想象一天晚上，你接到了大卫的电话。他是你以前的同学，你们曾在科学课上同桌。你已经多年没有和他联系了，但还记得他以前问过的那些奇怪问题。虽然你觉得他为人不错，却不太赞同他的想法。你勉强接起电话。简短寒暄之后，他邀请你一起吃午饭。你半推半就地答应了。 午饭时，他问道：“我可以跟你说件事吗？”你回答说可以。他开始向你讲一个你从未听过的观点：“你知道吗，过去——比如你昨天做的事、去年发生的事，一直到你出生的那一刻——其实并没有真正发生过。它只是你脑子里的一种幻觉。所以我想问你，你相信过去是存在的吗？” 作为一个讲道理的人，你不同意他的论断，于是回答：“你有什么证据证明过去不存在？” 现在让我们把这段对话倒回去，想象你整顿饭都在努力证明过去确实发生过。你更喜欢哪一种情形？

Imagine one evening you receive a call from David, one of your old school friends you used to sit next to during science lessons. You haven’t spoken to him for years, but you remember the weird questions he used to ask you. Although you found him pleasant, you were not a fan of his ideas. Reluctantly you answer the phone. After a brief exchange of greetings, he invites you to have lunch with him. You half-heartedly accept his invitation. During lunch he asks, “Can I tell you something?” You reply positively, and he begins to express to you something that you haven’t heard before: “You know, the past— like what you did yesterday, last year, and all the way back to your birth—didn’t really happen. It’s just an illusion in your head. So, my question to you is do you believe the past exists?” As a rational person you do not agree with his assertion and you reply, “What evidence do you have to prove that the past does not exist?” Now rewind the conversation, and imagine you spent the whole meal trying to prove that the past is something that really happened. Which scenario do you prefer?

你更倾向于第一种情形，是因为你和其他理性的人一样，都把过去的真实性视为不言自明的真理。对于所有不言自明的真理，如果有人对其提出质疑，举证责任就落在提出质疑的人身上。现在让我们把这一点应用到有神论者与无神论者的对话中。

The reason you prefer the first scenario is because you—like the rest of the reasonable people out there—regard the reality of the past as a self-evident truth. As with all self-evident truths, if someone challenges them, the burden of proof is on the one who has questioned them. Now let’s apply this to a theist-atheist dialogue.

一位有神论者邀请他的无神论朋友共进晚餐。用餐期间，这位无神论者断言："你知道，上帝并不存在。没有任何证据能证明他的存在。"这位有神论者随即提出了一连串关于上帝存在的论证。然而，他采取的策略正确吗？在我们提出关于上帝存在的正面论证之前，难道不应该先探究为什么质疑上帝的存在会被视为理所当然的默认问题吗？问题不应是：上帝存在吗？而应是：我们有什么理由拒绝祂的存在？ 请不要误会我的意思。我相信我们有许多支持信仰上帝的有力论证，本书也对这些论证进行了讨论。我在此提出的观点是：如果不存在反对上帝存在的论证，那么理性的默认立场就是相信神圣者的存在。否则，就等同于在没有充分理由的情况下质疑过去的真实性。从这个角度看，无神论是不自然的。

A theist invites his atheist friend for dinner, and during the meal the atheist asserts, “You know, God does not exist. There’s no evidence for his existence.” The theist replies with a barrage of different arguments for God’s existence. However, has the theist adopted the right strategy? Before we present a positive case for God’s existence, shouldn’t we be probing why questioning God’s existence is the assumed default question? It shouldn’t be: Does God exist? Rather, it should be: What reasons do we have to reject His existence? Now, do not get me wrong. I believe we have many good arguments that support a belief in God, and these are discussed in this book. The point I am raising here is that if there are no arguments against God’s existence, then the rational default position is the belief in the Divine. Otherwise, it would be tantamount to questioning the reality of the past without any good reason to do so. From this perspective atheism is unnatural.

自明的真理。

Self-evident truths.

我们认为许多信念是不言自明的真理。这意味着这些信念可以被描述为默认的、天然的或真实的。其中包括：

We consider many beliefs to be self-evidently true. This means the belief can be described as natural or true by default. Some of them include:

• 自然界的统一性。

• The uniformity of nature.

• 因果律。

• The law of causality.

过去的真实情况。

• The reality of the past.

• 我们推理的有效性。

• The validity of our reasoning.

• 他人心灵的存在。

• The existence of other minds.

• 外部世界的存在。

• The existence of an external world.

当有人质疑这些真理时,我们不会盲目接受他们的结论,通常会回应:“你凭什么证据来否定它们?”

When someone questions these truths, we do not blindly accept their conclusions, and we usually reply, “What evidence do you have to reject them?”.

这些真理之所以不言自明，是因为它们具有以下特征：

These truths are self-evident because they are characterised by being:

• 普遍性：这些原则并非某种特定文化的产物，而是跨文化的。这并不意味着人人都相信这些真理，也不意味着存在某种共识。这种不言自明的真理，并非产生于特定的社会条件之中。

• Universal: Not a product of a specific culture, they are cross-cultural. This doesn’t imply that everyone believes in the truth, or that there is some kind of consensus. The self-evident truth is not born out of specific social conditions.

• 未经教授的(Untaught):不是基于信息的传递。它们不是通过你内省和感官之外的信息获得的。换言之,它们不是通过获取知识而习得的。

• Untaught: Not based on information transfer. They are not acquired via information external to your introspection and senses. In other words, they are not learnt via acquiring knowledge.

