Babana yana son yin yawo. Yakan yi tunani a kan manyan tambayoyin da ke damun mai tunani. A wani yawo nasa, ya yanke shawarar ziyartar shahararren wurin nan na Speakers Corner da ke Landan. Wurin an santa da muhawarori masu hayaniya da zafi game da mutum, rayuwa da duniya, har da siyasa da kowane irin makirci. Wuri ne na 'yancin faɗin ra'ayi ba tare da hani ba, inda kowa zai iya faɗin kusan abin da yake so ta kowace hanya da yake so. Kusurwar sau da yawa tana shaida muhawarori na tauhidi da falsafa da ke ta'allaka da wanzuwar Allah. A ranar da babana ya ziyarci kusurwar, yana sauraron wata tattaunawa a kan ko muna da kyawawan dalilai na yin imani da Mai Girma. Babana ya katse tattaunawar ya ce musu, "Idan ka ƙi Allah, kana ƙin kanka." Lokacin da babana ya ba ni labarin nan, ban fahimci abin da yake nufi sosai ba. Duk da haka, bayan shekaru da dama, ina so in faɗaɗa kan wannan hikima tasa mai zurfi a cikin wannan babin.

My father loves going for walks. He ponders the profound questions that plague the thinking man. On one of these walks, he decided to visit the famous Speakers Corner in London. It is known for its loud and heated discussions about man, life and the universe, including politics and all sorts of conspiracies. It is a place for unfettered free speech, where anyone and everyone can say almost what they want in any way they want. The corner usually witnesses theological and philosophical debates centred on God’s existence. The day my father visited the corner he was listening to a discussion about whether or not we have good reasons to believe in the Divine. My father interrupted the discussion and told them, “If you reject God, you deny yourself.” When my father told me this story, I didn’t really understand the implications of what he said. However, fast-forward a few decades, I would like to expand on his profound wisdom in this chapter.

Mahaifina yana ƙoƙarin bayyana wa taron cewa, tun da muna da sanin wanda muke da abin da muke ji, hakan alama ce da ke nuna cewa Allah yana wanzuwa. A faɗin magana, abin da mahaifina yake nufi shi ne sanin abin da ke cikin zuciya (phenomenal consciousness); a sauƙaƙe, gaskiyar cewa muna da abubuwan da muke fuskanta a cikinmu, na zahiri da na ji. Sanin abin da ke cikin zuciya yana da alaƙa da ikonmu na samun sanin cikin gida, na abin da yake kasancewa a cikin wani yanayi na sani. Misali, idan na ci cakulan da na fi so ko kuma na saurari karatun Alkur'ani, ina sane da wannan gogewar da ke cikina, kuma ina iya fahimtar yadda yake kasancewa a cikin wannan yanayi na sani. Duk da haka, babu wani mutum da zai iya shiga cikin abin da nake ji a waɗannan gogewar. Hakika, sauran mutane za su sami nasu ra'ayin game da cakulan da karatun Alkur'ani, amma ba za su taɓa gogewa ko fahimtar abin da nake ji a lokacin waɗannan gogewar ba.

My father was trying to tell the crowd that since we have an awareness of who we are (and what we feel), it is a sign that God exists. In a broad sense, what my father was referring to was phenomenal consciousness; in simple terms, the fact that we have inner subjective experiences. Phenomenal consciousness relates to our ability to have an inner subjective awareness of what it is like to experience a particular conscious state. For example, when I eat my favourite chocolate or when I listen to a recitation of the Qur’an, I am aware of that internal experience, and I can appreciate what it is like to be in that conscious state. However, no one else can access what it is like for me to have those subjective experiences. Of course, other people will have their own perspectives of chocolate and the recitation of the Qur’an, but they will never truly experience or comprehend what I feel during those experiences.

Ko da kai ka san komai game da kwakwalwarka ta zahiri, ba za ka iya gano yadda yake ji a gare ni in sami wani takamaiman abin da na fuskanta ba, ko shan ruwan lemu, ko kallon faɗuwar rana mai kyau, ko faɗawa cikin soyayya. Babban dalilin haka shi ne ilimin kimiyyar jijiyoyi (neuroscience) ilimin alaƙa ne galibi. Masana kimiyyar jijiyoyi suna lura da aikin kwakwalwa su danganta wannan aiki da abin da mahalarta suka ce suna sane da shi. Duk da haka, waɗannan alaƙoƙi ba za su taɓa gaya mana abin da yake ji ga mahalarta su kasance cikin wani yanayi na sani ba; abin da za su iya gaya mana shi ne lokacin da hakan ke faruwa. Kana iya cewa mahalarci na iya ba masana kimiyyar jijiyoyi bayanai na farko-na-mutum ta hanyar bayyana gogewarsa ta zuciya, don haka ya amsa tambayar. Duk da haka, wannan ba amsa ba ce, domin ko da mutum ya yi amfani da kalmomi kamar 'sanyi', 'mai raɗaɗi', 'zaƙi', 'kyau' da 'baƙin ciki', ba za su taɓa gaya mana yadda yake ji ba su fuskanci waɗannan abubuwan da ji. Kalmomi hanyoyi ne na ma'ana da gogewa, amma dole ne mu wuce kalmomi don fahimtar gogewar sani ta wani sosai. Wani abu mai wahalar fahimta game da gogewar sani ta ciki shi ne dalilin da ya sa gogewar zuciya ke tasowa daga tsarin halittu da na zahiri marasa sani. Me ya sa wata gogewa ta musamman ta ciki ke tasowa daga abu marar sani? Wannan wata muhimmiyar tambaya ce a falsafar hankali da kimiyyar jijiyoyi. Batutuwan da na gabatar zuwa yanzu suna samar da abin da malamai ke kira matsalar wuya ta sani (hard problem of consciousness). Wannan har yanzu ba a warware ta ba, duk da cewa ta haifar da muhawara mai zafi da yawa game da yanayin ko wane ne mu da kuma gogewarmu ta sani. Mai bincike Daniel Bor ya bayyana matsalar kamar haka:

Even if you were to know everything about my physical brain, you would not be able to find out what it is like for me to have a particular experience, whether drinking orange juice, staring at a beautiful sunset or falling in love. The main reason for this is that neuroscience is mostly a science of correlations. Neuroscientists observe brain activity and correlate that activity with what the participants report they are conscious of. However, these correlations can never tell us anything about what it is like for participants to be in a given state of consciousness; it can only tell us when it occurs. You may argue that a participant may provide neuroscientists with first-person data by describing his or her subjective experience, thereby answering the question. Nonetheless, this is not an answer, because even if someone uses words like ‘cold’, ‘painful’, ‘sweet’, ‘beautiful’ and ‘sad’, they can never tell us what it is like to have those experiences and feelings. Words are vehicles for meaning and experience, but we must go beyond words to fully understand the conscious experience of another. Another elusive aspect of internal conscious experiences is why subjective experiences arise from non-conscious biological and physical processes. Why does a unique internal experience arise from non-conscious matter? This is another important question in the philosophy of the mind and neuroscience. The issues I have introduced so far form what academics call the hard problem of consciousness. This has remained unresolved, despite having sparked many heated debates on the nature of who we are and our conscious experiences. Research fellow Daniel Bor states the problem in the following way:

"Akwai matsaloli masu wuyar gaske da yawa a duniya, amma guda ɗaya ne kawai ke kiran kansa da 'matsalar wuya'. Wannan ita ce matsalar hankali—yadda kimanin gram 1300 na ƙwayoyin jijiyoyi ke haifar da wannan ɗimbin haɗakar jin daɗi, tunani, abubuwan tunawa da motsin rai waɗanda ke mamaye kowane lokaci na farkawa… Matsalar wuya har yanzu ba a warware ta ba."190.

“There are a lot of hard problems in the world, but only one gets to call itself ‘the hard problem’. That is the problem of consciousness—how 1300 grams or so of nerve cells conjures up the seamless kaleidoscope of sensations, thoughts, memories and emotions that occupy every waking moment… The hard problem remains unresolved.”190.

Gaskiyar cewa muna da abubuwan da muke fuskanta a cikin zukatanmu, na ciki da na kanmu kawai, ba za a iya bayyana su ba sai ta wurin kasancewar Wani Mai Cikakken Sani. Wannan Halitta ce ta halicci duniyar zahiri tare da halittu masu hankali, kuma ta ba su ikon sanin abubuwan da suke fuskanta a cikin zukatansu. Sauran bayanai sun kasa tun daga farko. Misali, kallon duniya mai sanyi da ta kayan zahiri kawai ba ya ba da wata mafita ga matsalar. Ka yi tunanin cewa a farkon duniya abin da ake da shi shi ne tsararrun abubuwa masu sauki, sannan bayan dogon lokaci sai suka sake tsara kansu zuwa mutane suka samar da hankali. Wannan yana kama da sihiri, domin kayan zahiri sanyi ne, makaho ne, kuma ba shi da hankali, to ta yaya zai zama sanadin irin wannan al'amari? Ba zai iya ba. Misali, ba zan iya ba ka £10 ba idan ba ni da su. Haka nan, kayan zahiri ba zai iya haifar da hankali ba idan ba shi da shi ko kuma ba shi da yiwuwar haifar da shi. Kuna iya cewa zan iya neman kudi sannan in ba wani; haka nan, kayan zahiri na iya "samun" hankali ta wata hanya mai sarkakiya. Wannan karya ne, domin wani tsari marar hankali guda daya tare da wani tsari marar hankali guda daya kuma suna ba da tsari marar hankali biyu. Kamar kokarin mayar da karfe ya zama itace ne: komai yadda ka sarrafa karfen, ba zai taba zama itace ba, koda ka kara karfe.

The very fact that we have internal subjective conscious experiences can only be explained by the existence of an All-Aware Being. This Being created the physical universe with conscious creatures, and gave them the ability to be aware of their internal subjective experiences. Other explanations fail from the onset—for instance, a cold, materialistic view on the universe offers no hope for a solution to the problem. Imagine in the beginning of the universe all you had were simple arrangements of matter, and after a long period of time, they rearranged themselves into human beings to form consciousness. This sounds like magic, because matter is cold, blind and non-conscious, so how can it be responsible for such a phenomenon? It cannot. For example, I cannot give you £10 if I do not have it. Likewise, matter cannot give rise to consciousness if it does not contain it or have the potential to give rise to it. You may argue that I can earn the money and then give it to someone; likewise, matter can somehow ‘earn’ consciousness via some complex process. This is false, because an individual non-conscious process plus another individual non-complex process still equal two non-conscious processes. It is like trying to turn a piece of iron into wood: no matter how you manipulate the iron, it will never turn into wood, even if you add more iron.

Manufar wannan babi shi ne ya tarwatsa shahararrun bayanai game da matsalar wahala ta sani (hard problem of consciousness), sannan ya bayyana yadda tsarin tauhidi, kuma ta haka wanzuwar Allah, ke ba da bayani mafi kyau. Haka kuma zan nuna cewa wannan ba matsala ce da "kimiyya za ta ba mu amsoshinta a ƙarshe" ba, domin ko da za mu san komai game da ƙwaƙwalwa, muna iya nacewa kan bayanan halitta, na abu kawai (materialist), ko ma na falsafa wadanda ba na tauhidi ba, har yanzu ba za mu amsa matsalar wahala ta sani ba.

The scope of this chapter is to deconstruct the popular explanations for the hard problem of consciousness and explain how a theistic approach, and by extension God’s existence, provides a far better explanation. I will also bring to light that this is not an issue for which ‘science will eventually give us the answers’, because even if we were to know everything about the brain and insist on referring solely to biological, materialist (or even non-theistic philosophical) explanations, we will still not answer the hard problem of consciousness.

Ƙarin bayani game da matsala mai wuya.

More about the hard problem.

Bisa ga abin da su kansu suka yarda da shi, batun sani (consciousness) ya jefa malamai da yawa cikin matsaloli da ba su da mafita, musamman waɗanda suka yi tsayuwar daka a kan tsarin falsafar kayan abu (materialism) fiye da kima. A cikin littafinsa Consciousness: Confessions of a Romantic Reductionist, Farfesa Christof Koch ya bayyana a fili cewa:

By their own admission, the issue of consciousness has caused many academics unsolvable problems, especially those who are excessively dogmatic in their materialistic approach. In his book Consciousness: Confessions of a Romantic Reductionist, Professor Christof Koch openly admits:

Yadda kwakwalwa ke mayar da aikin wutar lantarki na halittu zuwa yanayin tunani na zahiri, yadda hasken da ke haskakawa daga ruwa ke juyawa cikin sihiri zuwa hangen wani tafkin dutse mai launin shuɗi-kore mai walƙiya, wannan wani sirri ne. Alakar da ke tsakanin tsarin jijiyoyi da hankali har yanzu ba a fahimce ta ba, kuma tana cikin muhawara mai zafi da ba ta ƙarewa… Bayyana yadda wani abu mai tsari sosai zai iya mallakar ra'ayi na ciki ya gaji hanyar kimiyya, wadda a wasu fagage da yawa ta tabbatar da amfani sosai. 191.

“How the brain converts bioelectrical activity into subjective states, how photons reflected off water are magically transformed into the percept of an iridescent aquamarine mountain tarn is a puzzle. The nature of the relationship between the nervous system and consciousness remains elusive and the subject of heated and interminable debates… Explaining how a highly organized piece of matter can possess an interior perspective has daunted the scientific method, which in so many other areas has proved immensely fruitful.”191.

Waɗannan matsalolin da ba a warware ba ba su shafi tsarin jiki na ƙwaƙwalwa ba da yadda za mu iya danganta wasu yanayin sani da aikin ƙwaƙwalwa. Idan ina jin zafi, wani aiki a cikin ƙwaƙwalwata yana nuna cewa ina jin zafi. Babu wanda ke musanta cewa ƙwaƙwalwar jiki da sani suna da alaƙa, amma dole ne in jaddada anan cewa alaƙa ce kawai. Ƙwaƙwalwa da sani ba abu ɗaya ba ne. Ka yi la'akari da wannan misali: ƙwaƙwalwa mota ce, sani kuwa direba ne. Mota ba za ta tafi ba tare da direba ba, kuma direba ba zai iya fara motar ba, ko ya yi amfani da ita yadda ya kamata, idan ta lalace ko ta karye. Duk da haka, dukansu sun bambanta kuma suna da 'yancin kansu ta wata fuska.

