关于这种形式的崇拜,在确定其义务性之后,有一个全面的论述191,分为五章。第一章论述该义务所针对的人。第二章论述其所征收的财产种类的确定。第三章论述其征收比率和数额的确定。第四章论述其征收的时期和不征收的时期的确定。第五章论述应当向其支付的人员以及应付给他们的数额的确定。

A comprehensive discussion191 of this form of worship, after the determina­ tion of its obligation, is covered in five chapters. The first chapter is about the persons on whom it is obligatory. The second chapter deals with* the identification of the kinds of wealth on which it is imposed. The third chapter is abour the identification of the rates and the amounts on which it is levied. The fourth chapter is about the identification of the periods during which it is levied and the periods in which it is not. The fifth chapter is about the identification of the persons for whom it is to be paid and of the amounts due to them.

其义务的确定，通过《古兰经》、圣训以及公议（伊jmā‘，ijmā'）而成立，这是众所周知的，对此不存在任何争议。

The determination of its obligation through the Qut°an, the sunna, and from ijm# (consensus) is well-known, and there is no dispute about this.

他们一致认为，凡是自由、成年、神智健全、拥有达到应纳天课标准（nisab）的完整（无负债、无牵累）财产的穆斯林，都有义务缴纳天课。至于孤儿、精神病人、奴隶、有保护契约的非穆斯林（ahl al-dhimma）以及产权有缺陷（有牵累）的人——例如负债者或债权人，或财产本金被设为信托（habs，waqf）的情况——他们则存在分歧，即天课是否对这些人同样具有义务。

They agreed that it is obligatory upon every Muslim who is free, bdligk, sane, and who owns wealth equal to the (minimum) prescribed scale (nisdb) through a complete (unencumbered) ownership. They disagreed about its obligation upon the orphan, the insane, the slaves, the ahi al-dhimmay and the person with deficient (encumbered) ownership like a person who is in debt or is a creditor, or when for example the capital (of the wealth) is held in a trust (habs, waqf}.

关于未成年人，有一派学者认为其财产须缴纳天课。这是圣门弟子中阿里、伊本·欧麦尔、哲比尔和阿伊莎的观点，也是各地法学家中马立克、沙斐仪、萨乌里、艾哈迈德、伊斯哈格、艾布·save（阿布·赛propri）等人的观点。另一派学者则认为未成年人的财产完全不需缴纳天课。这是再传弟子中纳赫阿仪、哈桑和赛义德·伊本·朱拜尔的观点。还有一派法学家区分了土地的出产与非土地所得的财富：他们认为土地出产须缴纳天课，而除此之外的财产，如牲畜、现金和货物（动产），则不需缴纳。这是艾布·哈尼法及其门徒的观点。另有一派学者则区分现金与其他财产，认为除现金以外的财富都须缴纳天课。

With respect to minors, one group said that zakat is obligatory on their wealth. This was the opinion of ‘AIT, Ibn ^Umar, Jabir, and cA?isha from among the Companions, and of Malik, al-Shafi T, al-ThawrT, Ahmad, c Ishaq, Abu Thawr, and others from among the.jurists of the provinces. Another group said that there is no zakat at all on the wealth of the minor. This was the opinion of al-Nakha'i, al-Hasan, and SacTd ibn Jubayr from the Tabi un. One group of jurists made a distinction between the yield of c the land and wealth not derived from the land. They said that there is zakat on the yield from the land, but there is no zakat on what is besides this like cattle, liquid assets, goods (chattel). This was the opinion of Abu Harnfa and his disciples. Yet another group distinguished between liquid assets and other things saying that there is zakat on the wealth except on liquid assets.

