The four Great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far greater import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 [Palestine] Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land. (Arthur James Balfour, cited in Nutting 2013)

Zionist settler-colonialism is at the heart of the conflict in Palestine; settler-colonialism is a structure not an episode (Wolfe 2006). Zionist settler-colonialism is deeply rooted in European colonialism. Ignoring the existence and rights of indigenous peoples, British colonialists often saw large parts of the earth as terra nullius, ‘nobody’s land’. This (originally Roman legal) expression was used to describe territory which was not subject to the sovereignty of any European state – sovereignty over territory which is terra nullius may be acquired through occupation and/ or settler-colonisation.

When in the late 19th century European ‘Zionism nationalism’ arose as a political force calling for the settler-colonisation of Palestine and the ‘gathering of all Jews’, little attention was paid to the fact that Palestine was already populated. Indeed, the Basel Programme adopted at the First Zionist Congress, which launched political Zionism in 1897, made no mention of a Palestinian indigenous population when it spelled out the movement’s objective: ‘the establishment of a publicly and legally secured home in Palestine for the Jewish people’.

Moreover, in the early years of their efforts to secure support for their enterprise, the Zionists propagated in the West the racist myth of ‘a land without a people for a people without a land’, a slogan popularised by Israel Zangwill, a prominent Anglo-Jewish writer often quoted in the British press as a spokesman for Zionism and one of the earliest organisers of the Zionist movement in Britain. Even as late as 1914, Chaim Weizmann, who was to become the first President of Israel and who, along with Theodor Herzl and David Ben-Gurion, was one of the three men most responsible for turning the Zionist dream into reality, stated:

In its initial stage, Zionism was conceived by its pioneers as a movement wholly depending on mechanical factors: there is a country which happens to be called Palestine, a country without a people, and, on the other hand, there exists the Jewish people, and it has no country. What else is necessary, then, than to fit the gem into the ring, to unite this people with this country? The owners of the country [the Turks] must, therefore, be persuaded and convinced that this marriage is advantageous, not only for the [Jewish] people and for the country, but also for themselves.1

Neither Zangwill nor Weizmann intended these demographic assessments in a literal fashion. They did not mean that there were no people in Palestine, but that there were no people worth considering within the framework of the notions of racist European supremacy that then held sway. In this connection, a comment by Weizmann to Arthur Ruppin, the head of the colonisation department of the Jewish Agency, is particularly revealing.

When asked by Ruppin about the indigenous Palestinian Arabs, Weizmann replied: ‘The British told us that there are there some hundred thousand niggers [Hebrew: kushim, negroes] and for those there is no value.’2

In the English language, the word nigger is a White racist slur directed at Black and African people. Its derogatory connotations echo another pejorative English word, philistine, which White Britain borrowed from biblical prejudices and popularised in daily parlance. However, in the White racist colonial culture within which Weizmann and co. operated, the reference to the indigenous people of Palestine as nigger would have been instinctive and natural. Echoing Weizmann’s demographic racism and Shaftesbury’s biblical Orientalism, Zangwill himself spelled out the actual meaning of his slogan with admirable clarity in 1920:

If Lord Shaftesbury was literally inexact in describing Palestine as a country without a people, he was essentially correct, for there is no Arab people living in intimate fusion with the country, utilising its resources and stamping it with a characteristic impress: there is at best an Arab encampment. (Zangwill 1920: 104; see also Kamel 2015)

The interplay between British domestic and imperial considerations, Jewish Zionist lobbyists (especially Chaim Weizmann, 1874‒1952) and Christian Zionist prophetic politics would lead to the Balfour Declaration of 1917 which promised a ‘Jewish homeland’ in Palestine (Anderson, I. 2005: 1, 57‒58). Then an imperial world power, Britain gave sanction for the first time to the Zionist campaign for possession of Palestine. This highly controversial document, dated 2 November, was issued by Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour (later Lord Balfour), in the form of a letter to a prominent British Jewish supporter of the Zionist movement, Lionel Walter (Lord) Rothschild, declaring British support for political Zionism:

Her Majesty’s Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done to prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. (Quoted in Said 1980: 3)

Although the Zionist Jewish movement had already initiated a series of international congresses and established small Jewish colonies in the early 20th century Palestine, it was the sponsorship of Zionism by the leading imperial power of the age that would transform the Zionist project into a major European settler-colonial project in Palestine.

