想象你是一位探险家,乘坐宇宙飞船前往另一个星球,拜访与人类相似的生物。飞船降落后,你遇到了你的向导。他告诉你,你的飞船降落在Sphinga上,那是这个星球上一个没有边界的国家。你感到困惑,便问向导这个星球上是否还有其他国家。他笑着回答:“有,两个。”你反驳道:“那么,如果没有任何东西能够区分它们,你怎么知道自己是否已经进入另一个国家?”向导叹了口气说:“是啊,我们也有同样的问题。没有边界,而且一个国家的特征和另一个国家完全相同。”你最后结束了这段讨论,说:“那你们干脆把它们合并成一个国家好了,因为在我看来它本来就是一个国家。” 你们两人继续前行,去与一群官员共进午餐。用餐期间,一位官员赞美了这个国家的国王们。听到这话,你礼貌地问道:“你是说,国王不止一位?”官员回答:“是的,我们有两位国王。”你显得十分困惑,问这个国家如何在两位国王的情况下运转。“你们的法律如何保持和谐,社会如何保持秩序?”官员回答:“嗯,他们总是意见一致,他们的意志是统一的。”你忍不住回应道:“那么,你们其实并没有两位国王,因为他们都依照同一个意志行事。” 这个故事包含了我将提出的、证明唯一真主存在的五个论证中的三个。故事的第一部分概括了一个我称之为“概念区分”的论证。它假定,要使多样性存在,必须有一些概念能够将一物与另一物区分开来。例如,如果我说桌上有两根香蕉,你可以通过观察来验证这一说法。你之所以能看到两根香蕉,是因为有一些概念能将它们区分开来,比如它们的大小、形状以及在桌上的位置。 然而,如果两者之间没有任何可以区分它们的东西,你就无法把它们区分开来。同样,既然本书迄今为止已论证,存在一位必然存在、非被造、有大能、全知、全察且超越万物的创造者,那么若要主张存在两位,就必须有某种概念能够区分他们。但要使造物主成为造物主,祂必须具备这些属性。因此,在两者之间没有任何差别的情况下说有两位,实质上等于说只有一位造物主。若一位造物主所具有的一切属性,另一位也同样具有,那么我们所界定的就只是一位造物主,而非两位。

Imagine you are an explorer who took a spaceship to another planet to visit human-like creatures. Once you land on the planet, you meet your guide. He tells you that your spaceship landed on Sphinga, the planet’s borderless country. You are confused and ask your guide if there are any other countries on the planet. He laughs and replies, “Yes, there are two.” You retort, “Well, how do you know when you’re in another country if there is nothing to differentiate them?” Your guide sighs and says, “Yeah, we have the same problem. There are no borders and the features of one country are the same as the other.” You finally end the discussion by saying, “You should have just made them into one country then, because that is what it looks like to me.” You both continue your journey to meet a group of officials for lunch. During the meal, one of the officials praises the kings of the country. Upon hearing this, you politely ask, “You mean, there is more than one king?” The official replies, “Yes, we have two kings.” You seem perplexed and ask how the country can function with two kings. “How do you have harmony in your laws, and order in your society?” The official replies, “Well, they always agree. Their wills are one.” You cannot hold yourself back and you respond, “Well, you do not really have two kings, then. Because they are acting in accordance with one will.” This story contains three of the five arguments I will present for the fact that there can only be one God. The first part of the story summarises an argument that I call ‘conceptual differentiation’. It postulates that in order for multiplicity to exist, there must be some concepts that differentiate one thing from another. For example, if I said that there are two bananas on the table, you would be able to verify that statement by observing them. The reason you can see two bananas is because there are concepts that differentiate them; for example, their size, shape and location on the table. However, if there was nothing to differentiate them, you could not distinguish between them. Similarly, since this book so far has argued that there is a necessary, uncreated creator who is powerful, knowing, All-Aware and transcendent, then to claim that there are two would require a concept that differentiates them. But in order for the Creator to be a creator, He must have these attributes. So saying there are two without one being different from another is basically saying that there is only one creator. If whatever is true of one creator is true of another, then we have just defined one creator and not two.

