Tunanin ka cewa kana shiga wani kyakkyawan fadar sarauta. Yayin da kake tafiya cikin falon, girman ginin ya ba ka mamaki, sai ka yanke shawarar bincika ta hanyar bude kofar da ke kusa da kai. Da ka shiga dakin, sai ka ga daruruwan kujeru da teburori da aka jera kamar aji. Nan take ka rasa duk wani sha'awar binciken sauran dakunan. Ka yanke shawarar barin fadar ka tafi ganin abokinka a wani shagon kofi da ke unguwa. Yayin da kuke shan kofi tare, sai ya tambaye ka, "To me ka gani a fadar?" Sai ka amsa da cewa, "Dakin cike da teburori da kujeru da aka jera kamar aji kawai." Sai abokinka ya ce, "To me ya sa ba ka ga sauran dakunan ba?" Sai ka amsa da cewa, "Babu amfani, babu abin da za a gani. Idan wannan dakin cike yake da kujeru da teburori, to sauran dakunan ba za su sami komai a cikinsu ba." Shin amsarka tana da ma'ana? Shin ya kan biyo baya a zahiri cewa saboda akwai abu a daki daya, to babu komai a sauran dakunan? Tabbas ba haka yake ba. Masu kafircin da ke ikirarin cewa kimiyya ta karyata Allah suna bin irin wannan tunanin. Kimiyya tana mayar da hankali ne kawai kan abin da abubuwan da ake gani za su iya warwarewa. Duk da haka, Allah, bisa ma'anarsa, Wani ne da ke waje da duniyar zahiri. Saboda haka, ganin Sa kai tsaye ba zai yiwu ba. Duk da haka, mai kafirci zai iya cewa kallo a kaikaice na iya tabbatar ko karyata wanzuwar Allah. Wannan ba gaskiya ba ne. Duk wani nau'in kallo a kaikaice ba zai taba karyata wanzuwar Allah ba, domin hakan kamar a ce wani abin da aka gani zai iya karyata wani abin da ba a gani ba. Wannan yana bin irin wannan hujja ta misalin fadar da ke sama. Gaskiyar cewa kimiyya ba ta kaiwa ga kafirci ba an tabbatar da ita ne ta mafi yawan masana falsafar kimiyya. Misali, Hugh Gauch ya yanke hukunci daidai cewa yin nacin cewa "kimiyya tana goyon bayan kafirci" yana samun maki masu yawa a kwazo amma maki kadan a hujja.335 Gauch yana da gaskiya gaba daya, domin hanyar tunani da ta dogara da kallo ba za ta iya musanta abin da ba a iya gani ba. Abin da kimiyya za ta iya yi, duk da haka, shi ne ta yi shiru game da wannan al'amari ko kuma ta samar da hujjojin da masana falsafa za su iya amfani da su wajen gina hujja ta falsafa cewa Allah yana wanzuwa. Duk da haka, akwai hujjojin da suke amfani da shaidun kimiyya don kammalawa cewa wanzuwar Allah ba ta yiwuwa. Ana kiran waɗannan hujjojin da "hujjojin shaida"; su na falsafa ne da yanayi, ba matsayar kimiyya ba.

Imagine you entered an amazing palace. As you walk through the hallway, you are struck by the size of the building and decide to explore by opening the nearest door. As you enter the room, you see hundreds of chairs and tables arranged like a classroom. Suddenly you lose any motivation to explore the other rooms. You decide to leave the palace and head off to meet your friend at a local coffee shop. As you drink coffee with your friend he asks you, “So what did you see in the palace?” You reply, “Just a room full of tables and chairs arranged like a classroom”. Your friend then asks, “Why didn’t you see the other rooms?” You reply by saying, “There’s no point, there was nothing to see. If this room was full of chairs and tables, then the other rooms will have nothing in them.” Is your reply rational? Does it logically follow that just because there is something in one room, there will be nothing in the other rooms? Of course it does not. Atheists who claim that science has disproved God follow a similar logic. Science focuses its attention on only what observations can solve. However, God, by definition, is a Being who is outside the physical universe. Therefore, any direct observation of Him is impossible. However, an atheist may argue that indirect observation may support or negate God’s existence. This is not true. Any form of indirect observation could never negate God’s existence, because it is like saying an observed phenomenon can negate an unobserved phenomenon. This follows the same logic as the above example in the palace. The fact that science does not lead to atheism is attested by the majority of the philosophers of science. For example, Hugh Gauch rightly concludes that to “insist that… science supports atheism is to get high marks for enthusiasm but low marks for logic.”335 Gauch makes perfect sense because the method of thinking that relies on observation cannot deny what cannot be observed. What science can do, however, is stay silent on that matter or provide evidence that philosophers can use to formulate a philosophical argument that God exists. Notwithstanding, there are arguments that use scientific evidence that conclude God’s existence is unlikely. These are known as evidential arguments; they are philosophical in nature and not scientific conclusions.

Ga wasu masu kafirci (atheists) da ke ganin cewa kimiyya na iya musanta Allah, sai ka ce wani abu na yi wa gaskiyar addini tawaye. Wannan na nufin wannan tambaya ce da aka tambaya, amma ba fassara ce ta wani rubutu ba. Ina fassara rubutu daga Turanci zuwa Hausa, don haka sai ka aiko da rubutun da kake son in fassara.

Why do some atheists believe science can deny God?.

Kimiyya ta canza duniya. Tun daga magani zuwa sadarwa, kimiyya ta inganta rayuwarmu da walwalarmu ta hanyoyin da babu wani fanni na ilimi da ya yi hakan. Kimiyya tana ci gaba da inganta rayuwarmu, tana kuma taimakawa wajen fahimtar duniya da sararin samaniya. Duk da haka, nasarorin kimiyya sun sa masu kafirci da yawa su karɓi wasu zato marasa daidaito da marasa gaskiya. Ga taƙaitaccen bayanin waɗannan zato.

Science has changed the world. From medicine to telecommunications, science has improved our lives and well-being in ways that no other field of study has. Science continually improves our lives, and aids our understanding of the world and the universe. However, science’s successes have led many atheists to adopt incoherent and false assumptions. Below is a summary of these assumptions.

• Da farko, wasu masu kafircin Allah suna ganin cewa kimiyya ita kaɗai ce ma'aunin gaskiya, kuma cewa kimiyya tana da amsoshin dukkan tambayoyinmu. Wannan yana sa mai kafircin ya kammala cewa Allah ba ya wanzuwa, domin kimiyya tana iya magana ne kawai a kan abin da mutum zai iya gani. Tunda ba za a iya ganin Allah ba, kuma kimiyya ita ce kaɗai ma'aunin gaskiya, to, cewa Allah yana wanzuwa ƙarya ce. Wannan zato kuma yana sa mai kafircin ya yi imani cewa ba a ƙara buƙatar Allah a matsayin dalili ga abubuwan da ba mu fahimta ba.

• First, some atheists perceive that science is the only yardstick for truth and that science has the answers for all of our questions. This motivates the atheist to conclude that God doesn’t exist because science can only address what one can observe. Since God cannot be observed and science is the only yardstick for truth, then to claim God exists is false. This assumption also motivates the atheist to believe that God is no longer required as a reason for things we do not understand.

Wannan zato ne, domin kimiyya tana da iyaka, kuma akwai abubuwa da yawa da ba za ta iya amsawa ba. Bugu da ƙari, akwai wasu hanyoyin samun ilimi da kimiyya ba za ta iya tabbatar da su ba, duk da haka suna da muhimmanci kuma tushen ilimi ne da babu makawa. Wannan yana nufin cewa kimiyya ba ita kaɗai ce hanyar kafa gaskiya game da duniya da hakika ba.

This is a false assumption because science has many limitations, and there are many things that it cannot answer. In addition, there are other sources of knowledge that science cannot justify, yet they are indispensable and fundamental sources of knowledge. This implies that science is not the only way to establish truths about the world and reality.

• Assumption ta biyu ita ce cewa tunda kimiyya tana samun nasara sosai, to dole ne sakamakonta na kimiyya ya zama gaskiya. Idan sakamakon kimiyya gaskiya ne, kuma kimiyya ba za ta iya magana kan gaskiyar da ba a gani ba kamar Allah ba, to a bisa haka, Shi ba ya wanzuwa. Dalilin wannan zato ba shi da tabbas, kuma yana nuna rashin sanin falsafar kimiyya. A takaice, kawai don wani abu yana aiki ba ya nufin gaskiya ne. Wannan ra'ayi ne na asali a falsafar kimiyya. Abin takaici, har wasu masu musun Allah da aka yaba wa sosai suna ɗaukar ra'ayin rashin hankali cewa nasarar aiwatar da wata ka'idar kimiyya a aikace tana tabbatar da cewa gaskiya ce ta cikakkiyar ma'ana. Na taba haduwa da Richard Dawkins a Babban Taron Masu Musun Allah na Duniya na 2010, wanda aka gudanar a Dublin, Ireland. Na yi magana da shi a takaice, na tambaye shi dalilin da ya sa ya gaya wa wani mai tambaya kada ya yi nazarin falsafar kimiyya, a maimakon haka "kawai ya yi kimiyya". Bai ba ni amsa mai yawa ba. Idan aka duba ayyukansa na jama'a, yanzu a bayyane yake cewa ɗaya daga cikin manyan dalilansa shi ne cewa kimiyya "tana aiki, b*tches".336

• The second assumption is that since science is so successful, scientific conclusions must be true. If scientific conclusions are true, and science cannot address an unobserved reality like God, then it follows He does not exist. The logic behind this assumption is fuzzy and it exposes a common ignorance concerning the philosophy of science. Simply put, just because something works does not mean it is true. This is a basic idea in the philosophy of science. Unfortunately, even some highly acclaimed atheists take the incoherent view that the successful practical application of a scientific theory proves it to be true in an absolute sense. I once met Richard Dawkins at the World Atheist Convention in 2010, held in Dublin, Ireland. I spoke to him briefly and asked him why he told one questioner not to study the philosophy of science and “just do the science”. He didn’t give me much of a reply. Surveying his public work, it is now becoming clear that one of his main reasons is that science “works, b*tches”336

Ko da yake yana da ma'ana a zuciya, hakan ba gaskiya ba ne. Ba ya biyo baya ta hanyar hankali cewa ka'ida ko ƙarshen wani ilimin kimiyya gaskiya ne kawai saboda yana aiki.

. Although intuitive, it is false. It does not logically follow that a scientific theory or conclusion is true just because it works.

• Ƙa'ida ta uku ita ce cewa kimiyya tana kai ga tabbaci. In kimiyya ba za ta iya tabbatar da wanzuwar Allah kai tsaye ba, kuma ita ce kaɗai hanyar samun tabbaci, to ba za mu iya tabbatar da wanzuwar Allah ba. Wannan ƙa'ida ita ma tana sa mai kafirci ya yi jayayya cewa idan an sanya wani abu a matsayin ka'idar kimiyya da aka tabbatar, to dole ne mu yi watsi da wahayin Allah idan ya saɓa mata ta wata hanya. Wannan ba gaskiya ba ne. Idan masana kimiyya suka kira wani abu ka'ida, ba sa cewa abu ne cikakke kuma ba zai taɓa canzawa ba. Yana nufin shi ne mafi kyawun bayani game da wasu al'amura, bisa ga iyakantattun abubuwan da muka lura da su. Duk da haka, koyaushe akwai yiwuwar sabon lura—ko wata hanyar kallon abubuwa—da ke saɓa wa lura da aka yi a baya. Wannan shi ne kyawun kimiyya; ba a rubuta ta a dutse ba. Saboda haka, idan nassin addini da kimiyya suna da alama suna karo da juna, ba babbar matsala ba ce. Me yasa?

• The third assumption is that science leads to certainty. If science cannot directly prove God’s existence, and it is the only route to certainty, then we cannot be certain of God’s existence. This assumption also motivates the atheist to argue that once something is labelled as a well-confirmed scientific theory, we must dismiss Divine revelation if it opposes it in some way. This is not true. When scientists call something a theory, they are not saying it is absolute and that it will never change. It means it is the best explanation of particular phenomena, based on our limited observations. However, there can always be a new observation—or way of seeing things— that is at odds with previous observations. This is the beauty of science; it is not set in stone. Therefore, if religious scripture and science seem to conflict, it is not a huge problem. Why?

Saboda kimiyya na iya canzawa. Abin da za mu iya cewa kawai shi ne fahimtarmu ta yanzu game da abubuwan da ake gani—bisa iyakantattun abubuwan lura da muka yi—ta saba wa abin da wani littafi mai tsarki ya ce, amma hakan na iya canzawa. Wannan babban bambanci ne da amfani da kimiyya a matsayin sanda don rushe ikirarin nassoshin addini.

Because science can change. All that we can say is our current understanding of observed phenomena—based on our limited observations—is at odds with what a particular scripture says, but it may change. This is a huge difference from using science as a baseball bat to smash the claims of religious scripture.