• 自然的：由人类心理的自然运作所形成。

• Natural: Formed due to the natural functioning of the human psyche.

• 直观的：对世界最简单而又最全面的理解。

• Intuitive: The simplest and most comprehensive interpretation of the world.

让我们把上述特征应用于"过去是真实存在的"这一信念。

Let’s apply the above features to the belief that the past is real.

过去的真实性是一个不言自明的真理,因为它具有普遍性、非经教导、自然且直觉性。它之所以是普遍真理,是因为大多数(即便不是全部)文化都相信过去的存在,其观点是:过去曾经是现在。这清楚地表明,这种信念并非特定社会环境的产物。对过去的信念也是非经教导的,因为当一个人第一次意识到过去曾是实际存在的状态时,这种认识并非基于他人的告知或任何形式的学习。没有人是在父母告诉他过去是真实的环境中长大的。这种信念是通过个人自身的经验获得的。过去的真实性还是自然的,具有正常理性能力的人都认同,过去由曾经发生过的事情构成。

The reality of the past is a self-evident truth because it is universal, untaught, natural and intuitive. It is a universal truth because most—if not all—cultures have a belief in the past, from a point of view that the past was once the present. This clearly shows that the belief is not a result of specific social circumstances. The belief in the past is also untaught, because when someone first realises that the past was an actual state of affairs, it is not based on someone telling them or any type of learning. No one grows up being told by his or her parents that the past was real. This belief is acquired via their own experience. The reality of the past is also natural. People with normal rational faculties agree that the past consists of things that happened.

最后，相信过去曾经发生过，是对我们经验最简单、最全面的解释，并且它建立在对世界的一种天生理解之上。断言过去只是一种幻觉，所带来的问题比它解决的还多。它无法全面解释我们的记忆、我们对时间纵深的体验，以及有记载的历史。

Finally, the belief that the past once happened is the simplest and most comprehensive interpretation of our experiences, and it is based on an innate understanding of the world. To claim that the past is an illusion raises more problems than it solves. It doesn’t comprehensively explain our memories, our experience of temporal depth and recorded history.

真主：一个不言自明的真理。

God: a self-evident truth.

正如“过去曾经是现在”这一信念一样，神的存在同样是一个不言自明的真理。本章所说的“神”，指的是造物主这一基本概念，即一个非人格化的个体性原因或设计者；它并不指向某一特定宗教所理解的神明或上帝。接下来的讨论将说明，对这一基本神观念的信仰为何是普遍的、无需教导的、自然的且直觉性的。请注意，本章的目的并非证明神的存在，而是要指出：相信存在一位造物主或终极原因，才是更为融贯的默认立场，而无神论者的立场则不然。

Just like the belief that the past was once the present, the existence of God is also a self-evident truth. What is meant by ‘God’ in this chapter is the basic concept of a creator, a nonhuman personal cause or designer. It does not refer to a particular religious conception of a deity or God. The following discussion explains why the belief in this basic idea of God is universal, untaught, natural and intuitive. Please note, this chapter does not aim to prove God’s existence. Rather, it aims to highlight that the default position of a belief in a creator or an ultimate cause is more coherent than the atheist’s position.

普遍的

Universal.

创造者或超自然起因这一基本观念是跨文化的。它并不依赖于某种文化，而是超越文化，如同对因果关系和他人心灵存在的信念一样。例如，认为他人有心灵的观念存在于所有文化之中，是大多数理性之人所持有的信念。上帝或超自然起因的存在，是一种普遍持有的信念，而非某一特定文化的产物。不同文化中对上帝有着不同的理解，但这并不否定创造者或非人格化的个人起因这一基本观念。

The basic underlying idea of a creator, or a supernatural cause for the universe, is cross-cultural. It is not contingent on culture, but transcends it, like the belief in causality and the existence of other minds. For example, the idea of other people having minds exists in all cultures, a belief held by most rational people. The existence of God or a supernatural cause is a universally held belief and not the product of one specific culture. Different conceptions of God are held in various cultures, but this does not negate the basic idea of a creator or nonhuman personal cause.

尽管世上有许多无神论者,对神的信仰仍是普遍存在的。普遍的信仰并不意味着地球上的每一个人都必须信仰它。跨文化的共识已足以证明,人们普遍相信神的存在,因此这种信念并非源于特定的社会条件。显然,世界上有神论者远多于无神论者,而且从有记载的历史开始就一直如此。

In spite of the number of atheists in the world, the belief in God is universal. A universal belief does not mean every single person on the planet must believe in it. A cross-cultural consensus is enough evidence to substantiate the claim that people universally believe in God’s existence, and therefore, it is not due to specific social conditions. Evidently, there are many more theists than atheists in the world, and this has been the case from the beginning of recorded history.

未受教导的

Untaught.