Balfour’s legacy became inseparable from the pro-Zionist Declaration he issued in 1917. The reasons for the declaration were complex. Balfour’s brand of Christian Zionism was driven by a great deal of Judeophobia, hyped perceptions of ‘Zionist Jewish power’ and of fears of mass immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe to Britain. As Prime Minister, Balfour had passed the 1905 Aliens Act, the main object of which was to restrict the entry into Britain of Jews from Eastern Europe. Brian Klug put it rather sceptically: ‘Keeping Jews out of Britain and packing them off to Palestine were just two sides of the same antisemitic coin’.3 Here Zionist historians often chose to ignore the distinction between drivers/motives and justification and seize upon Balfour’s own post-war Christian Zionist rhetoric to justify his Declaration. Yet Balfour’s strategic and nationalist domestic motives and concerns, especially his well-documented efforts and policies to stop the influx of Eastern European Jewry into the UK, must be taken into consideration in any attempt to assess the motives behind the Declaration as well as the long-term catastrophic consequences for Palestine of that Balfour commitment.

The religio-political roots of this British pro-Zionist commitment go all the way back to the Protestant Christian Zionist lobby which was established in London in the 1830s by Lord Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper; 1801‒1885). Shaftesbury came from the British aristocratic ruling elite and was for decades at the heart of the Victorian establishment. He also became well known for advocating socially reformist policies at the height of the Victorian era. Shaftesbury was a Tory member of the Commons, and later a member of the Lords, the upper house of Parliament in the United Kingdom. He was the nephew-in-law of Lord Melbourne (Prime Minister through most of the period from 1834 to 1841), and the stepson-in-law of Lord Palmerston (Foreign Minister for most of the 1840s and early 1850s, and then Prime Minister for most of the period 1855‒1865) (Merkley 1998:

13). Palmerston (1784–1865) served twice as Prime Minister in the mid-19th century. For most of 1830 to 1865 he dominated British foreign policy when Britain was at the height of its imperialist power. Shaftesbury was offered positions of power by successive British governments, Palmerston encouraged and financially supported him and both men were instrumental in the establishment of the British Consulate in Jerusalem in 1838 – a Consulate which in the 19th century was dominated by Christian Zionists and was at the centre of British imperial schemes which led to the Balfour policy in Palestine (Schölch 1992).

In particular, crusading Protestant Christian Zionist Shaftesbury was the most ardent propagator and lobbyist of the restoration of ‘God’s ancient people’, as he styled the Jews (Tuchman 1982). He and the influential circle he dominated were under the influence of the ‘End of Times’ prophetic politics – evangelising politics based on the Old Testament’s Book of Daniel – which they believed would be fulfilled by the ‘literal return’ and ‘Restoration’ of the Jews to Palestine. As the demise of the Ottoman Empire appeared to be approaching, the Protestant advocacy of ‘Jewish restorationism’ and settler-colonisation of Palestine increased in the UK and was seen as highly beneficial to the expanding British Empire in the Middle East. In the mid-to-late 19th century Shaftesbury led the British Christian Zionist lobby which included establishment figures such as Lord Lindsay (Crawford 1847: 71), Lord Manchester, George Eliot, Holman Hunt and Hall Caine.

Epitomising Victorian Protestant imperialism, Bible-bashing Shaftesbury was also a myth-maker. He pushed zealously the myth of ubiquitous and perennial Jewish diaspora longing to ‘return’, and on 4 November 1840

he placed an advertisement in the Times (London):

RESTORATION OF THE JEWS: A memorandum has been addressed to the Protestant monarchs of Europe on the subject of the restoration of the Jewish people to the land of Palestine. The document in question, dictated by a peculiar conjunction of affairs in the East, and other striking ‘signs of the times’, reverts to the original covenant which secures that land to the [Jewish] descendant of Abraham. (Quoted in Wagner 1995: 91)

Shaftesbury was directly responsible for the propagandistic slogan ‘A country without a nation for a nation without a country’,4 later to be become a key Zionist Jewish myth: ‘A land without a people for a people without a land’ (Masalha 1997; Hyamson 1950: 10, 12; Kamel 2015).