第二部分的故事概括了排他论证和定义论证。排他论证认为，神圣的意志只能有一个。假设有两位创造者，其中一位想创造一棵树，那么只可能有三种情况。第一种是两者互相抵消，这在理性上不可能，因为创造确实存在，如果二者互相抵消，就不会有任何创造了。第二种是一位创造者压倒另一位，确保自己的树被创造出来。第三种是两者同意以相同的方式创造同一棵树。第二和第三种情况都意味着只有一个意志，而在我们讨论的语境中，一个意志就表明只有一位创造者。定义论证断言，创造者不可能多于一位。如果创造者多于一位，宇宙就不会呈现出它所具有的和谐。除了为创造者提供论证之外，本书还确立了关于神的传统观念。由于传统观念认为，神拥有一种无法被任何外在事物所限制的、至高无上的意志，因此从逻辑上讲，不可能存在两个无限的神圣意志。

The second part of the story summarises both the argument from exclusion and the argument from definition. The argument from exclusion maintains that there can only be one Divine will. If there were two creators and one wanted to create a tree, only three options would be possible. The first is that they both cancel each other out; this is not a rational possibility since creation exists, and if they cancelled each other out, there would be no creation at all. The second is that one creator overpowers the other by ensuring his tree is created. The third option is that they both agree to create the same tree in the same way. The second and third options imply that there is only one will, and one will in the context of our discussions indicates one creator. The argument from definition asserts that there cannot be more than one creator. If there was more than one creator, the cosmos would not display the harmony that it does. As well as presenting arguments for a creator, this book warrants the traditional conception of God. Since the traditional conception refers to God as having an imposing will that cannot be limited by anything external to Him, then it logically follows there cannot be two unlimited Divine wills.

本章将详细阐述这些论据，并再提出两项论证，以表明这位创造者必定是唯一的。

This chapter will elaborate on these arguments and present another two to show that this creator must be one:

排除论证。

• The argument from exclusion.

• 概念区分。

• Conceptual differentiation.

奥卡姆剃刀原则。

• Occam’s razor.

定义论证。

• The argument from definition.

• 来自启示的论证。

• The argument from revelation.

排除论证

Argument from exclusion.

这一论证认为，多个造物主的存在是不可能的，因为只能有一个意志。我此前已经讨论过，造物主必须拥有意志（见第五章），因此追问可以存在多少个意志，自然引出对这一论证的详细探讨。为了论证的需要，我们假设存在两个造物主。造物主甲想要移动一块石头，造物主乙也想要移动同一块石头。这时可能出现三种情形：

This argument maintains that the existence of multiple creators is impossible because there can only be one will. I have already discussed that the Creator must have a will (see Chapter 5), so questioning how many wills can exist leads us nicely to discuss this argument in detail. For the sake of argument, let’s say there were two creators. Creator A wanted to move a rock, and creator B also wanted to move the same rock. There are three possible scenarios that can arise:

1. 其中一位创造者通过将石头朝与另一位不同的方向移动而压制了另一位。

1. One of the creators overpowers the other by moving the rock in a different direction from the other.

2. 二者相互抵消，岩石纹丝不动。

2. They both cancel each other out, and the rock does not move.

3. 他们两人都朝同一个方向移动石头。

3. They both move the rock in the same direction.

第一种情况暗示只有一个意志显现出来。第二种情况意味着不存在任何起作用的意志。这是不可能的，因为必定有一个被施行的意志，既然创造物已经存在。第三种情况最终只描述了一个意志。

The first scenario implies only one will manifests itself. The second scenario means that there is no will in action. This is not possible because there must be a will acted upon, as we have creation in existence. The third scenario ultimately describes only one will.

因此，更合乎理性的结论是：造物主只有一位，因为意志只有一个。

Therefore, it is more rational to conclude that there is only one creator because there is only one will.

如果有人主张存在多个实体却仍然只有一个意志,我会反问:你怎么知道有多个实体?这听起来像是诉诸无知的论证,因为这种说法完全没有任何证据。这就引出了下一个论证。

If someone argues that you can have more than one entity and still have one will, I would respond by asking: How do you know there is more than one entity? It sounds like an argument from ignorance, because there is no evidence whatsoever for such a claim. This leads us to the next argument.

概念区分

Conceptual differentiation.