Wasu ilimin kimiyya na wasu gaskiyoyi da aka tabbatar ta hanyar kallo kai tsaye, ba kasafai suke canzawa a kimiyya ba, amma yawancin hujjojin da ake amfani da su wajen suka ga maganganun addini suna dogara ne akan bayanai da ka'idoji masu sarkakiya na kimiyya, kamar juyin halittar Darwin. Idan abin da wani nassi da aka saukar daga Allah ya kunsa ya zama kamar ya saba da bayanan kimiyya da ka'idojinta, to bai kamata ka ki amincewa da wahayi don karɓar kimiyya ba. Haka kuma, bai kamata ka ki kimiyya don karɓar wahayi ba. Yana cikin hakkinka na ilimi ka karɓi duka biyun! Hanyar da ta dace, saboda haka, ita ce ka karɓi kimiyya a matsayin mafi kyau da muke da shi, ba tare da yin tsalle-tsalle masu girma na imani ba, kuma ba tare da ka ɗauka cewa ta cika ba; a lokaci guda, za ka iya karɓar nassin wahayi domin kana da kyakkyawan dalili na yin hakan (duba Babi na 13).

Some scientific facts, based on direct observation, are unlikely to change in science, but most of the arguments that are used to bash religious discourse are based on more complex scientific explanations and theories, such as Darwinian evolution. If the content of a divinely revealed text seems to be at odds with scientific explanations and theories, you must not reject revelation to accept the science. In addition, you must not reject the science to accept the revelation. It is within your epistemic right to accept both! The correct approach, therefore, is to accept the science as the best that we have without making massive epistemic leaps of faith and concluding that it is absolute; at the same time, you can accept the revealed text because you have good reasons to do so (see Chapter 13).

• Zato na ƙarshe ita ce ginshiƙin da yawan masu kafirta Allah ke kallon duniya da shi. Wannan ginshiƙi, kamar yadda aka tattauna a sassa daban-daban na wannan littafi, shi ne dabi'anci (naturalism). Akwai nau'o'i biyu na dabi'anci.

• The final assumption forms the lens by which many atheists see the world. This lens, as discussed in various chapters of this book, is naturalism. There are two types of naturalism:

Falsafi da na tsari (hanya). Falsafi naturalism shine falsafar cewa dukkan abubuwan da ke faruwa a cikin duniya ana iya bayyana su ta hanyar tsarin zahiri, kuma babu abin da ya wuce na zahiri. Methodological naturalism kuwa shi ne ra'ayin cewa idan wani abu ana ɗaukarsa a matsayin na kimiyya, to ba zai taɓa komawa ga aikin Allah da ikonsa ba. Masu musun Allah (atheist) suna rikitar da falsafi naturalism da methodological naturalism. Ba tare da sani ba, masu musun Allah suna ɗaukar zato marar na kimiyya na falsafi naturalism don fahimtar sakamakon kimiyya.

philosophical and methodological. Philosophical naturalism is the philosophy that all phenomena in the universe can be explained via physical processes, and that there is no supernatural. Methodological naturalism is the view that if anything is deemed scientific, it can never refer to God’s Divine activity or power. The atheist conflates philosophical naturalism with methodological naturalism. The atheist inadvertently adopts the non-scientific assumption of philosophical naturalism to understand scientific conclusions.

Mai kafirci yana rikitar da ra'ayin cewa matsayoyin kimiyya, domin su zama na kimiyya, ba sai sun ambaci ikon halitta da hikimar Allah ba (naturalism na hanya), da kuma gaskiyar cewa ikon halitta da hikimarSa ba sa wanzuwa (naturalism na falsafa).

The atheist confuses the idea that scientific conclusions, in order to be scientific, must not refer to God’s creative power or wisdom (methodological naturalism), with the fact that His creative power and wisdom do not exist (philosophical naturalism).

Sauran wannan babin zai tattauna waɗannan zato, kuma hanya mafi kyau ta yin hakan ita ce komawa ga asali: fahimtar menene kimiyya, bincika iyakokinta, da kuma warware wasu daga cikin muhawarorin da ake yi a falsafar kimiyya.

The rest of this chapter will address these assumptions, and the best way to do that is to go back to basics: understand what science is, explore its limitations and unravel some of the discussions that exist in the philosophy of science.

Menene kimiyya?

What is science?.

Kalmar "science" ta samo asali daga kalmar Latin scientia, wadda ke nufin ilimi. Kimiyya (science) ƙoƙari ne na ɗan adam don fahimtar yadda duniyar zahiri take aiki. Masanin lissafi kuma masanin falsafar kimiyya, Bertrand Russell, ya bayyana kimiyya da kyau a matsayin "ƙoƙarin gano, ta hanyar lura da tunani bisa gare shi… takamaiman gaskiyoyi game da duniya, da dokokin da ke haɗa gaskiyoyi da juna."337

The word science comes from the Latin word scientia, meaning knowledge. Science is the human endeavour to understand how the physical world works. Mathematician and philosopher of science Bertrand Russell nicely explains that science is “the attempt to discover, by means of observation and reasoning based upon it… particular facts about the world, and the laws connecting facts with one another.”337

A la'akari da ma'anar Russell, bari mu ƙara fayyace hanyar kimiyya.

In light of Russell’s definition, let’s further break down the scientific method.

Ilimi yana da iyaka ta musamman. Yana mayar da hankali ne kan duniyar zahiri, kuma yana iya magana ne kawai kan al'amuran halitta da abubuwan da ke faruwa a cikinta. Daga wannan mahanga, tambayoyi kamar, menene rai? Menene ma'ana? tambayoyi ne da ke waje da tsarin ilimi na kimiyya.

Science has a particular scope. It focuses on the physical world, and can only address natural processes and phenomena. From this perspective, questions such as, what is the soul? What is meaning? are questions outside the scientific process.

Kimiyya tana nufin bayyana duniyar zahiri. A matsayinta na cibiya ta gama-gari, tana nufin samar da bayanai masu inganci game da yadda duniyar halitta take aiki. Hanyar da kimiyya take bi wajen samar da bayanai ita ce ta fito da hasashe masu iya gwaji. Domin hasashe ya zama mai iya gwaji, dole ne ya haifar da tsammani bayyananne ta hanyar hankali. Ka yi la'akari da wannan hasashe: "Kofi yana inganta aikin 'yan kokawa na Olympics." Wannan hasashe mai iya gwaji ne domin yana haifar da wadannan tsammani bayyananne:

Science aims to explain the physical world. As a collective institution, it aims to produce accurate explanations of how the natural world works. The way science aims to produce explanations is that it comes up with testable hypotheses. For a hypothesis to be testable, it must logically generate specific expectations. Consider the following hypothesis: “Coffee improves the performance of Olympic wrestlers.” This hypothesis is testable because it generates the following specific expectations:

• Kofi yana inganta aiki.

• coffee improves performance.

• kofi yana rage aiki.

• coffee impairs performance.

• babu wani canji a aikin.

• there is no change in performance.

Ɗaya daga cikin kyawawan abubuwan ilimin kimiyya shi ne cewa ba kawai yana bincika hasashe na gaskiya ba; a maimakon haka, yana buƙatar gwaji da jarrabawa. Shi ya sa, a ƙarshe, ra'ayoyin kimiyya ba kawai dole ne su kasance masu iya a gwada su ba; dole ne a gwada su a zahiri. Sakamako guda ɗaya ba shi ne zaɓin da aka fi so ba; ilimin kimiyya na gaskiya yana ƙunshe da cewa masana kimiyya daban-daban su maimaita gwajin sau da yawa gwargwadon iko.

One of the beautiful aspects of science is that it does not just examine true hypotheses; rather, it necessitates experimentation and testing. This is why, ultimately, scientific ideas must not only be testable; they must actually be tested. A single set of results is not the preferred option; true science involves that different scientists repeat the experiment as many times as possible.

Akwai hakika fiye da abin da muka tattauna zuwa yanzu a fagen kimiyya, amma waɗannan lura sun isa su fahimtar muhimman abubuwan hanyar kimiyya. Wannan yana kai mu ga amsa muhimman zato game da kimiyya waɗanda wasu masu musun Allah ke amfani da su don yanke hukunci na ƙarya cewa kimiyya tana kai ga musun Allah.

There is obviously more to science than what we have discussed so far, but these observations are sufficient to understand the basic elements of the scientific method. This leads us to respond to the key assumptions about science that some atheists use to falsely conclude that science leads to atheism.

Zato na farko: Kimiyya ita ce kaɗai hanyar tabbatar da gaskiya game da gaskiyar zahiri, kuma tana iya amsa dukkan tambayoyi.

Assumption #1: Science is the only way to establish the truth about reality, and it can answer all questions.

Wannan hujja, wacce ake kira da "scientism", tana da'awar cewa wata magana ba gaskiya ba ce idan ba za a iya tabbatar da ita ta hanyar kimiyya ba. A tattaunawoyi da na yi da masu musun Allah da masu akidar humanism, na lura suna ɗaukar wannan hujja a matsayin abin da ba a tambaya ba. Kimiyya ba ita kaɗai ce hanyar samun gaskiya game da duniya ba. Iyakokin hanyar kimiyya sun nuna cewa kimiyya ba za ta iya amsa dukkan tambayoyi ba. Daga cikin manyan iyakokinta akwai cewa:

This assertion, known as scientism, claims that a statement is not true if it cannot be scientifically proven. In various conversations I have had with atheists and humanists, I have found that they constantly presume this assertion. Science is not the only way to acquire truth about the world. The limitations of the scientific method demonstrate that science cannot answer all questions. Some of its main limitations include that it:

• ya takaita ga lura kawai.

• is limited to observation.

• yana da tsaka-tsaki a ɗabi'a.

• is morally neutral.

Ba zan iya zurfafa cikin al'amuran sirri ba.

• cannot delve into the personal.

• Ba zai iya amsa dalilin da yasa abubuwa ke faruwa ba.

• cannot answer why things happen.

• ba zai iya amsa wasu tambayoyin metaphysical ba.

• cannot address some metaphysical questions.

• ba za a iya tabbatar da gaskiya ta zahiri ba.

• cannot prove necessary truths.

Amma kafin mu tattauna waɗannan iyakoki, yana da muhimmanci a lura cewa kimiyyanci (scientism) yana kanshi yana rushe kansa. Kimiyyanci yana da'awar cewa wata magana ba gaskiya ba ce idan ba za a iya tabbatar da ita ta hanyar kimiyya ba. Amma maganar da ke sama kanta ba za a iya tabbatar da ita ta hanyar kimiyya ba. Kamar a ce, "Babu jimlolin harshen Ingilishi da suka fi kalmomi uku tsayi", wanda ke rushe kansa domin wannan jimlar kanta ta fi kalmomi uku tsayi.338.

However, before we discuss these limitations, it is important to note that scientism is self-defeating. Scientism claims that a proposition is not true if it cannot be scientifically proven. Yet the above statement itself cannot be scientifically proven. It is like saying, “There are no sentences in the English language longer than three words”, which is self-defeating because that sentence is longer than three words.338.

Iyakance ga lura.

Limited to observation.

Wannan na iya zama kamar iyaka ce bayyananniya, amma ba a fahimce ta sosai ba. Masana kimiyya koyaushe suna iyakance ga abin da suka lura. Misali, idan masanin kimiyya yana son sanin tasirin caffeine a kan jariran beraye, zai iyakance ga adadin da nau'in beraye da yake da su da kuma dukkan abubuwan da ke cikin gwajinsa. Masanin falsafar kimiyya Elliot Sober ya yi wannan magana a cikin makalarsa, Empiricism: "A kowane lokaci masana kimiyya suna iyakance ga abubuwan da suka lura da su a hannunsu… iyakar ita ce kimiyya dole ta takaita hankalinta ga matsalolin da abubuwan lura za su iya warwarewa."339

This may sound like an obvious limitation, but it is not entirely understood. Scientists are always limited to their observations. For example, if a scientist wants to find out the effect of caffeine on baby mice, they will be restricted to the number and type of mice they have and all the variables in place during their experiment. Philosopher of science Elliot Sober makes this point in his essay, Empiricism: “At any moment scientists are limited by the observations they have at hand… the limitation is that science is forced to restrict its attention to problems that observations can solve.”339

Ba wai masana kimiyya ne kawai aka takaita ga lura ba, har ila yau ana takaita su da cewa lura na gaba na iya kaiwa ga sabbin matsaya wadanda kuma na iya saba wa abin da aka lura da shi a baya (duba sashen da ke kasa, 'Matsalar Shigar da Hukunci'). Wani takaitawa kuma ya shafi cewa abin da ake ganin ba za a iya lura da shi ba a yau, za a iya fahimtar sa ta hankalinmu a nan gaba, ko dai saboda ingantuwar fasaha ko kuma ci gaba da bincike. Gano da amfani da na'urar hangen nesa mai girmama abu (microscope) da na'urar hangen nesa ta lantarki (electron microscope) misalai ne masu kyau na ci gaban kimiyya. Saboda haka, ba za mu taba tabbatar da fahimtarmu ta yanzu game da duniyar zahiri ba, domin tana iya canzawa tare da ingantattun lura.