自明的真理无需教授或学习。例如，要知道什么是意大利面，我需要了解西方饮食和意大利文化，仅凭思考是无法知道的。相比之下，要知道万物有一位创造者，你并不需要任何信息，无论是来自文化还是教育。这或许就是社会学家和人类学家认为，即便是无神论者家庭的孩子被困在荒岛上，他们也会相信有某种东西创造了这座岛屿的原因。⁹¹ 我们对真主的理解各不相同，但对某种原因或创造者的信念，是基于我们自身的反思。

Self-evident truths do not need to be taught or learnt. For example, for me to know what spaghetti is, I require information of western cuisine and Italian culture. I cannot know what spaghetti is merely by reflecting on it. By contrast, you do not require any information, whether from culture or education, to know a creator for things exists. This may be the reason why sociologists and anthropologists argue that even if atheist children were stranded on a desert island, they would come to believe that something created the island.91 Our understanding of God differs, but the underlying belief in a cause or creator is based on our own reflections.

有些无神论者会呼喊："相信神与相信飞天意大利面怪物没有区别。"这种反驳显然是站不住脚的。自明的真理不需要外部信息。怪物或意大利面的存在观念，则需要信息的传递。没有人是凭借自身的直觉或内省而获得关于怪物或意大利面的知识的。因此，飞天意大利面怪物并非自明的真理，所以不能将它与神相提并论。即便暂且撇开本章的上下文，这一反驳也依然不成立，因为关于神的存在有许多有力的论证，而关于飞天意大利面怪物的存在则没有任何站得住脚的论证。

Some atheists exclaim, “Believing in God is no different than believing in the spaghetti monster”. This objection is obviously false. Self-evident truths do not require external information. The idea that monsters exist, or even that spaghetti exists, requires information transfer. No one acquires knowledge of monsters or spaghetti by their own intuitions or introspection. Therefore, the spaghetti monster is not a self-evident truth; thus, the comparison with God cannot be made. Diverting our attention from the context of this chapter, this objection also fails, as there are many good arguments for God’s existence and no good arguments for the existence of a spaghetti monster.

Natural.

Natural.

信仰某种超自然的设计者或起因，是基于人类心智的自然运作。人们自然会觉得没有画家的画作、没有建造者的建筑十分荒谬。整个宇宙也不例外。上帝自明存在的观念，一直是伊斯兰学术传统中的一个讨论议题。古典学者伊本·泰米叶解释说："对造物主的肯定牢牢扎根于所有人的心中……它源于人被创造时的必然属性……"92 十二世纪的学者拉吉布·阿斯法哈尼也同样断言，对上帝的认识"牢牢扎根于灵魂之中"。93 除了伊斯兰的立场之外，诸多领域的大量研究也支持这样一个结论：我们本应将世界视为被创造、被设计的。

Belief in some type of supernatural designer or cause is based on the natural functioning of the human psyche. People naturally find the idea of a painting without a painter or a building without a builder absurd. This is no different for the entire cosmos. The concept of God’s self-evident existence has been a topic of scholarly discussion in the Islamic intellectual tradition. The classical scholar Ibn Taymiyya explained that “affirmation of a Maker is firmly-rooted in the hearts of all men… it is from the binding necessities of their creation….” 92 The 12th century scholar Al-Raghib al-Asfahani similarly asserts that knowledge of God “is firmly-rooted in the soul”.93 As well as the Islamic position, a wealth of research in various fields supports the conclusion that we are meant to see the world as created and designed.

心理学证据

Psychological evidence.

学者奥莉维拉·彼得罗维奇（Olivera Petrovich）研究了自然事物（如植物和动物）的起源问题，她发现学龄前儿童认为是上帝创造了这些事物而非人类的可能性大约高出七倍。94 在她接受的多次广受关注的访谈中，包括她与我的私人通信中，彼得罗维奇得出结论：相信一位非拟人化的上帝似乎是人的天性，而无神论则是后天习得的认知立场。95 彼得罗维奇已出版了一本名为《从童年到成年的自然神学理解》的书，对这一问题作了进一步阐发。心理学家保罗·布卢姆（Paul Bloom）认为，认知心理学的最新发现表明，宗教信仰的两个关键方面——对设计者的信仰，以及身心二元论的信仰——对幼儿而言是天生的。96 在题为《儿童是“直觉有神论者”吗？》的文章中，教授德博拉·凯莱门（Deborah Kelemen）探讨了一些研究，这些研究表明幼儿倾向于从目的和意图的角度去思考自然物体。尽管仍需更多研究，且这些研究只是初步为“直觉有神论”提供了证据，但凯莱门的总结进一步印证了我们在本章中一直讨论的结论：

The academic Olivera Petrovich conducted research concerning the origins of natural things, such as plants and animals, and she found that pre-schoolers were about seven times more likely to say God created them rather than humans.94 In her popular interviews, including private correspondence I have had with her, Petrovich concludes that the belief in a non-anthropomorphic God seems to be natural, and that atheism is an acquired cognitive position.95 Petrovich has published a book called Natural-Theological Understanding from Childhood to Adulthood that elaborates further on this issue. Psychologist Paul Bloom argues that recent findings in cognitive psychology indicate that two key aspects of religious belief—belief in a designer, and belief in mind-body dualism—are natural to young children.96 In the article Are Children ‘Intuitive Theists’? Professor Deborah Kelemen explored research that suggested young children have a propensity to think about natural objects in terms of purpose and intention. Although more research is required, and it only tentatively suggests evidence to support ‘intuitive theism’, Kelemen’s summary further indicates the conclusions we have been discussing in this chapter:

