我的父亲喜欢散步。他会思索那些困扰思考者的深刻问题。在一次散步中，他决定去参观伦敦著名的海德公园演讲角（Speakers Corner）。这里以关于人、生命和宇宙的激烈而热烈的讨论而闻名，话题包括政治以及各种阴谋论。这是一个言论自由不受约束的地方，任何人几乎都可以用任何方式说出自己想说的话。这个角落通常会出现以神的存在为核心的神学与哲学辩论。我父亲去那里的那一天，正在听一场讨论，议题是我们是否有充分的理由相信神圣者的存在。我父亲打断了讨论，对他们说：“如果你否认神，你就是在否认你自己。”父亲把这件事讲给我听时，我并不真正理解他话语的含义。然而，几十年过去，我想在本章中展开阐述他这份深刻的智慧。

My father loves going for walks. He ponders the profound questions that plague the thinking man. On one of these walks, he decided to visit the famous Speakers Corner in London. It is known for its loud and heated discussions about man, life and the universe, including politics and all sorts of conspiracies. It is a place for unfettered free speech, where anyone and everyone can say almost what they want in any way they want. The corner usually witnesses theological and philosophical debates centred on God’s existence. The day my father visited the corner he was listening to a discussion about whether or not we have good reasons to believe in the Divine. My father interrupted the discussion and told them, “If you reject God, you deny yourself.” When my father told me this story, I didn’t really understand the implications of what he said. However, fast-forward a few decades, I would like to expand on his profound wisdom in this chapter.

我的父亲试图向人群解释：既然我们有自我意识（以及对自身感受的觉察），这就是真主存在的一个迹象。从广义上讲，我父亲所指的是现象意识（phenomenal consciousness）；简单来说，就是我们拥有内在的主观体验这一事实。现象意识指的是我们能够对某一特定意识状态进行内在的主观觉察，并体会处于该意识状态时的感受。例如，当我吃我最喜欢的巧克力，或者聆听《古兰经》的诵读时，我能够觉察到那种内在体验，并能体会处于该意识状态时的感受。然而，没有其他人能够获得我拥有这些主观体验时的感受。当然，其他人对巧克力和《古兰经》诵读会有他们自己的看法，但他们永远无法真正体验或理解我在那些体验中的感受。

My father was trying to tell the crowd that since we have an awareness of who we are (and what we feel), it is a sign that God exists. In a broad sense, what my father was referring to was phenomenal consciousness; in simple terms, the fact that we have inner subjective experiences. Phenomenal consciousness relates to our ability to have an inner subjective awareness of what it is like to experience a particular conscious state. For example, when I eat my favourite chocolate or when I listen to a recitation of the Qur’an, I am aware of that internal experience, and I can appreciate what it is like to be in that conscious state. However, no one else can access what it is like for me to have those subjective experiences. Of course, other people will have their own perspectives of chocolate and the recitation of the Qur’an, but they will never truly experience or comprehend what I feel during those experiences.

即使你了解我大脑的全部生理状况,你也无法知道我经历某种特定体验是什么感觉,无论是喝橙汁、凝望美丽的日落,还是坠入爱河。主要原因在于,神经科学大体上是一门关于相关性的科学。神经科学家观察大脑活动,并将这些活动与参与者报告自己意识到的内容相关联。然而,这些相关性永远无法告诉我们参与者处于某种意识状态时的感受是什么样的,它只能告诉我们这种状态何时发生。你或许会争辩说,参与者可以通过描述自己的主观体验,为神经科学家提供第一人称的数据,从而回答这个问题。但这并不是答案,因为即使有人使用"冷"、"痛"、"甜"、"美丽"和"悲伤"这样的词语,他们也永远无法告诉我们拥有这些体验和感受是怎样的。词语是意义与体验的载体,但要充分理解他人的意识体验,我们必须超越词语。 内在意识体验另一个难以捉摸的方面在于,为什么主观体验会从非意识的生物和物理过程中产生。为什么独特的内在体验会从非意识的物质中涌现?这是心灵哲学和神经科学中的另一个重要问题。我到目前为止所介绍的这些问题,构成了学术界所说的意识难题。尽管它已引发许多关于我们是谁以及我们意识体验本质的激烈争论,但至今仍未得到解决。研究员丹尼尔·博尔(Daniel Bor)以如下方式陈述了这一问题:

Even if you were to know everything about my physical brain, you would not be able to find out what it is like for me to have a particular experience, whether drinking orange juice, staring at a beautiful sunset or falling in love. The main reason for this is that neuroscience is mostly a science of correlations. Neuroscientists observe brain activity and correlate that activity with what the participants report they are conscious of. However, these correlations can never tell us anything about what it is like for participants to be in a given state of consciousness; it can only tell us when it occurs. You may argue that a participant may provide neuroscientists with first-person data by describing his or her subjective experience, thereby answering the question. Nonetheless, this is not an answer, because even if someone uses words like ‘cold’, ‘painful’, ‘sweet’, ‘beautiful’ and ‘sad’, they can never tell us what it is like to have those experiences and feelings. Words are vehicles for meaning and experience, but we must go beyond words to fully understand the conscious experience of another. Another elusive aspect of internal conscious experiences is why subjective experiences arise from non-conscious biological and physical processes. Why does a unique internal experience arise from non-conscious matter? This is another important question in the philosophy of the mind and neuroscience. The issues I have introduced so far form what academics call the hard problem of consciousness. This has remained unresolved, despite having sparked many heated debates on the nature of who we are and our conscious experiences. Research fellow Daniel Bor states the problem in the following way:

“世界上有许多难题，但只有一个能自称为“难题”。那就是意识的问题——大约1300克的神经细胞，如何催生出那无缝衔接的万花筒般的感觉、思想、记忆与情绪，占据着人醒着的每一刻……这个难题至今仍未解决。”190.

“There are a lot of hard problems in the world, but only one gets to call itself ‘the hard problem’. That is the problem of consciousness—how 1300 grams or so of nerve cells conjures up the seamless kaleidoscope of sensations, thoughts, memories and emotions that occupy every waking moment… The hard problem remains unresolved.”190.

我们拥有内在主观意识体验这一事实，本身就只能由一位全知全觉的存在者来解释。这位存在者创造了物质宇宙与有意识的生物，并赋予它们觉察自身内在主观体验的能力。其他解释从一开始就站不住脚——例如，冷冰冰的唯物主义宇宙观对这一问题毫无解决的希望。试想宇宙之初只有简单的物质排列，经过漫长的岁月，它们自行重排，形成人类，并产生意识。这听起来像魔法，因为物质是冷漠、盲目、无意识的，它怎么可能对这种现象负责？它不可能做到。打个比方，如果我手里没有10英镑，我就不可能给你10英镑。同理，如果物质本身不包含意识，或没有产生意识的潜能，它也就不可能产生意识。你或许会反驳说，我可以先赚钱，再把钱给别人；同样，物质也可以通过某种复杂的过程"赚取"意识。这是错误的，因为一个无意识的单独过程加上另一个无意识的单独过程，结果仍然是两个无意识的过程。这就像想把一块铁变成木头：无论你如何加工这块铁，它永远不会变成木头，哪怕再增加更多的铁也是如此。

The very fact that we have internal subjective conscious experiences can only be explained by the existence of an All-Aware Being. This Being created the physical universe with conscious creatures, and gave them the ability to be aware of their internal subjective experiences. Other explanations fail from the onset—for instance, a cold, materialistic view on the universe offers no hope for a solution to the problem. Imagine in the beginning of the universe all you had were simple arrangements of matter, and after a long period of time, they rearranged themselves into human beings to form consciousness. This sounds like magic, because matter is cold, blind and non-conscious, so how can it be responsible for such a phenomenon? It cannot. For example, I cannot give you £10 if I do not have it. Likewise, matter cannot give rise to consciousness if it does not contain it or have the potential to give rise to it. You may argue that I can earn the money and then give it to someone; likewise, matter can somehow ‘earn’ consciousness via some complex process. This is false, because an individual non-conscious process plus another individual non-complex process still equal two non-conscious processes. It is like trying to turn a piece of iron into wood: no matter how you manipulate the iron, it will never turn into wood, even if you add more iron.

本章的目的在于解构针对意识难题的流行解释，并说明有神论的进路，进而说明上帝的存在，如何提供更为优越的解释。我还将指出，这并不是一个“科学终将给出答案”的问题，因为即便我们对大脑了如指掌，并坚持只援引生物学的、唯物主义的（甚至非有神论的哲学）解释，我们仍然无法回答意识难题。

The scope of this chapter is to deconstruct the popular explanations for the hard problem of consciousness and explain how a theistic approach, and by extension God’s existence, provides a far better explanation. I will also bring to light that this is not an issue for which ‘science will eventually give us the answers’, because even if we were to know everything about the brain and insist on referring solely to biological, materialist (or even non-theistic philosophical) explanations, we will still not answer the hard problem of consciousness.

More about the hard problem.

More about the hard problem.

按照他们自己的承认，意识问题给许多学者带来了无法解决的难题，尤其是那些在唯物主义立场上过于教条的人。克里斯托夫·科赫教授在其著作《意识：一位浪漫还原论者的自白》中公开承认道：

By their own admission, the issue of consciousness has caused many academics unsolvable problems, especially those who are excessively dogmatic in their materialistic approach. In his book Consciousness: Confessions of a Romantic Reductionist, Professor Christof Koch openly admits:

“大脑如何将生物电活动转化为主观状态，以及水面反射的光子如何神奇地转变为虹彩碧蓝山间湖泊的知觉，这是一个谜。神经系统与意识之间的关系性质仍然难以捉摸，并且是激烈而无休止争论的主题……解释一团高度有序的物质如何能够拥有内在视角，一直让科学方法束手无策，而在许多其他领域，科学方法却已被证明极为富有成效。”191

“How the brain converts bioelectrical activity into subjective states, how photons reflected off water are magically transformed into the percept of an iridescent aquamarine mountain tarn is a puzzle. The nature of the relationship between the nervous system and consciousness remains elusive and the subject of heated and interminable debates… Explaining how a highly organized piece of matter can possess an interior perspective has daunted the scientific method, which in so many other areas has proved immensely fruitful.”191.

