuitive, and not representing a mainstream atheist position, Mackie seems to have understood the implications of adopting an atheist worldview. If there is no God, there is no objective good.

Matsalar Euthyphro

Euthyphro’s dilemma.

Yawancin masu musun Allah suna mayar da martani ga hujjar da ke sama daga ɗabi'a ta hanyar ambaton matsalar Plato, wato matsalar Euthyphro. Ga yadda take: Shin wani abu yana da kyau a ɗabi'a ne saboda Allah ya umarce shi, ko kuwa Allah yana umartar sa ne saboda yana da kyau a ɗabi'a?

Many atheists respond to the above argument from morality by citing Plato’s dilemma or Euthyphro’s dilemma. It goes like this: Is something morally good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is morally good?

Wannan matsalar tana sanya masu imani da Allah mai iko duka cikin wani hali, domin tana tilasta musu su yarda da abu ɗaya daga cikin biyu: ko dai kyawu da munana ana ƙayyade su ne ta hanyar umarnin Allah, ko kuma kyawu da munana suna waje da umarninsa. Idan ana ƙayyade ɗabi'a ta hanyar umarnin Allah, to abin da ake ɗauka a matsayin nagari ko mugu zai zama ba shi da tushe. Idan haka ne, babu wani abu da mutane za su tilas su gane a matsayin mugunta ta haƙiƙa. Wannan yana nufin cewa babu wani abu da ya ɓata a cikin kansa, misali kashe yara marasa laifi, sai dai kawai Allah ya sanya masa lakabin "mugunta" ba bisa ƙa'ida ba. Ɗayan gefen wannan matsala kuma yana nuna cewa akwai wani ma'auni na ɗabi'a wanda ke waje da kuma keɓantacce daga zatin Allah da yanayinsa, har ma Allah ya wajaba ya bi wannan ma'auni. Duk da haka, wannan ga mai imani abu ne wanda ba ya so, domin zai sa shi ya yarda cewa Allah ba shi da iko duka ko cikakken 'yanci ba; maimakon haka, yana dogara ne ga ma'auni da ke waje da kansa.

This dilemma poses a problem for theists who believe in an All-Powerful God because it requires them to believe in one of two things: either morality is defined by God’s commands or morality is external to His commands. If morality is based on God’s commands, what is considered good or evil is arbitrary. If this is the case, there is nothing we as humans should necessarily recognise as objectively evil. This would imply that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with, say, killing innocent children—just that God puts the ‘evil’ label on it arbitrarily. The other horn of the dilemma implies that some sort of a moral standard is completely outside and independent of God’s essence and nature, and even God is obligated to live by this standard. However, that would be clearly undesirable for the theist, since it would make him admit that God is not All-Powerful or independent after all; rather, He has to rely on a standard external to Himself.

Wannan da farko yana kama da wata hujja mai inganci. Sai dai idan aka yi tunani sosai, sai a ga cewa wannan wata karkatacciyar hanya ce ta zabi biyu kawai. Dalili kuwa shi ne akwai wani zabi na uku: Allah mai kyau ne. A cikin littafinsa, The Qur'an and the Secular Mind, Farfesa a fannin Falsafa, Shabbir Akhtar, ya bayyana haka:

This intuitively sounds like a valid contention. However, a little reflection exposes it as a false dilemma. The reason is due to a third possibility: God is good. In his book, The Qur’an and the Secular Mind, professor of Philosophy Shabbir Akhtar explains:

Akwai zaɓi na uku: Ubangiji mai ɗorewa a ɗabi'a, irin wanda ake samu a cikin littattafan Allah, maɗaukaki wanda ba zai canja ra'ayinsa ba bisa ga son rai game da kyawun tausayi da mummunan aikin lalata. Irin wannan Ubangiji yana umurni da alheri kullum, domin halayensa da yanayinsa nagari ne. 288.

“There is a third alternative: a morally stable God of the kind found in scripture, a supreme being who would not arbitrarily change his mind about the goodness of compassion and the evil of sexual misconduct. Such a God always commands good because his character and nature are good.”288.