Assessing the significance of his lobbying efforts on the fortunes of the Protestant Zionist movement in Britain, Donald Wagner writes:

One cannot overstate the influence of Lord Shaftesbury on the British political elites, church leaders, and the average Christian layperson. His efforts and religious political thought may have set the tone for England’s colonial approach to the Near East and in particular the holy land during the next one hundred years. He singularly translated the theological positions of Brightman, Henry Finch, and John Nelson Darby [the father of modern premillennial dispensationalism]:5 see below]5 into a political strategy. His high political connections, matched by his uncanny instincts, combined to advance the Christian Zionist vision. (Wagner 1995: 92)

In 1880 F. Laurence Oliphant (1829‒1888), MP, novelist and evangelical Christian, a follower of Shaftesbury, published a book entitled The Land of Gilead (named after the biblical ‘land of Gilead’),6 in which he presented a plan of ‘Jewish restoration’ and a detailed project for Jewish settlement east of the River Jordan. He urged the British parliament to assist Jewish immigration from Russia and Eastern Europe to Palestine. Not surprisingly he also advocated that indigenous Palestinian Arabs be removed to reservations like those of the indigenous inhabitants of North America7

(Sharif 1983: 68), or hinting at the Bantustan ideology later developed by South Africa (Sharif 1983: 68; Wagner 1995: 93).

A combination of Protestant religious and imperialist considerations drove some Britons to produce Christian Zionist novels, to set up exploration societies and to advocate the ‘restoration of the Jews to Palestine’ in public and in private.8 Furthermore, a succession of archaeological discoveries in the Near East, military adventurism and the growing number of travelogues fired the imagination of Protestant missionaries, European officials and Arabist scholars and led to the direct involvement European powers in the Holy Land (Shepherd 1987; Osband 1989). This European obsession with the archaeological past was marked by a decided contempt for the indigenous people of Palestine and life in modern Palestinian villages and towns At the height of the British Empire and the Victorian era prophetic politics of ‘biblical restorationism’ went hand in hand with increasing British colonial involvement in the ‘Orient’. The Holy Land in the 19th century was an attractive target for several European nations which were flexing their colonial muscles around the globe. The region was ready for Western penetration, particularly while the Ottoman Empire was showing signs of political and economic disintegration. The race for a European national presence and colonial commercial interests in the East, and in the Holy Land in particular, was masked by scholarly activities and Oriental Studies (Said 1978). Coinciding with the European ‘scramble for Palestine’, various sectors of the Western academy, and most of the Western Christian churches, displayed an increasing interest in Palestine. Invariably foreign interest took the form of establishing Christian institutions – the Ottoman reforms after the Crimean War (1853‒1856) granted equal rights, including property rights, to non-Muslims – thereby uniting Christian missionary endeavour with national influence. The interests of God and country ran in parallel. The British moved early,9 and were soon emulated by the Russians,10

Germans,11 Austrians (Wrba 1996) and others, marking the beginning of extensive Western influence in Palestine, an influence which the Ottomans feared might be a prelude to attempting to recover Palestine as a Christian state.12 Such was the degree of Western penetration that the Austrian consul, the Count de Caboga, reported in 1880 that Jerusalem had become a European city, and Captain (later General Sir) Charles Warren (1840‒1927) of the British Royal Engineers and one of the key officers of the British Palestine Exploration Fund, who was sent to map the Old Testament topography of Jerusalem and investigate ‘the site of the temple’, noted: ‘[British] King Consul [James Finn] rules supreme, not over the natives of the city, but over strangers; but yet these strangers for the most part are the rightful owners, the natives, for the most part, are usurpers’ (Shepherd 1987: 127‒128).

Protestant Zionists and British imperialists believed that a ‘Jewish Palestine’ would be convenient for a British protectorate there along the main route to India. From the late 19th century to the middle of the 20th century three famous British prime ministers were closely associated with ‘Gentile Zionism’ in Britain: Benjamin Disraeli (1804‒1881), who was successful in securing for imperial Britain control of the Suez Canal, David Lloyd George (1863‒1945), whose government issued the Balfour Declaration of 1917, and Sir Winston Churchill, who for nearly half a century in and out of office was devoted to political Zionism and the British Empire (Sykes 1973: 45, 52, 207). Both Disraeli and Lloyd George were fascinated by the theories of amalgamation or affinity between Christianity and Judaism (Anderson, I.