“近期认知发展研究的综述显示，到大约5岁时，儿童已经理解自然物体并非由人类造成，能够推理非自然主体的心理状态，并表现出以设计的角度看待事物的能力。最后，对6至10岁儿童的证据表明，儿童给自然赋予目的的做法，与他们关于有意的非人类因果关系的观念相关。综合这些研究发现，可以认为儿童的解释方式或许可以准确地描述为直觉有神论。”Elisa Järnefelt、Caitlin F. Canfield与Deborah Kelemen的近期研究《一个不信者的分裂心智：不同类别的非宗教成年人对自然被有目的地创造的直觉信念》（The divided mind of a disbeliever: Intuitive beliefs about nature as purposefully created among different groups of non-religious adults）得出结论：人天生倾向于将自然视为经过设计的。该结论建立在三项研究之上。研究1以352名北美成年人为样本，样本既包括有宗教信仰的参与者，也包括无宗教信仰的参与者。研究程序采用了一种限时创造任务，这是“一种基于图片的程序，旨在测量成年人自动化的和反思性的倾向，即认为自然现象是由某种存在有目的地制造的”。参与者被随机分配到限时或不限时的条件下。所有参与者都在电脑上看到120张图片，然后需要判断“是否有任何存在有目的地制造了图片中的事物”，并通过按下键盘上的相应按键回答“是”或“否”。100

“A review of recent cognitive developmental research reveals that by around 5 years of age, children understand natural objects as not humanly caused, can reason about non-natural agents’ mental states, and demonstrate the capacity to view objects in terms of design. Finally, evidence from 6- to 10- year-olds suggests that children’s assignments of purpose to nature relate to their ideas concerning intentional nonhuman causation. Together, these research findings suggest that children’s explanatory approach may be accurately described as intuitive theism.” Recent research by Elisa Järnefelt, Caitlin F. Canfield and Deborah Kelemen, titled The divided mind of a disbeliever: Intuitive beliefs about nature as purposefully created among different groups of non-religious adults, concluded that there is a natural propensity to see nature as designed.98 This conclusion was grounded in three studies. Study 1 was based on a sample of 352 North American adults. The sample included religious and non-religious participants. The procedure involved a speeded creation task which was “a picture-based procedure devised to measure adults’ automatic and reflective tendencies to endorse natural phenomena as purposefully made by some being”99. The participants were randomly assigned either to a speeded or an unspeeded condition. All of the participants were presented with 120 pictures on a computer. They were then to judge whether “any being purposefully made the thing in the picture” and respond yes or no by pressing the relevant keys on a keyboard.100

研究2以148名北美成年人为对象,他们是"通过无神论者以及其他明确非宗教的协会和组织的电子邮件列表招募的"101。研究2的参与者接受了与研究1相同的快速创造任务。研究3以151名芬兰无神论成年人为对象,他们是"通过芬兰各地学生协会和组织的电子邮件列表招募的"102。该群体接受了类似的快速创造任务。结果颇为引人注目。研究者在讨论中总结道,无神论者也认为事物是有目的地被制造出来的:

Study 2 was based on 148 North American adults “who were recruited via the email lists of atheist and other explicitly non-religious associations and organizations”101. The same speeded creation task of Study 1 was given to the participants in Study 2. Study 3 was based on 151 Finnish atheist adults “recruited via the email lists of student associations and organizations all around Finland”102. This group was given a similar speeded created task. The results were fascinating. In their discussion the academics conclude that atheists saw things as purposefully made:

与研究1和研究2一致，研究3发现，在北欧芬兰，非宗教性并非问题，也不存在美国那种有声有色的有神论文化话语，在加工受限时，非宗教信仰的参与者仍会默认认为无论是有生命还是无生命的自然现象，都是由某种非人类存在有目的地创造的。耐人寻味的是，三项研究中不同非宗教群体的比较显示，尽管缺乏突出的有神论文化话语，芬兰非宗教参与者比北美无神论者更容易无法抑制其总体的创造认同水平。这一结果模式表明，周围的有神论文化话语并非解释人们倾向于认同自然中存在有目的创造的唯一因素。

“Consistent with Study 1 and Study 2, Study 3 revealed that non-religious participants in Nordic Finland, where non-religiosity is not an issue and where theistic cultural discourse is not present in the way it is in the United States, default to viewing both living and non-living natural phenomena as purposefully made by a non-human being when their processing is restricted. Interestingly, comparisons across the different groups of non-religious participants in all three studies showed that, despite the absence of prominent theistic cultural discourse, non-religious Finnish participants were more likely than North American atheists to fail in suppressing their overall level of creation endorsement. This pattern of results shows that ambient theistic cultural discourse is therefore not the only factor that explains people’s tendency to endorse purposeful creation in nature.”.

这项研究的总体结论包括：其结果“为宗教不信是需要认知努力的这一观点提供了经验支持”104，并且“目前的发现表明，人类天生有一种将自然视为被设计之物的根深蒂固的倾向”。105 换言之，不信教在智识上是令人疲惫的，而把事物看作经过设计，是我们人性的一部分。该研究暗示有神论是与生俱来的。然而，与大多数研究一样，“关于这些早期发展的设计直觉之间可能存在的联系，仍有许多问题有待解答”。106

The general conclusions of this research include the fact that the results “lend empirical support to the proposal that religious non-belief is cognitively effortful”104 and that “the current findings suggest that there is a deeply rooted natural tendency to view nature as designed”.105. In other words, non-belief is intellectually exhausting, and seeing things as designed is part of what makes us human. The study suggests that theism is innate. However, as with most research, “many questions remain regarding possible connections between these early developing design intuitions”.106.