要使两个创造者同时存在,它们必定在某些方面有所不同。例如,如果你有两棵树,它们在大小、形状、颜色和年龄上都会有差异。即便它们的外在属性完全相同,也必然至少有某种东西能让我们分辨出它们确实是两棵树。这种区别可以包括它们的位置或方位。同样的道理也适用于双胞胎:我们之所以知道他们是两个人,是因为有某种东西使他们彼此不同。这甚至可以仅仅是因为他们不能同时占据同一个位置。

For two creators to exist, they must be different in some way. For example, if you have two trees, they will differ in size, shape, colour and age. Even if they had identical physical attributes, there would be at least one thing that allows us to distinguish that they are in fact two trees. This can include their placement or position. You can also apply this to twins; we know there are two people because something makes them different. This could even be the mere fact that they cannot occupy the same place at the same time.

如果存在不止一位创造者，那么他们之间必定有某种东西能够将彼此区分开来。然而，如果他们在各个方面都完全相同，那么我们又怎能说有两位呢？如果某物与另一物完全相同，那么对其中一者为真的，对另一者也必然为真。假设我们有两样东西，A和B。如果它们在各方面都相同，而又没有任何东西能使我们将它们区分开来，那么它们就是同一个东西。我们可以把这一点化为一个假设命题：如果对A为真的一切，对B也为真，那么A与B是同一的。

If there were more than one creator, then there must be something to differentiate between them. However, if they are the same in every possible aspect, then how can we say there are two? If something is identical to another, then what is true of one is also true for the other. Say we had two things, A and B. If they are the same in every way, and nothing allows us to differentiate between them, then they are the same thing. We can turn this into a hypothetical proposition: If whatever is true of A is true of B, then A is identical to B.

现在让我们把这一点应用到造物主身上。设想存在两位造物主，分别称为造物主X和造物主Y，并且凡是造物主X所具有的属性，造物主Y也同样具有。例如，造物主X是全能的、全智的；那么造物主Y也是全能的、全智的。那么，实际上有几位造物主呢？只有一位，因为两者之间找不到任何可以区分的地方。如果有人争辩说它们是不同的，那么他所描述的就不是另一位造物主，而是被造物，因为它不具备与造物主相称的同样属性。

Now let us apply this to the Creator. Imagine that two creators exist, called creator X and creator Y, and that whatever is true of creator X is also true of creator Y. For instance, creator X is All-Powerful and All-Wise; so, creator Y is All-Powerful and All-Wise. How many creators are there in reality? Only one, due to the fact that there is nothing to differentiate between them. If someone were to argue that they are different, then they would not be describing another creator but something that is created, as it would not have the same attributes befitting the Creator.

如果有人坚持认为可以有两个造物主，而且他们彼此不同，那么我只会问一句：“他们有什么不同？”如果他们试图回答这个问题，他们就陷入了无知的论证，因为他们将不得不编造证据来为其错误的结论辩护。

If someone is adamant in claiming that there can be two creators and they are different from each other, then I simply ask, “How are they different?” If they attempt to answer the question, they enter the realm of arguing from ignorance, because they will have to make up evidence to justify their false conclusion.

奥卡姆剃刀

Occam’s razor.

鉴于上述内容，我们或许会遇到一些不讲道理、固执己见的人，他们仍然主张存在多个创造者或多个原因。依据奥卡姆剃刀原则，这种论点并不成立。奥卡姆剃刀是一条哲学原则，由十四世纪的逻辑学家、方济各会修士奥卡姆的威廉（William of Occam）提出。该原则规定：“Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate”，英文意思是：“没有必要，不应设定多元。”换言之，最简单、最全面的解释才是最好的解释。

In light of the above, we might find a few irrational and stubborn people who still posit a plurality of creators or causes. In light of Occam’s razor, this is not a sound argument. Occam’s razor is a philosophical principle attributed to the 14th century logician and Franciscan friar, William of Occam. This principle enjoins: ‘Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate’; in English: ‘Plurality should not be posited without necessity.’ In other words, the simplest and most comprehensive explanation is the best one.

在这种情况下，我们没有证据表明宇宙的创造者实际上是两个、三个，甚至一千个创造者的组合，因此最简单的解释是创造者只有一位。假设存在多个创造者，也无助于增强论证的全面性。换言之，增加创造者并不会提升论证的解释力或涵盖范围。断言一位全能的创造者创造了宇宙，与断言两位全能的创造者创造了宇宙，在解释的全面性上是一样的。只需要一位创造者，原因恰恰在于他是全能的。我认为，假设多位创造者实际上降低了解释力和涵盖范围，因为它所带来的问题远多于它所解决的问题。例如，以下几个问题揭示了这种多神论的不合理之处：众多永恒的存在者如何共存？他们之间可能存在的意志冲突怎么办？他们又如何相互作用？