These unresolved problems do not concern the physical makeup of the brain and how we can correlate some conscious states with brain activity. If I am experiencing pain, some sort of activity in my brain indicates that I am experiencing pain. No one is denying that the physical brain and consciousness are related, but I must stress here, it is just a relationship. The brain and consciousness is not the same thing. Take the following analogy into consideration: the brain is the car, and consciousness is the driver. The car will not move without the driver, and the driver will not be able to start the car—or use it properly—if it is damaged or broken. However, they are both different and independent in some way.

Waɗanne matsaloli ne masana a wannan fanni ke ƙoƙarin magancewa, kuma me ya sa ƙwaƙwalwa da hankali (sani) ba abu ɗaya ba ne? Amsar waɗannan tambayoyi tana cikin abin da ake kira matsalar wuya ta hankali (the hard problem of consciousness). Matsalar wuya ta hankali ta shafi gaskiyar cewa muna da gogewa ta ciki, ta kanmu. A wasu kalmomi, matsalar ita ce ba za mu iya bayyana yadda yake ji ga wata halitta ta samu gogewar sani ta kanta ba, da harshen mutum na uku na kimiyya. Farfesa David Chalmers, wanda ya shahara da kalmar matsalar wuya ta hankali, ya bayyana cewa:

What are the problems that specialists in the field are trying to address, and why are the brain and consciousness not the same thing? The answer to these questions lies in what is known as the hard problem of consciousness. The hard problem of consciousness concerns the fact that we have internal subjective experiences. In other words, the problem is that we cannot explain what it is like for a particular organism to have a subjective conscious experience in terms of the third-person language of science. Professor David Chalmers, who popularised the phrase the hard problem of consciousness, explains:

Matsalar da ta fi wahala ta sani game da hankali ita ce matsalar ƙwarewar rayuwa (experience). Idan muna tunani da kuma fahimta, akwai wani aiki na sarrafa bayanai da ke gudana, amma kuma akwai wani al'amari na zahiri (subjective) a ciki… Wannan al'amari na zahiri shi ne ƙwarewa. Idan muna gani, misali, muna fuskantar abubuwan gani: yanayin jin ja, ƙwarewar duhu da haske, ingancin zurfi a cikin filin gani. Sauran ƙwarewa suna tare da fahimta a wasu hanyoyi daban-daban: sautin clarinet, ƙamshin ƙwallon kwari. Sannan akwai abubuwan jin jiki, tun daga ciwo har zuwa jin daɗin jima'i; hotunan tunani da ake ƙirƙira a ciki; yanayin jin motsin rai; da kuma ƙwarewar rafin tunani mai sani. Abin da ke haɗa dukkan waɗannan yanayi shi ne cewa akwai wani abu kamar yadda yake a kasance cikinsu. Dukkansu yanayi ne na ƙwarewa… Idan wata matsala ta cancanci a kira ta matsalar hankali, wannan ita ce. A wannan ma'ana ta tsakiya ta "hankali", wata halitta, da kuma wani yanayi na tunani, mai sani ne idan akwai abin da yake kamar a kasance cikin wannan yanayi.192.

“The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information processing, but there is also a subjective aspect… This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a physical field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion; and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience… If any problem qualifies as the problem of consciousness, it is this one. In this central sense of ‘consciousness’, an organism, and a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that state.”192.

Farfesa Torin Alter ya ƙara wani fanni ga ma'anar matsalar wahala ta sani (hard problem of consciousness), ta hanyar mai da hankali kan rashin iyawar amsa tambayar dalilin da yasa hanyoyin ƙwaƙwalwar jiki ke samar da ƙwarewar sani.

Professor Torin Alter adds another dimension to the definition of the hard problem of consciousness, by focusing on the inability to answer why physical brain processes produce conscious experience:

"Yayin da nake rubuta waɗannan kalmomi, tsarin fahimta a cikin kwakwalwata na aiki wajen sarrafa bayanan gani da na ji. Wannan sarrafawa tana tare da yanayin sanin abubuwa na zahiri (phenomenal consciousness), kamar ƙwarewar sauraron tap-tap-tap na allon rubutu da ƙwarewar ganin haruffa suna bayyana a kan allo. Ta yaya aikin kwakwalwata ke samar da waɗannan ƙwarewa? Me ya sa waɗancan, ba wasu ba? Lallai, me ya sa duk wani abu na zahiri ke tare da ƙwarewar sani? Wannan jerin matsaloli ana kiransa matsala mai wuya ta sani (hard problem of consciousness)… Ko bayan an bayyana dukkan ayyuka da iyawar da ke da alaƙa, mutum zai iya yin mamaki cikin hankali me ya sa akwai abin da yake kama da ganin haruffa suna bayyana a allon kwamfuta." 193.

“As I type these words, cognitive systems in my brain engage in visual and auditory information processing. This processing is accompanied by states of phenomenal consciousness, such as the auditory experience of hearing the tap-tap-tap of the keyboard and the visual experience of seeing the letters appear on the screen. How does my brain's activity generate those experiences? Why those and not others? Indeed, why is any physical event accompanied by conscious experience? The set of such problems is known as the hard problem of consciousness… Even after all the associated functions and abilities are explained, one might reasonably wonder why there is something it is like to see letters appear on a computer screen.”193.

Bari in sauƙaƙa ma'anonin da ke sama da misali. Ka ce za ka ci strawberry. Masana kimiyya da masu falsafa za su iya gano alaƙoyi a cikin kwakwalwa da ke nuna cewa kana cin wani abu, watakila ma har cewa abin da kake ci 'ya'yan itace ne, da kuma ko ka ga yana da daɗi ko zaki ta hanyar tambayar ka ka bayyana abin da ka ji a zuciyarka. Duk da haka, ba za su taɓa sanin ko bincika yadda yake a gare ka ka ci strawberry ba, ko abin da ɗanɗano da zaƙi ke nufi da kuma yadda suke ji a gare ka, da kuma dalilin da ya sa kake da wannan ƙwarewa ta musamman ta cin strawberry wadda ta samo asali daga hanyoyin jiki.

Let me simplify the above definitions with an example. Say you were to eat a strawberry. Scientists and philosophers would be able to find correlations in the brain that indicate that you are eating something, maybe even the fact that you are eating a piece of fruit, and whether or not you find it tasty or sweet by asking you to describe your conscious experience. Nevertheless, they could never find out or examine what it is like for you to eat a strawberry, or what tastiness or sweetness mean and feel for you, and why you have had that particular subjective experience of eating a strawberry arising from physical processes.

Yana da muhimmanci a lura cewa batun da ke gaban mu ba batu ne na ilimi kawai ba; ba saboda rashin fahimtar ilimin jijiyoyi (neurobiology) ko rashin iya fahimtar yadda yake ji ga wani mutum ya sami kwarewar sani ta ciki ba, ta hanyar lura da abubuwan da ke faruwa a jijiyoyi kawai. A maimakon haka, matsala ce ta ontology; tana damuwa da asali da yanayin kwarewar abin ji (phenomenal experience). Yanayin abin zahiri (a nan, ilimin jijiyoyi) da sanin da ke na ciki (subjective consciousness) sun bambanta gaba ɗaya. Rashin iya gano yadda yake ji ga wani mutum ya sami kwarewar sani ta ciki, da rashin sanin yadda irin waɗannan kwarewa ke tasowa daga abubuwan zahiri, yana tayar da tambayoyin metaphysics masu zuwa: Menene yanayin kwarewar sani? Menene asalin waɗannan kwarewa?

It is important to note that the issue at hand is not merely an epistemic one; it is not due to a lack of understanding neurobiology or not being able to understand what it is like for someone to have an inner subjective conscious experience just by observing neurobiological happenings. Rather, it is an ontological problem; it concerns the source and nature of phenomenal experience. The nature of the physical (in this case, neurobiology) and subjective consciousness are completely different. Not being able to find out what it is like for someone to have a subjective conscious experience, and not knowing how these experiences arise from physical processes, raises the following metaphysical questions: What is the nature of conscious experience? What is the ultimate source of these experiences?.

Magance hanyoyin da suka gaza.

Addressing the failed approaches.

Akwai wasu hanyoyi daban-daban da ke ƙoƙarin bayyana al'amarin sani (consciousness) da matsalar wahala (hard problem) da ke tattare da shi. Waɗannan hanyoyi sun haɗa da bayanai na halitta (biological), na kayan abu kawai (materialist), da kuma waɗanda ba na kayan abu kawai ba (non-materialist). Zan yi ƙoƙarin tattauna dalilin da ya sa ba sa magance matsalar wahala ta sani, da kuma dalilin da ya sa tsarin imani da Allah ya fi bayani mai gamsarwa. A takaice dai, wanzuwar Allah (God) tana ba da tushe mai ma'ana don amsa tambayoyin da masana falsafa da masana kimiyyar jijiyoyi (neuroscientists) suka kasa amsawa.

A range of competing approaches attempt to explain the phenomenon of consciousness and its hard problem. These approaches include biological, materialist and non-materialist explanations. I will attempt to discuss why they do not address the hard problem of consciousness, and why a theistic approach provides the best explanation. In other words, God’s existence provides a rational basis to answer the questions philosophers and neuroscientists have been unable to answer.

Hanyoyin halitta.

Biological approaches.

Da farko, bari mu bayyana dalilin da ya sa bayanan halitta (biological) suka gaza. Daga cikin wadannan yunkurin akwai Toward a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness na Francis Crick da Christof Koch, Global Workplace theory na Bernard Baars, The Dynamic Core theory na Gerald Elderman da Giulio Tononi, Thalamocortical Binding theory na Rodolfo Llinas, Recurrent Processing theory na Victor Lamme, Microconsciousness theory na Semir Zeki, da kuma The Feeling of What Happens theory na Antonio Damasio. Ko da yake ba manufar wannan babi ba ce tattaunawa kan fasahohi da kuma kasawar wadannan ka'idojin na gwaji (domin dukkansu suna da tasirin falsafa da zato, wadanda ake tattaunawa a kasa), babu ko daya daga cikinsu da ya magance matsalar wahala ta sani (hard problem of consciousness) gaba daya. Farfesa David Chalmers ya bayyana kasawar hanyoyin halitta wajen magance matsalar wahala ta sani. A cikin littafinsa The Character of Consciousness, ya 145.

Let us first address why biological explanations have failed. Some of these attempts include Francis Crick and Christof Koch’s Toward a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness, Bernard Baars’s Global Workplace theory, Gerald Elderman’s and Giulio Tononi’s The Dynamic Core theory, Rodolfo Llinas’s Thalamocortical Binding theory, Victor Lamme’s Recurrent Processing theory, Semir Zeki’s Microconsciousness theory and Antonio Damasio’s The Feeling of What Happens theory. Although it is not the purpose of this chapter to discuss the technicalities and shortcomings of these empirical theories (because they all have philosophical implications and assumptions, which are addressed below), none of them comprehensively addresses the hard problem of consciousness. Professor David Chalmers explains the failure of the biological approaches in addressing the hard problem of consciousness. In his book The Character of Consciousness, he 145.

ya ambaci dabaru biyar masu haɗari da aka ɗauka

mentions five perilous strategies that have been adopted194:

1. Dabarun farko shi ne bayyana wani abu daban. Masu bincike kawai suna yarda cewa matsalar gogewa (kwarewar mutum) tana da wahala sosai a yanzu. Koch ya bayyana wannan dabara da ta gaza a fili. A wata hira da aka buga, ya furta: "To, bari da farko mu manta da abubuwan da suka fi wahala, kamar yanayin ji na cikin mutum, domin ba za su iya samun mafita ta kimiyya ba. Yanayin ji na mutum, na ciwo, na jin dadi, na ganin shudi, na shakar fure—akwai wani babban tazara tsakanin matakin abu, na bayyana kwayoyin halitta da jijiyoyi, da matakin ji na cikin mutum."195.

1. The first strategy is to explain something else. Researchers simply admit the problem of experience is too difficult for now. Koch openly admits this failed strategy. In a published interview, he confessed: “Well, let's first forget about the real difficult aspects, like subjective feelings, because they may not have a scientific solution. The subjective state of play, of pain, of pleasure, of seeing blue, of smelling a rose—there seems to be a huge jump between the materialistic level, of explaining molecules and neurons, and the subjective level.”195.

Dabara ta biyu ita ce musanta matsalar wahalar sani (hard problem of consciousness). Wato a yanke hukuncin cewa mu aljanu ne masu rarrafe (zombies), wadanda suke da kwarewar 'yanci a zahiri kawai. Wannan dabara tana kwatanta gaskiyar dan Adam a matsayin injin halitta wanda ba shi da kwarewar ji ko sani na kansa. A takaice, tana kauda kai daga matsalar kuma tana sake fasalta ma'anar zama dan Adam.

2. The second strategy is to deny the hard problem of consciousness. It is to decide that we are zombies, with only an illusion of free will. This strategy describes the human reality as a biological machine with no subjective experience. In other words, it ignores the problem and redefines what it means to be human.

3. Dabara ta uku tana iƙirarin cewa ana bayyana ƙwarewar zuciya (subjective experience) ta hanyar fahimtar hanyoyin jiki da ke faruwa a cikin ƙwaƙwalwarmu. Duk da haka, wannan yana kama da sihiri. Ƙwarewar sani (conscious experience) tana fitowa ta wata hanya ba tare da wani bayani ba. Tambayar ita ce: ta yaya waɗannan hanyoyi suke haifar da ƙwarewar zuciya ta ciki?

3. The third strategy claims that subjective experience is explained by understanding the physical processes in our brain. However, this sounds like magic. Conscious experience somehow emerges without any explanation. The question, how do these processes give rise to an inner subjective experience?

Abu ba ya amsa. Bugu da ƙari, fahimtar hanyoyin jiki ba ta gaya mana komai game da yadda mutum yake ji a cikin zuciyarsa ba lokacin da yake da wani takamaiman ƙwarewa ta ciki.

is never answered. Furthermore, understanding physical processes tells us nothing about what it is like for a person to have a particular internal conscious experience.