仍需对认知心理学和发展心理学开展更多研究，才能形成任何确定的结论。然而，上述研究支持这样一种观点：对上帝的信仰是自然的。一些反对者可能会引用某些研究，指出来自宗教背景的儿童在幼年时难以区分现实与幻想。但这类研究无法推翻上述结论，因为这些研究只关注宗教叙事，而没有涉及“事物需要设计者或创造者”这一概念。即便如此，宗教儿童可能难以区分现实与虚构，这一事实在形而上学上仍是中立的，因为若据此认为它支持无神论而非有神论，就预设了无神论为真、有神论为虚构。这类研究并不能使上述研究结果失效。必须指出的是，我在上文介绍的部分研究具有跨文化意义，这意味着无论参与者的有神论或无神论背景如何，他们都倾向于产生类似有神论的直觉。

Much more research is required in both cognitive and developmental psychology to form any definitive conclusions. However, the above studies support the view that the belief in God is natural. Some objectors may cite research that suggests that children from religious backgrounds have difficulty distinguishing between reality and fantasy at a young age. This research cannot undermine the aforementioned conclusions, because the studies only focused on religious narratives and not the concept of things requiring a designer or creator.107 Even so, the fact that religious children may have difficulty distinguishing between reality and fiction is still metaphysically neutral, because to suggest that it supports atheism rather than theism assumes that atheism is true and theism is fiction. Such research would not invalidate the findings mentioned above. It must be pointed out that some of the research I have presented above has cross-cultural implications, which means that regardless of the participants’ theist and atheist backgrounds, they had a tendency to have theist-like intuitions.

另一种观点认为，既然有研究表明无神论在认知上需要付出努力，也就是说需要更多的思考，那么这就表明无神论是最理性的立场。这一反驳建立在错误的推论之上。这些证据同样可以说明，无神论需要接受关于物质世界的错误假设（见第12章），因此它在心理上的负担也就随之而来。

Another contention includes that since some of the research shows that atheism is cognitively effortful—which implies that more thought is required—then it indicates that it is the most rational position. This objection is based on a false inference. The evidence can also suggest that atheism requires adopting false assumptions about the physical world (see Chapter 12); hence it becomes mentally taxing as a result.

我没有在此收录所有相关研究。这些讨论可能相当复杂，虽然也存在与之相矛盾的研究，但在我看来，它们的结论不够确定。本次讨论的主要目的，是展示研究中一个日益增长的趋势：这类研究支持这样一种观点，即相信真主存在是人的天性。

I have not included all of the relevant research here. The discussions can be quite complex and although there are contradictory studies, they are—in my view—less conclusive. The main objective of this discussion is to show a growing trend in the research that supports the view that the belief in God’s existence is natural.

社会学和人类学的证据。

Sociological and anthropological evidence.

巴雷特教授（Justin Barrett）在其著作《天生的信徒：儿童宗教信仰的科学》（Born believers: the science of children’s religious belief）中，考察了儿童的行为与言论。他的结论是，儿童相信他所称的“自然宗教”。这一观念认为，存在一位创造了整个宇宙的人格化存在。这位存在不可能是人类，而必定是神圣的、超自然的。

Professor Justin Barrett’s research in his book, Born believers: the science of children’s religious belief, looked at the behaviour and claims of children. He concluded that the children believed in what he calls “natural religion”. This is the idea that there is a personal Being that created the entire universe. That Being cannot be human—it must be divine, supernatural:

科学研究表明，儿童发育中的思维与超自然信仰之间存在关联：儿童通常会迅速形成一种便于相信超自然主体的心智。尤其是在出生后的第一年里，儿童能够区分主体与非主体，理解主体是能够以有目的的方式自主移动、追求目标的存在。他们热衷于在周围寻找能动性，即使证据很少。大约在满一周岁后不久，婴儿似乎就能理解，只有主体（而非自然力量或普通物体）才能从无序中创造出秩序……这种看重功能与目的的倾向，加上认为目的和秩序来自有心智之物的理解，使儿童很可能把自然现象看作是有意创造的。谁是造物主？儿童知道人并不是合适的人选。那一定是某位神……儿童生来就是我所称的自然宗教的信徒……108

“Scientific research on children’s developing minds and supernatural beliefs suggests that children normally and rapidly acquire minds that facilitate belief in supernatural agents. Particularly in the first year after birth, children distinguish between agents and non-agents, understanding agents as able to move themselves in purposeful ways to pursue goals. They are keen to find agency around them, even given scant evidence. Not long after their first birthday, babies appear to understand that agents, but not natural forces or ordinary objects, can create order out of disorder… This tendency to see function and purpose, plus an understanding that purpose and order come from minded beings, makes children likely to see natural phenomena as intentionally created. Who is the Creator? Children know people are not good candidates. It must have been a god… children are born believers of what I call natural religion….”108

直观的

Intuitive.