Not only are scientists restricted to observations, but they are also limited by the fact that a future observation may form new conclusions that in turn can go against what was previously observed (see the section below, ‘The Problem of Induction’). Another limitation involves the fact that what is considered to be non-observable today could be perceived by our senses in the future, either due to improved technology or persistent investigation. The discovery and use of the microscope and the electron microscope are good examples of scientific progress. Therefore, we can never be certain about our current understanding of the physical world, because it can change with improved observations.

Ba da ɗabi'a ba.

Morally neutral.

Kimiyya ba ta da ɗabi'a (ba ta da kyau ko mugunta a cikinta). Wannan ba yana nufin cewa masana kimiyya ba su da ɗabi'u ba. Abin da yake nufi shi ne kimiyya ba za ta iya samar da tushe ga ɗabi'a ba (duba Babi na 9). Misali, kimiyya ba za ta iya zama tushen ma'ana da tabbacin ɗabi'u ba, kuma ba za ta iya gaya mana abin da yake daidai ko kuskure ba. Wannan ba yana nufin ba za ta iya zama wani ɓangare na tsarin ilimi iri-iri wanda ke taimakawa wajen wasu shawarwari na ɗabi'a da na xabi'a ba. Duk da haka, kimiyya a kanta ta kasa samar da tushe ga abin da muke ɗauka a matsayin nagarta ko mugunta.

Science is morally neutral. Now this does not mean that scientists do not have morals. What it means is that science cannot provide a foundation for morality (see Chapter 9). For instance, science cannot be a basis for the meaningfulness and objectivity of morals, and it cannot tell us what is right or wrong. This does not mean that it cannot be part of a multidisciplinary approach that informs some ethical and moral decisions. However, science on its own fails to provide a basis for what we consider good or bad.

Kimiyya a zahiri tana gaya mana abin da yake, ba abin da ya kamata ya zama ba. Maganar nan, "ba za ka iya samun abin da ya kamata daga abin da yake ba", ta zama magana ta yau da kullum a falsafa; sai dai tana da gaskiya a cikinta. Kimiyya za ta iya gaya mana abin da ke faruwa idan wuka ta huda fatar mutum, har da dukkan matakan da ke cikin hakan, amma ba za ta iya gaya mana ko hakan haramun ne ba. Jini, zafi da lalacewar jiki na iya kasancewa sakamakon tiyata mai ceton rai, ko kuma sakamakon kisan kai. Abin da ke nufi shi ne, fahimtar dukkan matakan da ke cikin yankewa da hudawar naman mutum ba zai kai mu ga yanke shawara ta ɗabi'a ba.

Science essentially tells us what is and not what ought to be. The statement, “you cannot get an ought from an is”, has become a philosophical cliché; however, it has some truth in it. Science can tell us what happens when a knife penetrates someone’s skin, including all of the processes involved, but it cannot tell us whether it is immoral. The blood, pain and physical damage could be due to important life-saving surgery or the result of a murder. The point is that understanding all the processes involved in cutting and penetrating the human flesh does not lead us to a moral decision.

Kamar yadda aka ambata a Babi na 9, Charles Darwin ya yi la'akari da ɗabi'a da kimiyya (musamman ilimin halittu), kuma ya zo da misali mai tsananin gaske game da yuwuwar sakamakon da ɗabi'armu za ta iya samu daga wani tsarin halitta. Ya bayar da shawarar cewa idan an renemu ƙarƙashin wani sabon tsarin yanayin halitta, to abin da za mu ɗauka a matsayin ɗabi'a zai iya bambanta sosai da ra'ayoyinmu na yanzu.340 Abin da Darwin wataƙila yake gaya mana shi ne, idan abin da ɗan Adam ke ɗauka a matsayin ɗabi'a kawai sakamakon horon halitta ne da ya gabata, to samun wani tsarin yanayi daban zai haifar da ma'auni na ɗabi'a daban. Wannan yana da babban tasiri ga tushen da kuma ma'anar ɗabi'a. Na farko, sanya halitta ko wani tsarin yanayin zahiri a matsayin tushen ɗabi'a yana mayar da ɗabi'u na zato ne, domin suna ƙarƙashin sauye-sauye marasa makawa. Amma wannan yana sabawa da gaskiyar da ba a iya musantawa ba, cewa wasu ɗabi'u na haƙiƙa ne (duba Babi na 9). Na biyu, idan fahimtarmu ta ɗabi'a ta dogara ne akan yanayin halitta, to wace ma'ana ɗabi'unmu suke da ita? Tun da ɗabi'unmu za su iya zama daban da a ce an 'reni' mu daban, to ɗabi'unmu sun rasa ma'ana. Wannan saboda babu wani abu da ya zama dole game da hangen nesanmu na ɗabi'a, domin kawai sakamakon dama ne da hanyoyin zahiri. A cikin littafinsa, The Moral Landscape, masanin ilimin jijiyoyi kuma mai ƙin addini Sam Harris ya yi ƙoƙarin tabbatar da fahimtarmu ta haƙiƙanin ɗabi'a ta hanyar bayyana yadda kimiyya za ta iya tantance ƙimar ɗabi'armu. Abokan tafiyarsa masu ƙin addini sun yaba da ƙoƙarinsa, amma kuma ya fuskanci suka mai yawa daga masu imani da kuma daga abokan gwagwarmayarsa. Harris ya gabatar mana da filin ɗabi'arsa. A kan kololuwa akwai nagartar ɗabi'a, kuma a cikin kwazazzabai akwai mugunta ta ɗabi'a. Ta yaya yake sanin abin da yake nagarta da abin da yake mugunta? To, kololuwar tana wakiltar jin daɗin rayuwa, kwazazzabai kuma suna wakiltar wahala. This may sound like a crude summary of his discussion, but in fairness it boils down to Harris equating evil with suffering and goodness with well-being. This is where Harris fails. If it can be shown that people can increase their own well-being by harming others, his moral landscape is demolished. Another way to dismiss Harris' argument is to show that some things that can promote our well-being are morally abhorrent. Consider, for instance, incest with the use of contraception. Both parties have increased well-being (as they freely decide to act upon their desires), and there is no chance of harm or suffering—such as conceiving a child with genetic defects—due to the use of contraception. I even raised the issue of incest to Professor Krauss during our debate, and he wasn't entirely sure about his position (he argued that it was not clear to him that it was wrong and he could not morally condemn it341). Some things that can promote our well-being are morally abhorrent. Even if you disagree with this example, there are many other examples to choose from to make this point.

As mentioned in Chapter 9, Charles Darwin considered morals and science (specifically biology), and came up with an extreme example of the possible implications of our morality stemming from a biological process. He suggested that if we were reared under a different set of biological conditions, then what we would consider moral could be very different from our current views.340 What Darwin may have been telling us is that if what human beings consider to be moral was just a result of previous biological conditioning, then having a different set of conditions would result in different moral standards. This has immense implications for the foundations and meaningfulness of morality. Firstly, establishing biology or a set of physical conditions as a basis for morality renders morals subjective— because they are (and were) subject to inevitable changes. However, this contradicts the innate and undeniable fact that some morals are objective (see Chapter 9). Secondly, if our sense of morality was based on biological conditions, then what meaning do our morals have? Since our morals could have been different if we were ‘reared’ differently, then our morals lose their meaning. This is because there is nothing necessary about our moral outlook, as it is simply a result of chance and physical processes. In his book, The Moral Landscape, the outspoken atheist and neuroscientist Sam Harris has attempted to justify our sense of objective morality by explaining how science can determine our moral values. Fellow atheists have commended his efforts, but he has also faced tremendous criticism from both theists and his comrades in arms. Harris presents us with his landscape of morality. On the peaks is moral goodness and in the troughs is moral evil. How does he know what is good and evil? Well, the peaks represent well-being and the troughs represent suffering. This may sound like a crude summary of his discussion, but in fairness it boils down to Harris equating evil with suffering and goodness with well-being. This is where Harris fails. If it can be shown that people can increase their own well-being by harming others, his moral landscape is demolished. Another way to dismiss Harris’ argument is to show that some things that can promote our well-being are morally abhorrent. Consider, for instance, incest with the use of contraception. Both parties have increased well-being (as they freely decide to act upon their desires), and there is no chance of harm or suffering—such as conceiving a child with genetic defects—due to the use of contraception. I even raised the issue of incest to Professor Krauss during our debate, and he wasn’t entirely sure about his position (he argued that it was not clear to him that it was wrong and he could not morally condemn it341). Some things that can promote our well-being are morally abhorrent. Even if you disagree with this example, there are many other examples to choose from to make this point.

A cikin littafinsa, Rational Morality, abokin tafiyarsa mai ra'ayin rashin yarda da Allah kuma masanin falsafar kimiyya Robert Johnson ya gabatar da suka makamancin wacce Harris ya fuskanta. Johnson ya yi bayani cewa tsarin Harris ba shi da hujja da zai tabbatar da cewa dabi'u al'amura ne na gaskiya kuma na haƙiƙa.

In his book, Rational Morality, fellow atheist and philosopher of science Robert Johnson provides a similar criticism to Harris’s argument. Johnson argues that Harris’s approach lacks justification for morals being factual and objective:

"Harris har har yanzu yana kamar an makale a cikin matsalar yarda cewa yana kawai zato cewa gaskiyar ɗabi'a da ta shafi 'walwala' tana wanzuwa. Shin za mu sami wannan gaskiyar ɗabi'a ta hanyar nazarin ƙasa ƙarƙashin duwatsu? A'a. Shin za mu iya nuna wanzuwarta idan muka bincika batun kamar yadda ake yi da dokokin kimiyyar ƙwayoyin zarra? A'a. A zahiri, abin da kawai ke goyon bayan ra'ayoyinmu cewa waɗannan gaskiyar ɗabi'a suna wanzuwa a kansu kawai shi ne: ra'ayoyinmu… Matsalar kanta za a iya bayyana ta cikin sauƙi: kawai don Harris ya gano daidai yadda ɗabi'a ake ayyana ta a yanzu, wannan ba yana nufin cewa ya kamata a ɗauki ɗabi'a a matsayin gaskiya ba. Lallai, Harris kansa ya yarda cewa akwai abubuwa da yawa da muke yarda da su a yanzu waɗanda suke haramun ne.…"

“Harris still appears to be trapped in the problem of admitting that he is just assuming that the moral fact relating to ‘wellbeing’ exists. Will we find this moral fact while studying the ground under rocks? No. Will we be able to imply its existence when examining the issue like with the laws of quantum mechanics? No. In fact the only thing backing up our intuitions that these moral facts simply exist independently is just that: our intuitions… The problem itself can be explained fairly simply: just because Harris correctly identifies how morality is currently defined, it does not mean that morality should therefore be taken as factual. Indeed, Harris himself admits there are plenty of things we currently allow for which are immoral….”342.

Ba za ka iya gwada na sirri ba.

You cannot test the personal.

Imani yana alfahari da gwada ra'ayoyi. Ba tare da gwaji ba, babu kimiyya. Duk da haka, a wani mataki, gwaji dole ya ba da wuri ga amana. Misali, ta yaya za mu san abin da mutane suka yi niyya? Ta yaya za mu san abin da mutum yake ji? Masanin kimiyya zai iya cewa ana iya gane wanda ke karya ta amfani da na'urar gano karya; haka kuma yana iya tabbatar da cewa wani jerin alamomin jiki da na hali suna da alaƙa da wasu ji (wannan ba gaskiya ba ne kuma za a tattauna shi a ƙasa). Yana da hujja, amma al'amarin bai kai sauƙi haka ba. Ka yi la'akari da abota a matsayin misali. Abokinka ya tambaye ka game da ranarka da yadda kake ji, sai ka amsa da cewa ranar ta yi kyau ƙwarai kuma kana jin farin ciki sosai. Ka yi tunanin, washegari ka haɗu da shi, sai ya sake tambayarka tambayar, amma zai yarda da kai ne kawai idan ka haɗa kanka da na'urar gano karya don a ɗauki muhimman bayanan jiki. Shin hakan zai cutar da abotarka? Idan ya ci gaba da neman haka duk lokacin da ka amsa tambayarsa, shin dangantakar da kuka gina tare za ta shafu? Hakika za ta shafu. Fagen abota na mutum yana kiyayuwa ne idan mun zama amintattu a amsoshinmu, kuma idan muna amincewa da abin da mutane suke faɗa. Wani misali shi ne motsin zuciya. Ta yaya za mu san ko wani yana jin baƙin ciki? Shin muna da na'urar gano baƙin ciki da za mu iya amfani da ita? Ko da yake bayanan jiki suna ba da wani ɓangare na bayani, babban ɓangare na muhimman bayanai yana cikin hulɗar mutum tsakanin likitan hauka da majiyyaci. Wannan yawanci yana zuwa ne ta hanyar tambayoyi, amsoshi ma har ma da takardar tambayoyi da aka cika. Duk waɗannan suna buƙatar mu amince da wasu daga cikin amsoshin majiyyaci. Saboda haka, a ganina, lura kaɗai bai isa ba ga wasu fannoni na rayuwar ɗan adam, kamar abota da lafiyar hankali. Kimiyya, saboda haka, dole ta dogara da amincewa, maimakon dogara ga gwaji kawai.