他们在谁应当缴纳天课这一问题上的分歧，源于他们对天课法律性质的争论：天课究竟是一种类似拜功和斋戒的功修，还是穷人和贫困者对富人财产所享有的一种义务性权利。认为天课是功修的人，将人的成年（bulugh）作为其义务的条件；而认为天课是穷人和贫困者对富人财富所享有的义务性权利的人，则不考虑成年等条件。至于那些区分土地的出产与非土地出产、以及显性财产与隐性财产的人，他们所依据的证据，我目前尚不清楚。

The reason for their disagreement over the persons on whom zakat is t obligatory arises from their dispute over the nature of the legal form of zakat, whether it is a kind of worship like prayer and fasting or whether it is an obligatory right of the poor over the rich. Those who said that it is worship stipulated bulugh of the person as a condition (for the obligation), while those who said that it is an obligatory right of the poor and the needy over the wealth of the rich did not take into account bulugh of the person, among other things. Those who made a distinction between the yield of the land and what is not derived from it, and also between visible and invisible wealth, for them I am not aware at this time of the evidence relied upon.

这个问题涉及属于waqf(宗教捐赠/信托)的树木所产生的果实。马立克和沙斐仪认为对这些果实应当征收天课(zakat)，而麦库勒和陶伍斯则认为这些果实不需缴纳天课。一批法学家作了区分：如果信托是为穷人普遍设立的，或是为某个特定群体设立的，他们在受益人是特定群体时征收天课，而在受益人是一般穷人时则不征收。对于为穷人征收天课并无依据，因为其中有两个阻碍因素：第一，这等同于不完整的所有权；第二，穷人是不确定的人群，天课的款项应当用于他们，而不是由他们来缴纳。

This issue relates to fruit from trees, when, the trees are the property of a trust. Malik and al-Shafi T used to impose zakat c on them, while Makhul and Tawus used to say that there is no zakat on them. A group of jurists used to make a distinction when the trees were a trust for the needy generally or for a specified group. They imposed zakat on them when the beneficiaries were a determined (specified) group, but they did not do so when the beneficiaries were the needy generally. There is no justification in imposing the zakat on the needy as two disqualifying factors operate in this: first, it amounts to a deficient ownership, and second, the needy are an indeterminate category of people on whom the zakat funds are to be spent and not those from who it is due.

第二个问题涉及出租的土地。它探讨的是：这块土地的收成应由谁缴纳天课（zakat）。一群法学家认为，天课应由承租人征收，因为他是庄稼的所有者。这是马立克、al-Shafi‘ī、al-Thawrī、Ibn al-Mubārak、Abū Thawr，以及另一群法学家的观点。Abū Ḥanīfa及其门徒则主张，天课应由土地所有者缴纳，而从他那里租地的人无需承担任何义务。

The second issue relates to land given out on rent. It deals with the question as to who is liable for zakat on the yield of this land. A group of jurists said that the zakat is to be levied on the tenant, who is the owner of the plants. This was the opinion of Malik, al-Shafi T, al-ThawrT, Ibn al-Mubarak, Abu Thawr, c and a group of jurists. Abu HanTfa and his disciples maintained that zakat is due from the owner of the land and the person who rents it from him does not owe anything.

他们之间分歧的原因，在于'ushr（什一税）的义务究竟与土地有关、与耕种有关，还是与两者都有关。没有人说它与两者都有关，而实际上它确实与两者都有关。双方都同意这是一项落在二者之一上的义务，但他们在以下问题上存在分歧：当作物与土地属于同一个所有者时，哪一方更应当成为义务所关联的对象。多数学者主张，它与应当从中缴纳天课的东西相关，即谷物（或其产出）。而艾布·哈尼法则主张，它与构成义务基础的东西相关，即土地。

The reason for their disagreement arises from the question of whether hishr is a duty related to the land or to cultivation or to both. No one has said that it is a duty related to both when, in fact, it is a duty related to both. They agreed that it is a duty incumbent upon one of the two, but they disagreed on which one has precedence for being associated with a point on which there is agreement, and that is the occasion when the crop as well as the land belong to a single owner. The majority maintained that it is related to the thing from which zakat is to be paid, and that is grain (or the yield). Abu HanTfa maintained, however, that it is related to the thing that is the basis of the obligation, and that is land.