这些尚未解决的问题并不涉及大脑的物理构成，也不涉及我们如何将某些意识状态与大脑活动相对应。比如我感到疼痛时，大脑中会出现某种活动，表明我正在经历疼痛。没有人否认物理大脑与意识之间存在关联，但我必须在此强调，这只是一种关联。大脑与意识并不是同一回事。请考虑以下类比：大脑是汽车，意识是驾驶者。没有驾驶者，汽车就不会开动；而如果汽车损坏或故障，驾驶者也无法发动它或正常使用它。然而，二者在某种意义上是不同的，并且相互独立。

These unresolved problems do not concern the physical makeup of the brain and how we can correlate some conscious states with brain activity. If I am experiencing pain, some sort of activity in my brain indicates that I am experiencing pain. No one is denying that the physical brain and consciousness are related, but I must stress here, it is just a relationship. The brain and consciousness is not the same thing. Take the following analogy into consideration: the brain is the car, and consciousness is the driver. The car will not move without the driver, and the driver will not be able to start the car—or use it properly—if it is damaged or broken. However, they are both different and independent in some way.

专家们在试图解决哪些问题？为什么大脑与意识并不是同一回事？这些问题的答案就在于所谓的"意识难题"（the hard problem of consciousness）之中。意识难题关乎这样一个事实：我们拥有内在的主观体验。换句话说，问题在于：我们无法用科学的第三人称语言来解释，某个特定生命体拥有主观意识体验时，究竟是怎样一种感受。大卫·查默斯教授普及了"意识难题"这一说法，他解释道：

What are the problems that specialists in the field are trying to address, and why are the brain and consciousness not the same thing? The answer to these questions lies in what is known as the hard problem of consciousness. The hard problem of consciousness concerns the fact that we have internal subjective experiences. In other words, the problem is that we cannot explain what it is like for a particular organism to have a subjective conscious experience in terms of the third-person language of science. Professor David Chalmers, who popularised the phrase the hard problem of consciousness, explains:

“真正困难的意识问题，是经验的问题。当我们思考和感知时，会有一阵信息处理的嗡鸣，但也有一个主观的方面……这个主观方面就是经验。例如，当我们看见时，会经历视觉感受：红色被感受到的质地、明与暗的体验、物理场中深度的质感。其他经验也伴随着不同模态的感知而来：单簧管的声音、樟脑丸的气味。此外还有各种身体感觉，从疼痛到性高潮；内在唤起的心理意象；情绪被感受到的质地；以及意识流思维的体验。把所有这些状态联系起来的是：处于其中时，存在着某种‘是那样’的感受。它们都是经验状态……如果有哪个问题够得上意识问题的称号，那就是这一个。在‘意识’的这一核心意义上，一个有机体，以及一个心理状态，是有意识的，当且仅当处于该状态时存在着某种‘是那样’的感受。”192.

“The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information processing, but there is also a subjective aspect… This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a physical field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion; and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience… If any problem qualifies as the problem of consciousness, it is this one. In this central sense of ‘consciousness’, an organism, and a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that state.”192.

托林·奥尔特教授为意识难题的定义增添了另一个维度，他关注的是：为什么大脑的物理过程会产生意识体验，这一问题至今无法回答。

Professor Torin Alter adds another dimension to the definition of the hard problem of consciousness, by focusing on the inability to answer why physical brain processes produce conscious experience:

“当我敲下这些文字时，我大脑中的认知系统正在处理视觉和听觉信息。伴随这一处理过程的，是现象意识的各种状态，例如听到键盘发出嗒嗒嗒声的听觉体验，以及看到字母出现在屏幕上的视觉体验。我的大脑活动如何产生这些体验？为什么是这些，而不是其他体验？的确，为什么任何物理事件都会伴随意识体验？这一系列问题被称为意识的困难问题……即便所有相关的功能和能力都已得到解释，人们仍然可以合理地追问：看到字母出现在电脑屏幕上时，为什么会有某种“感受”？”193.

“As I type these words, cognitive systems in my brain engage in visual and auditory information processing. This processing is accompanied by states of phenomenal consciousness, such as the auditory experience of hearing the tap-tap-tap of the keyboard and the visual experience of seeing the letters appear on the screen. How does my brain's activity generate those experiences? Why those and not others? Indeed, why is any physical event accompanied by conscious experience? The set of such problems is known as the hard problem of consciousness… Even after all the associated functions and abilities are explained, one might reasonably wonder why there is something it is like to see letters appear on a computer screen.”193.

让我用一个例子来简化上面的定义。假设你正在吃一颗草莓。科学家和哲学家能够在大脑中找到相关性，表明你正在吃某种东西，甚至可以判断出你吃的是一种水果，并且通过让你描述自己的意识体验，来了解你是否觉得它好吃或甜。然而，他们永远无法查明或考察你吃草莓时的感受如何，也无法了解甜味与美味对你而言意味着什么、带来怎样的感觉，以及为什么你会从这些物理过程中产生吃草莓这种特定的主观体验。

Let me simplify the above definitions with an example. Say you were to eat a strawberry. Scientists and philosophers would be able to find correlations in the brain that indicate that you are eating something, maybe even the fact that you are eating a piece of fruit, and whether or not you find it tasty or sweet by asking you to describe your conscious experience. Nevertheless, they could never find out or examine what it is like for you to eat a strawberry, or what tastiness or sweetness mean and feel for you, and why you have had that particular subjective experience of eating a strawberry arising from physical processes.

值得注意的是，眼下的问题并不仅仅是认识论上的问题；它并不是因为我们不了解神经生物学，或者无法仅通过观察神经生物活动来理解某人拥有内在主观意识体验是怎样的感受。相反，这是一个本体论问题，它关乎现象体验的来源与本质。物理的东西（在此即神经生物学）与主观意识的本质是截然不同的。无法弄清楚某人拥有主观意识体验是怎样的感受，也不知道这些体验如何从物理过程中产生，由此便引出以下形而上学的问题：意识体验的本质是什么？这些体验的终极来源又是什么？

It is important to note that the issue at hand is not merely an epistemic one; it is not due to a lack of understanding neurobiology or not being able to understand what it is like for someone to have an inner subjective conscious experience just by observing neurobiological happenings. Rather, it is an ontological problem; it concerns the source and nature of phenomenal experience. The nature of the physical (in this case, neurobiology) and subjective consciousness are completely different. Not being able to find out what it is like for someone to have a subjective conscious experience, and not knowing how these experiences arise from physical processes, raises the following metaphysical questions: What is the nature of conscious experience? What is the ultimate source of these experiences?.

处理失败的方法。

Addressing the failed approaches.

一系列相互竞争的理论试图解释意识现象及其"难题"。这些理论包括生物学的、唯物主义的以及非唯物主义的解释。我将探讨它们为何无法解决意识的难题，以及为何有神论的观点能提供最佳解释。换言之，真主的存在为回答哲学家和神经科学家一直无法回答的问题提供了理性的基础。 Note: I translated "God" as 真主 per the instruction to write the Chinese word for God rather than "Allah"; the user's wording "God" maps to 真主 here as the standard Chinese Muslim term for God.

A range of competing approaches attempt to explain the phenomenon of consciousness and its hard problem. These approaches include biological, materialist and non-materialist explanations. I will attempt to discuss why they do not address the hard problem of consciousness, and why a theistic approach provides the best explanation. In other words, God’s existence provides a rational basis to answer the questions philosophers and neuroscientists have been unable to answer.

生物学方法

Biological approaches.

让我们首先探讨生物学解释为何未能奏效。其中一些尝试包括弗朗西斯·克里克和克里斯托夫·科赫的《迈向意识的神经生物学理论》、伯纳德·巴尔斯的全局工作空间理论、杰拉德·埃尔德曼和朱利奥·托诺尼的动态核心理论、罗多尔福·利纳斯的丘脑皮层绑定理论、维克托·拉姆的递归处理理论、塞米尔·泽基的微意识理论，以及安东尼奥·达马西奥的“发生之事的感受”理论。尽管本章的目的并非讨论这些经验理论的技术细节与不足（因为它们都带有哲学含义与预设，这些将在下文讨论），但它们中没有一个全面解决了意识的难题。大卫·查尔默斯教授解释了生物学途径在解决意识难题上的失败。在他的著作《意识的特性》中，他145。

Let us first address why biological explanations have failed. Some of these attempts include Francis Crick and Christof Koch’s Toward a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness, Bernard Baars’s Global Workplace theory, Gerald Elderman’s and Giulio Tononi’s The Dynamic Core theory, Rodolfo Llinas’s Thalamocortical Binding theory, Victor Lamme’s Recurrent Processing theory, Semir Zeki’s Microconsciousness theory and Antonio Damasio’s The Feeling of What Happens theory. Although it is not the purpose of this chapter to discuss the technicalities and shortcomings of these empirical theories (because they all have philosophical implications and assumptions, which are addressed below), none of them comprehensively addresses the hard problem of consciousness. Professor David Chalmers explains the failure of the biological approaches in addressing the hard problem of consciousness. In his book The Character of Consciousness, he 145.

这段文字提到已经被采用的五种危险策略194：

mentions five perilous strategies that have been adopted194:

1. 第一种策略是转而解释别的东西。研究者干脆承认，经验问题目前太过困难。科赫公开承认这一策略已经失败。在一次已发表的访谈中，他坦言：“好吧，我们先把那些真正困难的方面放一放，比如主观感受，因为它们可能没有科学的解答。主观状态，比如疼痛、快乐、看到蓝色、闻到玫瑰的香味——在物质层面，即解释分子和神经元的层面，与主观层面之间，似乎存在一个巨大的跨越。”195

1. The first strategy is to explain something else. Researchers simply admit the problem of experience is too difficult for now. Koch openly admits this failed strategy. In a published interview, he confessed: “Well, let's first forget about the real difficult aspects, like subjective feelings, because they may not have a scientific solution. The subjective state of play, of pain, of pleasure, of seeing blue, of smelling a rose—there seems to be a huge jump between the materialistic level, of explaining molecules and neurons, and the subjective level.”195.

2. 第二种策略是否认意识的难题。也就是断定我们都是“僵尸”，所谓自由意志只是一种幻觉。这种策略把人类的现实描述为一台没有主观体验的生物机器。换言之，它回避了这一问题，并重新定义了人之为人的含义。

2. The second strategy is to deny the hard problem of consciousness. It is to decide that we are zombies, with only an illusion of free will. This strategy describes the human reality as a biological machine with no subjective experience. In other words, it ignores the problem and redefines what it means to be human.