2005: 60). Lloyd George, a Protestant Zionist, was once quoted as saying:

‘I was taught far more history about the Jews than about the history of my own people’ (quoted by Stein 1961: 142); and Disraeli was baptised a Protestant, but he remained fascinated by his Jewish background. Describing Protestant Christianity as ‘completed Judaism’, he – like many Christian Zionists – delighted in describing himself as the ‘missing page’ between the Old and New Testaments (Johnson, P. 1993: 324). Disraeli’s civilising Christian imperialism combined patronising attitudes towards the Jews with imperialist foreign policies towards the Middle East, policies which he justified by invoking paternalistic and racist theories which saw imperialism as a manifestation of what Britain’s imperial poet, Rudyard Kipling, would refer to as ‘the white man’s burden’.13

For centuries, and for more than eighty years of political Zionism, the Palestinian Arabs were an absolute majority in Palestine. Balfour was fully aware of this fact when, on 11 August 1919, he frankly expressed his typically colonialist views and wrote:

Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land … The idea of planting a [European] minority of outsiders upon an indigenous majority population, without consulting it, was not calculated to horrify men who had worked with Cecil Rhodes or promoted European settlement in Kenya. (Quoted in Talmon 1965: 248, 250)

In 1925 Balfour visited Palestine and was a key guest of honour at the opening of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He was greeted enthusiastically by the leadership of the small European Zionist Yishuv (settlement)

in Palestine, while the majority of indigenous inhabitants of Palestine welcomed him with black flags.

The key to understanding the contribution of Britain to the Palestinian Nakba (catastrophe) of the mid-20th century lies in the intensity with which some British Christian restorationists embraced the project of a ‘Jewish homeland’in Palestine; the way in which the Bible and ‘divine rights and divine promises’ were seen by the likes of British Prime Minister Lloyd George and his Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour (who issued the Balfour Declaration); and generally the extraordinary appeal political Zionism had in the West. Although the Balfour Declaration was partly motivated by First World War calculations, it was not issued in an ideological vacuum. Its content reflected the Christian Zionist prophetic politics which became deeply rooted in 19th century imperialist Protestant Britain (Verete 1970).14 This all meant that, from the beginning, the reality of Palestine and the Palestinians lay outside Western and Zionist representations of the ‘Jewish homeland’ in Palestine.

Furthermore, as Edward Said argued, the ‘site of the Zionist struggle was only partially in Palestine’; the crucial site of the Zionist struggle remained until 1948 in the capital cities in the West, while the reality of Palestine and ‘the native resistance to the Zionists was either played down or ignored in the West’ (Said 1980: 22‒23). By removing the struggle from the Middle East, the Palestinians (and Arabs) were prevented from representing themselves, and were deemed incapable of doing so: ‘[T]hey cannot represent themselves; they must be represented’ (quoted in Said 1980).15 In making the Zionist movement attractive to Western audiences, its leaders not only denied the existence of the Arabic-speaking people of Palestine; they represented the Arabs to the West as something that could be understood and managed in specific ways. Between Zionism and the West there was and still is a community of language and of ideology; Arabs were not part of this community. To a very great extent this community depends on a tradition in the West of enmity towards Islam in particular and the Orient in general (Said 1979: 25‒26). A major success of the Christian and Jewish Zionists has been their ability to occupy the space from which they were all to represent and explain the Arabs to the West:

[The] Zionists took it upon themselves as a partially ‘Eastern’ people who had emancipated themselves from the worst Eastern excesses, to explain the Oriental Arabs to the West, to assume responsibility for expressing what the Arabs were really like and about, never to let the Arabs appear equally with them as existing in Palestine. This method allowed Zionism always to seem both involved in and superior to the native realties of Middle Eastern existence. (Said 1980: 26)

Despite such Christian and Jewish Zionist statements, however, the Zionist leaders from the outset were well aware that not only were there people on the land, but that people were there in large numbers. Zangwill, who had visited Palestine in 1897 and come face to face with the demographic reality, acknowledged in 1905 in a speech to a Zionist group in Manchester that ‘Palestine proper has already its inhabitants. The pashalik of Jerusalem is already twice as thickly populated as the United States, having fifty-two souls to the square mile, and not 25 percent of them Jews’ (Zangwill 1937: 210). Abundant references to the Palestinian population in early Zionist texts show clearly that from the beginning of Zionist settlement in Palestine, which Zionist historiography dates to the arrival of the members of the Russian Bilu Society in 1882, the Palestinian Arabs were far from being an ‘unseen’ or ‘hidden’ presence. Moreover, recent studies have shown that Zionist leaders were concerned with what they termed the ‘Arab problem’ (Hebrew: Habe’ayah Ha’arvit) or the ‘Arab Question’ (Hebrew:

Hashelah Ha’arvit). As seen in their writings, the attitudes prevailing among the majority of the Zionist groups and settlers concerning the indigenous Palestinian population ranged from indifference and disregard to patronising superiority. A typical example can be found in the works of Moshe Smilansky, a Zionist writer and Labour leader who immigrated to Palestine in 1890:

Let us not be too familiar with the Arab fellahin lest our children adopt their ways and learn from their ugly deeds. Let all those who are loyal to the Torah avoid ugliness and that which resembles it and keep their distance from the fellahin and their base attributes.