In this case, we have no evidence that the Creator of the universe is actually a combination of two, three or even one thousand creators, so the simplest explanation is that the Creator is one. Postulating a plurality of creators does not add to the comprehensiveness of the argument either. In other words, to add more creators would not enhance the argument’s explanatory power or scope. To claim that an All-Powerful creator created the universe is just as comprehensive as claiming that two All-Powerful creators created it. One creator is all that is required, simply because it is All-Powerful. I would argue that postulating multiple creators actually has reduced explanatory power and scope; this is because it raises far more problems than it solves. For example, the following questions expose the irrationality of this form of polytheism: How do many eternal beings co-exist? What about the potential of any conflicting wills? How do they interact?

一种常见的反驳是：如果把这一原则应用于埃及的金字塔，我们就会荒谬地认为它们是由一个人建造的，因为这似乎是最简单的解释。这种反驳误用了该原则，因为它忽略了全面性这一点。认为金字塔是由一个人建造的，并不是最简单、最全面的解释，因为它提出的问题远多于它所解答的问题。例如，一个人怎么可能建造金字塔呢？认为是由许多人建造的，要全面得多。有鉴于此，有人可能会说，宇宙如此复杂，若假定只有一位创造者创造了它，那就是荒谬的。这一论点虽然有其道理，但却用错了地方。一位强大的存在者创造整个宇宙，比多位创造者的解释要连贯、简单得多，因为多位创造者会引出前一段所述的那些无法回答的问题。尽管如此，批评者仍可能继续辩称，金字塔并非由一个人建造，而是由一位全能的创造者创造。这种说法的问题在于：宇宙中的任何事物都不是全能的存在者；而金字塔是建筑物，建筑物是由动作的动力因（即一个人或若干人）建造的，因此金字塔也必定是由同类的原因创造的。这就使我们回到了最初的观点：建造金字塔需要不止一个这样的原因。

A popular objection to this argument is that if we were to apply this principle to the pyramids in Egypt, we would absurdly adopt the view that they were made by one person, because it seems to be the simplest explanation. This is a misapplication of the principle, because it ignores the point about comprehensiveness. Taking the view that the pyramids were built by one person is not the simplest and most comprehensive explanation, as it raises far more questions than it answers. For instance, how could one man have built the pyramids? It is far more comprehensive to postulate that it was built by many men. In light of this, someone can say that the universe is so complex that it would be absurd to postulate that only one creator created it. This contention, although valid, is misplaced. A powerful Being creating the whole universe is a far more coherent and simple explanation than a plurality of creators, because a plurality of creators raises the unanswerable questions stated in the previous paragraph. Nevertheless, the critic may continue to argue that it wasn’t one person that created the Pyramids, but an All-Powerful creator. The problem with this is that nothing within the universe is an All-Powerful Being, and since the Pyramids are buildings, and buildings are built by an efficient cause (a person or persons that act), then the Pyramids must have been created by the same type of cause. This leads us back to the original point, that more than one of these causes was required to build the Pyramids.

定义论证。

The argument from definition.

理性表明，如果造物主不止一位，宇宙就会陷入混乱。那样的话，我们在宇宙中所见的秩序也就不可能存在。《古兰经》中有一段类似的论证："若天地间有除真主以外的众神，天地必定败坏。"294

Reason necessitates that if there were more than one creator, the universe would be in chaos. There would also not be the level of order we find in the cosmos. The Qur’an has a similar argument: “Had there been within the heavens and Earth gods besides God, they both would have been ruined.”294

《jalalayn》注释经典有云：“若天地间有多位主宰，天地必会失去其正常的秩序，因为内部必然会发生纷争，这正如多人为王时的常态：他们在事务上相互对立，彼此不相协调。”295

The classical commentary known as Tafsir al-Jalalayn states: “Heaven and the Earth would have lost their normal orderliness since there would have inevitably been internal discord, as is normal when there are several rulers: they oppose one another in things and do not agree with one another.”295

然而，有人可能会指出：你的汽车是由多人制造的——一人安装车轮，另一人装配发动机，还有一人安装电脑系统——因此，或许宇宙也是以同样的方式被创造的。这个例子表明，一个复杂的物体可以由不止一个创造者来创造。

However, one might point out that since more than one person made your car—one person fitted the wheels, someone else installed the engine and another person installed the computer system—maybe the universe was created in the same way. This example indicates that a complex object can be created by more than one creator.