Science prides itself on testing ideas. Without testing there is no science. However, at some point testing must give way to trust. For instance, how do we know what people have intended? How do we know what a person is feeling? The scientist may argue that they can tell someone is lying by using a lie detector; they may also assert that an entire array of physiological and behavioural indicators correlates to certain feelings (this is not true and will be discussed below). They have a point, but it is not as simple as that. Consider friendships as an example. Your friend asks you about your day and how you are feeling, and you respond by saying it has been a great day and that you are feeling quite happy. Imagine, you meet him the following day and he asks you the same question, but will only believe you if you hook yourself up to a lie detector to capture essential physiological data. Would that harm your friendship? If he continued to make the same request every time you responded to his question, would the relationship you have built with him be affected? Of course it would. The realm of personal friendship is preserved, if we are trustworthy in our responses and if we trust what people say. Another example is emotions. How do we know if someone is feeling depressed? Do we have a depression detector that we could use? Although physiological data provides some input, a significant portion of the vital information is in the personal interaction between the psychiatrist and the patient. This usually takes the form of questions, answers and even a completed questionnaire. These all require that we trust some of the patient’s answers. Therefore, it seems to me that observations alone are not enough for certain domains of human life, such as friendship and mental health. Science, therefore, must rely on trusting, rather than depending solely on testing.

Kamar yadda aka tattauna a Babi na 7, kimiyya tana iya magana ne kawai kan bayanan mutum na uku (third-person). Amma halayen mutum, kamar ji da abubuwan da mutum ya fuskanta, bayanai ne na mutum na farko (first-person). Hujjar Mary ta Frank Jackson, wadda na yi bayani a kai a Babi na 7, ta nuna cewa sanin dukkan gaskiyar zahiri ta mutum na uku ba ya kai ga sanin dukkan gaskiya. A wasu kalmomi, bayanan zahiri ba za su iya gaya mana komai game da bayanan mutum na farko ba. Kimiyya ba za ta iya gaya mana komai ba game da abin da yake ji ga halitta ta fuskanci wani yanayi na sani na ciki (duba Babi na 7). Hanya daya tilo da za ta kusantar da mu ga amsa ita ce ta dogara ga bayanin wani mutum game da abin da ya sani da kansa a cikin zuciyarsa, ko da yake ba za ka taba sanin hakikanin abin da yake ji ba (duba Babi na 7). Abin da ke nan a sarari shi ne: kimiyya ba za ta iya gwada abin da ke na mutum ba.

As discussed in Chapter 7, science can only deal with third-person data, whereas personal attributes, such as feelings and experiences, are first-person data. Frank Jackson’s Mary argument I expounded upon in Chapter 7, shows that knowing all the physical third-person facts do not lead to all the facts. In other words, they can tell us nothing about the personal first-person data. Science cannot tell us anything about what it is like for an organism to experience an internal subjective conscious state (see Chapter 7). The only way of getting close to an answer is by trusting someone’s description of their personal subjective conscious experience (although you will still never be able to truly know what it is like for them to have that experience; see Chapter 7). The point is simple: Science cannot test the personal.

Ba zan iya amsa "me yasa?" ba.

Cannot answer ‘why?’.

Yayata ta buga ƙofarka tana ba ka wata kek ɗin cakulat mai daɗi da ta toya da kanta. Ka karɓi kyautar ka ajiye kek ɗin a kan teburin girkinka. Bayan yayatan ta tafi, sai ka buɗe akwatin domin ka ci wani yanki. Kafin ka fara ci, sai ka tambayi kanka wata tambaya: Me ya sa ta toya maka wannan kek ɗin? A matsayinka na masanin kimiyya, babu abin da za ka iya yi sai dai ka bincika bayanan da kake da su a hannu kawai: kek ɗin. Bayan gwaje-gwaje da yawa, ka gano cewa mai yiwuwa an toya kek ɗin a digiri 350 na Fahrenheit, kuma sinadaran da aka yi amfani da su sun haɗa da garin cocoa, sukari, ƙwai da madara. Duk da haka, sanin dukkan wannan bayanin ba ya taimaka maka wajen amsa tambayar. Hanya ɗaya tilo da za ka iya gano amsar ita ce ka tambaye ta. Wannan misali ya nuna mana cewa kimiyya na iya gaya mana "me" da "yaya", amma ta kasa ba mu "me ya sa". Abin da ake nufi da "me ya sa" a nan shi ne cewa akwai manufa a bayan abubuwa. Kimiyya na iya amsa tambayar dalilin wanzuwar duwatsu daga mahangar cewa an samar da su ta hanyar sarrafa abubuwan ƙasa, amma ba ta iya bayar da manufar samuwar duwatsun ba. Mutane da yawa kawai za su musanta ra'ayin manufa gaba ɗaya.

My aunty knocks on your door and presents you with a lovely home-baked chocolate cake. You accept the gift and place the cake on your kitchen table. Once my aunty has gone, you open the box to have a slice. Before you indulge, you ask yourself a question: Why has she baked me this cake? As a scientist you cannot do much apart from explore the only piece of data you have at hand: the cake. After doing many tests, you find out that the cake was probably baked at 350 degrees Fahrenheit, and the ingredients included cocoa powder, sugar, eggs and milk. However, knowing all of this information does not help you to answer the question. The only way you can find out is if you ask her. This example shows us that science can tell us the ‘what’ and the ‘how’, but it fails to give us the ‘why’. What is meant by ‘why’ here is that there is a purpose behind things. Science can answer why mountains exist from the point of view that they were formed via geological processes, but it cannot provide the purpose behind the formation of the mountains. Many would simply deny the concept of purpose altogether.

Tambayar "me yasa?" tana nuna cewa akwai manufa, kuma yawancin masu kafirci sun dage cewa manufa tana cikin tunanin addini da ya tsufa, ba gaskiya ba ce. Wannan hanya ta kallon wanzuwarmu a duniya ba ta da amfani sosai. A irin wannan duniya, komai za a iya bayyana shi ta hanyar hanyoyin zahiri waɗanda ba mu da iko a kansu. Mu kawai ɗaya ne daga cikin dominoes a jere da ke faɗuwa. Dole ne mu faɗi, domin wanda ke bayanmu ya faɗi. Ba wai kawai hakan ya saɓa wa fahimta ta farko ba, har ma yana nuna wasu bambance-bambance masu ban mamaki a yadda muke tunani a ayyukan yau da kullum. Ka yi tunanin, yayin da kake karanta wannan littafi, ka isa babin ƙarshe sai ka ga wannan jumla: "Babu wata manufa a bayan wannan littafi." Shin za ka ɗauki irin wannan magana da muhimmanci?

Asking why implies a purpose, and many atheists maintain that purpose is an illusion, based on outdated religious thinking. This is a very unhelpful way of looking at our existence in the universe. In such a world, everything can be explained via physical processes that we have no control over. We are just one of the dominoes in a falling row of dominoes. We have to fall, because the domino behind us fell. Not only is it counterintuitive, but it highlights some striking contradictions in the way we reason in normal day-to-day activities. Imagine, while reading this book you reach the final chapter and you see the following sentence: “There is no purpose behind this book”. Would you even consider taking such a statement seriously?.

Ba zan iya amsa wasu tambayoyi na falsafa ko na ilimin metaphysics ba.

Cannot answer some metaphysical questions.

Ilimi zai iya magance wasu tambayoyin metaphysical. Sai dai, waɗannan su ne tambayoyin da za a iya amsawa ta hanyar gwaji da lura. Misali, ilimi ya iya bayyana farkon duniya ta hanyar fannin da ake kira cosmology. Duk da haka, akwai wasu tambayoyi masu inganci da ba za a iya amsa su ta hanyar kimiyya ba. Waɗannan sun haɗa da: Me ya sa ƙarshen hujjar deductive ke biyo bayan premises ɗin da suka gabata? Akwai lahira? Akwai rayuka? Yaya yake ji ga halitta mai hankali ta fuskanci kwarewar hankali ta zahiri? Me ya sa akwai wani abu maimakon babu komai? Dalilin da yasa ilimin kimiyya ba zai iya magance waɗannan tambayoyin ba shi ne cewa suna magana ne game da abubuwan da suka wuce duniyar zahiri da ake iya gani da aunawa.

Science can address some metaphysical questions. However, these are the questions that can be empirically addressed. For example, science has been able to address the beginning of the universe via its field known as cosmology. Nevertheless, some valid questions cannot be answered scientifically. These include: Why do conclusions in deductive reasoning necessarily follow from the previous premises? Is there an afterlife? Do souls exist? What is it like for a conscious organism to experience a subjective conscious experience? Why is there something rather than nothing? The reason that science cannot address these questions is because they refer to things that go beyond the physical, observable world.

Gaskiya ta asali.

Necessary truths.

Scientism ba zai iya tabbatar da gaskiyoyin wajibi kamar lissafi da ma'ana ba. Kamar yadda aka tattauna a Babi na 3, sakamakon hujjar kwatankwacin ƙaddara (valid deductive argument) yana bin mahallansa babu makawa. Ka yi la'akari da wannan hujja:

Scientism cannot prove necessary truths such as mathematics and logic. As discussed in Chapter 3, the conclusion of a valid deductive argument necessarily follows from its premises. Consider the following argument:

Ƙarshe-ƙarshen da aka cimma bisa ga ƴan lura kaɗan ba su zama tabbatattu ba.

1. Conclusions based on limited observations are not absolute.

2. Ƙarshen ilimin kimiyya yana dogara ne da ɗan abin da aka lura da shi kawai.

2. Scientific conclusions are based on limited observations.

3. Saboda haka, matsayin kammala-kammala na kimiyya ba shi da tabbas ko cikakke.

3. Therefore, scientific conclusions are not absolute.

Ingancin wannan hujja (ba a rikita ta da ƙarfinta ba) ba ta dogara ne da shaidar gwaji ba. Ingancinta yana nufin tsarin tafiyar da hujjar cikin hankali, kuma ba shi da alaƙa da gaskiyar muhimman maganganun da aka tsara ta a kansu. Akwai haɗin kai na hankali tsakanin ƙarshe da muhimman maganganun. Wannan haɗin ba shi da wata alaƙa da abin da ake gani ko aunawa; yana faruwa ne a cikin zuciyar mutum. Shin kimiyya za ta iya tabbatar da haɗin hankali tsakanin muhimman maganganu da ƙarshe? A'a, ba za ta iya ba. Kamar yadda aka tattauna a Babi na 3, akwai wani haske a cikin zukatanmu wanda ke kai mu daga muhimman maganganu zuwa ƙarshe. Muna ganin wani abu wanda ba shi da tushe a shaidar gwaji. Da alama akwai tsare-tsaren hankali na ciki, ko al'amura a cikin zukatanmu, waɗanda ke sauƙaƙa irin wannan tunani. Babu wata hanyar lura da za ta iya tabbatar ko hujjar tafiyar da hujjar ƙididdiga ta hankali.

The validity of this argument (not to be confused with its soundness) is not based on empirical evidence. Its validity refers to the logical flow of the argument and has nothing to do with the truth of the premises. There is a logical connection between the conclusion and the premises. This connection is not based on anything empirical; it is happening in one’s mind. Can science justify the logical connection between the premises and the conclusion? No, it cannot. As discussed in Chapter 3, there is an insight in our minds that moves us from the premises to the conclusion. We see something that is not based on empirical evidence. There seem to be internal logical structures or aspects of our minds that facilitate this type of reasoning. No form of observation can justify or prove the logical flow of a deductive argument.

Ayyukan lissafi irin su 3 + 3 = 6 suma gaskiya ce ta wajibi, ba kawai janar-janar da ake samu daga gwaji ba.343. Misali, idan na tambaye ka menene daya Fufulah da wani daya Fufulah, amsar a fili take cewa biyu ne. Duk da cewa ba ka san menene Fufulah ba, kuma ba ka taba ganinsa ko jin sa ba, ka san cewa daya daga cikinsu da wani daya za su zama biyu. Sauran Hanyoyin Ilimi Kimiyya ba ta iya tabbatar da sauran hanyoyin ilimi kamar shaida ta bakin wasu. Wannan wani reshe ne na epistemology wanda ke nazarin "yadda muke samun ilimi da gaskatawa mai inganci daga maganar wasu mutane".344.

Mathematical truths such as 3 + 3 = 6 are also necessary truths and are not purely empirical generalisations. 343. For instance, if I were to ask what is one Fufulah plus one Fufulah, the answer would obviously be two. Even though you do not know what a Fufulah is, and you have never sensed one, you know that one of them plus another one is going to be two. Other sources of knowledge Science cannot justify other sources of knowledge, such as testimony. This is a branch of epistemology “concerned with how we acquire knowledge and justified belief from the say-so of other people”.344.