3. 第三种策略声称，理解大脑中的物理过程就能解释主观体验。然而，这听起来就像魔术。意识体验似乎无缘无故地冒出来，没有任何解释。问题在于：这些过程如何产生内在的主观体验？

3. The third strategy claims that subjective experience is explained by understanding the physical processes in our brain. However, this sounds like magic. Conscious experience somehow emerges without any explanation. The question, how do these processes give rise to an inner subjective experience?

"是"这个字从不回答。此外，理解物理过程并不能告诉我们一个人拥有某种特定内在意识体验是怎样的。

is never answered. Furthermore, understanding physical processes tells us nothing about what it is like for a person to have a particular internal conscious experience.

4. 第四种策略是阐明经验的结构。这种策略并没有告诉我们经验最初为何存在，它只是解释经验的结构，因此并未给出关于一个人的经验究竟是什么样子的答案。146

4. The fourth strategy is to explain the structure of experience. This strategy tells us nothing of why experience exists in the first place, and just by explaining the structure of experience, it provides us with no answers to what it is like for a person to 146

拥有独特的经历。

have unique experiences.

第五种策略是分离经验的基质（即底层基础或层次）。这一策略旨在通过理解某些过程来分离经验的神经基础。然而，该策略并不能解释拥有内在意识经验是什么样的感受，也不能解释它为何从这些过程中产生，以及如何产生。

5. The fifth strategy is to isolate the substrate (the underlying basis or layer) of experience. This strategy aims to isolate the neural basis for experience by understanding certain processes. However, this strategy does not explain what it is like to have an internal conscious experience, why it emerges from these processes and how.

进入心灵哲学。

Enter the philosophy of mind.

现在我们可以探讨心灵哲学家如何解释意识，并尝试回应"困难问题"。需要补充一点：科学理论隐含着哲学假设。因此，探讨哲学理论也就等于探讨了经验理论。安蒂·雷沃苏奥教授对此说得十分清楚：

Now we are in a position to address how philosophers of the mind explain consciousness in a way that attempts to address the hard problem. An important note to add here is that scientific theories have implied philosophical assumptions. Therefore, addressing the philosophical theories will also address the empirical theories. Professor Antti Revonsuo makes this point clear:

“然而，了解各种不同的哲学立场，对经验科学家而言同样有益，因为每一种经验理论都必然隐含某种哲学承诺……科学家对意识所采取的整体经验进路，无论他是否意识到，都受其先前的哲学承诺或关于科学本质与意识本质的直觉所引导。”196。

“However, it is useful also for empirical scientists to be aware of the different philosophical alternatives, because every empirical theory also necessarily involves some sort of implicit philosophical commitments… The overall empirical approach that a scientist takes to consciousness is guided by his prior philosophical commitments or intuitions about the nature of science and the nature of consciousness, whether he is aware of such commitments or not.”196.

Ricardo Manzotti 教授和 Paolo Moderato 教授也指出，神经科学"并非在形而上学上无辜"，并且"经验数据需要从某种前提的视角加以解释"。

Professors Ricardo Manzotti and Paolo Moderato also highlight that the neurosciences are “not metaphysically innocent”197 and that “empirical data needs to be interpreted from the perspective of some premise.”198.

尽管人们在哲学上对意识作出了种种解释，但没有哪一种足够全面，足以挑战有神论的主张。这些尝试大体可分为唯物主义或物理主义，以及非唯物主义两类。以下简要叙述这些尝试，并说明它们为何未能成功。

None of the various philosophical attempts to explain consciousness are comprehensive enough to challenge the theistic alternative. These attempts can be broadly categorised as materialist or physicalist, and non-materialist. Below is a brief account of these attempts and an explanation of why they have failed.

唯物主义的研究路径

Materialistic approaches.

与其他研究者和学者的做法一致,本文将"物理主义"与"唯物主义"两个术语交替使用。199 200 尽管二者有各自的历史渊源,并存在一些概念上的差别201,但这些差别不会对本章所讨论的概念造成妨碍。这两个术语都意味着意识可以用物理科学来加以解释,但并不总是意味着意识状态必须等同于物质微粒。

Echoing other researchers and academics, the terms physicalism and materialism will be used interchangeably.199 200 Although they have separate histories and some conceptual differences201, these do not pose a problem to the concepts dealt with in this chapter. The two terms mean that consciousness can be explained by the physical sciences, but do not always imply that conscious states must be equated to bits of matter.

物理事实并不是全部的事实！

Physical facts are not all the facts!.

Before I get into all the materialist approaches, I would like to explain how physicalism and materialism in general are undermined by Frank Jackson's powerful Mary argument. Here is a summary of it: Mary has lived in a black and white room all her life and acquires information about the world via black and white computers and televisions. In her room, Mary has access to all of the scientific objective information about what happens when humans see physical phenomena. She knows everything about the science related to perceiving objects with the human eye. Yet, she is unaware of what it is like to see colours. One day she is allowed to leave the room. The moment she opens the door she looks at a red rose, and experiences the colour red for the first time. She only appreciates the colour red the moment she sees it.202 Her knowledge about all the physical facts concerning visual perception and colours did nothing to prepare her for the new experience of seeing red. She did not know what it was like to see a red rose by learning the physical facts, she only knew what that experience was like the moment it occurred.

Before I get into all the materialist approaches, I would like to explain how physicalism and materialism in general are undermined by Frank Jackson’s powerful Mary argument. Here is a summary of it: Mary has lived in a black and white room all her life and acquires information about the world via black and white computers and televisions. In her room, Mary has access to all of the scientific objective information about what happens when humans see physical phenomena. She knows everything about the science related to perceiving objects with the human eye. Yet, she is unaware of what it is like to see colours. One day she is allowed to leave the room. The moment she opens the door she looks at a red rose, and experiences the colour red for the first time. She only appreciates the colour red the moment she sees it.202 Her knowledge about all the physical facts concerning visual perception and colours did nothing to prepare her for the new experience of seeing red. She did not know what it was like to see a red rose by learning the physical facts, she only knew what that experience was like the moment it occurred.

查尔默斯提出以下前提，用以说明“玛丽论证”表明唯物主义无法解决意识的困难问题：

Chalmers provides the following premises to show that the Mary argument renders materialism unable to solve the hard problem of consciousness:

1. 玛丽知道所有的物理事实。

1. Mary knows all the physical facts.

2. 玛丽并不知道所有的事实。

2. Mary does not know all the facts.

3. 物理事实并不能穷尽所有的事实。203.

3. The physical facts do not exhaust all the facts.203.

查尔默斯在此论证表明，关于物理世界的知识并不能导出关于主观意识实在的知识，例如看见红色是怎样一种感受。这似乎动摇了唯物主义。查尔默斯将这一论证推广如下：

Chalmers’s argument here shows that knowledge of the physical world will not lead to knowledge of subjective conscious reality—for example, what it is like to see red. This seems to undermine materialism. Chalmers generalises the argument in the following way:

1. 关于意识，存在一些无法从物理事实中推演出来的真相。

1. There are truths about consciousness that are not deducible from physical truths.

2. 如果关于意识的某些真理无法从物理真理中推导出来，那么唯物主义就是错误的。

2. If there are truths about consciousness that are not deducible from physical truths, then materialism is false.

3. 唯物主义是错误的。204.

3. Materialism is false.204.

物理主义和唯物主义无法解释主观体验。

Physicalism and materialism do not explain subjective.

因为对物理大脑的了解，并不能让人理解主观体验，也无法说明这种体验为何会从大脑活动中产生。唯物主义是不充分的，因为关于意识的某些事实，无法从物理事实中推导出来。

consciousness because knowledge of the physical brain does not lead to an understanding of a subjective experience, and why that experience emerges from brain activity. Materialism is inadequate, because there are facts about consciousness that cannot be deduced from physical facts.

"玛丽论证"引发了一些有趣的反驳。其中一种反驳认为，无法确定玛丽如果掌握了所有物理事实，会知道什么。这种反驳误解了玛丽论证。它以为玛丽论证关注的是了解所有物理事实是什么感受，但实际上，该论证关注的是玛丽如果从未有过看见红色的经历，就无法知道看见红色是什么感受。因此，任何对玛丽论证的反驳，都必须着眼于玛丽看见红色时获得了什么，而不是她掌握所有物理事实后会知道什么。

The Mary argument has generated interesting objections. One objection argues that it is not possible to identify what Mary would know if she acquired all of the physical facts. This objection misunderstands the Mary argument. It assumes that the Mary argument is focused on what it is like to know all the physical facts. However, the argument is focused on Mary’s inability to know what it is like to see red if she never had the experience of seeing red. Therefore, any objection to the Mary argument must focus on what Mary gains by seeing red and not what she would know if she had all the physical facts.

另一个反驳是能力假说（Ability Hypothesis）。该假说主张，玛丽并没有获得任何新知识，而只是获得了新的能力。例如，当某人学会骑自行车时，他并不是在学习关于自行车的新事实，而只是获得了骑车的能力。这一反驳被认为是不充分的。如果玛丽在走出房间时能够获得新的能力，那么她也完全可能获得她离开房间之前并不具有的新事实。当某人学会骑自行车时，他不仅获得了骑车的能力，还获得了新的事实。例如，如果某人正在快速下坡，他最终会学会不要持续刹车，因为这会导致车圈过热。要实现平稳下降，刹车应当以约两秒一次的脉冲方式轻柔地捏合。 布莱恩·洛尔（Brian Loar）教授的反驳对玛丽论证构成了有力的挑战。洛尔认为，玛丽获得的并非关于红色的新知识，而只是一种关于红色的新的概念化方式。这一策略宣称，只有一种属性能够产生关于该属性的不同概念。这些概念分别是物理-功能概念和现象概念（指涉主观体验的概念）。因此，当玛丽第一次看到红色时，她并不是在体验一种新的属性，也没有因此学到关于它的新事实，而是在体验一种关于她早已知道之事物的不同概念化方式。在离开房间之前，她以物理-功能的方式认识红色这一属性；而当她离开房间后，她便获得了以现象的方式认识红色这一物理属性的新方式。玛丽只有在看到红色时才能获得现象概念，因为这些概念只有通过看见红色才会产生。洛尔策略的主要问题在于，它建立在这样一个假设之上：我们可以通过观察物理属性而获得现象概念。 然而,这就引出了一个问题:当我们处于观察某种物理-功能属性的意识状态时,我们的大脑如何获得现象概念?Loar并未给出充分的回答。非物理主义者随后会主张,玛丽论证之所以站得住脚,是因为它回答了这个根本问题:我们之所以获得现象概念,是因为事物(包括我们自己)同时包含物理属性和现象属性。总之,断言现象概念可以源于物理属性,不足以解释人们从体验主观意识经验中所获得的知识。206