为了回应这一论点，首先需要理解：正如前面各章所讨论的，对宇宙起源最合理的解释是“真主”的概念，而不仅仅是一位“创造者”。汽车的例子表明，抽象地说可能存在多个创造者，但真主不可能有多于一位。这是因为，按照定义，真主是拥有至高意志、且其意志不受任何外在事物限制的存在。如果存在两位或更多的神，他们的意志就会相互竞争，其结果将是混乱与失序。而我们所观察到的宇宙是由数学规律和秩序所支配的，因此它理应是某一个至高意志的结果。耐人寻味的是，上述异议实际上恰恰支持了真主的独一性。要使汽车得以运转，参与制造它的各个人员必须服从设计者的总体“意志”，设计限制了制造者的意志。既然按照定义，真主的意志不能受到自身之外任何事物的限制，那么就可以推出，真主的意志不可能有多于一个。

In order to respond to this contention, what has to be understood is that the most rational explanation for the origins of the universe, as discussed in the previous chapters, is the concept of God and not just a ‘creator’. There may be an abstract conceptual possibility of multiple creators, as highlighted by the car example, but there cannot be more than one God. This is because God, by definition, is the Being that has an imposing will that cannot be limited by anything external to Him. If there were two or more Gods, they would have a competition of wills, which would result in chaos and disorder. The universe we observe is governed by mathematical laws and order; therefore, it makes sense that it is the result of one imposing will. Interestingly, the objection above actually supports Divine oneness. In order for the car to work, the different people who were responsible for making it had to conform to the overall ‘will’ of the designer. The design limited the wills of those responsible for making the car. Since God, by definition, cannot have His will limited by anything outside of Himself, it follows that there cannot be more than one Divine will.

然而，有人可能会辩称，多位神明可以意志一致，或者各自拥有自己的领域。这意味着他们的意志是有限的、被动的，而根据定义，这样一来他们就不再是神了。

However, one may argue that multiple Gods can agree to have the same will or they can each have their own domain. This would mean that their wills are limited and passive, which would require that they are not Gods any more, by definition.

这位十二世纪的穆斯林思想家与哲学家伊本·路श德（Ibn Rushd），在西方传统中被称为阿威罗伊（Averroes），他对这一论证作了如下概括：

The 12th century Muslim thinker and philosopher Ibn Rushd, also known as Averroes in the western tradition, summarises this argument:

“经文的含义，依据天性，已植根于人的本能之中。显而易见，若有两位君王，各自的行为与对方完全相同，他们便无法共同治理同一座城市，因为同类的两个施动者不可能产生同一个行为。由此必然可得：若二者共同行动，城市必将毁坏，除非其中一方行动而另一方保持不作为；而这与神性的属性相违。当两个同类的行为汇聚于同一个载体时，该载体必然遭到败坏。”296。

“The meaning of the… verse is implanted in the instincts [of man] by nature. It is self-evident that if there are two kings, the actions of each one being the same as those of the other, it would not be possible [for them] to manage the same city, for there cannot result from two agents of the same kind one and the same action. It follows necessarily that if they acted together, the city would be ruined, unless one of them acted while the other remained inactive; and this is incompatible with the attribute of Divinity. When two actions of the same kind converge on one substratum, that substratum is corrupted necessarily.”296.

来自启示的论证。

The argument from revelation.

一种更简单的论证真主独一性的方式是诉诸启示。这一论证假定：如果真主已向人类启示了自己，并且这一启示能够被证明出自祂，那么祂关于自身所说的话就是真实的。然而，怀疑者可能会质疑这一论证背后的某些前提，包括：真主已向人类启示了自己，以及启示的形式是一部经书。我们先来讨论最后一个前提。如果真主已向人类启示了自己，那么人们只能通过两种可能的途径来了解祂：内在途径和外在途径。我所说的“内在”，是指你可以仅通过内省和内化来了解真主是谁；而我所说的“外在”，是指你可以通过来自自身之外的传达来了解真主是谁；换句话说，它在现实世界中得到了具体体现。通过内在途径了解真主是不可信的，原因如下：

