想象你走进了一座令人惊叹的宫殿。当你穿过走廊时,被这座建筑的宏大所震撼,于是决定打开最近的一扇门去探索。你走进房间,看到成百上千把椅子和桌子整齐排列,如同教室一般。突然间,你失去了探索其他房间的所有兴致。你决定离开宫殿,前往当地的咖啡馆与朋友会面。你和朋友喝着咖啡,他问你:“那你在宫殿里看到了什么?”你回答说:“就是一个摆满桌椅、排列得像教室一样的房间。”你的朋友接着问:“那你为什么没去看其他房间呢?”你回答道:“没有必要,那里没什么可看的。如果这个房间摆满了桌椅,那其他房间也一定什么都没有。” 你的回答合乎理性吗?仅仅因为一个房间里有东西,就能逻辑地推出其他房间里一定什么都没有吗?当然不能。那些声称科学已经驳倒上帝的无神论者,也遵循着类似的逻辑。科学只专注于能够通过观察来解决的问题。然而,上帝按照定义,是存在于物质宇宙之外的存在,因此对祂进行直接观察是不可能的。但无神论者可能会辩称,间接观察或许可以支持或否定上帝的存在。这并不成立。任何形式的间接观察都不可能否定上帝的存在,因为这就等于说,一个被观察到的现象可以否定一个未被观察到的现象。这与上面宫殿的例子遵循的是同样的逻辑。 科学并不导向无神论,这一点得到了大多数科学哲学家的认可。例如,休·高奇(Hugh Gauch)恰当地得出结论:坚持认为“……科学支持无神论”,是在热情上得了高分,而在逻辑上得了低分。高奇的论断十分在理,因为一种依赖观察的思维方式,无法否定那些本身不可观察的事物。 然而，科学能做的是对这一问题保持沉默，或提供哲学家可以用来构建"上帝存在"哲学论证的证据。尽管如此，也有一些运用科学证据的论证得出上帝存在不太可能的结论。这些被称为证据论证；它们本质上属于哲学范畴，而非科学结论。

Imagine you entered an amazing palace. As you walk through the hallway, you are struck by the size of the building and decide to explore by opening the nearest door. As you enter the room, you see hundreds of chairs and tables arranged like a classroom. Suddenly you lose any motivation to explore the other rooms. You decide to leave the palace and head off to meet your friend at a local coffee shop. As you drink coffee with your friend he asks you, “So what did you see in the palace?” You reply, “Just a room full of tables and chairs arranged like a classroom”. Your friend then asks, “Why didn’t you see the other rooms?” You reply by saying, “There’s no point, there was nothing to see. If this room was full of chairs and tables, then the other rooms will have nothing in them.” Is your reply rational? Does it logically follow that just because there is something in one room, there will be nothing in the other rooms? Of course it does not. Atheists who claim that science has disproved God follow a similar logic. Science focuses its attention on only what observations can solve. However, God, by definition, is a Being who is outside the physical universe. Therefore, any direct observation of Him is impossible. However, an atheist may argue that indirect observation may support or negate God’s existence. This is not true. Any form of indirect observation could never negate God’s existence, because it is like saying an observed phenomenon can negate an unobserved phenomenon. This follows the same logic as the above example in the palace. The fact that science does not lead to atheism is attested by the majority of the philosophers of science. For example, Hugh Gauch rightly concludes that to “insist that… science supports atheism is to get high marks for enthusiasm but low marks for logic.”335 Gauch makes perfect sense because the method of thinking that relies on observation cannot deny what cannot be observed. What science can do, however, is stay silent on that matter or provide evidence that philosophers can use to formulate a philosophical argument that God exists. Notwithstanding, there are arguments that use scientific evidence that conclude God’s existence is unlikely. These are known as evidential arguments; they are philosophical in nature and not scientific conclusions.

为什么一些无神论者认为科学能够否定上帝？

Why do some atheists believe science can deny God?.

科学改变了世界。从医学到电信，科学以其他任何学科都无法做到的方式改善了我们的生活和福祉。科学不断改善我们的生活，并帮助我们理解世界和宇宙。然而，科学的成功也使许多无神论者接受了一些前后不一、站不住脚的假设。以下是这些假设的概要。

Science has changed the world. From medicine to telecommunications, science has improved our lives and well-being in ways that no other field of study has. Science continually improves our lives, and aids our understanding of the world and the universe. However, science’s successes have led many atheists to adopt incoherent and false assumptions. Below is a summary of these assumptions.

• 首先，一些无神论者认为科学是衡量真理的唯一标准，科学能够回答我们所有的问题。这使无神论者得出结论：上帝不存在，因为科学只能研究可以被观察到的事物。既然上帝无法被观察，而科学又是衡量真理的唯一标准，那么声称上帝存在就是错误的。这一假设还促使无神论者相信，对于我们尚未理解的事物，已经不再需要用上帝来作为解释。

• First, some atheists perceive that science is the only yardstick for truth and that science has the answers for all of our questions. This motivates the atheist to conclude that God doesn’t exist because science can only address what one can observe. Since God cannot be observed and science is the only yardstick for truth, then to claim God exists is false. This assumption also motivates the atheist to believe that God is no longer required as a reason for things we do not understand.

这种假设是错误的，因为科学有许多局限，有很多问题是它无法回答的。此外，还有一些科学无法加以证明的其他知识来源，但它们是不可或缺的根本知识来源。由此可见，科学并非确立关于世界和现实之真理的唯一途径。

This is a false assumption because science has many limitations, and there are many things that it cannot answer. In addition, there are other sources of knowledge that science cannot justify, yet they are indispensable and fundamental sources of knowledge. This implies that science is not the only way to establish truths about the world and reality.

• 第二个假设是：既然科学如此成功，科学的结论就必定是真的。如果科学结论为真，而科学无法探讨像真主这样未被观察到的实在，那么就可以推出祂不存在。这一假设背后的逻辑很含糊，它暴露出人们对科学哲学普遍缺乏了解。简单地说，某样东西行之有效，并不等于它为真。这是科学哲学中的一个基本观点。遗憾的是，即便是一些备受推崇的无神论者，也持有一种站不住脚的观点，认为某一科学理论在实际应用中的成功，就足以证明它在绝对意义上为真。2010年，我在爱尔兰都柏林举行的世界无神论大会上见过理查德·道金斯。我与他简短交谈，问他为何曾对一位提问者说不要去研究科学哲学，而应“只管做科学”。他没有给出多少回答。纵观他的公开著作，如今越来越清楚的是，他的主要理由之一是科学“管用，婊子们”。336

• The second assumption is that since science is so successful, scientific conclusions must be true. If scientific conclusions are true, and science cannot address an unobserved reality like God, then it follows He does not exist. The logic behind this assumption is fuzzy and it exposes a common ignorance concerning the philosophy of science. Simply put, just because something works does not mean it is true. This is a basic idea in the philosophy of science. Unfortunately, even some highly acclaimed atheists take the incoherent view that the successful practical application of a scientific theory proves it to be true in an absolute sense. I once met Richard Dawkins at the World Atheist Convention in 2010, held in Dublin, Ireland. I spoke to him briefly and asked him why he told one questioner not to study the philosophy of science and “just do the science”. He didn’t give me much of a reply. Surveying his public work, it is now becoming clear that one of his main reasons is that science “works, b*tches”336

虽然这种直觉颇具说服力，但它是错误的。一个科学理论或结论能够奏效，并不能在逻辑上推出它就是真的。

. Although intuitive, it is false. It does not logically follow that a scientific theory or conclusion is true just because it works.

第三个假设是，科学能带来确定性。如果科学不能直接证明真主的存在，而它又是通往确定性的唯一途径，那么我们就无法确定真主的存在。这一假设还促使无神论者争辩说：一旦某个论断被冠以经过充分验证的科学理论之名，那么只要天启与之在某方面相悖，我们就必须摒弃天启。这种看法是不对的。科学家称某物为理论时，并不是说它是绝对的、永不改变的。它的意思是：基于我们有限的观察，它是对特定现象的最佳解释。然而，总会出现新的观察，或新的看待事物的方式，与先前的观察相抵触。这正是科学之美：它并非一成不变。因此，如果宗教经典与科学看似相互冲突，那并不是什么大问题。为什么呢？

• The third assumption is that science leads to certainty. If science cannot directly prove God’s existence, and it is the only route to certainty, then we cannot be certain of God’s existence. This assumption also motivates the atheist to argue that once something is labelled as a well-confirmed scientific theory, we must dismiss Divine revelation if it opposes it in some way. This is not true. When scientists call something a theory, they are not saying it is absolute and that it will never change. It means it is the best explanation of particular phenomena, based on our limited observations. However, there can always be a new observation—or way of seeing things— that is at odds with previous observations. This is the beauty of science; it is not set in stone. Therefore, if religious scripture and science seem to conflict, it is not a huge problem. Why?

因为科学是可以改变的。我们所能说的只是：基于我们有限的观察，目前对所观察现象的理解与某部经典的说法相抵触，但这种理解可能会改变。这与把科学当作棒球棍，用来砸碎宗教经典的主张，有着巨大的区别。

Because science can change. All that we can say is our current understanding of observed phenomena—based on our limited observations—is at odds with what a particular scripture says, but it may change. This is a huge difference from using science as a baseball bat to smash the claims of religious scripture.

