Tangu kuundwa kwake mwaka 1948, uhalisia wa nguvu za kijeshi za Israeli umefunikwa na hadithi ya kubuniwa ya kutoshindwa. Cha kushangaza ni kwamba hadithi kama hizo hazikuenezwa waziwazi na Israeli, bali zimepewa uhai na vitendo vya watawala wa Kiislamu wasaliti.

Since its formation in 1948, the reality of Israel’s military strength has been shrouded by a mythical aura of invincibility. Interestingly such myths have not been actively expressed by Israel, but have been given life by the actions of the treacherous Muslim rulers.

Utendaji wa Israeli katika vita vya 1948, 1956, 1967 na 1973 dhidi ya Waislamu wa eneo hilo kwa muda mrefu umeonekana kuwa uthibitisho wa ubora wa kijeshi wa Israeli. Kutokana na ubora huu unaoonekana na kutwaa kwake ardhi za Waislamu, inasemwa kwamba mapambano ya moja kwa moja ya kijeshi dhidi ya Israeli si njia inayowezekana kwa nchi za Kiarabu, hali inayozaa haja ya kuingia katika mazungumzo. Matokeo ya moja kwa moja ya hatua hiyo yamekuwa kukubali mamlaka ya Israeli kupitia mipango kama mchakato wa amani.

Israel’s performance in the wars of 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 against the Muslims in the region has long been seen as confirmation of Israel’s military superiority. In light of this apparent superiority and its seizure of Muslim lands, it is argued that direct military conflict with Israel is not a viable course of action for the Arab states, creating the necessity of entering into negotiations. The direct consequence of such a move has been the acceptance of Israel’s sovereignty through plans such as the peace process.

Katika kupitia upya nguvu za kijeshi zinazodaiwa za Israel, ni lazima kukumbuka swali hili: Ujenzi wa mtazamo huu wa hadithi unatumikia kusudi gani?

In reviewing Israel’s supposed military might one must keep in mind: What purpose does the construction of this myth serve?

Vita vya 1948 vilisababisha kuanzishwa kwa taifa la Israeli. Kwa mtazamo wa juu, ni vigumu kuelewa jinsi Waarabu milioni 40 wasingeweza kulingana na nguvu ya mapigano ya Wayahudi 600,000 pekee. Uchunguzi wa karibu zaidi wa watetezi wa sababu ya Wapalestina unaonyesha kwamba matendo yao, kwa kweli, ndiyo yaliyoongoza moja kwa moja kwa kuanzishwa kwa Israeli.

The war of 1948 led to the establishment of the state of Israel. On the surface it’s difficult to understand how 40 million Arabs could not match the fighting strength of just 600,000 Jews. A closer study of the defenders of the Palestinian cause shows how their actions in fact led directly to the establishment of Israel.

Wawakilishi wakuu wa sababu ya Wapalestina walikuwa Mfalme Abdullah wa Transjordan, Mfalme Farook wa Misri, na Mufti wa Palestina. Wote walikuwa watawala dhaifu sana, wakidhibitiwa mara kwa mara na Waingereza. Taswira ya Mfalme Abdullah kujiona kama mtetezi wa sababu ya Wapalestina ilikuwa ni kinyago. Ilijulikana kwamba yeye na Ben Gurion (Waziri Mkuu wa kwanza wa Israel)

The primary representatives of the Palestinian cause were King Abdullah of Transjordan, King Farook of Egypt and the Mufti of Palestine, all of them were extremely weak rulers subject to constant manipulation by the British. King Abdullah’s portrayal of himself as a defender of the Palestinian cause was a façade. It was known that he and Ben Gurion (Israel’s first Prime Minister)

Walikuwa wanafunzi pamoja mjini Istanbul, na katika mikutano ya siri Abdullah alikuwa ametoa pendekezo la kukubali kuanzishwa kwa Israeli badala ya Jordan kudhibiti sehemu za Palestina zenye wakazi wa Kiarabu.

were students together in Istanbul and that in clandestine meetings Abdullah had offered to accept the establishment of Israel in return for Jordanian control of the Arab populated parts of Palestine.