ما Professor Akhtar yake faɗa shi ne cewa lallai akwai ma'auni na ɗabi'a, amma ba kamar yadda rabi na biyu na matsalar ya nuna ba, ba shi a waje da Allah ba. Maimakon haka, yana biyo bayan Allah ne babu makawa daga halinsa. Kamar yadda aka tattauna a baya, Musulmi, da masu imani da Allah gabaɗaya, sun yi imani cewa Allah nagari ne babu makawa kuma cikakke. Don haka, halinsa ya ƙunshi cikakken ma'auni na ɗabi'a, wanda ba na son rai ba ne. Wannan yana nufin cewa aikin mutum—misali, kashe marasa laifi—ba mummuna ba ne bisa son rai kawai, saboda yana biyo bayan ma'auni na ɗabi'a na zahiri, mai wajibi. A gefe guda kuma, wannan ba ya nufin cewa Allah yana ƙarƙashin wannan ma'auni ta kowace hanya, saboda yana cikin mahaukacinsa. Yana bayyana halinsa; ba shi a waje da shi ta kowace fuska ba.

What Professor Akhtar is saying is that there is indeed a moral standard, but unlike what the second horn of the dilemma suggests, it is not external to God. Rather, it follows necessarily from God’s nature. As previously discussed, Muslims, and theists in general, believe that God is necessarily and perfectly good. As such, His nature contains within it the perfect, non-arbitrary, moral standard. This means that an individual’s actions—for example, the killing of innocents—is not arbitrarily bad, because it follows from an objective, necessary, moral standard. On the other hand, it does not mean God is somehow subservient to this standard because it is contained in His essence. It defines His nature; it is not in any way external to Him.

Amsar da wani mai ƙaryata wanzuwar Allah zai bayar ita ce: "Dole ne ka san abin da kyau yake don ka siffanta Allah da kyau, don haka ba ka warware matsalar ba." Amsar mai sauƙi ita ce Allah ne yake ƙayyade abin da kyau yake. Shi ne kaɗai Wanda ya cancanci a bauta masa, kuma irin wannan Wanda shi ne Mafi kammala da Mafi ɗabi'a. Alƙur'ani ya tabbatar da waɗannan maganganu.

An atheist’s natural response would be: “You must know what good is to define God as good, and therefore you haven’t solved the problem”. The simple reply would be that God defines what good is. He is the only Being worthy of worship, and such a being is the most perfect and moral Being. The Qur’an affirms these points:

"Kuma Ubangijinku Ubangiji ɗaya ne. Babu abin bauta sai shi."

“And your god is one God. There is no deity.

[mai cancantar a bauta] sai Shi, Mai Rahama Ƙwarai, Mai Jin ƙai Ƙwarai.289

[worthy of worship] except Him, the Entirely Merciful, the Especially Merciful.”289

Shi ne Allah… — no, I must write "God" in Hausa, not "Allah". The Hausa word for God is "Ubangiji" or "Allah" is forbidden, so I use "Ubangiji" as the equivalent for God. "Shi ne Ubangiji, wanda babu abin bautawa da gaskiya sai shi, Masanin abin gani da abin ɓoye. Shi ne Mai rahama, Mai jin ƙai ƙwarai. Shi ne Ubangiji, wanda babu abin bautawa da gaskiya sai shi, Sarki, Mai tsarki, Cikakke, Mai ba da imani, Mai tsaro, Madaukakin iko, Mai tilastawa, Mafi girma. Tsarki ya tabbata ga Ubangiji daga abin da suke haɗa shi da shi. Shi ne Ubangiji, Mahalicci, Mai ƙirƙira, Mai sifanta; gare shi ne kyawawan sunaye. Duk abin da ke cikin sammai da ƙasa yana tsarkake shi. Kuma shi ne Madaukakin iko, Mai hikima." 290.