有些科学事实基于直接观察，不太可能在科学中改变，但用来攻击宗教论述的大多数论据，都建立在更为复杂的科学解释和理论之上，例如达尔文的进化论。如果一段神圣启示的文本内容似乎与科学解释和理论相抵触，你不必因此拒绝启示而接受科学，也不必因此拒绝科学而接受启示。两者兼信是你认识论上的权利！因此，正确的做法是：将科学视为我们所拥有的最佳认识而加以接受，而不做出巨大的认识论飞跃，将其断定为绝对真理；同时，你也可以接受启示文本，因为你有充分的理由这样做（参见第13章）。

Some scientific facts, based on direct observation, are unlikely to change in science, but most of the arguments that are used to bash religious discourse are based on more complex scientific explanations and theories, such as Darwinian evolution. If the content of a divinely revealed text seems to be at odds with scientific explanations and theories, you must not reject revelation to accept the science. In addition, you must not reject the science to accept the revelation. It is within your epistemic right to accept both! The correct approach, therefore, is to accept the science as the best that we have without making massive epistemic leaps of faith and concluding that it is absolute; at the same time, you can accept the revealed text because you have good reasons to do so (see Chapter 13).

• 最后的这一假设构成了许多无神论者看待世界的透镜。正如本书各章所讨论的，这一透镜就是自然主义。自然主义有两种类型：

• The final assumption forms the lens by which many atheists see the world. This lens, as discussed in various chapters of this book, is naturalism. There are two types of naturalism:

哲学自然主义与方法论自然主义。哲学自然主义认为，宇宙中的一切现象都可以通过物理过程来解释，不存在超自然的事物。方法论自然主义则认为，凡被视为科学的东西，绝不可能涉及上帝的神圣作为或力量。无神论者混淆了哲学自然主义与方法论自然主义。无神论者在理解科学结论时，不自觉地采纳了哲学自然主义这一非科学的预设。

philosophical and methodological. Philosophical naturalism is the philosophy that all phenomena in the universe can be explained via physical processes, and that there is no supernatural. Methodological naturalism is the view that if anything is deemed scientific, it can never refer to God’s Divine activity or power. The atheist conflates philosophical naturalism with methodological naturalism. The atheist inadvertently adopts the non-scientific assumption of philosophical naturalism to understand scientific conclusions.

无神论者把两种观点混为一谈:一种是方法论自然主义,即科学结论要成为科学,就不能引用神的创造力与智慧;另一种是哲学自然主义,即认为神的创造力与智慧根本不存在。

The atheist confuses the idea that scientific conclusions, in order to be scientific, must not refer to God’s creative power or wisdom (methodological naturalism), with the fact that His creative power and wisdom do not exist (philosophical naturalism).

本章的其余部分将讨论这些假设，而处理这些假设的最好方法是回到基础：理解什么是科学，探讨其局限性，并梳理科学哲学中存在的一些争论。

The rest of this chapter will address these assumptions, and the best way to do that is to go back to basics: understand what science is, explore its limitations and unravel some of the discussions that exist in the philosophy of science.

什么是科学?

What is science?.

"science"一词源自拉丁语 scientia，意为“知识”。科学是人类探索物理世界如何运作的努力。数学家、科学哲学家伯特兰·罗素对此有一个很好的解释：科学是“借助观察以及基于观察的推理，去发现关于世界的特定事实……以及把事实彼此相连的规律”的尝试。337

The word science comes from the Latin word scientia, meaning knowledge. Science is the human endeavour to understand how the physical world works. Mathematician and philosopher of science Bertrand Russell nicely explains that science is “the attempt to discover, by means of observation and reasoning based upon it… particular facts about the world, and the laws connecting facts with one another.”337

鉴于罗素的定义，让我们进一步剖析科学方法。

In light of Russell’s definition, let’s further break down the scientific method.

科学有其特定的范围。它专注于物质世界，只能探讨自然过程和自然现象。从这一角度看，诸如"灵魂是什么？""意义是什么？"之类的问题，就超出了科学的研究过程。

Science has a particular scope. It focuses on the physical world, and can only address natural processes and phenomena. From this perspective, questions such as, what is the soul? What is meaning? are questions outside the scientific process.

科学旨在解释物质世界。作为一个集体性的机构,科学旨在对自然界的运作方式作出准确的解释。科学提出解释的方式是提出可以检验的假说。要使一个假说可以检验,它必须在逻辑上产生具体的预期。考虑以下假说:“咖啡能提高奥运会摔跤运动员的表现。”这一假说是可以检验的,因为它产生了以下具体的预期:

Science aims to explain the physical world. As a collective institution, it aims to produce accurate explanations of how the natural world works. The way science aims to produce explanations is that it comes up with testable hypotheses. For a hypothesis to be testable, it must logically generate specific expectations. Consider the following hypothesis: “Coffee improves the performance of Olympic wrestlers.” This hypothesis is testable because it generates the following specific expectations:

• 咖啡可以提高表现。

• coffee improves performance.

• 咖啡会损害表现。

• coffee impairs performance.

• 表现上没有任何变化。

• there is no change in performance.

科学之美的一个方面在于，它不只是检验正确的假设；相反，它需要实验与检验。因此，归根结底，科学思想不仅必须可以检验，而且必须真正接受检验。单一一组结果并不是理想的选择；真正的科学要求不同的科学家尽可能多次地重复实验。

One of the beautiful aspects of science is that it does not just examine true hypotheses; rather, it necessitates experimentation and testing. This is why, ultimately, scientific ideas must not only be testable; they must actually be tested. A single set of results is not the preferred option; true science involves that different scientists repeat the experiment as many times as possible.

显然，科学远不止我们目前所讨论的内容，但这些观察已足以让我们理解科学方法的基本要素。这促使我们回应一些无神论者用来错误地得出“科学导向无神论”结论的关于科学的关键假设。

There is obviously more to science than what we have discussed so far, but these observations are sufficient to understand the basic elements of the scientific method. This leads us to respond to the key assumptions about science that some atheists use to falsely conclude that science leads to atheism.

假设一：科学是确立关于现实真相的唯一途径，并且它能够回答所有问题。

Assumption #1: Science is the only way to establish the truth about reality, and it can answer all questions.

这种主张被称为科学主义，它认为，如果一个陈述无法得到科学证明，那它就不是真的。我在与无神论者和人文主义者的各种交谈中发现，他们常常不加质疑地预设这一主张。科学并非获取关于世界之真理的唯一途径。科学方法的局限性表明，科学无法回答所有问题。它的一些主要局限包括：

This assertion, known as scientism, claims that a statement is not true if it cannot be scientifically proven. In various conversations I have had with atheists and humanists, I have found that they constantly presume this assertion. Science is not the only way to acquire truth about the world. The limitations of the scientific method demonstrate that science cannot answer all questions. Some of its main limitations include that it:

• 仅限于观察。

• is limited to observation.

• 在道德上是中立的。

• is morally neutral.

• 不能深入探讨个人私事。

• cannot delve into the personal.

• 无法回答事情为何发生。

• cannot answer why things happen.

• 无法回答某些形而上学的问题。

• cannot address some metaphysical questions.

• 无法证明必然真理。

• cannot prove necessary truths.

然而,在讨论这些局限之前,有必要指出,唯科学主义是自我推翻的。唯科学主义主张,凡是不能被科学证明的命题都不是真的。然而,上述陈述本身也无法被科学证明。这就好比说"英语中不存在超过三个单词的句子",这句话本身是自我推翻的,因为它自身就超过了三个单词。338.

However, before we discuss these limitations, it is important to note that scientism is self-defeating. Scientism claims that a proposition is not true if it cannot be scientifically proven. Yet the above statement itself cannot be scientifically proven. It is like saying, “There are no sentences in the English language longer than three words”, which is self-defeating because that sentence is longer than three words.338.

仅限于观察。

Limited to observation.

这一点看似显而易见的局限，却并未被充分理解。科学家总是受限于其观察。例如，若科学家想研究咖啡因对幼鼠的影响，他们将受限于手头小鼠的数量和种类，以及实验中存在的所有变量。科学哲学家埃利奥特·索伯在其文章《经验主义》中指出了这一点：“在任何时刻，科学家都受限于手头的观察……这种局限在于，科学被迫将注意力局限于那些观察能够解决的问题。”339

This may sound like an obvious limitation, but it is not entirely understood. Scientists are always limited to their observations. For example, if a scientist wants to find out the effect of caffeine on baby mice, they will be restricted to the number and type of mice they have and all the variables in place during their experiment. Philosopher of science Elliot Sober makes this point in his essay, Empiricism: “At any moment scientists are limited by the observations they have at hand… the limitation is that science is forced to restrict its attention to problems that observations can solve.”339

不仅科学家只能局限于观察，而且他们还受到另一重限制：未来的观察可能得出新的结论，而这些结论反过来又可能与先前的观察相矛盾（见下文“归纳问题”一节）。另一个局限在于，今天被认为不可观察的事物，将来可能因技术的进步或持续的探索而被我们的感官所感知。显微镜和电子显微镜的发现与运用便是科学进步的良好例证。因此，我们永远无法确定自己对物质世界的现有理解是否正确，因为它会随着观察的改进而改变。

Not only are scientists restricted to observations, but they are also limited by the fact that a future observation may form new conclusions that in turn can go against what was previously observed (see the section below, ‘The Problem of Induction’). Another limitation involves the fact that what is considered to be non-observable today could be perceived by our senses in the future, either due to improved technology or persistent investigation. The discovery and use of the microscope and the electron microscope are good examples of scientific progress. Therefore, we can never be certain about our current understanding of the physical world, because it can change with improved observations.

道德中立。

Morally neutral.

