想象你是一名出租车司机，有一天你接到电话，要到火车站接两位乘客。你离车站很近，所以比预定时间早到。乘客乘坐的火车到站后，过了一会儿他们上了你的车。你们互相问候，然后你问他们要去哪里。他们请你送他们到办公室，那里距离大约9英里。你发动汽车开始行驶。过了一段时间，你把他们送到了办公室。 现在把故事倒回去。想象乘客刚上车后，你蒙上了眼罩。在这种情况下，你还能把乘客送到目的地吗？答案是显而易见的。你不可能把他们送到目的地，因为你蒙着眼睛，看不见，你是盲人。然而，如果你坚持说，蒙着眼罩也能开车，乘客难道不会认为你不讲道理，甚至疯了吗？能看见的出租车司机代表伊斯兰的有神论，蒙着眼罩的出租车司机代表无神论。

Imagine you are a taxi-driver and one day you receive a call to pick up two passengers from the train-station. You are quite close so you arrive before the scheduled time. The passengers’ train arrives and after a few moments they get into your car. You exchange greetings and then you ask them where they want to go. They request that you take them to their office, which is about 9 miles away. You start the car and begin to drive. After some time, you drop them off at their office. Now rewind the story. Imagine that just after the passengers get into your car, you put on a blindfold. In this scenario, would you be able to drive your passengers to their destination? The answer is obvious. You could never drive them to their destination because you are blind; you cannot see because of the blindfold. However, what if you insisted that you could drive your vehicle with your blindfold on? Wouldn’t your passengers describe you as irrational, if not insane? The taxi-driver who can see represents Islamic theism, and the taxi-driver who has a blindfold on represents atheism.

引言：论证的提出

Introducing the argument.

在我解释为什么本故事中的出租车司机是无神论和伊斯兰有神论的类比之前，先让我提供一些必要的背景信息。穆斯林和无神论者都假定自己具有推理能力。这意味着我们能够形成思维或理性的洞见。我们在心中“看到”通往结论的道路。我们的头脑接受前提或陈述，并将它们“驾驶”到一个心理目的地，换句话说，即一个逻辑结论。这是理性思维的一个关键特征。那么，为什么无神论就像蒙着眼睛的出租车司机呢？大多数形式的无神论都隐含着哲学自然主义，它要求理性（以及其他一切）只能通过盲目的、非理性的物理过程来解释。然而，正如你不可能蒙着眼睛把乘客开到办公室，盲目的物理过程也永远无法将我们心中的前提“驾驶”到一个心理目的地。换句话说，它们无法创造并认识论证前提之间的逻辑关系。因此，无神论实际上等同于拒绝理性本身，因为它使自身的假设失效。我们的推理能力根本无法纳入自然主义的世界观，因为理性不可能来自盲目的、非理性的物理过程。坚持认为它可以，就等同于相信无中可以生有。从这个角度看，无神论是不合理的。无神论使它用来否认真主的东西，即理性，本身失效。 那么，为什么伊斯兰有神论就像能看见的出租车司机呢？我们形成心智洞见的能力与伊斯兰有神论相契合，因为这种能力是说得通的（即得到了充分的解释），它是由全知、全见、全睿的创造主赐予我们的。一个事物如果本身不包含某种东西，或者不具备产生它的能力（或潜能），就不可能产生这种东西。换句话说，理性只能来自理性。 这就是为什么我们形成心智洞见的能力可以来自造物主。本章的论证断言，无神论者和有神论者都预设了我们的推理能力。然而，这一预设与伊斯兰有神论十分契合，而在无神论之下则说不通。因此，接受伊斯兰有神论而非无神论，才是理性的选择。本章将详细考察这些断言。不过，在展开论述之前，下面的对话概括了本章将要讨论的内容：

Before I explain why the taxi-drivers in this story are analogies of atheism and Islamic theism, let me provide you with some essential background information. Both Muslims and atheists assume that they have the ability to reason. This means that we are able to form mental or rational insights. We “see” our way to a conclusion in our minds. Our minds take premises or statements and “drive” them to a mental destination; in other words, a logical conclusion. This is a key feature of a rational mind. So why is atheism like a taxi-driver with a blindfold on? Most forms of atheism imply philosophical naturalism, which demands that reason (and everything else) must only be explained via blind, non-rational physical processes. However, just as you cannot drive passengers to their office with a blindfold on, physical processes that are blind can never “drive” any premises in our minds to a mental destination. In other words, they cannot create and recognise the logical relations between the premises of an argument. Therefore, atheism is in effect equivalent to rejecting reason itself, because it invalidates its own assumption. Our ability to reason simply does not fit within the naturalistic worldview, because rationality cannot come from blind, non-rational physical processes. To maintain that it can is the same as believing that something can come from nothing. From this perspective, atheism is irrational. Atheism invalidates the thing that it claims to use to deny God: reason. So why is Islamic theism like a taxi-driver who can see? Our ability to form mental insights fits within Islamic theism because this ability makes sense (i.e. is explained adequately), as it was given to us by the Creator Who is All-Seeing, The-Knowing and The-Wise. A thing cannot give rise to something if it does not contain it, or if it does not have the ability (or the potential) to give rise to it. In other words, rationality can only come from rationality. This is why our ability to form mental insights can come from the Creator. The argument in this chapter asserts that our ability to reason is assumed by both atheists and theists. This assumption, however, fits nicely within Islamic theism and does not fit or make sense under atheism. Therefore, it would only be rational to accept Islamic theism over atheism. This chapter will examine these assertions in detail. However, before I elaborate, the dialogue below is a summary of what will be discussed in this chapter:

无神论者：“没有任何证据能证明上帝的存在。信仰上帝是不理性的。”

Atheist: “There is no evidence for the existence of God. Belief in God is irrational.”.

"穆斯林："这是一个有意思的论断。在我们继续之前，我可以问你一个问题吗？你是否相信自己拥有理性的能力？换句话说，你是否相信自己能够推理？"

Muslim: “That’s an interesting assertion. Before we continue, can I ask you, do you believe that you have rational faculties? In other words, do you believe you can reason?”.

无神论者："显然。任何理性的人都会否认真主。根本没有证据。"

Atheist: “Obviously. Any rational person would deny God. There’s simply no evidence.”.

穆斯林："好的，很好。那我可以问一下，你们无神论者如何解释你们的理性能力？"

Muslim: “Okay, great. So can I ask, how do you explain your rational faculties under atheism?”.

无神论者:“你是什么意思?” 穆斯林:“那么,你是否相信所有现象都可以用物质的东西来解释?你是否相信不存在超自然的事物?” 无神论者:“当然。”

Atheist: “What do you mean?”. Muslim: “Well, do you believe all phenomena can be explained via physical stuff? And do you believe that there is no supernatural?” Atheist: “Sure.”.

穆斯林:"物理的东西本身是盲目的、非理性的。那么理性怎么可能从非理性中产生呢?一样东西如果本身不包含理性,也没有产生理性的潜能,它怎么可能生出理性?我们怎么可能从盲目的物理过程中形成理性的洞见?照此看来,你如何解释你自己的推理能力呢?"无神论者:"嗯,我们拥有一个经过进化的大脑。"穆斯林:"好的,而按照无神论的观点,进化而来的大脑同样是基于物理的东西,对吧?"

Muslim: “Physical stuff is just blind and non-rational. So how can rationality come from non-rationality? How can anything arise from something that does not contain it or have the potential to give rise to it? How can we form rational insights based on blind physical processes? In this light, how can you explain your ability to reason?”. Atheist: “Well, we have a brain that has evolved.”. Muslim: “Okay, and according to atheism an evolved brain is based on physical stuff too, no?”.

无神论者："是的，但我们的大脑已经进化得具有理性，因为你对世界了解得越多，就越有可能生存下来。"

Atheist: “Yes, but our brains have evolved to be rational, because the more you know about the world the more likely you are to survive.”.

穆斯林：“这不对；对世界持有非理性的信念，同样也可能有助于生存。”

Muslim: “That’s not true; holding non-rational beliefs about the world can lead to survival too.”.

无神论者："那又怎样？我们双方都假定理性是真的，所以这不成问题。"

Atheist: “So what? We both assume reason to be true, so it’s not an issue.”.

"穆斯林："嗯，对我来说不是这样。但按照无神论，你的推理能力就说不通了。无神论否定了它用来否认真主的那个前提本身。所以做无神论者是荒谬的，因为无神论使理性本身失效了。"无神论者："不，你得先向我证明真主的存在。"

Muslim: “Well, for me it isn’t. But under atheism your ability to reason does not make sense. Atheism has invalidated the very assumption that it claims to use to deny God. So it is absurd to be an atheist since atheism nullifies reason itself.”. Atheist: “No, you have to prove God to me first.”.

Muslim:"这是一种推脱，因为你使用了"证据"这个词。

Muslim: “That’s a cop-out, because your use of the word ‘proof’.