关于他们在哈拉吉土地上的分歧：当这类土地转归穆斯林所有时，是否在其上除哈拉吉外还要征收欧舍尔，或者是否不存在欧舍尔，多数学者认为应当征收欧舍尔，即天课；而艾卜·哈尼法及其门徒则认为其上不征收欧舍尔。他们分歧的原因，正如我们所说，在于天课义务是与土地相关，还是与庄稼相关。如果我们认为天课与土地相关，那么同一块土地上不能同时关联两项义务，即欧舍尔与哈拉吉。如果我们认为天课与庄稼相关，那么哈拉吉归于土地，天课归于庄稼。这一分歧的产生，是因为所有权存在缺陷，正如我们已经阐明的，学者们正是因此在哈拉吉土地的买卖问题上产生了分歧。然而，如果欧舍尔土地转让给耕种它的齐米人，多数学者认为他不承担任何义务。艾奴尔（Al-Nu'man）则认为，齐米人购买欧舍尔土地后，该土地即转为哈拉吉土地。看来他认为欧舍尔是加在穆斯林土地上的义务，哈拉吉是加在齐米人土地上的义务；但依据这一原则，他必须进一步主张：哈拉吉土地转归穆斯林时，将转为欧舍尔土地，正如在他看来，欧舍尔土地转归齐米人时将转为哈拉吉土地。

With respect to their dispute over kharaj land, when it is transferred to the Muslims, as to whether hishr is imposed on it along with kharaj or whether there is no zushr, the majority maintained that-there is ^ushr, that is, zakat, while Abu HanTfa and his disciples held that there is no hishr on it. The reason for their disagreement stems, as we have said, from the question of whether zakat is a duty related to the land or to the crop. If we maintain that it is a duty related to the land, then, two duties cannot be linked to it at the same time, and these are hishr and kharaj. If we maintain that zakat is linked to the crop, then, kharaj would be assigned to the land and zakat to the crop. This dispute arises because the ownership is deficient as we have stated and it was because of this that the jurists disagreed over the sale of kharaj land. If, however, hishr land is transferred to a dhimmi who cultivates it, the majority maintain that there is no liability on him. Al-Nucman held that when the dhimmi buys bishr land it is converted into kharaj land. It appears that he considered zushr to be a duty owed on Muslim land and he considered kharaj to be a duty owed on the land of the dhimmis, but on the. basis of this rule it was necessary for him to say that if the kharaj land was transferred to the Muslims it would be converted to Htshr land, just as in his view if the *ushr land was transferred to a dhimmi it would be converted to kharaj land.

与财产所有者相关的若干子问题，在本节讨论较为恰当。第一，是某人已经留出天课，但该天课却遗失了的情况。第二，是可以留出天课，但在留出天课之前，部分财产已被毁坏的情况。第三，是财产所有者负有缴纳天课的义务，却在缴纳之前去世的情况。第四，如果他卖掉了应付天课的农作物或果实，或者同样地将其作为礼物赠予他人，那么应由谁来缴纳天课。

There are sub-issues related to the owner of wealth the discussion of which is suitably placed is this section. The first of these is (the situation) when a man sets aside zakat but it is lost. Second, when the setting aside of zakat is possible but when part of the wealth is destroyed before zakat is set aside. Third, where the owner was under an obligation to pay zakat, but died before paying it. Fourth, who is to pay zakat if he sells off the crop or fruit on which zakat was due, and similarly when he gives it away as a gift.