Mfalme Abdullah alikuwa na Jeshi la Waarabu (Arab Legion), kikosi chenye mafunzo makubwa cha wanajeshi 4,500, huku Jenerali John Glubb, Mwingereza, akiwa kamanda wake. Glubb katika kumbukumbu zake alisimulia kwamba alikuwa chini ya amri kali kutoka kwa Waingereza, kwamba asiingie katika maeneo yaliyo chini ya udhibiti wa Wayahudi.21 Misri ilidhoofisha zaidi shambulio dhidi ya Israeli pale Nakrashi Pasha, Waziri Mkuu, alipokataa mwanzoni kutumia vikosi vya kijeshi vilivyokuwepo, badala yake akatuma jeshi la wajitolea ambalo lilikuwa limeundwa tu mwezi Januari wa mwaka huo. Jordan pia ilichelewesha kupitisha askari wa Iraq kupitia ardhi yake, hivyo kuzuia shambulio lolote dhidi ya Israeli. Ndiyo sababu, Imamu kipofu aliyeletwa kuwaamsha wanajeshi wa Jordan kabla ya vita alimwaibisha Abdullah alipoyasema haya: “Enyi jeshi, natamani mngekuwa wetu!” (akimaanisha kwamba Jeshi la Waarabu lilikuwa la Waingereza).

Mgogoro huu haukuwahi kuwa vita vya ukombozi wa Palestina, bali ulikuwa ni mapambano kati ya Marekani na Uingereza kwa ajili ya kudhibiti Mfereji wa Suez wenye umuhimu mkubwa wa kimkakati.

This conflict was never a war for the liberation of Palestine but rather a struggle between America and Britain for control over the strategically important Suez Canal.

Marekani iliiona Misri kuwa mshirika muhimu ikiwa ilitaka kupata ushawishi katika Mashariki ya Kati. Kupitia CIA, ilijaribu kumwondoa madarakani Mfalme Farouk, aliyeunga mkono Uingereza, kwa mapinduzi ya mwaka 1952, na kuwaweka madarakani Maafisa Huru ambao baadaye wangeongozwa na Gamal Abdul-Nasser. CIA ilifanya kazi katika mradi mwaka 1951.

The US saw Egypt as a critical ally if America was to gain influence in the Middle East. Through the CIA, she moved to depose the Pro-British King Farook in a coup in 1952, bringing into power the Free Officers who were to be led by Gamal Abdul-Nasser. The CIA worked on a project in 1951

known as "The Search for a Moslem Billy Graham." Mike Copeland, the CIA operative, published classified information in his memoirs in 1989, "The Game Player," about the CIA-backed coup d'état that ousted the British puppet King Farook. Copeland, who activated the project, explains that "the CIA needed a charismatic leader who would be able to divert the growing anti-American hostility that was building up in the area." He explains that both the CIA and Nasser were in agreement on Israel. For Nasser, talk of war with Israel was irrelevant. Much more of a priority was the British occupation of the Suez Canal Zone. Nasser's enemy was Britain.

known as “The Search for a Moslem Billy Graham.” Mike Copeland the CIA operative, published classified information in his memoirs in 1989, ‘The Game Player,’ about the CIA backed coup d’etat that ousted the British puppet King Farook. Copeland, who activated the project, explains that ‘the CIA needed a charismatic leader who would be able to divert the growing anti-American hostility that was building up in the area.’ He explains both the CIA and Nasser were in agreement on Israel. For Nasser talk of war with Israel was irrelevant. Much more of a priority was British occupation of the Suez Canal Zone. Nasser’s enemy was Britain.

Mwaka 1956 Nasser alitekeleza matakwa ya Marekani ya kutaifisha Mfereji wa Suez. Jibu la Uingereza lilikuwa kuwavuta Ufaransa na Israel katika mapambano hayo. Hili lilielezwa na mwanahistoria Corelli Barnett, aliyeandika kuhusu Suez katika kitabu chake, ‘The Collapse of British Power’: ‘Ufaransa ilikuwa na uadui na Nasser kwa sababu Misri ilikuwa ikiwasaidia waasi wa Algeria, na ilishikamana na mfereji kwa sababu za kihistoria. Baada ya yote, Mfaransa ndiye aliyeujenga. Israel nayo ilikuwa ikitamani kumshambulia Nasser kwa sababu ya mashambulizi ya fedayeen wa Kipalestina na kizuizi cha Misri katika Mlango-Bahari wa Tiran.

Vita hii ilikuwa tena sehemu nyingine ya mzozo kati ya Waingereza na Waamerika kwa ajili ya kudhibiti eneo hilo.

This war was again another episode in the Anglo-American conflict for control of the region.