"预设你有推理能力。然而，你并不能有理由作出这样的假设，因为在无神论之下理性已被否定。理性不可能源于非理性。从这一角度看，无神论是非理性的。而理性则可以源于理性。这就是为什么伊斯兰一神论最能解释我们为何能够运用理性：理性来自造物主，祂是全见的、全知的、至睿的。"

assumes your ability to reason. However, you are not justified in making such an assumption because rationality is nullified under atheism. Rationality cannot come from non-rationality. From this perspective, atheism is irrational. However, rationality can come from rationality. This is why Islamic theism explains best why we can use our reason, as it came from the Creator Who is All-Seeing, The-Knowing and The-Wise.”.

什么是理性？

What is reason?.

在本论证的语境中,“理性”指的是我们拥有理性能力这一事实。我们能够获得真理,我们渴求发现,我们能够进行推论、归纳和演绎。理性能力的一个重要方面,是能够得出逻辑上有效的结论。当我们进行逻辑推理时,我们的结论基于在心智中发生的理性洞察;我们看到结论是从前提中推出的。从技术上讲,我们所得出的结论,是基于逻辑论证前提之间的逻辑关系。我们正是基于这些关系看出结论是成立的。这种“看见”无法用物理的方式加以解释。物理世界中的任何事物,都无法说明这些前提为何以及如何与结论相连。总而言之,当我们进行逻辑推理时,我们在心智中获得一种洞察,即结论在逻辑上是成立的;它在逻辑上与其先前的前提相连。演绎论证是解释我们理性洞察的一个很好的例子。演绎论证是指前提能够保证结论为真的论证。一个演绎论证如果其结论必然从前提中推出,那么它就是有效的。如果它是有效的,并且其前提为真或在理性上可以接受,那么它就是可靠的。请看下面这个演绎论证:1. 所有单身汉都是未婚的男子。2. 约翰是单身汉。

In the context of this argument, reason refers to the fact that we have rational faculties. We can acquire truth, we desire to discover, and we can infer, induce and deduce. A significant aspect of our rational faculties is the ability to come to a logically valid conclusion. When we reason logically, our conclusions will be based on our rational insight that is occurring in our minds; we see that the conclusion follows. Technically speaking, the conclusions we make are based on the logical relations between the premises of a logical argument. We see that the conclusion follows based on these relations. This “seeing” cannot be explained physically. Nothing in physical world can explain why and how these premises are connected to the conclusion. In summary, when we reason logically we have a mental insight that the conclusion follows logically; it is logically connected to its previous premises. Deductive arguments are a good example to explain our rational insights. Deductive arguments are where the premises guarantee the truth of the conclusion. A deductive argument is valid if its conclusion follows necessarily from its premises. It is sound if it is valid and its premises are true or rationally acceptable. Consider the following deductive argument: 1. All bachelors are unmarried men. 2. John is a bachelor.

因此,约翰是一个未婚的男人。

3. Therefore, John is an unmarried man.

我们凭借自身的洞察力知道，(3)必然由(1)和(2)推出。物质世界中的任何东西都无法证明(3)为何与前面的前提相关联，换言之，无法证明它为何在逻辑上成立。该结论之所以必然成立，不仅仅是因为前提中词语的意义，它还因前提之间所存在的关系而成立。

We know that (3) necessarily follows from (1) and (2) based on our insight. Nothing in the physical world can prove why (3) is connected to the previous premises; in other words, why it logically follows. The conclusion doesn’t only necessarily follow by virtue of the meaning of the words in the premises65; it does so due to the relations occurring between them.

66 结论与前提之间的逻辑关系，无法通过物理方式观察和解释。从这一角度看，理性显然具有超越性的维度。为了说明这一点，请看下面这个演绎论证：

66 The connection between the conclusion and the logical relations between the premises cannot be observed and explained physically. From this perspective, reason clearly has a transcendent dimension. To drive this point home, consider the following deductive argument:

1. 约翰观察到了5个 modifus。

1. John has observed 5 modifus.

2. 约翰所观察到的5个modifus都是黄色的。

2. The 5 modifus John has observed are yellow.

3. 因此,至少有一些模态(modifus)必须是黄色的。

3. Therefore, some modifus at least must be yellow.

这是一个有效的论证；结论必然从前提中推出。约翰观察到5个黄色的modifus，因此必然可以推出，至少有一些modifus是黄色的。在前提(1)和(2)成立的情况下，(3)必然成立。然而，我们为什么同意结论(3)必然从这些前提中推出？既然我们根本不知道modifu是什么（这个词是我自己编造的），我们为什么仍然相信这个结论的逻辑有效性？原因在于，论证的逻辑推演是在我们的头脑中发生的，它与前提的意义以及我们可能基于自身经验形成的任何个人推断无关。前提之间的关系与结论之间存在着联系。我们在没有任何外在的、物质的和语义数据的情况下，就获得了对结论(3)的洞察。我们获得的洞察并不基于我们的经验（我们并不知道modifu是什么）。事实上，如果把“yellow”一词替换为“zellow”（另一个编造的词），结论仍然必然成立：某些modifus（至少5个）必定是zellow。不仅如此，我们的头脑得出的结论并非基于任何外部证据，我们的头脑还建立了前提之间的关系。这些关系无法用物理或经验证据来解释。我们的头脑引导并驱动着我们的洞察（换句话说，建立了这些逻辑关系），从而得出(3)必然从(1)和(2)中推出的结论。我们的头脑接受前提(1)和(2)，并引导、驱动我们的洞察，从而得出(3)。

This is a valid argument; the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. John has observed 5 yellow modifus, so it necessarily follows that at least some modifus must be yellow. Given premises (1) and (2), (3) must follow. However, why do we agree that the conclusion (3) necessarily follows from these premises? Why do we believe in the logical validity of the conclusion, although we have no idea what a modifu is? (By the way, I have made the word up). It is because the logical flow of the argument occurs in our minds regardless of the meaning of the premises and any personal inferences we might ever have formed from our own experiences. There is a connection between the relations of the premises and the conclusion. We have achieved an insight into conclusion (3) without any external, material and semantic data. We have achieved an insight into something that is not based on our experience (we do not know what a modifu is). In actual fact, if the word “yellow” was replaced with “zellow” (another made-up word), the conclusion would still necessarily follow; some modifus (at least 5) must be zellow. Not only have our minds come to a conclusion that is not based on any external evidence; our minds have also established relations between the premises. These relations cannot be explained using physical or empirical evidence. Our minds have directed and driven our insight (in other words, established these logical relations) to conclude that (3) must follow from (1) and (2). Our minds have taken premises (1) and (2) and driven or directed our insight to conclude (3).

然而，被驱动或指引至某个心理上的目的地或终点，并不是物理过程的特征。物理过程是盲目的、随机的，没有任何有意的力量引导它们走向某处。

However, being driven or directed to a mental destination or endpoint is not a characteristic of a physical process. Physical processes are blind, random and have no intentional force directing them anywhere.

这意味着，我们无法用物理过程来解释我们获得对某一结论的洞见的能力。理由：科学的一项预设。人类心智具有一种独特的品质：我们能够分辨对错、真假、美丑。这清楚地将我们与动物区分开来。我们的心智能力使我们得以进步与发展。事实上，在我们开始进行科学研究之前，必须先信任自己的理性能力。科学的一个关键预设是，我们的心智具有推理的能力。没有这一预设，我们就永远无法使用“证据”“事实”“真理”和“证明”等词语。人类的科学实践建立在我们能够推理这一预设之上。这意味着，理性的存在无法被任何类型的科学解释完全说明。例如，当科学家试图处理一个可检验的假设或一个可回答的问题时，就预设了其结果可以被以理性方式加以说明。科学家也承认，他们有能力评估一个科学解释的逻辑有效性。这显然预设了科学家在进行任何科学研究之前，就已经能够运用其理性。这并不意味着科学完全无法对我们的推理能力提供任何部分的解释。然而，从根基的角度看，科学无法为理性提供论证。试图通过某种物理过程来说明理性如何产生，并不能解释理性的超越维度。这包括依据前提之间的关系，凭借心中的洞见得出一个逻辑上有效结论的能力。这正是为何仅依赖科学解释是不够的：它无法说明我们在心中看见结论这一事实。我们能够依据前提之间的关系作出逻辑结论，而且即使前提中的关键词并不基于我们能够理解或经验验证的任何事物，我们也能做到这一点。 科学只能处理能够以某种方式被观察到的事物;前提之间的逻辑关系无法被观察到。由于科学需要借助理性才能开始解释理性,若主张科学能够以某种方式为我们的推理能力提供辩护,那就等同于陷入循环论证。科学是帮助我们理解世界的有用工具,但它有许多局限(参见第十二章)。至此,有人可能会argue说,假设无需加以解释或说明,因为某些假设(或第一原理)被视为无需证据即为真。这一点是站得住脚的。