Saboda haka, ɗaya daga cikin muhimman tambayoyin da yake ƙoƙarin amsawa shi ne: Ta yaya ake samun "ilimi a kan tushen abin da wasu mutane suke faɗa mana"?345

Therefore, one of the key questions it tries to answer is: How do we gain “knowledge on the basis of what other people tell us?”345

Farfesa Benjamin McMyler ya bayar da taƙaitaccen bayani game da ilimin shaida (testimonial knowledge):

Professor Benjamin McMyler provides a summary of testimonial knowledge:

"Ga wasu abubuwan da nake sani. Na san cewa kokuwar jan kai (copperhead) ita ce macijin dafi mafi yawa a yankin Houston da kewaye. Na san cewa Napoleon ya sha kashi a Yakin Waterloo. Na san cewa, a lokacin da nake rubutu, matsakaicin farashin mai a Amurka shi ne $4.10 a kowace galan… Dukkan wadannan abubuwa na sansu ne bisa abin da masana ilimin sanin asali (epistemologists) ke kira shaida-ta-magana, wato bisa ga kasancewar wani mutum ko rukuni na mutane ne suka gaya mana su."

“Here are a few things that I know. I know that the copperhead is the most common venomous snake in the greater Houston area. I know that Napoleon lost the Battle of Waterloo. I know that, as I write, the average price for gasoline in the U.S is $4.10 per gallon… All of these things I know on the basis of what epistemologists call testimony, on the basis of being told of them by another person or group of persons.”346.

McMyler ta ce taƙaitawarsa tana da sauƙin fahimta kuma tana nuna dalilin da ya sa muke ɗaukar wasu ilimi kawai bisa sahihancin abin da wasu suka ruwaito mana. Misalin cewa duniya zagaye take misali ne mai ban mamaki. Ga mafi yawan mu, imani da cewa duniya zagaye take ba ya dogara ne da lissafi ko kimiyya ba. Ya dogara ne kawai akan shaida ko ruwaya daga wasu. Ƙila amsoshin farko da za ka bayar su kasance kamar haka: "Na ga hotuna", "Na karanta a littattafan kimiyya", "Duk malamaina sun faɗa mini", "Zan iya hawa mafi tsayin dutse in lura da lanƙwasar duniya", da sauransu. Amma idan aka yi nazari sosai, duk waɗannan amsoshi suna cikin ilimin ruwaya. Ganin hotuna ruwaya ce, domin dole ne ka karɓi maganar mai iko ko mutumin da ya ce hoto ne na duniya. Koyon wannan gaskiya daga littattafan kimiyya ma ruwaya ce, domin dole ne ka karɓi abin da marubutan suka ce a matsayin gaskiya. Haka ma idan ka koma ga malamanka. Ƙoƙarin tabbatar da imaninka a yanzu ta hanyar tsayuwa a kan kololuwar dutse ma ruwaya ce, domin mutane da dama ba su taɓa yin hakan ba. Zatonka cewa tsayuwa a kan kololuwa za ta ba ka shaida na zagayen duniya yana dogara ne, a ƙarshe, ga maganar wasu. Ko da ka taɓa yin hakan, hakan ba ya tabbatar da zagayen duniya. Tsayuwa a kan kololuwa za ta nuna kawai cewa duniya tana da wani irin lanƙwasa, ba cikakkiyar ƙwallo ba (domin tana iya zama rabin zagaye ko siffar fure). A taƙaice, ga mafi yawan mu, gaskiyar cewa duniya zagaye take ba ta dogara da wani abu ba sai ruwaya.

McMyler’s summary seems quite intuitive and highlights why we claim some knowledge solely based on testimonial transmission. The world being a sphere is a striking example. The belief that the world is a sphere is—for most of us—not based on mathematics or science. It is purely centred on testimony. Your initial reactions may entail the following statements: “I have seen pictures”, “I have read it in science books”, “All my teachers told me”, “I can go on the highest mountain peak and observe the curvature of the Earth”, and so on. However, upon intellectual scrutiny, all of our answers fall under testimonial knowledge. Seeing pictures or images is testimonial because you have to accept the say-so of the authority or person who said it is an image of the world. Learning this fact from science textbooks is also due to testimonial transmission, as you have to accept what the authors say as true. This also applies when referring to your teachers. Attempting to empirically justify your current conviction by standing on the highest peak is also based on testimony, as many of us have never done such a thing. Your assumption that standing on the highest peak will provide you with evidence for the roundness of the Earth is still based, ultimately, on the say-so of others. Even if you have done it before, it does not in any way prove the roundness of the Earth. Standing on a peak will only indicate that the Earth has some form of curvature—and not a complete sphere (after all, it can be semi-circular or shaped like a flower). In summary, for the majority of us, the fact that the world is round is not based on anything else apart from testimony.

Ilimi ba zai yiwu ba tare da shaida ko bayani daga wasu ba. Farfesa a fannin ilimin ka'idojin ilimi (epistemology), C. A. J. Coady, ya taƙaita abubuwan da aka faɗa zuwa yanzu, kuma ya lissafa wasu daga cikin abubuwan da ake karɓa kawai bisa isar da shaida: "…yawancinmu ba mu taɓa ganin an haifi jariri ba, haka kuma yawancinmu ba mu bincika yadda jini ke zagayawa ba, ko ainihin yanayin ƙasa na duniya, ko wani ingantaccen samfurin dokokin ƙasa ba, ba mu kuma yi lura-lura da suke bayan iliminmu cewa fitillun sararin sama halittu ne na sama masu nisa sosai…."347

Knowledge is impossible without testimony. Professor of Epistemology C. A. J. Coady summarises the points made so far, and lists some of the things that are solely accepted on the basis of testimonial transmission: “…many of us have never seen a baby born, nor have most of us examined the circulation of the blood nor the actual geography of the world nor any fair sample of the laws of the land, nor have we made the observations that lie behind our knowledge that the lights in the sky are heavenly bodies immensely distant….”347

Muhimmancin ilimin shaida ba ya bukatar ƙarin bayani (don cikakken bayani kan shaida, ka duba Babi na 13). A takaice, scientism, wato ra'ayin cewa hanyar kimiyya ita kaɗai ce hanyar yanke hukunci game da gaskiyar duniya, ƙarya ce. Scientism ta kan rushe kanta; haka kuma ba ta iya bayyana gaskiyar ɗabi'a, gaskiyar lissafi da ma'auni, da kuma muhimman hanyoyin ilimi kamar shaida. Kimiyya hanya ce mai iyaka ta nazari, wadda ba za ta iya amsa dukkan tambayoyi ba. Zato na #2: Yana aiki, saboda haka gaskiya ne.

The significance of testimonial knowledge needs no further discussion (for a lengthier discussion on testimony please refer to Chapter 13). In summary, scientism, which is the view that the scientific method is the only way to form conclusions about reality, is false. Scientism is self-defeating; it also cannot account for moral truths, logical and mathematical truths, and indispensable sources of knowledge such as testimony. Science is a limited method of study that cannot answer all the questions Assumption #2: It works, therefore it’s true.

Ba ya biyo bayan cewa idan wani abu yana aiki, to gaskiya ne. Duk da haka, jahilcin jama'a game da falsafar kimiyya ya ba masu yada ilimi irin su Richard Dawkins damar ci gaba da cewa a fili cewa sakamakon kimiyya gaskiya ne saboda suna aiki. A wani laccar jama'a, an tambayi Dawkins game da matakin tabbaci da za a iya dangantawa da kimiyya; amsarsa—kamar yadda aka ambata a baya—ta kasance mara ladabi. Dawkins a bayyane yake yayi kuskure; ba ya biyo bayan cewa idan wani abu yana aiki, to a zahiri gaskiya ne. Ka'idar phlogiston misali ne mai dacewa da ke tabbatar da wannan batu.

It does not logically follow that just because something works, it is true. Despite this, popular ignorance of the philosophy of science has allowed popularisers such as Richard Dawkins to publicly maintain that scientific conclusions are true because they work. During a public lecture, Dawkins was asked about the level of certainty that we can attribute to science; his answer was—as mentioned previously—crude. Dawkins was obviously mistaken; it does not follow that just because something works, it is in fact true. The phlogiston theory is an apt example to prove this point.

Masana kimiyya na farko sun gabatar da wani ra'ayi cewa a cikin dukkan abubuwan da ke iya kama wuta akwai wani sinadari da ake kira phlogiston. Bisa ga wannan ra'ayi, idan abu mai iya kama wuta ya kama wuta, zai saki phlogiston. Duk abin da ya fi saurin kama wuta, to yana dauke da phlogiston mai yawa. Al'ummar kimiyya sun karbi wannan ra'ayi a matsayin gaskiya. Ra'ayin ya yi aiki sosai har ta kai a shekarar 1772 Dan Rutherford ya yi amfani da shi wajen gano nitrogen, wanda a lokacin ya kira shi 'iska mai dauke da phlogiston'. Sai dai daga baya an gano cewa phlogiston ra'ayi ne na karya; phlogiston ba ya wanzuwa. Wannan na daya daga cikin misalai da dama da ke nuna cewa ra'ayi na iya yin aiki kuma ya samar da sabbin gaskiyar kimiyya, amma daga baya a gano cewa karya ne. Darasin a bayyane yake: kasancewar wani abu yana aiki, ba ya nufin gaskiya ne. Wasu masu suka marasa horo na iya jayayya cewa misalin da ke sama takamamme ne kuma ba zai iya shafar kimiyyar zamani ba. Suna ganin cewa ra'ayin phlogiston ba cikakken ra'ayi ba ne kuma yana da zato. Sai dai ra'ayoyin kimiyya na yau ba su da wadannan matsaloli. Wannan kuskure ne gaba daya. Ka dauki juyin halittar Darwin a matsayin misali na ra'ayi da aka tabbatar. A cewar masana ilimin boko na al'ada, yana dogara ne akan zato, ana daukarsa a matsayin mai dan tsinkaye, kuma akwai sabani game da manyan ra'ayoyinsa.348

Early chemists postulated a theory that in all combustible objects was an element called phlogiston. According to this theory, when a combustible object burned, it would release phlogiston. The more combustible a material was, the more phlogiston it contained. This theory was adopted as a fact by the scientific community. The theory worked so well that in 1772 Dan Rutherford used it to discover nitrogen, which he called ‘phlogisticated air’ at the time. However, phlogiston was later found to be a false theory; phlogiston did not exist. This is one of many examples to show that a theory can work and produce new scientific truths, and yet later be found to be false. The lesson is obvious: just because something works, does not mean it is true. Some untrained objectors would argue that the example above is specific and cannot apply to modern science. They maintain that the theory of phlogiston was not a complete theory and had assumptions. However, today’s scientific theories do not suffer from these problems. This is completely false. Take Darwinian evolution as an example of a well-established theory. According to mainstream secular academics, it is based on assumptions, considered relatively speculative, and there are disputes about its core ideas.348

Ayyukan kimiyya na juyawa baya tambayar wanda ke zaune a kujerar gaba. Ko da abubuwan da ake gani a fili, babu wanda zai musanta su, kuma ana iya juya su. Wani misali na kwanan nan shi ne binciken kwanyar Neanderthal a Turai. Masana halittu masu bin ka'idar Darwin sun yi jayayya cewa Neanderthal dole ne ya zama kakannin nau'in mu. A littattafan karatu, fina-finan bayanai da gidajen tarihi an koyar da wannan a matsayin 'gaskiyar kimiyya'; a shekarar 1997 masana halittu sun sanar cewa Neanderthal ba zai iya zama magabacinmu ba, bisa gwajin DNA na zamani. Kowane fanni na kimiyya, har ma da ka'idojin ƙanana da ke haɗa manyan ka'idoji a kowane fage, a ƙarshe zai sake duba matsayinsa. Tarihin kimiyya ya nuna mana wannan yanayi, saboda haka magana game da 'gaskiyar kimiyya' a matsayin wadda ba ta canzawa ba ba daidai ba ce. Haka kuma ba ta da amfani. Duk ka'idojin kimiyya 'aikin da ake ci gaba da yi' ne kuma 'samfura na kusan gaskiya'. Idan wani ya ce akwai gaskiya cikakkiya ta kimiyya, to yaya zai bayyana gaskiyar cewa 'injiniyar ƙwayoyin zarra' da 'ka'idar dangantaka ta gaba ɗaya', waɗanda masana kimiyyar zahiri ke ganin dukansu gaskiya ne, sun saba wa juna a asali? Ba za su iya zama gaskiya cikakkiya ba tare. Sanin haka, masana kimiyyar zahiri suna ɗaukar dukansu a matsayin samfuran aiki na gaskiya, kuma suna amfani da wannan hanya don ci gaba. Don haka ra'ayin cewa ka'idojin kimiyya da aka tabbatar da su sosai ƙarshe ne, yana da ɓatarwa, ba shi da amfani, kuma yana da haɗari ga ci gaban kimiyya. Masana tarihin kimiyya da masana falsafar kimiyya sun yi ƙarfin hali wajen adawa da amfani da irin wannan harshe. Masana falsafar kimiyya Gillian Barker da Philip Kitcher sun jaddada wannan: "Kimiyya tana iya sake dubawa. Saboda haka, magana game da 'tabbatar' kimiyya abu ne mai haɗari, domin kalmar tana ƙarfafa ra'ayin cewa matsaya tana da tabbaci kamar an sassaƙa ta a dutse."349.