科学在道德上是中立的。这并不意味着科学家没有道德。它的意思是，科学无法为道德提供根基（参见第九章）。例如，科学不能成为道德的意义性和客观性的基础，也无法告诉我们什么是对的、什么是错的。这并不意味着科学不能成为多学科方法的一部分，从而为某些伦理和道德决定提供参考。然而，仅凭科学本身，无法为我们所认为的善与恶提供依据。

Science is morally neutral. Now this does not mean that scientists do not have morals. What it means is that science cannot provide a foundation for morality (see Chapter 9). For instance, science cannot be a basis for the meaningfulness and objectivity of morals, and it cannot tell us what is right or wrong. This does not mean that it cannot be part of a multidisciplinary approach that informs some ethical and moral decisions. However, science on its own fails to provide a basis for what we consider good or bad.

科学本质上告诉我们的是“是什么”，而不是“应当是什么”。“从是推不出应当”这句话已经成为哲学上的陈词滥调，但它确有几分道理。科学可以告诉我们刀刃刺入人体皮肤时会发生什么，包括其中涉及的全部过程，却无法告诉我们这一行为是否不道德。其中的血液、疼痛和身体损伤，既可能源于一场挽救生命的重要手术，也可能是谋杀的结果。关键在于，即便我们完全理解切割和刺穿人体组织所涉及的一切过程，也不能由此得出道德上的判断。

Science essentially tells us what is and not what ought to be. The statement, “you cannot get an ought from an is”, has become a philosophical cliché; however, it has some truth in it. Science can tell us what happens when a knife penetrates someone’s skin, including all of the processes involved, but it cannot tell us whether it is immoral. The blood, pain and physical damage could be due to important life-saving surgery or the result of a murder. The point is that understanding all the processes involved in cutting and penetrating the human flesh does not lead us to a moral decision.

如第9章所述,查尔斯·达尔文思考了道德与科学(尤其是生物学)之间的关系,并提出了一个极端的例子,说明我们的道德若源于生物过程,可能会带来怎样的影响。他提出,如果我们是在另一套不同的生物条件下成长的,那么我们认为什么是道德的,可能会与我们现在的看法大不相同。340 达尔文或许是在告诉我们:如果人类所认为的道德只是先前生物条件作用的结果,那么不同的条件就会产生不同的道德标准。这对道德的根基和意义有着极为深远的影响。 首先,如果将生物学或一套物理条件确立为道德的基础,那么道德就会沦为主观的,因为它们(过去和现在)都不可避免地会发生变化。然而,这与一个内在且不容否认的事实相矛盾:某些道德是客观的(见第9章)。 其次,如果我们的道德观念建立在生物条件之上,那么我们的道德还有什么意义?既然如果我们以不同的方式"成长",我们的道德本可以不同,那么我们的道德就失去了意义。这是因为我们的道德观并没有任何必然性,它不过是偶然和物理过程的产物。 无神论者、神经科学家山姆·哈里斯在其著作《道德景观》(The Moral Landscape)中,试图通过解释科学如何能够决定我们的道德价值,来为我们所感受到的客观道德辩护。其他无神论者赞赏他的努力,但他也遭到了来自有神论者和其同道中人的强烈批评。哈里斯向我们展示了他的道德景观:山峰上是道德之善,山谷中是道德之恶。他如何知道什么是善,什么是恶呢?答案是:山峰代表福祉,山谷代表苦难。 这番概括或许显得粗略,但公允地说,它归结为一点:哈里斯把邪恶等同于痛苦,把善等同于福祉。正是在这里,哈里斯的论证站不住脚。如果能够证明人们可以通过伤害他人来增进自身福祉,他的道德景观论便不攻自破。另一种驳斥其论证的方式,是说明某些能够促进我们福祉的事物在道德上是可憎的。例如,以避孕手段进行的乱伦。双方都增进了福祉(因为他们自由地依从自己的欲望而行动),而且由于使用了避孕措施,不存在伤害或痛苦的可能,比如生下有遗传缺陷的孩子。我在辩论中还向克劳斯教授提出过乱伦的问题,他对自己的立场并不十分确定(他认为对他而言,这种行为是否错误并不清楚,因此他无法在道德上谴责它341)。因此,有些能够促进福祉的事物在道德上是可憎的。即便你不同意这个例子,也还有许多其他例子可以用来说明这一点。

As mentioned in Chapter 9, Charles Darwin considered morals and science (specifically biology), and came up with an extreme example of the possible implications of our morality stemming from a biological process. He suggested that if we were reared under a different set of biological conditions, then what we would consider moral could be very different from our current views.340 What Darwin may have been telling us is that if what human beings consider to be moral was just a result of previous biological conditioning, then having a different set of conditions would result in different moral standards. This has immense implications for the foundations and meaningfulness of morality. Firstly, establishing biology or a set of physical conditions as a basis for morality renders morals subjective— because they are (and were) subject to inevitable changes. However, this contradicts the innate and undeniable fact that some morals are objective (see Chapter 9). Secondly, if our sense of morality was based on biological conditions, then what meaning do our morals have? Since our morals could have been different if we were ‘reared’ differently, then our morals lose their meaning. This is because there is nothing necessary about our moral outlook, as it is simply a result of chance and physical processes. In his book, The Moral Landscape, the outspoken atheist and neuroscientist Sam Harris has attempted to justify our sense of objective morality by explaining how science can determine our moral values. Fellow atheists have commended his efforts, but he has also faced tremendous criticism from both theists and his comrades in arms. Harris presents us with his landscape of morality. On the peaks is moral goodness and in the troughs is moral evil. How does he know what is good and evil? Well, the peaks represent well-being and the troughs represent suffering. This may sound like a crude summary of his discussion, but in fairness it boils down to Harris equating evil with suffering and goodness with well-being. This is where Harris fails. If it can be shown that people can increase their own well-being by harming others, his moral landscape is demolished. Another way to dismiss Harris’ argument is to show that some things that can promote our well-being are morally abhorrent. Consider, for instance, incest with the use of contraception. Both parties have increased well-being (as they freely decide to act upon their desires), and there is no chance of harm or suffering—such as conceiving a child with genetic defects—due to the use of contraception. I even raised the issue of incest to Professor Krauss during our debate, and he wasn’t entirely sure about his position (he argued that it was not clear to him that it was wrong and he could not morally condemn it341). Some things that can promote our well-being are morally abhorrent. Even if you disagree with this example, there are many other examples to choose from to make this point.

在他的著作《理性道德》中，同为无神论者、科学哲学家的罗伯特·约翰逊对哈里斯的论证提出了类似的批评。约翰逊认为，哈里斯的方法缺乏理由，无法证明道德是事实性的、客观的。

In his book, Rational Morality, fellow atheist and philosopher of science Robert Johnson provides a similar criticism to Harris’s argument. Johnson argues that Harris’s approach lacks justification for morals being factual and objective:

“哈里斯似乎仍然陷在一个难题之中：他承认自己只是假定了与‘福祉’相关的道德事实的存在。我们能在翻看石头底下的地面时找到这种道德事实吗？不能。我们能在像考察量子力学定律那样考察这个问题时推断出它的存在吗？也不能。事实上，唯一支持我们直觉的，认为这些道德事实独立地存在，只是直觉本身……这个问题本身可以相当简单地加以解释：哈里斯正确地指出了道德目前是如何被定义的，但这并不意味着道德因此就应当被视为事实。事实上，哈里斯本人也承认，我们目前所允许的许多事情其实是不道德的……” 342.

“Harris still appears to be trapped in the problem of admitting that he is just assuming that the moral fact relating to ‘wellbeing’ exists. Will we find this moral fact while studying the ground under rocks? No. Will we be able to imply its existence when examining the issue like with the laws of quantum mechanics? No. In fact the only thing backing up our intuitions that these moral facts simply exist independently is just that: our intuitions… The problem itself can be explained fairly simply: just because Harris correctly identifies how morality is currently defined, it does not mean that morality should therefore be taken as factual. Indeed, Harris himself admits there are plenty of things we currently allow for which are immoral….”342.

你无法测试个人。

You cannot test the personal.

科学以检验观念为傲。没有检验，就没有科学。然而，在某个节点上，检验必须让位于信任。比如，我们如何知道别人的意图？我们如何知道一个人的感受？科学家可能会辩称，用测谎仪就能判断某人是否在撒谎；他们也可能断言，一整套生理和行为指标与某些情绪相对应（这并不正确，下文将讨论）。他们说的有一定道理，但事情并没有那么简单。以友谊为例。你的朋友问你今天过得怎样、感觉如何，你回答说今天过得很好，心情相当愉快。试想第二天你们见面时，他又问同样的问题，却只有在你接上测谎仪、采集必要的生理数据之后，才肯相信你的回答。这会损害你们的友谊吗？如果他每次问你同样的问题时都提出同样的要求，你们之间建立起来的关系会受到影响吗？当然会。个人友谊的领域之所以得以维系，正是因为我们的回答值得信赖，也因为我们相信别人所说的话。再看情绪方面的例子。我们如何知道某人是否感到抑郁？我们有没有可以用来检测抑郁的仪器？生理数据虽能提供一些参考，但大量重要信息其实存在于心理医生与患者的面对面交流之中。这通常表现为提问、作答，甚至填写问卷。这一切都要求我们在某种程度上相信患者的回答。因此，在我看来，仅凭观察不足以应对人类生活的某些领域，例如友谊和心理健康。所以，科学必须依靠信任，而不能只依赖检验。

Science prides itself on testing ideas. Without testing there is no science. However, at some point testing must give way to trust. For instance, how do we know what people have intended? How do we know what a person is feeling? The scientist may argue that they can tell someone is lying by using a lie detector; they may also assert that an entire array of physiological and behavioural indicators correlates to certain feelings (this is not true and will be discussed below). They have a point, but it is not as simple as that. Consider friendships as an example. Your friend asks you about your day and how you are feeling, and you respond by saying it has been a great day and that you are feeling quite happy. Imagine, you meet him the following day and he asks you the same question, but will only believe you if you hook yourself up to a lie detector to capture essential physiological data. Would that harm your friendship? If he continued to make the same request every time you responded to his question, would the relationship you have built with him be affected? Of course it would. The realm of personal friendship is preserved, if we are trustworthy in our responses and if we trust what people say. Another example is emotions. How do we know if someone is feeling depressed? Do we have a depression detector that we could use? Although physiological data provides some input, a significant portion of the vital information is in the personal interaction between the psychiatrist and the patient. This usually takes the form of questions, answers and even a completed questionnaire. These all require that we trust some of the patient’s answers. Therefore, it seems to me that observations alone are not enough for certain domains of human life, such as friendship and mental health. Science, therefore, must rely on trusting, rather than depending solely on testing.