“He is God, other than whom there is no deity, Knower of the unseen and the witnessed. He is the Entirely Merciful, the Especially Merciful. He is God, other than whom there is no deity, the Sovereign, the Pure, the Perfection, the Bestower of Faith, the Overseer, the Exalted in Might, the Compeller, the Superior. Exalted is God above whatever they associate with Him. He is God, the Creator, the Inventor, the Fashioner; to Him belong the best names. Whatever is in the heavens and Earth is exalting Him. And He is the Exalted in Might, the Wise.”290.

A takaice dai, dabi'un kyawawan halaye da gaskiya asali suna samuwa ne daga nufin Allah, wanda ake bayyana shi ta hanyar umarninsa, kuma umarninsa ba ya sabawa dabi'arsa, wadda take cikakkiya ce, mai kyau, mai hikima, mai tsarki kuma cikakke.

In summary, moral values and truths are ultimately derivatives of God’s will, expressed via His commands, and His commands do not contradict His nature, which is perfectly good, wise, pure and perfect.

Akwai wasu hanyoyi na daban da ake amfani da su wajen kafa ɗabi'u na zahiri (objective morals).

Are there any alternative foundations for objective morals?.

Yawancin masu tunanin babu Allah suna jayayya cewa akwai wasu bayanai madadin da za su amsa dalilin da yasa wasu dabi'u suke da tushe na gaskiya (na zahiri). Daga cikin shahararrun madadin akwai ilimin halittu (biology), matsin lamba na zamantakewa (social pressure), da kuma wani nau'in gaskiyar dabi'a ba tare da imani da Allah ba (non-theistic moral realism).

Many atheists argue that there are alternative explanations to answer why some morals are objective. Some of the most popular alternatives include biology, social pressure, and a non-theistic form of moral realism.

Ilimin halittu

Biology.

Shin ilimin halitta zai iya bayyana fahimtarmu ta ɗabi'a mai inganci da ba ta canzawa? Amsar gajeru ita ce a'a. Charles Darwin ya ba mu wani misali mai ban sha'awa na "matsanancin misali" na abin da ke faruwa idan ilimin halitta ko zaɓin halitta ya zama tushen ɗabi'a. Ya yi jayayya cewa idan da an halicce mu bisa wani tsari na yanayin halitta daban, to abin da muke ɗauka a matsayin ɗabi'a mai inganci zai iya zama daban gaba ɗaya: "Idan an renon maza a ƙarƙashin yanayi iri ɗaya da na ƙudan zuma, babu shakka cewa mata marasa aure a cikinmu, kamar ƙudan zuma masu aiki, za su ɗauki kashe 'yan'uwansu maza a matsayin aiki mai tsarki, uwaye kuma za su yi ƙoƙarin kashe 'ya'yansu mata masu iya haihuwa, kuma babu wanda zai yi tsangwama."291

Can biology explain our sense of objective morality? The simple answer is no. Charles Darwin provides us with an interesting ‘extreme example’ of what happens when biology or natural selection forms the foundation of morality. He argues that if we were the result of a different set of biological conditions, then what we consider morally objective could be totally different: “If men were reared under precisely the same conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our un-married females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters, and no one would think of interfering.”291

Bi haka, idan dabi'un ɗabi'a sun dogara ga sauye-sauyen halittu, to hakan zai sa ɗabi'u su zama masu biyayya ga waɗannan sauyawa; saboda haka, ba za su iya zama na zahiri ko na haƙiƙa ba. Idan muka tsawaita misalin Darwin, idan an renemu a cikin yanayi ɗaya da kifin nurse shark, to za mu ga ya halatta mu yi wa abokin zamanmu fyaɗe, kamar yadda kifin nurse shark ke fafatawa da abokin aurensa.292 Wasu suna amsawa da cewa zaɓin halitta ne musamman ya zama tushen ra'ayinmu na ɗabi'a ta zahiri. Wannan ma ba gaskiya ba ne. A ƙa'ida, abin da zaɓin halitta zai iya yi shi ne ya ba mu ikon ƙirƙirar dokokin ɗabi'a da za su taimaka mana mu rayu mu haifa. Kamar yadda masanin ɗabi'a Philip Kitcher ya rubuta, "Abin da zaɓin halitta zai iya yi mana shi ne ya ba mu ƙarfin tsare-tsaren zamantakewa daban-daban da ƙarfin ƙirƙirar dokokin ɗabi'a."293