Dabara ta huɗu ita ce bayyana tsarin ƙwarewa (gogewa). Wannan dabara ba ta gaya mana komai game da dalilin da ya sa ƙwarewa ke wanzuwa tun farko ba, kuma ta hanyar kawai bayyana tsarin ƙwarewar, ba ta ba mu amsoshin abin da yake kasancewa ga mutum ba. 146

4. The fourth strategy is to explain the structure of experience. This strategy tells us nothing of why experience exists in the first place, and just by explaining the structure of experience, it provides us with no answers to what it is like for a person to 146

suna da abubuwan da suka bambanta da kowa.

have unique experiences.

Dabara ta biyar ita ce ware tushen (ko kuma matakin asali) na gogewa. Wannan dabara tana nufin ware tushen jijiyoyi na gogewa ta hanyar fahimtar wasu hanyoyi. Duk da haka, wannan dabara ba ta bayyana yadda yake ji a sami gogewa ta ciki mai hankali ba, ko dalilin da yasa take fitowa daga waɗannan hanyoyi da kuma yadda take fitowa.

5. The fifth strategy is to isolate the substrate (the underlying basis or layer) of experience. This strategy aims to isolate the neural basis for experience by understanding certain processes. However, this strategy does not explain what it is like to have an internal conscious experience, why it emerges from these processes and how.

Shiga cikin falsafar hankali.

Enter the philosophy of mind.

Yanzu mun shirya don tattauna yadda masana falsafar tunani ke bayyana hankali (consciousness) ta hanyar da ke ƙoƙarin magance matsalar wahala (hard problem). Abin da ya kamata a ƙara a nan shi ne cewa ka'idojin kimiyya suna ɗauke da zato na falsafa a ɓoye. Saboda haka, tattaunawa kan ka'idojin falsafa zai kuma shafi ka'idojin gwaji. Farfesa Antti Revonsuo ya bayyana wannan batu a fili:

Now we are in a position to address how philosophers of the mind explain consciousness in a way that attempts to address the hard problem. An important note to add here is that scientific theories have implied philosophical assumptions. Therefore, addressing the philosophical theories will also address the empirical theories. Professor Antti Revonsuo makes this point clear:

“Duk da haka, yana da amfani ga masana kimiyyar gwaji su san madogarorin falsafa daban-daban, domin kowace ka'idar gwaji tana tattare ne da wasu irin ɗaurin-gindi na falsafa da ba a bayyana su ba… Hanyar gwaji gabaɗaya da masanin kimiyya yake bi wajen nazarin hankali (consciousness) tana jagorancinta ne da abubuwan da ya riga ya yi imani da su a falsafance ko kuma hasashensa game da yanayin kimiyya da yanayin hankali, ko yana sane da irin wannan imani ko a'a.”196.

“However, it is useful also for empirical scientists to be aware of the different philosophical alternatives, because every empirical theory also necessarily involves some sort of implicit philosophical commitments… The overall empirical approach that a scientist takes to consciousness is guided by his prior philosophical commitments or intuitions about the nature of science and the nature of consciousness, whether he is aware of such commitments or not.”196.

Farfesoshi Ricardo Manzotti da Paolo Moderato suma nuna cewa ilimin jijiyoyi (neurosciences) "ba shi da laifi a fannin metaphysics ba"197, kuma cewa "bayanan gwaji (empirical data) suna bukatar a fassara su daga mahangar wata ka'ida (premise)."198

Professors Ricardo Manzotti and Paolo Moderato also highlight that the neurosciences are “not metaphysically innocent”197 and that “empirical data needs to be interpreted from the perspective of some premise.”198.

Babu ɗaya daga cikin ƙoƙarin falsafa da aka yi don bayyana sani (consciousness) da ya isa ya ƙalubalanci madadin tauhidi. Waɗannan ƙoƙari ana iya rarraba su gabaɗaya zuwa: na abin duniya ko na jiki (materialist ko physicalist), da waɗanda ba na abin duniya ba. A ƙasa akwai taƙaitaccen bayani game da waɗannan ƙoƙari da kuma bayanin dalilin da ya sa suka gaza.

None of the various philosophical attempts to explain consciousness are comprehensive enough to challenge the theistic alternative. These attempts can be broadly categorised as materialist or physicalist, and non-materialist. Below is a brief account of these attempts and an explanation of why they have failed.

Hanyoyin dukiyanci (na zahiri).

Materialistic approaches.

Dangane da wasu masana da malamai, za a yi amfani da kalmomin physicalism da materialism a madadin juna.199 200 Ko da yake suna da tarihi daban-daban da wasu bambance-bambancen ra'ayi201, waɗannan ba sa haifar da matsala ga ra'ayoyin da aka tattauna a cikin wannan babi. Kalmomin biyu suna nufin cewa za a iya bayyana sani (consciousness) ta hanyar kimiyyar zahiri, amma ba koyaushe suke nufin cewa yanayin sani dole ne a daidaita shi da ɓangarorin kwayoyin halitta ba.

Echoing other researchers and academics, the terms physicalism and materialism will be used interchangeably.199 200 Although they have separate histories and some conceptual differences201, these do not pose a problem to the concepts dealt with in this chapter. The two terms mean that consciousness can be explained by the physical sciences, but do not always imply that conscious states must be equated to bits of matter.

Abubuwan zahiri ba su ne duk gaskiyar ba!

Physical facts are not all the facts!.

Kafin in shiga cikin dukkan hanyoyin masu bin tsarin kayan duniya, ina so in bayyana yadda physicalism da materialism gabaɗaya suke rauni a gaban hujjar Mary mai ƙarfi ta Frank Jackson. Ga taƙaitaccen bayaninta: Mary ta kwashe rayuwarta duka a cikin wani ɗaki mai launin baƙi da fari, kuma tana samun bayanai ta hanyar kwamfutoci da talabijin masu launin baƙi da fari. A cikin ɗakin, Mary tana da damar samun dukkan bayanai na kimiyya game da abin da ke faruwa lokacin da mutane suka ga abubuwan zahiri. Ta san komai game da kimiyyar da ta shafi gani da abubuwa ta idon ɗan adam. Duk da haka, ba ta san yadda ake ganin launuka ba. Wata rana aka bar ta ta fita daga ɗakin. Nan take da ta buɗe ƙofar, ta kalli wata jan fure, kuma ta fara fuskantar launin ja a karon farko. Ta fahimci kyawun launin ja a daidai lokacin da ta gan shi.202 Iliminta game da dukkan abubuwan zahiri da suka shafi gani da launuka bai shirya ta ga sabon abin da ta fuskanta ba na ganin ja. Ba ta san yadda yake ganin jan fure ta hanyar koyon abubuwan zahiri ba; ta san yadda wannan ƙwarewar take ne kawai a daidai lokacin da ta faru.

Before I get into all the materialist approaches, I would like to explain how physicalism and materialism in general are undermined by Frank Jackson’s powerful Mary argument. Here is a summary of it: Mary has lived in a black and white room all her life and acquires information about the world via black and white computers and televisions. In her room, Mary has access to all of the scientific objective information about what happens when humans see physical phenomena. She knows everything about the science related to perceiving objects with the human eye. Yet, she is unaware of what it is like to see colours. One day she is allowed to leave the room. The moment she opens the door she looks at a red rose, and experiences the colour red for the first time. She only appreciates the colour red the moment she sees it.202 Her knowledge about all the physical facts concerning visual perception and colours did nothing to prepare her for the new experience of seeing red. She did not know what it was like to see a red rose by learning the physical facts, she only knew what that experience was like the moment it occurred.

Chalmers ya gabatar da waɗannan ginshiƙai don nuna cewa hujjar Mary ta sa ra'ayin abu (materialism) ya kasa warware matsalar wahala ta sani (hard problem of consciousness):

Chalmers provides the following premises to show that the Mary argument renders materialism unable to solve the hard problem of consciousness:

Maryam ta san dukkan gaskiyar zahiri.

1. Mary knows all the physical facts.

2. Maryam ba ta san dukkan gaskiyar lamarin ba.

2. Mary does not know all the facts.

3. Gaskiyar zahiri ba ta kammala dukkan gaskiyoyi ba.203.

3. The physical facts do not exhaust all the facts.203.

Hujjar Chalmers a nan ta nuna cewa sanin duniyar zahiri ba zai kai ga sanin hakikanin abin da ake ji a zahiri ba, misali abin da ake ji idan an ga launin ja. Wannan yana ganin kamar yana raunana ra'ayin materialism. Chalmers ya yi wa wannan hujja fadi kamar haka:

Chalmers’s argument here shows that knowledge of the physical world will not lead to knowledge of subjective conscious reality—for example, what it is like to see red. This seems to undermine materialism. Chalmers generalises the argument in the following way:

Akwai gaskiyoyi game da hankali (sani) waɗanda ba za a iya fitar da su daga gaskiyoyin zahiri ba.

1. There are truths about consciousness that are not deducible from physical truths.

2. Idan akwai gaskiya game da hankali (sani) waɗanda ba za a iya fitar da su daga gaskiyoyin zahiri ba, to akidar abu-kawai (materialism) ba ta da gaskiya.

2. If there are truths about consciousness that are not deducible from physical truths, then materialism is false.

3. Hasashen rayuwa ta zahiri (materialism) ƙarya ce.204.

3. Materialism is false.204.

Ilimin jiki (physicalism) da ilimin abu-kawai (materialism) ba sa bayyana abin da ke na zuciya (subjective).

Physicalism and materialism do not explain subjective.

saba'in cewa sani game da kwakwalwar zahiri ba ya kai ga fahimtar wani abu da ake ji a cikin rai ba, da kuma dalilin da ya sa wannan abu yake fitowa daga aikin kwakwalwa. Ra'ayin abin zahiri kawai bai isa ba, saboda akwai abubuwan da suka shafi sani wadanda ba za a iya fitar da su daga abubuwan zahiri ba.

consciousness because knowledge of the physical brain does not lead to an understanding of a subjective experience, and why that experience emerges from brain activity. Materialism is inadequate, because there are facts about consciousness that cannot be deduced from physical facts.

Hujja ta Maryamu ta haifar da ƙin yarda masu ban sha'awa. Wani ƙin yarda yana cewa ba zai yiwu a gano abin da Maryamu za ta sani ba idan ta samu dukkan gaskiyar zahiri. Wannan ƙin yarda bai fahimci hujjar Maryamu ba. Yana ɗauka cewa hujjar Maryamu tana mai da hankali ne kan abin da yake kasancewa a san dukkan gaskiyar zahiri. Duk da haka, hujjar tana mai da hankali ne kan rashin iyawar Maryamu wajen sanin yadda ake ji idan ta ga ja, tun da ba ta taɓa samun ƙwarewar ganin ja ba. Saboda haka, duk wani ƙin yarda ga hujjar Maryamu dole ne ya mai da hankali kan abin da Maryamu take samu ta wajen ganin ja, ba kan abin da za ta sani idan ta sami dukkan gaskiyar zahiri ba.

The Mary argument has generated interesting objections. One objection argues that it is not possible to identify what Mary would know if she acquired all of the physical facts. This objection misunderstands the Mary argument. It assumes that the Mary argument is focused on what it is like to know all the physical facts. However, the argument is focused on Mary’s inability to know what it is like to see red if she never had the experience of seeing red. Therefore, any objection to the Mary argument must focus on what Mary gains by seeing red and not what she would know if she had all the physical facts.

Wata shawara ta gaba da ake yi ita ce Ka'idar Iyawa (Ability Hypothesis). Wannan ka'ida tana tabbatar da cewa Mary ba ta samun wani sabon ilimi ba, sai dai tana samun sabuwar iyawa kawai. Misali, idan mutum ya koyi hawan keke, ba ya koyon sabbin abubuwa game da keken; kawai yana samun iyawar hawansa. Ana ganin wannan shawara ba ta isa ba. Idan Mary za ta iya samun sabbin iyawa a lokacin da ta fita daga ɗakin, to kuma yana yiwuwa ta samu sabbin gaskiya waɗanda ba ta da su kafin ta fita daga ɗakin. Idan mutum ya koyi hawan keke, ba wai kawai yana samun iyawar yin hakan ba, har ma yana samun sabbin gaskiya. Misali, idan mutum yana hawa da sauri a kan gangara, a ƙarshe zai koyi kada ya riƙa amfani da birki koyaushe, domin hakan zai sa ƙafafun keken su yi zafi sosai. Don sauka a hankali, ya kamata a matse birki a hankali cikin bugun kusan daƙiƙa biyu-biyu. Farfesa Brian Loar ya gabatar da wata hujja mai ƙarfi da ke ƙalubalantar hujjar Mary. Loar ya ce Mary ba ta samun sabon ilimi game da launin ja ba, sai dai sabuwar hanya ta fahimtar abin da ta riga ta sani game da launin. Wannan dabara tana bayyana cewa akwai dukiya ɗaya kawai da za ta iya haifar da tunani daban-daban game da ita. Waɗannan tunanin su ne tunanin zahiri-aiki (physical-functional concepts) da tunanin al'amari (phenomenal concepts), wato tunanin da ke nufin ƙwarewar mutum ta ciki. Saboda haka, a lokacin da Mary ta fara ganin ja, ba ta fuskantar wata sabuwar dukiya ko koyon sabbin gaskiya game da ita ba. Abin da take fuskanta shi ne sabuwar hanyar tunani game da abin da ta riga ta sani. Kafin ta fita daga ɗakin, ta gane launin ja ta hanyar zahiri da aiki; amma a lokacin da ta fita, ta sami sabuwar hanyar gane wannan dukiyar ta zahiri ta hanyar al'amari. Mary tana iya samun tunanin al'amari ne kawai idan ta ga ja, domin waɗannan tunanin suna zuwa ne kawai ta hanyar ganin launin ja. Babbar matsalar dabarar Loar ita ce tana dogara ne ga zato cewa za mu iya samun tunanin al'amari ta hanyar lura da dukiyoyin zahiri. Amma wannan yana tada tambaya: Ta yaya kwakwalwarmu, a lokacin da muke fuskantar yanayin sanin abu na ganin wata dukiya ta zahiri-aiki, za ta samu ra'ayin hankali (phenomenal concept)? Loar bai bayar da amsa mai gamsarwa ba. Mai ra'ayin cewa akwai abin da ya wuce na zahiri (non-physicalist) zai ce hujjar Mary tana nan daram saboda tana ba da amsa ga wannan muhimmiyar tambaya: muna samun ra'ayoyin hankali ne saboda abubuwa (ciki har da kanmu) suna ɗauke da dukiyoyi na zahiri da na hankali. A taƙaice, a ce ra'ayoyin hankali na iya tasowa daga dukiya ta zahiri bai isa ba wajen bayyana ilimin da mutum ke samu daga fuskantar kwarewar sanin abu ta zahiri.206