正如第7章所讨论的，科学只能处理第三人称的数据，而感受与经验等个人属性则属于第一人称的数据。我在第7章中阐述过的弗兰克·杰克逊的“玛丽论证”表明，掌握所有物理层面的第三人称事实，并不能得出全部的事实。换言之，这些事实无法告诉我们任何关于第一人称个人数据的信息。科学无法告诉我们，一个有机体体验内在主观意识状态时是什么感受（参见第7章）。接近答案的唯一途径，是相信某人对其个人主观意识经验的描述（不过，正如第7章所述，你仍然永远无法真正知道他拥有该体验时是什么感受）。要点很简单：科学无法检验个人的东西。

As discussed in Chapter 7, science can only deal with third-person data, whereas personal attributes, such as feelings and experiences, are first-person data. Frank Jackson’s Mary argument I expounded upon in Chapter 7, shows that knowing all the physical third-person facts do not lead to all the facts. In other words, they can tell us nothing about the personal first-person data. Science cannot tell us anything about what it is like for an organism to experience an internal subjective conscious state (see Chapter 7). The only way of getting close to an answer is by trusting someone’s description of their personal subjective conscious experience (although you will still never be able to truly know what it is like for them to have that experience; see Chapter 7). The point is simple: Science cannot test the personal.

无法回答"为什么？"。

Cannot answer ‘why?’.

我的姨妈敲响了你的门,送给你一块亲手烤制的美味巧克力蛋糕。你接过礼物,把蛋糕放在厨房的餐桌上。等姨妈走后,你打开盒子准备吃一片。在享用之前,你问了自己一个问题:她为什么要给我烤这块蛋糕?作为一名科学家,你能做的并不多,只能研究手边唯一的数据:这块蛋糕。经过多次检测,你发现蛋糕可能是在华氏350度下烤制的,所用的原料包括可可粉、糖、鸡蛋和牛奶。然而,掌握了这些信息并不能帮你回答这个问题。唯一的办法就是去问她。这个例子告诉我们,科学能够告诉我们"是什么"和"如何",却无法告诉我们"为什么"。这里所说的"为什么",是指事物背后存在目的。科学可以从地质过程的角度解释山脉为何存在,却无法给出山脉形成背后的目的。许多人甚至干脆否认目的这一概念本身。

My aunty knocks on your door and presents you with a lovely home-baked chocolate cake. You accept the gift and place the cake on your kitchen table. Once my aunty has gone, you open the box to have a slice. Before you indulge, you ask yourself a question: Why has she baked me this cake? As a scientist you cannot do much apart from explore the only piece of data you have at hand: the cake. After doing many tests, you find out that the cake was probably baked at 350 degrees Fahrenheit, and the ingredients included cocoa powder, sugar, eggs and milk. However, knowing all of this information does not help you to answer the question. The only way you can find out is if you ask her. This example shows us that science can tell us the ‘what’ and the ‘how’, but it fails to give us the ‘why’. What is meant by ‘why’ here is that there is a purpose behind things. Science can answer why mountains exist from the point of view that they were formed via geological processes, but it cannot provide the purpose behind the formation of the mountains. Many would simply deny the concept of purpose altogether.

当我们追问“为什么”时，就已经预设了某种目的。然而，许多无神论者坚持认为，目的只是一种幻觉，源自过时的宗教观念。这种看待我们在宇宙中存在的方式，实在是毫无助益。在这样的世界里，一切都可以用我们无法控制的物理过程来解释。我们不过是一排倒下的多米诺骨牌中的一块：我们之所以必须倒下，是因为身后的那块已经倒下。这不仅违背直觉，还暴露出我们在日常生活推理中的一些惊人矛盾。试想，你在阅读这本书时读到最后一章，看到这样一句话：“这本书背后没有任何目的。”你会认真对待这样的说法吗？

Asking why implies a purpose, and many atheists maintain that purpose is an illusion, based on outdated religious thinking. This is a very unhelpful way of looking at our existence in the universe. In such a world, everything can be explained via physical processes that we have no control over. We are just one of the dominoes in a falling row of dominoes. We have to fall, because the domino behind us fell. Not only is it counterintuitive, but it highlights some striking contradictions in the way we reason in normal day-to-day activities. Imagine, while reading this book you reach the final chapter and you see the following sentence: “There is no purpose behind this book”. Would you even consider taking such a statement seriously?.

无法回答一些形而上学的问题。

Cannot answer some metaphysical questions.

科学可以解决一些形而上学问题。然而，这些只是能够通过经验予以探讨的问题。例如，科学已经借助宇宙学这一学科，探讨了宇宙的起源。尽管如此，仍有一些合理的问题无法通过科学来回答。这些问题包括：演绎推理的结论为何必然从前提中推出？是否存在来世？灵魂是否存在？一个有意识的生命体体验主观意识经验是怎样的感受？为什么存在的是某物而不是虚无？科学之所以无法探讨这些问题，是因为它们所指的事物超越了物质的、可观察的世界。

Science can address some metaphysical questions. However, these are the questions that can be empirically addressed. For example, science has been able to address the beginning of the universe via its field known as cosmology. Nevertheless, some valid questions cannot be answered scientifically. These include: Why do conclusions in deductive reasoning necessarily follow from the previous premises? Is there an afterlife? Do souls exist? What is it like for a conscious organism to experience a subjective conscious experience? Why is there something rather than nothing? The reason that science cannot address these questions is because they refer to things that go beyond the physical, observable world.

必然真理。

Necessary truths.

科学主义无法证明数学和逻辑等必然真理。正如第三章所讨论的，有效演绎论证的结论必然由其前提推出。请看下面这个论证：

Scientism cannot prove necessary truths such as mathematics and logic. As discussed in Chapter 3, the conclusion of a valid deductive argument necessarily follows from its premises. Consider the following argument:

1. 基于有限观察得出的结论并非绝对的。

1. Conclusions based on limited observations are not absolute.

2. 科学结论是建立在有限观察的基础之上的。

2. Scientific conclusions are based on limited observations.

3. 因此，科学结论并非绝对的。

3. Therefore, scientific conclusions are not absolute.

这个论证的有效性（不要与其可靠性相混淆）并不建立在经验证据之上。它的有效性指的是论证的逻辑推进过程，与前提的真实性无关。结论与前提之间存在逻辑上的联系。这种联系并非基于任何经验事实，而是发生在人的心智之中。科学能否为前提与结论之间的逻辑联系提供辩护？不能。正如第三章所讨论的，我们心中存在一种洞见，它推动我们从前提走向结论。我们看到了某种并非基于经验证据的东西。似乎存在一些内在的逻辑结构或心智的某些方面，促成了这种推理方式。任何形式的观察都无法证明或辩护演绎论证的逻辑推进。

The validity of this argument (not to be confused with its soundness) is not based on empirical evidence. Its validity refers to the logical flow of the argument and has nothing to do with the truth of the premises. There is a logical connection between the conclusion and the premises. This connection is not based on anything empirical; it is happening in one’s mind. Can science justify the logical connection between the premises and the conclusion? No, it cannot. As discussed in Chapter 3, there is an insight in our minds that moves us from the premises to the conclusion. We see something that is not based on empirical evidence. There seem to be internal logical structures or aspects of our minds that facilitate this type of reasoning. No form of observation can justify or prove the logical flow of a deductive argument.

数学真理，例如 3 + 3 = 6，同样是必然真理，并非纯粹的经验概括。343. 例如，如果我问一个 Fufulah 加一个 Fufulah 等于多少，答案显然是二。即使你不知道 Fufulah 是什么，也从未感知过它，你仍然知道一个加另一个必然等于二。 科学无法为其他知识来源提供辩护，例如证言。这是认识论的一个分支，“关注我们如何从他人的陈述中获得知识和有理由的信念”。344.

Mathematical truths such as 3 + 3 = 6 are also necessary truths and are not purely empirical generalisations. 343. For instance, if I were to ask what is one Fufulah plus one Fufulah, the answer would obviously be two. Even though you do not know what a Fufulah is, and you have never sensed one, you know that one of them plus another one is going to be two. Other sources of knowledge Science cannot justify other sources of knowledge, such as testimony. This is a branch of epistemology “concerned with how we acquire knowledge and justified belief from the say-so of other people”.344.