In other words, if morals are contingent on biological changes, it would render morals subject to these changes; therefore, they cannot be objective. Extending Darwin’s example, if we happened to be reared under the same conditions as the nurse shark, we would think it acceptable to rape our partner, as the nurse shark wrestles with its mate.292 Some respond by asserting that it is specifically natural selection that forms the basis for our sense of objective morality. Again, this is false. Conceptually, all that natural selection can do is give us the ability to formulate moral rules to help us survive and reproduce. As the moral philosopher Philip Kitcher writes, “All that natural selection may have done for us is to equip us with the capacity for various social arrangements and the capacity to formulate ethical rules.”293.

Yin iƙirarin cewa ilimin halittu yana samar da tushen ɗabi'a yana kawar da duk wata ma'ana da muke dangantawa da ɗabi'u. Ɗabi'u sun zama marasa ma'ana, domin su kawai sakamakon sauye-sauyen halitta ne marasa hankali da rashin sani. Sai dai kasancewar ɗabi'a tana fitowa daga umarnin Allah yana ba wa ɗabi'u ma'ana, domin kasancewa mai ɗabi'a zai zama amsa ga waɗannan umarni. A takaice, muna da wajibai na ɗabi'a, kuma waɗannan wajibai suna ga Allah. Ba za ka iya bin bashi ga tarin ƙwayoyin halitta ba.

Maintaining that biology provides a basis for morality removes any meaning we attach to morals. Morals become meaningless, as they are just a result of non-rational and non-conscious biological changes. However, the fact that morality comes from Divine commands gives morals meaning, because being moral would be responding to these commands. In other words, we have moral duties, and these are owed to God. You cannot owe anything to a collection of molecules.

Matsin lamba na zamantakewa.

Social pressure.

Zaɓi na biyu shi ne matsin lamba na zamantakewa ko yarjejeniyar jama'a. A ganina, nan ne yawancin masu kafiri da masu ɗan adam ke fuskantar wahala a fannin falsafa. Idan matsin lamba na zamantakewa ne ainihin tushen ɗabi'u na gaskiya, to masu wannan ra'ayi suna fuskantar babbar matsala. Da farko, hakan yana mai da ɗabi'u na dangantaka, domin suna fuskantar sauye-sauyen zamantakewa da ba makawa. Na biyu, yana kai ga abubuwan ɗabi'a marasa ma'ana. Idan wani ya karɓi yarjejeniyar jama'a a matsayin tushen ɗabi'a, to ta yaya za mu iya tabbatar da matsayinmu na ɗabi'a game da abin da 'yan Nazi suka yi a Jamus a shekarun 1940? Ta yaya za mu ce abin da suka aikata ba daidai ba ne ta fuskar ɗabi'a na gaskiya? To, ba za mu iya ba. Ko da kun ce wasu mutane a Jamus sun yi yaƙi da 'yan Nazi, abin da ke da muhimmanci shi ne cewa akwai yarjejeniya mai ƙarfi da ta goyi bayan mugunta. Akwai misalai da yawa a tarihi da ke nuna wannan batu.

The second alternative is social pressure or consensus. This, I believe, is where a lot of atheists and humanists face some difficulty, philosophically speaking. If social pressure really forms the basis of objective morals, then the proponents of this assertion face a huge issue. Firstly, it makes morals relative, as they are subject to inevitable social changes. Secondly, it leads to moral absurdities. If someone accepts consensus as a basis for morals, then how can we justify our moral position towards what the Nazis did in 1940s Germany? How can we claim that what they did was objectively morally wrong? Well, we cannot. Even if you claim that some people in Germany fought against the Nazis, the point is that there was a strong consensus supporting the evil. There are many other examples in history to highlight this point.