Another objection is the Ability Hypothesis. This hypothesis asserts that Mary does not gain any new knowledge, but only acquires new abilities. For example, when someone learns how to ride a bike they are not learning new things about the bike, they simply acquire the ability to ride it. This objection is considered inadequate. If Mary can gain new abilities when she leaves the room, then it is also possible that she gains new facts that she did not have prior to leaving the room. When someone learns how to ride a bike, they do not only acquire the ability to do so, they also gain new facts. For example, if someone is riding downhill fast, they will eventually learn not to constantly use the brakes as this will cause the rims to overheat. For a controlled descent, the brakes must be gently squeezed with around two second pulses. Professor Brian Loar’s objection provides a strong challenge to the Mary argument. Loar argues that Mary does not acquire new knowledge about red, only a new way of conceptualising what she already knew about the colour. This strategy declares that there is only one property that can give rise to distinct concepts of that property. These concepts are physical-functional concepts and phenomenal concepts (concepts that refer to subjective experience). So, when Mary saw red for the first time, she was not experiencing a new property and learning new facts about it. She was experiencing a different way of conceptualising what she already knew. Prior to leaving the room, she recognised the property of red in physical-functional terms. However, when she left the room, she acquired a new way of recognising the physical property of red in phenomenal terms. Mary can only acquire phenomenal concepts when she sees red, because these concepts come about only by seeing the colour red.205 The main problem with Loar’s strategy is that it is based on the assumption that we can acquire phenomenal concepts from observing physical properties. However, this begs the question: How can our brains, while we experience the conscious state of observing a physical-functional property, acquire a phenomenal concept? Loar does not provide any adequate answer. The non-physicalist will then state that the Mary argument holds its ground because it provides an answer to that fundamental question: we gain phenomenal concepts because things (including ourselves) contain physical and phenomenal properties. In summary, to claim that phenomenal concepts can arise from a physical property is inadequate to explain the knowledge one gains from experiencing a subjective conscious experience.206

Akwai wasu dalilai da ya sa dabarar ra'ayin phenomenal ta Loar ba ta zama mai yanke hukunci ba. Don cikakkun tattaunawa da martani ga bayanin Loar, ku koma ga Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts na Michael Tye207, Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts na Erhan Demircioglu208, Brian Loar on Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts na Karol Polcyn209, da kuma rubutun David Chalmers, Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap210.

There are other reasons why Loar’s phenomenal concept strategy is not decisive. For detailed discussions and responses to Loar’s account, please refer to Michael Tye’s Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts207, Erhan Demircioglu’s Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts208, Karol Polcyn’s Brian Loar on Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts209 and David Chalmers’s essay, Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap210.

Adabin ilimi game da hujjar Mary ma yana da yawa, tare da hujjoji masu karfi da ke goyon bayan wannan ra'ayi (physicalism) da kuma wadanda ke kalubalantarsa. Wannan ba wuri ba ne da za a binciki adabin wannan batu. Duk da haka, tattaunawar ilimi ba ta karyata abin da aka gabatar a wannan sashe ba gaba daya.

The academic literature on the Mary argument is also vast, with compelling arguments supporting and challenging physicalism. This is not the space to explore the literature on the topic. However, the academic discussions do not conclusively undermine what has been presented in this section.

‘Bari mu yi watsi da matsalar’: Ra'ayin rusa-hankali (Eliminative materialism) Masu ra'ayin rusa-hankali sun ɗauka cewa komai za a iya bayyana shi ta hanyar hanyoyin zahiri, kuma ba sa yarda da cewa yanayin sani na zahiri (subjective conscious states) yana wanzuwa. Suna cewa kwakwalwa ta ƙunshi ƙwayoyin jijiya (neurons) da ke gudanar da hanyoyin zahiri da na sinadarai; saboda haka, bayyana waɗannan hanyoyi masu rikitarwa zai bayyana sani ta wata hanya.211 Masu ra'ayin rusa-hankali sun tabbatar da cewa ra'ayoyin 'ilimin jama'a' (folk psychology) da muka samar don bayyana sani na zahiri (saboda rashin mafita da ilimomin zahiri ke bayarwa a yanzu) za su zama ba su da amfani idan ilimin jijiyoyi (neuroscience) ya "balaga"212. A lokacin ne ilimin jijiyoyi zai maye gurbin sani na zahiri da "aikin jijiyoyi a takamaiman yankunan jiki"213. A takaice dai, kimiyya za ta bayyana abin da muke kira sani na zahiri a wata rana; don haka, matsalar wahala (hard problem) za ta warware.

‘Let’s ignore the problem’: Eliminative materialism Eliminative materialists assume everything can be explained via physical processes, and do not accept that subjective conscious states exist. They argue that the brain is made up of neurons undergoing physical and chemical processes; therefore, explaining these complex processes will somehow explain consciousness.211 Eliminative materialists assert that the ideas of ‘folk psychology’ we have developed to describe subjective consciousness (due to the current lack of solutions provided by the physical sciences) will be made redundant when neuroscience has “matured”212. This is when neuroscience will replace subjective consciousness with “neural activity in specialized anatomical areas”.213. In summary, science will one day explain what we call subjective consciousness; therefore, the hard problem will be solved.

Dangane da ra'ayin eliminative materialism, masanin falsafar nazari Patricia Churchland ta bayyana cewa tambayar da ake yi game da sanin kai (subjective consciousness) za ta zama a bayyane idan muka inganta ilimin kimiyyarmu. Churchland ta ce bai kamata a raba matsalar sirri ta sani (hard problem of consciousness) da sauran matsalolin ilimin jijiyoyin jiki (neuroscience) ba. Dalilinta shi ne cewa masu bincike suna da matsaloli da yawa da ba a warware su ba, kuma yin jayayya cewa ba za a taba warware su ba ba shi da ma'ana. Kawai saboda ana bayyana matsalar sirri a matsayin abin ban mamaki ko kalubale mai wuyar gaske ga physicalism, hakan ba ya nufin ba zai taba samun mafita ta kimiyya ba. Churchland ta yi amfani da tarihin kimiyya wajen goyon bayan hujjojinta. Tarihi ya nuna cewa kimiyya ta warware matsaloli masu wuya da dama, don haka matsalar sani ma za ta warwaru.214

Echoing the eliminative materialist approach, the analytical philosopher Patricia Churchland asserts that the apparent question of subjective consciousness will be demystified when we improve our scientific knowledge. Churchland argues the hard problem of consciousness should not be distinguished from other problems in neuroscience. The reason, according to Churchland, is that researchers have an array of problems that are unaddressed, and to argue that they will never be solved seems unreasonable. Just because the hard problem is described as mysterious or a difficult challenge to physicalism does not mean that it will never have a scientific solution. Churchland refers to the history of science in support of her arguments. History shows that science has solved many ‘hard problems’, indicating that the hard problem of consciousness will also be solved.214

Sai dai ilimin halayen abubuwa da sinadarai ba sa gaya mana komai game da abin da yake ji ga wani mai hankali na musamman idan yana da ƙwarewar rayuwa ta ciki ta zahiri. Wannan yana nufin cewa, ga masu ra'ayin kawar da hankali (eliminative materialist), ƙwarewar rayuwa ta ciki ta zahiri kawai ruɗi ne. A wata ma'ana, masu wannan ra'ayi ba su yarda da ainihin matsalar hankali (hard problem of consciousness) ba, saboda suna da'awar cewa abu da hanyoyin zahiri su ne kawai abin da ake buƙata don bayyana komai. Duk da haka, abu da hanyoyin zahiri ba za su iya gaya mana komai game da yadda yake ji a ciki ba, watau ƙwarewar hankali ta zahiri. Haka kuma, abu ba zai iya bayyana fitowar ƙwarewar hankali ta zahiri ba, domin abu sanyi ne, makaho, kuma ba shi da hankali. Wani abu ba zai iya haifar da wani abu ba sai dai idan yana ɗauke da shi tun farko ko kuma yana da ikon haifar da shi. Abu da hanyoyin zahiri ba su da hankali, don haka ba za su iya haifar da ƙwarewar hankali ta zahiri ba, domin ba sa ƙunshe da ita. Frank Jackson da Philip Pettit sun tabbatar da cewa da'awar masu kawar da hankali, watau cewa tarihin kimiyya ya nuna cewa harshen zahiri zai maye gurbin ilimin halayyar gargajiyar mu, ba ta biyo bayan dalili ba. Tushen hujjarsu shi ne cewa ba daidai ba ne a ƙi matsayar wata ka'ida saboda yiwuwar gano wata ka'idar da ke da faɗin bayani da ƙarfi. Yana yiwuwa abubuwan da ka'idar "rauni" ta faɗa su kasance gaskiya duk da cewa akwai hanyar kimiyya mafi kyau ta bayyana al'amura iri ɗaya. Jackson da Pettit sun yi amfani da ka'idar motsin iskar gas (kinetic theory of gases) a matsayin misali. Ka'idar motsin iskar gas tana nazarin "halayyar ƙwayoyin halitta a ƙanƙanta da mu'amalar da ke kaiwa ga alaƙa a babbar fuska", 215 kuma wannan ka'ida tana amfani da nazarin lissafi don samar da "sakamako daidai ga abubuwan da ake gani a babbar fuska waɗanda suka samo asali daga al'amura ƙanana". (Ibid) Jackson da Pettit sun yi zato cewa idan wata ka'idar hasashe mai suna "Super Kinetic" ta samar da lissafi marar yuwuwa, mai tabbatacce na "ainihin matsayi, yawa, gudu, da girman kowane kwayar gas", hakan ba zai samar da dalili na kin yarda cewa gas yana da zafi da matsin lamba ba.216 Dalilin shi ne ka'idar super kinetic ba ta ƙunshi "bayanin da ke goyon bayan sashin da ya dace na tsohuwar ka'ida ba."217 Jackson da Pettit sun taƙaita hujjarsu kamar haka:

However, physical and chemical processes tell us nothing about what it is like for a particular conscious being to have an internal subjective experience. This implies that, for the eliminative materialist, inner subjective experiences are just an illusion. In other words, proponents of this view do not really accept the hard problem of consciousness, because they claim that matter and physical processes are all that is required to explain anything. Nevertheless, matter and physical processes cannot tell us anything about what it is like to have an inner subjective conscious experience. Furthermore, matter cannot explain the emergence of subjective conscious experience because matter is cold, blind and non-conscious. Something cannot give rise to anything unless it contains that thing in the first place or has the ability to give rise to it. Matter and physical processes are non-conscious and therefore cannot give rise to subjective conscious experience as they do not contain it. Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit maintain that the eliminative materialist’s claim—that the history of science has shown that a physicalist language will replace our primitive folk psychology—does not logically follow. The basis of their argument is that it is unreasonable to reject the conclusions of a theory due to the potential discovery of another theory that may have greater explanatory scope and power. It could be that the claims of the ‘weaker’ theory are still true despite a scientifically better way of explaining the same phenomena. Jackson and Pettit use the kinetic theory of gases as an example. The kinetic theory of gases studies “the microscopic behavior of molecules and the interactions which lead to macroscopic relationships”.215 This theory uses statistical analysis to provide accurate “results for macroscopic manifestations of microscopic phenomena”. (Ibid) Jackson and Pettit postulate that if a hypothetical “Super Kinetic” theory provided non-statistical, deterministic calculations of the “exact position, mass, velocity, and size of every gas molecule” it would not provide a basis to reject the fact that gases have temperature and pressure.216 The reason is that the super kinetic theory does not contain “information that supports the relevant part of the old theory.”217 Jackson and Pettit summarise their argument:

Duk da haka, babu wani gyare-gyare mai sauƙi da za a iya yi wanda zai danganta zafin jiki da matsin lamba da kowace irin dukiya ta asali ta ka'idar motsi ta super. Misali, zafin jiki ba shi ne nauyi, gudu, ko matsayin wani kwayar halitta guda ɗaya ba. Ba za a sami daidaituwar tsari ko da da mafi sassaucin ma'auni ba tsakanin dokokin iskar gas da aka bayyana ta fuskar zafin jiki, matsin lamba da girma, da dokokin da aka bayyana ta fuskar nauyi, matsayi da gudun kwayoyin halitta a ka'idar motsi ta super. Ka'idodin rarrabawa na asali na ka'idoji guda biyu sun bambanta sosai.218

“And yet no reductive reductive identifications of temperature and pressure with fundamental properties of the super kinetic theory are possible. Temperature, for instance, is not the mass, velocity, or position of any individual molecule. There will be no isomorphism even by the most relaxed standards between gas laws framed in terms of temperature, pressure, and volume and the laws framed in terms of mass, position, and velocity of molecules of the super kinetic theory. The basic taxonomic principles of the two theories are very different.”218

A wannan dalili, ƙarfafa kimiyyar kawar da hankali (eliminative materialism) ba ta isa ta bayyana matsalar wahala ta sani (hard problem of consciousness) ba, domin tana watsi da abin da ke buƙatar bayani tun farko. Sakamakon kimiyyar kawar da hankali ana iya mayar da shi zuwa wannan wauta: ba mu da rayuwar ciki ta ji (inner subjectivity). Duk da haka, iyawarmu ta samun abubuwan da muke ji a ciki gaskiya ce ta mutum-na-farko (first-person fact); kuma yana da ban dariya a musanta ta.

In light of this, eliminative materialism is not an adequate explanation of the hard problem of consciousness as it ignores what requires explaining in the first place. The conclusions of eliminative materialism can be reduced to the following absurdity: we do not have inner subjectivity. However, our ability to have inner subjective experiences is a first-person fact; it is ludicrous to deny it.