Uingereza ilikuwa imepitwa kama nguvu kuu ya eneo hilo miaka 11 kabla, lakini bado ilibakiza ushawishi fulani kupitia mawakala wake nchini Jordan, Syria na Israel. Katika jaribio la kudhoofisha Nasser, Uingereza ilitaka kumvuta Israel ili iilazimishe Misri kuingia vitani, ambapo Israel ingeteka maeneo na kuyatumia kama chombo cha mazungumzo katika makubaliano yoyote ya amani ya baadaye; njia ya kufikia usalama ambao Waisraeli walikuwa wakiutafuta kwa hamu kubwa. Tarehe 5 Juni 1967 Israel ilianzisha shambulio la kuzuia, ikiharibu 60% ya ndege za jeshi la anga la Misri zilizokuwa ardhini na 66% ya ndege za kivita za Syria na Jordan.

Britain had been surpassed as the region's dominant force 11 years earlier, but still retained some influence through its agents in Jordan, Syria and Israel. In an attempt to weaken Nasser, Britain sought to lure Israel to drag Egypt into a war whereby Israel would seize territory and use it as a bargaining tool in any future peace settlement; a means through which to achieve the security which the Israelis so desperately sought. On 5th June 1967 Israel launched a pre-emptive strike destroying 60% of Egypt's grounded air force and 66% of Syrian and Jordanian combat aircraft.

Waisraeli waliuteka Ukingo wa Magharibi na Jerusalem ya mashariki kutoka mikononi mwa Wajordan. Mfalme Hussein, kabla ya vita, alikuwa amewaweka wanajeshi wake katika maeneo tofauti na yale ambako vita vikuu vilikuwa vikifanyika. Ndani ya saa 48 tu Waisraeli waliteka miji mikubwa ya Ukingo wa Magharibi. Kwa namna hiyo hiyo, Waisraeli waliteka Milima ya Golan yenye umuhimu wa kimkakati siku ya sita ya vita. Wanajeshi wa Syria waliokuwa wakiishikilia Milima ya Golan walisikia habari ya Israeli kuteka milima hiyo kupitia redio yao wenyewe ya taifa, licha ya kwamba wanajeshi wa Syria walikuwa wazi wakiishikilia milima hiyo. Israeli pia ilimpiga Nasser wa Marekani kwa kuteka Sharm al Sheikh na kuhakikisha njia ya maji ya Mlango wa Tiran inakuwa salama. Lengo la kudhoofisha utawala wa Nasser lilifikiwa, hivyo kwa njia isiyo ya moja kwa moja likasaidia maslahi ya Uingereza katika eneo hilo. Israeli iliweza kuteka ardhi zaidi na kuitumia kama kitega uchumi katika mazungumzo yoyote ya ardhi kwa amani, jambo ambalo hadi leo bado linatumika kama msingi wa mazungumzo badala ya hali ya mwaka 1948. Umoja wa Mataifa ulianzisha mpango wa kugawanya ardhi mwaka 1947, ambao ulipa Israeli 57% ya eneo, huku Palestina ikibaki na 42% ya ardhi yake ya awali. Katika vita vya mwaka 1967, ukaliaji wa Waisraeli uliongezeka zaidi, kwa kupata maeneo yaliyofikia hadi 78% ya Palestina ya kihistoria.

The Israelis seized the West Bank and east Jerusalem from Jordanian control. King Hussein, prior to the battle, had positioned his troops in different areas from where the main battle was taking place. In a matter of 48 hours the Israelis seized the major West Bank towns. In a similar manner the Israelis seized the strategically important Golan Heights on the 6th day of the war. The Syrian troops occupying the Golan Heights heard news of Israel’s capture of the heights through their own State radio despite the Syrian troops clearly occupying them. Israel also dealt America’s Nasser a blow by capturing Sharm al Sheikh and securing the waterway of the Straits of Tiran. The objective of weakening the regime of Nasser was achieved, thus indirectly aiding British interests within the region. Israel was able to seize more land and use it as a bargaining asset in any land for peace negotiations, which today is still used as a basis for negotiations rather then the status of 1948. The United Nations established the UN Partition plan in 1947, which gave 57% of territory to Israel with Palestine becoming 42% of its former self. In the 1967 war Israeli occupation increased further with its territorial gains of up to 78% of historic Palestine.

