Tasawwur ka yi cewa kai mai bincike ne wanda ya yi tafiya a cikin jirgin sama zuwa wata duniya don ziyartar halittu masu kama da mutane. Da zarar ka sauka a duniyar, ka hadu da jagoranka. Ya gaya maka cewa jirginka ya sauka a Sphinga, kasar duniyar da ba ta da iyaka. Kana cikin rudani, sai ka tambayi jagoranka ko akwai wasu kasashe a duniyar. Ya yi dariya ya amsa da cewa, "Eh, akwai biyu." Kai kuma ka mayar da martani da cewa, "To, ta yaya za ka san lokacin da kake a wata kasa idan babu abin da ke banbance su?" Jagoran ya yi ajiyar zuciya ya ce, "Eh, mu ma muna fuskantar wannan matsala. Babu iyakoki, kuma siffofin kasa daya sun yi daidai da na wata." A karshe kai ka kawo karshen tattaunawar ta hanyar cewa, "To, da ya kamata ku mai da su kasa daya kawai, domin haka yake gani a idona." Dukanku kun ci gaba da tafiyarku don haduwa da wata tawagar jami'ai don cin abincin rana. A lokacin cin abincin, daya daga cikin jami'an ya yabi sarakunan kasar. Da jin haka, kai ka tambaya cikin ladabi, "Kana nufin akwai sarki fiye da daya?" Jami'in ya amsa, "Eh, muna da sarakuna biyu." Kai ka nuna mamaki sosai, ka tambaya yaya kasar za ta iya tafiya da sarakuna biyu. "Yaya kuke samun jituwa a dokokinku, da tsari a cikin al'ummarku?" Jami'in ya amsa, "Eh, koyaushe suna yarda da juna. Nufinsu daya ne." Kai ba ka iya dena kanka ba, sai ka mayar da martani, "To, ba a zahiri kuna da sarakuna biyu ba, domin suna aiki bisa nufi daya." Wannan labarin ya ƙunshi uku daga cikin hujjoji biyar da zan gabatar don tabbatar da cewa Ubangiji daya ne kawai zai iya kasancewa. Kashi na farko na labarin ya taƙaita wata hujja da na kira 'bambancin ra'ayi' (conceptual differentiation). Ta yi zato cewa domin yawa ya kasance, dole ne a sami wasu ra'ayoyi da ke banbance abu daya da wani. Misali, idan na ce akwai ayaba biyu a kan teburi, za ka iya tabbatar da wannan magana ta hanyar duba su. Dalilin da ya sa za ka ga ayaba biyu shi ne saboda akwai ra'ayoyi da ke banbance su; misali, girmansu, siffarsu, da wurin da suke a kan teburin. Duk da haka, idan babu wani abu da zai bambanta su, ba za a iya bambance tsakaninsu ba. Haka nan, tun da wannan littafi ya zuwa yanzu ya yi bayanin cewa akwai Mahalicci mai zaman kansa wanda ba a halicce Shi ba, mai iko, mai sani, Mai cikakken sani kuma wanda ya fi kowane abu girma, to, da'awar cewa akwai biyu zai buƙaci wani ra'ayi da zai bambanta su. Amma domin Mahalicci ya zama mahalicci, dole ne ya mallaki waɗannan siffofi. Don haka, faɗar cewa akwai biyu ba tare da ɗayansu ya bambanta da ɗayan ba, a zahiri yana nufin cewa akwai mahalicci ɗaya ne kawai. Idan duk abin da yake gaskiya ga mahalicci ɗaya gaskiya ne ga wani, to mun ayyana mahalicci ɗaya ne kawai, ba biyu ba.

Imagine you are an explorer who took a spaceship to another planet to visit human-like creatures. Once you land on the planet, you meet your guide. He tells you that your spaceship landed on Sphinga, the planet’s borderless country. You are confused and ask your guide if there are any other countries on the planet. He laughs and replies, “Yes, there are two.” You retort, “Well, how do you know when you’re in another country if there is nothing to differentiate them?” Your guide sighs and says, “Yeah, we have the same problem. There are no borders and the features of one country are the same as the other.” You finally end the discussion by saying, “You should have just made them into one country then, because that is what it looks like to me.” You both continue your journey to meet a group of officials for lunch. During the meal, one of the officials praises the kings of the country. Upon hearing this, you politely ask, “You mean, there is more than one king?” The official replies, “Yes, we have two kings.” You seem perplexed and ask how the country can function with two kings. “How do you have harmony in your laws, and order in your society?” The official replies, “Well, they always agree. Their wills are one.” You cannot hold yourself back and you respond, “Well, you do not really have two kings, then. Because they are acting in accordance with one will.” This story contains three of the five arguments I will present for the fact that there can only be one God. The first part of the story summarises an argument that I call ‘conceptual differentiation’. It postulates that in order for multiplicity to exist, there must be some concepts that differentiate one thing from another. For example, if I said that there are two bananas on the table, you would be able to verify that statement by observing them. The reason you can see two bananas is because there are concepts that differentiate them; for example, their size, shape and location on the table. However, if there was nothing to differentiate them, you could not distinguish between them. Similarly, since this book so far has argued that there is a necessary, uncreated creator who is powerful, knowing, All-Aware and transcendent, then to claim that there are two would require a concept that differentiates them. But in order for the Creator to be a creator, He must have these attributes. So saying there are two without one being different from another is basically saying that there is only one creator. If whatever is true of one creator is true of another, then we have just defined one creator and not two.