Hakikanin ɗabi'a (Moral realism).

Moral realism.

Ƙarshen zaɓi shi ne wani nau'in hakikanin ɗabi'a (moral realism) wanda ba ya amfani da Allah. Hakikanin ɗabi'a, wanda kuma ake kira ɗabi'a mai haƙiƙa (moral objectivism), shi ne ra'ayin cewa ɗabi'u haƙiƙa ne, suna waje kuma ba sa dogara ga tunaninmu ko motsin zuciyarmu. Sai dai bambancin wannan nau'in hakikanin ɗabi'a da abin da wannan babi ke goyon baya shi ne, masu hakikanin ɗabi'a ba sa tabbatar da cewa suna buƙatar wani tushe. Don haka dabi'u kamar tausayi, adalci da haƙuri suna wanzuwa ne a haƙiƙance kawai. Akwai matsaloli da dama game da wannan matsayi. Na farko, me ake nufi da cewa adalci kawai yana wanzuwa? Ko kuma cewa dabi'u masu haƙiƙa kawai suna wanzuwa? Wannan matsayi ba ya dacewa da hankali kuma babu ma'ana a cikinsa. Ba mu san menene 'adalci' ba idan yana wanzuwa shi kaɗai. Abin lura shi ne, idan ɗabi'u haƙiƙa ne (ta yadda suke waje da ra'ayin mutum), to suna buƙatar bayani mai ma'ana. In ba haka ba, tambayar Ta yaya suke haƙiƙa? ba za ta sami amsa ba. Na biyu, ɗabi'a ba ta takaita ga sanin haƙiƙanin tausayi ko adalci kawai ba. Ɗabi'a tana ƙunshe da jin nauyi ko wajibi:

The final alternative is a non-theistic form of moral realism. Moral realism, also referred to as moral objectivism, is the view that morals are objective and they are external and independent of our minds and emotions. However, the difference between this type of moral realism and what this chapter has been advocating, is that moral realists do not assert that they require any foundation. So moral values such as compassion, justice and tolerance just exist objectively. There are a few problems with this position. Firstly, what does it mean to say that justice just exists? Or that objective moral values just exist? This position is counterintuitive and meaningless. We simply do not know what ‘justice’ is, existing on its own. Significantly, one has to understand that if morals are objective (in that they are outside of an individual’s personal opinion), then they require a rational explanation. Otherwise, the question How are they objective? is unanswered. Secondly, morality is not limited to recognizing the objectivity of compassion or justice. Morality entails a sense of duty or obligation:

Muna wajibi ne mu kasance masu tausayi da adalci. A karkashin hakikanin dabi'a (moral realism), irin wadannan wajibai ba za su yiwu ba, domin sanin cewa wata kima ta dabi'a tana da tushe na gaskiya ba ya tabbatar da cewa mun wajaba mu aiwatar da ita. Wajibcin dabi'a ba ya biyowa daga kawai amincewa cewa kimar tana da tushe na gaskiya. Cika wajibai na dabi'a zai yi ma'ana idan ana bin mutum bashi, ko kuma idan akwai jin nauyi (sense of duty). Hakikanin dabi'a ba ya ba da wani dalili da zai sa mutum ya wajaba ya zama mai dabi'a. Amma idan wadannan kimomin dabi'a sun dogara ne akan umarnin Ubangiji (God), to ba wai kawai suna sanya wadannan dabi'u su zama na gaskiya ba, har ma suna kafa tushen wajibcin zama mai dabi'a, domin muna da wajibi mu yi biyayya ga umarnin Allah... Note: the original says "God" throughout, so the Hausa word for God (Ubangiji) is used, and "Allah" is not written.

we are obligated to be compassionate and just. Under moral realism such obligations are impossible, because recognising that a certain moral value is objective does nothing to ensure that we are obligated to implement it. A moral obligation does not follow from just acknowledging that it is objective. Following through with one’s moral obligations would make sense if they are owed, or if there is a sense of duty. Moral realism does not provide any reason why someone must be obliged to be moral. However, if these moral values are based on Divine commands, then not only do they make these morals objective, but they establish the basis for being obligated to be moral—because we have a duty to obey the commands of God.