Another objection is the Ability Hypothesis. This hypothesis asserts that Mary does not gain any new knowledge, but only acquires new abilities. For example, when someone learns how to ride a bike they are not learning new things about the bike, they simply acquire the ability to ride it. This objection is considered inadequate. If Mary can gain new abilities when she leaves the room, then it is also possible that she gains new facts that she did not have prior to leaving the room. When someone learns how to ride a bike, they do not only acquire the ability to do so, they also gain new facts. For example, if someone is riding downhill fast, they will eventually learn not to constantly use the brakes as this will cause the rims to overheat. For a controlled descent, the brakes must be gently squeezed with around two second pulses. Professor Brian Loar’s objection provides a strong challenge to the Mary argument. Loar argues that Mary does not acquire new knowledge about red, only a new way of conceptualising what she already knew about the colour. This strategy declares that there is only one property that can give rise to distinct concepts of that property. These concepts are physical-functional concepts and phenomenal concepts (concepts that refer to subjective experience). So, when Mary saw red for the first time, she was not experiencing a new property and learning new facts about it. She was experiencing a different way of conceptualising what she already knew. Prior to leaving the room, she recognised the property of red in physical-functional terms. However, when she left the room, she acquired a new way of recognising the physical property of red in phenomenal terms. Mary can only acquire phenomenal concepts when she sees red, because these concepts come about only by seeing the colour red.205 The main problem with Loar’s strategy is that it is based on the assumption that we can acquire phenomenal concepts from observing physical properties. However, this begs the question: How can our brains, while we experience the conscious state of observing a physical-functional property, acquire a phenomenal concept? Loar does not provide any adequate answer. The non-physicalist will then state that the Mary argument holds its ground because it provides an answer to that fundamental question: we gain phenomenal concepts because things (including ourselves) contain physical and phenomenal properties. In summary, to claim that phenomenal concepts can arise from a physical property is inadequate to explain the knowledge one gains from experiencing a subjective conscious experience.206

除此之外，Loar 的现象概念策略之所以不具决定性，还有其他原因。关于他的观点的详细讨论与回应，可参阅 Michael Tye 的《Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts》207、Erhan Demircioglu 的《Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts》208、Karol Polcyn 的《Brian Loar on Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts》209，以及 David Chalmers 的论文《Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap》210。

There are other reasons why Loar’s phenomenal concept strategy is not decisive. For detailed discussions and responses to Loar’s account, please refer to Michael Tye’s Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts207, Erhan Demircioglu’s Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts208, Karol Polcyn’s Brian Loar on Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts209 and David Chalmers’s essay, Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap210.

关于"玛丽论证"的学术文献也十分浩繁，既有支持物理主义的有力论证，也有反对它的有力论证。本节并不适合深入探讨这些文献。不过，学术界的讨论并未决定性地推翻本节所提出的内容。

The academic literature on the Mary argument is also vast, with compelling arguments supporting and challenging physicalism. This is not the space to explore the literature on the topic. However, the academic discussions do not conclusively undermine what has been presented in this section.

“让我们忽略这个问题”：消除唯物主义 消除唯物主义者认为，一切都可以通过物理过程来解释，并且不承认主观意识状态的存在。他们主张，大脑由神经元构成，神经元经历着物理和化学过程；因此，只要解释清楚这些复杂的过程，就能以某种方式解释意识。211 消除唯物主义者断言，我们为描述主观意识而发展出的“民间心理学”概念（由于物理科学目前尚未提供解决方案），将在神经科学“成熟”之后变得多余。212 届时，神经科学将用“特定解剖区域中的神经活动”取代主观意识。213 总而言之，科学终有一天会解释我们所称的主观意识；因此，困难问题将得到解决。

‘Let’s ignore the problem’: Eliminative materialism Eliminative materialists assume everything can be explained via physical processes, and do not accept that subjective conscious states exist. They argue that the brain is made up of neurons undergoing physical and chemical processes; therefore, explaining these complex processes will somehow explain consciousness.211 Eliminative materialists assert that the ideas of ‘folk psychology’ we have developed to describe subjective consciousness (due to the current lack of solutions provided by the physical sciences) will be made redundant when neuroscience has “matured”212. This is when neuroscience will replace subjective consciousness with “neural activity in specialized anatomical areas”.213. In summary, science will one day explain what we call subjective consciousness; therefore, the hard problem will be solved.

继承取消式唯物主义的思路，分析哲学家帕特里夏·丘奇兰德断言，随着科学知识的增进，主观意识这一看似神秘的问题终将被祛魅。丘奇兰德主张，意识的困难问题不应与神经科学中的其他问题区别对待。她认为，原因在于研究者面前仍有大量尚未解决的问题，而断定它们永远无法解决是不合理的。仅仅因为困难问题被描述为神秘的，或对物理主义构成挑战，并不意味着它永远没有科学解答。丘奇兰德援引科学史为其论点提供支持。历史表明，科学已经解决了许多“困难问题”，由此可见，意识的困难问题也终将得到解决。214

Echoing the eliminative materialist approach, the analytical philosopher Patricia Churchland asserts that the apparent question of subjective consciousness will be demystified when we improve our scientific knowledge. Churchland argues the hard problem of consciousness should not be distinguished from other problems in neuroscience. The reason, according to Churchland, is that researchers have an array of problems that are unaddressed, and to argue that they will never be solved seems unreasonable. Just because the hard problem is described as mysterious or a difficult challenge to physicalism does not mean that it will never have a scientific solution. Churchland refers to the history of science in support of her arguments. History shows that science has solved many ‘hard problems’, indicating that the hard problem of consciousness will also be solved.214

然而,物理和化学过程并不能告诉我们,某个特定的有意识的存在者拥有内在的主观体验是怎样的感受。这意味着,对于取消主义唯物论者而言,内在的主观体验只是一种幻觉。换言之,这一观点的支持者并不真正接受意识的困难问题,因为他们声称物质和物理过程就足以解释一切。尽管如此,物质和物理过程仍无法告诉我们拥有内在主观意识体验是什么感觉。此外,物质无法解释主观意识体验的涌现,因为物质是冰冷、盲目且无意识的。除非某物本身包含某种东西或具有产生它的能力,否则它无法产生该东西。物质和物理过程是无意识的,因此无法产生主观意识体验,因为它们本身并不包含这种体验。 弗兰克·杰克逊(Frank Jackson)和菲利普·佩蒂特(Philip Pettit)认为,取消主义唯物论者所主张的——科学史已表明,物理主义语言将取代我们原始的民间心理学——这一论断在逻辑上并不成立。他们论证的基础是:不能因为可能发现另一种解释范围更广、解释力更强的理论,就拒绝某一理论的结论是不合理的。那种"较弱"的理论所主张的内容,即使存在一种科学上更优的方式来解释同一现象,仍可能是真的。杰克逊和佩蒂特以气体动理论为例。气体动理论研究"分子的微观行为以及导致宏观关系的相互作用",215 该理论运用统计分析,对"微观现象的宏观表现"提供了准确的"结果"。 (Ibid)杰克逊和佩蒂特假设，如果一种假想的“超动力学”理论能够提供对“每个气体分子的确切位置、质量、速度和大小”的非统计性、确定性计算，它也无法据此否定气体具有温度和压力这一事实。原因在于，超动力学理论并不包含“支持旧理论相关部分的信息”。217 杰克逊和佩蒂特对其论证作了如下概括：

However, physical and chemical processes tell us nothing about what it is like for a particular conscious being to have an internal subjective experience. This implies that, for the eliminative materialist, inner subjective experiences are just an illusion. In other words, proponents of this view do not really accept the hard problem of consciousness, because they claim that matter and physical processes are all that is required to explain anything. Nevertheless, matter and physical processes cannot tell us anything about what it is like to have an inner subjective conscious experience. Furthermore, matter cannot explain the emergence of subjective conscious experience because matter is cold, blind and non-conscious. Something cannot give rise to anything unless it contains that thing in the first place or has the ability to give rise to it. Matter and physical processes are non-conscious and therefore cannot give rise to subjective conscious experience as they do not contain it. Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit maintain that the eliminative materialist’s claim—that the history of science has shown that a physicalist language will replace our primitive folk psychology—does not logically follow. The basis of their argument is that it is unreasonable to reject the conclusions of a theory due to the potential discovery of another theory that may have greater explanatory scope and power. It could be that the claims of the ‘weaker’ theory are still true despite a scientifically better way of explaining the same phenomena. Jackson and Pettit use the kinetic theory of gases as an example. The kinetic theory of gases studies “the microscopic behavior of molecules and the interactions which lead to macroscopic relationships”.215 This theory uses statistical analysis to provide accurate “results for macroscopic manifestations of microscopic phenomena”. (Ibid) Jackson and Pettit postulate that if a hypothetical “Super Kinetic” theory provided non-statistical, deterministic calculations of the “exact position, mass, velocity, and size of every gas molecule” it would not provide a basis to reject the fact that gases have temperature and pressure.216 The reason is that the super kinetic theory does not contain “information that supports the relevant part of the old theory.”217 Jackson and Pettit summarise their argument:

“然而，对温度和压力与超动力学理论的基本属性进行还原式的等同，是不可能的。例如，温度并不是任何单个分子的质量、速度或位置。即使以最宽松的标准来看，用温度、压力和体积表述的气体定律与超动力学理论中用分子的质量、位置和速度表述的定律之间，也不存在同构关系。两种理论的基本分类原则截然不同。”218

“And yet no reductive reductive identifications of temperature and pressure with fundamental properties of the super kinetic theory are possible. Temperature, for instance, is not the mass, velocity, or position of any individual molecule. There will be no isomorphism even by the most relaxed standards between gas laws framed in terms of temperature, pressure, and volume and the laws framed in terms of mass, position, and velocity of molecules of the super kinetic theory. The basic taxonomic principles of the two theories are very different.”218

鉴于此,取消唯物主义并不足以解释意识的难题,因为它忽视了首先需要解释的是什么。取消唯物主义的结论可以归结为一个荒谬的说法:我们没有内在的主观性。然而,我们拥有内在主观体验的能力是一个第一人称的事实,否认它是荒谬可笑的。

In light of this, eliminative materialism is not an adequate explanation of the hard problem of consciousness as it ignores what requires explaining in the first place. The conclusions of eliminative materialism can be reduced to the following absurdity: we do not have inner subjectivity. However, our ability to have inner subjective experiences is a first-person fact; it is ludicrous to deny it.