Ƙaƙƙarfan falsafar kawar da tunani (eliminative materialism) ta shahara ta hannun masanin falsafa Daniel Dennet lokacin da ya buga littafinsa, Consciousness Explained. A cikin wannan littafi da aka soke shi sosai, ya sake bayyana ma'anar sani (consciousness) ta hanyar yin watsi da abin da ke buƙatar bayani: yanayin sanin kanmu na zahiri (subjective conscious states). A cewar Dennet, babu wani ainihin ƙwarewar zahiri ta kanmu; mu kawai robobi ne na halitta. A wasu kalmomi, mu aljanu ne masu kwaikwayon ƙwarewar zahiri. Sukan da ake yi wa tsarin Dennet, wanda kuma aka sani da ka'idar Multiple Drafts, Farfesa Antti Revonsuo ya taƙaita shi a littafinsa, Consciousness: The Science of Subjectivity:

Eliminative materialism became popular with the philosopher Daniel Dennet when he published his book, Consciousness Explained. In this heavily criticised book, he redefined consciousness by ignoring what requires explaining: our subjective conscious states. According to Dennet, we have no real personal subjective experiences; we are simply biological robots. In other words, we are zombies with the illusion of subjective experience. Criticism of Dennet’s approach, also known as Multiple Drafts theory, has been summarised by Professor Antti Revonsuo in his book, Consciousness: The Science of Subjectivity:

“Ka’idar Dennet ta sha suka sosai, domin ta alama tana sake fasalta ma’anar ‘hankali’ ta yadda kalmar take nufin wani abu daban sosai da abin da muka fara nufin bayyanawa. Littafin Dennet mai shahara na 1991 an sa masa suna ‘Consciousness Explained’ (Bayanin Hankali), amma mutane da yawa sun ji cewa da ya kamata a sa masa suna ‘Consciousness Explained Away’ (Hankali Da Aka Bayyana Har Aka Kore Shi). Abin da mafi yawan mutane suke so a samar musu da bayani a kansa shi ne hankali mai jin abubuwa (phenomenal consciousness), qualia da kuma subjectivity, amma Dennet ya ware su yana cewa kawai ruɗi ne.”219.

“Dennet’s theory has been heavily criticized because it seems to redefine ‘consciousness’ in such a way that the term comes to mean something very different from what we originally set out to explain. Dennet’s famous 1991 book is titled ‘Consciousness Explained’, but many felt it should have been called ‘Consciousness Explained Away’. What most people wanted to find an explanation for is phenomenal consciousness, qualia and subjectivity, but Dennet dismisses them as mere illusions.”219.

'Subjectivity exists, but it's just matter': Reductive materialism Reductive materialism asserts that there is a knowledge-gap between physical processes and subjective conscious experiences. However, they maintain that the gap can be explained within a materialistic philosophy. Proponents of this view assert that subjective conscious experience exists, but is not distinct from physical processes. The basis for their arguments is that there is a link between certain activities in the brain and certain experiences of consciousness; therefore, consciousness can be reduced to physical processes. Reductive materialism, unlike eliminative materialism, accepts that subjective consciousness exists, but can be reduced to physical happenings in our brains. In this way, subjective consciousness is identical with neurochemical activity.220 Although there is currently no way of reducing all subjective conscious states to physical phenomena, reductive materialism is based on the expectation that neuroscience will follow the other sciences in that old terms, such as 'heat', will have been replaced with 'the science of mean kinetic energy of molecules'. Similarly, neuroscience may replace words like 'love' with a neurochemical equivalent. In essence, "consciousness is nothing over and above a complex set of neural activities going on in our brain".22.

‘Subjectivity exists, but it’s just matter’: Reductive materialism Reductive materialism asserts that there is a knowledge-gap between physical processes and subjective conscious experiences. However, they maintain that the gap can be explained within a materialistic philosophy. Proponents of this view assert that subjective conscious experience exists, but is not distinct from physical processes. The basis for their arguments is that there is a link between certain activities in the brain and certain experiences of consciousness; therefore, consciousness can be reduced to physical processes. Reductive materialism, unlike eliminative materialism, accepts that subjective consciousness exists, but can be reduced to physical happenings in our brains. In this way, subjective consciousness is identical with neurochemical activity.220 Although there is currently no way of reducing all subjective conscious states to physical phenomena, reductive materialism is based on the expectation that neuroscience will follow the other sciences in that old terms, such as ‘heat’, will have been replaced with ‘the science of mean kinetic energy of molecules’. Similarly, neuroscience may replace words like ‘love’ with a neurochemical equivalent. In essence, “consciousness is nothing over and above a complex set of neural activities going on in our brain”.22.

Wannan ra'ayi ba shi da isasshen bayani ga yanayin sanin zuciya na zahiri, domin yana dogara ne akan zato cewa abubuwan da mutum ya ji a zuciyarsa gaskiya ne, amma ci gaban ilimin jijiyoyi (neuroscience) a nan gaba zai bayyana su. A takaice dai, reductive materialism yana cewa yanayin sanin zuciya na zahiri za a mayar da shi zuwa yanayin kwakwalwa na jiki. Wannan ba ya warware matsalar sani (hard problem of consciousness). Ba zai yiwu a san yadda abu yake ji ga wata halitta ba ta hanyar kallon wasu jijiyoyi suna harbawa kawai. Reductive materialism kuma ba ya bayyana asalin kwarewar sani. Ilimin halittar jijiyoyi (neurobiology) da kwarewar zahiri abubuwa ne mabanbanta sarai. Kawai bayyana cewa sani yana fitowa daga tsarin jiki wadanda ba su da sani ba bai isa ba. Kamar masu eliminative materialism, masu reductive materialism ma ba za su iya warware matsalar sani ba. Hakika ana ci gaba da watsi da duniyoyin ciki na zahiri na dan Adam. Farfesa Revonsuo ya bayyana cewa:

This view is not an adequate explanation for subjective conscious states, because it is based on the assumption that subjective experiences are real, but will be explained in the future by developments in neuroscience. Essentially, reductive materialism argues that subjective conscious states will be reduced to physical brain states. This does not solve the hard problem of consciousness. It is impossible to know what it is like for a particular organism to experience a subjective state simply by observing a bunch of neurons firing. Reductive materialism also doesn’t explain the source of conscious experience. Neurobiology and subjective experience are completely different. Simply explaining that consciousness emerges from non-conscious physical processes is not adequate. Just like the eliminative materialists, reductive materialists cannot solve the hard problem. The inner subjective realities of the human being are once again being ignored. Professor Revonsuo explains:

Duk da haka, ya bayyana a fili cewa magana game da harbawar jijiyoyi, kunna da kashe sassan kwakwalwa daban-daban, ko daidaiton girgizar jijiyoyi a cikin tarin jijiyoyi, ba daidai take da magana game da jin zafi, ganin launi, motsin zuciya mai karfi ko tunani na cikin zuciya ba—kuma ba za ta taba zama daidai ba. Abin da ake barin wa baya shi ne, da farko kuma sama da duka, bangaren na zahiri na al'amuran hankali masu sani.222

“Still, it seems clear that to talk about neural firings, activations and deactivations in different brain areas or oscillatory synchrony in neural assemblies is not at all the same thing as talking about feelings of pain, sensations of colour, passionate emotions or inner thoughts—and never will be. What is being left out is, first and foremost, the subjective aspect of the conscious mental events.”222

Bambancin da ke tsakanin materialism mai kawar da komai (eliminative materialism) da materialism mai mayar da komai zuwa abin zahiri (reductive materialism) yana da ɗan wahalar fahimta. Eliminative materialism yana cewa sanin kai na zuciya (subjective consciousness) ruɗi ne, kuma babu shi a zahiri. Bisa wannan ra'ayi, ruɗin sanin kai ba komai ba ne illa ƙwayoyin jijiya (neurons) suna harbawa. Reductive materialism kuwa yana yarda cewa sanin kai na zuciya yana wanzuwa, amma yana riƙe da cewa ba komai ba ne illa aikin zahiri a cikin ƙwaƙwalwa. Dukkan ra'ayoyin biyu sun kasa magance gaskiyar sanin kai ta mahangar mutum na farko (first-person fact of subjective consciousness).

The difference between eliminative materialism and reductive materialism is quite subtle. Eliminative materialism argues that subjective consciousness is an illusion and does not exist. According to this approach, the illusion of subjective consciousness is nothing more than neurons firing. Reductive materialism accepts that subjective consciousness exists, but maintains that it is nothing more than physical activity in the brain. Both fail to address the first-person fact of subjective consciousness.

‘Abin da kake yi ne’: Halayyar Aiki (Behaviourism) Wata hanya da ta raba matsayar kawar da ra’ayin hankali (eliminative materialism) ita ce halayyar aiki (behaviourism). Halayyar aiki tana ɗaukar cewa ana bayyana sani (consciousness) ta fuskar halaye. Masu wannan ra’ayi suna cewa mutum yana cikin wani yanayi na sani ne kawai idan halayensa sun tabbatar da hakan (misali, Susan tana cikin zafi idan, bayan an buge ta da wani abu, ta yi ihu ta ce ‘ouch!’). Halayyar aiki tana musanta ƙwarewar sani ta zahiri (subjective conscious experience), kuma tana bayyana sani a matsayin yadda muke aiki maimakon yadda muke kasancewa. Wannan hanya tana kawar da matsalar sani ta hakika (hard problem of consciousness) domin ba ta yarda cewa mutane za su iya kasancewa cikin yanayin tunani ba tare da nuna wani hali ba. Kamar yadda masanin falsafa David Lund ya bayar da hujja, ba za mu iya watsi da gaskiyar cewa muna fuskantar yanayin cikin gida na zahiri waɗanda ba koyaushe halayenmu ke bayyana su ba.223

‘It’s what you do’: Behaviourism Another approach that shares the conclusions of eliminative materialism is behaviourism. Behaviourism postulates that consciousness is defined in behavioural terms. Behaviourists assert that a person only has a certain conscious state if it can be verified by that person’s behaviour (for example, Susan is in pain if, after being struck with something, she cries ‘ouch!’). Behaviourism denies subjective conscious experience, and defines consciousness as the way we act rather than the way we are. This approach denies the hard problem of consciousness because it fails to acknowledge that humans can have mental states without displaying any behaviour. As the philosopher David Lund argues, we cannot dismiss the fact that we do experience inner subjective states that are not always revealed via our behaviours.223

Halayyar ɗabi'a (behaviourism) tana sanya yanayin sani (conscious state) ya zama daidai da yanayin jiki (physical state). Matsalar wannan hanya ita ce tana watsi da gaskiyar cewa yanayin sanin ne ke haifar da ɗabi'a. Misali, zafin ciwo ne ke sa Susan ta ce 'ouch!', don haka ciwo da furta 'ouch!' ba abu ɗaya ba ne.

Behaviourism makes a conscious state identical to a physical state. The problem with this approach is that it ignores the fact that it is the conscious state that causes the behaviour. For example, it is the pain that provokes Susan to say ‘ouch!’, so pain and saying ‘ouch!’ are not identical to each other.

'Kawai kawai na abubuwan shigarwa, yanayin hankali da abubuwan fitarwa': Aiki-aiki (Functionalism) Masu ra'ayin aiki-aiki (Functionalism) suna ɗaukar cewa sani (consciousness) ana bayyana shi ta hanyar ayyuka ko matsayin da yake takawa, wanda ke fitowa daga jerin alaƙoƙi a cikin halitta ko tsari, kamar yadda yake a kwamfuta. Ana bayyana aiki a matsayin alaƙa tsakanin abubuwan shigarwa, yanayin hankali da abubuwan fitarwa. Misali, idan na ga bas ɗina yana zuwa (shigarwa), sai hankalina ya shiga yanayin damuwa cewa watakila zan makara saboda yiwuwar rasa bas ɗin (yanayin hankali); daga nan sai in yi gudu zuwa tashar bas (fitarwa). Masu ra'ayin aiki-aiki sun tabbatar da cewa sani yana kama da shirin kwamfuta, wanda ke tasowa daga tsararrun tsare-tsare a cikin ƙwaƙwalwa.224 Ra'ayin aiki-aiki ya fuskanci ƙorafe-ƙorafe da dama.225

‘Just a bunch of inputs, mental states and outputs’: Functionalism Functionalists postulate that consciousness is defined as the functions or roles it plays, emerging from a set of relations within an organism or system, just like a computer. A function is defined as a relation of inputs, mental states and outputs. For example, if I see my bus arriving (input), I experience the mental state of worrying that I may be late due to the possibility of missing my bus (mental state); I then run towards the bus stop (output). Functionalists assert that consciousness is similar to a computer program, which arises from complex patterns within the brain.224 Functionalism has faced a number of objections.225

Wata daga cikin waɗannan ita ce cewa aikin-aiki (functionalism) ba zai iya la'akari da yanayin hankali na zahiri ba saboda ba za a iya fahimtar su ta fuskar aiki ba.226 Ba ya biyo baya cewa kawai ta hanyar sanin dukkan abubuwan shigarwa, yanayin hankali da abubuwan fitarwa za mu san yadda yake ji ga wata halitta ta musamman ta samu wani yanayin hankali. Ina iya fahimtar cewa idan wani ya ga kare mai haɗari yana gudu zuwa gare shi (shigarwa), zai ji tsoro (yanayin hankali), kuma babu makawa zai gudu neman tsira (fitarwa). Duk da haka, ta hanyar sanin alaƙar da ke tsakanin shigarwa, yanayin hankali da fitarwa, ba ni kusa da fahimtar yadda yake ji ga wannan mutum ya kasance cikin wani yanayin hankali na musamman ba. Hakanan bai gaya mani komai ba game da yadda da dalilin da yasa yanayin hankali ke tasowa daga wannan jerin alaƙoƙi. Komawa ga misalin da ke sama, ba zan iya sanin yadda yake ji ga wani mutum ya ji barazanar dabba mai haɗari ba. Fahimtar yadda yanayin hankali ke da alaƙa da shigarwa da fitarwa ba ya sa a san yadda yake ji a cikin wannan yanayin hankali.