Uchunguzi wa vita vya Oktoba 1973, ambavyo Misri na Syria zilivianzisha dhidi ya Israel, unaonyesha kwamba malengo yake yalikuwa machache na kamwe hayakujumuisha ukombozi wa Palestina. Malengo hayo hata hayakujumuisha ukombozi wa Milima ya Golan, ambayo ilipangwa kurejeshwa kama sehemu ya mkataba wa amani kati ya Syria na Israel. Malengo yalikuwa ni kuimarisha nafasi za Anwar Sadat na Hafez al-Assad, ambao walikuwa viongozi wapya kiasi katika nchi zilizokuwa na uwezekano wa mapinduzi ya kijeshi. Sadat hasa alikuwa katika hali ya hatari, kwa kuwa alimrithi Nasser, kiongozi mwenye haiba kubwa.

An examination of the October 1973 war launched by Egypt and Syria against Israel shows that the aims were limited and never included the liberation of Palestine. The aims never even included the liberation of the Golan Heights which were designed to be restored as part of a peace treaty between Syria and Israel. The aims were to solidify the positions of Anwar Sadat and Hafez al-Assad who were relatively new leaders in countries prone to military coups. Sadat in particular was vulnerable given the fact that he had succeeded the charismatic Nasser.

Mohammed Heikal, mhariri mashuhuri wa gazeti la Al Ahram kuanzia mwaka 1957 hadi 1974, ambaye alishuhudia vita hivyo, alieleza kwa kina nia za msingi za Anwar Sadat katika kitabu chake ‘The Road to Ramadhan’, ambamo ananukuu hali ya akili ya Sadat katika siku zilizotangulia vita. Heikal ananukuu mmoja wa majenerali wa Sadat, Mohammed Fouwzi, ambaye alitoa mfano wa samurai anayechomoa panga mbili, moja refu na moja fupi, kujiandaa kwa vita. Fouwzi alisema kwamba vita hivyo vingekuwa kama panga fupi, kuashiria vita vya kikomo kwa sababu fulani mahususi.

Mohammed Heikal the respected editor of Al Ahram from 1957 – 1974, who witnessed the war, explained the extent of Anwar Sadat’s underlying motives in his book ‘The Road to Ramadhan’ where he cites Sadat’s mood in the run up to the war. Heikal quotes one of Sadat’s generals, Mohammed Fouwzi who gave the analogy of a samurai drawing two swords - a long one and short one in preparation for battle. Fouwzi said that this battle would be a case of the short sword, signifying a limited battle for certain motives.

Anwar Sadat hakuwa na nia ya kuendesha vita vya ukombozi vya muda mrefu dhidi ya Israel. Ndiyo sababu alitafuta amani na Israel wakati alipokuwa katika nafasi ya ushindi katika vita hivyo. Katika saa 24 za kwanza za vita, Misri ilivunja ngome za Bar-Lev za Israel, zilizosifiwa sana, mashariki ya Mfereji wa Suez, ikipoteza watu 68 tu. Wakati huo huo, mgawanyiko 2 wa Syria na mizinga 500 ziliingia katika Milima ya Golan na kurejesha baadhi ya ardhi iliyotekwa mwaka 1967. Katika siku mbili za mapigano, Israel ilikuwa imepoteza ndege 49 na mizinga 500. Katikati ya hali hii, Sadat alituma ujumbe kwa Katibu wa Mambo ya Nje wa Marekani, Henry Kissinger, ambamo alisema kuwa lengo la vita hivyo lilikuwa "kupata amani Mashariki ya Kati na si suluhu za sehemu." Ujumbe huo uliendelea kueleza kwamba, endapo Israel ingeondoka katika maeneo yote yaliyokaliwa, Misri ingekuwa tayari kushiriki katika mkutano wa amani chini ya usimamizi wa Umoja wa Mataifa au wa upande wa tatu usioegemea upande wowote. Hivyo, licha ya kuwa na faida kubwa ya kimkakati, Sadat alikuwa tayari kwa mazungumzo katika hatua ya mapema kama hiyo. Kukataa kwa Sadat kutumia faida yake ya awali kikamilifu, na kuchelewa kwake kuanzisha mashambulizi ya pili ya Sinai, kuliruhusu Israel kujipanga upya, kwa msaada kutoka Marekani, na ikaanza kurejesha ardhi iliyopotea. Mapigano yalisitishwa rasmi tarehe 25 Oktoba 1974.