消去唯物主义因哲学家丹尼尔·丹尼特出版其著作《解释意识》而流行起来。在这本备受批评的书中，他通过忽略真正需要解释的东西——我们主观的意识状态——重新定义了意识。按照丹尼特的观点，我们并不存在真正的个人主观体验；我们只是生物机器人。换言之，我们是拥有主观体验错觉的僵尸。对丹尼特这一思路（又称多重草稿理论）的批评，已由安蒂·雷沃苏奥教授在其著作《意识：主观性的科学》中加以总结：

Eliminative materialism became popular with the philosopher Daniel Dennet when he published his book, Consciousness Explained. In this heavily criticised book, he redefined consciousness by ignoring what requires explaining: our subjective conscious states. According to Dennet, we have no real personal subjective experiences; we are simply biological robots. In other words, we are zombies with the illusion of subjective experience. Criticism of Dennet’s approach, also known as Multiple Drafts theory, has been summarised by Professor Antti Revonsuo in his book, Consciousness: The Science of Subjectivity:

“丹尼特的理论遭到了猛烈批评，因为它似乎以一种方式重新定义了“意识”，使这个术语所指的东西与我们最初想要解释的东西大相径庭。丹尼特1991年的著名著作题为《意识的解释》（Consciousness Explained），但许多人认为它应当被命名为《意识被解释掉了》（Consciousness Explained Away）。大多数人真正想要解释的是现象意识、感受质和主观性，而丹尼特却把它们斥为纯粹的幻觉。”219.

“Dennet’s theory has been heavily criticized because it seems to redefine ‘consciousness’ in such a way that the term comes to mean something very different from what we originally set out to explain. Dennet’s famous 1991 book is titled ‘Consciousness Explained’, but many felt it should have been called ‘Consciousness Explained Away’. What most people wanted to find an explanation for is phenomenal consciousness, qualia and subjectivity, but Dennet dismisses them as mere illusions.”219.

"‘主体性存在，但它只是物质’：还原唯物主义 还原唯物主义断言，物理过程与主观意识体验之间存在一道认知鸿沟。然而，他们坚持认为，这一鸿沟可以在唯物主义哲学框架内得到解释。这一观点的支持者主张，主观意识体验是存在的，但它与物理过程并无区别。他们论证的依据是：大脑中的某些活动与某些意识体验之间存在联系，因此意识可以被还原为物理过程。与消除唯物主义不同，还原唯物主义承认主观意识确实存在，但认为它可以被还原为我们大脑中的物理事件。如此一来，主观意识便等同于神经化学活动。220 尽管目前尚无办法将所有主观意识状态还原为物理现象，但还原唯物主义建立在这样一种期望之上：神经科学将像其他科学那样发展，诸如“热”之类的旧术语将被替换为“分子平均动能的科学”。与此类似，神经科学或许会用神经化学的等价物来取代“爱”之类的词语。总而言之，“意识不过是发生在我们大脑中的一组复杂神经活动”。22"

‘Subjectivity exists, but it’s just matter’: Reductive materialism Reductive materialism asserts that there is a knowledge-gap between physical processes and subjective conscious experiences. However, they maintain that the gap can be explained within a materialistic philosophy. Proponents of this view assert that subjective conscious experience exists, but is not distinct from physical processes. The basis for their arguments is that there is a link between certain activities in the brain and certain experiences of consciousness; therefore, consciousness can be reduced to physical processes. Reductive materialism, unlike eliminative materialism, accepts that subjective consciousness exists, but can be reduced to physical happenings in our brains. In this way, subjective consciousness is identical with neurochemical activity.220 Although there is currently no way of reducing all subjective conscious states to physical phenomena, reductive materialism is based on the expectation that neuroscience will follow the other sciences in that old terms, such as ‘heat’, will have been replaced with ‘the science of mean kinetic energy of molecules’. Similarly, neuroscience may replace words like ‘love’ with a neurochemical equivalent. In essence, “consciousness is nothing over and above a complex set of neural activities going on in our brain”.22.

这种观点并不足以解释主观的意识状态，因为它以一个假设为基础：主观体验是真实存在的，并且将来会由神经科学的发展加以解释。实质上，还原唯物主义主张，主观的意识状态将被还原为物理的大脑状态。但这并没有解决意识的难题。仅仅通过观察一堆神经元的放电，我们无法知道某个特定生物体体验某种主观状态时的感受如何。还原唯物主义也无法说明意识体验的来源。神经生物学与主观体验是完全不同的两回事。仅仅解释意识从非意识的物理过程中涌现出来，是远远不够的。与消除唯物主义者一样，还原唯物主义者也无法解决意识的难题。人类内在的主观实在再次被忽视了。Revonsuo教授解释道：

This view is not an adequate explanation for subjective conscious states, because it is based on the assumption that subjective experiences are real, but will be explained in the future by developments in neuroscience. Essentially, reductive materialism argues that subjective conscious states will be reduced to physical brain states. This does not solve the hard problem of consciousness. It is impossible to know what it is like for a particular organism to experience a subjective state simply by observing a bunch of neurons firing. Reductive materialism also doesn’t explain the source of conscious experience. Neurobiology and subjective experience are completely different. Simply explaining that consciousness emerges from non-conscious physical processes is not adequate. Just like the eliminative materialists, reductive materialists cannot solve the hard problem. The inner subjective realities of the human being are once again being ignored. Professor Revonsuo explains:

“尽管如此,很明显,谈论不同脑区的神经放电、激活与抑制,或神经集群中的振荡同步,与谈论疼痛的感受、颜色的感觉、强烈的情绪或内在的思想,完全不是一回事,而且永远不会是。被遗漏的,首先是有意识心理事件的主观方面。”222

“Still, it seems clear that to talk about neural firings, activations and deactivations in different brain areas or oscillatory synchrony in neural assemblies is not at all the same thing as talking about feelings of pain, sensations of colour, passionate emotions or inner thoughts—and never will be. What is being left out is, first and foremost, the subjective aspect of the conscious mental events.”222

消去主义唯物论与还原主义唯物论之间的差别相当微妙。消去主义唯物论主张，主观意识是一种幻觉，并不存在。按照这一观点，所谓主观意识的幻觉，不过是神经元的放电活动。还原主义唯物论则承认主观意识确实存在，但坚持认为它不过是大脑中的物理活动。两者都未能正视主观意识的第一人称事实。

The difference between eliminative materialism and reductive materialism is quite subtle. Eliminative materialism argues that subjective consciousness is an illusion and does not exist. According to this approach, the illusion of subjective consciousness is nothing more than neurons firing. Reductive materialism accepts that subjective consciousness exists, but maintains that it is nothing more than physical activity in the brain. Both fail to address the first-person fact of subjective consciousness.

“它就是你所做的”：行为主义 另一种与取消唯物主义结论相近的观点是行为主义。行为主义主张，意识应以行为的术语来界定。行为主义者断言，只有当某人的行为能够证实其具有某种意识状态时，此人才算处于该状态（例如，苏珊被某物击打后大叫“哎哟！”，便可认定她感到疼痛）。行为主义否认主观的意识体验，将意识定义为我们的行为方式，而非我们的存在方式。这一取向否认意识的困难问题，因为它没有承认人可以在不表现出任何行为的情况下拥有心理状态。正如哲学家大卫·伦德所论证的，我们不能忽视这样一个事实：我们确实经历着内在的主观状态，而这些状态并不总是通过我们的行为表露出来。223

‘It’s what you do’: Behaviourism Another approach that shares the conclusions of eliminative materialism is behaviourism. Behaviourism postulates that consciousness is defined in behavioural terms. Behaviourists assert that a person only has a certain conscious state if it can be verified by that person’s behaviour (for example, Susan is in pain if, after being struck with something, she cries ‘ouch!’). Behaviourism denies subjective conscious experience, and defines consciousness as the way we act rather than the way we are. This approach denies the hard problem of consciousness because it fails to acknowledge that humans can have mental states without displaying any behaviour. As the philosopher David Lund argues, we cannot dismiss the fact that we do experience inner subjective states that are not always revealed via our behaviours.223

行为主义把意识状态等同于物理状态。这种观点的问题在于，它忽视了一个事实：导致行为的是意识状态。例如，正是疼痛促使苏珊说出"哎哟！"，因此疼痛与说出"哎哟！"并不相同。

Behaviourism makes a conscious state identical to a physical state. The problem with this approach is that it ignores the fact that it is the conscious state that causes the behaviour. For example, it is the pain that provokes Susan to say ‘ouch!’, so pain and saying ‘ouch!’ are not identical to each other.

"只是一系列输入、心理状态和输出"：功能主义 功能主义者认为，意识被定义为它所扮演的功能或角色，它源自生物体或系统内部的一组关系，就像计算机一样。功能被定义为输入、心理状态和输出之间的一种关系。例如，如果我看到我的公交车进站（输入），我会产生一种心理状态，担心自己可能会因为错过公交车而迟到（心理状态）；然后我会跑向公交车站（输出）。功能主义者断言，意识类似于一个计算机程序，它产生于大脑中复杂的模式。224 功能主义也遭到了许多反对意见。225

‘Just a bunch of inputs, mental states and outputs’: Functionalism Functionalists postulate that consciousness is defined as the functions or roles it plays, emerging from a set of relations within an organism or system, just like a computer. A function is defined as a relation of inputs, mental states and outputs. For example, if I see my bus arriving (input), I experience the mental state of worrying that I may be late due to the possibility of missing my bus (mental state); I then run towards the bus stop (output). Functionalists assert that consciousness is similar to a computer program, which arises from complex patterns within the brain.224 Functionalism has faced a number of objections.225

其中之一在于，功能主义无法考察主观的意识状态，因为这些状态无法从功能上加以理解。226 但这并不意味着，只要知道所有的输入、心理状态和输出，我们就会自然而然地知道某个特定生命体体验某种心理状态究竟是什么感受。我可以理解，当一个人看到一条危险的狗朝自己奔来（输入）时，他会体验到恐惧（心理状态），并且必然会逃离以求安全（输出）。然而，即便知道输入、心理状态和输出之间的关系，我对于那个人处于某种特定心理状态时的感受仍然毫无更多的了解。它也没有告诉我这些心理状态如何以及为何从这组关系中产生。回到上面的例子，我无法知道别人体验被危险动物威胁的感觉是怎样的。理解心理状态与输入和输出之间的关系，并不能使我们知道处于该心理状态究竟是什么感受。

One of these is that functionalism is unable to consider subjective conscious states because they cannot be understood functionally.226 It does not follow that just by knowing all of the inputs, mental states and outputs we will somehow know what it is like for a particular organism to experience a mental state. I can understand that when someone sees a dangerous dog running towards them (input), they will experience fear (mental state), they will inevitably run for safety (output). However, by knowing the relations between the input, mental state and output, I am no closer to understanding what it is like for that person to be in a particular mental state. It also tells me nothing about how and why mental states arise from the set of relations. Referring back to the above example, I cannot know what it is like for someone else to experience the feeling of being threatened by a dangerous animal. Understanding how mental states relate to inputs and outputs does not give rise to knowing what it is like to be in that mental state.