本款讨论的问题是:财主已经将天课分离出来,但天课随后遗失了。一群法学家认为,应当免除他的责任,视为已经交付。另一群认为,他仍须负责,直到将天课交付到其应得的地方。第三群作出区分:一种情况是他推迟分离天课,即在可以分离之后才分离;另一种情况是他在义务产生、且具备分离条件的时刻就立即分离。其中一些法学家说,如果他在义务产生并具备分离条件之后数日才分离,那么他须负责;但如果他在义务产生的第一时刻就分离,且没有疏忽,则不负责。这是马立克学派中的一个著名观点。第四群法学家说,如果他有疏忽,须予以赔偿;如果他没有疏忽,则只需就剩余的财产缴纳天课。这是艾布·陶尔和沙斐仪的观点。第五群说,遗失的部分应视为全体各方共同的损失,贫困者与财主都应按各自在剩余财产中的份额成为共有人,正如两位合伙人的共同资本部分遗失后,他们依然按相同比例在剩余资本中保持合伙关系。 由此,关于此问题共有五种观点:第一,他完全不必赔偿损失;第二,他始终须赔偿;第三,如果他有疏忽则赔偿,如果没有疏忽则不赔偿;第四,如果他有疏忽则赔偿,如果没有疏忽则就剩余部分缴纳天课;第五,他们(财主与贫困者)在剩余财产中成为合伙人。

This (issue) deals with the problem where the owner sets aside zakat and it is lost. A group of jurists said that he is to be given credit for it. Another group said that he is liable for it till he delivers it to its location. A third group made a distinction between his setting it aside later than when it was possible to do so and between setting it aside (promptly) at the beginning of the time when the obligation arises and when it is possible to do so. Some of these jurists said that if he sets it aside some days after the time at which the obligation arises and the possibility to do so, then he is liable but if he sets it aside at the first moment obligation arises and there was no negligence on his part he is not liable. This is a well-known opinion in Malik’s school. A fourth group of jurists said that if there was negligence on his part he is to compensate for it, but if he was not negligent he is to pay zakat on the remainder alone. This was the opinion of Abu Thawr and al-ShaficT. A fifth group said that what has been lost is to be counted as a loss for all parties, and the needy people as well as the owner are to be considered co-owners in proportion to their shares in the remaining wealth, as (is the case) with two partners when part of the common capital is lost but remain partners in the residue in the same ratio. Thus, we arrive at five opinions on the issue: first, that he is not to compensate for the loss at all; second, that he always compensates; third, that he compensates if he was negligent, but does not if he was not negligent; fourth, that he compensates if he was negligent and pays zakat on the residue if he was not; and fifth, that they (the owner and the needy) become partners in the remaining wealth.

本款讨论的问题是:财主已经将天课分离出来,但天课随后遗失了。一群法学家认为,应当免除他的责任,视为已经交付。另一群认为,他仍须负责,直到将天课交付到其应得的地方。第三群作出区分:一种情况是他推迟分离天课,即在可以分离之后才分离;另一种情况是他在义务产生、且具备分离条件的时刻就立即分离。其中一些法学家说,如果他在义务产生并具备分离条件之后数日才分离,那么他须负责;但如果他在义务产生的第一时刻就分离,且没有疏忽,则不负责。这是马立克学派中的一个著名观点。第四群法学家说,如果他有疏忽,须予以赔偿;如果他没有疏忽,则只需就剩余的财产缴纳天课。这是艾布·陶尔和沙斐仪的观点。第五群说,遗失的部分应视为全体各方共同的损失,贫困者与财主都应按各自在剩余财产中的份额成为共有人,正如两位合伙人的共同资本部分遗失后,他们依然按相同比例在剩余资本中保持合伙关系。 由此,关于此问题共有五种观点:第一,他完全不必赔偿损失;第二,他始终须赔偿;第三,如果他有疏忽则赔偿,如果没有疏忽则不赔偿;第四,如果他有疏忽则赔偿,如果没有疏忽则就剩余部分缴纳天课;第五,他们(财主与贫困者)在剩余财产中成为合伙人。 他们产生分歧的原因，在于如何类比天课与债务：一种观点认为，天课义务与人的负债责任相关，而不与财产实体相关；另一种观点则认为，它与那些与财产实体相关、而非与持有财产者的责任相关的义务类似，例如受托人及其他类似情形。认为财产所有者类似于受托人的人说，如果他将天课单独划出而其丢失，则他无需再承担任何义务。认为所有者类似于债务人的人说，他须予以赔偿。区分疏忽与否的人，则在各方面都将所有者与受托人相类比，因为受托人在有疏忽的情况下须予以赔偿。认为若他并无疏忽，则应就余下的财产缴纳天课的人，是将那些在天课义务产生之后、已为天课划出而又损失了部分财产的人，与那些在义务开始之前便已损失部分财产的人相比较：正如后者在义务产生时只需就其手中现存的财产缴纳天课，前者也应就其手中现存的财产缴纳天课。由此可见，分歧的根源在于人们对财产所有者与债务人、受托人、合伙人以及在义务产生前已损失部分财产者之间的关联，有着不同的理解。