This means that we cannot use physical processes to account for our ability to achieve an insight into a conclusion. Reason: an assumption of science The human mind has a distinctive quality; we can distinguish between right and wrong, truth and falsehood, beauty and vileness. This clearly separates us from animals. Our mental abilities have enabled us to progress and advance. In fact, we must trust our rational faculties before we can even begin to conduct science. One of science’s key assumptions is that our minds have the ability to reason. Without such an assumption, we could never use words such as evidence, fact, truth and proof. The human practice of science rests on the assumption that we can reason. This means that the existence of reason cannot be fully accounted for by any type of scientific explanation. For example, when a scientist attempts to address a testable hypothesis or an answerable question, there is an assumption that the results can be rationalised. Scientists also accept that they have the ability to assess the logical validity of a scientific explanation. This obviously assumes that the scientist can use her reason before she performs any science. This does not mean that science cannot provide any partial explanation at all for our ability to reason. However, it is unable to justify reason from a foundational point of view. Attempting to demonstrate how reason emerged via some physical process does nothing to explain its transcendent dimension. This includes the ability to come to a logically valid conclusion that is determined by an insight in one’s mind. This is why relying solely on a scientific explanation is inadequate: it fails to account for the fact that we see the conclusion in our minds. We have the ability to make a logical conclusion based on the relations between premises. We can also do this without the key words in the premises being based on anything we can understand or verify empirically. Science can only deal with what can be observed in some way; logical relations between premises cannot be observed. Since science requires reason in order to begin to explain reason, to argue that it can somehow justify our ability to reason would be tantamount to arguing in a circle. Science is a useful tool to help us understand the world, but it has many limitations (see Chapter 12). At this point one might argue that assumptions do not need to be explained or accounted for, because some assumptions (or first principles) are taken to be true without evidence. This is a valid point.

然而，假设有有效与无效之分。一个假设要成为有效的，它必须与其所支撑的知识领域、概念或理论相契合。反之，如果一个旨在支持某种世界观的假设无法纳入该世界观之内，那么这一假设就不能被视为成立。例如，科学建立在这样一个观念之上：“支配自然世界的各种原因具有一致性”。67

However, there is a difference between valid and invalid assumptions. For an assumption to be valid it must make sense to the sphere of knowledge, concept or theory that it supports. However, if an assumption that aims to support a worldview cannot fit within that worldview, then the assumption cannot be presumed. For example, science rests on the notion that there is “consistency in the causes that operate the natural world”67

如果科学家总是断定物理原因是不一致的,那么这一假设就需要被摒弃或改变。如果哲学自然主义(甚至科学)坚持认为理性可以通过随机的、非理性的物理过程来解释,那么一个采纳自然主义的无神论者,又如何解释这一假设呢?这一假设显然无法契合自然主义的视角。自然主义实际上否定了理性,因为理性不可能源自非理性的物理过程。心智的洞察不可能来自盲目的物理过程。因此,无神论者必须改变其世界观,或者放弃我们是有理性的这一观念。

. If scientists were to always conclude that physical causes are inconsistent, then that assumption would need to be dismissed or changed. If philosophical naturalism (and even science) maintains that reason can be explained via random, non-rational physical processes, then how can an atheist—who adopts naturalism—account for such an assumption when it clearly cannot fit within the perspective of naturalism? Naturalism actually denies reason, because rationality cannot come from non-rational physical processes. Mental insights cannot come from blind physical processes. Therefore, atheists must change their worldview or dismiss the idea that we are rational.

在无神论之下，我们无法为自己的理性能力提供辩护。

Under atheism we cannot justify our rational faculties.

大多数无神论者是哲学自然主义者;自然主义断言不存在超自然的东西,物理过程可以解释一切现象。根据自然主义,如果我们探究实在最基本的层面,就会看到一切都是盲目的、随机的、非理性的物理过程的结果;亚原子粒子、原子和分子在没有任何方向、引导或预定结果的情况下四处运动。物理的东西没有目的;没有任何东西在有意地驱动这些物理过程。然而,如果情况确实如此,我们又怎能声称自己的心智有能力获得心理上的洞见呢?我们又怎能声称自己有能力得出结论呢?推理能力的一个关键部分,是拥有理性的洞见,即在心中看到某个结论基于前提之间的逻辑关系而从另一个命题逻辑地推出。正是在这里,自然主义站不住脚了,因为它断言一切现象都基于随机的、非理性的物理过程。

Most atheists are philosophical naturalists; naturalism asserts that there is no supernatural, and that physical processes can explain all phenomena. According to naturalism, if we probe the most basic levels of reality, we see that everything is the result of blind, random, non-rational physical processes; subatomic particles, atoms and molecules are whizzing around without any direction, guidance or intended outcome. Physical stuff has no purpose; nothing is intentionally driving these physical processes. If this is the case, though, how can we claim our minds have the ability to achieve mental insights? How can we claim the ability to reach a conclusion? A key part of being able to reason is to have rational insights, to see in one’s mind that something logically follows from something else based on the logical relations between premises. This is where naturalism fails, as it asserts that all phenomena are based on random, non-rational physical processes.

推理的能力，即从前提出发将思维引向某个心理结论的能力，如果有人假定这种能力来自盲目的、非理性的物理过程，那么它就被否定了。一个事物如果本身不包含某物，或者没有产生某物的能力（或潜能），就不可能产生该物。例如，如果我没有钱，就不能给你五百美元；如果我失业且信用不良，就无法筹到这笔钱（本书将始终运用这一原则）。

The ability to take premises and “drive” them towards a mental destination is invalidated if one postulates that the ability comes from blind, non-rational physical processes. A thing cannot give rise to something if it does not contain it, or if it does not have the ability (or the potential) to give rise to it. For example, I cannot give you $500 if I do not have the money, and I cannot raise the amount if I am jobless with bad credit (this principle will be used throughout this book).

同样地,如果物理过程本身不包含理性,那么它们又如何产生理性呢?根据定义,物理过程不包含理性,也没有"洞察力"。它们无法看出由某个论证所推出的结论。物理过程不是有目的或有意图地被驱动或指引的。因此,哪怕只是暗示理性可以来自非理性的物理过程,也等同于相信无中可以生有。请考虑以下例子。与本章开头的故事相似,设想有两名公交车司机。第一位视力良好、经验丰富。第二位则双目失明、缺乏经验。第一位司机开始行程,接上了两个人,名叫"前提1"和"前提2"。他们的最终目的地是"结论"。他在地图上看到了目的地,行程快结束时,他清楚地看到了最后一站。第二位司机被引领到车站的公交车旁。车上等候着"前提1"和"前提2",他们的目的地与第一种情形相同。这位司机设法把车发动了。然而,你认为他能到达目的地吗?就像那位蒙着眼睛的出租车司机一样,他永远到不了最终的目的地。物理过程也面临同样的问题。它们是盲目的。它们无法解释理性,因为理性的一项特征就是能够推导出洞察或得出结论,而从盲目的事物中不可能获得洞察。断言这样的事情,无异于说某物可以从无中产生。从这个角度看,无神论因其自然主义的立场,不仅是非理性的,而且是理性的对立面。它使得任何关于真主的论断所必需的东西失去了效力:

Likewise, if physical processes do not contain rationality, then how do they give rise to it? Physical processes by definition do not contain rationality, and they do not have “insight”. They cannot see the conclusion that follows from an argument. Physical processes are not purposefully or intentionally driven or directed. Therefore, to even suggest that rationality can come from non-rational physical processes, is exactly the same as believing that something can come from nothing. Consider the following example. Similar to the story at the beginning of this chapter, imagine there are two bus-drivers. The first has good eyesight and is an experienced driver. The second bus-driver is blind and inexperienced. The first driver starts his journey and picks up two people called “Premise 1” and “Premise 2”. Their final destination is “Conclusion”. He sees the destination on his map and as the journey is coming to an end he clearly observes the final stop. The second driver is escorted to his bus at the bus station. Waiting on the bus are “Premise 1” and “Premise 2”. Their destination is the same as in the first scenario. The driver manages to start the bus. However, do you think he will reach the destination? Just like the taxi-driver with the blindfold, he will never reach the final destination. Physical processes suffer the same problem. They are blind. They cannot explain reason because a feature of rationality is the ability to derive insight or reach a conclusion, and one cannot obtain insight from something that is blind. To assert such a thing is the equivalent of saying something can arise from nothing. From this perspective, atheism—because of its naturalistic perspective—is not only irrational, but an adversary of reason. It invalidates the thing that is required to make any claim about God:

理性本身。由于理性不可能从非理性中产生,因此自然主义无法解释我们的推理能力。尽管有这一论证,仍存在若干可能的反对意见,这些将在本章末尾加以讨论。然而,一个关键的反对意见认为,计算机程序能够进行演绎推理:计算机程序由物质构成;因此,物理过程可以解释理性。这一论点也将在本章末尾详细回应。不过,核心要点在于,计算机程序并不具有“洞见”,尤其是没有有意义的洞见。人类的理性包括得出有意义结论的能力。我们能够质疑一个结论的含义或蕴涵(即使我们并不知道其含义,如上文提到的“modifus”的例子),这一事实本身就表明人类理性包含有意义的洞见。而计算机程序并不具备这些有意义的洞见。事实上,计算机系统基于句法规则(符号的操作),而非语义(意义)。这一点将在后文作进一步说明。

reason itself. Since rationality cannot come from non-rationality, it follows that naturalism cannot explain our ability to reason. Despite this argument, there are a few possible objections. These will be discussed at the end of this chapter. However, one key objection argues that computer programmes have the ability to reason deductively: computer programmes are made up of physical stuff; therefore, physical processes can explain rationality. This contention will be addressed in detail at the end of this chapter. However, the main point is that computer programmes do not have “insights”; in particular, they do not have meaningful insights. Human rationality involves the ability to establish meaningful conclusions. The very fact that we can question the implications or the meaning of a conclusion (even if we do not know its meaning, as in the case of the modifus above) indicates that human rationality involves meaningful insights. Computer programmes do not have these meaningful insights. In actual fact, a computer system is based on syntactical rules (the manipulation of symbols), not on semantics (meaning). This will be explained further later.

达尔文进化论能否为我们的理性能力提供依据？

Can Darwinian evolution justify our rational faculties?.

根据自然主义者的观点,我们的心智已经进化为理性的。自然主义者认为,对于我们的祖先而言,了解自身所处环境的真相是有利的。能够分辨真假,对他们的生存而言是必不可少的。尽管自然主义否定了我们具有推理能力这一假设,达尔文式进化论乍看之下似乎是一种合理的解释。然而,只要稍加深入思考,我们就会遇到无数的问题。连达尔文本人对此也有过怀疑。他明白,如果人类获取真理的能力只是从低等生命形式进化而来,那么这种能力是无法解释的。他在1881年的一封信中写道:"但是,我心中总是会产生那令人恐惧的疑虑:人类心智的各种信念——这种心智是从低等动物的心智发展而来的——是否还有任何价值,或者是否根本值得信赖?谁会相信一只猴子心智中的信念,假如这样的心智还有什么信念的话?"68 现在让我们来看看,自然主义的进化论能否提供一个救生圈,挽救人类的理性。我们所说的自然主义进化,指的是这样一种观点:进化过程不受神圣干预;依照这种观点,我们的心智之所以进化为理性的,是因为推理能力和获得真实信念的能力对生存是必要的。这一主张存在若干问题。第一,分辨真假的能力并非生存的必要条件。第二,获得心智上的洞见同样不是我们持续存在的必要条件。进化关乎的是生存能力,而非作出逻辑上有效结论的能力。最后,我们的发现能力与渴望——这是理性心智的一项必要特征——往往反而有害于我们的生存。理性心智的一个关键特征,正是其获取真理、摒弃虚妄的能力。 我们也拥有理性的洞察力，以及由前提推出结论的能力。这些正是我们从事科学研究时所运用的思维过程。现在要问的问题是：自然主义的进化能否解释这些能力？答案是否定的。要驳斥这一观点，我们只需证明错误的信念也能带来生存优势。如果确实如此，那么进化过程就不必产生理性能力。那么，错误的信念能带来生存吗？不难发现，无数错误的信念都能做到这一点。一个人若相信所有身上带有红色斑纹的昆虫都有毒，他就会回避所有这类昆虫，从而得以存活。然而，这一信念是错误的，因为许多身上带红的昆虫是无害的，最明显的例子就是普通的瓢虫。另一个人可能因为相信所有真菌都有毒而回避一切真菌，并借此存活下来。然而，我们知道有些真菌，比如双孢蘑菇，是完全健康且富有营养、可以食用的。哲学教授安东尼·奥希尔（Anthony O’Hear）提供了一个类似的例子，用以说明进化可以产生错误而非正确的信念，从而表明非理性的信念同样能带来生存：“鸟类可能会回避某些颜色特定的毛虫，因为它们有毒；但它也会回避颜色相似的无毒毛虫，因此可能被认为对无毒毛虫持有错误的信念，即认为它有毒。当然，这只鸟因回避整类毛虫（既包括有毒的也包括无毒的）而提高了生存机会。因此，对某一特定毛虫持有错误信念，乃是一种促进生存的倾向所附带产生的副产品。” 鉴于无害的毛虫是通过模仿有毒的毛虫而进化来的，这里便给出了虚假何以演化的一种进化论解释，从而进一步印证了一个普遍观点：从进化的运作过程并不能直接推导出真理。69

According to naturalists our minds have evolved to be rational. Naturalists argue that it was advantageous for our ancestors to have known the truth about their environments. Having an ability to distinguish between truth and falsehood was necessary for their survival. Despite the fact that naturalism invalidates the assumption that we have the ability to reason, Darwinian evolution seems a plausible explanation on the surface. However, when we scratch a little deeper we run into a myriad of problems. Even Charles Darwin himself had his doubts about this matter. He understood that our ability to acquire truth could not be accounted for if it had only evolved from lower life-forms. He wrote in a letter in 1881: “But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would anyone trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?”68 Now let’s see whether naturalistic evolution can provide a lifejacket with which to rescue human rationality. When we use the term naturalistic evolution, we are referring to the idea that the evolutionary process is free from Divine intervention; according to this idea, our minds evolved to be rational because our ability to reason and attain true beliefs is necessary for survival. There are several problems with this claim. Firstly, our ability to distinguish between truth and falsehood is not a requirement for survival. Secondly, achieving mental insights is also not a requirement for our continual existence. Evolution is about the ability to survive, not about the ability to make logically valid conclusions. Finally, our ability and desire to discover—a necessary feature of a rational mind—is often detrimental to our survival. One of the key features of our rational minds is their ability to attain truth and discard what is false. We also have mental insights, and the ability to see a conclusion based on previous premises. These are the very processes we use when we engage in science. Now the question to ask is: Can naturalistic evolution account for these abilities? The answer is no. All we need to do in order to disprove this idea is show that false beliefs can lead to survival. In that case, there is no need for the evolutionary process to result in rational faculties. So can false beliefs result in survival? It does not take long to work out that countless false beliefs do. An individual who believes that all insects with red markings on their bodies are poisonous will avoid all insects with red markings and survive. However, this belief is false, as many insects with red on their bodies are harmless, the common ladybird being the most obvious example. Someone else might avoid all fungi because he or she believes they are poisonous, and by doing so survive. However, we know that some fungi, like button mushrooms, are completely healthy and nutritious to eat. Professor of Philosophy Anthony O’Hear provides a similar example to show that evolution can produce false, rather than true beliefs, thereby showing that non-rational beliefs can lead to survival: “A bird may avoid caterpillars with certain types of colouring because they are poisonous; but it will also avoid non-poisonous caterpillars with similar colours, and may be credited with a false belief about the poisonousness of the harmless caterpillar. Of course, the survival chances of the bird are increased by its avoidance of the caterpillar type which includes both noxious and harmless caterpillars. Having a false belief, then, about a particular caterpillar will be a by-product of a survival-producing disposition. Given that the harmless caterpillars have evolved through mimicry of the poisonous ones, we have here an evolutionary explanation of falsehood, reinforcing the general point that there is no direct way of moving from evolutionary workings to truth.”69