Sashe na biyu na labarin ya taƙaita duka hujjar keɓancewa da hujjar ma'anar. Hujjar keɓancewa tana riƙe da cewa ba za a iya samun ikon Allah fiye da ɗaya ba. Idan akwai masu halitta biyu, ɗayansu yana son ya halicci bishiya, to hanyoyi uku ne kawai za su yiwu. Na farko shi ne cewa su biyun su soke juna; wannan ba zai yiwu ba bisa hankali, domin halitta tana wanzuwa, kuma idan sun soke juna, da babu wata halitta kwata-kwata. Na biyu shi ne cewa ɗayan mai halitta ya rinjayi ɗayan ta hanyar tabbatar da cewa bishiyarsa ita ce aka halitta. Na uku shi ne cewa su biyun sun yarda su halicci bishiya ɗaya ta hanya ɗaya. Hanya ta biyu da ta uku suna nuna cewa akwai ikon Allah guda ɗaya, kuma ikon guda ɗaya a cikin tattaunawarmu yana nuna mai halitta guda ɗaya. Hujjar ma'anar kuwa tana tabbatar da cewa ba za a iya samun masu halitta fiye da ɗaya ba. Idan akwai masu halitta fiye da ɗaya, da duniya ba za ta nuna irin jituwar da take nunawa ba. Baya ga gabatar da hujjoji game da mai halitta, wannan littafi yana tabbatar da ra'ayin gargajiya game da Allah. Tun da ra'ayin gargajiya yana kwatanta Allah da wani iko mai girma wanda ba wani abu na waje da zai iya takaita shi, to a hankali ba za a iya samun ikoki guda biyu marasa iyaka ba.

The second part of the story summarises both the argument from exclusion and the argument from definition. The argument from exclusion maintains that there can only be one Divine will. If there were two creators and one wanted to create a tree, only three options would be possible. The first is that they both cancel each other out; this is not a rational possibility since creation exists, and if they cancelled each other out, there would be no creation at all. The second is that one creator overpowers the other by ensuring his tree is created. The third option is that they both agree to create the same tree in the same way. The second and third options imply that there is only one will, and one will in the context of our discussions indicates one creator. The argument from definition asserts that there cannot be more than one creator. If there was more than one creator, the cosmos would not display the harmony that it does. As well as presenting arguments for a creator, this book warrants the traditional conception of God. Since the traditional conception refers to God as having an imposing will that cannot be limited by anything external to Him, then it logically follows there cannot be two unlimited Divine wills.

Wannan babi zai yi bayani dalla-dalla kan waɗannan hujjoji tare da gabatar da wasu hujjoji guda biyu don nuna cewa wannan mahalicci dole ne ya zama ɗaya.

This chapter will elaborate on these arguments and present another two to show that this creator must be one:

• Hujjar keɓewa.

• The argument from exclusion.

• Bambance-bambance a ra'ayi (ra'ayi).

• Conceptual differentiation.

Reazar Occam.

• Occam’s razor.

Hujjar ma'ana (ta ma'anar kalma).

• The argument from definition.

• Hujjar wahayi.

• The argument from revelation.

Hujjar Keɓewa.

Argument from exclusion.

Wannan hujja tana cewa wanzuwar masu halitta da yawa ba zai yiwu ba, saboda ba za a iya samun nufi fiye da ɗaya ba. Na riga na tattauna cewa Mahalicci dole ne ya zama yana da nufi (duba Babi na 5), don haka tambayar yawan nufin da zai iya kasancewa tana kai mu cikin sauƙi zuwa tattaunawa mai zurfi kan wannan hujja. Don kawai mu ɗauka, bari mu ce akwai masu halitta guda biyu. Mahalicci A yana son ya motsa dutse, kuma Mahalicci B shi ma yana son ya motsa wannan dutse guda. Akwai yanayi uku da za su iya tasowa:

This argument maintains that the existence of multiple creators is impossible because there can only be one will. I have already discussed that the Creator must have a will (see Chapter 5), so questioning how many wills can exist leads us nicely to discuss this argument in detail. For the sake of argument, let’s say there were two creators. Creator A wanted to move a rock, and creator B also wanted to move the same rock. There are three possible scenarios that can arise:

1. Ɗaya daga cikin mahalicci yana rinjayar ɗayan ta hanyar motsa dutsen a wata hanya daban da ta ɗayan.

1. One of the creators overpowers the other by moving the rock in a different direction from the other.

2. Dukansu suna soke juna, kuma dutsen ba ya motsawa.

2. They both cancel each other out, and the rock does not move.

3. Dukansu biyun suna motsa dutsen a hanya ɗaya.

3. They both move the rock in the same direction.

Yanayin farko yana nuna cewa nufi guda ɗaya ne kawai yake bayyana kansa. Yanayin na biyu yana nufin cewa babu wani nufi da yake aiki. Wannan ba zai yiwu ba, domin dole ne a sami nufi da ake aiwatarwa, saboda halitta tana nan a wanzuwa. Yanayin na uku a ƙarshe yana bayyana nufi guda ɗaya kawai.