因此，它试图回答的关键问题之一是：我们如何获得"基于他人所告知的知识"？345

Therefore, one of the key questions it tries to answer is: How do we gain “knowledge on the basis of what other people tell us?”345

教授本杰明·麦克迈勒对证言性知识作了如下概述：

Professor Benjamin McMyler provides a summary of testimonial knowledge:

“这里有几件我所知道的事。我知道，在大休斯顿地区，铜斑蝮是最常见的有毒蛇类。我知道拿破仑在滑铁卢战役中失败了。我还知道，在我写下这些文字时，美国汽油的平均价格是每加仑4.10美元……这些事情我都是通过认识论者所说的证言而知晓的，也就是说，是通过他人或群体告诉我而得知的。”346.

“Here are a few things that I know. I know that the copperhead is the most common venomous snake in the greater Houston area. I know that Napoleon lost the Battle of Waterloo. I know that, as I write, the average price for gasoline in the U.S is $4.10 per gallon… All of these things I know on the basis of what epistemologists call testimony, on the basis of being told of them by another person or group of persons.”346.

麦克迈勒的总结颇为直观，也说明了为什么我们仅凭传闻证言的传递便会认定某些知识。地球是球形的，就是一个鲜明的例子。对我们大多数人而言，“地球是球体”这一信念并非基于数学或科学，而纯粹建立在证言之上。你最初的反应可能包括以下说法：“我看过图片”、“我在科学书上读到过”、“我所有的老师都这样告诉我”、“我可以登上最高的山峰，亲眼观察地球的弧度”，等等。然而，经过理智的审视，我们所有的回答都属于证言性知识。看图片之所以属于证言，是因为你必须接受权威或某个人的说法，即这是地球的图像。从科学教科书中学到这一事实同样依赖证言的传递，因为你必须接受作者所言为真。提到你的老师时也是如此。试图通过站在最高峰上来实证地确认你目前的信念，同样依赖证言，因为我们中的许多人从未做过这样的事。你假定站在最高峰上就能为地球是圆的提供证据，这一假定归根结底仍然基于他人的说法。即便你曾经做过这样的事，也丝毫不能证明地球是圆的。站在山峰上只能表明地球具有某种弯曲，而不能说明它是一个完整的球体（毕竟，它完全可以是半圆形的，或者形如一朵花）。总而言之，对我们大多数人来说，地球是圆的这一事实，除了证言之外，并不建立在其他任何基础之上。

McMyler’s summary seems quite intuitive and highlights why we claim some knowledge solely based on testimonial transmission. The world being a sphere is a striking example. The belief that the world is a sphere is—for most of us—not based on mathematics or science. It is purely centred on testimony. Your initial reactions may entail the following statements: “I have seen pictures”, “I have read it in science books”, “All my teachers told me”, “I can go on the highest mountain peak and observe the curvature of the Earth”, and so on. However, upon intellectual scrutiny, all of our answers fall under testimonial knowledge. Seeing pictures or images is testimonial because you have to accept the say-so of the authority or person who said it is an image of the world. Learning this fact from science textbooks is also due to testimonial transmission, as you have to accept what the authors say as true. This also applies when referring to your teachers. Attempting to empirically justify your current conviction by standing on the highest peak is also based on testimony, as many of us have never done such a thing. Your assumption that standing on the highest peak will provide you with evidence for the roundness of the Earth is still based, ultimately, on the say-so of others. Even if you have done it before, it does not in any way prove the roundness of the Earth. Standing on a peak will only indicate that the Earth has some form of curvature—and not a complete sphere (after all, it can be semi-circular or shaped like a flower). In summary, for the majority of us, the fact that the world is round is not based on anything else apart from testimony.

没有见证或传述，知识是不可能的。认识论教授 C. A. J. 科迪（C. A. J. Coady）总结了前面所提出的观点，并列举了一些仅凭传述而接受的事情："……我们中的许多人从未亲眼见过婴儿的出生，我们大多数人也没有考察过血液循环，没有亲自了解世界的实际地理状况，也没有对本国法律做过任何具有代表性的考察，更没有做过那些观察，而正是这些观察构成了我们关于天空中的光点是距离极其遥远的天体这一知识的基础……"347

Knowledge is impossible without testimony. Professor of Epistemology C. A. J. Coady summarises the points made so far, and lists some of the things that are solely accepted on the basis of testimonial transmission: “…many of us have never seen a baby born, nor have most of us examined the circulation of the blood nor the actual geography of the world nor any fair sample of the laws of the land, nor have we made the observations that lie behind our knowledge that the lights in the sky are heavenly bodies immensely distant….”347

作为证言的知识的重要性无需再作深入讨论（关于证言的更详细论述，请参阅第13章）。简而言之，唯科学主义，即认为科学方法是形成关于实在之结论的唯一途径的观点，是错误的。唯科学主义是自我反驳的；它也无法解释道德真理、逻辑与数学真理，以及证言这类不可或缺的知识来源。科学是一种有限的研究方法，无法回答所有问题 假设二：它有效，所以它是真的。

The significance of testimonial knowledge needs no further discussion (for a lengthier discussion on testimony please refer to Chapter 13). In summary, scientism, which is the view that the scientific method is the only way to form conclusions about reality, is false. Scientism is self-defeating; it also cannot account for moral truths, logical and mathematical truths, and indispensable sources of knowledge such as testimony. Science is a limited method of study that cannot answer all the questions Assumption #2: It works, therefore it’s true.

它并不能逻辑地推出：某件事行之有效，它就是真的。尽管如此，由于大众对科学哲学缺乏了解，理查德·道金斯（Richard Dawkins）这类科普作家得以公开主张：科学结论之所以为真，是因为它们有效。在一次公开讲座中，有人问道金斯我们能赋予科学多大程度的确定性；他的回答——如前所述——很粗陋。道金斯显然是错的；并不能因为某件事行之有效，它就确实为真。燃素理论就是证明这一观点的一个恰当例子。

It does not logically follow that just because something works, it is true. Despite this, popular ignorance of the philosophy of science has allowed popularisers such as Richard Dawkins to publicly maintain that scientific conclusions are true because they work. During a public lecture, Dawkins was asked about the level of certainty that we can attribute to science; his answer was—as mentioned previously—crude. Dawkins was obviously mistaken; it does not follow that just because something works, it is in fact true. The phlogiston theory is an apt example to prove this point.

早期的化学家提出了一种理论,认为所有可燃物质中都含有一种名为“燃素”的元素。根据这一理论,可燃物在燃烧时会释放出燃素。物质越易燃,所含的燃素就越多。这一理论被科学界当作事实接受。该理论的效果非常好,以至于在1772年,丹·卢瑟福(Dan Rutherford)运用它发现了氮气,当时他称之为“燃素化空气”。然而,燃素后来被证明是一个错误的理论;燃素并不存在。这是众多例子之一,表明一个理论可以行之有效并产生新的科学真理,但之后仍可能被证明是错误的。其中的道理显而易见:某事物行之有效,并不意味着它就是真实的。一些未经专业训练的反对者可能会争辩说,上述例子具有特殊性,不能适用于现代科学。他们坚持认为,燃素理论并不是一个完整的理论,而且含有若干假设。然而,今天的科学理论并不存在这些问题。这种说法完全不实。以达尔文进化论为例,它是一个公认成熟的理论。根据主流世俗学术界的看法,该理论建立在若干假设之上,被认为具有较多的推测性,并且其核心观点存在争议。348

Early chemists postulated a theory that in all combustible objects was an element called phlogiston. According to this theory, when a combustible object burned, it would release phlogiston. The more combustible a material was, the more phlogiston it contained. This theory was adopted as a fact by the scientific community. The theory worked so well that in 1772 Dan Rutherford used it to discover nitrogen, which he called ‘phlogisticated air’ at the time. However, phlogiston was later found to be a false theory; phlogiston did not exist. This is one of many examples to show that a theory can work and produce new scientific truths, and yet later be found to be false. The lesson is obvious: just because something works, does not mean it is true. Some untrained objectors would argue that the example above is specific and cannot apply to modern science. They maintain that the theory of phlogiston was not a complete theory and had assumptions. However, today’s scientific theories do not suffer from these problems. This is completely false. Take Darwinian evolution as an example of a well-established theory. According to mainstream secular academics, it is based on assumptions, considered relatively speculative, and there are disputes about its core ideas.348

科学的“大转弯”并不在乎谁坐在副驾驶座上。即便是看似显而易见、无可置疑、可以直接观察到的事物，也可能被推翻。一个相对较新的例子是对欧洲尼安德特人头骨的研究。达尔文主义生物学家曾主张，尼安德特人必定是我们物种的祖先。在教科书、纪录片和博物馆中，这一“科学事实”被广泛传授；然而在1997年，生物学家依据现代DNA检测宣布，尼安德特人不可能是我们的祖先。 科学的每个领域，乃至构成各大理论的子理论，最终都会修正其结论。科学史已经表明了这一趋势，因此把“科学事实”视为一成不变的东西是不准确的。这样做也不切实际。所有科学理论都是“进行中的工作”和“近似模型”。如果有人声称存在科学上的绝对真理，那么他或她将如何解释这样一个事实：物理学家都视为正确的“量子力学”和“广义相对论”，在根本层面上彼此矛盾？它们不可能在绝对意义上都为真。认识到这一点，物理学家便假定二者都是有效的工作模型，并借此推动进一步的进展。因此，认为已获充分证实的科学理论具有最终性，这种观点是误导性的、不切实际的，并且对科学进步有害。科学史家和科学哲学家曾强烈反对使用这类说法。科学哲学家吉莉安·巴克和菲利普·基彻说得直截了当：“科学是可修正的。因此，谈论科学的‘证明’是危险的，因为这个词助长了结论刻在石头上、不可更改的观念。”349

Scientific U-turns do not care about who is sitting in the passenger seat. Even things which seemed obvious, undeniable and observable can be overturned. A relatively recent example of this is the study of Neanderthal skulls in Europe. Darwinian biologists argued that Neanderthals must have been the ancestors to our species. In textbooks, documentaries and museums, this ‘scientific fact’ was taught; in 1997 biologists announced the Neanderthal simply could not be our forerunner, based on modern DNA testing. Every aspect of science, and even the subtheories that make up the bigger theories in every field, will eventually revise their conclusions. The history of science has shown us this trend, so to speak of ‘scientific facts’ as immutable is not accurate. It is also impractical. All scientific theories are ‘work in progress’ and ‘approximate models’. If someone claims there is such a thing as scientific absolute truths, then how would he or she explain the fact that ‘quantum mechanics’ and ‘general relativity’, which are both seen as true by physicists, contradict each other at a fundamental level? They both cannot be true in an absolute sense. Knowing this, physicists assume both to be true working models and use this approach to make further progress. The idea that well-confirmed scientific theories are final is therefore misleading, impractical and dangerous for scientific progress. Historians and philosophers of science have been vocal in their opposition of using such language. Philosophers of science Gillian Barker and Philip Kitcher drive the point home: “Science is revisable. Hence, to talk of scientific ‘proof’ is dangerous, because the term fosters the idea of conclusions that are graven in stone.”349.