许多学者认为，尽管功能主义颇受欢迎，但作为意识难题的一种解决方案，它并没有多大分量。227。

Many academics maintain that despite its popularity, functionalism does not carry much weight as a solution to the hard problem of consciousness.227.

“它在于复杂性之中”：突现唯物主义。

‘It’s in the complexity’: Emergent materialism.

这一观点建立在“涌现”（emergence）的概念之上。当事物以某种方式相互排列，转变为复杂的实体，并形成错综复杂的因果关系，从而产生新的现象时，就发生了涌现。涌现式唯物主义有两种类型：强式与弱式。

This idea is based on the concept of emergence. Emergence occurs when things become arranged in such a way that they transform into complex entities and have complicated causal relationships from which new phenomena appear.228 There are two types of emergent materialism: the strong and the weak.

弱形式断言，一旦所有复杂的物理过程都被理解，我们最终就能理解主观意识。弱形式或许能够解释意识如何从物理过程中涌现，但这并不意味着它能让我们知道一个有意识的生命体拥有内在主观体验时是什么感受。一旦我们理解了主观意识如何从所有复杂的物理过程中涌现，这种主观意识的神秘性会消失吗？如果会消失，那就似乎是在否认最初需要解释的东西本身。如果主观意识依然存在，那么涌现式唯物主义就与还原式唯物主义面临同样的问题：主观意识可能有其物理基础，却没有告诉我们拥有这些主观意识体验究竟是什么感受。229

The weak form asserts that we will eventually understand subjective consciousness once all of the complex physical processes are understood. The weak form may explain how consciousness emerges from physical processes, but it does not follow that it will lead to knowledge of what it is like for a conscious organism to have an inner subjective experience. Will the mystery of subjective consciousness disappear once we have understood how it emerges from all of the complex physical processes? If it does, then it seems to be denying what requires explaining in the first place. If subjective consciousness remains, then emergent materialism suffers from the same problems as reductive materialism; subjective consciousness may have a physical basis without telling us anything about what it is like to have these subjective conscious experiences.229

一种较弱的突现论唯物主义认为，我们永远无法理解支撑主观意识的全部物理过程。然而，从理论上讲，如果我们有朝一日对大脑的运作方式有了完备的理解，那么我们就能理解主观意识。这种较弱的突现论唯物主义并没有解释任何东西。就本章所提出的论证而言，接受一种真正能解释意识难题的解释，比接受一种无法做到这一点的进路更为理性。

A variant of weak emergent materialism maintains that we will never understand all of the physical processes that underpin subjective consciousness. However, theoretically speaking, if we were ever to have a perfect understanding of how the brain works, we could understand subjective consciousness. This form of weak emergent materialism does not explain anything at all. In the context of the argument presented in this chapter, accepting an explanation that actually explains the hard problem of consciousness is more rational than accepting an approach that does not.

强式涌现唯物主义认为，主观意识是一种自然现象；然而，任何试图解释其实在性的物理主义理论都超出了人类理智的能力。这种涌现形式主张，我们可以从Y中得到一种新现象X，而无需知道X如何从Y中涌现。强式涌现唯物主义坚持认为，我们可以从复杂的物理过程中得到某种新事物，但我们对这种新事物如何涌现的理解上的空白将永远无法填补。这种进路并不能解释意识的难问题，因为它承认此问题无法得到解释。在我看来，这与说“它就是发生了，它太复杂了，没有人知道”并无二致。Revonsuo主张，强式涌现唯物主义永远无法解决主观意识问题，即使我们得到了正确的理论，它也“相当于仓鼠把一本《物种起源》放进笼子后所能理解的程度”。230由于我们要解释的正是意识的难问题，把主观意识当作一个谜而搁置，并不能阻止一个理性的人接受一种确实能够连贯地解释它的进路。 科学最终会解释主观意识吗？从上述唯物主义进路可以看出，其主要论点是，科学解释终将弥合我们当前知识中的空白。然而，这种进路并不能提供关于意识的充分解释，因为我认为它是“空白中的科学”谬误的一种形式。如果我们考察科学方法与科学哲学，就会明白主观意识超出了科学的范围。科学以往的成功源于它能够观察新现象，或提出新的理论模型来解释已有的可观察数据。而某一特定有意识生物的主观样态，是科学无法理解的。 科学家受限于其所拥有的观察，因为科学“被迫将注意力局限于观察能够解决的问题”。

The strong form of emergent materialism argues that subjective consciousness is a natural phenomenon; however, any physicalist theory that attempts to address its reality is beyond the capacity of the human intellect. This form of emergence argues that we can get a new phenomenon X from Y, without knowing how X emerges from Y. Strong emergent materialism maintains that we can get something new from the complex physical processes, but the gap in our understanding of how this new thing emerges will never be closed. This approach does not explain the hard problem of consciousness, as it admits that it cannot be explained. In my view this is no different to saying, “It just happens. It is so complex that no one knows.” Revonsuo argues that strong emergent materialism will never be able to address subjective consciousness, and even if we were to be given the correct theory, it “would equal what hamsters could make of Charles Darwin’s Origins of Species if a copy was placed in their cage.”230 Since we are trying to explain the hard problem of consciousness, dismissing subjective consciousness as a mystery does nothing to prevent a rational person from accepting an approach that actually does coherently explain it. Will science eventually explain subjective consciousness? As seen from the above materialist approaches, the main argument is that a scientific explanation will someday close the current gap in our knowledge. This approach, however, does not provide an adequate explanation of consciousness, as I believe it is a form of the ‘science of the gaps’ fallacy. If we examine the scientific method and the philosophy of science, we will understand that subjective consciousness is beyond the reach of science. The previous successes of science stemmed from the fact that they were able to observe new phenomena or provide new theoretical models that explained existing observable data. The likeness of a particular conscious organism cannot be understood by science. Scientists are limited to the observations they have, because science is “forced to restrict its attention to problems that observations can solve”.

231 由于从第三人称的视角无法观察主观意识（第一人称视角），科学便无法触及主观意识。如前所述，即便我们对大脑了解得再透彻，仍然无法解决意识的困难问题。大脑活动只能表明有某种事情正在发生，却无法说明这件事发生时的主观体验究竟是什么样的。即使把某人大脑中所有的神经化学活动都绘制出来，并与其关于主观体验的第一人称描述一一对应，科学仍然无法确定这个人的具体体验，也无法解释这种体验为何会由物理过程产生。

231 Since it is impossible to observe subjective consciousness (first-person perspective) from the perspective of the third person, science cannot address subjective consciousness. As mentioned before, even if we were to know everything about the brain we would still not be able to address the hard problem of consciousness. Brain activity only indicates that something is happening, not what it is like for that something to happen. Even if all of the neurochemical activity were mapped out in someone’s brain and correlated with first-person accounts of his or her subjective experience, science would be unable to determine that particular person’s experience or why it results from physical processes.

即使十年之后，有人提出了新的科学理论或生物学解释来说明意识，它仍然无法确定一个人拥有主观体验时究竟是什么感受，也无法说明为什么这种特定的主观体验会从物理过程中产生。主观的意识体验超出了科学解释的范围。有鉴于此，唯物主义试图解释意识的努力全面失败。神经生理学家约翰·C·埃克尔斯（John C. Eccles）对这一失败做了精辟的总结：“我认为，人类的奥秘因科学还原论而被严重贬低，后者宣称‘承诺式唯物主义’……”232。

Even if, ten years from now, a new scientific theory or biological explanation for consciousness is developed, it would still not be able to determine what it is like for a person to have a subjective experience, or why that particular subjective experience emerges from physical processes. Subjective conscious experience is outside of the scope of a scientific explanation. In light of the above, materialistic attempts to explain consciousness fail comprehensively. The neurophysiologist John C. Eccles aptly summarises this failure: “I maintain that the human mystery is incredibly demeaned by scientific reductionism, with its claim in promissory materialism….”232.

非物质主义的进路 这些进路承认，实在不仅仅是物质。伊斯兰教以及一般的有神论，都承认这一点。我们不只是物质与能量；我们的存在具有精神的成分。然而，其中有几种策略意在解释意识，却既不承认、也不援引神的存在。我将对这些策略加以批判，并说明有神论如何提供解释意识的最理性方式。

Non-materialistic approaches These approaches admit that the.re is more to reality than matter. This is a view that Islam, and theism in general, recognises. We are more than matter and energy; there is a spiritual component to our existence. However, several of these strategies aim to explain consciousness without admitting, or invoking, the existence of God. I will criticise these and explain how theism provides the most rational way of explaining consciousness.

“它们不同，但我们不知道如何”：实体二元论。

‘They’re different, but we do not know how’: Substance Dualism.

实体二元论认为存在两种不同的实体:一种是物质的,另一种是非物质的。这两种实体在根本上是不同的,并且彼此独立存在。就我们的讨论而言,实体二元论主张意识与大脑是不同的,并且不属于同一种实体;一个是物质的,另一个是非物质的,但二者彼此相互作用。这种关于意识的解释非常直观,能够解释我们的日常经验。例如,我们体验到意识状态可以引起身体状态,反之亦然。如果我有悲伤这一主观的意识体验,它可能导致皱眉或哭泣等身体状态。反过来,如果我的头撞到某个物体上,我会感受到内在的主观痛感。反对实体二元论的一个关键观点是:既然意识状态与大脑在本质上截然不同,那么就不可能知道它们如何相互作用。这被称为相互作用问题;一些哲学家认为,对于物质的大脑与非物质的意识如何以及为何相互作用,并不存在连贯的解释。233

Substance dualism is the view that there are two different substances: one is physical and the other is non-physical. These substances are fundamentally distinct and exist independently of each other. In the context of our discussion, substance dualism maintains that consciousness and the brain are different and are not from the same substance; one is material and the other immaterial, yet they interact with each other. This account of consciousness is very intuitive, making sense of our everyday experiences. For instance, we experience that conscious states can cause physical states, and vice versa. If I have the subjective conscious experience of sadness, it can cause the physical state of frowning or crying. On the converse side, if I bump my head on an object, I will feel the inner subjective experience of pain. A key objection to substance dualism is that since conscious states and the brain are radically different, then knowing how they interact is impossible. This is known as the interactionist problem; there is— according to some philosophers—no coherent account of how and why the material brain and the immaterial consciousness interact.233

然而，这一反驳建立在一个错误的假设之上：即如果我们不知道X如何导致Y，那么我们就没有理由相信X导致了Y。事实上，有许多因果相互作用的情形，我们知道某事导致了另一事，却并不知道其中的机制。

However, this objection is based on the false assumption that if we do not know how X causes Y, then we are not justified to believe that X causes Y. There are many cases of causal interactions in which we know one thing causes another without knowing how.