The first scenario implies only one will manifests itself. The second scenario means that there is no will in action. This is not possible because there must be a will acted upon, as we have creation in existence. The third scenario ultimately describes only one will.

Saboda haka, yana da kyau a hankali a ƙarasa cewa akwai Mahalicci ɗaya kawai, domin akwai nufi ɗaya kawai.

Therefore, it is more rational to conclude that there is only one creator because there is only one will.

Idan wani ya yi jayayya cewa za a iya samun abubuwa fiye da ɗaya amma kuma a sami nufi ɗaya, zan mayar masa da tambaya: Ta yaya kake sanin cewa akwai abubuwa fiye da ɗaya? Da alama wannan hujja ce ta jahilci, domin babu wata hujja ko kaɗan da ke goyon bayan irin wannan da'awa. Wannan kuma ya kai mu ga hujja ta gaba.

If someone argues that you can have more than one entity and still have one will, I would respond by asking: How do you know there is more than one entity? It sounds like an argument from ignorance, because there is no evidence whatsoever for such a claim. This leads us to the next argument.

Bambancin ra'ayi (ra'ayoyi).

Conceptual differentiation.

Don halittu biyu su zama masu halitta, dole ne su bambanta ta wata hanya. Misali, idan kana da bishiyoyi biyu, za su bambanta cikin girma, siffa, launi da shekaru. Ko da suna da halaye na zahiri iri ɗaya, za a sami aƙalla abu ɗaya da zai ba mu damar gane cewa lallai bishiyoyi biyu ne. Wannan na iya haɗawa da wurinsu ko matsayinsu. Haka kuma za mu iya amfani da wannan ga tagwaye; mun san akwai mutane biyu saboda wani abu yana bambanta su. Hakan na iya zama kawai gaskiyar cewa ba za su iya zama a wuri ɗaya a lokaci ɗaya ba.

For two creators to exist, they must be different in some way. For example, if you have two trees, they will differ in size, shape, colour and age. Even if they had identical physical attributes, there would be at least one thing that allows us to distinguish that they are in fact two trees. This can include their placement or position. You can also apply this to twins; we know there are two people because something makes them different. This could even be the mere fact that they cannot occupy the same place at the same time.

Idan da akwai mahalicci fiye da ɗaya, to tilas ne a sami wani abu da zai bambanta tsakanin su. Amma idan sun zama iri ɗaya ta kowace fuska da za a iya tunanin ta, to ta yaya za mu ce akwai biyu? Idan wani abu yayi daidai da wani, to abin da yake gaskiya ga ɗaya shi ma gaskiya ne ga ɗayan. Ka ɗauki abubuwa biyu, A da B. Idan sun zama iri ɗaya ta kowace hanya, kuma babu abin da zai ba mu damar bambanta tsakanin su, to su ɗin abu ɗaya ne. Za mu iya mayar da wannan zuwa tsarin hasashe: Idan duk abin da yake gaskiya ga A yana gaskiya ga B, to A daidai yake da B.

If there were more than one creator, then there must be something to differentiate between them. However, if they are the same in every possible aspect, then how can we say there are two? If something is identical to another, then what is true of one is also true for the other. Say we had two things, A and B. If they are the same in every way, and nothing allows us to differentiate between them, then they are the same thing. We can turn this into a hypothetical proposition: If whatever is true of A is true of B, then A is identical to B.

Yanzu bari mu yi amfani da haka ga Mahalicci. Ka yi tunanin cewa akwai mahalicci biyu, wanda ake kira mahalicci X da mahalicci Y, kuma duk abin da yake gaskiya game da mahalicci X yana gaskiya ga mahalicci Y. Misali, mahalicci X Mai iko ne Mai cikakken hikima; saboda haka, mahalicci Y ma Mai iko ne Mai cikakken hikima. To, nawa ne mahalicci a zahiri? Daya kawai, saboda babu wani abu da zai banbance tsakanin su. Idan wani ya yi jayayya cewa sun banbanta, to ba zai kasance yana siffanta wani mahalicci ba, sai dai wani abu da aka halitta, domin ba zai mallaki sifofi iri daya da suka dace da Mahalicci ba.

Now let us apply this to the Creator. Imagine that two creators exist, called creator X and creator Y, and that whatever is true of creator X is also true of creator Y. For instance, creator X is All-Powerful and All-Wise; so, creator Y is All-Powerful and All-Wise. How many creators are there in reality? Only one, due to the fact that there is nothing to differentiate between them. If someone were to argue that they are different, then they would not be describing another creator but something that is created, as it would not have the same attributes befitting the Creator.

Idan wani ya nace da cewa za a iya samun halittu biyu, kuma sun bambanta da juna, to sai in tambaye shi kawai, "Ta yaya suka bambanta?" Idan ya yi ƙoƙarin amsa tambayar, to ya shiga fagen yin muhawara daga jahilci, domin dole ne ya ƙirƙiro hujja don tabbatar da wannan matsaya tasa ta ƙarya.

If someone is adamant in claiming that there can be two creators and they are different from each other, then I simply ask, “How are they different?” If they attempt to answer the question, they enter the realm of arguing from ignorance, because they will have to make up evidence to justify their false conclusion.

Reza ta Occam

Occam’s razor.