这一事实——错误的信念也可能有助于生存——给自然主义带来了另一个棘手的问题：我们为什么应当信任自己的心智？既然真理与生存之间并无必然联系，而错误的信念同样可能有助于生存，那么，如果我们的理性能力可能是由一个受错误信念驱动的进化过程所塑造的，我们又怎能信任这些理性能力呢？ 我们探索的欲望同样给进化论带来了难题。进化并不必然导致我们获得理解物理定律或从事数学活动的能力。我们拥有能够理解宇宙的心智，这一点本不合常理。蟑螂和甲虫生存得极为出色，已经繁衍了数百万年，但我们从未见到它们坐在咖啡桌旁，讨论无神论在存在论和逻辑上的含义（或其他任何问题）。 请稍作思考：设想一枚装载了五十万公斤燃料、即将以每小时一万七千五百英里的速度射向太空的火箭。是什么驱使宇航员登上这艘飞船，而他并不知道自己能否返回，甚至能否抵达太空？这种探索与发现的欲望有利于他的生存吗？又是什么驱使登山者攀登珠穆朗玛峰，忍受严寒与恶劣的环境，而并不知道自己能否登顶？他难道不是被设计为应当把生存放在首位的吗？是什么驱使僧侣远离尘世、保持独身、致力于寻求内心的平安？这难道不是完全违背生存与繁衍的吗？ 的确，探索与发现的欲望在人类身上十分强烈，在许多情况下甚至压倒了求生的本能。我们看到许多人主动割舍那些有利于其生存的事物，并借此获得真正的幸福与安宁。那么，我们如何解释这种导致有害于生存之活动的探索欲望呢？答案是：我们无法解释。如果采纳自然主义的进化观，这些欲望便说不通。 总而言之,我们较高的理性水平和求知欲,常常使我们把时间花在那些无助于生存与繁衍的“多余”活动上,例如艺术、灵修、哲学,或设计新型避孕技术。按照自然选择的道理,这些行为本应被淘汰,因为它们没有任何适应性上的益处。达尔文的进化机制只能解释“生存与繁衍”,因此无法说明我们的推理能力,也无法说明其最显著的特征:探索的欲望。由这两个问题可以清楚看出,以生存为导向而非以真理为导向的达尔文进化论,不足以解释我们的推理能力和探索的欲望。学界人士已经察觉到这些问题,并发表了一些令人震惊的言论。生物学家约翰·格雷指出:“如果人类的心智是遵循生存的需要而进化的,那么有什么理由认为它能够获得关于实在的知识呢?既然繁衍物种所要求的仅仅是它的错误和幻觉不致命即可。纯粹的自然主义哲学无法解释我们自以为拥有的知识。”70 DNA的发现者弗朗西斯·克里克说:“毕竟,我们高度发达的大脑并不是在发现科学真理的压力下进化而来的,而只是为了让我们足够聪明,得以生存并留下后代。”71 认知科学家史蒂文·平克写道:“我们的大脑是为适应性而塑造的,而非为真理。有时真理是有适应性的,但有时并非如此。”72 尽管直言不讳的无神论者、神经科学家萨姆·哈里斯相信科学终将给我们答案,他也承认:“……我们的逻辑、数学和物理直觉并非由自然选择设计来追踪真理。”73 总之,当无神论者声称他们运用理性能力证明了真主不存在时,这是一种智识上的虚伪。 要顾及他们拥有理性思维这一事实，他们就必须否认无神论，或者否认理性本身。其中的理智讽刺在于：他们的推理能力，最能由真主的存在来解释。 关于进化可靠论的一点说明 许多自然主义者承认，生存与真理之间并不存在必然联系。他们认为，很有可能存在某些生物条件和压力，促使产生了能够形成真实信念的可靠认知能力。这些能力必定有助于生物适应度，因而被自然选择所青睐。主张达尔文进化论能够解释我们那些能产生真实信念的认知能力，这种观点被称为进化可靠论。要使进化可靠论成立，自然选择青睐能产生真实信念的认知能力的概率，就必须大于青睐那些产生错误信念的不可靠认知能力的概率。这一论证的主要前提是：能产生真实信念的认知能力，比产生错误信念的不可靠认知能力更能增强适应度（即更有利于我们的生存与繁衍）。然而，根据我们迄今的讨论，这一前提已被削弱。此外，还有其他理由表明该前提缺乏依据；其中一些将在下文讨论。

The fact that false beliefs can lead to survival raises another difficult question for naturalism: Why should we trust our minds? Since there is no necessary link between truth and survival—and that false beliefs can also lead to survival—then how can we trust our rational faculties if they could have been based on an evolutionary process driven by false beliefs? Our desire to discover also poses a problem for evolution. There is no need for evolution to result in abilities that allow us to understand the laws of physics or engage in mathematics. It just does not make sense that we should end up with minds that have the ability to understand the universe. Cockroaches and beetles survive extremely well, and have done so for millions of years, yet we do not see them sitting over coffee discussing the existential and logical implications of atheism (or anything else). Think about this for a moment: Imagine a rocket containing 500,000 kilogrammes of fuel, about to be blasted into space at 17,500 miles per hour. What drives an astronaut to board this shuttle, unknowing of whether or not he will return or even reach space? Is this desire to explore and discover conducive to his survival? What drives a climber to ascend Mount Everest, enduring cold and harsh conditions, not knowing if he will reach the summit? Isn’t he designed to put his survival first? What drives a monk to isolate himself, remain celibate and devote himself to discovering inner peace? Does not this go completely against survival and reproduction? Indeed, the desire to discover is powerful in humans and in many cases overrides our desire to survive. We see many cases of people cutting themselves off from the very things that are conducive to their survival, and in doing so achieve true happiness and peace. So, how can we explain our desire to discover, resulting in activities that are detrimental to survival? The answer is we cannot. These desires do not make sense if one adopts naturalistic evolution. In conclusion, our higher levels of rationality and desire to learn often lead us to spend time in ‘superfluous’ activities which do not aid survival and reproduction, such as art, spirituality, philosophy or designing novel contraceptive techniques. Natural selection should have eliminated all of these, because such behaviours have no adaptive benefits. Because the Darwinian evolutionary mechanism explains only “survival and reproduction”, it cannot account for our ability to reason, or for its most conspicuous characteristic: the desire to discover. It should be clear from these two problems that the Darwinian theory of evolution, which is geared towards survival, not truth, is an inadequate explanation of our ability to reason and desire to discover. Academics have recognised these problems and have made some startling remarks. Biologist John Gray states: “If the human mind has evolved in obedience to the imperatives of survival, what reason is there for thinking that it can acquire knowledge of reality, when all that is required in order to reproduce the species is that its errors and illusions are not fatal? A purely naturalistic philosophy cannot account for the knowledge that we believe we possess.”70 DNA discoverer Francis Crick said, “Our highly developed brains, after all, were not evolved under the pressure of discovering scientific truths, but only to enable us to be clever enough to survive and leave descendants.”71 Cognitive scientist Steven Pinker wrote, “Our brains were shaped for fitness, not for truth. Sometimes the truth is adaptive, but sometimes it is not.”72 Although Sam Harris, outspoken atheist and neuroscientist, believes that science will eventually give us answers, he admits that “…our logical, mathematical, and physical intuitions have not been designed by natural selection to track the Truth.”73 In summary, when atheists claim to have used their rational faculties to prove that God does not exist, it is a form of intellectual hypocrisy. To account for the fact that they have a rational mind, they have to deny atheism or deny reason itself. The intellectual irony is that their ability to reason is best explained by the existence of God. A Note on Evolutionary Reliabilism Many naturalists admit that there is no necessary link between survival and truth. They maintain that it is highly likely that there were biological conditions and pressures that gave rise to reliable cognitive faculties that produce true beliefs. These faculties must have been conducive to biological fitness and were subsequently preferred by natural selection. The view that Darwinian evolution can explain our truth-reliable cognitive faculties is referred to as evolutionary reliabilism. In order for evolutionary reliabilism to be justified the probability of natural selection favouring truth-reliable cognitive faculties must be greater than the probability of favouring unreliable cognitive faculties that produce false beliefs. The main premise for this argument is that truth-reliable cognitive faculties were more fitness enhancing (conducive to our survival and reproduction) than unreliable cognitive faculties that produced false beliefs. However, based on our discussion so far, this premise is undermined. There are additional reasons why this premise is unwarranted; some of these are discussed below.

不可靠的认知能力若产生了错误的信念，仍可能帮助我们生存和繁衍。我们可能持有某些谨慎的信念形成过程，它们虽然是错误的，却能提高适应度。学者詹姆斯·塞奇（James Sage）主张：

Unreliable cognitive faculties that produced false beliefs could have led to our survival and reproduction. We could have held cautious belief-forming processes that were false, yet fitness enhancing. The academic James Sage argues:

“例如，一个生物可能因为错误地相信附近有捕食者而躲藏起来。从进化的角度看，拥有谨慎的信念形成机制是有利的，这种机制会“过度探测”危险的捕食者，尤其是在错误信念代价很小的情况下。”74

“For example, an organism may hide because it believes falsely that a predator is nearby. Evolutionarily, it pays to have cautious belief-forming processes that “over detect” dangerous predators, especially when false beliefs carry little cost.”74

真正可靠的认知能力可能并未因自然选择而被青睐，因为它们的代价高昂。James Sage 认为，真正可靠的认知能力“代价高昂”75。这些能力的生物学代价包括以下方面：

Truth-reliable cognitive faculties could have not been favoured by natural selection as they came as a high cost. James Sage maintains that truth-reliable cognitive faculties “come at a high price”75. The biological cost of these faculties involves the following:

“（i）大脑需要氧气、热量和散热，（ii）进行详细的推断（即使只有极少的数据）需要相当多的时间和专注，（iii）调取过往经验中的信息需要庞大的存储容量和检索通路，（iv）识别相关信息需要多层级的分类子程序，（v）对欲望和目标进行排序需要大量的权衡与反思，以及（vi）运用“探测器”（及其他感知输入）需要精确性和敏锐度。这些因素中的每一项都带有显著的生物代价。”76

“(i) the brain requires oxygen, calories, and cooling, (ii) calculating detailed inferences (even with minimal data) requires considerable time and concentration, (iii) accessing information from past experience requires extensive storage capacity and retrieval pathways, (iv) identifying relevant information requires multi-level sorting subroutines, (v) ranking desires and goals requires extensive deliberation and reflection, and (vi) utilizing “detectors” (and other perceptual inputs) requires precision and acuity. Each of these factors carries a significant biological cost.”76

由于依赖真实可靠的认知能力会消耗对生存至关重要的关键生物资源，自然选择可能青睐那些能提高适应性、却会产生错误信念的不可靠认知能力，因为这些能力的消耗更少。

Since truth-reliable cognitive faculties put a strain on key biological resources that are essential for survival, natural selection could have favoured fitness enhancing unreliable cognitive faculties that produced false beliefs which were less taxing.