存在一位造物主，是对世界最直观的解释。它是对宇宙和我们自身存在最简单、最全面的说明，而且无需明确的教导也容易理解。人类总是习惯于为事物寻找原因，而整个宇宙正是这样的事物（见第五章和第六章）。并非所有直觉都是正确的，但要让人放弃其对事物的最初直觉，就需要证据。例如，当某人察觉到宇宙中存在设计与秩序时，直觉的结论是有一位设计者（见第八章）。要使此人改变想法，就需要有效的证据来证明与直觉相反的观点是合理的。对神、造物主、设计者或超自然原因的信仰，是一个不言自明的真理。它是普遍的、无需教授的、自然的和直观的。有鉴于此，正确的问题不是：神存在吗？正确的问题应当是：你为什么否认神的存在？这样一来，你就扭转了局面，而这样做是理所应当的：无神论是违背自然的。对一个不言自明的真理提出挑战的人，负有举证的责任。当有人声称过去是幻觉，或声称其他人没有心智时，他或她就必须承担举证的责任。无神论者也没有不同。他们必须论证自己拒绝宇宙存在一个原因或造物主的理由。

The existence of a creator is the most intuitive interpretation of the world. It is the simplest and most comprehensive explanation of the universe and our existence. It is also easy to understand without explicit instruction. Human beings have an affinity to attribute causes to things all the time, and the entire cosmos is one of those things (see Chapters 5 and 6). Not all intuitions are true, but evidence is required to make someone depart from their initial intuitions about things. For example, when someone perceives design and order in the universe, the intuitive conclusion is that there is a designer (see Chapter 8). To make that person change their mind, valid evidence is required to justify the counter-intuitive view. The belief in a God, creator, designer or supernatural cause is a self-evident truth. It is universal, untaught, natural and intuitive. In this light, the right question to ask is not: Does God exist? The right question should be: Why do you reject God’s existence? This way you will have turned the tables and rightly so; atheism is unnatural. The onus of proof is on someone who challenges a self-evident truth. When someone claims that the past is an illusion or that other people do not have minds, he or she would have to shoulder the burden of proof. Atheists are no different. They have to justify their rejection of a cause or creator for the universe.

“无神论是不言自明的真理” 有些无神论者主张，无神论默认为真。然而，否定造物主或因果本源并非不言自明。尽管无神论如今也已成为一种普遍立场，并且可能自有文字记载的历史以来便已存在，但它是后天习得的，并且有违直觉。人们必须学习才能否定造物主或事物的本源概念。否认宇宙有一位造物主，并不是最简单、最全面的解释。它或许简单，却算不上全面的解释。事实上，它制造的问题远多于它解决的问题。例如，宇宙如何能从无中产生（见第五章）？这个偶然存在的宇宙，其存在如何能没有任何解释（见第六章）？无神论者可能会回应说，关于宇宙的起源与本质，还有其他解释。这确实如此。然而，这些解释并非不言自明。它们不是默认立场，而是后天习得的立场。如前所述，要否定被视为不言自明的东西，就必须提供证据。我并非要排斥关于宇宙存在的其他解释，我只是指出什么才是默认立场。既然造物主的基本观念默认为真，我们首先应当问的问题是：我们有什么证据来否定造物主的存在？

“Atheism is self-evidently true” Some atheists argue that atheism is true by default. However, the rejection of a cause or a creator is not self-evident. Although atheism is now also a universal position (and may have been since the beginning of recorded history), it is taught and is counter-intuitive. People have to learn to reject the concept of a creator or cause for things. Denying a creator for the universe is not the simplest and most comprehensive explanation. It may be simple, but it does not provide a comprehensive explanation. It actually creates far more problems than it solves. For instance, how could the universe come into existence from nothing (see Chapter 5)? How could this contingent universe have no explanation for its existence (see Chapter 6)? The atheist may respond by saying that there are alternative explanations for the origins and nature of the universe. This is true. However, these explanations are not self-evident. They are not the default; they are acquired positions. As mentioned previously, in order to reject what is considered self-evident, one must provide evidence. I am not dismissing alternative explanations for the existence of the cosmos, I am merely pointing out what is the default position. Since the basic idea of a creator is true by default, the first question we should ask is: What evidence do we have to reject the existence of a creator?.

天性：fitrah（菲特拉）。

The innate disposition: fitrah.

将神视为不证自明的真理，与伊斯兰教神学中关于“菲特拉”（fitrah）的概念相关。该词源自阿拉伯语三字根 f-ṭ-r（ف ط ر），与 fatrun、fatarahu 等词相关，意为被创造或被造之物。从词义上讲，“菲特拉”指的是真主在我们内心所创造的某种东西。从神学上讲，“菲特拉”是人的天性或内在本性，是真主所创造的，人天生认识真主，并天然倾向于崇拜真主。这基于穆罕默德ﷺ先知的一段可靠圣训，其中说：“每个孩子都生于菲特拉之中，然后他的父母使他成为犹太教徒、基督教徒或拜火教徒……”110

God as a self-evident truth relates to the Islamic theological concept concerning the fitrah. The word comes from the Arabic trilateral stem fa ṭa ra ( which relates to words such as fatrun and fatarahu), meaning a created or made thing. From a lexical point of view, the fitrah refers to something that has been created within us by God. Theologically, the fitrah is the natural state or the innate disposition of the human being that has been created by God with innate knowledge of Him and with the affinity to worship the Divine.109 This is based on the authentic statement of the Prophet Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم which states, “every child is born in a state of fitrah. Then his parents make him a Jew, a Christian or a Magian….”110