假设三:科学能带来确定性。

Assumption #3: Science leads to certainty.

有些无神论者对科学哲学存在严重的误解。他们认为，一旦科学宣布某件事已被科学证明，它就绝对正确，并且永远不会改变。然而，这恰恰暴露出他们对科学中一些基本的未解决问题缺乏了解。与我们的讨论相关的其中一个问题是归纳法。尽管科学家确认理论或对所检验的经验数据作出结论的方式有很多，但归纳论证仍然是其中大多数方式的基石。然而，归纳论证永远无法带来确定性。

Some atheists have a gross misunderstanding of the philosophy of science. They assume that once science declares something as scientifically proven, then it is absolutely true and will never change. This, however, exposes a lack of knowledge of the basic unresolved issues in science. One of these issues, which is relevant to our discussion, is induction. Although there are many ways scientists confirm a theory or form conclusions about the empirical data they have tested, inductive arguments remain the bedrock of most of them. Yet inductive arguments can never lead to certainty.

归纳论证

Inductive arguments.

归纳论证关乎我们对未被观察之事的认识。它们在人类知识，特别是科学知识中占据核心地位。归纳论证以我们已观察到的实例为依据，对我们尚未观察到的事物作出结论。它们的适用范围可以包括现在与过去。例如：

Inductive arguments concern our knowledge of the unobserved. They play a central role in human knowledge, specifically scientific knowledge. Inductive arguments use instances of what we have observed to make conclusions for what we have not observed. They can be applied to include the present and the past. For example:

• 过去——前提：我所交谈过的健美运动员都是通过大量摄入动物蛋白来增加肌肉量的。结论：过去所有的健美运动员都是通过大量摄入动物蛋白来增加肌肉量的。

• Past—Premise: The bodybuilders I have spoken to have increased muscle mass as a result of eating a lot of animal protein. Conclusion: All bodybuilders in the past increased muscle mass by eating a lot of animal protein.

• 前提：我的朋友一直遇到的都是友善的狗。 结论：所有的狗都是友善的。

• Present—Premise: My friend has always experienced friendly dogs. Conclusion: All dogs are friendly.

未来——前提:美国总统竞选中的每一次都有民主党候选人。结论:下一次总统竞选也将有民主党候选人。

• Future—Premise: All of the US presidential campaigns have had a Democrat candidate. Conclusion: The next presidential campaign will have a Democrat candidate.

以上结论显然未达到真正确定性的程度,因为它们并非演绎论证。下面的解释说明了为什么以上归纳论证中的结论并不必然成立:

The above conclusions obviously do not reach the level of true certainty because they are not deductive arguments. The explanations below show why the conclusions in the above inductive arguments do not necessarily follow:

过去的素食健美运动员仅靠食用植物蛋白就增长了肌肉量。

• Vegetarian bodybuilders in the past gained muscle mass from eating only vegetable protein.

• 有些狗可能并不友善。

• It could be the case that some dogs are unfriendly.

在未来，美国政治可能会出现政治范式的转变：民主党可能解体，一个新的政党可能出现。

• In the future, there could be a political paradigm shift in US politics, the Democrats could dissolve and a new party could emerge.

归纳论证的不确定性使许多哲学家质疑归纳作为获得知识之手段的有效性：这是哲学中被称为认识论证成（epistemic justification）的一个领域。这种质疑导致了如今所称的归纳问题。必须指出，归纳论证与归纳推理并不相同，因为归纳推理指的是运用感官，而非结论是如何得出的。例如，你在花园里观察到青蛙，于是通过陈述“你的花园里有青蛙”来反映你所观察到的情况。你并没有对未知现象（在这个例子中是所有青蛙，或者你尚未观察到的下一只青蛙）作出结论。

The uncertain nature of inductive arguments has caused many philosophers to question the validity of induction as a means to knowledge: this is an area of philosophy known as epistemic justification. This questioning led to what is now known as the problem of induction. It must be noted that inductive arguments are not the same as inductive reasoning, as this type of reasoning refers to the use of the senses and not how conclusions are made. For example, you observe frogs in your garden, and you mirror what you have observed by stating that there are frogs in your garden. You do not make a conclusion for unknown phenomena (in this case all frogs, or the next frog you have not yet observed)

归纳问题

The problem of induction.

对归纳法的质疑可以追溯到希腊的怀疑主义哲学流派——皮浪主义。然而，是大卫·休谟全面地阐明了归纳论证为何无法提供关于实在的知识。休谟认为，我们推理的本质建立在因果关系之上，而因果关系的基础则是经验。他主张，既然我们对因果关系的理解基于经验，它便不能导向确定性。休谟认为，以有限的经验集合去推断未曾观察到的经验，不可能产生确定性。351

The challenge to induction can be traced back to the Greek, sceptical, philosophical school known as Pyrrhonism.350 However, it was David Hume who comprehensively explained the failure of inductive arguments to provide knowledge of reality. Hume argued that the nature of our reasoning was based upon cause and effect, and that the foundation of cause and effect was experience. He maintained that since our understanding of cause and effect was based on experience, it would not lead to certainty. Hume argued that to use a limited set of experiences to conclude for an unobserved experience would not give rise to certainty.351

先前的例子表明,归纳论证是通过从特殊推向一般来得出结论的。换言之,人们从有限的一组经验出发,对尚未经历过的经验作出结论。归纳论证在演绎上并不有效,也就是说,结论不一定从前提中必然推出。休谟并不把他的论证限定在归纳的不确定性上,而是主张归纳根本得不到任何辩护。归纳论证建立在这样一个假设之上:"未来将与过去相似",这一假设暗含着自然是齐一的。然而,要为这一假设辩护,唯一的办法就是使用归纳论证。休谟认为,这种推理是循环的,因为这一假设所依据的正是我们想要证明的东西。用这一假设来为归纳论证辩护,无异于用归纳论证来为归纳论证辩护。毕竟,自然完全有可能并不齐一。353

The previous examples show that inductive arguments make a conclusion by moving from the particular to the general. In other words, one moves from a limited set of experiences to conclude for experiences that have not been experienced. Inductive arguments are not deductively valid, in that the conclusion does not necessarily follow from its premises. Hume does not restrict his argument to the uncertainty of induction; he claims that they are not justified in any way. Inductive arguments are based on an assumption that “the future will resemble the past”, 352 which implies that nature is uniform. However, the only way to justify this assumption would be to use an inductive argument. Hume argues that this reasoning is circular, because the assumption is based on the thing that we are seeking to justify. To justify an inductive argument with this assumption would be tantamount to justifying induction arguments with inductive arguments. After all, it could be that nature is not uniform.353

简而言之,休谟的论证是:我们无法为归纳论证提供辩护。关于自然具有一致性的假设本身是基于归纳论证的,因此,用这一假设来为归纳论证辩护,"就如同用'你会信守承诺'来担保你会偿还贷款的承诺一样"。354

In summary, Hume’s argument is that we cannot justify inductive arguments. The assumption that nature is uniform is based on an inductive argument, and therefore to use this assumption as a means to validate inductive arguments “is like underwriting your promise to pay back a loan by promising you will keep your promises”. 354.

归纳论证作为科学的一个难题

Inductive arguments as a problem for science.