One of these is that functionalism is unable to consider subjective conscious states because they cannot be understood functionally.226 It does not follow that just by knowing all of the inputs, mental states and outputs we will somehow know what it is like for a particular organism to experience a mental state. I can understand that when someone sees a dangerous dog running towards them (input), they will experience fear (mental state), they will inevitably run for safety (output). However, by knowing the relations between the input, mental state and output, I am no closer to understanding what it is like for that person to be in a particular mental state. It also tells me nothing about how and why mental states arise from the set of relations. Referring back to the above example, I cannot know what it is like for someone else to experience the feeling of being threatened by a dangerous animal. Understanding how mental states relate to inputs and outputs does not give rise to knowing what it is like to be in that mental state.

Masana ilimi da yawa sun tabbatar da cewa duk da shaharar falsafar aiki (functionalism), ba ta da wani karfi sosai a matsayin mafita ga matsalar wuya ta sani (hard problem of consciousness).227.

Many academics maintain that despite its popularity, functionalism does not carry much weight as a solution to the hard problem of consciousness.227.

‘Yana cikin sarkakiyar ta': Kayan-aiki mai tasowa (Emergent materialism).

‘It’s in the complexity’: Emergent materialism.

Wannan ra'ayi yana kan ginshiƙin ra'ayin fitowa (emergence). Fitowa tana faruwa ne idan abubuwa suka zama an tsara su ta yadda za su canja zuwa halittu masu sarƙaƙiya, kuma suna da alaƙoƙin sanadi masu rikitarwa daga inda sabbin al'amura ke bayyana.228 Akwai nau'i biyu na kayan-dabbaka na fitowa: mai ƙarfi da mai rauni.

This idea is based on the concept of emergence. Emergence occurs when things become arranged in such a way that they transform into complex entities and have complicated causal relationships from which new phenomena appear.228 There are two types of emergent materialism: the strong and the weak.

Tsarin rauni ya bayyana cewa za mu fahimci sanin kai na zahiri da zarar mun fahimci dukkan hadaddun hanyoyin zahiri. Tsarin rauni na iya bayyana yadda sani ke fitowa daga hanyoyin zahiri, amma hakan ba ya nufin zai kai ga sanin abin da yake ji ga halitta mai sani ta kasance da kwarewar cikin gida ta zahiri. Shin asirin sanin kai na zahiri zai ɓace da zarar mun fahimci yadda yake fitowa daga dukkan hadaddun hanyoyin zahiri? Idan ya ɓace, to ya zama yana musanta abin da ke buƙatar bayani tun farko. Idan sanin kai na zahiri ya ci gaba da kasancewa, to materialism na fitowa (emergent materialism) yana fama da matsalolin da materialism na rage (reductive materialism) ke fama da su; sanin kai na zahiri na iya samun tushe na zahiri ba tare da ya gaya mana komai game da abin da yake ji ga mutum ya kasance da waɗannan kwarewar sani ta zahiri ba.229

The weak form asserts that we will eventually understand subjective consciousness once all of the complex physical processes are understood. The weak form may explain how consciousness emerges from physical processes, but it does not follow that it will lead to knowledge of what it is like for a conscious organism to have an inner subjective experience. Will the mystery of subjective consciousness disappear once we have understood how it emerges from all of the complex physical processes? If it does, then it seems to be denying what requires explaining in the first place. If subjective consciousness remains, then emergent materialism suffers from the same problems as reductive materialism; subjective consciousness may have a physical basis without telling us anything about what it is like to have these subjective conscious experiences.229

A wata nau'in sigar "rashin ƙarfi" (weak) na tunanin kayan zahiri mai tasowa (emergent materialism) ta riƙe cewa ba za mu taɓa fahimtar dukkan hanyoyin zahiri da ke goyon bayan sanin kai, wato hankali na zahiri ko kuma kwarewar rayuwa ta ciki ba. Duk da haka, a ka'idar, idan za mu taɓa samun cikakkiyar fahimtar yadda kwakwalwa take aiki, to za mu iya fahimtar sanin kai. Wannan nau'in tunanin kayan zahiri mai tasowa mai rauni bai bayyana komai ba. A cikin mahallin hujjar da aka gabatar a wannan babin, karɓar bayanin da gaske yake bayyana matsalar wuya ta hankali (hard problem of consciousness) ya fi hankali fiye da karɓar hanyar da ba ta yi haka ba.

A variant of weak emergent materialism maintains that we will never understand all of the physical processes that underpin subjective consciousness. However, theoretically speaking, if we were ever to have a perfect understanding of how the brain works, we could understand subjective consciousness. This form of weak emergent materialism does not explain anything at all. In the context of the argument presented in this chapter, accepting an explanation that actually explains the hard problem of consciousness is more rational than accepting an approach that does not.

Dhariyar ƙarfafa ta ta falsafar haɗuwar halitta (emergent materialism) tana jayayya cewa hankali mai sanin kansa (subjective consciousness) lamari ne na halitta; sai dai duk wata ka'idar physicalist da ta yi ƙoƙarin bayyana gaskiyar sa ta wuce ƙarfin tunanin ɗan adam. Wannan nau'in haɗuwar yana cewa za mu iya samun sabon lamari X daga Y, ba tare da mun san yadda X ke fitowa daga Y ba. Haɗuwar halitta ta ƙarfi tana riƙe cewa za mu iya samun wani sabon abu daga hadaddun hanyoyin zahiri, amma gibin fahimtarmu game da yadda wannan sabon abu ke fitowa ba zai taɓa rufuwa ba. Wannan hanya ba ta bayyana matsalar wuya ta hankali (hard problem of consciousness) ba, domin ta yarda cewa ba za a iya bayyana ta ba. A ra'ayina wannan ba ya bambanta da cewa, "Kawai yana faruwa. Yana da sarkakiya har babu wanda ya sani." Revonsuo ya yi jayayya cewa haɗuwar halitta ta ƙarfi ba za ta taɓa iya magance hankali mai sanin kansa ba, kuma ko da an ba mu ka'idar da ta dace, "zai zama daidai da abin da hamsters za su iya fahimta daga littafin Charles Darwin, Origin of Species, idan aka sanya kwafinsa a cikin kejinsu." Tun da muna ƙoƙarin bayyana matsalar wuya ta hankali, kawar da hankali mai sanin kansa a matsayin asiri ba ya hana mutum mai hankali karɓar wata hanya da ta iya bayyana shi cikin daidaito. Shin kimiyya za ta bayyana hankali mai sanin kansa a ƙarshe? Kamar yadda aka gani daga hanyoyin materialist da ke sama, babban hujja ita ce bayanin kimiyya zai rufe gibin ilimin da muke da shi a wata rana. Sai dai wannan hanya ba ta ba da bayani gamsasshe game da hankali ba, domin ina ganin ta zama wani nau'i na kuskuren 'science of the gaps'. Idan muka duba hanyar kimiyya da falsafar kimiyya, za mu fahimci cewa hankali mai sanin kansa ya fi ƙarfin kimiyya. Nasarorin da kimiyya ta samu a baya sun samo asali ne daga cewa iya lura da sabbin lamura ko samar da sabbin ƙirar ka'idoji da ke bayyana bayanan da ake iya gani. Kamannin wata halitta mai hankali ta musamman ba za a iya fahimtarsa ta hanyar kimiyya ba. Masana kimiyya suna iyakance ga abubuwan da suka lura da su, domin kimiyya "dole ne ta takaita hankalinta ga matsalolin da lura za ta iya warwarewa."

The strong form of emergent materialism argues that subjective consciousness is a natural phenomenon; however, any physicalist theory that attempts to address its reality is beyond the capacity of the human intellect. This form of emergence argues that we can get a new phenomenon X from Y, without knowing how X emerges from Y. Strong emergent materialism maintains that we can get something new from the complex physical processes, but the gap in our understanding of how this new thing emerges will never be closed. This approach does not explain the hard problem of consciousness, as it admits that it cannot be explained. In my view this is no different to saying, “It just happens. It is so complex that no one knows.” Revonsuo argues that strong emergent materialism will never be able to address subjective consciousness, and even if we were to be given the correct theory, it “would equal what hamsters could make of Charles Darwin’s Origins of Species if a copy was placed in their cage.”230 Since we are trying to explain the hard problem of consciousness, dismissing subjective consciousness as a mystery does nothing to prevent a rational person from accepting an approach that actually does coherently explain it. Will science eventually explain subjective consciousness? As seen from the above materialist approaches, the main argument is that a scientific explanation will someday close the current gap in our knowledge. This approach, however, does not provide an adequate explanation of consciousness, as I believe it is a form of the ‘science of the gaps’ fallacy. If we examine the scientific method and the philosophy of science, we will understand that subjective consciousness is beyond the reach of science. The previous successes of science stemmed from the fact that they were able to observe new phenomena or provide new theoretical models that explained existing observable data. The likeness of a particular conscious organism cannot be understood by science. Scientists are limited to the observations they have, because science is “forced to restrict its attention to problems that observations can solve”.

231 Tun da ba zai yiwu a lura da sanin zuciya na zahiri (hangen farko, wato kallon mutum da kansa) daga mahangar mutum na uku ba, kimiyya ba za ta iya magana a kan sanin zuciya na zahiri ba. Kamar yadda aka ambata a baya, ko da za mu san komai game da kwakwalwa, har yanzu ba za mu iya magance matsalar wahala ta sanin zuciya ba. Aikin kwakwalwa yana nuna kawai cewa wani abu yana faruwa, ba abin da yake kasancewa ga wannan abin da yake faruwa ba. Ko da an zana dukkan aikin sinadarai na jijiyoyi a cikin kwakwalwar wani mutum, aka kuma danganta shi da bayanan mutum na farko game da abin da ya ji a zuciyarsa, kimiyya ba za ta iya tantance ainihin abin da wannan mutum yake ji ba, ko dalilin da ya sa hakan ke faruwa daga tsarin zahiri.

231 Since it is impossible to observe subjective consciousness (first-person perspective) from the perspective of the third person, science cannot address subjective consciousness. As mentioned before, even if we were to know everything about the brain we would still not be able to address the hard problem of consciousness. Brain activity only indicates that something is happening, not what it is like for that something to happen. Even if all of the neurochemical activity were mapped out in someone’s brain and correlated with first-person accounts of his or her subjective experience, science would be unable to determine that particular person’s experience or why it results from physical processes.

Ko da a cikin shekaru goma masu zuwa, an samar da wata sabuwar ka'idar kimiyya ko bayanin halitta game da hankali, har yanzu ba zai iya tantance yadda yake ji ga mutum idan yana da wani ƙwarewar zuciya ta kansa, ko dalilin da ya sa wannan ƙwarewa ta musamman ke fitowa daga hanyoyin jiki ba. Ƙwarewar hankali ta kai ba ta cikin iyakokin bayanin kimiyya. Saboda haka, yunƙurin masu ra'ayin abin duniya na bayyana hankali ya gaza gaba ɗaya. Masanin ilimin jijiyoyi John C. Eccles ya taƙaita wannan gazawa sosai: "Ina ganin cewa asirin ɗan adam ana raina shi ƙwarai da kimiyyar raba-abu-zuwa-ɓangarori (reductionism), tare da da'awarta ta materialism na alƙawari…."232.

Even if, ten years from now, a new scientific theory or biological explanation for consciousness is developed, it would still not be able to determine what it is like for a person to have a subjective experience, or why that particular subjective experience emerges from physical processes. Subjective conscious experience is outside of the scope of a scientific explanation. In light of the above, materialistic attempts to explain consciousness fail comprehensively. The neurophysiologist John C. Eccles aptly summarises this failure: “I maintain that the human mystery is incredibly demeaned by scientific reductionism, with its claim in promissory materialism….”232.

Hanyoyin da ba na abin duniya ba. Waɗannan hanyoyi sun yarda cewa akwai fiye da abu a cikin gaskiya. Wannan ra'ayi ne da Musulunci, da kuma tauhidi gabaɗaya, suke amincewa da shi. Mu ba abu da kuzari kawai ba ne; akwai bangaren ruhaniya a cikin wanzuwarmu. Duk da haka, da yawa daga cikin waɗannan dabaru suna nufin bayyana sani ba tare da sun yarda ko sun kira kasancewar Allah ba. Zan soki waɗannan, kuma in bayyana yadda tauhidi ke bayar da hanya mafi hankali ta bayyana sani.

Non-materialistic approaches These approaches admit that the.re is more to reality than matter. This is a view that Islam, and theism in general, recognises. We are more than matter and energy; there is a spiritual component to our existence. However, several of these strategies aim to explain consciousness without admitting, or invoking, the existence of God. I will criticise these and explain how theism provides the most rational way of explaining consciousness.

"Suna daban, amma ba mu san yadda ba": Dualism na Abu (Substance Dualism).

‘They’re different, but we do not know how’: Substance Dualism.

Dualism na jauhari shi ne ra'ayin cewa akwai abubuwa biyu daban-daban: ɗaya na zahiri (na jiki) ɗayan kuma ba na zahiri ba. Waɗannan abubuwa biyu sun bambanta sosai da juna, kuma kowannensu yana wanzuwa ba tare da dogaro da ɗayan ba. A cikin tattaunawarmu, jauhari dualism yana riƙe da cewa hankali (consciousness) da ƙwaƙwalwa (brain) sun bambanta, ba kuma daga abu ɗaya suke ba. Ɗayan na zahiri ne, ɗayan kuma ba na zahiri ba, amma duk da haka suna mu'amala da juna. Wannan bayanin game da hankali yana da sauƙin fahimta ƙwarai, domin yana bayyana abubuwan da muke fuskanta a rayuwar yau da kullum. Misali, muna fuskantar cewa yanayin hankali na iya haifar da yanayin jiki, kuma akasin haka. Idan ina da jin baƙin ciki na zahiri (subjective), hakan na iya haifar da yanayin jiki kamar kumburin fuska ko kuka. A ɗaya gefen kuma, idan na buga kaina da wani abu, sai na ji ciwo a cikina na zahiri. Babbar suka ga jauhari dualism ita ce: tunda yanayin hankali da ƙwaƙwalwa sun bambanta sosai, to ba zai yiwu a san yadda suke mu'amala ba. Wannan ana kiransa matsalar mu'amala (interactionist problem). A cewar wasu masana falsafa, babu wani bayani mai ma'ana da ke nuna yadda kuma dalilin da yasa ƙwaƙwalwa ta zahiri da hankali marar zahiri suke mu'amala.233

Substance dualism is the view that there are two different substances: one is physical and the other is non-physical. These substances are fundamentally distinct and exist independently of each other. In the context of our discussion, substance dualism maintains that consciousness and the brain are different and are not from the same substance; one is material and the other immaterial, yet they interact with each other. This account of consciousness is very intuitive, making sense of our everyday experiences. For instance, we experience that conscious states can cause physical states, and vice versa. If I have the subjective conscious experience of sadness, it can cause the physical state of frowning or crying. On the converse side, if I bump my head on an object, I will feel the inner subjective experience of pain. A key objection to substance dualism is that since conscious states and the brain are radically different, then knowing how they interact is impossible. This is known as the interactionist problem; there is— according to some philosophers—no coherent account of how and why the material brain and the immaterial consciousness interact.233

Amma wannan ƙin yarda ya ginu ne akan zato marar gaskiya cewa idan ba mu san yadda X ke haifar da Y ba, to ba mu da hujjar yin imani da cewa X yana haifar da Y. Akwai abubuwa da yawa na hulɗar dalili da sakamako wanda mu kan san cewa abu ɗaya yana haifar da wani ba tare da mun san yadda hakan ke faruwa ba.