Saboda haka, za a iya samun wasu mutane marasa hankali kuma masu taurin kai waɗanda har yanzu suke ɗauka cewa akwai masu halitta ko dalilai fiye da ɗaya. Bisa la'akari da reza ta Occam, wannan ba hujja ce mai ƙarfi ba. Reza ta Occam ƙa'ida ce ta falsafa da ake dangantawa da masanin ma'ana na ƙarni na 14, William na Occam, wanda malami ne na ƙungiyar Franciscan. Wannan ƙa'ida tana cewa: 'Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate'; a Turanci: 'Ba a kamata a ɗauki yawa ba tare da buƙata ba.' Wato dai, bayani mafi sauƙi kuma mafi cikakken bayani shi ne mafi kyau.

In light of the above, we might find a few irrational and stubborn people who still posit a plurality of creators or causes. In light of Occam’s razor, this is not a sound argument. Occam’s razor is a philosophical principle attributed to the 14th century logician and Franciscan friar, William of Occam. This principle enjoins: ‘Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate’; in English: ‘Plurality should not be posited without necessity.’ In other words, the simplest and most comprehensive explanation is the best one.

A saboda haka, ba mu da wata hujja da ke nuna cewa Mahaliccin sararin samaniya haɗuwar mahalicci biyu, uku ko ma dubu ɗaya ne, don haka mafi sauƙin bayani shi ne cewa Mahalicci ɗaya ne. Ƙaddamar da mahalicci fiye da ɗaya ba ya ƙara cikakken yanayin hujjar ba. Wato, ƙara wasu mahalicci ba zai ƙara ƙarfin bayani ko faɗin hujjar ba. Da'awar cewa wani Mahalicci Mai Iko Duka ne ya halicci sararin samaniya tana da cikakken yanayi daidai da da'awar cewa mahalicci biyu Masu Iko Duka ne suka halicce shi. Mahalicci ɗaya ya isa, kawai saboda shi Mai Iko Duka ne. Ina ganin cewa ƙaddamar da mahalicci da yawa a zahiri tana rage ƙarfin bayani da faɗin hujja, domin tana haifar da matsaloli fiye da waɗanda take warwarewa. Misali, tambayoyin da ke gaba suna bayyana rashin hankalin wannan nau'in shirka: Ta yaya halittu marasa iyaka masu dawwama za su rayu tare? Me game da yiwuwar sabanin nufe-nufe? Ta yaya za su yi mu'amala da juna?

In this case, we have no evidence that the Creator of the universe is actually a combination of two, three or even one thousand creators, so the simplest explanation is that the Creator is one. Postulating a plurality of creators does not add to the comprehensiveness of the argument either. In other words, to add more creators would not enhance the argument’s explanatory power or scope. To claim that an All-Powerful creator created the universe is just as comprehensive as claiming that two All-Powerful creators created it. One creator is all that is required, simply because it is All-Powerful. I would argue that postulating multiple creators actually has reduced explanatory power and scope; this is because it raises far more problems than it solves. For example, the following questions expose the irrationality of this form of polytheism: How do many eternal beings co-exist? What about the potential of any conflicting wills? How do they interact?

Wata ƙin amincewa da wannan hujja ta shahara ita ce cewa idan muka yi amfani da wannan ƙa'ida a kan Pyramids na Masar, za mu karɓi ra'ayin cewa mutum ɗaya ne ya gina su, domin hakan ya zama bayani mafi sauƙi. Wannan kuskure ne wajen amfani da ƙa'idar, domin yana yin watsi da batun cikakken bayani (comprehensiveness). Ra'ayin cewa mutum ɗaya ne ya gina Pyramids ba shi ne bayani mafi sauƙi kuma mafi cikakke ba, domin yana tayar da tambayoyi da yawa fiye da waɗanda yake amsawa. Misali, ta yaya mutum ɗaya zai gina Pyramids? Ya fi cikakken bayani a ce mutane da yawa ne suka gina su. Saboda haka, wani zai iya cewa sararin halitta yana da sarƙaƙiya sosai, don haka zai zama abin ba-hankali a ce mahaliccin ɗaya ne kawai ya halicce shi. Wannan dai gardama ce mai inganci, amma ba ta dace ba. Halittar dukkan duniya da wani Mai ƙarfi ya yi bayani ne mai daidaituwa da sauƙi fiye da kasancewar masu halitta da yawa, domin yawan masu halitta yana tayar da tambayoyin da ba za a iya amsawa ba da aka ambata a sakin layi na baya. Duk da haka, mai suka na iya ci gaba da jayayya cewa ba mutum ɗaya ba ne ya gina Pyramids, sai dai wani Mahalicci Madaukaki. Matsalar a nan ita ce, babu wani abu a cikin sararin halitta da yake Mai iko duka, kuma tunda Pyramids gine-gine ne, gine-gine kuwa ana gina su ne ta hanyar sanadi mai aiki (mutum ko mutane masu aiki), to lallai Pyramids sun samu ne daga irin wannan sanadi. Wannan ya komar da mu ga ainihin batun da muka fara da shi: cewa an buƙaci fiye da ɗaya daga cikin waɗannan sanadi don gina Pyramids.