鉴于归纳论证无法得出确定性结论,这就给科学结论带来了问题。科学家在对所观察到的数据形成结论时,严重依赖归纳论证。然而,由于所有观察都是有限的,或基于特定的一组观察数据,因此基于有限数据得出的结论并不确定。科学史提供了许多例子,突显了科学的动态本质。每个领域的主流理论都与过去的时代大不相同。约克大学哲学讲师萨米尔·奥卡莎(Samir Okasha)认为,如果我们任选一门科学学科,我们可以“确信该学科的主流理论将与50年前大不相同,与100年前相比则更加不同”。355

Given that inductive arguments cannot give rise to certainty, it then becomes a problem for scientific conclusions. Scientists heavily rely on inductive arguments to form conclusions about the data that they have observed. However, since all observations are limited or based on a particular set of observed data, then deriving a conclusion based on limited data will not be certain. The history of science provides many examples that highlight its dynamic nature. Prevailing theories in every field of science are very different from past eras. Samir Okasha, a lecturer of philosophy at the University of York, argues that if we were to pick any scientific discipline, we could be “sure that the prevalent theories in that discipline will be very different from those 50 years ago, and extremely different from 100 years ago.”355

20世纪初，物理学在牛顿的宇宙模型下显得井然有序。大约二百年间，没有人对它提出挑战，因为它被认为已经“科学地证明”是正确的。然而，量子力学和广义相对论打碎了牛顿式的世界观。牛顿力学假定时间和空间是固定不变的实体，而阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦表明，它们是相对的、动态的。经过一段动荡时期，“爱因斯坦模型”最终取代了“牛顿模型”。粗略地回顾科学史就能证实归纳问题：一个新的观察结果总有可能与先前的结论相矛盾。

At the beginning of the 20th century, physics looked neat and tidy with its Newtonian model of the universe. No one had challenged it for around 200 years as it was ‘scientifically proven’ to work. However, quantum mechanics and general relativity shattered the Newtonian view of the world. Newtonian mechanics assumed time and space to be fixed entities, but Albert Einstein showed these were relative and dynamic. Eventually, after a period of upheaval, the ‘Einstein Model’ of the universe replaced the ‘Newtonian Model’. A cursory glance at the history of science confirms the problem of induction: a new observation can always contradict previous conclusions.

科学与宗教经典

Science and religious scripture.

既然科学结论本质上是归纳性的,而归纳论证并不能导出确定性,因此我们所谓的科学解释不应被视为绝对的。科学中并没有"摩西法版"那样的绝对真理。然而,也有一些事情我们不应对其持怀疑态度,例如:地球是圆的、引力的存在,以及轨道的椭圆性质。

Since scientific conclusions are inductive in nature, and inductive arguments do not lead to certainty, it follows that what we call scientific explanations should not be considered absolute. There are no Moses tablets in science. There are, however, some things that we should not be sceptical about, such as: the roundness of the Earth, the existence of gravity and the elliptical nature of orbits.

许多无神论者嘲笑宗教经典无法如实反映事实。网络上和线下都有大量关于科学与宗教正统观念的讨论，甚至主流电视节目也会邀请嘉宾辩论宗教对自然界的看法。然而，鉴于上述讨论，我们制造了一种宗教与科学的虚假二分法。事情并非如此简单，不是非此即彼地接受其中一方。

Many atheists mock religious scripture for its inability to represent the facts. There are many online and off-line discussions on science and religious orthodoxy. Even mainstream television programmes host debates on religious perspectives on the natural world. However, in light of the discussion above, we have created a false dichotomy of religion versus science. It is not as simple as accepting one over the other.

科学是将理性运用于自然世界的活动。它试图理解世界是如何运作的。《古兰经》也提到了自然现象，因此难免会出现与科学结论直接冲突的情况。当冲突出现时，没有理由惊慌失措，也没有理由否认与科学不相符的那节经文；任何人也不能借此宣称《古兰经》是错误的。这样做就等于假定科学结论在绝对意义上是真实的，并且永远不会改变；这显然是错误的。历史表明，科学会修正自己的结论。相信这一点并不意味着反对科学。试想一下，如果科学家不被允许质疑过去的结论，我们的进步将何其有限：几乎不会有任何进步。科学不是一套永恒不变的事实，也从来不是要成为这样的东西。既然有充分的理由证明《古兰经》是真主的语言（见第13章），那么当《古兰经》与有限的人类知识相冲突时，就不应造成巨大的困惑。请记住，真主看到的是全图，而我们只看到一个像素。直到20世纪50年代，包括爱因斯坦在内的所有物理学家都相信宇宙是永恒的；所有数据都支持这一观点，而这一信念与《古兰经》相矛盾。然而，《古兰经》明确指出宇宙有一个开端。利用强大的先进望远镜所做的新观测，使物理学家放弃了“稳态”模型（永恒宇宙），转而接受大爆炸模型（有开端的宇宙，可能形成于约137亿年前）。因此，科学与《古兰经》取得了一致。关于太阳，也发生了同样的情况。《古兰经》指出太阳有运行轨道；天文学家则认为太阳是静止的。这是科学家的观测与《古兰经》之间最直接的矛盾。 然而,在哈勃望远镜被发现之后,天文学家修正了他们的结论,发现太阳是围绕银河系中心运行的。但这并不意味着《古兰经》是一部科学著作。它是一部关于迹象的书。《古兰经》并未给出任何有关自然现象的细节。其中提及的大多数事物,肉眼即可理解和验证。那些指向自然界的经文,其主要目的在于昭示一种超越物质的力量与智慧。它们的作用并不包括阐明科学细节。这些细节可能随时间而改变;然而,自然现象背后存在力量与智慧,这一事实则是永恒的真理。从这一角度看,《古兰经》与科学结论之间的冲突很可能会持续下去,因为二者是两种截然不同的知识类型。

Science is the application of reason to the natural world. It seeks to understand how the world works. The Qur’an also refers to natural phenomena, and inevitably there have been direct conflicts with scientific conclusions. When a conflict arises, there is no reason to panic or to deny the Qur’anic verse that is not in line with science; nor can anyone use this situation to claim that the Qur’an is wrong. To do so, would be to assume that scientific conclusions are true in an absolute sense and will not change; this is patently false. History has shown that science revises its conclusions. Believing this does not make one anti-science. Imagine how much progress we would make if scientists were not allowed to challenge past conclusions: there would be none. Science is not a collection of eternal facts and was never meant to be. Since there are good arguments to justify the Qur’an’s claim of being God’s word (see Chapter 13), then if the Qur’an conflicts with limited human knowledge, it should not create massive confusion. Remember, God has the picture, we have just a pixel. Until the 1950s, all physicists, including Einstein, believed that the universe was eternal; all the data supported this, and this belief conflicted with the Qur’an. Yet the Qur’an explicitly states that the universe had a beginning. New observations using powerful advanced telescopes made physicists drop the ‘steady state’ model (eternal universe) and replace that with the Big Bang Model (universe with a beginning, possibly about 13.7 billion years ago). So, science came into line with the Qur’an. The same thing happened with the Qur’anic view of the sun. The Qur’an states that the sun has an orbit; astronomers disagreed, saying it was stationary. This was the most direct contradiction between observations of scientists and the Qur’an. However, after the discovery of the Hubble telescope, astronomers revised their conclusions and found the Sun was orbiting around the centre of the Milky Way galaxy. Yet this does not mean that the Qur’an is a book of science. It’s a book of signs. The Qur’an does not give any details concerning natural phenomena. Most of the things it refers to can be understood and verified with the naked eye. The main objective of the verses that point towards the natural world is to expose a metaphysical power and wisdom. Their role does not include elucidating scientific details. These can change over time; however, the fact that natural phenomena have a power and wisdom behind them is a timeless reality. From this perspective, conflict between the Qur’an and scientific conclusions will probably continue, as they are two completely different types of knowledge.

这一讨论不应因此而鼓励穆斯林和信教之人否定科学结论。那样做是荒谬的。相反，经过充分证实的科学理论与启示性真理都应当被接受，即便二者彼此相互矛盾。科学结论可以在实践中被接受，作为可以改变、并非绝对的工作模型；启示性真理则可以被接受，作为个人信仰的一部分。如果无法调和某一科学结论与《古兰经》的某段经文，那么你不必为了接受当时的科学而放弃启示。反过来，科学也不应当被拒绝。如前所述，同时接受科学真理与启示真理，是你在认识论上的权利。关于科学与启示的平衡而细致的态度，是接受科学，并让证据自己说话。但这应当建立在不做重大认识论飞跃的前提之上，即不要断定我们所获得的证据和所得出的结论就是不容置疑的终极真理。科学是可以改变的。此外，这一态度也包括接受启示。总之，我们可以在实践中把科学结论当作工作模型来接受；但如果某一结论与启示相抵触（在尝试调和二者之后），你不必把这一科学结论纳入自己的信仰体系。这就是为什么穆斯林不必否定达尔文的进化论：他们可以在实践中把它当作当前最好的工作模型来接受，但也应当明白，其中某些方面与正统教义无法调和。请记住，某个理论即便是当前最好的工作模型，也不等于绝对真理。同样重要的是，科学知识与神圣启示有着不同的来源：一者来自有限的人类心智，另一者来自真主。 一个人若要用科学结论来否定启示，就会犯下认识论上的失格。我们对实在的理解是像素化的，我们的知识是有限的，而真主的知识是无限的。因此，若两者之间出现矛盾，就应当采取上述策略。

This discussion should not, however, encourage Muslims and religious people to deny scientific conclusions. To do so would be absurd. Rather, both well-confirmed scientific theories and the revelational truths should be accepted, even if they contradict each other. Scientific conclusions can be accepted practically as working models that can change and are not absolute, and the revelational truths can be accepted as part of one’s beliefs. If there is no hope of reconciling a scientific conclusion and a statement of the Qur’an, then you do not have to reject revelation and accept the science of the day. Conversely, the science should not be rejected either. As previously mentioned, it is within your epistemic right to accept both scientific and revelational truths. The balanced and nuanced approach concerning science and revelation is to accept the science and allow the evidence to speak for itself. However, this should be in the context of not making massive epistemic leaps of faith and concluding that the evidence we have acquired and the conclusions we have made are the gospel truth. Science can change. In addition, this approach includes accepting the revelation. In summary, we can accept scientific conclusions practically and as working models, but if anything contradicts revelation (after attempting to reconcile the two), you do not have to accept the scientific conclusion into your belief system. This is why Muslims should not need to deny Darwinian evolution; they can accept it practically as the current best-working model, but understand that some aspects of it cannot be reconciled with orthodoxy. Remember, just because something is the current best-working model, it is not the absolute truth. It is also important to note that scientific knowledge and Divine revelation have two different sources. One is from the human limited mind, the other is from God. One would have to commit an epistemological disqualification to use scientific conclusions as a means to dismiss revelation. We have a pixelated understanding of reality. Our knowledge is finite, God’s knowledge is not. Therefore, if there happens to be a contradiction between the two, the above strategy should be adopted.