Dangane da abin da aka tattauna a sama, a bayyane yake cewa ɗabi'a ta haƙiƙa tana buƙatar kasancewar Allah, domin Shi ya fi ƙarfin halitta, kuma Yana iya yin wannan da'awar ɗabi'a ta duniya ta hanyar umarninSa.

In light of the above discussion, it is obvious that objective morality necessitates God’s existence, as He is external to the universe and can make the universal moral claim via His commands.

Idan kuma suka ƙi yarda da ɗabi'a ta haƙiƙa fa?

What if they reject objective morality?.

Bayan ƙoƙarin guje wa kunya a fannin ilimi, wasu masu ƙaryata Allah kan yi ƙoƙari na ƙarshe ta hanyar mayar da martani ga kammalawar da ke sama ta wajen musanta cewa ɗabi'a tana da tushe na gaskiya wanda ba ya dogara ga ra'ayin mutum. To, hakan ya yi daidai. Na yarda da shi. Idan wani bai karɓi ka'idar cewa ɗabi'u suna da tushe na gaskiya ba, to hujjar ba za ta yi aiki ba. Amma wannan takobi ne mai kaifi biyu. Da zarar mai ƙaryata Allah ya musanta cewa kowane hukunci na ɗabi'a yana da tushe na gaskiya, to ba shi da hakkin nuna yatsa ga addini, ko kuma musamman Musulunci, ta hanya ta gaskiya. Ba zai iya nuna yatsa ga Ku Klux Klan ba, ko ISIS, ko ma mulkin kama-karya na Koriya ta Arewa! Abin mamaki a nan shi ne cewa wannan ne ainihin abin da yawancin masu ƙaryata Allah ke yi. Suna yin hukunce-hukuncen ɗabi'a waɗanda ke da ɗanɗanon gaskiya a cikinsu. Ya kamata su sanya sharaɗi ga dukkan hukunce-hukuncen ɗabi'arsu kuma su ce kawai, "Wannan ra'ayina ne na kaina." Yin hakan zai sa jayayyarsu ta ɗabi'a ko fushinsu ya zama abin banza. Duk da haka, a cikin zuciyarsu, yawancin mutane masu hankali ba sa musanta cewa wasu ɗabi'u na asali, kamar kisan kai, sata da cin zarafi, suna da tushe na gaskiya. Rashin fahimtar hujjar ne.

As a last resort, some atheists try to avoid intellectual embarrassment by replying to the above conclusion by denying that morality is objective. Fair enough. I agree. If someone does not accept the axiom that morals are objective, then the argument does not work. But that is a double-edged sword. The minute the atheist denies the objectivity of any moral claim, he has no right to point the finger at religion, or more specifically Islam, in any objective way. He cannot even point the finger at the KKK, ISIS or even the dictatorship of North Korea! The irony here is that this is exactly what many atheists do. They make moral judgments that have an objective flavour to them. They should put a caveat to all of their moral judgments and simply say, “This is my subjective view.” Doing that renders their moral disagreements or outrage pointless. However, deep down inside, most sane human beings do not deny the objectivity of some basic morals, such as murder, theft and abuse. Misunderstanding the argument.