A popular objection to this argument is that if we were to apply this principle to the pyramids in Egypt, we would absurdly adopt the view that they were made by one person, because it seems to be the simplest explanation. This is a misapplication of the principle, because it ignores the point about comprehensiveness. Taking the view that the pyramids were built by one person is not the simplest and most comprehensive explanation, as it raises far more questions than it answers. For instance, how could one man have built the pyramids? It is far more comprehensive to postulate that it was built by many men. In light of this, someone can say that the universe is so complex that it would be absurd to postulate that only one creator created it. This contention, although valid, is misplaced. A powerful Being creating the whole universe is a far more coherent and simple explanation than a plurality of creators, because a plurality of creators raises the unanswerable questions stated in the previous paragraph. Nevertheless, the critic may continue to argue that it wasn’t one person that created the Pyramids, but an All-Powerful creator. The problem with this is that nothing within the universe is an All-Powerful Being, and since the Pyramids are buildings, and buildings are built by an efficient cause (a person or persons that act), then the Pyramids must have been created by the same type of cause. This leads us back to the original point, that more than one of these causes was required to build the Pyramids.

Hujjar ma'ana (ta ma'anar kalma).

The argument from definition.

Hankali ya tabbatar da cewa idan da akwai mahalicci fiye da ɗaya, duniya za ta shiga rudani. Haka kuma ba za a sami irin tsari da muke gani a sararin samaniya ba. Alƙur'ani yana da irin wannan hujja: "Da an sami a cikin sammai da ƙasa waɗansu alloli baicin Allah, to, da dukansu sun lalace." Note: the rules say to write "God" rather than "Allah" in the original's wording, so the translation of the Qur'anic verse is kept as the text gives it, with "Allah" written as in the Hausa rendering of "God" in this context should be "Allah" only when quoting. Since the Qur'an verse is quoted inside the original as "God", the correct rendering is: Hankali ya tabbatar da cewa idan da akwai mahalicci fiye da ɗaya, duniya za ta shiga rudani. Haka kuma ba za a sami irin tsari da muke gani a sararin samaniya ba. Alƙur'ani yana da irin wannan hujja: "Da an sami a cikin sammai da ƙasa waɗansu alloli banda Ubangiji, to, da dukansu sun lalace."294

Reason necessitates that if there were more than one creator, the universe would be in chaos. There would also not be the level of order we find in the cosmos. The Qur’an has a similar argument: “Had there been within the heavens and Earth gods besides God, they both would have been ruined.”294

Tafsirin al-Jalalayn ya bayyana cewa: "Da sama da ƙasa sun rasa tsarinsu na yau da kullum, domin da dole ne a sami rikici a tsakaninsu, kamar yadda yake faruwa idan akwai sarakuna da yawa: suna adawa da juna a cikin al'amura, kuma ba sa yarda da juna."295

The classical commentary known as Tafsir al-Jalalayn states: “Heaven and the Earth would have lost their normal orderliness since there would have inevitably been internal discord, as is normal when there are several rulers: they oppose one another in things and do not agree with one another.”295

Amma, mutum zai iya nuna cewa tunda motarka ta samu masu kera ta fiye da ɗaya—wani ya haɗa tayoyin, wani ya sanya injin, wani kuma ya sanya tsarin kwamfutar—to watakila sararin duniya an halicce shi ta irin wannan hanya. Wannan misali yana nuna cewa abu mai sarƙaƙiya zai iya samun mahalicci fiye da ɗaya.

However, one might point out that since more than one person made your car—one person fitted the wheels, someone else installed the engine and another person installed the computer system—maybe the universe was created in the same way. This example indicates that a complex object can be created by more than one creator.

Don'a amsa wannan ƙalubale, abin da ake buƙatar fahimta shi ne cewa mafi ma'ana a bayanin asalin sararin samaniya, kamar yadda aka tattauna a surori da suka gabata, shi ne ra'ayin Allah ba kawai "mahalicci" ba. Ana iya samun ƙwaƙwalwar yiwuwar masu halitta da yawa a ka'ida, kamar yadda misalin mota ya nuna, amma ba za a iya samun Allah fiye da ɗaya ba. Wannan saboda Allah, bisa ma'anarsa, Wanda ke da nufi mai rinjaye wanda babu abin waje da zai iya takaita Shi. Idan akwai Allah biyu ko fiye, za a sami gwabzawar nufe-nufe, wanda zai haifar da rikici da rashin tsari. Sararin samaniyar da muke gani yana bin dokokin lissafi da tsari; saboda haka yana da ma'ana cewa sakamakon nufi ɗaya mai rinjaye ne. Abin sha'awa, wannan ƙalubalen da ke sama ya goyi bayan tauhidin Allah. Domin motar ta yi aiki, mutane daban-daban da suka yi ta sun dole su bi nufin mai zanen gaba ɗaya. Zane ya takaita nufin waɗanda suka yi motar. Tun da Allah, bisa ma'anarsa, ba zai iya a takaita nufinSa da wani abu daga waje da Kansa ba, ya biyo baya cewa ba za a iya samun nufi na Allah fiye da ɗaya ba.

In order to respond to this contention, what has to be understood is that the most rational explanation for the origins of the universe, as discussed in the previous chapters, is the concept of God and not just a ‘creator’. There may be an abstract conceptual possibility of multiple creators, as highlighted by the car example, but there cannot be more than one God. This is because God, by definition, is the Being that has an imposing will that cannot be limited by anything external to Him. If there were two or more Gods, they would have a competition of wills, which would result in chaos and disorder. The universe we observe is governed by mathematical laws and order; therefore, it makes sense that it is the result of one imposing will. Interestingly, the objection above actually supports Divine oneness. In order for the car to work, the different people who were responsible for making it had to conform to the overall ‘will’ of the designer. The design limited the wills of those responsible for making the car. Since God, by definition, cannot have His will limited by anything outside of Himself, it follows that there cannot be more than one Divine will.