伊斯兰的归纳论证?

Islamic inductive arguments?.

批评者和有学问的观察者在这场讨论中会注意到,虽然这是科学(在学术界和哲学界)的主流理解,但它也揭示了对伊斯兰认识论的潜在批评。他们可能会主张,在伊斯兰传统中,归纳论证被用来保存《古兰经》和先知圣训(即哈迪斯;复数为阿哈迪斯),因此穆斯林无法对这些重要的源文本声称确定性。这是一种误解。为了说明原因,请回顾前面关于归纳推理与归纳论证之间的区分。归纳推理为基本类型的知识提供确定性。例如,如果我观察到Y中有X,那么必然可以得出Y允许X;我观察到乌鸦会飞,因此必然可以得出某些乌鸦会飞。可见,这种形式的归纳只是"映照"了观察结果。它陈述的是明显的事实,而不对尚未被观察到的事物作出结论。这种类型的归纳正是用于保存《古兰经》和先知圣训的方法。例如,先知穆罕默德ﷺ的一位同伴听到了《古兰经》,他只是重复了所听到的内容,从未对他未曾听到的经文作出推论。比如,一位同伴不会听到"Iyyaka na'abudu wa iyyaka nasta'een"(我们只崇拜你,也只向你求助),然后推断出"Qul huwa Allahu ahad"(你说:他是安拉,是独一的)。因此,这一反驳是错误的,因为它误解了《古兰经》和先知圣训保存过程中所涉及的归纳类型。

Critical and learned observers of this discussion will notice that although this is a mainstream understanding of science (amongst academics and philosophers), it also brings to light potential criticisms of Islamic epistemology. They can argue that in the Islamic tradition, inductive arguments are used to preserve the Qur’an and Prophetic traditions (known as hadith; ahadith, pl.). Therefore, Muslims cannot claim certainty in these vital source texts for Islam. This is a misplaced contention. To explain why, refer back to the earlier distinction between inductive reasoning and inductive arguments. Inductive reasoning provides certainty for basic types of knowledge. For instance, if I observe X in Y, it follows that Y allows X; I observe that crows fly, so it necessarily follows that some crows fly. As you can see, this form of induction just ‘mirrors’ the observation. It states the plain facts without making a conclusion for something that is yet to be observed. This type of induction was used in the preservation of the Qur’an and the Prophetic traditions. For example, a companion of the Prophet Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم heard the Qur’an, and he simply repeated what he had heard. He never made a conclusion for a verse that he never heard. For example, a companion wouldn’t hear “Iyyaka na’abudu wa iyyaka nasta’een” (it is You we worship and it is You we ask for help) and then conclude “Qul huwa Allahu ahad” (Say, He is God, the uniquely One). Hence this objection is false, as it misunderstands the type of induction involved in the preservation of the Qur’an and the Prophetic traditions.

假设第四：将方法论自然主义与哲学自然主义混为一谈。

Assumption #4: Conflating methodological with philosophical naturalism.

科学导致无神论这一论断背后的最后一个预设，涉及哲学自然主义与方法论自然主义。哲学自然主义认为，宇宙如同一个封闭的系统：宇宙之外没有任何东西会干预它，也不存在上帝或任何与超自然相关的事物。哲学自然主义的一个关键要素是，一切现象都可以通过物理过程来解释。方法论自然主义则主张，任何要被称为科学的东西，都不能涉及上帝的创造力或创造活动。

The final assumption behind the assertion that science leads to atheism refers to philosophical naturalism and methodological naturalism. Philosophical naturalism is the view that the universe is like a closed system; there is nothing outside the universe that interferes with it, and there is no God or anything related to the supernatural. A key aspect of philosophical naturalism is that all phenomena can be explained via physical processes. Methodological naturalism maintains that for anything to be described as scientific, it cannot refer to God’s creative power or activity.

无神论者中，有人认为科学会导向无神论，他们持有一种非科学的预设，即哲学自然主义。哲学自然主义构成了人们观看世界的“镜片”。如果你戴上一副黄色的墨镜，你会看到什么颜色？黄色。同样，如果你戴上哲学自然主义的镜片，你所看到的只能是一个没有上帝的宇宙。哲学自然主义塑造了人们看待世界的方式。哲学自然主义本质上就是一种信仰。无神论哲学家迈克尔·鲁斯承认了这一事实：“如果你想要一个让步，我一直说自然主义是一种信仰行为……”356 为什么说它是一种信仰？因为自然主义是不融贯的，它盲目地相信一切都可以通过物理过程来解释，却无视大量顽固的事实。所谓顽固的事实，即那些抵制某种理论的事实。357举个例子：假设我们今天六点在一家餐厅碰面，而第二天警察到我家来逮捕我，怀疑我在同一时刻谋杀了某人。顽固的事实就是，案发时我正和你一起吃饭。我已被证实的行踪，足以抵制警方对我的怀疑。 你或许会问，那些使哲学自然主义变得不融贯的顽固事实是什么？前面的many章节是很好的起点。哲学自然主义无法充分解释意识的难题（见第7章）、宇宙的有限性与依赖性（见第5和第6章）、法则的精细调谐与宇宙的秩序（见第8章）、客观道德的存在（见第9章）等等。鉴于此，为什么还有人会盲目接受这样一种哲学，从而使自己无法让实在本身说话呢？许多无神论者都怀有这样的自然主义预设。因此，他们驳斥有神论论证的结论也就不足为奇了。 通常他们会拒绝良好的论证,因为他们被一种错误的假设蒙蔽了双眼:即一切都必须用物理过程来解释,而且他们永远不能接受超自然的解释。然而,方法论自然主义对有神论,尤其是伊斯兰有神论而言并不构成问题。方法论自然主义之所以不构成伊斯兰有神论的问题,是因为伊斯兰传统承认整个宇宙由物理原因构成,而这些原因正是神圣意志的显现。然而,有些无神论者把方法论自然主义与哲学自然主义混为一谈。科学的结论和理论无法涉及真主的大能与创造(方法论自然主义),但这并不意味着真主不存在(哲学自然主义)。正如进化生物学家斯科特·C·托德所说:"作为个体,科学家可以自由地接受超越自然主义的实在。"358

Atheists who believe that science leads to atheism hold the non-scientific assumption of philosophical naturalism. Philosophical naturalism forms the ‘lenses’ that are put on one’s eyes to understand the world. If you wore some yellow tinted glasses, what colour are you going to see? Yellow. Similarly, if you put on the lenses of philosophical naturalism, all you will see is a universe without God. Philosophical naturalism shapes the way one sees the world. Philosophical naturalism is simply a faith. The atheist Professor Michael Ruse admits this fact: “If you want a concession, I’ve always said that naturalism is an act of faith….” 356 Why is it a faith? Well, naturalism is incoherent, as it blindly believes that everything can be explained via physical processes, despite a number of recalcitrant facts; in other words, facts that resist a theory.357 For example, we both meet today at a restaurant at six o’clock, and the following day the police come to my house to arrest me on suspicion of murdering someone at the same time we were having dinner. The recalcitrant fact would be that I was with you eating at the time of the murder. My proven whereabouts resist the police’s suspicions that I committed the murder. You may be wondering, what are these recalcitrant facts that render philosophical naturalism as incoherent? Well, many of the previous chapters are a good starting point. Philosophical naturalism cannot adequately explain the hard problem of consciousness (see Chapter 7), the finitude and dependency of the universe (see Chapters 5 and 6), the fine-tuning of the laws and the order in the universe (see Chapter 8), the existence of objective morals (see Chapter 9) and much more. In light of this, why would anyone blindly adopt such a philosophy, which prevents one from allowing reality to speak for itself? Many atheists have such naturalistic presuppositions. Therefore, it is not surprising that they dismiss the conclusions of theistic arguments. Usually they reject good arguments, because they are blinded with the false assumption that everything has to be explained by physical processes and that they can never entertain supernatural explanations. Methodological naturalism however is not a problem for theism, especially Islamic theism. Methodological naturalism is not a problem for Islamic theism because the Islamic tradition accepts that the whole universe is made up of physical causes and these causes are a manifestation of the Divine will. Some atheists, however, conflate methodological naturalism with philosophical naturalism. Just because scientific conclusions and theories cannot refer to God’s power and creativity (methodological naturalism), it doesn’t follow that God doesn’t exist (philosophical naturalism). As evolutionary biologist Scott C. Todd said, “the scientist, as an individual, is free to embrace a reality that transcends naturalism”358.

科学是否否定了真主？

So has science disproved God?.

在上述内容的基础上，答案是否定的。科学是一种美妙的研究方法，为人类带来了巨大的益处。然而，它的结论并非刻在石头上的定论。作为一种方法，科学既不能直接否定真主的存在，也不能回答所有问题，而且它并不是认识实在的唯一途径。一些无神论者对科学所持的许多假设是前后不一致的，并且建立在对科学哲学的严重误解之上。

In light of the above, the answer is no. Science is a beautiful method of study that has benefited humanity tremendously. However, its conclusions are not engraved in stone. As a method, it cannot directly reject God’s existence, answer all questions, and it is not the only way to form conclusions about reality. Many of the assumptions that some atheists hold about science are incoherent and based on a gross misunderstanding of the philosophy of science.