就像许多哲学话题一样,进化可靠论既有支持的论证,也有反对的论证。关于进化可靠论为何不能充分解释我们那些能够可靠地产生真信念的认知能力,并对流行的与学术上的反对意见作出回应,欲做深入讨论,请阅读我的文章《进化能否充分解释我们那些能产生真信念的认知能力?》。78

Like with many philosophical topics there are arguments for and against evolutionary reliabilism. For an in-depth discussion on the why evolutionary reliabilism does not adequately explain our truth-reliable cognitive faculties, with responses to popular and academic objections, please read my essay Can evolution adequately explain our truth-reliable cognitive faculties?78

伊斯兰一神论：最佳的解释。

Islamic theism: the best explanation.

我若没有一条面包,或没有能力获得或制作面包,便无法把它给你。这基于以下理性原则:一物若不包含某物,或没有能力产生某物,便不能产生该物。例如,非理性的力量不能产生理性,因为它们本就不包含理性。物理过程是非理性的,因为它们没有任何"洞察力",不能看出结论如何从先前的前提中得出。真主使我们拥有理性之心这一事实便得到了解释,因为理性可以来自全见、全知、至睿的造物主。如果宇宙起初只有非理性的、盲目的、随机的物质与过程,那么无论它们如何排列,都不可能产生理性。然而,如果起初就存在一位具有上述名号与属性的造物主,那么宇宙中便可以包含具有推理能力的有意识生命。从这个角度看,无神论者实际上需要真主来解释他们的理性能力。因此,全见、全知、至睿的造物主之存在,是解释一个拥有能够推理的有意识生命之宇宙的最佳理由。伊斯兰有神论为本章提出的主要问题提供了美妙而简洁的答案。真主创造了我们,赋予我们理性之心和探索的渴望,以帮助我们完成我们的使命。真主做到这一点的方式之一,是引导我们留意祂的创造,其中蕴含着祂的迹象(即线索、提示、指引)。通过思考和反省这些迹象,我们便能体会祂的伟大与创造之力;这种体会与承认,自然会引导我们崇拜祂(见第十五章)。 真主凭借祂的知识、能力和意志创造了宇宙和我们的心智，因此解释了我们具有推理能力，并能发现宇宙之间相互关联的原理。这让人想起古兰经中一节美妙的经文：真主说："我将在各地和他们自身中昭示我的迹象，直到他们明白这是真理。难道你的主对万物作证还不够吗？"79真主不断鼓励我们思考，运用我们的心智："他们难道不思索《古兰经》吗？难道他们的心上有锁吗？"80"你们难道不理解吗？"81这些经文表明，我们有能力对自然界进行推理和思考，以获得真理。真主在古兰经中还说："天地的创造，昼夜的更替，对于有理智的人，确是有许多迹象的。"82

I could not give you a loaf of bread if I did not have one in the first place or if I did not have the ability to obtain or make one. This is based on the following rational principle: A thing cannot give rise to something else if it does not contain it, or if it does not have the ability to give rise to it. For instance, non-rational forces cannot give rise to rationality, as they do not contain it in the first place. Physical processes are non-rational because they do not have any “insight”. They cannot see a conclusion following from previous premises. God makes sense of the fact that we have rational minds, because rationality can come from the Creator Who is All-Seeing, The-Knowing and The-Wise. If in the beginning of the universe there had been only non-rational, blind, random, physical matter and processes, then no matter how they were arranged they could not give rise to rationality. However, if in the beginning there was a creator with the names and attributes mentioned above, it follows that the universe can contain conscious beings with the ability to reason. From this perspective, atheists actually need God to account for their rational faculties. Therefore, the existence of a Creator Who is All-Seeing, The-Knowing and The-Wise is the best explanation for a universe with conscious organisms that have the ability to reason. Islamic theism provides a beautiful and simple answer to the main questions raised in this chapter. God created us and gave us rational minds with a desire to discover, in order to aid us in fulfilling our purpose. One way God does this is by directing us towards His creation, wherein lie His signs (i.e. clues, hints, indications). By pondering and reflecting over these signs, we can appreciate His majesty and creative power, for which appreciation and acknowledgement then naturally lead us to worship Him (see Chapter 15). God via His knowledge, power and will created the universe and our minds, hence explaining our ability to reason and discover the interconnecting principles of the cosmos. This brings to mind a beautiful verse of the Qur’an: God says, “We will show them Our signs in the horizons and within their own selves until it becomes clear to them that it is the truth. But is it not sufficient concerning your Lord that He is over all things a Witness?”79. God continuously encourages us to ponder, to use our minds: “Then do they not reflect upon the Qur’an, or are there locks upon [their] hearts?”80. “So will you not reason?”81. These verses signify that we have the ability to reason and ponder on the natural world to attain truth. God also says in the Qur’an: “Indeed, in the creation of the heavens and the Earth and in the alternation of the night and the day are signs for the people of understanding.”82

由此,我们可以得出一个全面的结论。真主赐予我们理性的头脑和探索的渴望,使我们能够运用理性去理解这宇宙的种种美妙,进而引导我们崇拜创造它的那一位(参见第15章)。真主为我们设置了从事科学等学科所需的工具,而讽刺的是,当我们中有些人拥有了这份天赋的恩赐时,却用它来挑战真主本身(参见第12章)。下文将探讨对这一论证的几个主要反驳。

From this, we can draw a comprehensive conclusion. God gave us rational minds and the desire to discover, so that we can use our rational faculties to understand the universe in all its beauty, which in turn leads us to worship the One Who created it (see Chapter 15). God placed within us the very tools required for us to engage in disciplines such as science, yet the irony is that when some of us find this God-given gift, they use it to challenge God Himself (see Chapter 12). There are some key objections to this argument that are addressed below.

上帝的空隙

God of the gaps.

"上帝的空隙"异议认为，科学知识中某一特定现象上的空白，不应导致人们相信上帝的存在，或将其归因于神圣的作为，因为科学终将进步到足以提供解释的程度。这一异议不能适用于本章所提出的论证，因为该论证并不涉及科学知识中的空白，而是涉及科学的基础。在任何科学活动开始之前，都需要具备理性的能力。若主张科学终将解释其自身的前提，无异于在循环论证。这一讨论已超出科学的范围，因为我们所讨论的正是科学本身的基础性前提。因此，在这种情况下，"上帝的空隙"异议是用错了地方。

The “god of the gaps” objection asserts that a gap in scientific knowledge about a particular phenomenon should not give rise to belief in God’s existence, or reference to Divine activity, because science will eventually progress far enough to provide an explanation. This objection cannot be applied to the argument presented in this chapter because it does not address a gap within scientific knowledge; it addresses the foundations of science. The ability to reason is required before any science can take place. To argue that science will eventually explain its own assumptions is tantamount to arguing in a circle. This discussion is beyond the realm of science, as we are discussing the foundational assumptions of science itself. Hence the “god of the gaps” objection is in this case misplaced.

这是一个前提预设式论证。

This is a presuppositional argument.

预设主义是一种论证形式，它断言：如果不以基督教世界观为前提，我们就无法解释理性。这一断言认为，如果一个人的推理能力无法得到说明，他就不能运用理性。然而，无神论者完全可以、也确实有理由将这一论证反过来用于基督徒。无神论者可以追问，基督徒凭什么相信自己已经解释了自身的推理能力。如果基督徒回答说，基督教世界观解释了他的推理能力，那么无神论者有权进一步追问其中的道理，论证便可能陷入循环。本章的论证并非预设主义的论证。它接受我们具有推理能力这一前提，并不主张在运用理性之前必须先说明推理能力的来源。这一论证回答的问题是：既然我们承认自己能够推理，那么什么样的世界观最能解释这种能力？它主张，最好的解释是上帝的存在，而自然主义，进而无神论，则使我们具有推理能力这一假设站不住脚。因此，无神论必须被否定。理性可以从复杂性中产生。

Presuppositionalism is a form of argument that asserts that we cannot account for reason without the Christian worldview. The assertion maintains that you cannot use reason if it is unaccounted for. However, the atheist can—and rightly does—throw the argument back at the Christian. The atheist can ask why the Christian believes he has accounted for his ability to reason. If the Christian replies that the Christian worldview accounts for his ability to reason, then the atheist is within his right to ask how, and the argument can go around in circles. The argument in this chapter is not a presuppositional one. It accepts the assumption that we have the ability to reason, and it does not argue that before you use your reason you need to account for your ability to reason. The argument answers the question: Given that we accept the fact that we can reason, what worldview best explains our ability to do so? It argues that the best way to explain our ability to reason is by God’s existence, and that naturalism—and by extension, atheism—invalidates the assumption that we have the ability to reason. Therefore, atheism must be rejected. Rationality can arise out of complexity.