A simpler way of providing evidence for God’s oneness is to refer to revelation. This argument postulates that if God has announced himself to humanity, and this revelation can be proven to be from Him, then what He says about Himself is true. However, a sceptic may question some of the assumptions behind this argument. These include that God has announced Himself to humankind and that the revelation is in the form of a book. Let’s first tackle the last assumption. If God has announced Himself to humankind, there are only two possible ways to find out: internally and externally. What I mean by ‘internally’ is that you can find out who God is solely by introspection and internalisation, and what I mean by ‘externally’ is that you can find out who God is via communication from outside of yourself; in other words, it is instantiated in the real world. Finding out about God internally is implausible for the following reasons:

1. 人与人之间存在差异，心理学家称之为"个体差异"。这些差异包括DNA、生活经历、社会环境、智力与情感能力、性别差异等诸多方面。这些差异会影响一个人通过内省或直觉进行内化的能力。

1. Human beings are different; they have what psychologists call ‘individual differences’. These include DNA, experiences, social contexts, intellectual and emotional capacities, gender differences and many more. These differences play a role in our ability to internalise via introspection or intuition.

因此，思考的结果会有所不同。如果这些过程仅仅被用来认识神，那么我们对他的理解必然会产生分歧。从历史的角度看，情况确实如此。从公元前6000年的古代世界直到今天，有记载的……约3700

Therefore, the results of thinking will differ. If these processes were solely used to find out about God, inevitably differences in our conception of Him would arise. This is true from a historical point of view. From the ancient world of 6000 BCE to the present, there are records of approximately 3,700

不同的真主名称与概念

different names and concepts for God.

2. 既然断定真主存在所用的方法是一种“常识”方法（哲学家称之为“理性思考”，穆斯林神学家称之为“固有思维”），那么试图探究真主是谁，而不只是肯定祂的存在，就是谬误的。我们的理性是有限的。抽象思考和对物质世界的反思，只能使我们得出结论：存在一位创造者，祂是全能的、全知的，等等。超越这些结论的推测，就是臆断。《古兰经》恰当地问道：“你们竟对真主说你们所不知道的话吗？”297 试图通过内省来探究真主是谁，就如同一只老鼠试图去构想银河系。人类并非永恒、独一、全能的，因此人类无法构想真主是谁。真主必须通过外在的启示告诉你。

2. Since the method used to conclude that God does exist is a ‘common sense’ method (referred to by philosophers as ‘rational thought’ and by Muslim theologians as ‘innate thinking’), then trying to find out who God is, rather than just affirming His existence, would be fallacious. There are limits to our reasoning. Abstract thinking and reflections on the physical world can only lead us to the conclusion that a creator exists, and He is powerful, knowing, etc. To go beyond those conclusions would be speculative. The Qur’an aptly asks, “Do you say about God that which you do not know?”297 Trying to find out who God is via introspection would be like a mouse trying to conceptualise a galaxy. The human being is not eternal, unique and powerful. Therefore, the human being cannot conceptualise who God is. God would have to tell you via external revelation.

举例来说：你知道上帝存在，就像听到敲门声一样；你可以安全地假定门外有某人，但你知道是谁吗？你并没有期待任何人，所以要知道门外是谁，唯一的办法就是那个人告诉你。因此，你可以得出结论：如果上帝说过或宣布过什么，那必定来自人类之外。除此之外的任何东西，都只是臆测。

Take the following example into consideration. Your knowledge that God exists is like the knocking of the door; you safely assume that something is there, but do you know who it is? You weren’t expecting anyone, so the only way to find who is behind the door is if the person tells you. Therefore, you can conclude that if God has said or announced anything, it must be external to the human being. Anything else would be mere speculation.

从伊斯兰的角度来看，这种外在的启示就是《古兰经》（见第13章），因为它是唯一一部声称来自真主、并符合神圣经典标准的文本。这些标准包括：

From an Islamic perspective, this external communication is the Qur’an (see Chapter 13), as it is the only text to claim to have come from God that fits the criteria for a Divine text. These criteria include:

1. 它必须与关于真主存在的理性和直观结论相一致。例如，如果一本书说真主是一头有四十条腿的大象，你便可以放心地断定这本书不是出自真主，因为真主必定在宇宙之外且独立存在。大象无论是何种形态，都是依赖性的存在，因为它具有有限的物理属性，如大小、形状和颜色。所有具有有限物理属性的事物都是依赖性的，因为有外部因素导致了它们这些限制。真主不是“物质性的”，而是独立的。因此，任何具有有限物理属性的事物都不可能是真主（参见第6章）。

1. It must be consistent with the rational and intuitive conclusion of God’s existence. For example, if a book says God is an elephant with 40 legs, you could safely assume that this book is not from God, as God must be external to the universe and independent. An elephant, regardless of form, is a dependent being. This is because it has limited physical qualities, such as size, shape and colour. All things with limited physical qualities are dependent because there are external factors that gave rise to their limitations. God is not ‘physical’ and is independent. Therefore, nothing with limited physical qualities can be God (see Chapter 6).