这段圣训教导说，每个人都有这种天生的本性，但父母的教育以及由此延伸的社会环境等外在影响，会使人转而接受与真主的天生认知不相符的信仰和做法。关于“菲特拉”（fitrah）的概念，学者们已有大量讨论。例如，11世纪的神学家安萨里（Al-Ghazali）认为，菲特拉是人们获得真主存在之真理、以及真主应当受到崇拜的一种途径。他还主张，对真主的认识是“每个人在其意识深处都拥有的”。111 14世纪的学者伊本·泰米叶（Ibn Taymiyya）则把天生本性描述为真主在其创造物之中所造就的某种事物，其中蕴含着对真主的内在认知。

This Prophetic tradition teaches that every human being has this innate disposition, but external influences such as parenting and by extension society—change the human being into someone who adopts beliefs and practices that are not in line with the innate knowledge of God. There have been numerous scholarly discussions on the concept of the fitrah. For example, the 11th century theologian Al-Ghazali argues that the fitrah is a means that people use to acquire the truth of God’s existence and that He is entitled to our worship. He also maintained that knowledge of God is something “every human being has in the depths of his consciousness”.111 Ibn Taymiyya, the 14th century scholar, describes the innate disposition as something God created within His creation that contains ingrained knowledge of God:

“……存在一位完美的造物主，是可以从人的天性（fitrah）中认知的；这种认知是根植于内心的、必然的、显而易见的。”112

“…the existence of a perfect Creator is known from the fitrah, and this knowledge is ingrained, necessary, and obvious.”112

尽管“法特喇”（fitrah）是一种天然的本性，它仍可能被外部影响“遮蔽”或“败坏”。正如上述先知圣训所指出的，这些影响包括养育方式、社会环境以及同辈压力。这些影响可能会蒙蔽法特喇，使人无法承认真理。伊本·泰米叶认为，当天然的本性被其他影响所遮蔽时，人可能需要其他证据来证明真主的存在：

In spite of the fact that the fitrah is a natural state, it can be ‘veiled’ or ‘spoiled’ by external influences. These influences, as indicated by the above Prophetic tradition, can include parenting, society and peer pressure. These influences can cloud the fitrah and prevent someone from acknowledging the truth. Ibn Taymiyya argues that when the natural state is clouded with other influences, the person may require other evidences for God’s existence:

对于天性未曾受到扭曲的人而言，对造物主及其完美的肯定是与生俱来且必然存在的。即便在这种肯定之外，还有许多其他的证据可以佐证，但当天性被改变之时，许多人或许正需要这些其他的证据。

“Affirmation of a Creator and His perfection is innate and necessary with respect to one whose innate disposition remains intact, even though alongside such an affirmation it has many other evidences for it as well, and often when the innate disposition is altered… many people may be in need of such other evidences.”.

这些其他证据可以包括理性论证。伊本·泰米叶并不是理性论证证明真主存在的有力倡导者。他坚持认为，fitrah（天性）才是确认安拉的主要途径。然而，他并没有否定可靠的理性证明真主存在的论据。[114] 尽管如此，这些理性论证必须符合伊斯兰神学，不能采用与之相抵触的前提（或假设）。从伊斯兰认识论的角度来看，重要的是要认识到，对真主存在的信念并非仅仅从某种归纳、演绎、哲学或科学证据中推导出来的。相反，这些证据唤醒并澄清了fitrah，使人能够认识到关于真主的天生知识。真主的存在以及他值得我们崇拜这一事实，已经为fitrah所知。然而，fitrah可能会被社会化和其他外部影响所蒙蔽。因此，理性论证的作用是“提醒”我们那些我们已经知道的真理。为了说明这一点，设想我在打扫母亲的阁楼。当我搬动旧袋子、扔掉不需要的东西时，我找到了五岁时常玩的心爱玩具。我由此想起了某件我早已知道的事情。我心里想：“哦，对了。我记得这个玩具，它是我最喜欢的。”相信真主以及他值得我们崇拜这一真理也是如此。理性论证起到精神和理智上的唤醒作用，使我们认识到蕴含在我们fitrah中的知识。

These other evidences can include rational arguments. Ibn Taymiyya was not a strong advocate of rational arguments for God’s existence. He maintained that the fitrah was the main way of affirming the Divine. However, he did not dismiss sound rational proofs for God’s existence.114 Nevertheless, these rational arguments must conform to Islamic theology and not adopt premises (or assumptions) that contradict it. From the perspective of Islamic epistemology, it is important to know that conviction in the existence of God is not solely inferred from some type of inductive, deductive, philosophical or scientific evidence. Instead, these evidences awaken and uncloud the fitrah so the human being can recognise the innate knowledge of God. The truth of God’s existence and the fact that He is worthy of our worship is already known by the fitrah. However, the fitrah can be clouded by socialisation and other external influences. Therefore, the role of rational arguments is to ‘remind’ us of the truth that we already know. To illustrate this point, imagine I am cleaning my mother’s loft. As I move old bags around and throw away unwanted objects, I find my favourite toy that I used to play with when I was 5 years old. I am reminded about something that I already have knowledge of. In my mind I think, “Oh yeah. I remember this toy. It was my favourite.” The truth of believing in God and the fact that He is worthy of our worship is no different. Rational arguments serve as spiritual and intellectual awakenings to realise the knowledge that is contained in our fitrah.