涌现唯物主义者主张，一个由复杂物理过程构成的系统，在复杂的相互作用中，可以产生其组成部分本身并不具备的性质或现象。涌现唯物主义者会引用科学史来说明：某件事物曾被视为“神秘”，但当其背后的复杂过程被理解之后，它便被祛魅了。因此，涌现唯物主义者对理性论证的回应是：我们的推理能力，更确切地说，我们对某一结论获得洞见的能力，是建立在大脑复杂过程之上的。一旦这些过程被理解，我们的推理能力也就得到了解释。涌现唯物主义者常举的一个例子是水，即H2O。水由氢和氧构成，而这两种物质都是气体，但它们经化学结合后形成了维持生命的液体。水具有氢和氧所不具备的性质。这类例子让涌现唯物主义者有信心主张：一种性质可以从复杂过程的系统中产生，即便它并不存在于该系统的组成部分之中。 然而，这个例子并不恰当，因为本章所阐述的论证并不是一个物理事物产生另一个物理事物的情形（如气体氢和氧产生水的物理性质）。恰恰相反，需要解释的是一种非物理的性质（对某一结论产生心智上的洞见）如何从物理性质（盲目的物理过程）中产生。即使大脑活动背后的复杂过程被理解，其全部因果相互作用被完整描绘出来，这又如何解释我们的推理能力呢？它仍然无法回答这个问题：如果我们的心智据称是建立在先前盲目、随机的物理过程之上的，那么我们如何借助形成洞见的能力获得真理？ 要仅仅诉诸复杂性,并不能解释任何问题,这等于说"事情就是这样发生的"。在我看来,涌现唯物主义是为填补自然主义世界观所留下的空白而做的一次软弱的尝试(第7章说明了涌现唯物主义为何无法解释主观的意识体验)。H2O这个例子的另一个问题在于,理性洞见——基于前提之间的关系——似乎与物理过程(在此即神经活动)截然不同。H2O的例子预设了理性洞见与物理过程是同一的。雷蒙德·塔利斯教授(Professor Raymond Tallis)论证道:"闪亮的水与H2O分子都需要被揭示为二者之一。它们对应于两种不同的观察方式……水的两个方面是两种显现,是两种体验它的方式,而这几乎不适用于作为电化学活动的神经活动以及作为体验的神经活动。"83

Emergent materialists argue that a system of complex physical processes, undergoing complex interactions, can give rise to properties or phenomena that do not exist in the individual components that comprise the system. The emergent materialist will cite the history of science: when something was deemed ‘mysterious’, it was later demystified when the underlying complex processes were understood. Therefore, the emergent materialist responds to the argument from reason, by postulating that our ability to reason—more specifically, the ability to achieve an insight into a conclusion—is based on complex processes in the brain. Once these processes are understood, our ability to reason will have been explained. A common example that emergent materialists cite is water, H20. Water is made up of hydrogen and oxygen, which are gases, yet when combined chemically they form the life-sustaining liquid. Water has properties that hydrogen and oxygen do not. Examples like these provide the emergent materialist with the confidence to argue that a property can arise from a system of complex processes, even though it is not present in the components of that system. Nevertheless, this example is misplaced because the argument articulated in this chapter is not a case of a physical thing bringing into existence another physical thing (like gases hydrogen and oxygen giving rise to water’s physical properties). On the contrary, what requires explaining is a nonphysical property (having a mental insight into a conclusion) arising from physical ones (blind physical processes). If the complex processes that underpin brain-activity were understood, and all of their causal interactions were mapped out, how would that explain our ability to reason? It would still not answer the question: How can we acquire truth using our ability to form insights with minds allegedly based on prior blind, random physical processes? To simply refer to complexity does not explain anything, and it is tantamount to saying, “it just happens”. It seems to me that emergent materialism is a weak attempt to fill the gap created by a naturalistic worldview (Chapter 7 explains how emergent materialism cannot explain subjective conscious experiences). Another problem with the H20 example is that rational insights— based on relations between premises—seem to be very different to physical processes, in this case neural activity. The H20 example assumes that rational insights and physical processes are the same. Professor Raymond Tallis argues that “both shiny water and H20 molecules need to be revealed as one or the other. They correspond to two different modes of observation… The two aspects of water are two appearances, two modes of experiencing it, and this hardly applies to neural activity as electrochemical activity and as experience.”83

更广泛的推论是，采纳突现唯物主义就等于允许那些无法解释某个系统的物理关系或过程的理论存在。如果有人主张复杂性能够解释新的属性，却不解释这些属性是如何突现的，那么我们为什么还要期待一个理论能解释任何东西呢？仅仅等待我们的科学认识有所提高，并不能构成论证。这就好比对一个初学的建筑工人说，只要有很多砖，就能盖成一座房子。这并不正确；建造房屋还需要其他东西，比如水泥、设计图、泥瓦匠、水管工、电工、工具等等。总之，突现唯物主义并不是一个连贯的理论，而是为填补自然主义留下的空白所作的一次前后矛盾的尝试。

The wider implication of adopting emergent materialism is that we allow theories that cannot explain the physical relations or processes of a system. If one argues that complexity can explain new properties—without explaining how they emerge—then why should we expect a theory to explain anything? Merely waiting for our scientific understanding to improve is not an argument. This is equivalent to explaining to a trainee builder that you can build a house by having many bricks. This is not true; other things are also required to build a house, such as cement, a design, bricklayers, plumbers, electricians, tools, etc. In conclusion, emergent materialism is not a coherent theory; it is an incoherent attempt to fill the gap left by naturalism.

计算机是理性的；因此，物理过程可以解释理性。

Computers are rational; therefore, physical processes can explain rationality.

一种常见的反驳认为，理性不可能源于物理过程，其依据是据称计算机程序能够进行演绎推理。理性的一个关键特征是：在一个有效的演绎论证中，结论必然随前提而来。既然计算机程序基于物理过程，又表现出理性的这一关键特征，物理过程便可以解释我们的推理能力，这种论点如是说。这同样是一种误置的论断。正如本章所强调的，人类的推理建立在对前提之间逻辑关系的心智洞见之上。计算机程序无法“看见”任何东西。人类不仅拥有洞见，我们的洞见还是有意义的。我们能够理解并质疑自己所得结论的意义。计算机程序并不被认为具有有意义的洞见。计算机程序依据的是句法规则（即对符号的操作），而非语义（意义）。要理解语义与句法的区别，可以考虑以下句子：

A common objection to the argument that rationality cannot arise from physical processes is the alleged ability of computer programmes to engage in deductive reasoning. A key feature of rationality is that, in a valid deductive argument, the conclusion necessarily follows. Since computer programmes are based on physical processes and exhibit a key feature of rationality, physical processes can account for our ability to reason, the argument goes. This is another misplaced contention. As highlighted in this chapter, human reasoning is based on having mental insights based on the logical relations between premises. Computer programmes cannot “see” anything. Humans not only have insights; our insights are also meaningful. We have the ability to understand and question the meaning of the conclusions we come to. Computer programmes are not characterised as having meaningful insights. Computer programmes are based on syntactical rules (the manipulation of symbols), not semantics (meaning). To understand the difference between semantics and syntax, consider the following sentences:

• 我爱我的家人。

• I love my family.

• 我爱我的家人。

• αγαπώ την οικογένειά μου.

我爱我的家人。

• আমি আিার পমরবারকে ভালবামি.

这三个句子的意思相同：我爱我的家人。这指的是语义，即句子的意思。但是句法不同。换句话说，所使用的符号并不相同。第一个句子使用的是英文"符号"，第二个使用希腊文，最后一个使用孟加拉文。由此可以得出以下论证：

These three sentences mean the same thing: I love my family. This refers to semantics, the meaning of the sentences. But the syntax is different. In other words, the symbols used are unalike. The first sentence is using English ‘symbols’, the second Greek, and the last Bangla. From this, the following argument can be developed:

1. 计算机程序是句法性的（基于句法）。

1. Computer programmes are syntactical (based on syntax).

2. 心智具有语义。

2. Minds have semantics.

3. 句法本身既不足以构成语义，也不是语义的构成要素。

3. Syntax by itself is neither sufficient for, nor constitutive for semantics.

4. 因此，计算机程序本身并不是心灵。84.