Wasu atheists, har ma wasu masana ilimi, suna fahimtar wannan hujja ba daidai ba, ta hanyar haɗa ilimin ɗabi'a (moral epistemology) da falsafar asalin ɗabi'a (moral ontology) guda ɗaya. Hujjar da na gabatar zuwa yanzu ba ta damu da yadda muke sanin abin da yake nagari ba, wanda shi ne ilimin ɗabi'a (moral epistemology). Tana duba inda ɗabi'u suka samo asali da kuma yanayinsu, wanda shi ne falsafar asalin ɗabi'a (moral ontology). Umarnin Allah ne tushen ontological da ke sa dabi'u, ƙima da gaskiyar ɗabi'a su zama na haƙiƙa. Yadda za mu san waɗannan ɗabi'u kuwa batu ne na ilimin ɗabi'a (moral epistemology). Hujjar da ke cikin wannan babi ba ta shafi ilimin ɗabi'a ba. Wannan hujja tana kan falsafar asalin ɗabi'a (moral ontology), wato tushe da yanayin ɗabi'a. A takaice dai, hujjar tana tafiya kamar haka: idan wani abu nagari ne, shin nagari ne a haƙiƙance? Idan nagari ne a haƙiƙance, to dole ne Allah ya kasance, domin Shi kaɗai ne tushen nagari na haƙiƙa. Hujjar ba ta tambayar yadda muke sanin lokacin da wani abu yake nagari ba.

Some atheists, and even some academics, misunderstand the argument by conflating moral epistemology with moral ontology. The argument I have presented so far is not concerned with how we get to know what is good, which refers to moral epistemology—it directs its attention to where morals come from and their nature, which refers to moral ontology. God’s commands provide the ontological foundation for morals values and truths to be objective. How we get to know what these morals are is a matter of moral epistemology. The argument presented in this chapter does not concern moral epistemology. This argument is about moral ontology, which refers to the foundations and nature of morality. The argument in its simplest form goes something like this: if something is good, is it objectively good? If it is objectively good, then it necessitates God’s existence, as He is the only foundation for objective good. The argument does not ask how we know when something is good.

Mai cikakken iko da na zahiri (na haƙiƙa).

Absolute vs. objective.

Wata ingantacciyar damuwa da mai neman ilimin tauhidi mai kwazo zai iya gabatarwa ita ce: a cikin tattaunawar ilimin tauhidin Musulunci (da kusan dukkan tsarin shari'ar duniya), akwai yanayi da kisa (kamar kare kai da iyali) ya zama halal a ɗabi'a da kuma a shari'a. Saboda haka, babu abin da yake mugunta a zahiri. Wannan tunani ne mai ban sha'awa, amma yana rikitar da ɗabi'a cikakkiya da ɗabi'a ta zahiri; su biyun sun bambanta sosai. Ɗabi'a cikakkiya tana nufin cewa aiki mai kyau ko mara kyau ne ba tare da la'akari da yanayin da ake ciki ba. Misali, wanda ya yi imani cewa kisa haramun ne a kowane hali zai yi imani cewa kisa haramun ne ko da a kare kai. Ɗabi'a ta zahiri kuwa tana yarda da cewa wasu gaskiyar ɗabi'a suna dogara ga yanayi. Wata gaskiyar ɗabi'a ta zahiri na iya zama: kashe mutum ba tare da hujja mai karɓuwa ba haramun ne. Wannan da'awa mai dogara ga yanayi tana ɗauke da sharaɗi muhimmi, wato cewa kisan ya zama ba shi da hujja. Misali, kisan wani mutum na iya zama halal a ɗabi'a idan wanda aka kashe yana harbin yara ba tare da bambanci ba a wata makarantar gida. Hujjar da na gabatar ba ta ƙunshi ra'ayoyin ɗabi'a cikakkiya ba. Bayani a kan ɗabi'a ta dangantaka (ethical relativism) Mai bin ra'ayin dangantakar ɗabi'a, wanda ke ganin cewa ɗabi'a tana dangana ga al'adu, zai iya cewa tattaunawar kan ɗabi'a cikakkiya da ta zahiri ta tabbatar da cewa ɗabi'a ba ta zahiri ba ce, illa dangantacciya. Amma waɗanda suke ganin cewa ɗabi'a ta zahiri ce za su ce abin da mutane suka yi imani da shi, ko ji, ko aikata ba shi da alaƙa da darajar ɗabi'a ta zahiri, kuma hakan ne ainihin ma'anar zahiri. Daga wannan mahanga, dangantakar ɗabi'a ba ta tsayawa a kafa, domin tana nuna al'adun mutane don ƙaryata abin da yake gaskiya a zahiri. Wannan yana da tabbas ya kasa, domin ma'anar ɗabi'a ta haƙiƙa ta bayyana cewa ɗabi'u ba sa dogara ga ji, imani da al'adun mutane, don haka amfani da su a matsayin hanyar musanta haƙiƙanin ɗabi'u ba shi da ma'ana.