Scientific U-turns do not care about who is sitting in the passenger seat. Even things which seemed obvious, undeniable and observable can be overturned. A relatively recent example of this is the study of Neanderthal skulls in Europe. Darwinian biologists argued that Neanderthals must have been the ancestors to our species. In textbooks, documentaries and museums, this ‘scientific fact’ was taught; in 1997 biologists announced the Neanderthal simply could not be our forerunner, based on modern DNA testing. Every aspect of science, and even the subtheories that make up the bigger theories in every field, will eventually revise their conclusions. The history of science has shown us this trend, so to speak of ‘scientific facts’ as immutable is not accurate. It is also impractical. All scientific theories are ‘work in progress’ and ‘approximate models’. If someone claims there is such a thing as scientific absolute truths, then how would he or she explain the fact that ‘quantum mechanics’ and ‘general relativity’, which are both seen as true by physicists, contradict each other at a fundamental level? They both cannot be true in an absolute sense. Knowing this, physicists assume both to be true working models and use this approach to make further progress. The idea that well-confirmed scientific theories are final is therefore misleading, impractical and dangerous for scientific progress. Historians and philosophers of science have been vocal in their opposition of using such language. Philosophers of science Gillian Barker and Philip Kitcher drive the point home: “Science is revisable. Hence, to talk of scientific ‘proof’ is dangerous, because the term fosters the idea of conclusions that are graven in stone.”349.

Zato #3: Kimiyya tana kaiwa ga tabbatacciyar sani.

Assumption #3: Science leads to certainty.

Wasu masu ra'ayin cewa babu Allah suna da babbar fahimta ta kuskure game da falsafar kimiyya. Suna ɗauka cewa da zarar kimiyya ta tabbatar da wani abu a matsayin wanda aka tabbatar da shi a kimiyance, to gaskiya ne ba tare da wata shakka ba kuma ba zai taɓa canzawa ba. Wannan kuwa yana nuna rashin sanin manyan matsalolin da har yanzu ba a warware su ba a kimiyya. Ɗaya daga cikin waɗannan matsalolin, wadda ta shafi tattaunawarmu, ita ce shigar da hujja (induction). Duk da cewa akwai hanyoyi da dama da masana kimiyya ke amfani da su wajen tabbatar da ka'ida ko yin ƙarshe game da bayanan da suka gwada, hujjojin shigar da hujja su ne ginshiƙin mafi yawan su. Duk da haka, hujjojin shigar da hujja ba za su taɓa kai ga tabbaci ba.

Some atheists have a gross misunderstanding of the philosophy of science. They assume that once science declares something as scientifically proven, then it is absolutely true and will never change. This, however, exposes a lack of knowledge of the basic unresolved issues in science. One of these issues, which is relevant to our discussion, is induction. Although there are many ways scientists confirm a theory or form conclusions about the empirical data they have tested, inductive arguments remain the bedrock of most of them. Yet inductive arguments can never lead to certainty.

Hujjojin Ƙaddamarwa (Inductive arguments)

Inductive arguments.

Hujjojin ƙaddara (inductive arguments) sun shafi iliminmu game da abin da ba a gani ba. Suna taka muhimmiyar rawa a cikin ilimin ɗan adam, musamman ilimin kimiyya. Hujjojin ƙaddara suna amfani da misalan abin da muka gani don yanke hukunci game da abin da ba mu gani ba. Ana iya amfani da su har da abin da ke yanzu da abin da ya gabata. Misali:

Inductive arguments concern our knowledge of the unobserved. They play a central role in human knowledge, specifically scientific knowledge. Inductive arguments use instances of what we have observed to make conclusions for what we have not observed. They can be applied to include the present and the past. For example:

Ginshiƙi: Ga abin da na ji daga masu gina jiki da na yi magana da su, sun ƙara yawan tsoka saboda cin sunadarin dabbobi da yawa. Kammalawa: Duk masu gina jiki a baya sun ƙara yawan tsoka ta hanyar cin sunadarin dabbobi da yawa.

• Past—Premise: The bodybuilders I have spoken to have increased muscle mass as a result of eating a lot of animal protein. Conclusion: All bodybuilders in the past increased muscle mass by eating a lot of animal protein.

• Gabatarwa—Dalili: Abokina ya kasance koyaushe yana haɗuwa da karnuka masu abokantaka. Ƙarshe: Duk karnuka masu abokantaka ne.

• Present—Premise: My friend has always experienced friendly dogs. Conclusion: All dogs are friendly.

• Makomai—Gabatarwa: Dukkan yakin neman shugabancin Amurka sun taba samun dan takarar Democrat. Kammalawa: Yakin neman shugabancin Amurka na gaba zai sami dan takarar Democrat.

• Future—Premise: All of the US presidential campaigns have had a Democrat candidate. Conclusion: The next presidential campaign will have a Democrat candidate.

Matsayin waɗannan ƙarshe-ƙarshen a sama, a bayyane suke ba su kai matakin tabbaci na gaskiya ba, domin ba hujjoji ne na kwatance (deductive) ba. Bayanan da ke ƙasa suna nuna dalilin da ya sa ƙarshe-ƙarshen da ke cikin hujjojin ƙwaƙwalwa (inductive) da ke sama ba lallai ba ne su biyo baya.

The above conclusions obviously do not reach the level of true certainty because they are not deductive arguments. The explanations below show why the conclusions in the above inductive arguments do not necessarily follow:

Masu gina jiki na masu cin ganyayyaki a da sun sami karuwar tsoka ta hanyar cin sinadarin furotin na kayan lambu kawai.

• Vegetarian bodybuilders in the past gained muscle mass from eating only vegetable protein.

Wasu karnuka na iya zama marasa abokantaka.

• It could be the case that some dogs are unfriendly.

A nan gaba, za a iya samun sauyin tsarin siyasa a siyasar Amurka, inda jam'iyyar Democrats za ta iya wargajewa kuma sabuwar jam'iyya ta fito.

• In the future, there could be a political paradigm shift in US politics, the Democrats could dissolve and a new party could emerge.

Rashin tabbas da ke tattare da hujjojin ilimin tunanin (inductive) ya sa masana falsafa da yawa suna tambaya game da ingancin ilimin tunanin a matsayin hanyar samun ilimi: wannan wani fanni ne na falsafa da ake kira epistemic justification. Wannan tambayar ta haifar da abin da yanzu ake kira matsalar ilimin tunani (problem of induction). Ya kamata a lura cewa hujjojin ilimin tunani ba iri ɗaya suke da tunanin ilimin tunani (inductive reasoning) ba, domin wannan nau'in tunani yana nufin amfani da gabobin jiki na ji da gani, ba yadda ake yin ƙarshe ba. Misali, ka lura da kwaɗi a cikin lambunka, sannan ka bayyana abin da ka gani ta hanyar cewa akwai kwaɗi a cikin lambunka. Ba ka yin ƙarshe game da abubuwan da ba a sani ba (a wannan yanayin, duk kwaɗi, ko kwaɗin gaba da ba ka gani ba tukuna).

The uncertain nature of inductive arguments has caused many philosophers to question the validity of induction as a means to knowledge: this is an area of philosophy known as epistemic justification. This questioning led to what is now known as the problem of induction. It must be noted that inductive arguments are not the same as inductive reasoning, as this type of reasoning refers to the use of the senses and not how conclusions are made. For example, you observe frogs in your garden, and you mirror what you have observed by stating that there are frogs in your garden. You do not make a conclusion for unknown phenomena (in this case all frogs, or the next frog you have not yet observed)

Matsalar hujja ta hanyar tunani daga takamaiman abubuwa zuwa dokoki gaba ɗaya.

The problem of induction.

Ƙalubalen da ake yi wa hujjar ƙididdigewa (induction) ana iya komawa da shi zuwa ga makarantar falsafa ta Girka mai shakka da ake kira Pyrrhonism.350 Sai dai David Hume ne ya bayyana cikakken dalilin da ya sa hujjojin ƙididdigewa suka kasa ba mu ilimin hakikanin abubuwa. Hume ya yi jayayya cewa yanayin tunaninmu yana dogara ne a kan dalili da sakamako, kuma tushen dalili da sakamako shi ne gogewa. Ya ce tun da fahimtarmu game da dalili da sakamako tana dogara ne a kan gogewa, ba zai kai ga tabbaci ba. Hume ya yi bayani cewa yin amfani da ɗan iyakantaccen saitin gogewa don yanke hukunci game da gogewar da ba a gani ba ba zai haifar da tabbaci ba.351

The challenge to induction can be traced back to the Greek, sceptical, philosophical school known as Pyrrhonism.350 However, it was David Hume who comprehensively explained the failure of inductive arguments to provide knowledge of reality. Hume argued that the nature of our reasoning was based upon cause and effect, and that the foundation of cause and effect was experience. He maintained that since our understanding of cause and effect was based on experience, it would not lead to certainty. Hume argued that to use a limited set of experiences to conclude for an unobserved experience would not give rise to certainty.351

Misalan da suka gabata sun nuna cewa hujjojin induction (na tsari-daga-takamaiman-zuwa-gama-gari) suna kaiwa ga matsaya ta hanyar daukar abubuwan da suka faru a iyakantacce, sa'annan su yanke hukunci game da abubuwan da ba a taba fuskanta ba. Hujjojin induction ba su da inganci a cikin ma'anar deductive, domin matsayar ba lallai ta biyo bayan muhallan ba. Hume bai takaita muhawararsa ga rashin tabbas na induction kadai ba; yana ikirarin cewa ba su da wata hujja ta kowace fuska. Hujjojin induction suna dogara ne akan zato cewa "nan gaba zai yi kama da abin da ya gabata", wanda ke nufin cewa yanayi yana da daidaito. Sai dai, hanya daya tilo da za a tabbatar da wannan zato ita ce ta amfani da hujjar induction. Hume ya bayyana cewa wannan dalili zagaye ne, domin zato din ya dogara ne akan abin da muke neman tabbatarwa. Tabbatar da hujjar induction da wannan zato zai zama daidai da tabbatar da hujjojin induction da hujjojin induction. Bayan haka, zai yiwu yanayi ba shi da daidaito.353

The previous examples show that inductive arguments make a conclusion by moving from the particular to the general. In other words, one moves from a limited set of experiences to conclude for experiences that have not been experienced. Inductive arguments are not deductively valid, in that the conclusion does not necessarily follow from its premises. Hume does not restrict his argument to the uncertainty of induction; he claims that they are not justified in any way. Inductive arguments are based on an assumption that “the future will resemble the past”, 352 which implies that nature is uniform. However, the only way to justify this assumption would be to use an inductive argument. Hume argues that this reasoning is circular, because the assumption is based on the thing that we are seeking to justify. To justify an inductive argument with this assumption would be tantamount to justifying induction arguments with inductive arguments. After all, it could be that nature is not uniform.353

A takaice dai, hujjar Hume ita ce ba za mu iya tabbatar da hujjojin ilimin hasashe (inductive) ba. Zaton cewa dabi'a tana da tsari iri ɗaya ya dogara ne kan hujja ta ilimin hasashe, saboda haka amfani da wannan zato don tabbatar da hujjojin ilimin hasashe "kamar yin garantin biyan bashinka ta hanyar alkawarin cewa za ka cika alkawuranka ne". 354.

In summary, Hume’s argument is that we cannot justify inductive arguments. The assumption that nature is uniform is based on an inductive argument, and therefore to use this assumption as a means to validate inductive arguments “is like underwriting your promise to pay back a loan by promising you will keep your promises”. 354.

Hujjojin shigar da hukunci (inductive arguments) a matsayin matsala ga kimiyya.

Inductive arguments as a problem for science.