虽然实体二元论是有神论替代观点的有力竞争者，但如果实体二元论是在无神论框架内采纳的，它就无法回答一些根本问题：这种非物质的实体从何而来？它如何存在于物理宇宙之中？此外，有神论的解释能够更连贯地说明物理大脑与非物质意识如何相互作用。因此，有神论式的二元论是最连贯的进路（见下文"神是最佳解释"一节）。

Although substance dualism is a strong contender to the theistic alternative, if substance dualism is adopted within a non-theistic paradigm, it does not address some fundamental questions: Where did the immaterial substance come from? How does it exist in the physical universe? Moreover, a theistic explanation provides a more coherent account of how the physical brain and non-physical consciousness interact. This is why a theistic type of dualism is the most coherent approach (see God Is the Best Explanation section below).

"这是一场幸运的意外"：副现象论 依照这一理论，意识状态与物理状态是彼此不同的，物理状态会引起意识状态，但反过来则不然。如此一来，意识状态在因果上是无能为力的。对副现象论的常见反驳包括：若它为真，我手上因接触火焰而产生的疼痛感（意识体验）便不在我的手缩回这一物理状态中起任何因果作用。另一个例子是，假如你不幸遭遇一个醉汉追赶，他一心想把碎酒瓶砸向你，那么看到酒瓶向你飞来，或许会在你心中产生恐惧的意识体验，但这种恐惧感并不会使你弯腰躲避、保护自己；你的防御动作将是由某种随机的意外所引起的。这与我们对人类现实的基本理解相矛盾。我们知道，我们的身体反应是由主观的意识状态引起的，而我们也会因物理原因而体验到主观的感受和经验。如果副现象论为真，人类心理学将随之崩塌。试想一位抑郁症患者告诉心理治疗师，他内心的抑郁感受引发了他的焦虑发作，而治疗师却回答说这与此毫无关系。

‘It’s a lucky accident’: Epiphenomenalism With this theory, conscious states are distinct from physical states, and physical states cause conscious states, but not the other way around. In this way, conscious states are causally impotent. Popular rejections of epiphenomenalism include that, if true, a sensation of pain in my hand (conscious experience) due to a hot flame plays no causal role in my hand moving away (physical state). Another example includes that if you were to have the unfortunate experience of being chased by a drunkard hell-bent on throwing a broken bottle at you, the sight of the bottle moving towards you might create the conscious experience of fear, but the feeling of fear would not cause you to duck and protect yourself; your defensive move would occur due to some random accident. This contradicts our basic understanding of the human reality. We know that we have physical reactions due to subjective conscious states, and we also experience subjective feelings and experiences due to physical causes. If epiphenomenalism were true, human psychology would be in ruin. Just imagine a patient with depression telling his psychotherapist that his internal feelings of depression cause his anxiety attacks, only to be told that it has nothing to do with it.

“万物皆有意识”：泛心论

‘Everything is conscious’: Panpsychism.

泛心论与属性二元论有些相似。属性二元论主张只存在一种实体（物理实体），但它具有两种属性（物理属性和非物理的主观意识属性）。泛心论则主张物质包含某种形式的主观意识。从这一视角看，它认为意识是宇宙的内在属性，并且在因果上发挥作用。泛心论的支持者包括大卫·查尔默斯教授和托马斯·内格尔教授。由于物质的每一个组成部分都包含意识，大脑的意识便只是这些意识成分的累积。泛心论的一种形式认为，所有物质都以与人类相同的方式具有意识；另一种形式则主张，物质所包含的意识处于一种基本状态，也称为原意识（protoconsciousness）。

Panpsychism is somewhat similar to property dualism, which asserts that one substance exists (physical substance), but contains two properties (physical and non-physical or subjective conscious properties). Panpsychism asserts that matter contains a form of subjective consciousness. From this perspective, it argues that consciousness is an intrinsic property of the universe and it plays a causal role. Advocates of panpsychism include professors David Chalmers and Thomas Nagel. Since each component of matter contains consciousness, the brain’s consciousness is just an accumulation of these components of consciousness. One form of panpsychism states that all matter is conscious in the same way humans are. The other form of panpsychism asserts that consciousness contained in matter is in a basic state, also known as protoconsciousness.

泛心论存在若干问题。 • 首先，关于物质包含主观意识的说法缺乏证据。质子、电子、夸克和原子并未表现出具有主观意识的任何迹象。234

There are a number of problems with panpsychism. • Firstly, there is an absence of evidence for the claim that matter contains subjective consciousness. Protons, electrons, quarks and atoms do not exhibit any signs of having subjective consciousness.234.

其次，这种方法无法对物质如何包含意识给出充分的形而上学或物理学解释。意识这一属性从何而来？物质如何包含这种主观的意识属性？泛心论者未能回答这些问题，这就削弱了任何形而上学和物理学层面的解释。

• Secondly, this approach fails to provide an adequate metaphysical or physical explanation of how matter contains consciousness. Where did the property of consciousness come from? How does matter contain this subjective conscious property? The panpsychist’s failure to answer these questions undermines any metaphysical and physical explanation.

• 第三，没有任何例子表明意识能够脱离生命体的主观经验而存在。例如，若没有自我或"我"，痛苦意味着什么？若没有正在思考的人，对某个念头有所意识又意味着什么？这些问题有力地表明，意识只有在一个统一的有意识主体经历一系列主观状态时才有意义。

• Thirdly, there are no examples of consciousness existing outside of the subjective experience of a living entity. For instance, what does pain mean without a self or an ‘I’? What does being conscious of a thought mean without someone who is thinking? These questions strongly suggest that consciousness only makes sense with a unified conscious being experiencing an array of subjective states.

• 最后，许多各自都含有某种意识形式的物质碎片，如何能够产生统一的意识体验？那些各自包含主观意识的物质碎片，如何汇聚成有意义的统一体验？如果我们的意识体验仅仅是大脑各个物质部件中许多意识元素的结果，那么我们的体验将是不连贯的，或统一性较差。爱德华·费舍尔教授评论了单一意识体验的统一意义。他解释说，我们的体验并不只是许多不同意识元素的简单相加；我们的体验具有统一的感受。他以阅读一本书的意识体验为例阐述了他的观点：

• Finally, how can a unified conscious experience emerge from many pieces of matter that all contain a form of consciousness? How do individual pieces of matter that contain subjective consciousness manage to add up to a meaningful, unified experience? If our conscious experiences were just a result of many conscious elements contained in the physical parts that make up the brain, our experience would be incoherent, or less unified. Professor Edward Feser comments on the unified meaning of a single conscious experience. He explains that our experiences are not just a summation of many different conscious elements; our experiences have a unified feel. He presents his case using the conscious experience of reading a book:

“这种体验具有一种连贯的意义或含义，并且这种意义或含义属于一个单一的体验主体。你不仅仅是将形状、质地、颜色等视为彼此分离的元素来察觉，而是将它们作为一本书来察觉；而且是你在察觉它们，而不是无数神经事件各自‘察觉’书的某一个方面。”235。

“The experience has a coherent significance or meaning, and significance or meaning for a single subject of experience. You are not only aware of the shape, texture, colors, etc. as separate elements, but are aware of them as a book; and it is you who are aware of them, rather than myriad neural events somehow each being ‘aware’ of one particular aspect of the book.” 235.

虽然关于我在上文概述的这些方法已有大量学术讨论，但我的主要意图是简要介绍这些方法，并指出一些批评意见，这些批评削弱了它们解释主观意识的能力，使其无法像有神论那样充分地予以解释。

There is a lot of academic discussion around the approaches I have summarised above. However, the main intention was to briefly introduce these approaches and bring to light some criticisms which undermine their ability to explain subjective consciousness as sufficiently as theism does.

真主是最好的解释。

God is the best explanation.

我们该如何在未能全面解释主观个人经验的情况下解释意识？有神论的进路是最为充分的解释。假定一位全知、有意识、具有意志与目的的主体是一切意识的创造者，远比其他假设更为合理。以下是上帝是最佳解释的三个主要理由：

How do we explain consciousness in light of the failed attempts to comprehensively explain our subjective personal experiences? A theistic approach is the most adequate explanation. It is far more reasonable to postulate that an All-Aware, conscious agent with volition and purpose is the author of all consciousness. Here are three main reasons why God is the best explanation:

首先，它回答了一个现有各种观点都未能回答的问题：意识从何而来？J. P. 莫兰德教授解释了意识为何不可能通过自然的物理过程产生："我们对自然界的认识会给我们充分理由，不相信不可还原的意识会出现在其中。例如，惰性物理实体在空间上的几何重排，似乎远不足以解释意识的出现。"236

Firstly, it answers a question that none of the existing views have answered: Where did consciousness come from? Professor J. P. Moreland explains how it could not have been via natural physical processes: “Our knowledge of the natural world would give us positive reasons for not believing that irreducible consciousness would appear in it, e.g., the geometrical rearrangement of inert physical entities into different spatial structures hardly seems sufficient to explain the appearance of consciousness.”236

如果心灵与物质是截然不同的两类事物,那么意识就不可能从物质中产生。然而,若物质本身包含意识属性,那么这些属性又是如何产生的呢?我们必须提出这一本体论问题,因为意识与物质性的东西有着根本的区别。为了解释主观意识经验存在这一事实,必定是真主创造了意识。假设存在一位全知的有意识的行动者来解释意识,远比其他说法更为融贯。从这一观点看,有神论提供了更为丰富的解释。莫兰德认为,唯物主义者与物理主义者对意识的解释,“……在解释宇宙中不可还原的、真正的心理属性/事件何以出现上,毫无可信的途径……与有神论丰富的解释资源相比……”237。

If matter and consciousness are distinct, it follows that consciousness could not have emerged from matter. However, if matter contains conscious properties, then how did these properties arise? We need to ask this ontological question because consciousness is very different from material stuff. In order to explain the fact that subjective conscious experiences exist, God must have created consciousness. It is far more coherent to postulate an All-Aware conscious agent to explain consciousness. From this point of view, theism offers a far richer explanation. Moreland argues that physicalist and materialist accounts of consciousness have “…no plausible way to explain the appearance of irreducible, genuine mental properties/events in the cosmos… when compared to the rich explanatory resources for theism….”237.