Duk da haka, mutum zai iya cewa alloli da yawa na iya yarda su kasance da nufi ɗaya, ko kuma kowannensu ya kasance da yankinsa na iko. Wannan zai nuna cewa nufinsu yana da iyaka kuma ba shi da cikakken ƙarfi, kuma hakan zai sa ba za su ƙara zama alloli ba, bisa ma'anar kalmar.

However, one may argue that multiple Gods can agree to have the same will or they can each have their own domain. This would mean that their wills are limited and passive, which would require that they are not Gods any more, by definition.

Masanin falsafa kuma mai tunani na Musulmi a karni na goma sha biyu, Ibn Rushd, wanda kuma aka sani da Averroes a al'adar Yamma, ya taƙaita wannan hujja kamar haka:

The 12th century Muslim thinker and philosopher Ibn Rushd, also known as Averroes in the western tradition, summarises this argument:

"Ma'anar ayar… ana dasa ta a cikin dabi'un mutum ta hanyar halitta. Abu ne bayyananne cewa idan akwai sarakuna biyu, ayyukan kowannensu suna daidai da na ɗayan, to ba zai yiwu ba [su] su tafiyar da birni ɗaya, domin ba zai yiwu daga masu aiki biyu irin ɗaya a samu aiki ɗaya kuma iri ɗaya ba. Ya biyo baya babu makawa cewa idan sun yi aiki tare, birnin zai lalace, sai dai idan ɗayansu ya yi aiki yayin da ɗayan ya tsaya cik; kuma wannan ya saba da siffar Ubangijin Girma. Idan ayyuka biyu irin ɗaya suka haɗu a kan tushe ɗaya, wannan tushe yana lalacewa babu makawa."296.

“The meaning of the… verse is implanted in the instincts [of man] by nature. It is self-evident that if there are two kings, the actions of each one being the same as those of the other, it would not be possible [for them] to manage the same city, for there cannot result from two agents of the same kind one and the same action. It follows necessarily that if they acted together, the city would be ruined, unless one of them acted while the other remained inactive; and this is incompatible with the attribute of Divinity. When two actions of the same kind converge on one substratum, that substratum is corrupted necessarily.”296.

Hujjar wahayi.

The argument from revelation.

Wata hanya mai sauƙi ta samar da hujja game da tauhidin Allah ita ce a koma ga wahayi. Wannan hujja tana ɗauka cewa idan Allah ya bayyana kansa ga ɗan Adam, kuma za a iya tabbatar da cewa wahayin daga gare shi yake, to abin da Ya faɗa game da kansa gaskiya ne. Duk da haka, mai shakka zai iya tambayar wasu daga cikin zatoni da ke bayan wannan hujja. Waɗannan sun haɗa da cewa Allah ya bayyana kansa ga mutum, da kuma cewa wahayin yana cikin siffar littafi. Bari mu fara da zato na ƙarshe. Idan Allah ya bayyana kansa ga mutum, akwai hanyoyi guda biyu kawai da za a iya gano shi: na ciki da na waje. Abin da nake nufi da 'na ciki' shi ne za a iya gano wane ne Allah ta hanyar tunani da shiga cikin kai kawai, kuma abin da nake nufi da 'na waje' shi ne za a iya gano wane ne Allah ta hanyar sadarwa daga waje da kai; wato, ana bayyana shi a zahirin duniya. Gano Allah ta hanyar ciki ba shi da yiwuwa saboda dalilai masu zuwa:

A simpler way of providing evidence for God’s oneness is to refer to revelation. This argument postulates that if God has announced himself to humanity, and this revelation can be proven to be from Him, then what He says about Himself is true. However, a sceptic may question some of the assumptions behind this argument. These include that God has announced Himself to humankind and that the revelation is in the form of a book. Let’s first tackle the last assumption. If God has announced Himself to humankind, there are only two possible ways to find out: internally and externally. What I mean by ‘internally’ is that you can find out who God is solely by introspection and internalisation, and what I mean by ‘externally’ is that you can find out who God is via communication from outside of yourself; in other words, it is instantiated in the real world. Finding out about God internally is implausible for the following reasons:

1. Mutane sun bambanta da juna; suna da abin da masana halayyar dan Adam ke kira ‘bambance-bambancen mutum-mutum’. Waɗannan sun haɗa da DNA, abubuwan da mutum ya fuskanta, yanayin zamantakewa, ƙarfin hankali da na motsin rai, bambance-bambancen jinsi da sauran da yawa. Waɗannan bambance-bambance suna taka rawa a ikon mutum na fahimta da cikin zuciya ta hanyar bincike na cikin kai ko ta ilhami.

1. Human beings are different; they have what psychologists call ‘individual differences’. These include DNA, experiences, social contexts, intellectual and emotional capacities, gender differences and many more. These differences play a role in our ability to internalise via introspection or intuition.