Tun da ba za a iya samun tabbaci daga hujjojin induction ba, sai ya zama matsala ga ƙarshen kimiyya. Masana kimiyya sun dogara sosai da hujjojin induction wajen kafa ƙarshe game da bayanan da suka lura da su. Duk da haka, tunda duk lura da ake yi tana da iyaka ko kuma tana kan wani takamaiman tsari na bayanan da aka lura da su, to kafa ƙarshe bisa ga bayanai masu iyaka ba zai zama tabbatacce ba. Tarihin kimiyya ya bada misalai masu yawa da ke nuna yanayinta mai canzawa. Ka’idojin da suka yi tasiri a kowane fanni na kimiyya sun sha bamban sosai da na zamanin da. Samir Okasha, malami a fannin falsafa a Jami'ar York, ya yi bayani cewa idan muka zaɓi kowane fanni na kimiyya, za mu iya "tabbata cewa ka’idojin da suka fi yaɗuwa a wannan fanni za su bambanta sosai da waɗanda ake da su shekaru 50 da suka wuce, kuma sun bambanta sosai da waɗanda ake da su shekaru 100 da suka wuce."355

Given that inductive arguments cannot give rise to certainty, it then becomes a problem for scientific conclusions. Scientists heavily rely on inductive arguments to form conclusions about the data that they have observed. However, since all observations are limited or based on a particular set of observed data, then deriving a conclusion based on limited data will not be certain. The history of science provides many examples that highlight its dynamic nature. Prevailing theories in every field of science are very different from past eras. Samir Okasha, a lecturer of philosophy at the University of York, argues that if we were to pick any scientific discipline, we could be “sure that the prevalent theories in that discipline will be very different from those 50 years ago, and extremely different from 100 years ago.”355

A la'akari da farkon karni na 20, ilimin kimiyyar lissafi ya bayyana cikin tsari da kyau tare da tsarin Newton na duniya. Babu wanda ya ƙalubalance shi na kusan shekaru 200 saboda an tabbatar da cewa yana aiki ta hanyar kimiyya. Sai dai, injiniyoyin ƙwayoyin zarra (quantum mechanics) da ka'idar alaƙa ta gaba ɗaya (general relativity) sun ruguza ra'ayin Newton game da duniya. Injiniyoyin Newton sun ɗauka cewa lokaci da sarari abubuwa ne da ba sa canzawa, amma Albert Einstein ya nuna cewa su dangi ne kuma suna canzawa. A ƙarshe, bayan wani lokaci na rikice-rikice, 'tsarin Einstein' na duniya ya maye gurbin 'tsarin Newton'. Kallon tarihin kimiyya da sauri ya tabbatar da matsalar hujja ta hanyar kwatance (problem of induction): sabuwar lura za ta iya saɓa wa matsayar da aka cimma a baya a kowane lokaci.

At the beginning of the 20th century, physics looked neat and tidy with its Newtonian model of the universe. No one had challenged it for around 200 years as it was ‘scientifically proven’ to work. However, quantum mechanics and general relativity shattered the Newtonian view of the world. Newtonian mechanics assumed time and space to be fixed entities, but Albert Einstein showed these were relative and dynamic. Eventually, after a period of upheaval, the ‘Einstein Model’ of the universe replaced the ‘Newtonian Model’. A cursory glance at the history of science confirms the problem of induction: a new observation can always contradict previous conclusions.

Kimiyya da littafin addini.

Science and religious scripture.

Tun da ƙarshen kimiyya yana da yanayin induction, kuma hujjojin induction ba sa kaiwa ga tabbaci, to ya biyo baya cewa abin da muke kira bayanan kimiyya bai kamata a ɗauke su a matsayin cikakkun gaskiya ba. Babu allunan Musa a kimiyya. Duk da haka, akwai wasu abubuwa da bai kamata mu yi shakka a kansu ba, kamar: zagayen Duniya, kasancewar nauyi (gravity), da kuma yanayin elliptical na kewayen taurari.

Since scientific conclusions are inductive in nature, and inductive arguments do not lead to certainty, it follows that what we call scientific explanations should not be considered absolute. There are no Moses tablets in science. There are, however, some things that we should not be sceptical about, such as: the roundness of the Earth, the existence of gravity and the elliptical nature of orbits.

Masu adawa da addini da yawa suna yi wa nassosin addini ba'a saboda rashin iyawarsu wajen bayyana gaskiyar abubuwa. Akwai tattaunawoyi masu yawa a intanet da kuma a rayuwar yau da kullum kan kimiyya da akidar addini. Har shirye-shiryen talabijin na yau da kullum suna gayyatar mahawara kan ra'ayoyin addini game da duniyar halitta. Duk da haka, bisa ga tattaunawar da aka yi a sama, mun kirkiri rarrabuwa ta karya tsakanin addini da kimiyya. Ba abu ne mai sauki ba a karɓi ɗaya a kan ɗayan.

Many atheists mock religious scripture for its inability to represent the facts. There are many online and off-line discussions on science and religious orthodoxy. Even mainstream television programmes host debates on religious perspectives on the natural world. However, in light of the discussion above, we have created a false dichotomy of religion versus science. It is not as simple as accepting one over the other.

Kimiyya ita ce amfani da hankali ga duniyar halitta. Tana neman fahimtar yadda duniya take aiki. Alkur'ani ma yana magana kan al'amuran halitta, kuma babu makawa an sami rikici kai tsaye tsakanin shi da matsayar kimiyya. Idan rikici ya taso, babu dalilin firgita ko musanta ayar Alkur'ani da ba ta dace da kimiyya ba; haka kuma babu wanda zai yi amfani da wannan yanayi ya ce Alkur'ani ba daidai ba ne. Yin hakan zai zama ɗaukar cewa matsayar kimiyya gaskiya ce ta dindindin wadda ba za ta taɓa canjawa ba; wannan kuskure ne bayyananne. Tarihi ya nuna cewa kimiyya tana sake duba matsayinta. Yin imani da haka ba ya sa mutum ya zama mai adawa da kimiyya. Ka yi tunanin irin ci gaban da za mu samu idan ba a bar masana kimiyya su kalubalanci matsayin da aka riga aka cimma ba: da babu wani ci gaba kwata-kwata. Kimiyya ba tarin gaskiyoyi ne na har abada ba, kuma ba a taba nufin ta zama haka ba. Tun da akwai ingantattun hujjoji da ke tabbatar da da'awar Alkur'ani cewa magana ce daga Allah (duba Babi na 13), to idan Alkur'ani ya saba da iyakantaccen ilimin ɗan Adam, bai kamata hakan ya haifar da rudani mai girma ba. Ku tuna, Allah yana da cikakken hoto, mu muna da ƙaramin ɗigo guda kawai. Har zuwa shekarun 1950, dukkan masana kimiyyar lissafi, ciki har da Einstein, sun yi imani cewa sararin duniya madawwami ne; dukkan bayanai sun goyi bayan haka, kuma wannan imani ya saba da Alkur'ani. Duk da haka Alkur'ani ya bayyana a fili cewa sararin duniya yana da farko. Sabbin lura da aka yi ta amfani da manyan na'urorin hangen nesa na zamani sun sa masana kimiyyar lissafi suka watsar da samfurin 'yanayin tsayuwa' (duniya madawwamiya) suka maye gurbinsa da Samfurin Babban Fashewa (duniya mai farko, wataƙila kimanin shekaru biliyan 13.7 da suka wuce). Don haka kimiyya ta zo daidai da Alkur'ani. Abu irin wannan ya faru da ra'ayin Alkur'ani game da rana. Alkur'ani ya ce rana tana da kewaya; masana falaki sun yi sabani da haka, suna cewa tana tsaye ba ta motsi. Wannan shi ne mafi bayyananniyar sabani tsakanin lura da masana kimiyya suka yi da Alkur'ani. Sai dai bayan da aka gano na'urar Hubble, masana falaki sun sake duba matsayinsu, inda suka gano cewa Rana tana kewayawa a kusa da tsakiyar taurarin Milky Way. Duk da haka, wannan ba yana nufin cewa Alkur'ani littafin kimiyya ne ba. Littafin alamu ne. Alkur'ani ba ya ba da cikakkun bayanai game da al'amuran halitta. Yawancin abubuwan da yake ambata ana iya fahimtarsu da tabbatar da su da ido tsirara. Babban manufar ayoyin da ke nuni zuwa duniyar halitta shi ne bayyana ikon Allah da hikimarsa wadanda ba na zahiri ba. Rawarsu ba ta haɗa da yin bayani kan cikakkun bayanan kimiyya ba. Wadannan bayanai na iya canzawa a kan lokaci; amma gaskiyar cewa al'amuran halitta suna da iko da hikima a bayansu gaskiya ce da ba ta canzawa. Daga wannan mahanga, rikici tsakanin Alkur'ani da sakamakon kimiyya zai iya ci gaba, domin su nau'o'in ilimi ne guda biyu daban-daban gaba ɗaya.

Science is the application of reason to the natural world. It seeks to understand how the world works. The Qur’an also refers to natural phenomena, and inevitably there have been direct conflicts with scientific conclusions. When a conflict arises, there is no reason to panic or to deny the Qur’anic verse that is not in line with science; nor can anyone use this situation to claim that the Qur’an is wrong. To do so, would be to assume that scientific conclusions are true in an absolute sense and will not change; this is patently false. History has shown that science revises its conclusions. Believing this does not make one anti-science. Imagine how much progress we would make if scientists were not allowed to challenge past conclusions: there would be none. Science is not a collection of eternal facts and was never meant to be. Since there are good arguments to justify the Qur’an’s claim of being God’s word (see Chapter 13), then if the Qur’an conflicts with limited human knowledge, it should not create massive confusion. Remember, God has the picture, we have just a pixel. Until the 1950s, all physicists, including Einstein, believed that the universe was eternal; all the data supported this, and this belief conflicted with the Qur’an. Yet the Qur’an explicitly states that the universe had a beginning. New observations using powerful advanced telescopes made physicists drop the ‘steady state’ model (eternal universe) and replace that with the Big Bang Model (universe with a beginning, possibly about 13.7 billion years ago). So, science came into line with the Qur’an. The same thing happened with the Qur’anic view of the sun. The Qur’an states that the sun has an orbit; astronomers disagreed, saying it was stationary. This was the most direct contradiction between observations of scientists and the Qur’an. However, after the discovery of the Hubble telescope, astronomers revised their conclusions and found the Sun was orbiting around the centre of the Milky Way galaxy. Yet this does not mean that the Qur’an is a book of science. It’s a book of signs. The Qur’an does not give any details concerning natural phenomena. Most of the things it refers to can be understood and verified with the naked eye. The main objective of the verses that point towards the natural world is to expose a metaphysical power and wisdom. Their role does not include elucidating scientific details. These can change over time; however, the fact that natural phenomena have a power and wisdom behind them is a timeless reality. From this perspective, conflict between the Qur’an and scientific conclusions will probably continue, as they are two completely different types of knowledge.

Wannan tattaunawa bai kamata ta sa Musulmi da masu addini su ƙi amincewa da ƙarshen binciken kimiyya ba. Yin hakan zai zama abin dariya. Maimakon haka, ya kamata a karɓi ingantattun ka'idojin kimiyya da gaskiyar wahayi, koda kuwa sun saɓa wa juna. Ana iya karɓar ƙarshen binciken kimiyya a aikace a matsayin tsare-tsare masu aiki waɗanda za su iya canzawa, ba kuma cikakkun gaskiya ba, yayin da za a iya karɓar gaskiyar wahayi a matsayin wani ɓangare na imaninka. Idan babu fatan sulhunta wani ƙarshen binciken kimiyya da wata aya ta Alƙur'ani, to ba sai ka ƙi wahayi ka karɓi kimiyyar zamanin ba. Akasin haka kuma, bai kamata a ƙi kimiyya ba. Kamar yadda aka faɗa a baya, kana da 'yancin ilimi na karɓar gaskiyar kimiyya da ta wahayi duka. Hanya mai daidaito da sassauci game da kimiyya da wahayi ita ce karɓar kimiyya tare da barin shaida ta yi magana da kanta. Duk da haka, ya kamata hakan ya kasance cikin yanayin rashin yin manyan tsalle-tsalle na imani wajen ɗaukar shaidar da muka samu da ƙarshen da muka kai a matsayin gaskiya marar canzawa. Kimiyya na iya canzawa. Bugu da ƙari, wannan hanya ta haɗa da karɓar wahayin. A taƙaice, za mu iya karɓar ƙarshen binciken kimiyya a aikace da kuma a matsayin tsare-tsare masu aiki, amma idan wani abu ya saɓa wa wahayi (bayan an yi ƙoƙarin sulhunta su), ba sai ka shigar da ƙarshen binciken kimiyyar cikin tsarin imaninka ba. Shi ya sa Musulmi ba sa buƙatar ƙin juyin halittar Darwin; za su iya karɓarsa a aikace a matsayin mafi kyawun tsari mai aiki a yanzu, amma su fahimci cewa wasu sassansa ba za a iya sulhunta su da koyarwar addini ba. Ka tuna, kasancewar wani abu shi ne mafi kyawun tsari mai aiki a yanzu, ba ya nufin gaskiya ce cikakka. Haka kuma yana da muhimmanci a lura cewa ilimin kimiyya da wahayin Allah suna da tushe biyu daban-daban. Ɗaya daga tunanin ɗan adam mai iyaka ne, ɗayan kuma daga wurin Allah. Mutum zai aikata kuskuren ilimi idan ya yi amfani da binciken kimiyya a matsayin hanyar watsi da wahayi. Ilimin mu na zahirin abubuwa yana da iyaka, kamar hoto mai gutsutsure, yayin da ilimin Allah ba shi da iyaka. Saboda haka, idan aka sami sabani tsakanin su biyun, ya kamata a bi wannan hanya.