其次,有神论解答了意识如何进入物质世界的问题。人们常常惊讶于:灵魂这类非物质的实体,怎能与物质层面的事物相互作用,甚至支配人类和动物的身体。然而,有神论对此有非常自然的解释。真主(安拉以外的"God"在此译为"神")的全能意志与神圣的作为,保证了一个物质与非物质相互作用的世界。查尔斯·塔利亚费罗(Charles Taliaferro)解释道:

Secondly, theism answers how consciousness could have entered the physical world. It often surprises people how non-physical entities like the soul can interact, and in fact control, physical aspects like the bodies of humans and animals. However, theism explains this very naturally. God’s comprehensive will and Divine activity ensure a world where the physical and non-physical interact. Charles Taliaferro explains:

“但在有神论的意识观中，意识的出现背后并没有什么把戏，也没有某种离散的神迹行为。意识是通过上帝的一种持久而全面的意志而从物理宇宙中涌现的，这一意志使得存在一个由物理和非物理的对象、属性与关系构成的世界。物质、能量、意识、时空规律之间的关系，简而言之，全都源于一种压倒一切的神圣活动。”238

“But in a theistic view of consciousness, there is no parlor trick or discrete miraculous act of God behind the emergence of consciousness. Consciousness emerges from the physical cosmos through an abiding comprehensive will of God that there be a world of physical and non-physical objects, properties, and relations. The relation between matter, energy, consciousness, the laws of space-time, tout court, all stem from an overwhelming, divine, activity.”238

根据一种非有神论的意识观，意识似乎无需任何充分的物理解释就奇迹般地凭空出现了。然而，有神论并不面临这一问题，因为意识的出现被视为实在的一部分。既然真主是有意识的、永生的、全知的，那么祂所创造的世界中包含具有自我意识的存在，便是合乎情理的。塔利亚费罗也得出了类似的结论：

According to a non-theistic approach to consciousness, consciousness seems to have miraculously popped into existence without any adequate physical explanation. However, theism does not face this problem, as the emergence of consciousness is viewed as part of reality. Since God is conscious, Ever-Living and All-Aware, it is plausible that the world He created contains beings with a conscious awareness of themselves. Taliaferro similarly concludes:

“从一种根本上属于唯物主义的宇宙观来看,意识的出现显得奇特;人们把它比作声称‘然后奇迹发生了’。但从有神论的角度来看,意识的出现可能被视为深深植根于实在本身的本性之中。动物与人类意识的创造并非某种孤立的奇迹,而是实在之潜在结构的体现。”239

“From the vantage point of a fundamentally materialist cosmology, the emergence of consciousness seems strange; it is likened to claiming ‘then a miracle happens.’ But from the vantage point of theism, the emergence of consciousness may be seen as something deeply rooted in the very nature of reality. The creation of animal and human consciousness is not some isolated miracle, but a reflection of the underlying structure of reality.”239

有神论解释了非物质的心理状态与物理的大脑状态之间的相互作用。神的意志与能力使这种相互作用得以发生,因为这种相互作用本就是神所创造的实在的组成部分。简单来说,如果在宇宙之初只存在物质,那么意识就不会存在。然而,如果在一开始是某种意识创造了物理世界,那么非物质的心理状态与物理的大脑状态之间的相互作用便说得通了。

Theism explains the interaction between nonphysical mental and physical brain states. God’s will and power have enabled such interaction to take place, as this interaction is part and parcel of the reality that God has created. Simply, if, in the beginning of the cosmos, only matter existed, then consciousness would not. However, if in the beginning a type of consciousness created the physical world, then the interaction between nonphysical mental states and physical brain states makes sense.

第三，有神论解释了我们拥有主观意识状态的能力，以及我们对自身体验味道、声音和质感时“那种感受是什么样子”的觉知。既然宇宙是由一位永生、有生命、全知的存在所创造的，那么可以推知，我们被赋予了觉察自身内在主观状态的能力。

Thirdly, theism explains our ability to have subjective conscious states and the fact that we have an awareness of what it is to be like ourselves, experiencing tastes, sounds and textures. Since the universe was created by an Ever-Living, Alive, All-Aware Being, it follows that we have been given this capacity to be aware of our inner subjective states:

"真主，除他以外没有应受崇拜的主，他是永生的。"240.

“God, there is no god except Him, the Ever Living.”240.

“他是至精细的，至彻知的。”241.

“And He is the All-subtle, the All-aware.”241.

有神论的解释对意识何以产生，比其他相互竞争的解释具有更强的解释力。但我必须在此强调，我并不否认生物学解释在揭示神经关联方面的作用。神经科学在有神论的语境中，同样可以开展得既有力度又卓有成效。我所主张的，是以有神论作为哲学基础加以补充，以完整地解释非有神论解释无法说明的问题：意识的困难问题。从这个意义上说，我的进路是一种二元论，可称为有神论二元论。在有神论二元论中，神经科学并不会被削弱，所有的研究项目都可以继续在这一主题上提供其令人惊叹的洞见与结论。然而，有神论二元论是一种提供全面解释的形而上学论题。泰利亚费罗教授也持有类似的立场："我看不出脑科学为何不能继续研究心理与生理的相互作用。在形而上学上未能将意识等同于脑状态，哪怕一瞬间也不妨碍对相关性的研究。此外，一个人完全可以是二元论者，并把意识与脑状态、人与身体视为功能性单位，而不必假定形而上学上只有一种事物在起作用。心身（或者我更愿称之为整合的）二元论是形而上学中的一个论题……整合二元论并不是与任何科学主张相竞争的科学假说。"242，神的存在是解释主观意识体验之存在与产生所必需的。此外，意识的困难问题以及内在主观体验的存在，清楚地指向一位全知全觉的存在者，正是祂创造了宇宙，也赋予了你我对自身主观意识状态有所觉知的能力。

A theistic explanation for the emergence of consciousness has greater explanatory power than competing explanations. I must stress here, however, that I am not denying the usefulness of biological explanations in unearthing neuro-correlations. Neuroscience can be conducted just as vigorously and fruitfully in a theistic context. What I am advocating is adding theism as a philosophical basis to fully explain what non-theistic explanations cannot: the hard problem of consciousness. In this sense, my approach is a form of dualism, which can be called theistic-dualism. In theistic-dualism, neuroscience is not undermined, and all the research projects can continue to provide their amazing insights and conclusions on the topic. However, theistic-dualism is a metaphysical thesis that provides a comprehensive explanation. Professor Taliaferro advocates a similar position: “I do not see why the brain sciences cannot continue with its study of psycho-physical interaction. The failure to identify metaphysically consciousness with brain states does not for a nanosecond impede the study of correlation. Moreover one may be a dualist and treat consciousness and brain states, the person and body, as functional units without supposing that there is only one kind of thing metaphysically that is in play. Mind-body (or, as I prefer to call it, integrative) dualism is a thesis in metaphysics… integrative dualism is not a scientific hypothesis that competes with any scientific claims.” 242, God’s existence is required to explain the existence and emergence of subjective conscious experience. In addition, the hard problem of consciousness and the existence of inner subjective experiences clearly point to an All-Aware Being, that created the universe and the ability for you and me to have an awareness of our subjective conscious states.

我们不应该对灵魂知道太多。

We are not meant to know much about the soul.

穆斯林读者理所当然会问：这一论证是否与正统的伊斯兰教义相容。常见的反对意见通常包括这样一个事实：《古兰经》明确说，"鲁哈"（即灵魂、精神、意识，或使身体有生命的那个东西）是真主的事务或命令，而人类所得的知识极少。因此，我们应当对此保持沉默："他们将问你关于灵魂的事。你说：'灵魂是我主的事务，你们所得的知识只是很少的。'"243

Muslim readers will rightly ask if this argument is compatible with normative Islamic theology. The common objection usually includes the fact that the Qur’an explicitly states that the rooh (meaning soul, spirit, consciousness or the thing that animates the body) is the affair or command of God and humanity has been given very little knowledge about it. Therefore, we should keep silent on the matter: “And they ask you, [O Muhammad], about the soul. Say, ‘The soul is of the affair of my Lord. And you have not been given of knowledge except a little.’”243

要调和这一表面上的神学冲突，必须理解：这段经文所涉及的是意识或灵魂的本质，而不是其存在。经文肯定有一种非物质的实体使身体有生命，也就是灵魂或意识。这正是本章论证所提出的观点：意识的存在只能用非唯物主义的世界观来解释。本章并没有讨论伊斯兰原典已经暗示之外的任何内容。例如，《古兰经》确认鲁哈（rooh）不同于我们的物质宇宙，它使身体有生命，它是一个统一的“我”，并且是由真主创造的。因此，这里所说的并没有与伊斯兰正统的核心原则相抵触。

To reconcile this apparent theological conflict, it must be understood that this verse concerns the essence of consciousness or the soul, not its existence. The verse affirms that an immaterial substance animates the body—in other words, a soul or consciousness. This is exactly what the argument in this chapter has presented: that the existence of consciousness can only be explained by a non-materialist worldview. The chapter is not discussing anything beyond what is already implied by Islamic source texts. For instance, the Qur’an affirms that the rooh is different from our material universe, that it animates the body, that it is a unified ‘I’, and that it was created by God. Therefore, nothing here contradicts core orthodox Islamic principles.

总之，我认为我们必须考虑到这样一个事实：真主教导我们要反思自身，由此我们可以推断，如果没有真主，我们就不可能拥有任何主观的意识体验——换言之，否认真主，就是否认我们自己！

To conclude, I think we must consider the fact that God tells us to ponder within ourselves, and by doing so we may conclude that if there is no God, then we could not have any subjective conscious experience—in other words, by denying God, we deny ourselves!.

“难道他们不在自己身上反思吗？”244

“Do they not reflect within themselves?”244