This (issue) deals with the problem where the owner sets aside zakat and it is lost. A group of jurists said that he is to be given credit for it. Another group said that he is liable for it till he delivers it to its location. A third group made a distinction between his setting it aside later than when it was possible to do so and between setting it aside (promptly) at the beginning of the time when the obligation arises and when it is possible to do so. Some of these jurists said that if he sets it aside some days after the time at which the obligation arises and the possibility to do so, then he is liable but if he sets it aside at the first moment obligation arises and there was no negligence on his part he is not liable. This is a well-known opinion in Malik’s school. A fourth group of jurists said that if there was negligence on his part he is to compensate for it, but if he was not negligent he is to pay zakat on the remainder alone. This was the opinion of Abu Thawr and al-ShaficT. A fifth group said that what has been lost is to be counted as a loss for all parties, and the needy people as well as the owner are to be considered co-owners in proportion to their shares in the remaining wealth, as (is the case) with two partners when part of the common capital is lost but remain partners in the residue in the same ratio. Thus, we arrive at five opinions on the issue: first, that he is not to compensate for the loss at all; second, that he always compensates; third, that he compensates if he was negligent, but does not if he was not negligent; fourth, that he compensates if he was negligent and pays zakat on the residue if he was not; and fifth, that they (the owner and the needy) become partners in the remaining wealth. The reason for their disagreement stems, from the comparison between zakat and debts, that is, the duty is associated with liability and not with the substance of the wealth, or it is its comparison with duties that are related to the substance of the property not with the liability of the person who is in possession of the wealth, as in the case of trustees and others. Those who considered the owners of wealth to be similar to the trustees said that if he sets it aside and it is lost there is nothing due from him. Those who considered them similar to debtors said that they are to compensate (for the loss). Those who made a distinction on the basis of negligence, and the absence of it, associated them with trustees from all aspects, as the trustee compensates (for the loss) in case of negligence. Those who maintained that if he was not negligent he is to pay zakat on the residue compared the person who had lost part of his wealth after setting aside zakat with one who had lost part of his wealth before the commencement of the obligation; just as that person pays zakat at the time of the obligation on what exists with him, this person will pay zakat on what exists with him. The reason for the disagreement arises from the variation in the association of the owner with a debtor, a trustee, a partner, and with one who has lost part of his wealth before the obligation.

这与在义务（责任）开始之后死去的人有关 • IQ？

This relates to the person who dies after the commencement of the obligation • IQ?

关于天课的问题。一部分法学家认为,应当从其本金中拿出。这是沙斐仪(al-ShaficT)、艾哈迈德、伊斯哈格和艾布·绥尔(Abu Thawr)的观点。另一部分人则认为,只有当他留下遗嘱,要求从其遗产中支付时,天课才需要缴纳。在这种情况下,应从遗产的三分之一中拿出。否则便不需要缴纳。这些法学家中有人认为,如果天课的数额等于或少于三分之一,则应优先支付;另有人则认为不应优先支付。关于马立克(Malik)的观点,两种说法都有记载,但较为著名的观点是应将其视为遗嘱中的捐赠。

of zakat. A group of jurists said that it is to be taken out from his capital. This was the opinion of al-ShaficT, Ahmad, Ishaq, and Abu Thawr. Another group said that zakat is to be paid only if he leaves a testament to the effect that it is to be paid from his estate. In that case, it is to be taken out from the third of the estate. Otherwise nothing is due. Some of these jurists said that zakat is to be satisfied first if it is as much as the third or is less than that, while others said that it is not to be satisfied first. Both opinions are narrated from Malik, but the well-known opinion is that it is to be treated as a bequest.