This discussion should not, however, encourage Muslims and religious people to deny scientific conclusions. To do so would be absurd. Rather, both well-confirmed scientific theories and the revelational truths should be accepted, even if they contradict each other. Scientific conclusions can be accepted practically as working models that can change and are not absolute, and the revelational truths can be accepted as part of one’s beliefs. If there is no hope of reconciling a scientific conclusion and a statement of the Qur’an, then you do not have to reject revelation and accept the science of the day. Conversely, the science should not be rejected either. As previously mentioned, it is within your epistemic right to accept both scientific and revelational truths. The balanced and nuanced approach concerning science and revelation is to accept the science and allow the evidence to speak for itself. However, this should be in the context of not making massive epistemic leaps of faith and concluding that the evidence we have acquired and the conclusions we have made are the gospel truth. Science can change. In addition, this approach includes accepting the revelation. In summary, we can accept scientific conclusions practically and as working models, but if anything contradicts revelation (after attempting to reconcile the two), you do not have to accept the scientific conclusion into your belief system. This is why Muslims should not need to deny Darwinian evolution; they can accept it practically as the current best-working model, but understand that some aspects of it cannot be reconciled with orthodoxy. Remember, just because something is the current best-working model, it is not the absolute truth. It is also important to note that scientific knowledge and Divine revelation have two different sources. One is from the human limited mind, the other is from God. One would have to commit an epistemological disqualification to use scientific conclusions as a means to dismiss revelation. We have a pixelated understanding of reality. Our knowledge is finite, God’s knowledge is not. Therefore, if there happens to be a contradiction between the two, the above strategy should be adopted.

Hujjojin Istiqra'i a Musulunci?

Islamic inductive arguments?.

Masu lura masu zurfi da ilimi a wannan tattaunawa za su lura cewa, duk da cewa wannan ra'ayi ne da aka fi yarda da shi a tsakanin malamai da masana falsafa, yana kuma fito da wasu suka da za a iya yi wa ilimin Musulunci. Suna iya jayayya cewa a tsarin Musulunci ana amfani da hujjojin shigowa (inductive arguments) wajen kiyaye Alkur'ani da hadisan Annabi (hadisai; ahadith a jam'i), saboda haka Musulmi ba za su iya da'awar tabbaci a cikin waɗannan muhimman tushen Musulunci ba. Wannan zargi ba daidai ba ne. Don bayyana dalilin, a koma ga bambancin da aka yi a baya tsakanin tunani na shigowa (inductive reasoning) da hujjojin shigowa (inductive arguments). Tunani na shigowa yana ba da tabbaci ga nau'o'in ilimi na asali. Misali, idan na lura da X a cikin Y, to babu shakka Y yana barin X; na lura cewa kurciya tana tashi, saboda haka babu makawa wasu kurciyoyi suna tashi. Kamar yadda kake gani, wannan nau'in shigowa kawai yana "madubantar" abin da aka lura da shi. Yana bayyana gaskiyar da ke bayyane ba tare da yin hukunci kan abin da ba a riga an lura da shi ba. Wannan nau'in shigowa ne aka yi amfani da shi wajen kiyaye Alkur'ani da hadisan Annabi. Misali, wani sahabin Annabi Muhammadﷺ ya ji Alkur'ani, sai kawai ya maimaita abin da ya ji. Bai taba yin hukunci kan ayar da bai ji ba. Misali, wani sahabi ba zai ji "Iyyaka na'abudu wa iyyaka nasta'een" (Kai muke bautawa, kuma Kai muke neman taimako) sannan ya yanke hukunci cewa "Qul huwa Allahu ahad" (Ka ce: Shi Allah ne, Makaɗaici). Saboda haka wannan zargi karya ne, domin yana rashin fahimtar nau'in shigowar da ke cikin kiyaye Alkur'ani da hadisan Annabi.

Critical and learned observers of this discussion will notice that although this is a mainstream understanding of science (amongst academics and philosophers), it also brings to light potential criticisms of Islamic epistemology. They can argue that in the Islamic tradition, inductive arguments are used to preserve the Qur’an and Prophetic traditions (known as hadith; ahadith, pl.). Therefore, Muslims cannot claim certainty in these vital source texts for Islam. This is a misplaced contention. To explain why, refer back to the earlier distinction between inductive reasoning and inductive arguments. Inductive reasoning provides certainty for basic types of knowledge. For instance, if I observe X in Y, it follows that Y allows X; I observe that crows fly, so it necessarily follows that some crows fly. As you can see, this form of induction just ‘mirrors’ the observation. It states the plain facts without making a conclusion for something that is yet to be observed. This type of induction was used in the preservation of the Qur’an and the Prophetic traditions. For example, a companion of the Prophet Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم heard the Qur’an, and he simply repeated what he had heard. He never made a conclusion for a verse that he never heard. For example, a companion wouldn’t hear “Iyyaka na’abudu wa iyyaka nasta’een” (it is You we worship and it is You we ask for help) and then conclude “Qul huwa Allahu ahad” (Say, He is God, the uniquely One). Hence this objection is false, as it misunderstands the type of induction involved in the preservation of the Qur’an and the Prophetic traditions.

Zato #4: Rikitar da hanyar ilimi (methodological naturalism) da falsafar dabi'a (philosophical naturalism).

Assumption #4: Conflating methodological with philosophical naturalism.

Ƙarshen zato da ke bayan da’awar cewa kimiyya tana kai ga rashin imani da Allah shi ne batun naturalism na falsafa da naturalism na hanya. Naturalism na falsafa shi ne ra’ayin cewa duniya kamar tsari ne da aka rufe; babu wani abu a waje da duniya da ke tsoma baki a cikinta, kuma babu Allah ko wani abu da ya shafi al’amuran ghaibu. Muhimmin al’amari na naturalism na falsafa shi ne cewa dukkan abubuwan da ke faruwa za a iya bayyana su ta hanyar tsarin halitta. Naturalism na hanya kuwa yana riƙe da cewa domin a kira wani abu na kimiyya, ba zai iya komawa ga ikon halitta ko aikin Allah ba.

The final assumption behind the assertion that science leads to atheism refers to philosophical naturalism and methodological naturalism. Philosophical naturalism is the view that the universe is like a closed system; there is nothing outside the universe that interferes with it, and there is no God or anything related to the supernatural. A key aspect of philosophical naturalism is that all phenomena can be explained via physical processes. Methodological naturalism maintains that for anything to be described as scientific, it cannot refer to God’s creative power or activity.

Masana kimiyya waɗanda suka yi imani cewa kimiyya na kai ga rashin imani da Allah suna riƙe da zato marar na kimiyya na naturalism na falsafa. Naturalism na falsafa yana zama kamar ‘tabarau’ da ake sanya wa idanu domin fahimtar duniya. Idan ka sanya tabaraun rawaya, wane launi za ka gani? Rawaya. Haka kuma, idan ka sanya tabaraun naturalism na falsafa, abin da kawai za ka gani shi ne duniya ba tare da Allah ba. Naturalism na falsafa yana tsara yadda mutum ke ganin duniya. Naturalism na falsafa kawai imani ne. Masanin falsafa marar imani Michael Ruse ya yarda da wannan gaskiyar: “Idan kana son amincewa, koyaushe na ce naturalism aiki ne na imani….” 356 Me ya sa yake imani? To, naturalism ba shi da daidaito, domin yana imani makaho cewa komai za a iya bayyana shi ta hanyar hanyoyin zahiri, duk da cewa akwai gaskiyoyi da dama masu tsayayya; wato gaskiyoyin da ke ƙin ka’ida.357 Misali, mu biyu mun haɗu yau a gidan abinci da ƙarfe shida, kuma washegari ‘yan sanda suka zo gidana don kama ni bisa zargin kisan wani a daidai lokacin da muke cin abinci tare. Gaskiyar da ke tsayayya zata kasance cewa ina tare da kai ina cin abinci a lokacin kisan. Wurin da aka tabbatar ina ya ƙi zargin ‘yan sanda cewa na aikata kisan. Watakila kana mamakin, waɗannan gaskiyoyi masu tsayayya da ke sa naturalism na falsafa ya zama marar daidaito su ne menene? To, yawancin surori da suka gabata shine wuri mai kyau na farawa. Naturalism na falsafa ba zai iya bayyana matsalar wahala ta sani ba (duba Babi na 7), ƙarewa da dogaro da duniya (duba Babi na 5 da 6), daidaita dokokin halitta da tsari a cikin duniya (duba Babi na 8), wanzuwar ɗabi’u na haƙiƙa (duba Babi na 9) da sauran abubuwa da yawa. Saboda haka, don me mutum zai karɓi irin wannan falsafa makaho, wadda ke hana mutum barin gaskiya ta yi magana da kanta? Masana da yawa suna da irin waɗannan zato na naturalism. Saboda haka, ba abin mamaki ba ne cewa suna watsi da sakamakon hujjojin tauhidi. Yawanci suna ƙin hujjoji masu kyau, domin an makanta su da zato na ƙarya cewa kome dole ne a bayyana shi ta hanyar hanyoyin zahiri, kuma ba za su taɓa karɓar bayanai na abin da ya wuce na zahiri ba. Duk da haka, hanyar ilimi ta naturalism (methodological naturalism) ba matsala ba ce ga imani da Allah, musamman imanin Musulunci. Ba matsala ba ce ga imanin Musulunci domin koyarwar Musulunci ta yarda cewa dukkan duniya an yi ta ne da musabbabai na zahiri, kuma waɗannan musabbabai bayyanuwa ne na nufin Allah. Wasu masu musun Allah kuwa, suna haɗa hanyar ilimi ta naturalism da falsafar naturalism. Kawai domin ƙarshe-ƙarshen kimiyya da ka'idojinta ba za su iya komawa ga ikon Allah da halittarsa ba (methodological naturalism), ba ya biyo baya cewa Allah ba ya wanzuwa (philosophical naturalism). Kamar yadda masanin halittun juyin halitta Scott C. Todd ya faɗa, "masanin kimiyya, a matsayinsa na mutum, yana da 'yancin rungumar gaskiyar da ta wuce naturalism."358

Atheists who believe that science leads to atheism hold the non-scientific assumption of philosophical naturalism. Philosophical naturalism forms the ‘lenses’ that are put on one’s eyes to understand the world. If you wore some yellow tinted glasses, what colour are you going to see? Yellow. Similarly, if you put on the lenses of philosophical naturalism, all you will see is a universe without God. Philosophical naturalism shapes the way one sees the world. Philosophical naturalism is simply a faith. The atheist Professor Michael Ruse admits this fact: “If you want a concession, I’ve always said that naturalism is an act of faith….” 356 Why is it a faith? Well, naturalism is incoherent, as it blindly believes that everything can be explained via physical processes, despite a number of recalcitrant facts; in other words, facts that resist a theory.357 For example, we both meet today at a restaurant at six o’clock, and the following day the police come to my house to arrest me on suspicion of murdering someone at the same time we were having dinner. The recalcitrant fact would be that I was with you eating at the time of the murder. My proven whereabouts resist the police’s suspicions that I committed the murder. You may be wondering, what are these recalcitrant facts that render philosophical naturalism as incoherent? Well, many of the previous chapters are a good starting point. Philosophical naturalism cannot adequately explain the hard problem of consciousness (see Chapter 7), the finitude and dependency of the universe (see Chapters 5 and 6), the fine-tuning of the laws and the order in the universe (see Chapter 8), the existence of objective morals (see Chapter 9) and much more. In light of this, why would anyone blindly adopt such a philosophy, which prevents one from allowing reality to speak for itself? Many atheists have such naturalistic presuppositions. Therefore, it is not surprising that they dismiss the conclusions of theistic arguments. Usually they reject good arguments, because they are blinded with the false assumption that everything has to be explained by physical processes and that they can never entertain supernatural explanations. Methodological naturalism however is not a problem for theism, especially Islamic theism. Methodological naturalism is not a problem for Islamic theism because the Islamic tradition accepts that the whole universe is made up of physical causes and these causes are a manifestation of the Divine will. Some atheists, however, conflate methodological naturalism with philosophical naturalism. Just because scientific conclusions and theories cannot refer to God’s power and creativity (methodological naturalism), it doesn’t follow that God doesn’t exist (philosophical naturalism). As evolutionary biologist Scott C. Todd said, “the scientist, as an individual, is free to embrace a reality that transcends naturalism”358.

Shin kimiyya ta karyata Allah?

So has science disproved God?.

A cikin hasken abin da aka faɗa a sama, amsar ita ce a'a. Kimiyya hanya ce mai kyau ta bincike wadda ta amfanar da ɗan adam sosai. Duk da haka, sakamakon da take kaiwa ba a rubuce suke a dutse ba. A matsayinta na hanya, ba za ta iya ƙin wanzuwar Allah kai tsaye ba, ba kuma za ta amsa dukkan tambayoyi ba, kuma ba ita kaɗai ce hanyar yanke hukunci game da gaskiya ba. Yawancin zato da wasu masu musun Allah ke riƙewa game da kimiyya ba su da daidaito, kuma suna dogara ne a kan rashin fahimta mai girma game da falsafar kimiyya.

In light of the above, the answer is no. Science is a beautiful method of study that has benefited humanity tremendously. However, its conclusions are not engraved in stone. As a method, it cannot directly reject God’s existence, answer all questions, and it is not the only way to form conclusions about reality. Many of the assumptions that some atheists hold about science are incoherent and based on a gross misunderstanding of the philosophy of science.