除此之外，还有其他方式可以使人的fitrah（天性）重新清明，包括内省、灵性体验、反思和沉思。《古兰经》鼓励人们质疑，并对事物进行深入思考：

Other ways the fitrah can be unclouded include introspection, spiritual experiences, reflection and pondering. The Qur’an promotes questioning and thinking deeply about things:

“我们就这样详细地阐明各种迹象，给那些用心思考的人。”115

“Thus do We explain in detail the signs for who give thought.”115

确实，在其中有对善于思考的民众的一个迹象。116

“Indeed in that is a sign for a people who give thought.”116

“难道他们是无中生有地被创造的吗？还是他们自己就是创造者呢？还是他们创造了天地呢？不，他们是不确信的。”117

“Or were they created by nothing? Or were they the creators [of themselves]? Or did they create the heavens and the Earth? Rather, they are not certain.”117

伊斯兰认识论认为，理性论证只是手段而非目的。它们的作用在于唤醒或澄清人的天性（fitrah）。因此必须注意，引导只来自真主，任何理性证据都无法使人的心灵真正领悟伊斯兰的真理。真主对此说得非常明确："你不能引导你所喜爱的人，而真主引导他所意欲的人。他最知道遵循正道的人。"118 引导是一件属灵的事情，它建立在真主的慈悯、知识和智慧之上。如果真主意欲某人通过理性论证得到引导，那么没有任何东西能阻止此人接受真理。然而，如果真主基于其神圣的智慧，判定某人不配得到引导，那么无论呈现出多少有力的论证，此人都将永远不会接受真理。

Islamic epistemology views rational arguments as means and not ends. They serve as a way of awakening or unclouding the fitrah. This is why it is very important to note that guidance only comes from God, and no amount of rational evidence can convince one’s heart to realise the truth of Islam. God makes this very clear: “Indeed, you do not guide whom you like, but God guides whom He wills. And He is most knowing of the [rightly] guided.”118 Guidance is a spiritual matter that is based on God’s mercy, knowledge and wisdom. If God wills that someone is guided through rational arguments, then nothing will stop that person from accepting the truth. However, if God decides that someone does not deserve guidance—based on a Divine wisdom— then regardless of how many cogent arguments that are presented, that person will never accept the truth.

综上所述,相信真主存在是一个不证自明的真理。与所有不证自明的真理一样,当有人对其提出质疑时,举证责任在于质疑者。只有找到关于真主不存在的正面证据,才可能动摇这一信仰。然而,正如本书将要表明的,无神论者针对真主存在所提出的少数论点既薄弱又在哲学上浅显(见第11章和第12章)。真主的不证自明性早在1400多年前就已在《古兰经》中被提及:

To conclude, the belief in God’s existence is a self-evident truth. As with all self-evident truths, when someone challenges them, the onus of proof is on them. The only way the belief in God can be undermined is if there is any positive evidence for the non-existence of the Divine. However, as this book will show, the few arguments that atheists have against the existence of God are weak and philosophically shallow (see Chapters 11 and 12). The self-evident truth of God was addressed in the Qur’an over 1,400 years ago:

“对创造天地的真主，岂能有疑？” Note on the rules: the original says "God", so I've used the Chinese word for God (真主) rather than rendering it as "Allah", per your instructions.119

“Can there be doubt about God, Creator of the heavens and Earth?”119

最后，伊斯兰学者韦萨姆·沙尔卡维（Wesam Charkawi）恰当地解释道：神的存在与我们的天性相契合。

To end this chapter, Islamic scholar Wesam Charkawi aptly explains that God’s existence is in line with our natural disposition:

“诚然，人若深入内心并省察周围的世界，他首先感受到的，便是一种至高的力量在主宰着这个世界，它掌管着生死、创造与毁灭、动静，以及其中发生的各种精细入微的变化。毫无疑问，人类感受到这一实在，并深信不疑，无论他能否提出证据来证实这种感受的真实性，也无论他是否做得到。这是一种天性本能，即人类的本然之性（fitrah），而这本身便是精确而明确的证据……此外，我们在自身中感受到慈悲、爱、憎恶、喜爱与厌恶的存在，然而，即便它们在我们内心涌动，又有什么证据能证明它们存在呢？一个人能提出比他所感受到和体察到的更多的证据吗？而这些情感依然毫无疑问地真实存在。人会感到兴奋，也会感到疼痛，然而他能否提出比自己的感受更多的证据来证明它们的存在呢？毫无疑问，这就是人类被造时所依循的天性（fitrah）或本能，这些深刻的感受也是早已植根于我们内心的。它们存在于我们之中，并非无缘无故，也非徒劳，而是与这个世界相应的自然真理。”120

“Indeed, the first sense in the depth of a person if he contemplates within himself and in the world around him is the sense of a higher power that reigns over the world with the command to dispose over life and death, creation and annihilation, motion and stillness and all the different types of meticulous changes that occur in it. Unequivocally, mankind senses this reality and believes in it deeply, regardless of whether one is able to produce evidence to verify the truth of this feeling or is unable. This is a natural instinct or the natural disposition of mankind, which is indeed a precise and exact evidence… In addition, we feel in ourselves the presence of compassion, love, hate, encouragement and dislike, though what is the proof that it exists, even while it flutters within us? Is one able to bring forth evidence more than that which he feels and senses, and yet it is real without doubt? One feels excitement and senses pain, yet is one unable to establish evidence to prove it exists with more than what he feels? Without doubt, this is the natural way [fitrah] or instinct on which mankind has been created, and these are the deep feelings that have been embedded within us. They are not within us for no reason or in vain, rather it is a natural truth that corresponds to the world.”120