4. Therefore, computer programmes by themselves are not minds.84.

设想一场雪崩恰好把山上的岩石排列成了“I love my family”这几个词。若说这座山明白这些岩石的排列所表达的意思，那是荒谬的。这表明，单纯地操控符号（句法）并不能产生意义（语义）。85

Imagine that an avalanche somehow arranges mountain rocks into the words I love my family. It would be absurd to say that the mountain knows what the arrangement of rocks (symbols) means. This indicates that the mere manipulation of symbols (syntax) does not give rise to meaning (semantics).85

计算机程序是基于对符号的操作，而非对意义的操作。同样，仅仅通过操纵字母（符号），我也无法理解孟加拉语句子的含义。无论我把孟加拉语字母摆弄多少次，都无法理解这些词的意思。因此，要理解语义，我们需要的不仅仅是正确的句法。计算机程序处理的是句法，而非语义。计算机并不知道任何事物的含义。哲学家约翰·塞尔（John Searle）的“中文屋”思想实验有力地表明，仅仅操纵符号并不能带来对其所指意义的理解。

Computer programmes are based on the manipulation of symbols, not meanings. Likewise, I cannot know the meaning of the sentence in Bangla just by manipulating the letters (symbols). No matter how many times I manipulate the Bangla letters, I will not be able to understand the meaning of the words. This is why for semantics, we need more than the correct syntax. Computer programmes work on syntax and not on semantics. Computers do not know the meaning of anything. Professor John Searle’s Chinese Room thought-experiment is a powerful way of showing that the mere manipulation of symbols does not lead to an understanding of what they mean:

“想象一下，你被关在一个房间里，房间里有几个装满中文符号的篮子。想象一下，你和我一样，一个汉字也不懂，但你手里有一本英文规则手册，用来操作这些中文符号。这些规则只从形式上规定符号的操作，即只考虑它们的句法，而不考虑它们的语义。因此，规则可能会说：‘从第一号篮子里取出一个弯弯曲曲的符号，把它放在第二号篮子里一个弯弯曲曲的符号旁边。’现在假设又有一些其他的中文符号被送进房间，你还得到了进一步的规则，告诉你如何把中文符号送出房间。假设你并不知道，房间外的人把送进来的符号称为‘问题’，而你送出去的符号则被称为‘问题的答案’。再假设，程序员设计程序的水平非常高，而你操作符号的技术也非常娴熟，以至于很快你的回答就与一位母语为中文的人的回答无法区分。于是你被锁在房间里，摆弄着你的中文符号，对送进来的中文符号给出中文符号作为回应……故事的要点很简单：从外部观察者的角度看，通过执行一个形式化的计算机程序，你的表现与真正懂中文的人完全一样，但你依然一个字也不懂中文。”86

“Imagine that you are locked in a room, and in this room are several baskets full of Chinese symbols. Imagine that you (like me) do not understand a word of Chinese, but that you are given a rule book in English for manipulating the Chinese symbols. The rules specify the manipulation of symbols purely formally, in terms of their syntax, not their semantics. So the rule might say: ‘Take a squiggle-squiggle out of basket number one and put it next to a squiggle-squiggle sign from basket number two.’ Now suppose that some other Chinese symbols are passed into the room, and that you are given further rules for passing back Chinese symbols out of the room. Suppose that unknown to you the symbols passed into the room are called ‘questions’ by the people outside the room, and the symbols you pass back out of the room are called ‘answers to questions.’ Suppose furthermore, that the programmers are so good at designing the programs and that you are so good at manipulating the symbols, that very soon your answers are indistinguishable from those of a native Chinese speaker. There you are locked in your room shuffling your Chinese symbols and passing out Chinese symbols in response to incoming Chinese symbols… Now the point of the story is simply this: by virtue of implementing a formal computer program from the point of view of an outside observer, you behave exactly as if you understood Chinese, but all the same you do not understand a word of Chinese.”86

在"中文屋"思想实验中，屋内的人在模拟一台计算机。另一个人以某种方式操作符号，使屋内的人看起来懂得中文。然而，屋内的人并不懂这门语言，他们只是模仿了那种状态。塞尔教授由此得出结论：

In the Chinese Room thought-experiment, the person inside the room is simulating a computer. Another person manages the symbols in a way that makes the person inside the room seem to understand Chinese. However, the person inside the room does not understand the language; they merely imitate that state. Professor Searle concludes:

“仅仅拥有符号本身——仅仅拥有句法——并不足以拥有语义。单纯操纵符号，并不足以保证知道它们的意义。”87

“Having the symbols by themselves—just having the syntax— is not sufficient for having the semantics. Merely manipulating symbols is not enough to guarantee knowledge of what they mean.”87

反对者可能会回应说，尽管计算机程序并不懂其意义，但整个系统是懂的。塞尔教授将这种反驳称为“系统回应”88。然而，为什么程序本身不懂意义呢？答案很简单：它没有办法为符号赋予意义。既然计算机程序无法为符号赋予意义，那么依赖于程序运行的计算机系统又如何能够理解意义呢？仅仅拥有正确的程序，并不能产生理解。塞尔提出了中文屋思想实验的扩展版本，以说明整个系统并不理解意义：“设想我把篮子里的内容和规则手册都记在脑中，并在心里完成所有计算。你甚至可以想象我是在公开场合工作。‘系统’中没有任何东西不在我身上，而既然我不懂中文，那么这个系统也不懂。”89

The objector might respond to this by arguing that although the computer programme does not know the meaning, the whole system does. Professor Searle has called this objection “the systems reply”88. However, why is it that the programme does not know the meaning? The answer is simple: it has no way of assigning meaning to the symbols. Since a computer programme cannot assign meaning to symbols, how can a computer system—which relies on the programme—understand the meaning? You cannot produce understanding just by having the right programme. Searle presents an extended version of the Chinese Room thought-experiment to show that the system, as a whole does not understand the meaning: “Imagine that I memorize the contents of the baskets and the rule book, and I do all the calculations in my head. You can even imagine that I work out in the open. There is nothing in the ‘system’ that is not in me, and since I don’t understand Chinese, neither does the system.”89

一个对此反驳的简单回应还包括这样一个事实：计算机并不是能够进行演绎推理的独立系统。它们是由具有意识和理性的人类设计、开发和制造的。因此，计算机只不过是我们进行理性洞察能力的延伸。威廉·哈斯克（William Hasker）解释道：

A simple response to this objection also includes the fact that computers are not independent systems with the ability to engage in deductive reasoning. They were designed, developed and made by human beings that are conscious and rational. Therefore, computers are just a protraction of our ability to perform rational insights. William Hasker explains:

“计算机之所以能如此运作，是因为它们被赋予了理性洞察力。换言之，计算机不过是其设计者与使用者理性的延伸；它本身并非独立的理性洞察力来源，正如电视机并非独立的新闻与娱乐来源一样。”90.

“Computers function as they do because they have been endowed with rational insight. A computer, in other words, is merely an extension of the rationality of its designers and users; it is no more an independent source of rational insight than a television set is an independent source of news entertainment.”90.

无神论并不垄断理性，也不可能垄断理性。令人遗憾的是，人们越来越普遍地认为无神论者是理性的，无神论是建立在理性之上的。事实远非如此。盲目、随机的物理过程无法解释我们的推理能力。这正是无神论的根本矛盾所在：它声称用来拒斥神圣者的东西，恰恰被它自己否定了。 然而，根据伊斯兰有神论，我们生活在一个理性的宇宙之中，它由全见者、至睿者和全知者——创造主——所创造，祂赋予了我们推理的能力。这一理论自洽，并完整地解释了我们的理性能力；其他任何理论都无法做到这一点（实际上，也不可能做到）。坚持认为盲目、随机的物理过程能够解释我们观看、思考和学习的能力，是不理性的。坚持这种想法的人，实际上是理性的敌人。他们与一位蒙上眼罩却坚称能把乘客准确送达目的地的出租车司机并无二致。

Atheism does not—and cannot—have a monopoly on reason. It is a shame that there is a growing perception that atheists are rational, and that atheism is based on reason. Nothing could be further from the truth. Blind, random physical processes cannot account for our ability to reason. This is why atheism invalidates the very thing it claims to use to reject the Divine. However, according to Islamic theism, we live in a rational universe created by the All-Seeing, The-Wise and The-Knowing Creator, who gave us the ability to reason. This is coherent and accounts fully for our rational faculties; nothing else will (indeed, nothing else can). Maintaining that blind, random physical processes can make sense of our ability to see, think and learn is irrational. Those who persist in this thinking are in fact adversaries of reason. They are no different from a taxi-driver putting on a blindfold and insisting that he can drive his passengers to their destination.