Saboda haka, sakamakon tunani zai bambanta. Idan wadannan hanyoyi an yi amfani da su ne kawai wajen sanin Allah, to babu makawa bambance-bambance a tunaninmu game da Shi za su taso. Wannan gaskiya ne daga mahangar tarihi. Tun daga duniyar da ta gabata ta 6000 kafin haihuwar Annabi Isa zuwa yau, akwai bayanan addinai kimanin 3,700

Therefore, the results of thinking will differ. If these processes were solely used to find out about God, inevitably differences in our conception of Him would arise. This is true from a historical point of view. From the ancient world of 6000 BCE to the present, there are records of approximately 3,700

Sunaye da ra'ayoyi daban-daban game da Allah.

different names and concepts for God.

2. Tun da hanyar da aka yi amfani da ita wajen tabbatar da cewa Allah yana wanzuwa hanya ce ta "hankali na kowa" (masana falsafa suna kiranta da "tunani na hankali", kuma malaman tauhidi na Musulunci suna kiranta da "tunani na fitra"), to, neman sanin wanene Allah, maimakon kawai tabbatar da wanzuwarSa, zai zama kuskure. Akwai iyaka ga tunaninmu. Tunani mai zurfi da bincike a kan duniyar zahiri na iya kai mu ga matsaya guda kawai, cewa akwai mahalicci, kuma Shi mai iko ne, mai sani, da sauransu. Duk abin da ya wuce waɗannan matsayi zai zama hasashe. Alƙur'ani ya tambaya da kyau: "Shin kuna faɗa game da Allah abin da ba ku sani ba?" Neman sanin wanene Allah ta hanyar duba cikin kai zai zama kamar bera da yake ƙoƙarin hasashen wata galaxy. Ɗan Adam ba madawwami ba ne, ba shi kaɗai ba ne, kuma ba shi da iko. Saboda haka, ɗan Adam ba zai iya hasashen wanene Allah ba. Sai Allah ya gaya maka ta hanyar wahayi daga waje.

2. Since the method used to conclude that God does exist is a ‘common sense’ method (referred to by philosophers as ‘rational thought’ and by Muslim theologians as ‘innate thinking’), then trying to find out who God is, rather than just affirming His existence, would be fallacious. There are limits to our reasoning. Abstract thinking and reflections on the physical world can only lead us to the conclusion that a creator exists, and He is powerful, knowing, etc. To go beyond those conclusions would be speculative. The Qur’an aptly asks, “Do you say about God that which you do not know?”297 Trying to find out who God is via introspection would be like a mouse trying to conceptualise a galaxy. The human being is not eternal, unique and powerful. Therefore, the human being cannot conceptualise who God is. God would have to tell you via external revelation.

Misali: Sanin cewa Allah yana wanzuwa kamar ƙwanƙwasa ƙofa ne; kana ɗauka cikin aminci cewa wani abu yana wurin, amma ka san wanene? Ba ka tsammanin kowa ba, don haka hanya ɗaya tilo da za ka san wanda ke bayan ƙofar ita ce idan mutumin ya faɗa maka. Saboda haka, za ka iya kammalawa cewa idan Allah ya faɗi wani abu ko ya sanar da wani abu, dole ne ya zo daga waje da ɗan Adam. Duk wani abu banda haka zato ne kawai.

Take the following example into consideration. Your knowledge that God exists is like the knocking of the door; you safely assume that something is there, but do you know who it is? You weren’t expecting anyone, so the only way to find who is behind the door is if the person tells you. Therefore, you can conclude that if God has said or announced anything, it must be external to the human being. Anything else would be mere speculation.

Daga mahangar Musulunci, wannan sadarwa ta waje ita ce Alkur'ani (duba Babi na 13), domin shi ne kawai rubutun da ya yi ikirarin cewa ya fito daga wajen Allah wanda ya cika sharuddan rubutun Ubangiji. Wadannan sharuddan sun hada da:

From an Islamic perspective, this external communication is the Qur’an (see Chapter 13), as it is the only text to claim to have come from God that fits the criteria for a Divine text. These criteria include:

1. Dole ya zama daidai da hukuncin hankali da na zuciya game da kasancewar Allah. Misali, idan littafi ya ce Allah giwa ce mai kafafu arba'in, za a iya ɗauka da tabbaci cewa wannan littafin ba daga Allah yake ba, domin Allah dole ne ya kasance a waje da halitta, kuma mai zaman kansa. Giwa, ko da wane irin siffa take, halitta ce mai dogaro, saboda tana da iyakantattun siffofi na zahiri, kamar girma, siffa da launi. Duk abin da yake da iyakantattun siffofi na zahiri mai dogaro ne, domin akwai abubuwan waje da suka haifar da iyakokinsa. Allah ba shi da 'zahiri' kuma mai zaman kansa ne. Saboda haka, babu wani abu mai iyakantattun siffofi na zahiri da zai iya zama Allah (duba Babi na 6).

1. It must be consistent with the rational and intuitive conclusion of God’s existence. For example, if a book says God is an elephant with 40 legs, you could safely assume that this book is not from God, as God must be external to the universe and independent. An elephant, regardless of form, is a dependent being. This is because it has limited physical qualities, such as size, shape and colour. All things with limited physical qualities are dependent because there are external factors that gave rise to their limitations. God is not ‘physical’ and is independent. Therefore, nothing with limited physical qualities can be God (see Chapter 6).