However, this objection is based on the false assumption that if we do not know how X causes Y, then we are not justified to believe that X causes Y. There are many cases of causal interactions in which we know one thing causes another without knowing how.

Duk da cewa dualism na abu (substance dualism) yana cikin manyan madadin ra'ayin tauhidi, idan aka karɓe shi a cikin tsarin rashin imani da Allah (non-theistic), to bai amsa wasu muhimman tambayoyi ba: Daga ina wannan abu marar jiki (immaterial substance) ya fito? Ta yaya yake wanzuwa a cikin duniyar zahiri? Haka kuma, bayanin tauhidi yana ba da cikakken bayani mai ma'ana game da yadda kwakwalwar zahiri da hankali marar jiki (non-physical consciousness) ke mu'amala da juna. Saboda haka ne dualism irin na tauhidi shi ne hanya mafi dacewa (duba sashen "Allah Shi Ne Mafi Kyawun Bayani" a ƙasa).

Although substance dualism is a strong contender to the theistic alternative, if substance dualism is adopted within a non-theistic paradigm, it does not address some fundamental questions: Where did the immaterial substance come from? How does it exist in the physical universe? Moreover, a theistic explanation provides a more coherent account of how the physical brain and non-physical consciousness interact. This is why a theistic type of dualism is the most coherent approach (see God Is the Best Explanation section below).

‘Yana da kyau kawai hadari’: Epiphenomenalism Da wannan ra'ayi, al'amuran hankali (conscious states) sun bambanta da al'amuran zahiri (physical states), kuma al'amuran zahiri suna haifar da al'amuran hankali, amma ba akasin haka ba. Ta haka, al'amuran hankali ba su da ikon haifar da wani abu (causally impotent). Shahararrun ƙin yarda da epiphenomenalism sun haɗa da cewa, idan gaskiya ne, jin zafi a hannuna (ƙwarewar hankali) sakamakon harshen wuta mai zafi ba ya taka wata rawa ta sanadi a janyewar hannuna daga wutar (al'amarin zahiri). Wani misali kuma shi ne cewa idan ka taɓa fuskantar mummunan yanayi na wani mashayin giya mai kwazon jefa maka kwalba da ta karye, ganin kwalban yana zuwa gare ka na iya haifar da ƙwarewar hankali ta tsoro, amma jin tsoron ba zai sa ka ɓoye kanka ka kare kanka ba; motsinka na kariya zai faru ne saboda wani hatsari kawai. Wannan yana saɓa wa fahimtarmu ta asali game da gaskiyar ɗan adam. Mun san cewa muna da martanin zahiri saboda al'amuran hankali na zahiri, kuma muna kuma fuskantar ji da ƙwarewa na zahiri saboda sanadi na zahiri. Idan epiphenomenalism gaskiya ne, ilimin halayyar ɗan adam zai lalace. Ka yi tunanin majinyacin da ke fama da baƙin ciki yana gaya wa likitansa na tunani cewa jin baƙin cikin cikinsa ne ke haifar da harin damuwarsa, sai a ce masa wannan ba shi da alaƙa da komai.

‘It’s a lucky accident’: Epiphenomenalism With this theory, conscious states are distinct from physical states, and physical states cause conscious states, but not the other way around. In this way, conscious states are causally impotent. Popular rejections of epiphenomenalism include that, if true, a sensation of pain in my hand (conscious experience) due to a hot flame plays no causal role in my hand moving away (physical state). Another example includes that if you were to have the unfortunate experience of being chased by a drunkard hell-bent on throwing a broken bottle at you, the sight of the bottle moving towards you might create the conscious experience of fear, but the feeling of fear would not cause you to duck and protect yourself; your defensive move would occur due to some random accident. This contradicts our basic understanding of the human reality. We know that we have physical reactions due to subjective conscious states, and we also experience subjective feelings and experiences due to physical causes. If epiphenomenalism were true, human psychology would be in ruin. Just imagine a patient with depression telling his psychotherapist that his internal feelings of depression cause his anxiety attacks, only to be told that it has nothing to do with it.

"Komai yana da hankali": Panpsychism.

‘Everything is conscious’: Panpsychism.

Panpsychism yana da ɗan kama da property dualism, wanda ke tabbatar da cewa akwai abu ɗaya kaɗai (abu na zahiri), amma yana ɗauke da halaye biyu (halaye na zahiri da halaye marasa na zahiri ko na sanin kai). Panpsychism yana tabbatar da cewa kwayoyin halitta suna ɗauke da wani nau'i na sanin kai na mutum. Daga wannan mahanga, yana jayayya cewa sani wani hali ne na asali na duniya, kuma yana taka rawa ta sanadi. Masu goyon bayan panpsychism sun haɗa da Farfesa David Chalmers da Thomas Nagel. Tunda kowane sashe na kwayoyin halitta yana ɗauke da sani, sanin kwakwalwa kawai tarin waɗannan sassan sani ne. Wani nau'i na panpsychism ya bayyana cewa dukkan kwayoyin halitta suna da sani irin na mutane. Ɗayan nau'in panpsychism kuma yana tabbatar da cewa sanin da ke cikin kwayoyin halitta yana cikin yanayi na asali, wanda aka fi sani da protoconsciousness.

Panpsychism is somewhat similar to property dualism, which asserts that one substance exists (physical substance), but contains two properties (physical and non-physical or subjective conscious properties). Panpsychism asserts that matter contains a form of subjective consciousness. From this perspective, it argues that consciousness is an intrinsic property of the universe and it plays a causal role. Advocates of panpsychism include professors David Chalmers and Thomas Nagel. Since each component of matter contains consciousness, the brain’s consciousness is just an accumulation of these components of consciousness. One form of panpsychism states that all matter is conscious in the same way humans are. The other form of panpsychism asserts that consciousness contained in matter is in a basic state, also known as protoconsciousness.

Akwai matsaloli da dama game da ra'ayin panpsychism. • Da farko, babu hujja da ke tabbatar da da'awar cewa abu yana da hankali na zahiri. Proton, electron, quark da atom ba su nuna wata alama da ke nuna cewa suna da hankali na zahiri ba.234.

There are a number of problems with panpsychism. • Firstly, there is an absence of evidence for the claim that matter contains subjective consciousness. Protons, electrons, quarks and atoms do not exhibit any signs of having subjective consciousness.234.

• Na biyu, wannan hanya ba ta bayar da cikakken bayani na zahiri ko na al'amuran falsafa kan yadda abu ke ƙunshe da hankali ba. Daga ina wannan siffar hankali ta samo asali? Ta yaya abu zai ƙunshi wannan siffa ta hankali mai ji da kanta? Rashin amsa waɗannan tambayoyi daga masu koyarwar panpsychism yana raunana duk wani bayani na falsafa da na zahiri.

• Secondly, this approach fails to provide an adequate metaphysical or physical explanation of how matter contains consciousness. Where did the property of consciousness come from? How does matter contain this subjective conscious property? The panpsychist’s failure to answer these questions undermines any metaphysical and physical explanation.

• Na uku, babu misalai na sani da ke wanzuwa a waje da ƙwarewar zahirin mai rai. Misali, menene ma'anar ciwo idan babu kai ko 'ni'? Menene ma'anar sanin tunani idan babu wanda ke tunani? Waɗannan tambayoyi suna nuna ƙarfi cewa sani yana da ma'ana ne kawai tare da wani mai hankali guda ɗaya wanda ke fuskantar jerin yanayi na zahiri.

• Thirdly, there are no examples of consciousness existing outside of the subjective experience of a living entity. For instance, what does pain mean without a self or an ‘I’? What does being conscious of a thought mean without someone who is thinking? These questions strongly suggest that consciousness only makes sense with a unified conscious being experiencing an array of subjective states.

• Mwanzo, ta yaya wani tunani guda da aka haɗa zai fito daga abubuwa da yawa na kwayoyin halitta waɗanda duk suna ƙunshe da wani nau'in sani? Ta yaya ƙananan kwayoyin halitta masu ɗauke da sanin kai ɗaya-ɗaya za su taru su zama ƙwarewa guda mai ma'ana da haɗin kai? Idan abubuwan da muke gani da ji da tunani a sanin kanmu kawai sakamakon abubuwa masu sani da yawa ne da ke cikin sassan jiki da suka haɗa kwakwalwa, to ƙwarewarmu za ta zama mara daidaito, ko kuma ba ta da haɗin kai sosai. Farfesa Edward Feser ya yi sharhi game da ma'anar haɗin kai ta tunani guda ɗaya. Ya bayyana cewa ƙwarewarmu ba kawai jimillar abubuwa masu sani daban-daban ba ce; ƙwarewarmu tana da yanayi guda na haɗin kai. Ya gabatar da hujjarsa ta amfani da ƙwarewar karanta littafi:

• Finally, how can a unified conscious experience emerge from many pieces of matter that all contain a form of consciousness? How do individual pieces of matter that contain subjective consciousness manage to add up to a meaningful, unified experience? If our conscious experiences were just a result of many conscious elements contained in the physical parts that make up the brain, our experience would be incoherent, or less unified. Professor Edward Feser comments on the unified meaning of a single conscious experience. He explains that our experiences are not just a summation of many different conscious elements; our experiences have a unified feel. He presents his case using the conscious experience of reading a book:

"Kwarewar tana da ma'ana ko muhimmanci mai daidaituwa, kuma muhimmanci ko ma'ana ga wani mutum ɗaya mai kwarewa. Ba kawai kana sane da siffa, laushi, launuka, da sauransu a matsayin abubuwa daban-daban ba, amma kana sane da su a matsayin littafi; kuma kai ne kake sane da su, ba miliyoyin abubuwan jijiyoyi ba ne ke sane kowannensu da wani ɓangare na littafin ba." 235.

“The experience has a coherent significance or meaning, and significance or meaning for a single subject of experience. You are not only aware of the shape, texture, colors, etc. as separate elements, but are aware of them as a book; and it is you who are aware of them, rather than myriad neural events somehow each being ‘aware’ of one particular aspect of the book.” 235.

Akwai muhawara mai yawa a ilimance game da hanyoyin da na taƙaita a sama. Duk da haka, babban manufar ita ce a gabatar da waɗannan hanyoyin a takaice, da kuma bayyana wasu sukatuttuka waɗanda ke rage ƙarfinsu wajen bayyana sani na zahiri (subjective consciousness) kamar yadda akidar tauhidi (theism) take yi.

There is a lot of academic discussion around the approaches I have summarised above. However, the main intention was to briefly introduce these approaches and bring to light some criticisms which undermine their ability to explain subjective consciousness as sufficiently as theism does.

Allah ya fi kowane bayani. Wait, correction per your rule: the original says "God", so I must not write "Allah". Ubangiji ne mafi kyawun bayani.

God is the best explanation.

Ta yaya za a bayyana sani (consciousness) a cikin haske na gazawar yunkurin bayyana gaba ɗaya abubuwan da mutum ke fuskanta na kansa? Hanyar tauhidi ita ce mafi dacewa da bayani. Ya fi dacewa a ɗauka cewa wani Mai Sani duka, mai sani, mai nufi da manufa, shi ne marubucin dukkan sani. Ga manyan dalilai guda uku da ya sa Allah shi ne mafi kyawun bayani:

How do we explain consciousness in light of the failed attempts to comprehensively explain our subjective personal experiences? A theistic approach is the most adequate explanation. It is far more reasonable to postulate that an All-Aware, conscious agent with volition and purpose is the author of all consciousness. Here are three main reasons why God is the best explanation:

Da farko, yana amsa tambayar da babu ɗaya daga cikin ra'ayoyin da ake da su da ya amsa: Ina ne hankali (consciousness) ya fito? Farfesa J. P. Moreland ya bayyana yadda ba zai yiwu ya samo asali ta hanyar tsarin halitta na zahiri ba: "Ilimin mu game da duniyar halitta zai ba mu dalilai masu kyau na rashin yarda cewa hankali wanda ba za a iya raba shi ba zai bayyana a cikinta, misali, sake tsara abubuwan zahiri marasa rai zuwa tsare-tsare daban-daban na sarari ba ya da alama ya isa ya bayyana bayyanar hankali."236

Firstly, it answers a question that none of the existing views have answered: Where did consciousness come from? Professor J. P. Moreland explains how it could not have been via natural physical processes: “Our knowledge of the natural world would give us positive reasons for not believing that irreducible consciousness would appear in it, e.g., the geometrical rearrangement of inert physical entities into different spatial structures hardly seems sufficient to explain the appearance of consciousness.”236

Idan hankali da abu sun bambanta, to, ba zai yiwu hankali ya samo asali daga abu ba. Amma idan abu yana ɗauke da halayen hankali, to ta yaya waɗannan halaye suka samu? Dole ne mu yi wannan tambaya ta ontology saboda hankali ya bambanta sosai da abu na zahiri. Domin a bayyana gaskiyar cewa abubuwan da ake fuskanta a zuciya na zahiri suna wanzuwa, dole ne Allah ya halicci hankali. Ya fi dacewa a ce akwai wani mai hankali mai cikakken sani wanda ya haifar da hankali. Daga wannan mahanga, ra'ayin tauhidi yana ba da bayani mai wadata sosai. Moreland ya yi jayayya cewa bayanan masu ra'ayin cewa komai abu ne (physicalist) da masu ra'ayin abu kawai (materialist) game da hankali ba su da "wata hanya mai ma'ana da za ta bayyana bayyanar abubuwan tunani na gaske kuma marasa iyaka a cikin halittu... idan aka kwatanta da arzikin bayanan ra'ayin tauhidi...."237.