关于财产在应纳天课之后被出售的情况，学者们存在分歧。一派法学家认为，应缴天课的人（即卖方）可以从该财产本身中取出天课，买方则向卖方追索其价值。这是艾布·赛尔（Abu Thawr）的观点。另一派法学家认为，买卖应当撤销，这是沙斐仪（al-Shafi‘i）的观点。艾布·哈尼法（Abu Hanifa）认为，买方可在执行买卖与撤销买卖之间作出选择，而什一税（ʿushr）则从应纳税的果实或谷物中征收。马立克（Malik）认为，卖方负有缴纳天课的责任。

With respect to their disagreement about wealth that is sold after zakat has become due on it, a group of jurists said that the person from whom zakat is due (the seller) may take the zakat from the wealth itself, and the buyer is to have recourse to the seller for its value. This was the opinion of Abu Thawr. Another group of jurists said that the sale is rescinded, and this was al-Shafic?s opinion. Abu HanTfa said that the buyer has an option between .the execution of the sale or its revocation, and the hishr is to be taken from the fruit or from the grain on which zakat was due. Malik said that the seller is liable for the payment of zakat.

他们之间产生分歧的原因，在于如何类比财产的出售与财产的损毁和灭失。将二者视为相似的人认为，毁坏财产或造成财产损失的人应承担天课的义务。而认为出售并不等同于毁灭财富的实体或使其灭失，而是等同于人出售不属于自己的东西的人，则认为天课与财富的实体相关联。至于买卖是否应当撤销，这是另一个问题，将在买卖章中讨论，若真主意欲。他们关于以赠与方式转让财产后是否应缴天课的争论，性质与此相似。

The reason for their disagreement arises from the comparison of the sale of the property with its loss and destruction. Those who considered them similar said that zakat is the liability of the person destroying the property or causing its loss. Those who maintained that sale does not amount to destruction of the substance of the wealth nor its loss, but amounts to sale by a person of what does not belong to him said that zakat is linked to the substance of the wealth. Whether the sale is to be rescinded is a separate discussion that will be taken up in the section on sales, God willing. Their dispute about zakat on wealth that has been alienated by a gift is of a similar nature.

在我们提到的这些问题中，学派内部有一些详细的讨论，我们认为不适合在此呈现，因为这与我们的目的不相符。此外，要说明这些区分的理由也颇为困难，因为其中大多数是基于istihsān（伊斯提哈桑，即善法原则）的，例如他们关于哪些债务应计入应缴天课的财产、哪些不应计入，以及哪些债务会免除天课、哪些不会的详细论述。因此，我们认为本章应当提及的，是与天课义务人的确定有关的内容，与天课产生义务所需的产权条件有关的内容，以及与天课义务人的相关教法规定有关的内容。

In some of these issues that we have mentioned there are detailed discussions in the School that we have not deemed proper for presentation here, as that is not compatible with our aim. Further, it becomes difficult to give the reasons for these distinctions, because most of them - are based on istihsdn, like their discussion of the details of debts that are liable for zakat and those that are not, and debts that cause a waiver of zakat and those that do not. This, then, is what we considered should be mentioned in this chapter and it relates to the identification of the person from whom zakat is due, to the conditions of ownership with which it becomes due, and to the ahkam of the person from whom it is due.

有一条广为人知的关于此人的律例（hukm），涉及这样的问题：拒绝缴纳天课（zakat）却不否认其义务的人，其裁决是什么。