There were, certainly, those who took exception to such attitudes.

Ahad Ha’Am (Asher Zvi Ginzberg), a liberal Russian Jewish thinker who visited Palestine in 1891, published a series of articles in the Hebrew periodical Hamelitz that were sharply critical of the ethnocentricity of political Zionism as well as the exploitation of Palestinian peasantry by Zionist settlercolonists.

Ahad Ha’Am, who sought to draw attention to the fact that Palestine was not an empty territory and that the presence of another people on the land posed problems, observed that the Zionist ‘pioneers’ believed that the only language that the Arabs understand is that of force ... [They] behave towards the Arabs with hostility and cruelty, trespass unjustly upon their boundaries, beat them shamefully without reason and even brag about it, and nobody stands to check this contemptible and dangerous tendency. (Cited in Masalha 1992: 7)

He cut to the heart of the matter when he ventured that the colonists’ aggressive attitude towards the native peasants stemmed from their anger ‘towards those who reminded them that there is still another people in the land of Israel that have been living there and does not intend to leave’.

Another early settler, Yitzhak Epstein, who arrived in Palestine from Russia in 1886, warned not only of the moral implications of Zionist colonisation but also of the political dangers inherent in the enterprise. In 1907, at a time when Zionist land purchases in the Galilee were stirring opposition among Palestinian peasants forced off land sold by absentee landlords, Epstein wrote a controversial article entitled ‘The Hidden Question’, in which he strongly criticised the methods by which Zionists had purchased Arab land. In his view, these methods entailing dispossession of Arab farmers were bound to cause political confrontation in the future.

Reflected in the Zionist establishment’s angry response to Epstein’s article are two principal features of mainstream Zionist thought: the belief that Jewish acquisition of land took precedence over moral considerations, and the advocacy of a separatist and exclusionist Yishuv (colony) in Palestine.

Following in the footsteps of European settler-colonialists, before the First World War some Zionist leaders (notably Theodor Herzl in his Zionist novel Altneuland), conceived the reality of Palestine, and the material benefits European Jewish colonisation would bring to Palestine, to be similar to the supremacist ideology of the ‘white man’s burden’. During the Mandatory period, however, it became clear to the Zionist leadership that a systematic dislocation and ‘transfer’ of the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine was the conditio sine qua non of the Zionist enterprise (Wiemer 1983: 26; Masalha 1992).

In his seminal work, Orientalism (1978), Edward W. Said subjected Western ‘Oriental Studies’ to a devastating critique and exposed the underlying presumptions of the discipline. He also concluded that Biblical Studies were part of and an extension of the Western Orientalist discourse, which had been constructed without any ‘Oriental’/Arab/Muslim reader in view. For Said, in this biblical Orientalist discourse the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine were presented as incapable of unified action and national consciousness. The biblical scholars, following in the footsteps of the Western Orientalists, concentrated on historical and archaeological questions. In The Question of Palestine, which came out two years after Orientalism, Said also tried to explain the erasure of Palestinians from history. For him, the deletion of the reality of Palestine centred on three key issues: first, understanding the representation of Palestine, the Palestinians and Islam in the West: Said’s book Covering Islam (1981) should be treated as part of a trilogy which includes Orientalism (1978) and The Question of Palestine (Said 1980; Ashcroft and Ahluwalia 2001: 125). For Said, the representations of Islam in the West are an important part of the question of Palestine because they are used to silence the Palestinians, the majority of whom are Muslims (Said 1980; Ashcroft and Ahluwalia 2001: 128); second, understanding the ‘contest between an affirmation and a denial’; third, understanding Western Orientalist attitudes towards Arabs and Islam; Western racial prejudices, and especially the Western narrative of a contest between the ‘civilising’ forces of the Zionist European settlers and the ‘uncivilised’, ‘treacherous’ and degenerate Oriental Arabs (Said 1980: 25‒28). This biblically framed discourse entails (a) the shaping of history, ‘so that this history now appears to confirm the validity of Zionist claims to Palestine, thereby denigrating Palestinians claims’ (Said 1980: 8), and (b) the Zionist legitimisation of Zionist settler-colonisation in Palestine, a process that did not end with the creation of Israel in 1948.