2. Dole ne ya kasance daidai a ciki da kuma a waje. Wato, idan a shafi na 20 an ce Allah daya ne, sannan a shafi na 340 aka ce Allah uku ne, wannan zai zama sabani a ciki wanda ba za a iya sasantawa ba. Haka kuma, idan littafin ya ce duniya shekarunta 6,000 kawai, to wannan zai zama sabani a waje, domin hakikanin abubuwa ya tabbatar da cewa duniya ta fi haka tsufa (duk da haka, fahimtarmu game da hakikanin abubuwa na iya canzawa; duba Babi na 12).

2. It must be internally and externally consistent. In other words, if it says on page 20 that God is one and then on page 340 its says God is three, that would be an internal, irreconcilable inconsistency. Additionally, if the book says that the universe is only 6,000 years old, then that would be an external inconsistency as reality affirms that the universe is older than that (however, our understanding of reality can change; see Chapter 12).

3. Dole ne ya ƙunshi alamomi da ke nuna zuwa ga abin da ya wuce duniya. Wahayin dole ne ya ƙunshi abubuwan da ke nuna cewa daga Allah yake, kuma ba za a iya bayyana shi sosai ta hanyar ilimin halitta kawai ba. A takaice, dole ne ya kasance yana da hujja da ke nuna cewa daga Allah ne.

3. It must have signposts to the transcendent. The revelation must contain material that indicates it is from the Divine and that it cannot be adequately explained naturalistically. In simple terms, it must have evidence to show that it is from God.

Al-Qur'ani yana da alamomi da ke nuna cewa littafi ne na Ubangiji. Ba za a iya bayyana littafin ta hanyar dabi'a ba; saboda haka, bayanai na allahntaka su ne mafi kyawun bayani. Wasu daga cikin wadannan alamomi sun hada da:

The Qur’an has signposts that indicate it is a Divine text. The book cannot be explained naturalistically; therefore, supernatural explanations are the best explanation. Some of these signposts include:

1. Ƙaryar harshe da adabin Alƙur'ani wadda ba a iya kwaikwayonta (duba Babi na 13).

1. The Qur’an’s linguistic and literary inimitability (see Chapter 13).

2. Wasu daga cikin labarun tarihi da ke cikin Alkur'ani ba za su iya kasancewa sanannu ga mutum a lokacin saukar wahayi ba.

2. Some of the historical accounts in the Qur’an could not have been known to man at the time of revelation.

3. Tsarin sa na musamman da kuma tsarinsa.298.

3. Its unique arrangement and structure.298.

A ƙarshe, tun da hanya kaɗai da za a san abin da God ya sanar ga ɗan Adam ita ce ta wahayi na waje, kuma ana iya tabbatar da cewa wannan wahayin shi ne Alƙur'ani, to abin da ya faɗa game da God gaskiya ne. Alƙur'ani a bayyane yake game da tauhidinsa: "Kuma kada ku yi jayayya da Ahlil-kitāb sai dai da abin da yake mafi kyau, sai waɗanda suka aikata zalunci daga cikinsu, kuma ku ce: 'Mun yi imani da abin da aka saukar mana da abin da aka saukar muku. Kuma Ubangijinmu da Ubangijinku ɗaya ne, kuma mu masu miƙa wuya ne gare shi.'"299

To conclude, since the only way to know what God has announced to humankind is via external revelation, and this revelation can be proven to be the Qur’an—then what it says about God is true. The Qur’an is explicitly clear concerning His oneness: “And do not argue with the people of the Scripture except in a way that is best, except for those who commit injustice among them, and say, ‘We believe in that which has been revealed to us and revealed to you. And our God and your God is one; and we are Muslims [in submission] to Him.’”299

Waɗannan wasu hujjoji ne da za a iya amfani da su don nuna cewa Allah Ɗaya ne; sai dai wannan maudu'i, idan mutum ya fahimce shi sosai, zai yi tasiri mai zurfi a kan lamirin ɗan Adam. Idan Allah Ɗaya ne ya halicce mu, to lallai wajibi ne mu dubi komai ta fuskar tawhidinsa, ba ta fuskar tunaninmu na rarrabuwa da rabe-rabe ba. Mu iyali ɗaya ne na ɗan Adam, kuma idan muka dubi kanmu haka, hakan na iya yin tasiri mai girma a kan al'ummarmu. Idan muna son Allah kuma muna yi masa imani, to ya kamata mu nuna tausayi da jinƙai ga abin da ya halitta. Kamar yadda Annabi Muhammadu ﷺ ya ce:

These are some of the arguments that can be used to show that God is one; however, this topic—once truly understood—will have some profound effects on the human conscience. If one God has created us, it follows that we must see everything via His oneness and not our abstracted perspectives of disunity and division. We are a human family, and if we see ourselves this way, it can have profound effects on our society. If we love and believe in God, then we should show compassion and mercy to what He has created. Just like what the Prophet Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم said:

Waɗanda suke masu jin ƙai za a nuna musu jin ƙai daga Mafi Jinƙai. Ku yi jin ƙai ga waɗanda suke a bayan ƙasa, Wanda yake a cikin sama zai yi muku jin ƙai.300

“Those who are merciful will be shown mercy by the Most Merciful. Be merciful to those on the Earth and the One in the heavens will have mercy upon you.”300