A valid concern that can be raised by the keen and aspiring theologian is that within Islamic theological discourse (and virtually all of the justice systems in the world), certain situations exist where killing (such as defending one’s self and family) becomes morally (and legally) permissible. Therefore, nothing is objectively evil. This is an interesting reflection, but it conflates absolute morality with objective morality; they are very different. Absolute morality entails that a moral act is good or bad regardless of the given situation. For example, someone who believes killing is absolutely wrong would believe killing is wrong even in self-defence. Objective morality, however, readily acknowledges the context-sensitivity of some moral truths. An objective moral fact might be killing human beings without appropriate justification is wrong. The context-sensitive nature of this moral claim includes an important caveat that the killing must also be unjustified. For instance, killing another human being might be seen as morally justified, if the person who was killed had been indiscriminately shooting children at a local school. The argument I have presented does not involve absolute notions of morality. A note on ethical relativism An ethical relativist, who maintains that morality is relative to cultural norms, would argue that the discussion on absolute and objective morality proves that morals are not objective, and that they are relative. Those who maintain that morals are objective would argue that what people believe or feel or do is irrelevant, and does not take away from objective moral value (and that is precisely the definition of objectivity). Ethical relativism is bankrupt from this perspective because it points to cultural practices to refute what is objectively true. This is doomed to failure, because the definition of objective morality states that morals are independent of feelings, beliefs and cultural practices, so to use them as a means to deny the objectivity of morals is meaningless.

Wannan babin yana da muhimman abubuwa masu ban mamaki ga masu kafirci. Idan masu kafirci suna ganin wasu dabi'u, ka'idoji da gaskiyoyi a matsayin wadanda ba na zato ba ne, to dole ne su yarda cewa Allah yana wanzuwa, domin Shi ne kadai tushen hankali na wanzuwar dabi'a ta gaskiya, ko kuma su kawo wata hujja mai gamsarwa ta daban. Idan ba su iya yi ba, to dole ne su yi watsi da yanayin dabi'arsu ta halitta wacce ke gane alheri da sharri na gaskiya, kuma su ki amincewa da batun dabi'u na gaskiya gaba daya. Idan suka yi haka, duk zargi da hukunci da suke yi a kan Musulunci zai koma zuwa matakin ra'ayin kai kawai. Hujjar daga mahangar dabi'a tana bayyana ma'anar Allah a addinin Musulunci sosai. Allah Mai kyautatawa ne cikakke kuma Mai hikima, kuma umarninSa ba sa saba wa cikakkiyar dabi'arSa ba. Saboda haka, umarnansa cikakkun alheri ne.

This chapter has some striking implications for the atheist. If atheists consider some morals values and truths to be objective, they must either admit that God exists—as He is the only rational foundation for the existence of objective morality—or provide a compelling alternative. If they cannot, they have to ignore their innate disposition that recognises objective good and evil, and reject the notion of objective morals altogether. Once they do that, all their finger-pointing and moral judgements against Islam will be diminished to the level of personal subjectivity. The argument from the stance of morality truly makes sense of the Islamic conception of the Divine. God is perfectly good and wise, and His commands do not contradict His perfect nature. Therefore, His commands are perfectly good.

Sanin wannan game da Allah... (translated with "God" rendered as Hausa word) Sanin wannan game da Ubangiji yana ba mu tushe don ɗabi'u masu ma'ana (na gaske). A wasu kalmomi, sanin Ubangiji shi ne sanin abin alheri.

Knowing this about God gives us a foundation for objective morals. In other words, knowing God is knowing good.