2. 它必须内部一致且与外部事实相符。换言之，如果书中第20页说真主是独一的，而第340页说真主是三位一体，那就是无法调和的内部矛盾。此外，如果书中说宇宙只有6000年的历史，那就是与外部事实不符，因为现实表明宇宙远比这更古老（不过，我们对现实的理解可能会改变；参见第12章）。

2. It must be internally and externally consistent. In other words, if it says on page 20 that God is one and then on page 340 its says God is three, that would be an internal, irreconcilable inconsistency. Additionally, if the book says that the universe is only 6,000 years old, then that would be an external inconsistency as reality affirms that the universe is older than that (however, our understanding of reality can change; see Chapter 12).

3. 它必须具有通往超越者的路标。启示必须包含能够表明其来自神圣者、且无法用自然主义方式充分解释的内容。简单地说，它必须有证据表明它来自真主。

3. It must have signposts to the transcendent. The revelation must contain material that indicates it is from the Divine and that it cannot be adequately explained naturalistically. In simple terms, it must have evidence to show that it is from God.

《古兰经》有一些迹象表明它是神圣的启示。这部经典无法用自然主义的方式来解释，因此，超自然的解释才是最好的解释。其中一些迹象包括：

The Qur’an has signposts that indicate it is a Divine text. The book cannot be explained naturalistically; therefore, supernatural explanations are the best explanation. Some of these signposts include:

1. 《古兰经》在语言和文学上的无法模仿性（见第十三章）。

1. The Qur’an’s linguistic and literary inimitability (see Chapter 13).

2. 《古兰经》中的一些历史叙述，在启示降临的时代是人类所无法知晓的。

2. Some of the historical accounts in the Qur’an could not have been known to man at the time of revelation.

3. 其独特的编排与结构。298.

3. Its unique arrangement and structure.298.

总而言之,既然人类只能通过外在的启示来了解神所宣示的内容,而这份启示可以被证明就是《古兰经》,那么《古兰经》关于神所说的一切便是真实的。《古兰经》对神的独一性有着明确的论述:{你们不要同有经的人辩论,除非用最好的方式,但其中不义者除外。你们说:"我们确信降示我们的经典,也确信降示你们的经典;我们的神和你们的神是独一的,我们是归顺他的人。"}299

To conclude, since the only way to know what God has announced to humankind is via external revelation, and this revelation can be proven to be the Qur’an—then what it says about God is true. The Qur’an is explicitly clear concerning His oneness: “And do not argue with the people of the Scripture except in a way that is best, except for those who commit injustice among them, and say, ‘We believe in that which has been revealed to us and revealed to you. And our God and your God is one; and we are Muslims [in submission] to Him.’”299

这些是可以用来证明真主是独一的论据之一；然而，这一主题一旦被真正理解，就会对人的良知产生深远的影响。如果是独一的真主创造了我们，那么我们就必须透过祂的独一性来看待万事万物，而不是依据我们那种割裂与分歧的片面观点。我们是一个人类大家庭；如果我们以这种方式看待自己，就会对社会产生深远的影响。如果我们爱并信仰真主，那么我们就应当对祂所创造的一切表现出慈悲与怜悯。正如先知穆罕默德ﷺ所说：

These are some of the arguments that can be used to show that God is one; however, this topic—once truly understood—will have some profound effects on the human conscience. If one God has created us, it follows that we must see everything via His oneness and not our abstracted perspectives of disunity and division. We are a human family, and if we see ourselves this way, it can have profound effects on our society. If we love and believe in God, then we should show compassion and mercy to what He has created. Just like what the Prophet Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم said:

“怀慈悲心的人，至仁的主必怜悯他们。你们怜悯大地上的众生，那在天上的主必怜悯你们。”300

“Those who are merciful will be shown mercy by the Most Merciful. Be merciful to those on the Earth and the One in the heavens will have mercy upon you.”300