If matter and consciousness are distinct, it follows that consciousness could not have emerged from matter. However, if matter contains conscious properties, then how did these properties arise? We need to ask this ontological question because consciousness is very different from material stuff. In order to explain the fact that subjective conscious experiences exist, God must have created consciousness. It is far more coherent to postulate an All-Aware conscious agent to explain consciousness. From this point of view, theism offers a far richer explanation. Moreland argues that physicalist and materialist accounts of consciousness have “…no plausible way to explain the appearance of irreducible, genuine mental properties/events in the cosmos… when compared to the rich explanatory resources for theism….”237.

Na biyu, hasashen tauhidi yana bayyana yadda sani (consciousness) ya shigo duniyar zahiri. Sau da yawa yana ba mutane mamaki yadda abubuwan da ba na zahiri ba, kamar rai, za su iya yin mu'amala da, ma har ma su yi iko a kan, abubuwan zahiri kamar jikunan mutane da dabbobi. Duk da haka, tauhidi yana bayyana wannan cikin sauƙi. Nufin Allah mai cikakken iko da aikinsa na Ubangiji suna tabbatar da duniyar da abubuwan zahiri da waɗanda ba na zahiri ba suke mu'amala tsakaninsu. Charles Taliaferro ya bayyana:

Secondly, theism answers how consciousness could have entered the physical world. It often surprises people how non-physical entities like the soul can interact, and in fact control, physical aspects like the bodies of humans and animals. However, theism explains this very naturally. God’s comprehensive will and Divine activity ensure a world where the physical and non-physical interact. Charles Taliaferro explains:

“Amma a tsarin tunanin ra'ayin addini na sani, babu wata dabara ta sihiri ko wani aiki na mu'ujiza guda ɗaya daga Allah a bayan fitowar sani. Sani yana fitowa daga halittar zahiri ta hanyar nufin Allah mai dorewa kuma mai cikakken iko, cewa a sami duniya ta abubuwa da halaye na zahiri da na marasa zahiri, da alaƙoƙi a tsakaninsu. Alaƙar da ke tsakanin kwayar halitta, makamashi, sani, dokokin sarari da lokaci, gaba ɗaya, dukansu suna samuwa ne daga wani aiki mai girma da ban mamaki na Allah.”238

“But in a theistic view of consciousness, there is no parlor trick or discrete miraculous act of God behind the emergence of consciousness. Consciousness emerges from the physical cosmos through an abiding comprehensive will of God that there be a world of physical and non-physical objects, properties, and relations. The relation between matter, energy, consciousness, the laws of space-time, tout court, all stem from an overwhelming, divine, activity.”238

Bisa ga wata hanyar da ba ta yarda da Allah ba wajen fahimtar hankali (consciousness), hankali ya bayyana kamar ya fito ba zato ba tsammani ba tare da wata gamsasshiyar bayani ta fuskar jiki ba. Amma addinin tauhidi (theism) ba ya fuskantar wannan matsala, domin fitowar hankali ana ganinta a matsayin wani ɓangare na gaskiyar halitta. Tunda Allah Mai hankali ne, Mai Rayuwa Har Abada, kuma Mai Sani Komai, yana da yiwuwa duniyar da Ya halitta ta ƙunshi halittu masu sanin kansu da hankali. Taliaferro ma ya kammala haka:

According to a non-theistic approach to consciousness, consciousness seems to have miraculously popped into existence without any adequate physical explanation. However, theism does not face this problem, as the emergence of consciousness is viewed as part of reality. Since God is conscious, Ever-Living and All-Aware, it is plausible that the world He created contains beings with a conscious awareness of themselves. Taliaferro similarly concludes:

"Daga mahangar cosmology na abin duniya kawai, bayyanar hankali (consciousness) tana da ban mamaki; ana kwatanta ta da cewa "sai kuma wani abin al'ajabi ya faru." Amma daga mahangar masu imani da Allah (theism), bayyanar hankali na iya kasancewa wani abu da ke da tushe mai zurfi a cikin ainihin yanayin gaskiyar halitta. Halittar hankalin dabbobi da na mutane ba wani al'ajabi ne da ya keɓanta ba, sai dai madubi ne na tsarin gaskiyar halitta da ke ƙasa."239

“From the vantage point of a fundamentally materialist cosmology, the emergence of consciousness seems strange; it is likened to claiming ‘then a miracle happens.’ But from the vantage point of theism, the emergence of consciousness may be seen as something deeply rooted in the very nature of reality. The creation of animal and human consciousness is not some isolated miracle, but a reflection of the underlying structure of reality.”239

Tiyoriyar hasashe ta yi bayani game da hulɗar da ke tsakanin yanayin tunani marasa na zahiri da yanayin ƙwaƙwalwa na zahiri. Iko da nufin Allah sun sa wannan hulɗa ta faru, domin wannan hulɗa wani sashe ne na gaskiyar da Allah Ya halitta. A takaice, idan a farkon halittar duniya abu kaɗai ne ya wanzu, to da hankali ba zai wanzu ba. Amma idan tun farko wani nau'in hankali ne ya halicci duniyar zahiri, to hulɗar da ke tsakanin yanayin tunani marasa na zahiri da yanayin ƙwaƙwalwa na zahiri tana da ma'ana.

Theism explains the interaction between nonphysical mental and physical brain states. God’s will and power have enabled such interaction to take place, as this interaction is part and parcel of the reality that God has created. Simply, if, in the beginning of the cosmos, only matter existed, then consciousness would not. However, if in the beginning a type of consciousness created the physical world, then the interaction between nonphysical mental states and physical brain states makes sense.

Na uku, akida ta tauhidi tana bayyana ikonmu na samun yanayin zuciya na zahiri (na ciki) da kuma sanin yadda yake ji a kasancewar mu, muna dandano, sauti da sassaucin abubuwa. Tun da Halittar duniya Wani Mai Rayuwa Madawwami, Mai Rai, Mai Sanin Komai ya yi ta, ya biyo baya cewa an ba mu wannan iko na sanin yanayin zuciyarmu ta ciki:

Thirdly, theism explains our ability to have subjective conscious states and the fact that we have an awareness of what it is to be like ourselves, experiencing tastes, sounds and textures. Since the universe was created by an Ever-Living, Alive, All-Aware Being, it follows that we have been given this capacity to be aware of our inner subjective states:

"Ubangiji, babu abin bautawa sai Shi, Mai Rayuwa Madawwami."240.

“God, there is no god except Him, the Ever Living.”240.

"Kuma Shi ne Mai lura da abubuwa a ɓoye, Masani."241.

“And He is the All-subtle, the All-aware.”241.

Wani ra'ayi na tiyoloji-dualism yana da ƙarfin bayani fiye da sauran bayanai masu gasa game da fitowar hankali. Amma dole in jaddada cewa ba na musanta amfanin bayanan halitta wajen gano alaƙar jijiyoyi da hankali ba. Ana iya gudanar da ilimin jijiyoyi da himma da amfani daidai gwargwado a cikin mahallin imani da Allah. Abin da nake bayarwa shi ne a ƙara imani da Allah a matsayin tushen falsafa don cikakken bayanin abin da bayanan da ba na imani da Allah ba ba za su iya bayarwa ba: matsalar wahala ta hankali. Ta wannan ma'ana, hanyata nau'i ne na dualism, wanda za a iya kira tiyoloji-dualism. A cikin tiyoloji-dualism, ba a raina ilimin jijiyoyi ba, kuma dukkan ayyukan bincike na iya ci gaba da ba da fahimtarsu da sakamakonsu masu ban mamaki kan wannan batu. Duk da haka, tiyoloji-dualism ka'ida ce ta metaphysics da ke bayar da cikakken bayani. Farfesa Taliaferro yana goyon bayan matsayi makamancin wannan: "Ban ga dalilin da ya sa ilimin kwakwalwa ba zai ci gaba da nazarinsa na hulɗar psycho-physical ba. Rashin iya gano hankali da yanayin kwakwalwa a metaphysically ba ya hana nazarin alaƙa ko da na nanosecond. Haka kuma, mutum na iya zama dualist kuma ya ɗauki hankali da yanayin kwakwalwa, mutum da jiki, a matsayin raka'o'in aiki ba tare da ɗauka cewa akwai nau'in abu guda ɗaya kawai a metaphysically da ke aiki ba. Dualism na hankali-jiki (ko, kamar yadda na fi so in kira shi, haɗin kai) ka'ida ce ta metaphysics… dualism na haɗin kai ba hasashe ne na kimiyya da ke gogayya da kowane da'awar kimiyya ba." 242: Wanzuwar Allah wajibi ne don bayyana wanzuwa da fitowar ƙwarewar hankali ta ciki. Bugu da ƙari, matsalar wahala ta hankali da wanzuwar ƙwarewar cikin gida a fili suna nuni zuwa ga Wanda ke Masani da Komai, wanda ya halicci duniya da ikon ku da ni na sanin yanayin hankalinmu na ciki.

A theistic explanation for the emergence of consciousness has greater explanatory power than competing explanations. I must stress here, however, that I am not denying the usefulness of biological explanations in unearthing neuro-correlations. Neuroscience can be conducted just as vigorously and fruitfully in a theistic context. What I am advocating is adding theism as a philosophical basis to fully explain what non-theistic explanations cannot: the hard problem of consciousness. In this sense, my approach is a form of dualism, which can be called theistic-dualism. In theistic-dualism, neuroscience is not undermined, and all the research projects can continue to provide their amazing insights and conclusions on the topic. However, theistic-dualism is a metaphysical thesis that provides a comprehensive explanation. Professor Taliaferro advocates a similar position: “I do not see why the brain sciences cannot continue with its study of psycho-physical interaction. The failure to identify metaphysically consciousness with brain states does not for a nanosecond impede the study of correlation. Moreover one may be a dualist and treat consciousness and brain states, the person and body, as functional units without supposing that there is only one kind of thing metaphysically that is in play. Mind-body (or, as I prefer to call it, integrative) dualism is a thesis in metaphysics… integrative dualism is not a scientific hypothesis that competes with any scientific claims.” 242, God’s existence is required to explain the existence and emergence of subjective conscious experience. In addition, the hard problem of consciousness and the existence of inner subjective experiences clearly point to an All-Aware Being, that created the universe and the ability for you and me to have an awareness of our subjective conscious states.

Ba a nufin mu san abubuwa da yawa game da rai ba.

We are not meant to know much about the soul.

Masu karatu musulmi za su tambaya da gaskiya ko wannan muhawara ta dace da akidar Musulunci ta gargajiya. Abin da ake yawan kawo wa ta hanyar suka shi ne cewa Alqur'ani ya bayyana a sarari cewa rai (ma'ana rai, ruhi, hankali ko abin da ke raya jiki) al'amari ne na Allah, kuma an ba mutum ɗan ilimi kaɗan game da shi. Saboda haka, ya kamata mu yi shiru a kan wannan batu: "Kuma suna tambayarka, (ya Muhammadu ﷺ), game da rai. Ka ce: 'Rai daga al'amarin Ubangijina yake, kuma ba a ba ku ilimi ba sai kaɗan.'"243

Muslim readers will rightly ask if this argument is compatible with normative Islamic theology. The common objection usually includes the fact that the Qur’an explicitly states that the rooh (meaning soul, spirit, consciousness or the thing that animates the body) is the affair or command of God and humanity has been given very little knowledge about it. Therefore, we should keep silent on the matter: “And they ask you, [O Muhammad], about the soul. Say, ‘The soul is of the affair of my Lord. And you have not been given of knowledge except a little.’”243

To reconcile this apparent theological conflict, it must be understood that this verse concerns the essence of consciousness or the soul, not its existence. Wannan ayar tana tabbatar da cewa wani abu marar jiki yana rayar da jiki—wato rai ko hankali. Wannan shi ne daidai abin da muhawarar wannan babi ta gabatar: cewa wanzuwar hankali ba za a iya bayyana ta ba sai ta hanyar ra'ayin da ba na kayan abu kaɗai ba. Babin ba ya tattauna wani abu fiye da abin da nassosin Musulunci suka riga suka nuna. Misali, Alƙur'ani ya tabbatar da cewa rooh ta bambanta da duniyar abu, cewa tana rayar da jiki, cewa tana da "ni" guda ɗaya, kuma cewa Allah ne ya halicce ta. Saboda haka, babu abin da ke cikin wannan da ya saɓa wa ƙa'idodin Musulunci na gaskiya.

To reconcile this apparent theological conflict, it must be understood that this verse concerns the essence of consciousness or the soul, not its existence. The verse affirms that an immaterial substance animates the body—in other words, a soul or consciousness. This is exactly what the argument in this chapter has presented: that the existence of consciousness can only be explained by a non-materialist worldview. The chapter is not discussing anything beyond what is already implied by Islamic source texts. For instance, the Qur’an affirms that the rooh is different from our material universe, that it animates the body, that it is a unified ‘I’, and that it was created by God. Therefore, nothing here contradicts core orthodox Islamic principles.

A ƙarshe, ina ganin dole ne mu yi la'akari da gaskiyar cewa Allah ya umarce mu da yin tunani a cikin kanmu, kuma ta haka za mu iya kammalawa cewa idan babu Allah, to ba za mu iya samun wata gogewa ta sani ta zahiri ba. A takaice, ta hanyar musun Allah, muna musun kanmu!

To conclude, I think we must consider the fact that God tells us to ponder within ourselves, and by doing so we may conclude that if there is no God, then we could not have any subjective conscious experience—in other words, by denying God, we deny ourselves!.

Shin ba sa tunani a cikin zukatansu?244

“Do they not reflect within themselves?”244